Case Detail

HCMA 311/2007

[2018] HKCFI 55

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 311 OF 2007

________________________

BETWEEN
	HKSAR	Receiving Party
	and
	LI CHUN TING	Paying Party

________________________

Before: Mr Registrar K. W. Lung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 9 January 2018

Date of Decision: 16 January 2018

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

The review

1. On 4 August 2017, I taxed the bill of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for a criminal appeal and I had, on the same day, delivered a reasoned Decision in writing (“Decision”).

2. This application for review of my Decision is made by DOJ, under sections 7 and 8 of Cap. 492A. Section 8 provides that the procedures for the application are the same as those provided under Order 62, rule 33 of the Rules of the High Court.

3. DOJ is represented by Ms. Anna YK Lai, SC, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and Mr. Jonathan Lin, Senior Public Prosecutor. The paying party is present in person.

4. The issues for review are as follows:

(a)   “Before the hourly rates for party and party charges have been fixed by the special committee, the standing rates as the one in July 1997 to date should apply.”: §11 lines R-T of the Decision;
(b)   “For usual bills of criminal appeals, the standard rates for government counsel and the staff in accordance with the July 1997 table should apply and be strictly adhered to.”: §15(a) of the Decision; and
(c)   “… it is a misconception that a solicitor who will do the work of a solicitor and that of a barrister should receive higher rate of charges as this is not found in any of the authorities or in our statutes.”: §11 lines L-N of the Decision.

5. DOJ has made it clear that the purpose of this review is to clarify the above directions given in the Decision so as to facilitate the drafting of the bills for criminal matters. It will not ask for a variation of the amount as taxed and also it will not ask for costs against the paying party whatever the result of this Court today. The paying party is content with DOJ’s proposals.

Issues arising from 5. a. and b.

6. In support of issues a and b, DOJ has submitted that criminal cases should be taxed on the basis of “reasonably sufficient for expenses properly incurred”, relying upon HKSAR v Wong Tsz Yuk [2010] 1 HKC 464 by Poon J (as he then was) at §41 and Vivien Fan v HKSAR (unreported, FACC 6-12 of 2010, at §10).

7. DOJ therefore submits that it is erroneous to apply the party and party charges in criminal cases, and no question of adherence arises.[1]

8. I have no dispute with the above authorities.

9. I also agree that for criminal taxation, the common fund basis should apply. See the Taxation Guide at 62/App/98 of the White Book 2018. But the hourly rates in the Law Society’s Circular entitled “High Court Taxation – Consolidation Circular – Updated April 2008” (“the agreed hourly rates”) must be adopted for reference. This is the only table of solicitors’ hourly rates for reference. The different bases for taxation only affect the factors to be taken into account for the amounts to be allowed. See Re Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd (Costs: Taxation) (2012) 15 HKCFAR 657, 671-673) at §37 where the learned PJ Chan said:

“… In my view, the Law Society’s hourly rates should be applied with flexibility bearing in mind the appropriate approaches to be adopted in different types of taxation.”

10. It is on this basis that I directed the drafter of the criminal bills that when they draft the bills, they must adhere to the hourly rates set out in the Law Society’s Circular. There is simply no other rate for solicitors’ charge that this Court can refer to for taxation of bills, be they criminal or civil matters. If the drafter adopts other rates without explanation in the bills, I will not understand the charges. I will therefore raise requisitions on them.

11. As I said in my Decision, DOJ may ask for higher rates of charge for taxation if there are reasons for the request. See §15(b) of the Decision.

12. DOJ has to, in the bill, set out such request and state the reasons for the items on which it asks for higher rate of charge. The fact that government counsel has to do the work of an instructing solicitor and that of an advocate in court is one of the factors that the court has to consider. Whether or not the court will accept such reasons or explanations and what the appropriate rates of charge should be is the court’s discretion.

13. The costs of government lawyers who are treated as barristers and solicitors for the purpose of fees and costs are to be taxed on the same basis as private practitioners. Ling Yuk Sing v The Secretary for the Civil Service & Another [2010] 3 HKLRD 722 at §§16-17. There is no dispute from DoJ. DoJ also confirms that the salary of a government counsel will not be affected by the work the government counsel does, whether being a solicitor or a counsel, or doing civil or criminal work.

14. I suppose this has clarified the direction in my Decision on the drafting of the bills.

Issue from 5.c.

15. In respect of issue c, DOJ relies upon the Schedules of the Legal Aid in Criminal Case Rules, Cap. 221D, rule 21(8)(b), and Part 2 of the same Ordinance, in which the rate of hourly pay for instructing solicitor is lower than that of a solicitor with higher rights of audience.

16. I do not find this argument attractive. A solicitor with higher rights of audience under rule 21(8)(b)(ia) refers to those solicitors who have attained higher right of audience. They usually have higher seniority. Ms. Lam’s post-qualification is only 3 years, which is by no means comparable to a solicitor with higher rights of audience. She can charge for time spent on the work as a solicitor and for time working as counsel, which I did not challenge. I also agree to take this factor into consideration when considering her hourly rate of charge. But her rate of hourly charge must be reasonable and the burden is, under the common fund basis, on DOJ.

17. DOJ also relies upon the case of Building Authority v Business Rights Ltd [1999] 3 HKC 247 by Burrell J (as he then was). In this judgment, the learned judge acknowledged the professional skills of the public prosecutors and they should be paid accordingly. This is no doubt correct. The fact that they should be paid at the level of a partner in a solicitors’ firm has been discussed in my previous Decision of HKSAR v Ma Sin Chi & Others [2017] 2 HKLRD 889 at §§12-17. I do not accept a junior government counsel of three years’ experience can justifiably command the same hourly charge of a partner of a law firm of 10 years or more. This simply defies common sense. The indemnity principle of costs equally applies to government counsel. I shall not say any more in this Decision.

18. DOJ submits that the court should not take the agreed hourly rates under the protocol as the strait jacket. I agree. I have said in my Decision that the receiving party was at liberty to make submissions to the taxing authority for a higher rate of hourly charge.

Conclusion

19. I have clarified the three issues raised by DOJ. I am grateful for Senior Counsel A. Lai’s assistance in this hearing wherein we have exchanged our views on the issues and we understand our situations and stance. I hope this will assist DOJ in drafting the bills.

20. As to the costs of this application, as agreed, there will be no order as to costs.

	(K. W. Lung)
	Registrar, High Court

Miss Anna Lai, SC, DDPP and Mr. Jonathan Lin, SPP of HKSAR for the Receiving Party

The Paying Party, Mr. Li Chun Ting appeared in person

[1] §4 of the written submissions

HCMA 311/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO 311 OF 2007

(ON APPEAL FROM ESCC 4571 OF 2006)

________________________

BETWEEN

	HKSAR	Respondent
	and
	LI CHUN TING	Appellant

________________________

Before: Mr Registrar K. W. Lung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 4 August 2017

Date of Decision: 4 August 2017

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

Introduction

1. In the course of taxing the bills for criminal appeals issued by the Department of Justice (“DoJ”) against the defendants in the criminal appeal cases, I have discovered the following features:

(a) The bills were usually uncontested by the defendants;
(b) The defendants did not even put in any grounds of objection;
(c) DoJ usually applied for ex parte taxation of the bills on paper; and
(d) The bills were issued without much information as to the nature of the charge, what happened at the trial or appeal, any particular issues of novel legal principles that required special legal research or legal analysis or any reasons that justified the hourly charge of the government counsel and other staff.

2. Without the grounds of objection from the defendants, this Court relied on the integrity of the drafter of the bills to apply just and common sense in drafting the bills, taking into account of the fundamental principles of costs. At the initial stage, this Court had approved a number of bills without raising any requisitions. This Court’s reliance upon the integrity of the drafter of the bills has now become the ground to justify the requisitions that this Court finds necessary to raise because of some blatant excessive charges in the bills as will be seen below.

3. I had, in my previous Decision dated 14 March 2017, raised the requisitions in relation to some questionable high charges for government counsel or senior government counsel. I shall set out the relevant part of the factual background here:

(a) In the course of taxing the bills, the Registrar found that senior government counsel and government counsel were charging $6,000 or $5,000 per hour;
(b) The Registrar applied the costs for civil taxation on the hourly charges of the legal profession;
(c) For the time being, the applicable rate of hourly charge, as currently applied by the other courts for taxation for civil litigation is $4,000 per hour for a solicitor over 10 years post qualification experience, subject to adjustment by the court on individual case for special reasons;
(d) Since there is no information as to the complexity of the matter and the seniority of the government counsel or senior government counsel, the Registrar had raised requisitions with DoJ, asking for information for the seniority of the government counsel;
(e) DoJ had agreed to adopt $4,000 as the highest level of costs for some of the other bills;
(f) When the Registrar raised the same requisitions for other bills of similar situations, DoJ asked for a hearing on this issue.

4. Since last hearing, Department of Justice has provided the seniority of the government counsel handling the matters.

The hearing today

5. Closer scrutiny has been given to the bills of costs. On this occasion, the charge of Miss Lam, government counsel, who was qualified in 2014, charged $4,000 per hour for her professional service whereas senior government counsel Fu, who was qualified in 2008, charged $3,500. The charge for the litigation clerk was $1,600 per hour.

6. According to the hourly rates allowed for solicitors and their staff on party and party taxation in the High Court to date (“the standard rates”), the hourly rate of charge for Miss Lam should be between $2,000 to $2,500 and the litigation clerk between $800 to $1,000.

7. The charges for Miss Lam and the litigation clerk are 60% over the standard rates.

8. Apart from this bill, I discovered that DoJ had been drafting the other criminal bills using the same rates. For the sake of consistency and better administration of our Registry, I had asked the drafter of the bill to appear before myself to explain why this bill was not drafted in accordance with the standard rates.

The Public Prosecutor’s explanations

9. Mr. Cliff Ip, Public Prosecutor on behalf of DoJ appears before me today. He had submitted a written submission to me two days before this hearing wherein he set out the following reasons:

(a) Part D of the Law Society’s Circular “High Court Taxation – Consolidated Circular – Updated April 2008” in which the Law Society advised its members that the Masters would pay attention to the level at which work has been done, which means that where the work should be done by person qualified to do, the costs would be allowed accordingly.
(b) Where the criminal case is represented by solicitor-advocate (instead of barrister), this Division has agreed to a “higher-than-normal” hourly rate for those solicitors-advocates as he is doing both the solicitor’s and a barrister’s work. It is not entirely clear the parties of the so-called agreement to pay higher rate. I assume that DoJ agreed to pay higher rates to the solicitor-advocate when it had to pay the costs to the successful appellant. This has nothing to do with taxation by the taxing masters.
(c) Consistently, when solicitors of this Division act as advocates, they also do work of both barrister and solicitors and this Division considers that it is entitled to charge an hourly rate higher than “the norm” stated in the Circular.
(d) The costs are not paid to the individual prosecutors, nor are they appraised by such rates. All such costs go to the public revenue in respect of work and human resources etc. of this Division financed by the public revenue.
(e) For this case, Miss Lam was doing the work of a solicitor as well as a barrister; as such she is entitled to a higher rate of charge.
(f) This Court had, in the past, approved other bills with higher rates of charges.

The general principles applicable to taxation of costs in criminal proceedings

10. It is high time to remind the drafter of the criminal bills of the general principles applicable to taxation of costs in criminal proceedings as set out the Decision of Master De Souza in HKSAR v Yip Kim Po [2013] 2 HKLRD 459 at §§8-11:

“ 8. The award of costs in criminal proceedings is regulated by the Costs in Criminal Cases Ordinance, Cap. 492. S.15(a) thereof stipulates:
“the costs that may be awarded by virtue of an order shall not be punitive but shall be such sums as appear to a court or a judge reasonably sufficient to compensate any party to the proceedings for any expenses properly incurred by him in the course of these proceedings, including any proceedings preliminary or incidental thereto;” (italics mine)
9. Rule 7 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Rules further provides that:
“ (1) The taxing authority must consider the claim, any further particulars, information or documents supplied by the claimant under rule 6 and any representation by any interested party and must allow such costs in respect of –
(a) such work as appears to the taxing authority to have been actually and reasonably done; and
(b) such disbursements as appear[ed] to the taxing authority to have been actually and reasonably incurred,
as it considers reasonably sufficient to compensate the claimant for any expenses properly incurred by the claimant in the proceedings.
(2) In taxing costs under subrule (1) the taxing authority must take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case including the nature, importance, complexity or difficulty of the work and the time involved.
(3) For the purposes of this rule, there must be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably incurred and any doubts which the taxing authority may have as to whether the costs were actually and reasonably incurred or were reasonably sufficient in amount must be resolved against the claimant. (emphasis supplied)
10. As to whether a particular set of costs has been properly or reasonably incurred, Sachs J pertinently observed in Francis v Francis and Dickson [1955] 3 All ER 836 at 840:
“When considering whether or not an item in a bill is ‘proper’ – the correct viewpoint to be adopted by a taxing officer is that of a sensible solicitor sitting in his chair and considering what in the light of his then knowledge is reasonable in the interest of his lay client … the lay client … should be deemed a man of means adequate to bear the expense of the litigation out of his own pocket – and by, ‘adequate’ I mean neither ‘barely adequate’ nor ‘super-abundant’.”
11. Any costs taxed or agreed in present circumstances will inevitably be met by the public purse. The timely reminder of Lord Denning in Storer v Wright [1981] 2 WLR 208 at 212 in legal aid taxation is nonetheless apt. He stated:
“Seeing that there is no-one to oppose, it seems to me that, on a legal aid taxation, it is the duty of the taxing officer to bear in mind the public interest. He should himself disallow any item which is unreasonable in amount or which is unreasonably incurred. In short, whenever it is too high, he must tax down. Otherwise the legal aid system could be much abused by solicitors and counsel.”

The Court’s views of the explanations

11. As to the explanations given by the Public Prosecutor for this hearing, suffice it to say, it is a misconception that a solicitor who will do the work of a solicitor and that of a barrister should receive higher rate of charges as this is not found in any of the authorities or in our statutes. The taxing master is not concerned with, let alone bound by, any agreement that may be reached between DoJ and any other parties. The master, for the purpose of taxation, will only apply the relevant statutory provisions under the law and the protocol reached between the Judiciary and The Law Society. The hourly rates for party and party charges are being reviewed by a special committee approved by the Chief Justice. Before the hourly rates for party and party charges have been fixed by the special committee, the standing rates as the one in July 1997 to date should apply.

12. The standard rates are subject to variation by the taxing master on the merits of individual case. DoJ can apply to the Registrar for fixing the hourly rates for a specific case, which it considers to justify separate and special consideration, setting out all the relevant materials and information as may be required for the assessment of the rates of costs as provided under the general principles of taxation in criminal proceedings above.

13. As to the past approvals of the criminal bills of higher rates, they might be due to the oversight of the Registrar or taxing master. They are not binding precedents for any other taxations.

14. To justify random charging of costs against the defendants, who do not dispute the bills by saying that the money does not go to the government counsel nor would it appraise the prosecuting counsel will not assist me in the taxation of the bills. I agree that the money will go to the public revenue. But it does not exonerate the drafter of the bills from his duty of properly drafting the taxation bills in accordance with the statutory provisions and trite practice. Whilst this will not benefit the Public Prosecutor personally, it will not do justice to the defendant who has to foot the bill. This is public interest that this Court has the duty to protect.

Directions for future criminal bills

15. I shall now make the following directions for the drafter of the criminal bills:

(a) For usual bills of criminal appeals, the standard rates for government counsel and the staff in accordance with the July 1997 table should apply and be strictly adhered to;
(b) For unusual cases where the drafter considers that higher rates of charges other than the standard rates should apply, application should be made to the Registrar, in which he should set out the nature of the case and complexities involved and other reasons for the higher rates of charges. The application will be dealt with on paper unless the Registrar directs that assistance is required for the drafter to appear him for explanation;
(c) The staff of the Registry shall see that the criminal bills comply with the above directions and may raise requisitions on them. Absent explanation from DoJ, the criminal bills cannot be taxed and the matter will be referred to the Registrar for directions.

16. This bill concerns an appeal against conviction of a charge of contravention of Trading Descriptions Ordinance in forging trade mark. Although it says that the defendant had raised the facts of the case for the appellate court, I do not agree that this is a difficult issue for the appellate court. This is trite law.[1] The bill has not demonstrated any complexity in the matter. As I have rejected the explanations from the Public Prosecutor, the standard rates shall apply to this bill. The bill will be taxed accordingly.

17. There shall be no costs for this hearing today.

	(K. W. Lung)
	Registrar, High Court

Mr. Cliff Ip, Public Prosecutor of Department of Justice, for the Respondent and the Receiving Party

[1] Mahabobur Rahman v. HKSAR (2010) 13 HKCFAR 20 para. 13

HCMA 311/2007

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

定罪上訴

裁判法院上訴案件2007年第311號

(原東區裁判法院刑事案件2006年第4571號)

__________________

答辯人	香港特別行政區
對
上訴人	李振霆

__________________

主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官游德康

聆訊日期： 2016年12月23日

判案書日期： 2017年2月3日

判案書

1. 上訴人於2007年2月1日在吳承威裁判官席前經審訊後被裁定一項「為售賣或任何商業或製造用途而管有應用偽造商標的貨品」罪罪名成立，罰款2000元。被告人不服定罪，提出上訴。由於上訴人的代表律師嘗試從韓國取得一些他們認為對上訴有重大影響的韓國法院判決文件，上訴曾經被多番押後。

案情

2. 海關人員於2006年7月18日在香港銅鑼灣謝斐道501 ‑ 505號銅鑼坊2字樓514號舖內撿取3條印有「Evisu」商標的牛仔褲，調查後認為該3條牛仔褲是應用偽造商標的貨品，於是對店主，即上訴人，提出檢控。

3. 根據控辯雙方承認的事實，「Evisu牌是在香港註冊的商標」。

4. 上訴人在他自願作出的一份警誡口供內有以下說法：

「問11: 海關人員今日係你間舖頭檢獲了3條Evisu牛仔褲係屬於邊個嘅？
答11: 我本人
問12: 有乜嘢用途？
答12: 要黎賣
問13: 賣幾多錢1條呀？
答13: 賣1000蚊
問14: 係由邊個入呢3條牛仔褲嘅？
答14: 本人
問15: 喺邊度入嘅？
答15: 韓國首爾
問16: 入貨價係幾多錢？
答16: 大約800至900蚊
問17: 你知唔知呢3條Evisu牛仔褲係屬於正貨定冒牌貨？
答17: 我當時喺韓國首爾嘅Evisu專門店買入嘅，當時我認為係正貨。
問18: 你買入時有無查詢過呢3條Evisu牛仔褲係正貨定冒牌貨？
答18: 我唔識講韓國話，所以無問。
問19: 你有冇向Evisu商標持有人查詢過呢3條牛仔褲係屬於正貨定冒牌貨？
答19: 沒有。
問20: 你有冇得到Evisu商標持有人准許售賣呢3條牛仔褲？
答20: 沒有」

上訴理據

5. 基本上，上訴人指裁判官沒有考慮和分析控方第二證人彭先生的證供中的疑點，錯誤接納他的證供，因而錯誤裁定涉案牛仔褲為應用偽造商標貨品。上訴人的代表大律師強調彭先生不熟識韓國的事情，除了知道在韓國有分銷商外，其他一概不知道。上訴人認為由於彭先生對Evisu在韓國的運作談不上熟識，由於裁判官沒有將疑點利益歸於上訴人，裁判官的定罪不穩妥和不安全。

6. 上訴人於2016年5月26日向法庭遞交一份非宗教式誓詞來支持他的上訴。

7. 上訴人在誓詞中要求法庭接納一份南韓專利法院於2006年5月25日頒佈的判決書的中文翻譯本，及一份首爾高等法院於2010年8月26日頒佈的判決書的中文翻譯本為上訴的新證據。

8. 上訴人在誓詞第4段指出原審時他的抗辯理由是涉案牛仔褲是上訴人從南韓一家合法持牌Evisu專門店購買的，「而非應用偽造商標的貨品」。

9. 上訴人指出他希望依賴兩份判決書來「證明」和「加強證明」Evisu (南韓商標) 在南韓是合法地應用於服飾上，因此上訴人無理由懷疑應用於3條涉案牛仔褲的商標並非在南韓合法的Evisu (南韓商標)。

10. 上訴人指出他的代表大律師在研究過兩份判決書後認為其內容可以呈現一個更全面的情況給上訴法庭考慮。而且，牛仔褲是上訴人在南韓購買的，兩份判決書有助證明Evisu (南韓商標) 在南韓的合法性，進一步支持上訴人的抗辯理由。上訴人希望法庭能夠接納未經南韓法院蓋印的兩份判決書及其翻譯本為上訴的新證據。

討論

11. 上訴人的抗辯理由是牛仔褲由上訴人在南韓Evisu專賣店購入，並非應用偽造商標貨品。

12. 牛仔褲是否應用偽造商標貨品是控罪元素之一，必須由控方舉證證明。若裁判官不接受，或不肯定牛仔褲是應用偽造商標貨品，則必須裁定控方未能證明控罪元素，繼而裁定罪名不成立。

13. 對於這元素的舉證，裁判官首先如下撮述商標持有人代表的供詞：

「 7. 第二控方証人是在冠運（香港）有限公司（下稱“冠運”）任職了三年多的“Evisu”牌商標檢查員（下稱“彭”）。彭說“Evisu”牌牛仔褲都是由冠運設計、生產、及售賣。冠運的總部設在香港，和擁有世界各地的“Evisu”牌商標。他熟識“Evisu”牌的產品，和呈上一條“Evisu”牌牛仔褲（証物P6）與P1比較。他指真正的“Evisu”牌牛仔褲必定有以下的特徵：(1) 牛仔褲是用『布邊布』製成。換言之，每條“Evisu”牌牛仔褲都是用一塊布裁製而成，不像P1的牛仔褲，用上了兩塊布；(2) “Evisu”牌使用的『布邊布』又是『完布』，即是沒有經過漂漿或加工的布匹；(3) 牛仔褲腰圍的縫線是用三蕊線；及 (4) 牛仔褲褲脚的縫線成鎖鏈狀。因P1沒有上述的特徵，所以郭相信它們是附有偽造“Evisu”牌的牛仔褲。郭又指冠運在港九設有“Evisu”牌牛仔褲的專門店，在連卡佛、D-Mop的連鍞店亦有得出售，若客人想知貨品的真偽，可親到或致電專門店向職員查詢。
8. 辯方大律師的盤問頗為詳盡。簡要而言，她質問彭為何知識產權証書（証物P2）上的商標擁有人，不是冠運而是一間處於日本，名叫Yugengaisha Doulaku (Dowluck Limited)的公司（“日本公司”）。而彭就解說：日本公司是商標的前擁有人；在2006年，日本公司把擁有權轉讓給冠運；他記不起轉讓的確實時間，但是約4月。彭又說海關關員與他會面時，知識產權署的綱頁已顯示冠運是商標的擁有人，他不明白為何P2上的擁有人還是日本公司。辯方大律師又問彭知不知：日本公司在擁有商標的期間有沒有授權他人生產該商牌的牛仔褲，及韓國首爾有售賣“Evisu”牌牛仔褲的專門店？而彭就說：他的工作範圍是在生產，不是在市場推廣，所以他不清楚首爾有沒有“Evisu”牌的專門店，他只知冠運有分銷商在韓國。他絕對肯定自2001年起，冠運已負責設計、生產所有的“Evisu”牌牛仔褲，生產地只會在國內、義大利、及日本，不會在韓國。該牌子的牛仔褲亦不會因生產地不同而有不同的特徵。（由本席強調）」

14. 就控方能否在無合理疑點下証明涉案牛仔褲是附有偽造Evisu牌商標的牛仔褲這爭議點（裁判官稱為爭論（a）），裁判官如下處理證人彭先生的可信和可靠度，並作出有關事實裁斷：

「 11. 就爭論(a)：證據全來自彭。辯方大律師對他作出一個詳盡的盤問。然而，大部份的盤問都是環繞在“Evisu”牌商標的擁有權，對爭論並不重要。因為，依本席的看法：既然“Evisu”牌商標，在案發時，已在香港註冊是無爭議的事實，唯一重要的問題就是：本席能否在無合理疑點下信納彭的鑑定。本席裁斷彭是誠實、可靠的証人。本席信納：雖然冠運在2006年約4月才成為香港“Evisu”牌商標的擁有人，但“Evisu”牌牛仔褲自2001年一直以來都是由冠運負責設計和在各地生產。而彭自2003年入職冠運，一直負責該商標的產品，及為商標的檢查員。因此，本席認為他絕對有能力去鑑定P1的真偽。他指“Evisu”牌牛仔褲無論在任何地方生產，都有他說的特徵，因為那些特徵就是“Evisu”的標記。本席認為他的說法合理、可信。所以，本席亦信納P1不可能是在其他地方生產的真正“Evisu”牌產品。其實，在盤問時，辯方大律師並無依照Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67的法則，質疑過彭的鑑定能力或結論；她在結案陳詞時，才首次提出質疑。總括而言，本席肯定P1是附有偽造“Evisu”牌商標的牛仔褲。（由本席強調）」

15. 裁判官清楚指出案件爭議點，撮述有關證供，仔細分析後裁定彭先生是誠實、可靠的證人，並進一步裁定涉案牛仔褲是附有偽造Evisu商標的貨品。

16. 根據裁判官所正確接納的彭先生供詞，Evisu牛仔褲自2001年一直以來都是由冠運負責設計和在各地生產。彭先生2003年入職冠運後一直負責該商標的產品，及為商標的檢查員。彭先生證供中最重要的一點是無論生產地方，所有Evisu牛仔褲都必定擁有證人所指出的特徵，因為這些特徵就是Evisu的標記。

17. 彭先生供詞的另一重點是他絕對肯定自2001年起，冠運已負責設計和生產所有Evisu牛仔褲。生產地只會在國內、義大利、及日本，不會在韓國。該牌子的牛仔褲不會因生產地不同而有不同的特徵。

18. 換句話說，涉案牛仔褲，無論在哪裏購買，由誰人購買，若屬真品，則必定會有證人提出的特徵。由於涉案牛仔褲沒有這些特徵，牛仔褲不是真品，由於牛仔褲清楚附有看似Evisu的商標，牛仔褲卻不是由Evisu製造，涉案牛仔褲就是附有偽造商標的貨品。

19. 裁判官對彭先生證供的處理和分析沒有犯錯，本席完全同意裁判官的裁斷。

20. 因此，無論日本Evisu商標持有人和南韓Evisu商標持有人有任何商標爭議，根據彭先生的供詞，任何人在韓國售賣的Evisu牛仔褲依舊必定會有既定特徵，若沒有這些特徵，即使在報稱是Evisu專賣店的地方購買，外表看來是Evisu牛仔褲的也必定是附有偽造商標的貨品。上訴人在誓詞中希望依賴的兩份判決書所處理的事情根本與本案爭議點完全無關。即使裁判官在原審時得知內裏事項也完全不會對3條牛仔褲是否應用偽造商標貨品的裁決有任何影響。

合理辯解

21. 在裁定上訴人當時管有的是應用偽造商標的貨品後，裁判官進而考慮上訴人是否有在相對可能性下提出了足夠證據，從而得到第 26(4) 條的免責辯護：

「在任何就第 9(2) 條所訂罪行而進行的法律程序中，被控人如證明他不知道、無理由懷疑，並且即使已盡合理的努力，亦不能確定偽造商標已應用於貨品…即可以此作為免責辯護。」

22. 裁判官如下處理有關免責辯護的事情，最終裁定上訴人未能依賴免責辯護條款：

「 13. 在作証時，被告人聲稱沒有聽過“Evisu”的名字，直至他將領團去韓國，他的朋友託他去買該牌子的牛仔褲，然而，他又說去首爾的“Evisu”專門店是行程旅遊點之一。明顯地，前者的說法不可信。在証物P4，被告人向海關關員聲稱：因為他不懂韓語，所以沒有向首爾“Evisu”專門店的店員查詢P1是否真正的“Evisu”牌牛仔褲。但依本席的看法：既然“Evisu”牌專門店是行程的旅遊點，若被告人不懂韓語，就應有本地的導遊。本席認為被告人的解釋不過是托詞而已。被告人又聲稱從未在香港見過“Evisu”牌的產品。然而，根據未受到辯方質疑的証供，冠運在港、九兩主要的購物地方都設有“Evisu”牌的專門店；連卡佛、及D-Mop的連鎖店亦出售該牌子的牛仔褲。本席認為被告人的聲稱不可信。總括而言，在所有的情況下，雖然本席接納被告人曾在首爾一間聲稱是“Evisu”牌專門店外拍過相片，但本席裁斷被告人的証供不盡不實，他沒有向法庭說出全部真話。本席拒納他的証供。
14. 基於本席拒納被告人的証供，他的免責辯護便當然失敗。其實，即使本席接納：從一個主觀的角度，被告人不知道、及無理由懷疑P1附有偽造商標；本席亦會，基於以下的理由，裁定被告人未能滿足到第 26(4) 條的第三個要求：即在客觀下，即使他盡合理努力，亦不能確定偽造商標已應用於貨品。
15. 就第 26(4) 條的第三個要求，辯方大律師指：既然被告人不知道、及無理由懷疑，他便當然不會查究。但依本席的看法：辯方大律師的辯說於事無補，因為法例明確地指出被告人還須証明即使他盡合理的努力，亦不能確定偽造商標已應用於貨品。
16. 辯方大律師又指：根據知識產權証書（証物P2），“Evisu”商標的擁有人是一間日本公司。在這個情況下，被告人怎會知道冠運的存在？又怎會有冠運的電話、地址能讓他作出查究？本席明白到查究會令賣貨的商人加添麻煩，但為了保護香港是購物天堂的美譽，保証賣出的貨品是正貨，從事這個行業的商人，有些麻煩也在所難免。無論如何，就本案而言，是否因為P2沒有冠運的資料，被告人就無法查究呢？依本席的看法，答案明顯地是『不是』。P2寫明擁有人在香港的送達地址，被告人不但可以直接與日本公司接觸，還可以透過本地的送達地址去查究。本席肯定若被告人作出查究，他一定會獲悉商標現由冠運擁有，及得到P1是否真正“Evisu”牌牛仔褲的答案。因此，本席肯定被告人未能，在相對可能性下，証明第26(4) 條的第三個要求。他的免責辯護亦因此失敗。」

23. 裁判官對證據及證供的處理和分析精確，沒有任何犯錯的地方。根據商標紀錄 (上訴卷宗第22頁) Evisu商標擁有人的送達地址是一間歷史悠久的律師樓，上訴人若作出合理努力，可以非常容易地得到聯絡電話然後致電查詢。

24. 3條涉案牛仔褲是在「Evisu專賣店」購買的證供只來自上訴人。除了一張照片外，上訴人沒有提供任何該專賣店的資料。在過去9年時間，沒有證據顯示上訴人及他的代表律師曾經嘗試聯絡該專賣店來確定他們專賣店的身份。當然，根據上訴人的會面紀錄，他在購買牛仔褲時根本沒有嘗試向該商店查詢任何事情，因此即使上訴人在被定罪後嘗試查詢專賣店的真偽也已經太遲。

25. 本席完全同意裁判官的分析和結論，同意上訴人未能在相對可能性的衡量準則下證明他在案發時，即決定開始售賣3條牛仔褲前，即使已盡合理的努力，亦不能確定偽造商標已應用於貨品，因為上訴人根本沒有盡合理努力。

26. 上訴人在其書面誓詞中強調他由被檢控開始就一直向南韓方面查詢有關南韓Evisu商標持有人與日本商標持有人的商標糾紛的事宜，認為當時他們間發生的事情直接影響上訴人的答辯。

27. 本席不同意有影響這說法。上訴人作出第 26(4) 條中的免責辯護的行為的有關時候必須是在決定為售賣目的而管有3條牛仔褲之前。一旦上訴人決定不作出任何查詢就開始售賣應用偽造商標的牛仔褲，他就已經干犯有關罪行，上訴人在後來所做的一切均不能推翻他之前已經干犯罪行的事實，更不能成為免責辯護的理據。

結論

28. 上訴人的上訴理據不能成立。裁判官的判決沒有犯錯，本席沒有任何法理基礎干預裁決，裁定駁回上訴人的定罪上訴，維持原判。

29. 上訴人的上訴理據薄弱，錯誤理解案件爭議點，沒有任何勝訴機會，裁定需要負責答辯人訟費，如雙方不能同意，金額將交由聆案官評定。

	(游德康)
	高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

答辯人：由律政司檢控官林曉敏代表。

上訴人：由張廖律師事務所轉聘唐明大律師代表。

HKSAR v. LI CHUN TING

Related cases with same parties

Files (3)