FBC CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v. BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LTD
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FBC CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v. BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LTD
HTML content
FBC CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v. BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LTD
HTML content
HCA1363/2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTION NO. 1363 OF 2008
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BETWEEN
| FBC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED (福島建設有限公司) | Plaintiff | |
| and | ||
| BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LIMITED (國民建設(香港)有限公司) | Defendant |
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Before : Hon Poon J in Chambers
Date of Hearing : 28 December 2009
Date of Decision : 28 December 2009
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D E C I S I O N
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Applications
1. Before the court are :
(a) the defendant’s application for trial of a preliminary issue under Order 33 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), (“the 1st Application”); and
(b) the plaintiff’s application for security for costs under section 357 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) (“the 2nd Application”).
The background circumstances may be summarized as follows.
The disputes
2. This is a derivative action brought by Wu Yi Construction Company Limited (“Wu Yi”) in the name of the plaintiff. Wu Yi owns 60% of the plaintiff’s shares. The remaining 40% is owned by Big Island Asia Limited, which is beneficially owned by Mr Ben Lee (“Mr Lee”). Mr Lee is also a director of the plaintiff.
3. The defendant is beneficially owned by Mr Lee as well.
4. The plaintiff’s claim is based on a loan agreement made between the parties in or about January 1996. Pursuant to the loan agreement, the plaintiff advanced loans to the defendant between January 1996 and July 2001. After certain credits being given to the defendant, the outstanding sum amounted to HK$2,698,102.17, which the defendant had failed to repay.
5. The defendant alleged that the Wu Yi Group and the Big Island Group had since 1991 used the plaintiff as a corporate vehicle for the purpose of conducting a joint venture business. It denied that it had entered into the alleged loan agreement. The joint venture parties were entitled to withdraw monies from the plaintiff from time to time. Those withdrawals were to be off set against the expenses incurred by the parties for the plaintiff. As the Wu Yi Group refused to provide funding to the plaintiff, the defendant had financed the operational expenses of the plaintiff and had issued debit notes to the plaintiff for reimbursement since September 2001. The plaintiff had failed to take into account and off set the expenses and management fees incurred by the defendant on its behalf since 2002, totalling some HK$2.9 million.
6. The defendant also relied on the limitation defence. The plaintiff purportedly advanced the loans to the defendant between 3 January 1996 and 17 January 2001. They all preceded the date of writ for more than six years and were all time-barred.
7. The defendant further counterclaimed against the plaintiff for the operational expenses and management fees of HK$2.9 million.
8. In reply to the limitation defence, the plaintiff alleged that the loans were payable on demand. And the plaintiff demanded repayment of the outstanding sum on 13 May 2008. The cause of action therefore accrued on that date. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had repeatedly admitted and acknowledged the loans since 2003.
9. I now turn to the 1st Application.
The 1st Application
10. The defendant took out this application for the limitation defence to be tried as a preliminary issue and for a stay for all further proceedings pending the determination of the preliminary issue.
11. The general rule is that all the issues in the case are to be tried at the same time. There is power to order that different issues be tried at different times but that departure is ordered only if it is just and convenient to do so. The burden lies on the applicant to demonstrate that it is so justified. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2009, Vol.1, para.33/4/9 at p.606.
12. The defendant argued that a separate trial of the limitation defence would have the effect of expediting the hearing of the substantial issues in the action, eliminating the need for the discovery of documents and evidence on the other issues and producing a substantial saving of costs. I disagree.
13. A proper determination of the limitation defence involves two issues :
(1) whether the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on the date of the purported loans or the date of the demand; and
(2) whether the defendant had acknowledged the loans.
14. On the 1st issue, Mr Suen, for the defendant, submitted that the law is clear. When a loan is said to be repaid on demand without more, the cause of action would accrue immediately : Lee Siu Fong Mary v Ngai Yee Chai [2006] 1 HKC 157. However, as rightly submitted by Mr Ng, for the plaintiff, if the demand is a pre-condition for the repayment, time does not run until a demand is made : Chitty on Contracts, 13th edn, Vol.2, para. 38-247. In my view, whether in the instant case a demand is a pre-condition for the repayment of the loans in question is a matter of construction of the loan agreement relied on by the plaintiff, which can only be undertaken within the relevant factual matrix. So quite contrary to Mr Suen’s submission, the 1st issue is fact-sensitive.
15. As to the 2nd issue, there can be no doubt that it is fact-sensitive as well.
16. The two issues pertaining to the limitation defence cannot be resolved without oral evidence from the protagonists including Mr Lee. However, the court’s finding on his credibility is essential in determining not only the above issues but also the issues pertaining to the true nature of the sums advanced to or received by the defendant and whether the defendant had in fact incurred the so-called operational expenses and management fees for the plaintiff. A close examination of the documentary evidence, in particular, the relevant audited accounts and board minutes of the plaintiff, and the trial balances prepared by the defendant, is also necessary for both the issues on limitation and the other issues. A separate trial will inevitably raise the risk of inconsistent findings on credibility and the documentary evidence.
17. That being the case, it is wholly inappropriate for the court to order a separate trial for the limitation defence.
18. Further, the counterclaim will continue even if the limitation defence succeeds at a preliminary trial. The court will have to visit Mr Lee’s evidence and the documentary evidence again. I fail to see how costs can be saved at all.
19. For these reasons, I dismiss the 1st Application.
20. I now come to the 2nd Application
The 2nd Application
21. Section 357 of the Companies Ordinance provides :
“357. Costs in actions by certain limited companies
Where a limited company is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, any judge having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the company will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs, and may stay all proceedings until the security is given.”
22. An applicant has to first show that the company would not (as opposed to may not) be able to meet its debts when an order for costs was made against it. Here, I am so satisfied in light on the defendant’s current financial position on the evidence before me.
23. Whether the court will then exercise the discretion depends on all the circumstances of the case. Merits of the defendant’s counterclaim is plainly an important factor. And I share the observations made by Burrell J in the Order 14 application that the counterclaim appears to be dubious : see para.12 of His Lordship’s decision dated 25 March 2009. However, I cannot lose sight of another important factor, which is this. There is a very substantial, if not complete overlap of the defendant’s defence and its counterclaim. The issues to be canvassed for the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s counterclaim will just be the same. In such circumstances, it will not be appropriate to order security : see BJ Crabtree (Insulation) Ltd v GPT Communication Systems Ltd (1990) 59 BLR 43, applied in Goal Setting Consulting Company Limited v Unigraphics Solutions Asia/Pacific Incorporated, HCA994/2003, unreported, Sakhrani J, 25 October 2004.
24. Having taken the matter in the round and balanced all the factors, I will not order security against the defendant on its counterclaim.
25. I will therefore dismiss the 2nd Application.
[Submission on costs]
26. Costs are to follow the event for both Applications. The plaintiff shall have the costs of the 1st Application; the defendant, that of the 2nd Application. Costs are to be paid forthwith and to be taxed if not agreed.
| (J. Poon) Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court |
Mr Lawrence Ng, instructed by Messrs C.Y. Tsang & Co., for the Plaintiff
Mr Jenkin Suen, instructed by Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo, for the Defendant
FBC CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v. BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LTD
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HCA1363/2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTION NO. 1363 OF 2008
--------------------------
BETWEEN
| FBC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED | Plaintiff | |
| (福島建設有限公司) | ||
| and | ||
| BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LIMITED | Defendant | |
| (國民建設(香港)有限公司) |
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Before : Hon Burrell J in Chambers
Date of Hearing : 15 April 2009
Date of Decision : 22 April 2009
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D E C I S I O N
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1. By a decision handed down on 25 March 2009 I granted the defendant leave to defend, following an Order 14 application by the plaintiff, conditional upon a payment into court of the claimed sum of HK$2,698,102.
2. By this application the defendant seeks a stay of my order imposing the condition pending an appeal against it. The defendant’s position is that leave to defend should have been granted unconditionally.
3. After hearing and considering brief but helpful submissions from Mr Malcolm Kemp for the defendant and Mr Lawrence Ng for the plaintiff I have decided to decline the application for a stay for the following reasons:
(1) No evidence has been adduced to indicate that the appeal against the imposition of a condition will be rendered nugatory if the stay is not granted. Other than Mr Kemp informing the court that “it would be difficult” for the defendant to comply with the condition there is no other evidence of the defendant’s financial circumstances. Ma J (as he then was) in Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co. Ltd [2007] 5 HKC at p.88 observed:
“… whatever the nature of the order or judgment appealed from, the court will still require good evidence as to why an appeal will be rendered nugatory in the event of a stay not being granted. …”
(2) The payment of the money into court is the price the defendant pays for his day in court in all the circumstances of this case. Should he appeal successfully against the condition it will be returned pending trial. Should he appeal unsuccessfully against the condition but is successful wholly or in part at trial, the payment will again, wholly or in part, be returned. In either event, there is no risk to the defendant whilst the litigation unfolds.
(3) Mr Kemp submits that his reliance on the Limitation Ordinance is a “complete defence” to the claim and as such the condition should not have been imposed. Whether or not it is “a complete defence” is a matter for the trial judge. All that can be said at this stage is that if the limitation argument succeeds it will be a complete answer to the plaintiff’s claim. If by a “complete defence” Mr Kemp means an “all or nothing” defence, I agree; if he means an “unanswerable” defence, I do not agree. I have considered the merits of that defence in my original decision and having weighed it in the balance concluded that in all the circumstances of this case, the imposition of a condition was appropriate.
(4) Similarly, Mr Kemp’s submissions with regard to the defendant’s counterclaim really amount to a repetition of the arguments advanced at the original hearing. I do not think it is necessary to repeat my observations on this application.
(5) It is further submitted that having conceded in my original judgment that the ultimate amount of the defendant’s indebtedness to the plaintiff could be less than the full amount claimed a condition requiring the full amount should not have been made. I do not think that there is any merit in this contention because the payment is to be made into court. As already stated, if the plaintiff is only partly successful at trial the balance will be returned.
(6) The test in deciding whether a stay should be granted is whether there are strong grounds for the proposed appeal (against the imposition of a condition). It is a higher hurdle than that imposed when considering the chances of success for the purpose of deciding whether or not to grant leave to appeal. I am not persuaded that the test has been met. To elaborate further would involve a repetition of my original decision.
4. Thus, the application for a stay pending appeal is refused. The original deadline for the payment in was 15 April 2009. That has now passed. I accept from Mr Kemp that the defendant may find it “difficult” to make the payment in. I am therefore prepared to grant an extension of time. I will allow a further 21 days from the date of handing down this decision.
5. The costs of this application shall be to the plaintiff in any event.
| (M.P. Burrell) Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court |
Mr Lawrence Ng, instructed by Messrs C.Y. Tsang & Co., for the Plaintiff
Mr Malcolm Kemp of Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo, for the Defendant
FBC CONSTRUCTION CO LTD v. BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LTD
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HCA1363/2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
ACTION NO. 1363 OF 2008
--------------------------
BETWEEN
| FBC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED | Plaintiff | |
| (福島建設有限公司) | ||
| and | ||
| BIG ISLAND CONSTRUCTION (HK) LIMITED | Defendant | |
| (國民建設(香港)有限公司) |
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Before : Hon Burrell J in Chambers
Date of Hearing : 9 March 2009
Date of Decision : 25 March 2009
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D E C I S I O N
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1. This is an application for summary judgment pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court. The matter was first listed to be heard in October 2008 but was adjourned due to the late filing of an affirmation by Mr Ben Lee, a director of the defendant company. At all material times the defendant company was 99.9999% owned by “Big Island Asia” which, in turn, was 99.9% owned by Ben Lee.
2. Big Island Asia also owned 40% of the plaintiff company, of which Ben Lee was also a director.
3. This is also a statutory derivative action brought by a shareholder of the plaintiff, namely Wu Yi Construction Company Limited, brought on behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant for the repayment of debts. In short, it is said, quite simply, that between 1996 and 2001 Ben Lee wrote numerous letters to the plaintiff in which he referred to the defendant as “my company” requesting to borrow specific sums of money. On every occasion the records show that within a very short time the money was transferred to the defendant.
4. The schedule attached to the Statement of Claim, which is dated 19 July 2008, records the history of the transactions. Between 1996 and 2001, 25 “loans” are recorded in amounts varying from $50,000 to $1 million. The unpaid balance is adjusted downward from time to time by items referred to as “offsetting loans”. Most of these are “offsetting loans by payment of FBC expenses”. In other words, instead of being reimbursed expenses Mr Lee’s debt was reduced. This happened on numerous occasions without demur. In August 2005, the amount still outstanding was the amount now claimed, $2,698,102.
5. I shall briefly deal in due course with the plaintiff’s submissions and the defendant’s response in relation to these debts, as advanced by Mr Lawrence Ng and Mr Andrew Sheppard respectively. Firstly, however, the plaintiff relies on two other actions in which, it is submitted, there are striking similarities with this case. The defendant is the same. In 2004, the defendant borrowed $500,000 from “Wu Yi Development” and $500,000 from “China Expert”. In the first action, the plaintiff brought Order 14 proceedings in which Chu J granted leave to defend conditional on the full amount being paid into court. The judgment makes a number of critical observations concerning the bona fides of the defence. In the other action, the defendant eventually consented to judgment although, somewhat disingenuously, in a later affirmation relating to this case affirmed that he consented to judgment “for commercial reasons” which, as I read it, seems to infer that the consenting to judgment in that case should not be regarded as an unequivocal admission of liability.
6. In any event, Mr Ng points to these two cases, whilst acknowledging that no two cases are ever identical, in support of his submission that Ben Lee’s modus operandi in receiving loans and then seeking to avoid repayment is not confined to this case. There is considerable force to this contention. With that preliminary observation made I now focus on the issues surrounding the alleged debts in this case.
THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE
1. Evidence in support of the debts
(a) Contemporaneous documents
7. The plaintiff relies on numerous letters from the defendant company to the plaintiff company, signed by Ben Lee specifically and unequivocally requesting loans in specific amounts. The requests were invariably approved and granted. The schedule in the Statement of Claim identifies the vouchers, cheques and receipts relied on in respect of each advance.
(b) Acknowledgement and admissions of the loans and debts
8. In the defendant’s own trial balances for 2004 and 2005, the plaintiff is listed as a “sundry creditor” to whom (approximately) $1.8 million in 2005 and (approximately) $2.8 million in 2006 is owed.
9. Further, Ben Lee signed and thus acknowledged the accuracy of the plaintiff’s audited accounts on numerous occasions. For the accounts ending 31 March 1999, he signed as director that the defendant owed the plaintiff $2 million. For the financial statements up to 31 December 1999, he acknowledged the defendant owed the plaintiff $3.17 million (approximately). The same documents for periods ending December 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 show debts of $4 million, $4.3 million, $4.2 million and $3.2 million (all approximate). The plaintiff’s balance sheets for 2005 and 2006 show the outstanding debt to be $2,698,102 (namely, the sum claimed). Ben Lee has made no response concerning the validity of these documents in his affirmations.
10. The plaintiff also relies on a minuted board meeting held on 24 March 2006, at which Ben Lee was present but abstained from voting, when the board resolved to pursue the outstanding debt from Ben Lee. The minutes were signed by Ben Lee.
2. Ben Lee’s defence lacks bona fides
11. The plaintiff demonstrates that the loans were made when the defendant’s financial position was parlous. The plaintiff also relies on a lack of any real challenge to the debts at the material times. The plaintiff also draws comparisons with the other loans, already referred to, where the modus operandi was very similar. Adverse judicial comments have been made and Ben Lee’s response has been shown to have been disingenuous.
12. Also disingenuous in the defendant’s counterclaim in which it is claimed, inter alia, that Ben Lee’s entitlement to “management fees” has not been accounted for and, if they had, would have extinguished the loans entirely. This claim, it is pointed out, emerged for the first time in the affirmation filed by Ben Lee after the requested adjournment before Suffiad J in October 2008. Not only has this claim come remarkably late but also the authenticity of the documents in support is said to be dubious and is strongly challenged.
3. Defence of limitation
13. As will be noted hereafter, the defendant raises the argument that the claims will fail because they are statute barred by the defence of limitation. The final loan was made in January 2001. The writ is dated July 2008. In answer the plaintiff primarily relies on the argument that the debts have been regularly acknowledged since, in particular by signing the audited accounts in August 2003, by signing the board meeting minutes in April 2006 and by confirming the defendant’s trial balance for 2004 and 2005.
THE DEFENDANT’S CASE
1. Defence of limitation
14. In answer to the plaintiff’s submission that the debts have been admitted, the defendant argues that Ben Lee’s signing of the plaintiff’s audited accounts does not constitute an acknowledgement or admission by the defendant company.
15. There is also much factual dispute as to the circumstances and reasons he signed the minutes of the board meeting in 2006. He also submits there is little evidential value in a company’s own trial balance.
16. In short, it is said that answers exist to each of the matters upon which the plaintiff relies in their submission that the statute of limitations does not bite.
2. The terms of, details of, reasons for and parties to the alleged loans
17. I do not propose to go into detail, because it is neither necessary nor helpful to do so at this stage, but the defendant raises a number of issues relating to interest, management fees, some undocumentated amounts, expenses and so on which lends some support, albeit fragile, to their submission that an account should be taken.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
18. In the context of this case, the remarks of Bokhary JA (in 1994) in In re Safe Rich Industries, CACV81/1994 are to point:
“The test at the summary stage is whether the defendant’s assertions are believable. But it must be recognised - because failure to recognise it would create a debt-dodgers' charter - that whether the defendant's assertions are believable is a question to be answered not by taking those assertions in isolation but rather by taking them in the context of so much of the background as is either undisputed or beyond reasonable dispute.”
19. The onus is on the defendant to satisfy the court that there probably is a real or bona fide defence. Such a defence must be apparent at the Order 14 stage. It must be particularized to the extent that it can be seen to be triable.
CONCLUSION
20. The defence submissions as to the existence of the debts are in my judgment plainly lacking bona fides. The defendant has been muddying the waters and it is right for the court to step in to clear the way ahead at this Order 14 stage. However, for two reasons, I think the correct order in this case is the same as that made by Chu J in HCA714/2007 in which the defendant was sued by Wu Yi Development for a substantial loan in very similar circumstances, namely that leave to defend be granted conditional upon the full value of the claim being paid into court.
21. The two reasons are firstly, that the amount of the indebtedness could be less than the full amount claimed once an account has been taken and, secondly, and more importantly, the argument concerning the limitation period cannot be confidently overlooked.
ORDER
22. Leave to defend is granted to the defendant upon the condition that $2,698,102 is paid into court within 21 days of the handing down of this judgment.
23. I make an order nisi that the costs of and occasioned by the application shall be in the cause.
| (M.P. Burrell) | |
| Judge of the Court of First Instance | |
| High Court |
Mr Lawrence Ng, instructed by Messrs C.Y. Tsang & Co., for the Plaintiff
Mr Andrew Sheppard, instructed by Messrs Stephenson Harwood & Lo, for the Defendant