HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2007

HASHIMI HABIB HALIM v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

Related cases with same parties

  • CACC526/2001HKSAR v.HASHIMI HABIB HALIM
  • CACC760/1980DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION v. CHU SHIU-FAT
  • CACV100/2007BUTT, AZIZ AKBAR v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV103/2015BH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV104/2021TAMANG MINITA v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV1077/2001DURGA MAYA GURUNG v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV112/2018LUBIANO NANCY ALMORIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV117/2016QT v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV118/1997CONG VAN HA and Others v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV119/2007CHU WOAN-CHYI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV12/2018RAM CHANDER v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV12/2022SHAHIN, alias SHAHIN SEKH, alias KHAN SUJAN, alias WASHIM, alias SHAK SHAHIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV134/2015BH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV149/2016DEMBELE, SALIFOU AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV163/1992LI JIN FEI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV164/1992YAN CHEN CHANG MEI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV164/1993LE TU PHUONG AND ANOTHER v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV173/1992PAN ZE YAN ABLE AND ANOTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV187/2017NOWODZELSKI, STACEY ALAN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV197/2006LAM KHIET PHUNG v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

Files (2)

73791-EN-2010-11-12

HASHIMI HABIB HALIM v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 139/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 139 OF 2007

____________

BETWEEN

 HASHIMI HABIB HALIMApplicant

and

 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent
____________

Before: Hon Saunders J in Court

Date of Hearing: 9 September 2010

Date of Judgment: 12 November 2010

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Background:

1.  The factual background to these proceedings is set out in paragraphs 12-22 of the judgment delivered by me on 15 October 2008.  In that judgment I held that Mr Hashimi’s detention was unlawful, and I ordered that he be released on recognizance with the remaining aspects of the application for judicial review being adjourned sine die with liberty to apply.

2.  The particular decision now under challenge was dealt with in paragraph 22 of that judgment in the following terms:

“On 13 February 2007, a removal order was made in respect of Mr Hashimi under s 19(1)(b) of the (Immigration) Ordinance (Cap 115) upon the ground that he had landed in Hong Kong unlawfully. On the same day he was detained pending removal pursuant to s 32(3A) of the Ordinance. That subsection provides:

“A person in respect of whom a removal order under section 19(1)(b) is in force may be detained under the authority of the Director of Immigration, the Deputy Director of immigration or any assistant director of immigration pending his removal from Hong Kong under section 25.”

Section 25 provides the machinery by which a removal order under s 19 is carried out.  There is no evidence that a deportation order was ever made.  Nothing turns on that fact.”

3.  By consent, on 15 April 2010, I directed that the application by Mr Hashimi for an order of certiorari challenging the validity of the removal order be set down for argument.  That argument was heard on 9 September 2010.

4.  In his Form 86A setting up the grounds of challenge the following assertions were made, (these are not verbatim, except where indicated, as the grounds were “home-made”, but reflect the essence of the assertions:

(1)    The statutory period of 24 hours provided under section 19 (5) of the Ordinance for the subject of a Notice of Removal Order to take the requisite steps to appeal against the Removal Order is somehow “tailored to be such to put the detainee at a disadvantage, maximising his chances of failure, compounded by denial of any legal assistance in the course to assure desired objectives”, so as to “amount to an act of impropriety” (sic).

(2)    The Immigration Tribunal’s determination of the Applicant’s appeal in his absence and in the absence of legal assistance to him was reached “unreasonably”.

5.  Mr Wilson Chan does not pursue these grounds, sensibly for they are manifestly bad.  Instead the following arguments are raised, as correctly summarised by Mr Abraham Chan:

(1)    the Removal Order is invalid as the Notice of Removal Order and Right to Appeal dated 15 February 2007 did not specify any country to which Mr Hashimi would be removed: (the Specified Country Argument);

(2)    having decided against making a Deportation Order under s 20 of the Ordinance, the Director has acted “irrationally” by making a Removal Order under s 19(1)(b) of the Ordinance: (the Irrationality Argument);

(3)    the “uncertainty” regarding Mr Hashimi’s nationality and the Director’s inability to name a ‘specified country’ to which Mr Hashimi could be removed under s 25 of Ordinance were material factors which the Director failed to consider when exercising his discretion to make the Removal Order: (the Uncertainty Argument):

(4)    the “position prevailing” at the time of this adjourned hearing is that removal from Hong Kong is no longer a real possibility such that the removal order should not be left hanging over the head of Mr Hashimi: (the Prevailing Position argument);

(5)    there are “real doubts” as to the lawfulness of the Removal Order, since this was made for the alleged ulterior motive that “without an order being made on that day, the power to detain Mr Hashimi under s 32(2A)(c) of the Ordinance would expire”: (the Ulterior Motive Argument).

6.  Mr Abraham Chan quite rightly points out that none of these arguments were contained or even foreshadowed in the Amended Form 86A, and that there is no application for leave to amend.  He invited me to refuse leave to amend if it were sought.  Mr Abraham Chan is quite right when he says that it is now firmly established that a late attempt to widen the scope of judicial review proceedings should rarely be acceded to: Wise Union Industries Ltd v Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks Corp, (unreported HCAL 12/2009, 21 September 2009) and Lau Kong Yung v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 300 per Litton PJ at 340.

7.  While that is entirely right, I had regard to the fact that at the time Mr Hashimi filed his amended Form 86A he did not have the benefit of legal advice.  In circumstances where the liberty of a citizen is at stake, or where a person faces removal from Hong Kong, I am of the view that it is open to the court to take a more liberal view of the position and not to strictly apply time limits against an applicant.  I accordingly allowed the arguments to be made.

The Specified Country Argument:

8.  It is important to remember that there are three stages in the removal of the person under the Ordinance.  First, a removal order is made pursuant to s 19(1).  That is the decision that is under challenge in these proceedings.  Second, notice of that removal order is given to the subject informing him of the ground on which the order is made and his right of appeal: see s 19(5).  Third, the physical steps to effect that removal are taken under s 25.  In so far as a specified country can be named when the actual removal comes to be effected under s 25, it will be necessary to fulfil the requirements of that section.

9.  The contention that upon making the removal order under s 19(1) a particular country must be specified cannot succeed. First, there is no requirement in s 19 that a country must be specified. Second, I accept Mr Abraham Chan’s submission that the argument leads to an absurd result.  If the Director is sure that the person has unlawfully landed in Hong Kong, and hence a removal order is justified pursuant to s 19(1)(b), but that person has refused to say where he comes from, or has otherwise been uncooperative in that respect, then it will be impossible for the Director to specify a country to which the person may be removed.  That simply cannot be right.

10.  The absurdity of the situation is graphically illustrated by the present case where Mr Hashimi has adopted the various positions in respect of his nationality.  On 19 September 2006, in opposing deportation on grounds of questionable nationality, he was only prepared to say that he had no claim to Bangladeshi nationality.  At that time he did not assert any other nationality.

11.  On 14 November 2006, having asserted on 31 October 2006 that he was “Indian by birth and in heart and I just endeavoured to stick to my roots that I am an Indian”, he refused to fill in a form to apply for an Indian passport.  On 2 February 2007, he refused to answer questions as to whether he was Bangladeshi or Indian, and on 3 February 2007, insisted that he was Indian.

12.  He is unable to assert that he is a stateless person, as the position of the Consulate General of India is that it has been unable to confirm its final position on his citizenship claim.  The Consulate General seeks supporting documents to substantiate the citizenship claim, which Mr Hashimi has not yet provided.  Mr Hashimi described his position in his Torture Convention Questionnaire in the following terms:

“...in future the I cannot speculate about nor I can rule out details of (additional documents shedding light on my status)..... if any it would take considerable time due to long absence from the respective countries such as India and Pakistan.” (sic)

13.  Finally, I have regard to the following passage from the decision of the Court of Appeal in A (Torture Claimant) v Director of Immigration [2008] 4 HKLRD 752 at §21:

“We agree with Mr. Chow that while the making of the removal or deportation order (we use the terms interchangeably) has the immediate effect of requiring the person who is subject to the order to leave Hong Kong, it does not require that person to go to any particular country. Nor does it oblige the Director of Immigration (the Director) to immediately send that person to any particular country.”

As Mr Abraham Chan put it, the passage, cited for Mr Hashimi is critically against him.

14.  I accordingly reject the Specified Country argument.

The Irrationality Argument:

15.  The submission made is that it is irrational for the Director, having abandoned the intention to make a deportation order under s 20 of the Ordinance, to then make a removal order under s 19, several months later.

16.  Mr Wilson Chan acknowledges that the criteria for making a deportation order were undoubtedly satisfied.  The evidence does not establish, (because the ground was not advanced at the time the Director filed his affidavits), precisely why a removal order was made and a deportation order was not made.  But it is plain that so long as the Director has followed proper procedures, the issue in these proceedings, it was open to the Director to make either a deportation order or a removal order.

17.  The submission of irrationality, made without the support of either authority or useful argument, proceeds upon what Mr Abraham Chan correctly described as a glaring non-sequitur.  Simply because a decision is made by the Director not to have recourse to a s 20 deportation order, it does not follow that there is no rational basis for relying on a separate substantive provision, a s 19 removal order, some months later.  Mr Wilson Chan did not attempt to support the submission with argument other than to assert the submission.  For the reasons advanced by Mr Abraham Chan the submission is fundamentally flawed.

18.  I reject the Irrationality Argument.

The Uncertainty Argument:

19.  If there can be no duty upon the Director to specify a particular country at the time the removal order is made, then plainly any uncertainty as to which country a person might be removed at the time of the making removal order must be irrelevant.  That alone is sufficient to deal with the argument.

20.  The removal order was made on 13 February 2007. Already at that time it was plain that there were questions about Mr Hashimi’s nationality which was consequently uncertain.  His conduct prior to the making of the removal order is set out in paragraph 10-11 above.  That conduct must inevitably have placed the issue of Mr Hashimi’s nationality in the mind of the decision maker when making the removal order.  Plainly, the decision maker would have been aware that Mr Hashimi’s nationality was uncertain.

21.  In those circumstances I accept Mr Abraham Chan’s submission that reliance upon the judgment in Yin Xiang-jiang v Director of Immigration [1994] 2 HKLR 101 is entirely misplaced.  First, the court in that case was not considering a removal order.  Second, the court was only concerned with the question of leave to apply for judicial review and was examining only potential arguments.  Third, and most importantly, there was evidence in the case that the decision maker had deliberately shut his mind to any consideration based on the nationality, or absence of nationality, of the applicants in that case.  The evidence in Mr Hashimi’s case is completely to the contrary.

22.  Finally, there is no obligation upon the Director to consider matters beyond those expressly identified in s 19, see Yu Ah Wing v Director of Immigration [2000] 1 HKLRD 365.  There being no express requirement in s 19 to specify a particular country to which a person might ultimately be removed, there can be no requirement on the Director to place weight on that consideration at the time the removal order is made.

23.  I accordingly reject the Uncertainty Argument.

The Prevailing Position Argument:

24.  It is argued for Mr Hashimi that in considering the validity of the removal order, and whether or not it should remain in force, the court should take into account the position prevailing at the time of the hearing, September 2010, and that it would not be right or fair for the removal order to be hanging over the head of Mr Hashimi indefinitely.

25.  I accept Mr Abraham Chan’s submission that the orthodox judicial review grounds of unlawfulness and irrationality depend necessarily on an evaluation of the situation prevailing at the time of the decision: see Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook, 5th Edn, at 31.2.

26.  The reliance of Mr Wilson Chan upon three paragraphs in the decision of Reyes J in Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security (unreported, HCAL 77/2008, 5 May 2009), is misplaced for the reasons advanced by Mr Abraham Chan.  The material question in that case was not one of the validity of the decision-making or the reasoning process leading to a deportation order, but the constitutionality of the order in itself.  The difference is crucial, because where questions of constitutionality and fundamental rights are raised, the focus is not on the decision-making process, but simply on whether the applicant’s rights have been violated: see R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100 and Belfast City Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 1420.

27.  There is no argument in the present case that the removal order is incompatible with any of Mr Hashimi’s fundamental rights.

28.  As part of this argument it is said that it is not fair for the order to be hanging over the head of Mr Hashimi indefinitely. There is no challenge, indeed there can be no challenge, to the merits of the order that has been made.  The challenge can only be one to procedure.  If the removal order is to be set aside, presumably leaving it open to the Director, ultimately when Mr Hashimi’s nationality is established, to issue a new removal order, it would be open to Mr Hashimi to say that there being no removal order, he had a reasonable expectation that he would not be removed.  That would be a quite false expectation, but one which, in the absence of a removal order, would be open to argument.

29.  It would be quite irrational to set aside an entirely justified removal order simply because there will be a period of time, presently unascertainable, before which that removal may be effected.  It is right that in that sense the order constitutes a sword of Damocles, but that is a situation that arises not through the acts of the Director, but as a consequence of Mr Hashimi entering Hong Kong illegally, and committing a serious offence, in circumstances where he is unable to establish his nationality.  It certainly does not provide a basis upon which the order ought to be set aside.

30.  I accordingly reject the Prevailing Position Argument.

The Ulterior Motive Argument:

31.  The submission made by Mr Wilson Chan was that “there are real doubts as to whether the Removal Order was lawfully made in the first place.”

32.  The submission seems to be based on an argument that, Mr Hashimi not having been notified of the removal order until two days after it was made on 15 February 2007, the requirement in s 19(5) that written notice of the order be served on the person “as soon as is practicable”, has not been met.  There is no suggestion that Mr Hashimi was prejudiced in any way by that two-day period.  There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that it was practicable to serve the order on Mr Hashimi earlier.  In any event, no suggestion was made as why the two day period was outside the scope of the expression “as soon as practicable”.

33.  The submission seemed to be founded in an unstated assertion that as Mr Hashimi was in custody, the removal order, to be served as soon as practicable, must be served upon him virtually immediately it was made.  There is no sensible basis for such a requirement and service within two days, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, or as to any prejudice suffered adequately meets the requirements of the Ordinance.

34.  It is entirely beside the point that on 16 February 2007, the Director should write to the Consulate General of Bangladesh urging them to expedite the verification process and to issue a replacement travel document to Mr Hashimi as soon as possible.  A travel document would be necessary to physically effect his removal, and at that stage Bangladesh seemed to be the most likely source of such a document.

35.  Rather than demonstrating an ulterior motive on the part of the Director his action seeking to expedite the issue of a travel document is entirely consistent process that the Director was undeniably entitled to follow, with Mr Hashimi having entered Hong Kong unlawfully on a false passport, and having committed a serious offence.

36.  The fact that the power to detain Mr Hashimi was about to expire prior to the making of the removal order is entirely beside the point.  It may well be that the Director was dilatory in not reaching a conclusion prior to that time, and that with the impending time-limit was forced to reach a conclusion.  But there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the relevant factors were not properly considered.  The fact that the relevant factors were considered and a decision made at the last minute is a mere coincidence, and does not establish an ulterior motive on the part of the Director.

37.  I accordingly reject the Ulterior Motive Argument.

Conclusion:

38.  The application for judicial review is accordingly dismissed, and the proceedings are concluded.

Costs:

39.  If the Director wishes to seek costs he may do so by written submissions to be filed within 14 days, Mr Hashimi’s counsel to respond in 14 days, the Director to reply 7 days thereafter.

(John Saunders)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Wilson K S Chan, instructed by Messrs Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Applicant

Mr Abraham Chan, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Respondent

62918-EN-2008-10-15

HASHIMI HABIB HALIM v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 139/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 139 OF 2007

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 HASHIMI HABIB HALIMApplicant
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

Before:  Hon Saunders J in Court

Dates of Hearing:  8, 18 April, 7, 8 August and 9 October 2008

Date of Judgment:  15 October 2008

 

----------------------

J U D G M E N T

----------------------

 

The application:

1.  In November 2007, Mr Hashimi, acting on his own, without the assistance of solicitors, sought by judicial review proceedings, certiorari quashing a decision of the Director of Immigration that he should be detained pending his removal from Hong Kong.  Mr Hashimi also sought a writ of habeas corpus, to achieve his release from immigration detention, pursuant to s 32(3A), Immigration Ordinance, (the Ordinance).

2.  Following the grant of leave, Mr Hashimi was granted legal aid, and solicitors and counsel were instructed.  They elected to proceed on the basis of Mr Hashimi’s home-made papers.

The course of the proceedings:

3.  The proceedings first came before me on 8 April 2008, when the central issue was whether or not Mr Hashimi’s continued detention was in breach of what have become known as the Hardial Singh principles, (See R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704).  If the detention offended those principles, certiorari would be likely to issue.  Following argument from counsel the decision was reserved. 

4.  On 10 April 2008, whilst in the course of preparing the reasons for judgment, I received a handwritten 5 page “Notice of Motion”, with an 14 page annexure, from Mr Hashimi requesting that the consideration of the reserved judgement should not proceed without a further oral hearing.  The essence of Mr Hashimi’s concern was a complaint that he had had insufficient time to consider the submissions to be delivered by counsel, and to give proper instructions to counsel.  Consequently, notwithstanding the competent manner in which Mr Chan had dealt with matters,  Mr Hashimi sought to address the court himself.

5.  I reconvened the court on 18 April 2008, and heard from counsel.  Initially Mr Chan applied for leave to enable Mr Hashimi to address me directly.  Mr Man opposed both the reopening of the issues, and Mr Hashimi addressing the court, when he was represented by counsel.  After taking further advice Mr Hashimi instructed Mr Chan to seek leave to make further submissions on his behalf, and leave was sought to file further evidence.

6.  As the issue raised was one of the liberty of a person, and a writ of habeas corpus had been sought, I gave directions for a further affidavit to be filed by Mr Hashimi, with liberty to the Director to reply if he wished.  I gave directions for skeleton arguments to be exchanged and filed.

7.  Before the matter could be set down for hearing again, the Court of Appeal intervened, on 18 July 2008, with the delivery of the decision in A (Torture Claimant) v Director of Immigration [2008] 4 HKLRD 752.  That judgment dealt directly with the power to detain conferred by s 32 of the Ordinance, in that case holding that the exercise of power by the Director was unlawful as being contrary to Article 5 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, (BoR), because no policy as to the manner in which the power of detention existed or had been made accessible to persons affected by the exercise of the power.

8.  In the light of that decision, at the request of the parties, a further directions hearings was held on 7 August 2008, when Mr Chan sought to amend the Form 86A, to accommodate an argument that the detention of Mr Hashimi since 13 February 2007, was and had been unlawful as being in contravention of Article 5 BoR.  Thus the issue in A (Torture Claimant) was directly raised in the proceedings.  I gave leave for the amendment subject to an adjournment to enable Mr Man to file an appropriate affidavit.

9.  Mr Man informed me that the Director had now published an appropriate and accessible policy, but he was unable, at that hearing, to produce that policy to the court.  Mr Chan was concerned that unless the policy was promptly given to the court it would be tailor-made to the applicant.  Upon my direction the proceedings were adjourned to the next day, 8 August 2008, when the details of the policy were supplied by Mr Man.  Directions were then given on the filing of affidavits.

10.  Appropriate affidavits were filed, and the matter resumed on 9 October 2008, with the argument confined to the issue whether or not the detention of Mr Hashimi was lawful in terms of the decision in A (Torture Claimant).

11.  It will only be that, if his detention is lawful in terms of the decision in A (Torture Claimant), the issue of whether or not Mr Hashimi’s continued detention is in breach of the Hardial Singh principles will arise.  That issue remains outstanding to be determined, depending on the result of this judgment.  It is agreed by the parties that if the issue is to be determined further affidavits and the argument will be required.  The final conclusion of the judicial review proceedings consequently remains open.

Factual scenario:

12.  On 19 October 2000, Mr Hashimi arrived in Hong Kong from Thailand.  He presented to the immigration officer at the border control a Bangladeshi passport, issued on 2 December 1999, representing him as a Bangladeshi citizen.  Mr Hashimi was permitted to enter and to remain in Hong Kong until 2 November 2000.

13.  On 28 October 2000, Mr Hashimi gave packets of drug-laced juice to some tourists causing them to fall unconscious.  On 29 October 2000, Mr Hashimi was arrested by the police in relation to those acts.  He was ultimately charged with three counts of administering a stupefying or overpowering drug with intent to commit indictable offences, and three counts of theft.  Pending his trial he was remanded in custody.

14.  On 5 October 2001, whilst on remand prior to his trial, Mr Hashimi punched a Correctional Services Department officer.

15.  On 9 November 2001, Mr Hashimi was convicted, following trial, on the 6 criminal counts he faced.  He was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment.  On 16 January 2002, Mr Hashimi was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in relation to the assault on the CSD officer.  On 23 January 2002, he was sentenced to nine months imprisonment for that assault, with six months of that sentence to run consecutively to the 8 year term.

The steps towards removal:

16.  With that background scenario it will come as no surprise that on 6 May 2002, the Director of Immigration caused to be served on Mr Hashimi a “Notice of Consideration of Deportation”.  The notice informed Mr Hashimi that consideration was being given to recommending his deportation to Bangladesh.  Mr Hashimi refused to sign the notice, the signature being requested merely to acknowledge receipt of the documents.  There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that at the same time, Mr Hashimi was then informed in any way of any policy adopted by the Director in determining whether or not he should make a detention order should a removal order be made consequent upon a decision to deport Mr Hashimi.

17.  In order to consider the lawfulness of Mr Hashimi’s detention in terms of the decision in A (Torture Claimant) it is not necessary to examine in detail the events that transpired between 6 May 2002, and his subsequent detention for removal.  Those facts may subsequently be relevant to any consideration of Hardial Singh principles to the circumstances of Mr Hashimi’s detention.

18.  It is sufficient to say that Mr Hashimi completed his prison sentence on 20 December 2006, upon which day he was given formal notice that he was then detained pursuant to s 32(2A)(a) of the Ordinance, which permits detention for not more than seven days pending the decision of the Director of Immigration as to whether or not a removal order should be made under s 19(1)(b) of the Ordinance.  That provision essentially enables the removal of persons who, for a number of different reasons, such as being subject to a deportation order or having landed unlawfully, have no right to remain in Hong Kong.

19.  That detention expired on 3 January 2007, on which day Mr Hashimi was then detained pursuant to s 32(2A)(b) of the Ordinance, which permits a further 21 day detention, to 24 January 2007, under the authority of the Secretary for Security.

20.  On 13 January 2007, Mr Hashimi made a written request for release from detention on recognizance.  On 15 January 2007, Mr Hashimi lodged a claim under the Convention Against Torture, (CAT) with the Director of Immigration.

21.  On 23 January 2007, Mr Hashimi’s detention for a further 21 day period, to 13 February 2007, was authorised by the Secretary for Security pursuant to s 32(2A)(c) of the Ordinance.  On 30 January 2007 Mr Hashimi made a further written request for release from detention on recognizance.

22.  On 13 February 2007, a removal order was made in respect of Mr Hashimi under s 19(1)(b) of the Ordinance upon the ground that he had landed in Hong Kong unlawfully.  On the same day he was detained pending removal pursuant to s 32(3A) of the Ordinance.  That subsection provides:

“A person in respect of whom a removal order under section 19(1)(b) is in force may be detained under the authority of the Director of Immigration, the Deputy Director of immigration or any assistant director of immigration pending his removal from Hong Kong under section 25.”

Section 25 provides the machinery by which a removal order under s 19 is carried out.  There is no evidence that a deportation order was ever made.  Nothing turns on that fact.

The effect of the decision in A (Torture Claimant)

23.  The following propositions, relevant to these proceedings, are established in A (Torture Claimant):

(1) The power to detain under s 32 is lawful under the domestic law of Hong Kong.  The provision conferred a power to detain pending removal from Hong Kong under s 25.  So long as the Secretary of Security was intent upon removing the person at the earliest possible moment and it was not apparent to him that the removal within a reasonable time would be impossible, the power to detain pending removal was in principle still exercisable;

(2) However, the power of detention under s 32 was contrary to Article 5(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and so unlawful.  The grounds and procedure for detention were not sufficiently certain and accessible, as required by Article 5;

(3) In the absence of published policies as to the circumstances under which the s 32 power to detain would be exercised, Article 5(1) was infringed;

(4) A clear and lawful policy, which did not exist, would ensure that the Director of Immigration, when deciding whether or not to detain, would have considered all relevant circumstances and the decision would not be arbitrary;

(5) The availability of such grounds would also enable an applicant to know how best to ensure that he was not detained.

The steps taken by the Director following A (Torture Claimant):

24.  Following the delivery of the decision in A (Torture Claimant), the Director took steps to meet the requirements of that decision.  Those steps were set out in the affidavit of Mr Tam Yun Keung, an Acting Assistant Principal Immigration Officer.  In order to make the policy accessible, certain notices, purporting to set out the policy, were placed at noticeable locations inside the various detention centres.  The affidavit described notices in the following terms:

“(a)   A notice entitled “Notice on Detention Authority” to inform detainees of: (i) the relevant provisions of section 32 of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) (“the Ordinance”) under which person may be detained; (ii) of the detention period; (iii) the authority of detention[1]; and (iv) the purpose of detention.

(b) A notice entitled “Notice on Request for Release on Reognizance” to inform detainees that a person detained under section 32 of the Ordinance may request to be released on recognizance in lieu of detention, and to inform them of the main criteria which the Director will take into account in determining whether to release person on cognizance.”

25.  Mr Tam went on to say:

“…at the same time (as those notices were posted the Director reviewed) all detention cases, informing the detainees of the reasons for the detention and reasons for refusal to release where detention is maintained after review.  In this connection, the Director has devised a notice/form to complement such exercise.”

26.  As with each other detainee, Mr Hashimi’s case was reviewed.  Following the review he was given two documents, the first entitled “Detailed Ground(s) for Detention”, and the second entitled “Review of Detention”.  These were exhibited to Mr Tam’s affidavit.  The relevant portion of those documents is as follows:

“Detailed Ground(s) for Detention

You are detained under the following section of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).  Detailed ground(s) for your detention are stated as below.

S 32(3A).

The detainee’s CAT claim was refused

The detainee may abscond and/or commit (re)offending.  The detainee was arrested by the Police and convicted of serious criminal offences.

Others: the detainee’s identity is still in doubt.”

“Review of Detention

Result of Review of Detention

We have conducted review of your detention.  The result of the review is stated as below.

With respect to the prevailing policy, the Director of Immigration has conducted a review of detention in your case.  Having carefully considered all the relevant circumstances of your case, the Director of Immigration decides on 30-07-2008 that:

Release on recognizance is not granted on the following reasons:

The detainee’s removal is going to be possible within a reasonable time.  The detainee’s CAT claim was refused.

The detainee may abscond and/or commit (re)offending.  The detainee was arrested by the Police and convicted of serious criminal offences.

Others: The detainee’s identity is still in doubt.

Should there be any material change in circumstances of your case, we are prepared to consider the matter again.”

27.  The case advanced by Mr Man was that these steps appropriately remedied the defaults in the procedure identified by the Court of Appeal in A (Torture Claimant).  Mr Chan contended, as will be seen in the next section, that any errors in the procedure adopted by the Director when he originally detained Mr Hashimi could not be remedied.

May an originally unlawful detention be subsequently remedied:

28.  It is arguable that, in terms of the decision in A (Torture Claimant),Mr Hashimi’s original detention, following the completion of his prison sentence, was unlawful.  The first argument advanced by Mr  Chan was that as Mr Hashimi was originally unlawfully detained he was entitled to release and that the subsequent steps taken by the Director could not remedy the situation.

29.  In this respect it must be remembered that the relief sought by Mr Hashimi, in respect of his detention, is that of habeas corpus.  The correct position is set out in the judgment of the Mortimer VP in Director of Immigration v Long Quoc Tuong [1998] 1 HKC 290 at 299, where the learned Vice-President cites two passages from R J Sharpe on the Law of Habeas Corpus, (2nd Ed) at p 179, from which it is quite clear:

(a) that the authorities may amend and correct informalities which are relied on as grounds for an application for habeas corpus, and

(b)    that a substituted warrant which corrects defects in a first committal will always be allowed.

30.  I am accordingly satisfied that the Director was perfectly entitled, following the decision in A (Torture Claimant), to take steps to remedy any defects that might be perceived in the detention of Mr Hashimi.  Consequently, if those steps are lawfully effective, then any originally unlawful detention will be irrelevant.  In simple terms, on an application for habeas corpus the court is concerned with the lawfulness of an applicant’s current detention, and not what might have happened in the past.

31.  For completeness, I note that the decision in Long Quoc Tuong went to the Court of Final Appeal, sub nom Thang Thieu Quyen & Ors v Director of Immigration & Anor (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 167, where, except to the extent that at p 197E Bokhary PJ indicated agreement with the view of Godfrey JA “that the courts are concerned with the power under which the early arrivals are ‘currently detained’”, the issue did not arise.

Is the policy lawful:

32.  In A (Torture Claimant) the Court of Appeal compared the Director’s policy with the policy relied upon by the Home Office in N (Kenya) v Secretary for State for Home Department [2004] INLR 612.  In that decision the English Court of Appeal concluded that the detention of the applicant was unlawful because the policy as to detention was not accessible in its entirety.  No exception was taken to the policy itself.  However the failure of the policy to state that, while the fact that the institution of proceedings challenging detention would result in release, and that an intimation by solicitors of a pending challenge was not sufficient to achieve release, was sufficient for the court to hold that the whole of the policy was not accessible.

33.  Comparing the policy of the Director with that of the Secretary for State, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal concluded that the Director’s policy, as stated in the document upon which the Director relied, was incomplete.

34.  The Director now relies upon the Notice on Detention Authority, and the Notice on Request for Release on Recognizance, together with the documents comprising his decisions, served on Mr Hashimi, as the documents upon which the complete policy, accessible to a person liable to be detained, is established.

35.  The Notice on Detention Authority does not assist the Director.  It merely states the section in the Ordinance upon which the Director will rely for the detention, the allowable period of detention, the individual within Government who may order the detention, and the purpose of detention, which, in each case in the document, (there are 9 alternative scenarios under s 32), merely repeats the purpose set out in the Ordinance.

36.  It does not in any way comprise a statement of the policy by which the Director will exercise the various discretions he has under s 32.

37.  The Notice on Request for Release on Recognizance is in the following terms:

“Under section 36 of the Immigration Ordinance, Chapter 115, Laws of Hong Kong, a person detained under section 32 of the same Ordinance may request to be released on recognizance in lieu of detention.  In determining whether to release a person on recognizance under section 36 (1) of the Immigration Ordinance, the Director will take into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case, including inter alia, (i) whether that person concerned constitutes a security risk to the community: (ii) whether there is any risk of that person absconding and/or (re)offending; and (iii) whether removal is not going to be possible within a reasonable time.  The request for release on recognizance will be considered on individual merits.”

38.  I am satisfied, for a number of reasons, that this document fails to properly establish a policy that is complete.  To be complete, the policy must be such so as to meet the “requirement that the law should enable those affected by reasonably to foresee the consequences of their actions”: see  Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979] 2 EHRR 245, and R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 19 at 38.

39.  First, plainly, the Director cannot rely upon any documents served on Mr Hashimi recording his decision and reasons for that decision as documents constituting a policy, accessible to Mr Hashimi.  The policy must be established prior to making a decision, and accessible prior to the making of the decision. 

40.  Second, on its terms, the matters set out in the documents, relied upon show that what policy there is, are at best, a policy directed only at considering an application for release on recognizance under s 36 of the Ordinance, and not a policy directed at considering whether or not a person should be detained pending removal.  There is a plain distinction between the initial decision that must be made to detain a person, (under the various sub-sections of s 33), and any subsequent decision under a different provision, (e.g. under s 36), whether or not to continue detention, or to release upon recognizance.

41.  Third, even if the documents constituted a policy directed at considering whether or not a person should be detained pending removal, it is a policy which does not admit to any basis upon which a potential detainee might not be immediately detained pending removal, but instead immediately released.  The Director has a discretion whether or not to make a detention order.  In exercising that discretion he must inevitably consider, at the outset, the prospect that the person may not be detained but may be released into the community.

42.  In my view it is particularly significant that in N (Kenya), the policy established by the Secretary of State contained the following statements:

“1. There is a presumption in favour of temporary admission or temporary release.

2.  There must be strong grounds for believing that a person will not comply with conditions of temporary admission or temporary release for detention to be justified.

3.  All reasonable alternatives to detention must be considered before detention is authorised.

…

6.  The following factors must be taken into account when considering the need for initial or continued detention.

For Detention

(7 criteria)

Against detention:

§  is the subject under 18?

§  has the subject a history of torture?

§  has the subject a history of physical or mental ill health?”

43.  It is quite plain from this policy that the Secretary for State, when considering the initial question of detention, will also direct his mind to release generally or on recognizance.  In fact he does so immediately, and with a presumption in favour of release from detention.

44.  There is nothing in the purported policy of the Director that indicates any basis to those considering the issue upon which they may give any consideration to release.  On the basis of the policy as established, a person considering the issue is given no guidance as to how he should approach that aspect of the decision, neither does a person facing detention know what matters should be raised to achieve immediate release.  On the face of the policy the question of release will not be considered until such time as a person might make an application for release on recognizance.

45.  The requirement of the decision in A (Torture Claimant), is that the statement of the policy must be complete.  In the absence of any indication as to any basis upon which immediate release on recognizance, or immediate release into the community upon the basis of an entitlement to stay until removal is effected, instead of detention, might be considered, I am satisfied that the documents relied upon by the Director cannot constitute a complete statement of policy.

46.  Fourth, even if it were argued that the Notice on Request for Release on Recognizance was sufficient to constitute a policy in respect of the decision to detained upon the making of an Order for Removal, it is deficient for the reasons in paras 41-45 above, in failing to consider any basis upon which a person might be immediately released.

47.  Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, I should record that I am of the view that there is nothing paragraph 17 of the Legislative Council Paper relied upon by the Director in A (Torture Claimant) which in any way advances the position of the Director in the establishment of a policy.

48.  The error into which the Director appears to have fallen is to have slavishly followed paragraph 17 of the LegCo Paper in the documents posted, rather than carefully examining what might constitute an appropriate policy.  It is unfortunate that more careful consideration was not apparently given to that policy by the Director.   Having been given the advantage of knowing of the policy adopted by the Home Secretary in N (Kenya), and albeit that that policy had been found deficient in one aspect, the Director would have been well advised to use that policy as an indication of what might be an appropriately complete policy.  Had such consideration being given, it appears to me to be obvious that the question of immediate release, and grounds upon which release might be ordered, would have been included in the policy.

What constitutes a complete policy:

49.  Mr Chan argued strongly that the use of the expression “including, inter alia”, in the documents relied upon by the Director was fatal to the statement of policy because it meant that there were factors which the Director might take into account, but which were not made known to the subject.  The use by Mr Tam of the expression “main criteria” in his affidavit, aggravates the situation, (see para 24(b) above).

50.  While superficially attractive, I do not believe that there is any merit in the argument.  That said there are much better ways to express the position.

51.  First, as Mr Man pointed out, item 5 of the policy of the Secretary for State in N (Kenya) provides:

“There are no statutory criteria for detention, and each case must be considered on its individual merits.”

This statement makes it plain that the Secretary will, in appropriate circumstances, weigh into the balance the individual merits of the case.  Obviously, the individual merits of a case might well raise a factor which is not specified in the policy.

52.  I accept the submission of Mr Man that the certainty criterion does not require the Director to exhaustively list every possible factor that he may take into account in coming to his decision.  It is plain that the law must be sufficiently flexible, especially where it has to deal with a variety of different circumstances: see Mo Yuk Ping v HKSAR (2007) 10 HKCFAR 386 at § 69, and Shum Kwok Ser v HKSAR [2002] 5 HKSAR at § 69.  It would be quite wrong to impose upon the Director a requirement that denied flexibility in appropriate cases, and effectively shackled his hands in all future cases.

53.  In this respect, what is important, is that when a detainee is informed of the reasons for his original detention, or, as in the present case, his continued detention, or for the refusal of release on recognizance, he must be informed of all of the grounds upon which the Director relies.

54.  Mr Chan argued that the use of the word, “Others”, in the two documents given to Mr Hashimi meant that he did not know all of the reasons why he was detained.  The argument is untenable.  In both documents the Director has given as the “Other” reason, that Mr Hashimi’s identity is still in doubt.  In any challenge to the reasonableness of the detention in judicial review, the Director would be confined to that reason.  It would not be open to him to assert some additional “other” reason.

55.  Accordingly, were I satisfied that a proper policy was established, and accessible, the use of the expression, “Others”, in the documents given to Mr Hashimi would not justify any interference with the decision of the Director.

56.  There is a plain danger of uncertainty in the use of the expressions such as “including, inter alia” or “main reasons”, in a policy statement in circumstances such as these.  Good guidance as to a satisfactory way in which unknown factors, or factors relevant only to a particular case, might be taken into account is seen in item 5 of the policy in N (Kenya), (see para 51 above).

Is the policy accessible:

57.  Having concluded that there is no proper policy, it is not strictly necessary for me to go to the issue of accessibility.  In case the matter should go further I set out my views.

58.  The issue of accessibility to the Director’s policy on detention pending removal raises different questions in relation to different factual circumstances.  The question of accessibility to the policy in relation to a person who arrives in Hong Kong, and is virtually immediately faced with the prospect of detention pending removal is not one which arises in these proceedings.  That fact scenario raises difficult issues.  For that reason anything I may say as to accessibility in the case of Mr Hashimi must be restricted to his particular factual circumstances.

59.  The evidence of Mr Tam is that the documents comprising the policy were posted in the day rooms of the various detention centres.  It is in those rooms that detainees spend the bulk of their days.  The documents were in English and Chinese and 12 other languages, namely Bengali, Sinhalese, Tamil, Nepali, Punjabi, Urdu, Hindi, Somali, Thai, Tagalog, Vietnamese and French.  In a further affidavit, Mr Tam has produced photographs showing the posted notices.  They are plainly exposed to easy viewing.

60.  It is no answer for an applicant to say that he did not see the notices, or that he did not read them.  In simple terms they were perfectly accessible to anyone who chose to read them. 

61.  I am satisfied that the documents relied upon by the Director, although not containing a sufficiently certain policy, were appropriately accessible to Mr Hashimi.

When must the policy be accessible:

62.  The issue of accessibility, and the authorities relied upon, raised a further difficulty in this case.  This arises from the use of the following expression in Sunday Times,

“…. the law should enable those affected by it reasonably to foresee the consequences of their actions.”

and Evans:

“…. and that it must be sufficiently precise to enable the individual to foresee the consequences of the restriction….”

63.  The implication that arises from those statements is that an person who may be affected by the policy must be able to be access the policy prior to any decision based upon the policy which may affect them, so that they may order their affairs in the light of the policy.

64.  Sunday Times was a case dealing with circumstances in which the Attorney-General obtained an injunction restraining the publication of newspaper articles in relation to the drug thalidomide.  The publication was potentially a contempt of court, and the issue was whether the principles in relation to such publications constituting a contempt were formulated with sufficient precision to enable the newspapers to foresee, to the appropriate degree, the consequences which publication might entail.  The European Court of Human Rights held that the particular principle at issue, known as the “pressure principle”, was formulated with sufficient provision.

65.  Evans was a case dealing with the basis upon which a release date for a prisoner was computed.  Had the prisoner had proper access to the policy by which release dates were computed she would have been able to challenge the decision made as to her release date prior to that date, and would have achieved release 59 days earlier. 

66.  Sunday Times was referred to in Shum Kwok Sher, a case dealing with the constitutionality of the offence of misconduct in public office.  Shum Kwok Sher was referred to in Mo Yuk Ping, a case dealing with the constitutionality of the offence of conspiracy to defraud.  In both of those cases the court found that the offences were sufficiently certain to enable a person, with appropriate advice if required, to foresee the consequences of their actions and to regulate their conduct accordingly.

67.  It is plain that all of these cases relate to circumstances in which, well prior to any decision being made in respect of a person, that person had ample time in which to access the policy and foresee the consequences of his actions.

68.  Mr Chan contended that in order for any policy to be lawful it must be accessible to Mr Hashimi before any decision to detain him was made in order that he may appropriately order his conduct so as to avoid detention.

69.  It would be asking the impossible to require the Director to have the policy in relation to detention accessible to all persons coming into Hong Kong, so that they may be aware of the consequences of their actions and the risk that they may be the subject of a removal order and consequently be detained pending removal.  To adopt the words of the Court of Appeal in A (Torture Claimant) at p 770, § 51:

“What accessibility requires will depend on the circumstances and common sense must come into it.”

70.  In my view the requirement that accessibility must enable a person to know the policy in order that he may regulate his conduct, must, in the context of this case, be a requirement that he must be informed of the policy prior to the decision for administrative detention, in order that he may know what matters to draw to the attention of the appropriate official, in order that that official may properly weigh in the balance all appropriate factors. 

71.  The length of time available to the potential detainee will vary depending upon the circumstances.  It may be a very short period of time if that person is to be refused admittance to Hong Kong at the airport, and the authorities wish to detain him pending removal.  That issue does not arise in these proceedings.

72.  In this case the Director had notified Mr Hashimi on 6 May 2002, that he was considering making an order for deportation.  It would have been a simple matter to inform Mr Hashimi, at the same time, that in the event of a deportation order being made, a removal order would be made, and that detention pending removal would then be considered.  Bearing in mind that initial detention order was not made until 28 December 2006, four years and seven months later, and the removal order was not made until six weeks later, on 13 February 2007, there was more than sufficient time within which to make the policy setting out the basis upon which a detention order might be made accessible to Mr Hashimi.

73.  Once a decision has been made to detain a person under s 32, he should then be informed of his right to apply for release upon recognizance under s 36, and of the policy to be applied on such an application, in order that he may conduct himself so best as to achieve release from detention.

74.  In this case the facts must be judged upon the basis of the subsequent steps taken by the Director.

75.  As I understand the evidence, the notices purporting to contain the policy were posted on 18 July 2008.  The notices by which the Director purported to make a fresh decision in respect of Mr Hashimi’s detention under s 32(3A), although undated, are attached to a facsimile transmission leader page, sent by the Director to Mr Hashimi’s solicitors on 1 August 2008.  The leader page records that the documents were to be served upon Mr Hashimi.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary I proceed on the basis that Mr Hashimi received those documents on or about 1 August 2008. 

76.  Had the documents met the requirements of a policy, (which they do not), I am of the view that sufficient time had elapsed to enable Mr Hashimi to inform that the Director of any relevant matters pursuant to the policy that Mr Hashimi wished the Director to take into account.

77.  In those circumstances, were it necessary for me to rule on this aspect of accessibility, I would have held that the policy was accessible to Mr Hashimi.

Conclusion:

78.  For the foregoing reasons I am satisfied that, by reason of the absence of a sufficiently certain policy as to the circumstances under which the s 32 power to detain would be exercised by the Director of Immigration, Article 5(1) of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights has been infringed, and that consequently Mr Hashimi is currently unlawfully detained.

79.  I will hear counsel now on the orders to be made consequent upon that declaration.

 (John Saunders)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Wilson K S Chan, instructed by S Y Fung, for the Applicant

Mr Bernard Man, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Respondent


[1]I understand this to be a reference to the official in Government authorised to make the detention order in the particular circumstances.