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Companies Winding-up Proceedings2007

CHAN LUEN YAN AND OTHERS v. CHAN TIN CHAI AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV161/2013CHAN LUEN YAN AND OTHERS v. CHAN TIN CHAI AND OTHERS
  • HCA3021/2016CHAN LUEN YAN AND OTHERS v. GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LTD

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88599-EN-2013-08-14

CHAN HIN TUNG AND OTHERS v. CHAN TIN CHAI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 211/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO 211 OF 2007

____________

 

IN THE MATTER OF GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 168A AND 177(1)(f) OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE, CAP 32

____________

BETWEEN

 CHAN LUEN YAN1st Petitioner
 CHAN HIN TUNG2nd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN FAI3rd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN CHEUNG4th Petitioner

and

 CHAN TIN CHAI1st Respondent
 CHAN HIN KAI2nd Respondent
 CHAN HIN KUEN MICKY3rd Respondent
 CHAN HIN CHEUNG PAUL4th Respondent
 CHAN BO YU5th Respondent
 CHAN MO YIN6th Respondent
 CHAN TAT CHAI7th Respondent
 CHAN HIN CHAI8th Respondent
 CHAN NAM THOMAS9th Respondent
 CHAN LOON FONG10th Respondent
 GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED11th Respondent

____________

Before: Hon Ng J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Dates of Receipt of Written Submissions: 16 & 23 July 2013
Date of Decision: 14 August 2013

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

Background

1.  By a petition presented on 15 May 2007, the Petitioners, as shareholders of the 11th Respondent, Goldsfine Development Limited (“the Company”), sought relief under sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 32).  Under section 168A, they sought an order for the Respondents to buy back their shares in the Company at a price to be determined by reference to the “net asset value of the Company as at the date [of the petition] to be determined by an independent certified public accountant nominated by the Court”.

2.  The petition was tried before Barma J (as he then was) in April 2009. The Respondents were held to have committed unfairly prejudicial conduct towards the Petitioners. At paragraph 55 of the Judgment handed down on 14 May 2010 (“the Judgment”), the learned Judge ruled that “the appropriate way in which to deal with the unfairly prejudicial conduct, which is likely to continue so long as the Respondents are in control of [the Company], is by requiring [the Company] itself to buy out the shares of the Petitioners on the basis of its net asset value as at the date of the petition, adjusted so as to include interest on outstanding loans and advances by [the Company] to CLC Ltd and all arrears of rental (ignoring any agreement by [the Company] to waive outstanding or future rents). The parties should seek to agree on the identity of a valuer and any consequential matters, but may apply to the court for directions if they are unable to agree”. An Order along those lines was subsequently drawn up (“May 2010 Order”).

3.  On 25 July 2011, pursuant to a joint application by consent, the learned Judge ordered the Petitioners and the Respondents to jointly appoint Mr Philip Lam of KLC Kennic Lui & Co (“the Valuer”) to perform an independent evaluation of the Company’s net asset value pursuant to the May 2010 Order (“July 2011 Order”). Paragraph 5 of the July 2011 Order provided that the valuation when completed be placed before the court with liberty to the parties to restore the matter for further consideration by the court.

4.  The Valuer issued a valuation report on the net asset value of the Company on 3 November 2011 (“First Report”). 

5.  The Valuer’s conclusion, set out in section 16 of the First Report, was that the adjusted net asset value of the Company as at 15 May 2007 was HK$2,894,238. On the basis that the total numbers of Class A and Class B shares were 1,800 and 1,500 respectively, and that both Class A and Class B shares had the same rights to dividends, entitlement and benefits, he assessed the adjusted net asset value per Class A and Class B share at HK$877.04.

6.  On 16 January 2012, upon the Petitioners’ application, Barma J directed the parties to file expert evidence, ordered a further report from the Valuer and gave the parties liberty to fix a hearing after receiving the Valuer’s supplemental report (“January 2012 Order”).

7.  After the January 2012 Order, several rounds of affidavit evidence were filed by the parties. One of the affirmations filed on behalf of the Petitioners was made by a Mr Lam Yat Cheong, CPA, the Petitioners’ expert. According to his evaluation, the adjusted net asset value per Class A and Class B share should be HK$5,058.28.

8.  By a summons filed on 27 June 2012 (“the Summons”), the Petitioners sought a review of the First Report.

9.  The Summons set out, inter alia, the Petitioners’ requests to revise various aspects of the First Report which, if allowed, would result in an upward adjustment to the net asset value of the Company. In the Summons, the Petitioners further requested for

“direction … on how the market rental, appreciation in value of the property and interest should be calculated after 15th May, 2007 in order to compensate our interests.” (emphasis added)

10.  On 18 July 2012, Barma J gave leave to the Petitioners and the Respondents to file further affidavit evidence and directed the Valuer to take into consideration the further evidence in preparing his supplemental report (“July 2012 Order”).

11.  On 13 August 2012, the Valuer issued his Supplemental Report (“Supplemental Report”). His revised conclusion, set out in section 13 of the Supplemental Report, was that the adjusted net asset value of the Company as at 15 May 2007 should be HK$4,011,849. On the basis that the total numbers of Class A and Class B shares were 1,800 and 1,500 respectively, and that both Class A and Class B shares had the same rights to dividends, entitlement and benefits, he assessed the net asset value per Class A and Class B share at HK$1,215.71.

12.  The Petitioners were still not satisfied with the revised valuation. Upon their application, the learned Judge ordered yet another round of affidavit evidence on 17 September 2012 in relation to the value of the Company’s shares, and adjourned consideration of the two Valuation Reports to a date to be fixed.

13.  The learned Judge having been elevated to the Court of Appeal, this court was assigned to preside over the adjourned hearing and fix the purchase price of the Petitioners’ shares.

14.  In a judgment handed down on 3 July 2013 (“2013 Judgment”), this court made the following order:

a. the Petitioners’ shares in the Company, whether Class A or Class B, be valued at HK$1,215.71 per share;[1]

b. the Company do pay each of the Petitioners the purchase price for their shares in the Company in accordance with the valuation aforesaid, and interest, if any; such payment to be made by bankers draft on a date to be agreed between the Petitioners and the Company, such date to be not later than 60 days from the date hereof;

c. concurrent with the payment by the Company of the purchase price and interest, if any, on the date to be agreed, each of the Petitioners shall execute all bought and sold notes, instruments of transfer and other documents reasonably required by the Company to effect the transfer of the Petitioners’ shares to the Company;

d.     liberty to apply.

15.  So far as interest on the purchase price and costs were concerned, this court gave leave to the parties to file and exchange written submissions on whether interest should be payable, and if yes, the rate of interest and the period for which it was payable, as well as costs, within 14 days for disposal on paper.

16.  This is the court’s decision on interest on the purchase price and costs, after considering the written submissions filed by the parties.

Interest on purchase price

17.  There are abundant authorities in support of the proposition that the court has power to award interest on the purchase price if it makes a buy‑out order under section 168A: Re Tai Lap Investment Co Ltd. [1999] 1 HKLRD 384; Re Sharpart Co Ltd., HCCW No. 858 of 1999, 15 November 2000, Chu J; Wong Man Yin v Law Lam Wai & Ors [2001] 3 HKLRD 720; Re Golden Bright Ltd., HCMP 6472 of 2001, 21 September 2006, Kwan J. 

18.  Interest awarded in this situation is not qua interest; it is used as “a proxy to measure the increment in the value of the petitioner’s investment in the company appropriate to reflect the fact that the respondent’s interests had the use of the petitioner’s investment since the date of the petition[2]”: Re Tai Lap Investment Co Ltd. at 402J.

19.  The interest factor is added to the value of the petitioner’s shareholding to arrive at a fair price which should be paid for his shares, to give monetary compensation for the injury done to the petitioner: Re Golden Bright Ltd. at para. 36.

20.  Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the learned trial Judge “conspicuously did not award interest on the share buy-out (or in any other regard) in his Judgment [dated 14 May 2010].” He further submitted that, since interest was not a matter that the learned Judge left for a future court to decide, it should not arise for decision now.

21.  I accept that the learned Judge has not expressly reserved the question of interest to a later date or another court, but if Counsel intended to argue that “conspicuously did not award interest” meant “consciously decided not to award interest”, I would respectfully disagree. There is nothing in the Judgment which indicates the parties have made submissions to the learned Judge on the question of interest or that the learned Judge has consciously decided against it; otherwise, I would expect the learned Judge to have spelt out in the Judgment the arguments put forward by the parties and the reasons for his decision.

22.  It seems to me that the learned Judge simply has not dealt with the question of interest in the Judgment, for reasons which are unnecessary for this court to speculate. Now that the Petitioners have sought directions on the calculation of interest in the Summons, this court should deal with it without further ado. In so far as authority is required in support of the court’s power to order payment of interest after making a buy‑out order, see Re Golden Bright Ltd. at paras. 37-38. In that case, the question of interest on the purchase price was not raised by the petitioner’s counsel at the end of the trial of a 168A petition. Kwan J (as she then was) held that the court had power to award interest two and a half years after the making of the buy-out order, either under the slip rule or under the order made at trial giving liberty to apply “for directions as to the payment of purchase price and generally”.

23.  I hold that this court has power to award interest in the present situation under the slip rule.  In so far as may be necessary, I also rely on paragraph 55 of the Judgment which gave leave to the parties to apply to court for directions on “any consequential matters”. Following the reasoning in the authorities cited at paragraphs 17 - 19 above, it is in my view fair and appropriate to award interest on the purchase price in this case. Given the length of time for which the Petitioners’ investment in the Company has been locked up since the date of the petition ie 15 May 2007 (that being also the date of valuation), the Petitioners should be compensated for the loss of the use of their investment by an award of interest.

24.  The remaining question is the appropriate period for which interest should be awarded and at what rate.  The Petitioners in their written submissions said they would leave them to this court. The Respondents have put forward no meaningful submissions on these matters. This court can only do the best it can under the circumstances.

25.  In Re Tai Lap Investment Co Ltd [1999] 1 HKLRD 384; Re Sharpart Co Ltd, HCCW No. 858 of 1999, 15 November 2000, Chu J and Wong Man Yin v Law Lam Wai & Ors. [2001] 3 HKLRD 720, interest was awarded from the date of the petition, that being the date of the valuation. I see no reason to depart from those cases – as I have said earlier, the Petitioners’ investment in the Company has been locked up since the date of the Petition and they should be compensated by an award of interest from that date. I would therefore hold that interest on the purchase price should run from 15 May 2007.

26.  As for the rate of interest, I notice that the Hong Kong dollar prime rate has dropped significantly from 2007 onwards. It would therefore not be appropriate to adopt a flat rate, as in cases like Re Tai Lap Investment Co Ltd. I would instead follow the approach of Kwan J (as she then was) in Re Golden Bright Ltd. at paragraph 45 and order the payment of interest from 15 May 2007 to 14 May 2010, the date on which the buy‑out order was made, at the rate of 1% over the prime rate of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation during that period. After 14 May 2010, interest should be payable at the prevailing judgment rate.

Costs

27.  As far as costs are concerned, the Petitioners suggested that all costs should be borne by the Respondents.

28.  The Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the valuation exercise had involved several rounds of affidavit evidence and hearings when only one should have been enough. They therefore asked that 75% of the costs of the valuation exercise, including 75% of all the costs reserved by Barma J since 14 May 2010, be to the Respondents.

29.  In principle, the costs of the valuation of the Petitioners’ shares (including costs of the hearings before Barma J in so far as the same have been reserved) should be borne by the Respondents, as part of the costs of this action: see Re Golden Bright Ltd. para. 46.

30.  In my view, this principle should apply up to the date of the Supplemental Report ie 13 August 2012 since this court did eventually make an order that the Petitioners’ shares be valued at HK$1,215.71 per share, as assessed in the Supplemental Report.

31.  If the Petitioners had been content to accept the valuation in the Supplemental Report, there would have been no need to incur further costs on valuation. It was entirely due to their dissatisfaction with the figure of HK$1,215.71 that the parties went back to Barma J on 17 September 2012 at which hearing the learned Judge gave leave to file one more round of affidavit evidence and adjourned the consideration of the two Valuation Reports for a one-day hearing.  Eventually, the Petitioners failed to obtain a higher valuation of their shares. In these circumstances, it seems to this court it is only fair that the costs after 13 August 2012 be borne by the Petitioners instead, and I so order. 

Disposition

32.  For the above reasons, I make the following orders on interest and costs:

(1) Interest be awarded on the purchase price of the Petitioners’ shares to run from 15 May 2007 to 14 May 2010, at the rate of 1% over the prevailing prime rate of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and thereafter at the prevailing judgment rate until payment.

(2) Costs of the valuation of the Petitioners’ shares up to 13 August 2012, including all costs previously reserved, be to the Petitioners, and all costs of the valuation exercise incurred thereafter be to the Respondents, to be taxed on the party and party basis if not agreed.

(Peter Ng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Written submission by the petitioners in person

Written submission by Mr John J E Swaine, instructed by Rowland Chow, Chan & Co, for the respondents



[1] ie as assessed by the Valuer in the Supplemental Report

[2] The date of the petition was used as the valuation date in that case.

87895-EN-2013-07-03

CHAN LUEN YAN AND OTHERS v. CHAN TIN CHAI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 211/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO 211 OF 2007

____________

 

IN THE MATTER OF GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

  and
 

IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 168A AND 177(1)(f) OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE, CAP 32

____________

BETWEEN

 CHAN LUEN YAN1st Petitioner
 CHAN HIN TUNG2nd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN FAI3rd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN CHEUNG4th Petitioner

and

 CHAN TIN CHAI1st Respondent
 CHAN HIN KAI2nd Respondent
 CHAN HIN KUEN MICKY3rd Respondent
 CHAN HIN CHEUNG PAUL4th Respondent
 CHAN BO YU5th Respondent
 CHAN MO YIN6th Respondent
 CHAN TAT CHAI7th Respondent
 CHAN HIN CHAI8th Respondent
 CHAN NAM THOMAS9th Respondent
 CHAN LOON FONG10th Respondent
 GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED11th Respondent
____________
Before: Hon Ng J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 21 February 2013
Date of Judgment: 3 July 2013

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

A. Background

1.  By a petition presented on 15 May 2007, the Petitioners, as shareholders of the 11th Respondent, Goldsfine Development Limited (“the Company”), sought relief under sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 32).  Under section 168A, they sought an order for the Respondents to buy back the Petitioners’ shares in the Company at a price to be determined by reference to the “net asset value of the Company as at the date [of the petition] to be determined by an independent certified public accountant nominated by the Court”.

2.  All the individual parties to these proceedings share a common surname. According to the Judgment handed down on 14 May 2010 (“the Judgment”) by the learned trial judge Barma J (as he then was), they are all members of the same extended family, but from different branches of it.  It is common ground that all of the individual parties to these proceedings are members of a Chinese family tong known as the Chan Him Muk Tong (“the Tong”).  Since about the early twentieth century, members of the Tong have, together with members of another Chinese family tong known as the Li King Sun Tong, operated a Chinese medicine business in Hong Kong known as Chan Li Chai or Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (“Chan Li Chai”). In July 1952, the Chan Li Chai business was registered as a partnership under the then Business Regulation Ordinance. Subsequently, the partnership and its business were converted into a limited company namely Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (Hong Kong) Company Limited (“CLC Limited”). 

3.  The Company was at all material times the owner of Units A1 and A2 of the 2nd and 3rd floors, Block A, and a car parking space at No. 40 Lee Chung Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong (“the Property”). The Property (or rather parts of it) was later rented out by the Company to CLC Limited under a tenancy agreement pursuant to which rent was payable to the Company.

4.  The Petitioners complained about the way in which the Company and CLC Limited were being run. One of their principal complaints concerned the failure of the Company to take steps to recover outstanding rentals and loans due from CLC Limited, and a decision by the Company in January 2005 to defer repayment of such loans for 18 months, to waive rental for a similar period, and to make all loans to CLC Limited interest free with effect from 1 November 2004.

5.  At paragraph 52 of the Judgment, the learned Judge found that the decision in January 2005 to grant CLC Limited a waiver of rent for 18 months, and to make all loans to CLC Limited interest free from November 2004 onwards was conduct by the majority that was unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the Petitioners, since the effect was to benefit the majority (through their additional shareholdings in CLC Limited) at the expense of the minority.

6.  At paragraph 55 of the Judgment, the learned Judge ruled that “the appropriate way in which to deal with the unfairly prejudicial conduct, which is likely to continue so long as the Respondents are in control of [the Company], is by requiring [the Company] itself to buy out the shares of the Petitioners on the basis of its net asset value as at the date of the petition, adjusted so as to include interest on outstanding loans and advances by [the Company] to CLC Ltd and all arrears of rental (ignoring any agreement by [the Company] to waive outstanding or future rents)” (emphasis added). An Order in the same terms was subsequently drawn up (“May 2011 Order”).

7.  There is no appeal from the Judgment.

8.  On 25 July 2011, pursuant to a joint application by consent, the learned Judge ordered the Petitioners and the Respondents to jointly appoint Mr Philip Lam of KLC Kennic Lui & Co (“the Valuer”) to perform an independent evaluation of the Company’s net asset value pursuant to the May 2011 Order (“July 2011 Order”). Paragraph 5 of the July 2011 Order provided that the valuation when completed be placed before the court with liberty to the parties to restore the matter for further consideration by the court.

9.  The Valuer issued a valuation report on the net asset value of the Company on 3 November 2011 (“First Report”). 

10.  The Valuer’s conclusion, set out in section 16 of the First Report, was that the adjusted net asset value of the Company as at 15 May 2007 was HK$2,894,238. On the basis that the total numbers of Class A and Class B shares were 1,800 and 1,500 respectively, and that both Class A and Class B shares had the same rights to dividends, entitlement and benefits, he assessed the adjusted net asset value per Class A and Class B share at HK$877.04.

11.  On 16 January 2012, upon the Petitioners’ application, Barma J directed the parties to file expert evidence, ordered them to seek a further report from the Valuer and gave the parties liberty to fix a hearing after receiving the Valuer’s supplemental report (“January 2012 Order”).

12.  After the January 2012 Order, several rounds of affidavit evidence were filed by the parties. One of the affirmations filed on behalf of the Petitioners was made by a Mr Lam Yat Cheong, CPA, the Petitioners’ expert. According to his evaluation, the adjusted net asset value per Class A and Class B share should be HK$5,058.28.

B.  The present application

13.  By a summons filed on 27 June 2012 (“the Summons”), the Petitioners sought a review of the First Report.

14.  The Summons set out the Petitioners’ requests to revise various aspects of the First Report as follows:

“a. request for the amount of $5,226,292 written off could be added back as asset of the Company;

b. request for the waived rents of 30.5 months could be payable at the market rental, together with interest accruing at the commercial rate or judgment rate;

c. request for the purchase of the related company’s shares for $350,000 which have been devalued to $1 could be reversed;

d. request for the directors’ estimated valuation of $15,863,000 … could be taken as the “Valuation” of the property;

e. request for the payment of the solicitor’s fees related to this case and the solicitor’s fees which should not be borne by [the Company] could be reversed;

f. request for direction … on how the market rental, appreciation in value of the property and interest should be calculated after 15th May, 2007 in order to compensate our interests.”

15.  The net result of these requests, if allowed, would be an upward adjustment to the net asset value of the Company.

16.  The Petitioners further sought an order that a date be set for completing the procedure for the buyout of their shares and that the Company should repay the loans due to them at the same time as the payment of the purchase price for their shares. According to paragraph 2.12 of the Petitioners’ expert report, the total amount due to the Petitioners was over HK$4.3 million as at 15 May 2007.

17.  On 18 July 2012, Barma J gave leave to the Petitioners and the Respondents to file further affidavit evidence and directed the Valuer to take into consideration the further evidence in preparing his supplemental report (“July 2012 Order”).

18.  On 13 August 2012, the Valuer issued his Supplemental Report (“Supplemental Report”). His revised conclusion, set out in section 13 of the Supplemental Report, was that the adjusted net asset value of the Company as at 15 May 2007 should be HK$4,011,849. On the basis that the total numbers of Class A and Class B shares were 1,800 and 1,500 respectively, and that both Class A and Class B shares had the same rights to dividends, entitlement and benefits, he assessed the net asset value per Class A and Class B share at HK$1,215.71.

19.  Apparently, the Petitioners were still not satisfied with the revised valuation. Upon their application, there was yet another round of affidavit evidence after the issuance of the Supplemental Report in relation to the valuation of the Company’s shares.

20.  This is the adjourned hearing for the purpose of considering the two valuation reports.

C.  The Petitioners’ challenge to the Valuer’s reports

21.  In an affirmation of the 1st Petitioner dated 28 September 2012 (“September affirmation”), the Petitioners made a number of challenges to the Supplemental Report. In essence, the Petitioners complained that the Valuer had failed to accept their/their expert’s previous comments on the First Report and thereby failed to make proper and sufficient revisions to the valuation of their shares for the purpose of the buyout. There was also an opaque criticism of the Valuer as being unfair and not truly independent, given his aforesaid failures.

22.  In cases where the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed that an expert valuation is to be binding, it is settled law that the valuation cannot be challenged on the ground that mistakes have been made, unless it could be shown that the expert had departed from the instructions given to him in a material respect, or if there was fraud or collusion: Campbell v Edwards [1976] 1 WLR 403; Jones v Sherwood Computer Services Plc [1992] 1 WLR 277; Nikko Hotels (UK) Ltd v MEPC plc [1991] 2 EGLR 103; Dlugash v Mayers [1997] 2 HKC 814; Lau Yee Ching v Wong Tak Kwong & Ors unrep. CACV 172/2006; 26 January 2007.

23.  In the present case, the parties have not expressly agreed to be bound by the Valuer’s reports and I am not prepared to go so far as to infer that they have impliedly agreed to be so bound simply on the basis that they have agreed on the identity of the Valuer and jointly appointed him to perform the task of valuation. On a subject as notoriously difficult as valuation of shares in a private company, any number of experts, however reasonable, can reasonably differ on the valuation. Unless some sensible restrictions are placed on the grounds on which an agreed expert’s determination can be challenged, the advantage to be gained from an out‑of-court share valuation by an independent expert (such as its relative speed and inexpensiveness) will become illusory. I would hold that, on a matter of opinion (as opposed to fact or law), unless patent errors can be demonstrated on the face of the report, the court should be very slow to intervene with the chosen expert’s determination solely on the ground that one party has subsequently found and engaged another expert who holds a different opinion: Kendall, Freedman & Farrell Expert Determination 4th Ed. para. 14.4.10; Campbell and Palmer v Crest Homes (Wessex) Ltd. unrep. ChD 13 November 1989.

24.  It is important to note that, in the present case, there is no suggestion that the Valuer has departed from the instructions given to him in a material way; in particular, there is no suggestion that the Valuer has failed to conduct an evaluation of the Company’s net asset value pursuant to the terms of the May 2011 Order. In so far as the Petitioners criticised the Valuer for not being truly independent, I find that criticism is no more than a bare assertion, unsupported by the evidence placed before this court.

25.  I now turn to the Petitioners’ challenges to the Supplemental Report.

Value of investment in CLC Limited, Goodwill of CLC Limited & Provision for Impairment Loss on loans to CLC Limited

26.  These three challenges are all concerned with CLC Limited and can be dealt with together.

27.  First, it is common ground that the Company has acquired a minority stake ie 1.4778% (225 shares) in CLC Limited at the historical (1998) cost of HK$350,000. The question is what was its value on 15 May 2007.

28.  The Valuer observed from the audited accounts of CLC Limited for the year ended 30 June 2007 that it had incurred significant operating losses over the years with an accumulated loss of HK$6,874,272 as at 30 June 2007. These losses had depleted the entire share capital of CLC Limited and resulted in a net assets deficit of over HK$5 million. These figures were not challenged by the Petitioner’s expert or in the September affirmation as such. On the basis of these figures, the directors of the Company had written down the carrying value of the shareholding in CLC Limited to HK$1 in its 2007 audited accounts. The Valuer took the same view and accorded the Company’s shareholding in CLC Limited a nominal value of HK$1, rather than its historical cost of HK$350,000. The Valuer’s view, based as it is on the figures in CLC Limited’s audited accounts, is entirely reasonable and prudent. I do not see what mistake the Valuer is said to have made. The only complaint discernable in the September affirmation was that CLC Limited had given special bonus to its directors in 2006. In my view, whether or not that was true, it was irrelevant.

29.  Second, the Petitioners’ own expert had previously opined that CLC Limited possessed goodwill value derived from its brand name and patented medicine sold in Hong Kong and overseas. The Petitioners’ expert further assessed this goodwill value at HK$37,978,871 (which figure did not appear in CLC Limited’s audited accounts) and attributed HK$2,136,311 to the Company as a value enhancement.

30.  The Valuer, on the other hand, took the view that no (upward) adjustment to the Company’s NAV on account of the goodwill of CLC Limited was required. He based his opinion on CLC Limited’s audited balance sheets as at 30 June 2004, 2007 and 2011 which did not show any intangible properties, whether brand name, patent or trademark, as assets of CLC Limited. He also took into consideration a note in CLC Limited’s 2004 audited accounts under “Principal Accounting Policies” that no value had been placed on the trademarks of the company. The latter was not challenged in the September affirmation as such – the Petitioners only insisted that CLC Limited possessed registered trademarks in the US and other countries, but without adducing any evidence in support of their expert’s assessment that the goodwill was worth anywhere near HK$37 million.

31.  As I observed earlier, CLC Limited’s 2007 audited accounts recorded a net assets deficit of over HK$5 million. The directors of the Company have accordingly written down its investment in CLC Limited to a nominal value of HK$1, which the Valuer agreed. Consistent with this approach, I fail to see how the Valuer can be criticised for rejecting the approach of the Petitioners’ expert in attributing the sum of HK$2,136,311, or any sum, to the Company as a value enhancement.

32.  Third, in CLC Limited’s 2007 audited accounts, its auditors had expressed concern of its ability to continue as a going concern. In view of CLC Limited’s doubtful ability to repay its loan in full to the Company, the directors have made a provision of HK$5,226,292 (out of a total of HK$5.9 million odd) in its 2007 audited accounts for impairment loss of the loan to CLC Limited. The Valuer has expressed his view in both reports that such a provision was in line with the concept of prudence in generally accepted accounting principles. The Petitioner’s expert in fact acknowledged that this was so at paragraph 2.9 of his report. There is therefore in fact no divergence of views between the experts on a matter of opinion, and the Petitioners’ complaint is baseless.

Valuation of the Property

33.  In the September affirmation, the Petitioners criticised the Valuer for not adopting the estimation of the Company’s directors in its 2007 audited accounts that the Property be valued at HK$15.8 million odd.

34.  The Valuer’s explanation was that the directors were not engaged in the real estate appraisal practice and were not qualified to express a professional opinion on the fair market value of the Property as at 15 May 2007. The Valuer therefore relied on outside professional surveyors instead. In the First Report, the Valuer adopted the opinion of Miss Lau Pik Yu Isabel of Jointgoal Surveyors Limited, a registered professional surveyor, who gave a valuation of HK$11.2 million. In preparing the Supplemental Report, the Valuer took a second opinion from the firm CBRE HK Limited which gave a slightly higher valuation of HK$12.1 million. After reviewing both, the Valuer decided to adopt the higher valuation.

35.  This Court realises that real estate valuation is an art and not a science and the opinions of professional surveyors may often vary by a margin, sometimes a wide margin. A fortiori, the opinions of professional surveyors compared to non-professionals such as the Company’s directors. It is a matter of professional judgment whether the Valuer should simply rely on the Company directors’ estimation at the time or to entrust the task to professional surveyors. In my view, the Valuer’s approach in preferring the opinions of outside professional surveyors is sound and within the ambit of his instructions. Further, having obtaining a second professional opinion which was in line, albeit not identical, with the first, the Valuer was entitled to adopt the valuation of HK$12.1 million as the value of the Property. The criticism of the Petitioners in this regard is not justified.

Legal expenses

36.  As best as this court tries to understand, the complaint seems to be this. The Petitioners’ expert alleged, at paragraph 2.8 of his report, that the Company had paid legal fees in the sum of HK$320,000 to Messrs Rowland Chow, Chan and Company for their services relating to these proceedings. In his opinion, these legal fees were unrelated to the Company’s business and should therefore be added back to the Company’s NAV as at 15 May 2007.

37.  The opinion makes no sense to this court. Either the expenses were incurred by the Company or they were not. The fact that these were legal and not business expenses is neither here nor there. It might be different if there were a court order precluding the Company from incurring legal expenses (or disallowing legal expenses already incurred) in relation to what was essentially a shareholders’ dispute, in accordance with established authorities such as Re Crossmore Electrical and Civil Engineering [1989] BCLC 137 and Re CG & L Investment Ltd. [1992] 1 HKC 78. But there is no suggestion by the Petitioners that Barma J had made such an order. It would certainly be different if Barma J had found that incurring such legal expenses was itself an unfairly prejudicial act on the part of the majority shareholders and should be reversed. But there was no such finding or direction in the Judgment.

Adoption of market value for waived rents and judgment rate

38.  The Petitioners’ suggestion that the Valuer should have used market rents of the Property and judgment rate as the interest rate for waived rents in adjusting the NAV of the Company is baseless and can be dealt with briefly.

39.  At paragraph 55 of the Judgment, Barma J directed that the NAV of the Company should be adjusted to ignore the Company’s agreement to waive CLC Limited’s outstanding or future rentals of the Property as this was an unfairly prejudicial act and should be reversed. This is exactly what the Valuer did at paragraph 14 of the First Report. There is no evidence before this court that the actual rent agreed between the Company and CLC Limited at the time was lower than the market rent and the learned Judge did not direct the Valuer to adjust the NAV of the Company by ignoring the rent actually agreed between the Company and CLC Limited ie HK$43,000 and replacing it with the market rent of the Property, whatever that might be. In my view, the Valuer has made proper adjustments in accordance with the Judgment and cannot be faulted.

40.  As far as interest rate is concerned, there was no judgment in favour of the Company against CLC Limited in respect of the waived rents (or outstanding loan for that matter) as at 15 May 2007. There was also no direction from Barma J in the Judgment that the Valuer should add back interest at judgment rate on the waived rent (or outstanding loan for that matter) in adjusting the Company’s NAV as at 15 May 2007. In making the adjustment, the Valuer has adopted the interest rate of 2.5% which was the rate approved by the Company’s board of directors and mutually agreed in 2003 by the Company and CLC Limited in respect of the outstanding loan. In my view, it is not unreasonable for the Valuer to adopt a uniform interest rate for waived rents as well as outstanding loan in adjusting the Company’s NAV as at 15 May 2007, and what he has done is within the ambit of the direction given to him in paragraph 55 of the Judgment.

Repayment of shareholders’ loans

41.  Lastly, for reasons incomprehensible to this court, the Petitioners (and their expert) take the view that the amounts allegedly due to them from the Company should be repaid at the same time when the Company completes the buyout of their shares.

42.  As far as this court can ascertain from the Judgment, there was no finding that the amounts allegedly due to the Petitioners were in fact due and immediately payable, and there was no direction by Barma J that the shareholders’ loans, if any, should be repaid at the same time as the completion of the buyout. This is not surprising since there was no such claim in the Petition itself.  In these circumstances, this court is not prepared to make an Order to that effect in these proceedings. The Petitioners will have to make a demand on the Company, and, if necessary, take separate legal proceedings for repayment of the loans.

D.      Disposition and Costs

43.  For the reasons set out above, this court is not minded to disturb the revised valuation made by the Valuer in the Supplemental Report. I hereby make an order as follows:

a. the Petitioners’ shares in the Company, whether Class A or Class B, be valued at HK$1,215.71 per share;

b.   the Company do pay each of the Petitioners the purchase price for their shares in the Company in accordance with the valuation aforesaid, and interest, if any; such payment to be made by bankers draft on a date to be agreed between the Petitioners and the Company, such date to be not later than 60 days from the date hereof;

c.    concurrent with the payment by the Company of the purchase price and interest, if any, on the date to be agreed, each of the Petitioners shall execute all bought and sold notes, instruments of transfer and other documents reasonably required by the Company to effect the transfer of the Petitioners’ shares to the Company;

d.   liberty to apply.

44.  So far as interest on the purchase price is concerned, unless the payment and the calculation of the same is agreed, I will give leave to the parties to file with this Court, and exchange among themselves, written submissions on whether interest should be payable, and if yes, the rate of interest and the period for which it is payable, within 14 days from the date hereof.

45.  So far as costs are concerned, I will give leave to the parties to file with this Court, and exchange among themselves, written submissions on costs, including all costs previously reserved, within 14 days from the date hereof.

46.  Upon receiving the parties’ written submissions, or, if no submissions are received from either or both parties, upon the expiry of 14 days from the date hereof, this court shall thereafter dispose of the question of interest and costs on paper.

(Peter Ng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The petitioners appeared in person

Mr John J E Swaine, instructed by Rowland Chow, Chan & Co, for the respondents

Attendance of the Official Receiver was excused

71007-EN-2010-05-14

CHAN LUEN YAN AND OTHERS v. CHAN TIN CHAI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 211/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO. 211 OF 2007

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 IN THE MATTER OF GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 168A AND 177(1)(f) OF THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE, CAP. 32

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BETWEEN  
 CHAN LUEN YAN   1st Petitioner
 CHAN HIN TUNG   2nd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN FAI3rd Petitioner
 CHAN LUEN CHEUNG4th Petitioner
 And 
 CHAN TIN CHAI1st Respondent
 CHAN HIN KAI 2nd Respondent
    CHAN HIN KUEN MICKY 3rd Respondent
   CHAN HIN CHEUNG PAUL   4th Respondent
  CHAN BO YU  5th Respondent
 CHAN MO YIN 6th Respondent
 CHAN TAT CHAI7th Respondent
 CHAN HIN CHAI8th Respondent
   CHAN NAM THOMAS   9th Respondent
 CHAN LOON FONG   10th Respondent
 GOLDSFINE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED11th Respondent

 

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Before:  Hon Barma J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 1, 2, 3 and 30 April 2009

Date of Judgment: 14 May 2010

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  By these proceedings, the Petitioners seek relief under sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32) in respect of a company called Goldsfine Development Limited (“Goldsfine”).  Under section 168A, they seek an order that the 1st to 10th Respondents purchase their shares in Goldsfine at a price to be determined by reference to the net asset value per share as at the date of the petition.  Under section 177(1)(f), they seek, as an alternative, an order for the winding up of Goldsfine on the just and equitable ground.

2.  The Petitioners are Chan Luen Yan, Chan Hin Tung, Chan Luen Fai and Chan Luen Cheung (the 1st to 4th Petitioners respectively).  The 1st to 10th Respondents are, respectively, Chan Tin Chai, Chan Hin Kai, Chan Hin Kuen Micky, Chan Hin Cheung Paul, Chan Bo Yu, Chan Mo Yin, Chan Tat Chai, Chan Hin Chai, Chan Nam Thomas and Chan Loon Fong.  Goldsfine is the 11th Respondent.

3.  All of the individuals who are parties to these proceedings share a common surname.  They are all members of the same extended family, but are from different branches of it.  The 1st, 3rd and 4th Petitioners are brothers.  The 2nd Petitioner (who is from a different branch of the family) is the brother of the 9th Respondent.  The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents are also brothers, from a further branch of the family.  For the most part, the remaining Respondents each come from further and different branches of the family.

4.  In order to appreciate the background against which Goldsfine came into existence, it is necessary to have regard to certain aspects of the family history.

5.  It is common ground that all of the Chans who are parties to these proceedings are members of a Chinese family tong known as the Chan Him Muk Tong.  Since about the early twentieth century, members of the Chan Him Muk Tong have, together with members of another Chinese family tong known as the Li King Sun Tong, operated a Chinese medicine business in Hong Kong known as Chan Li Chai or Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (“Chan Li Chai”).

6.  Apart from the Hong Kong business, there was also in existence in China a Chinese medicine business of the same name, with a history going back some three or four hundred years.  It is not entirely clear, however, whether the Hong Kong business was a continuation of the Chinese business, or whether it was a separate business set up by certain members of the Chan and Li families in Hong Kong using their own personal funds.  Although this question was of some importance in the context of other proceedings, in which a claim was made that the Hong Kong business was one to which all members of the Chinese tong (and not just the various branches of the family that had settled in Hong Kong by the early twentieth century) were interested, it is not a matter that needs to be resolved for the purposes of these proceedings.

7.  The Hong Kong Chan Li Chai business had, since the 1920s until the mid- 1990s operated from premises in Belcher’s Street and Queen’s Road Central.  These premises were acquired in the 1920s, and were held at various times in the names of certain members of the Chan and Li families, who were the managers of Chan Li Chai from time to time.

8.  In July 1952, the Chan Li Chai business was registered as a partnership under the then recently enacted Business Regulation Ordinance.  In September 1952, the two properties were assigned to four individuals who were managers of the business – two members of the Chan family and two members of the Li family – as tenants in common in equal shares.  The two managers from the Chan family declared that they held their interests in the property for what was described as “the Chan family tong”

9.  Thereafter, in 1975, having apparently been advised that the partnership was no longer a valid one in law, the Chan and Li family tongs agreed, through meetings of their representatives, to convert the partnership and its business into a limited company.  They did so making use of a limited company, which had earlier been incorporated under the name of Chan Li Chai Medical Factory (Hong Kong) Company Limited (“CLC Ltd”).  The two properties, however, were not transferred to CLC Ltd – instead, they remained vested in the four individuals, and on their later passing away, became vested in their respective personal representatives.

10.  From 1992 onwards, various proceedings were taken in relation to the properties.  The object seems to have been to enable the properties to be sold and the proceeds shared between the two families.

11.  First, CLC Ltd brought proceedings against the then titleholders (i.e. the personal representatives of the four individuals who had been tenants in common of the properties) seeking declarations that CLC Ltd had title to the properties and orders for sale.  Initially, CLC Ltd was owned as to 50% by members of the Chan family and 50% by members of the Li family, but by around the time of CLC Ltd’s claim, the shareholdings had changed (the changes are described in paragraph 14 below), and only one member of the Li family still had an interest in CLC Ltd.  The proceedings were settled as between CLC Ltd and the personal representatives of the former managers from the Chan family.  Under the settlement, it was agreed that the personal representatives of former managers from the Chan family should assign the shares in the property that were held by them to CLC Limited.  Such assignments were made in September 1995.  No settlement was reached with the personal representatives of the former managers from the Li family, perhaps because by this time, the Li family’s interest in CLC Ltd had been reduced.

12.  Thereafter, an application was made by CLC Ltd against the personal representatives of the former managers from the Li family under the Partitions Ordinance seeking orders for sale of the properties and directions for the disposition of the sales proceeds.  Orders for sale were made, and it was directed that the net sales proceeds of each property should be divided into two equal parts, one of which should be paid to CLC Ltd, and the other to the personal representatives of the former managers representing the Li family.  When the two properties were sold, they fetched a total of HK$120.1 million, of which HK$60 odd million should have been paid to CLC Ltd.

13.  However, the fact that a member of the Li family was still a shareholder of CLC Ltd complicated matters.

14.  Initially, each of the Chan and Li families had owned 50% of the shares of CLC Ltd.  Two members of the Li family each held 45 shares in CLC Ltd, while ten members of the Chan family (each of whom was apparently from a a different branch of the family) held the other 90 shares (all but two held 9 shares each, with the remainder holding 10 and 8 shares respectively – the reason for this difference was not explained and does not appear to be relevant).  Over time, the share capital of CLC Ltd was increased from 180 shares to 4,500 shares.  Of these, half (2,250) were divided equally between members of the Chan family from the ten branches to which I have referred.  With the exception of the branch of the family consisting of Chan Po Chai and his sons, the 2nd to 4th Respondents, one member of each branch of the family held 225 shares.  In the case of Chan Po Chai and the 2nd to 4th Respondents, each of the sons held 70 shares, while the father held 15 shares.  The remaining 2,250 shares were held as to 750 by a Mr Hans Li, and as to 1,500 by a company called All Able Development Ltd (“All Able”).  By mid-1996, All Able, which had formerly been owned by members of the Li family, had become owned by certain members of the Chan family, but not all those who had interests in CLC Ltd – in particular, the no-one from the branch of the family of whom the 1st Petitioner was a part had any interest in All Able.

15.   As a result of Mr Hans Li’s shareholding in CLC Ltd, payment of a half share of the proceeds to CLC Ltd would have meant that some members of the Li family would additionally benefit to the extent of his shareholding in CLC Ltd, with the result that the Li family would, overall, obtain more than half of the value of the properties (as the other half share had been paid to parties representing them, to the exclusion of the Chan family).  In addition, the interests of the different branches of the Chan family in the sale proceeds would not be equal, as a result of certain branches having a greater interest in CLC Ltd through their interests in All Able.

16.  This led eventually to an arrangement being reached with a view to ensuring that the half share of the sale proceeds that were to be paid to CLC Ltd would enure for the benefit of the Chan family alone in broadly equal shares for each branch.  This was achieved by way of a Deed of Compromise dated 22 January 1998, to which I refer below.

17.  Prior to that, however, Goldsfine had been acquired by members of the Chan family.  Although the family consisted of ten branches, not all ten of the branches of the family took up an interest in Goldfine – only individuals from eight branches of the family did so.  The branch of the Chan family consisting of the descendants of Chan Sum Yu and the branch consisting of Chan Luen Kai, Albert and his relatives did not.  Broadly speaking, the interests in Goldfine corresponded to the interests in the 2,250 shares in CLC Ltd that were held by individuals from the various branches of the Chan family, with the exception of the two branches that did not acquire any interest in Goldsfine.

18.  Goldsfine had by this time entered into an agreement to acquire property known as Units A1 and A2 of the 2nd and 3rd floors (Block A) and a car parking space at No. 40 Lee Chung Street, Hong Kong (“the Property”).  The Property was later rented out to CLC Limited.

19.  The Deed of Compromise was entered into between CLC Ltd and nine members of the Chan family, namely, the eight branches of which members took up shares in Goldsfine, together with the branch of which Chan Luen Kai, Albert was a member.  No member from the branch consisting of the descendants of Chan Sum Yu was a party to the Deed.  Instead, it had been agreed between the Chans that a cash payment representing its share of the proceeds of sale should be made to the Chan Sum Yu branch of the family.  Under the Deed of Compromise, CLC Ltd agreed that its half share of the net sale proceeds of the two properties from which it had operated, less various agreed deductions, should be paid to the nine Chans who were parties to the Deed of Compromise.  The deductions included an amount for the acquisition of the Property, an amount of HK$350,000 to be paid to the administratrix of Chan Sum Yu’s estate for the acquisition by Goldsfine of the estate’s 225 shares in CLC Ltd, and various amounts in respect of legal costs.

20.  The Deed recited, incorrectly, that the nine Chans who were parties to it were all the extant male members of the Chan Him Muk Tong.  Although each of the nine Chans were from a different branch of the family, they were not in fact all the extant male members of the family, and thus could not have been the same persons as were then interested in whatever property the Tong might then have.

21.  After the payment of the agreed deductions, there remained a substantial balance that was payable in accordance with the directions of the nine Chans who were parties to the Deed of Settlement.  In the result, it appears to have been agreed that a distribution should be made to all the Chan shareholders of CLC Ltd at the rate of HK$3,000 per share.  Initially, it was proposed to make a similar payment to All Able, but this was subsequently revoked.  According to the 1st Petitioner, this was a result of his having protested against making such a payment to All Able, as the making of such a payment would have meant that those members of the family who had interests in All Able would receive a larger share than the others, who did not.  Certain other payments were also agreed upon, and the balance remaining was later paid into Goldsfine, and treated as shareholders’ loans by the then shareholders.

22.  A little later, the branch of the Chan family consisting of Chan Luen Kai, Albert and his immediate relatives indicated that they did not wish to be shareholders of Goldsfine either.  It was eventually agreed that a further payment would be made to Chan Luen Kai, Albert and that he would not take up any shares in Goldsfine.  Unlike the Chan Sum Yu branch of the family, however, Chan Luen Kai, Albert did not sell his shares in CLC Ltd to Goldsfine, and has remained a shareholder of CLC Ltd throughout.

23.  The shares in Goldsfine were divided into two types – Class A shares with a par value of HK$10 each, and Class B shares with a par value of HK$1 each.  The shares carried different voting rights.  In broad terms, shareholders from each of the eight branches of the Chan family who took up shares in Goldsfine obtained 225 Class A shares, while only shareholders from six of the eight branches obtained Class B shares, each branch obtaining about 250 Class B shares.  This appears to have been done by agreement between the shareholders.

24.  As at around the beginning of 1998, the shareholdings in Goldsfine, CLC Ltd and All Able were as indicated in Annex A.  It will be observed from Annex A that the interests of the various branches of the Chan family in Goldsfine were not quite identical (as a result of two shareholders having no Class B shares).  More importantly, however, the Class A shareholdings, while broadly corresponding in more or less the same proportions to the shareholdings of each branch of the family in CLC Ltd that were held through individuals, did not correspond to the interests of each branch in CLC Ltd when the shareholdings held through All Able were taken into account.  As All Able held 1,500 shares in CLC Ltd, the five branches of the family who had interests in All Able (those of the 1st, 2nd/3rd/4th, 6th, 9th and 10th Respondents) each had an interest in a further 250 or 300 shares in CLC Ltd, resulting in their direct and indirect interests in CLC Ltd being just over double that of the other branches of the family.

25.  On 22 January 1998, the same day as the Deed of Compromise was entered into, the eight members of the Chan family who were to take up shares in Goldsfine agreed that the surplus funds from the sale of the two properties, amounting to some HK$25.9 million, should be injected into Goldsfine, and treated as shareholders’ loans in the same proportions as the intended shareholdings of each shareholder in Goldsfine.  It was also agreed that any transfer of shares in Goldsfine by a shareholder should be accompanied by an assignment of his shareholder’s loan, and that the shareholder’s loans should be repayable only with the approval of Goldsfine’s board of directors.

26.  Thereafter, Goldsfine leased part of the Property to CLC Ltd, and leased the remaining part to another tenant.  It also seems to have placed some of its excess funds on deposit or in investments in shares, and to have made occasional loans to its shareholders, on terms that involved the payment of interest.  Occasional payments were made to the shareholders – although these seem to have been regarded by them as dividend payments, they were treated as repayments of shareholder’s loans so far as Goldsfine was concerned.

27.  However, the relationship between the various shareholders in Goldsfine did not run smoothly.  The 1st Petitioner soon began to complain about the way in which Goldsfine and CLC Ltd were being run.  Initially, the complaints seem to have related to the number of relatives who were employed by CLC Ltd.  Further complaints were made as to:-

(1) allegedly unauthorised loans by Goldsfine to CLC Ltd;

(2) a decision at an EGM of CLC Ltd to raise funds by way of a rights issue, the alleged failure by CLC Ltd to give notice of such meeting to Goldsfine, and a decision by Goldsfine (made at an EGM held the same day) not to subscribe for its entitlement under the rights issue, but instead to effect repayments of the shareholder’s loans so as to enable individual shareholders to subscribe for their entitlements instead;

(3) the failure by Goldsfine to take steps to recover outstanding rentals and loans due from CLC Ltd, and a subsequent decision in January 2005 to defer repayment of such loans for 18 months, to waive rental for a similar period, and to make all loans to CLC Ltd interest free with effect from 1 November 2004 onwards

28.  When the Petitioners instructed lawyers to complain about these matters, solicitors acting on behalf of CLC Ltd responded to the effect that the individual shareholders had no real interest in the assets of Goldsfine, which were, or should be regarded as, held on trust (or as nominee) for CLC Ltd. The Petitioners also complain about this stance, saying that it amounts to a denial of their beneficial interest in Goldsfine and as such is a further form of unfairly prejudicial conduct.

29.  As the parties were unable to resolve their differences, the Petitioners brought these proceedings.  Their petition was supported by affirmation evidence from the 1st Petitioner.  On the Respondents’ side, evidence was provided through an affirmation made by the 3rd Respondent, who had by the time the proceedings commenced become the chairman of Goldsfine’s board of directors, in which he adhered to the contention that Goldsfine was no more than a nominee or trustee for CLC Ltd, and that its assets were thus to be used to support the business of CLC Ltd.

30.  At the trial, the Petitioner’s position was that they were the beneficial owners of the shares in Goldsfine that were registered in their respective names, and that Goldsfine did not hold its assets as a nominee or trustee for CLC Ltd (as the Respondents claimed), so that the insistence by the Respondents that Goldsfine should simply be viewed as a source of support for CLC Ltd, and the actions by the Respondents of which complaint was made, amounted to conduct that entitled the Petitioners to relief under either section 168A or section 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance.

31.  The Respondent’s position at trial was, however, no longer that which had been taken in the pre-action correspondence and the evidence filed on their behalf.  Instead, Mr Swaine, who appeared for the Respondents, suggested that the correct approach was to seek to ascertain the purpose for which Goldsfine was set up, and to consider the matters complained of in the context of that purpose.  Adopting that approach, he contended that while it would not be appropriate to suggest that Goldsfine’s purpose was to act as a nominee for CLC Ltd, or to be a trustee of its assets for CLC Ltd, it was nonetheless the case that the mutual understanding between the shareholders of Goldsfine, at the time that it was set up, was that it should act as a source of support for CLC Ltd, which was carrying on the business out of which Goldsfine’s assets were derived.  On that basis, Mr Swaine submitted, there was nothing unfair or prejudicial about Goldsfine providing such support by making loans to CLC Ltd, or leasing its property to CLC Ltd.  Nor was there anything unfair or prejudicial about Goldsfine choosing (through a majority of its shareholders and directors) to provide such support on terms that might, in other circumstances, seem uncommercial.

32.  In my view, Mr Swaine’s abandonment of the suggestion that Goldsfine was a nominee of, or trustee for, CLC Ltd was sensible.  Given the history which I have described above, such a suggestion was, I think, a non-starter.  The whole point of the entering into of the arrangements embodied in the Deed of Compromise was to ensure that the half-share of the proceeds of sale of the two properties formerly occupied by CLC Ltd should remain in the hands of members of the Chan family, a purpose which would not be achieved by allowing such proceeds to be left in the ownership of CLC Ltd, which had among its shareholders a member of the Li family.  Further, as I have also noted, leaving such proceeds in the ownership of CLC Ltd would also have meant that different branches of the Chan family would have different and unequal interests in the proceeds, given that some branches of the family had acquired proportionately greater interests in CLC Ltd through their acquisition of All Able from the Li family.  In these circumstances, to regard Goldsfine as no more than a nominee for, or trustee of its assets for, CLC Ltd would be to render the Deed of Compromise a pointless exercise, and would have simply put things back into the position they would have been in had the Deed of Compromise never been entered into, and the sale proceeds simply allowed to remain in the ownership of CLC Ltd.

33.  It is therefore necessary, in my view, to ascertain what (if anything) had been agreed by the shareholders in Goldsfine at the time that the balance of the proceeds of sale of the two properties was transferred to it.  Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward task.  It was clear from their evidence at the trial that neither the 1st Petitioner nor the 3rd Respondent had any real knowledge of the detailed thinking behind the entering into of the Deed of Compromise, and they were thus unable to throw any real light on it.  All that they could say was that the object was to ensure that the half share of the sale proceeds should go to the Chans, and not be left with CLC Ltd where the Lis would also have some claim to it.  The 3rd Respondent said that, as a younger member of the Chan family at the time, he had left matters in the hands of his uncles, who (being members of the senior generation) had primary responsibility for making the arrangements.  Although the 1st Petitioner did not appear to accept that everything was left to two of the more senior members of the family to arrange, he too was unable to speak with any personal knowledge of the arrangements that were made.

34.  Mr Wong, who appeared for the Petitioners, argued that a purpose of the nature asserted by the Respondents could only arise if it were first established that the proceeds of sale of the two properties belonged to the Chan family tong, rather than to the individual shareholders in Goldsfine personally.

35.  He went on to submit that the proceeds of sale did not belong to the Chan family tong, and in fact belonged to the individual shareholders of Goldsfine in their personal capacity, as a result of the Deed of Compromise.

36.  Mr Wong’s first argument in support of this contention was to suggest that the Deed of Compromise showed that the nine members of the Chan family who were defined by the Deed as “the Chan Group”, were not the same as the “Chan Tong”, as that was a separately defined term in the Deed.  However, it is clear from the Deed that the Chan Group was defined as the nine persons who were signatories to the Deed, and that they were also described as the only extant male members of the Chan Tong.  Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the Deed referred in a number of clauses (e.g. clauses 9, 10 and 11) to the “Chan Group” and the “Chan Tong” as if they were different groups of persons, there was in fact no difference between the two groups (and thus the Chan Group and the Chan Tong) so far as the persons making up the two groups of persons (as defined in the Deed) were concerned.  I therefore do not think that this point takes matters very far.

37.  Mr Wong also submitted that the Deed of Compromise made it clear that the nine Chans who were parties to it were asserting a personal claim to the proceeds of sale, and that such claim was accepted by CLC Ltd.  However, in the course of cross-examination, the 1st Petitioner accepted on more than one occasion that he understood that in becoming a party to the Deed of Compromise, he was acting in some sense as a representative of at least the other members of his branch of the Chan family.  He accepted, for example, that when he received any payments out of the proceeds of sale, he would share these with his brothers (and sisters).  He also accepted that if he (or one of the other shareholders) were to take the entire benefit of their shareholding in Goldsfine for himself, this would be something for which he would be answerable to other members of his branch of the family (but not to the other branches of the Chan family).  Having regard to this evidence, it would not seem that the nine persons who were parties to the Deed in fact regarded themselves as wholly entitled to the sales proceeds for their own account, to the exclusion of other members of the family.  However, as Mr Wong pointed out, this did not mean that the proceeds of sale were not intended to be paid to the nine individuals named in the Deed of Compromise, subject to some obligation on their part to deal with them in a manner that took account of the interests of their branch of the family.

38.  But Mr Wong also relied on other matters in support of his contention.  He pointed to the fact that two branches of the family were allowed to, in effect, withdraw their shares of the sale proceeds as an indication that the proceeds should not be regarded as the property of the Chan family tong, and to the fact that there were from time to time distributions of substantial sums to the nine individual shareholders as indicating that they had personal interests.  It seems to me that these factors do tend to suggest that after the entry into of the Deed of Compromise, the proceeds were to be dealt with as determined by the nine individual Chans, rather than as if they were in some sense the property of the Chan family tong.

39.  Moreover, Mr Swaine did not seriously suggest that the half share of the sales proceeds should be regarded as the property of the Chan Tong, recognising that there were substantial difficulties in the way of any suggestion that a Tong is capable of owning property other than New Territories land.

40.  I am therefore of the view that the half share of the sale proceeds of the two properties were to be dealt with as decided by the nine individuals, albeit that they may have been expected to have regard to the interests of their respective branches of the family in doing so.

41.  Nonetheless, I do not think that this is conclusive of anything in the petitioners’ favour.  The question remains: the parties to the Deed of Compromise having decided that a substantial part of the proceeds of sale of the two properties should be injected into Goldsfine, what, if anything, had they agreed about the purpose for which Goldsfine had been set up and how the funds so injected should be used by Goldsfine?

42.  As to this, the 3rd Respondent’s evidence was that he understood the purpose of Goldsfine to be to support CLC Ltd.  However, he was unable to articulate the basis for this understanding on his part, other than to suggest that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Chan family and the Chan Tong for the assets of Goldsfine to be used in any other way.

43.  The 1st Petitioner disputed this, saying that the purpose of Goldsfine was simply to act as an investment holding company, to make such investments as were agreed upon by its shareholders.

44.  Given the paucity of direct evidence as to the intentions of the persons concerned it is necessary to have regard to all of the circumstances in seeking to ascertain whether or not Goldsfine was set up with the purpose contended for by the Respondents.  It is, however, important to bear in mind that that purpose calls for, in effect, the interests of the members of Goldsfine to be subordinated to the interests of CLC Ltd.

45.  The fact that the source of Goldsfine’s funding was from properties formerly occupied and used by CLC Ltd’s predecessor firm, Chan Li Chai, which was in turn a long-established business of the Chan family tong provides some support for the suggestion that members of the family might wish to continue to provide support for the business.  But even if it is accepted that there was a general intention to provide support for CLC Ltd, the question that must still be answered is what the nature of that support was to be:  was it to be the total and virtually unlimited support which the Respondents’ case ultimately entails, or was it to be something less?

46.  The various payments out that were made, such as the distributions in proportion to the individuals’ shareholdings in January 1998, and payments to particular branches or members of the family approved at a meeting on 19 January 1998, while suggesting that the funds were to be used as determined by the nine individuals, does not take matters much further when it comes to seeking to ascertain what agreement might have been made as to how Goldsfine’s assets were to be used.

47.  In my view, the matter weighing most strongly against the case advanced by the Respondents is the divergence in the underlying beneficial interests of the various shareholders in Goldsfine and CLC Ltd.  Even leaving aside the fact that Mr Hans Li appeared to have retained an interest in CLC Ltd, the more important difference relates to the differences in the interests of the various branches of the Chan family.  As I have already noted, some branches of the family (all of whom are on the Respondent’s side of the divide) have almost twice the interest in CLC Ltd through their shareholdings in All Able as compared to the interest in CLC Ltd of those branches of the family which did not own any shares in All Able.  Thus, whenever Goldsfine confers a benefit on CLC Ltd, but does not get anything in return, the branches of the family benefit in unequal proportions.  Those with additional interests in CLC Ltd through All Able obtain an additional benefit, while those having no such interests suffer a corresponding disadvantage.  It seems to me inherently unlikely that the parties would have agreed at the outset to such an arrangement.

48.  Further, the incident relating to the proposal to distribute HK$3,000 for each share held in CLC Limited, in which it was initially decided that the distribution should extend to All Able, but subsequently decided that it should not, provides, in my view, cogent support for the view that the persons involved were conscious of this fact, and accepted that the funds deriving from the sale of the two properties should be regarded as funds to which each branch of the family had an equal claim.  Although this incident might be said to precede the injection of funds into Goldsfine, there is no reason to think that the injection of the balance of the funds into Goldsfine was intended to make any difference, so as to permit them to be used to benefit different branches of the Chan family differently.  Similarly, the very fact that the interests in Goldsfine were, as between the various branches of the family, more or less equal, tends to suggest that  the interests in the proceeds of sale were to be shared equally among the different branches.  It would be inconsistent with this if Goldsfine were to to serve the sole purpose of providing unlimited support for CLC Ltd, thus giving different branches unequal benefits from the use of the funds they had allowed to be injected into Goldsfine.

49.  Moreover, while the facts that the property purchased by Goldsfine was made available to CLC Ltd, and loans were made to CLC Ltd from time to time might be regarded as the giving of support, it must be borne in mind that so far as the property was concerned, it was occupied under a tenancy agreement, under which rent was payable by Goldsfine, and so far as the loans were concerned, they were (initially, at any rate) interest bearing.  Thus, neither of these situations represented unqualified support in a way that would benefit CLC Ltd at the expense of Goldsfine.  On the contrary, in the earlier stages, matters were dealt with in such a way that Goldsfine received consideration for the support which it provided to CLC Ltd.  This would indicate, to my mind, that while there might have been a desire to provide CLC Ltd with some support or facilities, it was at the outset the intention that this should be done in a way that provided compensating benefits for Goldsfine, so that the persons interested in Goldsfine would not be, in effect, subsidising CLC Ltd.

50.  Mr Swaine was critical of the attitude adopted by the Petitioners, contending that their approach ignored the family history and amounted to a suggestion that the nine individuals were appropriating to themselves the benefit of the assets of the family business.  However, having regard to the fact that the 1st Petitioner in fact did conduct himself, vis-à-vis his siblings, as in effect their representative, going so far as to transfer part of his shareholding to his two brothers, I do not think that this criticism was really justified.

51.  I am therefore not persuaded that the purpose of Goldsfine was to provide support for CLC Ltd in such a way as would require it to subordinate its interests to those of CLC Ltd.

52.  That being so, it seems to me that the decision in January 2005 to grant CLC Ltd a waiver of rent for 18 months, and to make all loans to CLC Ltd interest free from November 2004 onwards would be conduct by the majority that was unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the Petitioners, as the effect was to benefit the majority (through their additional shareholdings in CLC Ltd) at the expense of the minority.

53.  On the other hand, I do not think that the mere fact that loans were from time to time made to CLC Ltd would amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct.  Only two loans were identified by the Petitioners, of which the larger was repaid shortly after it was made.  So long as interest was charged on any outstanding balances, the Petitioners would not appear to have good grounds for complaint.

54.  Similarly, the decision to make a distribution to shareholders by way of partial repayment of shareholders loans, so as to enable them to subscribe for shares in CLC Ltd directly when CLC Ltd decided to raise funds by way of a rights issue, does not seem to be particularly unfair or prejudicial.  While it is true that the result was that Goldsfine itself did not subscribe for its share of the rights issue and suffered a dilution of its interests in CLC Ltd, the shareholders individually were given the means to invest directly in CLC Ltd if they wished to do so.  If some received less than others because of earlier advances made to them by Goldsfine, which were set off against such payments, that was not unfair, as they had already had the benefit of the earlier loans.

55.  The approach taken by the Respondents, in particular their insistence on the notion that Goldsfine exists to provide total support for CLC Ltd, suggests that, if nothing is done, matters are likely to continue in the same vein in future.  In these circumstances, it seems to me that there the appropriate way in which to deal with the unfairly prejudicial conduct, which is likely to continue so long as the Respondents are in control of Goldsfine, is by requiring the company itself to buy out the shares of the Petitioners on the basis of its net asset value as at the date of the petition, adjusted so as to include interest on outstanding loans and advances by Goldsfine to CLC Ltd and all arrears of rental (ignoring any agreement by Goldsfine to waive outstanding or future rents).  The parties should seek to agree on the identity of a valuer and any consequential matters, but may apply to the court for directions if they are unable to agree.

56.  So far as the costs of the proceedings are concerned, the Petitioners having succeeded in obtaining the primary relief sought, I make an order nisi that the Respondents are to pay the Petitioners’ costs of the proceedings, inclusive of any previously reserved costs, such costs to be taxed on the party and party basis if not agreed.

 (Aarif Bama)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr. Jason Wong instructed by Messrs Chan, Wong & Lam, for the Petitioner

Mr. John J.E. Swaine instructed by Messrs Rowland Chow, Chan & Co., for the Respondent

Attendance excused for the Official Receiver

ANNEX A

Name of ShareholderGoldsfine (A Shares)Goldsfine (B shares)CLC LtdAll Able
Chan Luen Yan (P1)225250225-
Chan Tin Chai (R1)225249*225 1,000
Chan Po Chai (father of R2, 3 & 4)   15   10
Chan Hin Kai (R2)75 8370 330
Chan Hin Kuen Micky (R3)758470330
Chan Hin Cheung Paul (R4)758370330
Chan Bo Yu (R5)225-225-
Chan Chun (father of R6) --225 1,000
Chan Mo Yin (R6)225 250   
Chan Tat Chai (R7)225-2251,500
Chan Che Chin (father of R9)---1,500  
Chan Nam Thomas (R9)225250225-
Chan Loon Fong (R10)225---
Chan Loon Shu (brother of R10)-249*225 1,500
Chan Luen Kai Albert--225-
GoldsfineN/AN/A225-
All Able --1,500N/A
Hans Li--750-
TOTAL1,8001,5004,0006,000