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Civil Action2008

ALVIERO MARTINI S.P.A. v. BUBBLE RETAIL MANAGEMENT LTD AND OTHERS

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90034-EN-2013-10-28

ALVIERO MARTINI S.P.A. v. BUBBLE RETAIL MANAGEMENT LTD AND OTHERS

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HCA 1937/2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1937 OF2008

BETWEEN

 ALVIERO MARTINI S.P.A.Plaintiff
 and
 BUBBLE RETAIL MANAGEMENT LIMITED (百寶龍有限公司)1st Defendant
 LAU KAI YIU(劉繼堯)2nd Defendant
 SOBDEALL INTERNATIONAL FASHION COMPANY LIMITED ( 沙伯迪澳國際精品有限公司)3rd Defendant
 HO WAI-XIN ( 何偉新)4th Defendant
Before: Mr Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers (Open to the public)
Date of Hearing: 28 October 2013
Date of Decision: 28 October 2013

_______________________________

DECISION

_______________________________

The applications

1. There are two applications taken out by the defendants for security for costs pursuant to Order 23 rule 1 of RHC on the ground that the plaintiff is a foreign company without assets within the jurisdiction:

a.  The 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant apply for “top up” security for costs up to trial in the amount of HK$2 million, the plaintiff having paid into court HK$700,000 as security; and

b.  The 3rd defendant and the 4th defendant apply for security for costs up to trial in the amount of HK$800,000.

2. Mr. D. Clark, counsel acts for the plaintiff.  Mr. Ling, counsel acts for the 1st and the 2nd defendants and Mr. B. Lo, counsel acts for the 3rd and the 4th defendants.

The facts

3. It is the plaintiff’s primary case that the 1st defendant’s sale and/or distribution of the leather products in Hong Kong constituted acts of passing off and/or infringement of the plaintiff’s trade mark.  The plaintiff claims damages, an account of profit and injunctive relief against all the defendants for those acts.

4. The plaintiff does not dispute that it is a foreign company.  By consent, the plaintiff had made payment into court for security for the costs of the 1st and 2nd defendants for the sum of $700,000 up to the stage of exchange of witness statements and obtaining counsel’s advice on evidence.  Now the 1st and the 2nd defendants apply for further security up to and including trial, which will take 11 days.

5. The 3rd and the 4th defendants only joined in the proceedings in November 2011.  This is their first application for security for costs up to and including trial.

The grounds of opposition

6. The plaintiff does not dispute the fact that it had paid $700,000 into court as security for costs of the 1st and the 2nd defendants’ costs up to counsel’s advice on evidence.  However, it opposes the defendants’ applications on the following reasons:

a.  The court has the wide discretion whether to grant or refuse to grant the security for costs, having considered all the circumstances of the case.  The fact that the plaintiff had consented to security for the 1st and the 2nd defendants should not fetter the Court’s discretion in their application for further security for costs up to trial.

b.  Although the decisions of H.H. Judge Lok in the District Court in Izumo Mokko Co Ltd v TS Lines Ltd [2007] 2 HKLRD 363 was not followed in Lim Yi Shenn v Wong Yuen Yee [2012] 4 HKC 102, by Recorder Horace Wong SC Hong Kong has a reciprocal enforcement of judgment agreement with Italy.  This factor has to be taken into consideration.  Mr. Clark therefore argues that even if security should be provided, the amount should be the costs for taking out the ex-parte application to enforce the costs order in Italy.[1] &

c.  The plaintiff has assets in the jurisdiction.

Discussion

7. It is trite law that the Court has the unfettered discretion under Order 23 rule 1.  See §§15 & 36 of Hui Yin Sang & Others v Tsoi Ping Kwan & Others CACV208/2011 reported in [2012]2 HKLRD 1085 by Fok JA (as he then was) on 19 April 2012.

8. The issue of reciprocal enforcement was discussed in my another Decision in Kin Ming Holdings International Limited (建明集團國際有限公司) & Another v Lin Man Yuan (林满园) & Another HCA216/2008 (unreported) 18 June 2013 where Senior Counsel submitted that the costs order could be enforced in the mainland under the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance (Cap. 597), a similar issue of reciprocal enforcement of court orders.  At §16 of my Decision, I set out the arguments:

‘16. Mr. Fung SC submits that the rationale or objective underlying Ord. 23, r.1(1)(a) is to alleviate the difficulty that may be faced by a successful defendant in seeking to recover costs against a foreign plaintiff. Importantly, there has already been put in place a well-designed mechanism under Cap. 597 for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments between Mainland China and Hong Kong. This may be true. However, there is no authority to support that, given all other factors in support of the application are satisfied, an order for security for costs should not be granted. This factor alone, though may be one of the factors for consideration, should not, in my view, be conclusive or dispositive, to borrow Madam Justice Le Pichon’s words in Wing Fai Construction Limited (in liquidation) v. Cheng Kit Yin Kelly & Others CACV249/2010, supra. See also the discussion on the court’s approach on weight that should be given to enforcement of the costs order at §§52-55 of Lim Yi Shenn v Wong Yuen Yee [2012]3 HKLRD 505by Recorder H. Wong SC, in which the learned Recorder discussed the approach as recommended by HH Judge Lok in the case of Izumo Mokko Co Ltd v TS Lines Ltd [2007] 2 HKLRD 363 that the court should focus its attention on the issue of enforcement of the costs order in determining whether an order for security for costs should be imposed, reference having been made to the UK case Nasser v United Bank of Kuwait [2002] 1 WLR 1868, taking into account of the human rights issue of access to court. The learned Recorder refused to adopt HH Judge Lok’s approach and decided that the conventional approach, without taking the human rights issue into account, should be adopted. The learned Recorder, however, recognized that enforcement of the court order should be one of the factors for the court’s consideration for its determination whether an order for security for costs should be made.

17. The Court of Appeal in Montgomery Ward & Co Incorporated v Evergo Trading Company Limited and Evergo Holdings Company Limited, unreported, CACV 32/1996, 31 May 1996, where Nazareth VP held (paragraph 8):

‘Given that there are no proper factors weighing in favour of the foreign plaintiff or at least either way, it seems to me that [the judge's] discretion plainly had to be exercised in conformity with the position set out in the judgment of Lord Denning in AeronaveSPA v Westland Charters [1971] 3 All ER 531 at 533 where he said this:

"I agree with the note in the Supreme Court Practice that the rule does give a discretion to the court.  In 1984 in Crozai v Brogden Lopes J said that there was an inflexible rule that if a foreigner sued he should give security for costs.  But that is putting it too high.  It is the usual practice of the courts to make a foreign plaintiff give security for costs.  But it does so, as a matter of discretion, because it is just to do so.  After all, if the defendant succeeds and gets an order for his costs, it is not right that he should have to go to a foreign country to enforce the order." (emphasis added). Parker LJ observed in the case of Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] 2 QB 407 at 418F: "....... it is, I accept, common for orders to be made on little if anything more than fact of residence outside the jurisdiction, but this is because it is also commonly the case that it is obvious from the pleadings that enforcement of any judgment for costs in the event of the plaintiff's action being dismissed would be difficult and costly to enforce. "’

9. I had refused to make an order for security for costs in that case for the reason that the plaintiff had sufficient assets within the jurisdiction.

10. Mr. Clark now submits that the plaintiff has 20 registered trademarks in Hong Kong, which can be realized by appointment of a receiver and sale.  Also, these trademarks are valuable to the plaintiff.  If they were sold, the plaintiff would not be able to carry on its business for those products with the trademarks in Hong Kong.  As the plaintiff has substantial business in Hong Kong and Asia, it is unlikely that the plaintiff will run the risk of losing the rights to the trademarks in Hong Kong.

11. The trademarks may be valuable assets of the plaintiff in Hong Kong.  However, the commodity of trademarks, unlike other tangible properties, is difficult to assess.  One wonders if there are available buyers for the trademarks and how the price is to be fixed. The plaintiff has given no evidence on this.  The burden is on the plaintiff to show that such assets are valuable assets in Hong Kong sufficient to cover the defendants’ costs if the court grants the order.

12. Having considered the circumstances and counsel’s submissions, I decide that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of showing that it has sufficient assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy the defendant’s costs if orders for costs were made against it.  It is then a question of quantum for the top-up security for the 1st and the 2nd defendants and the security for the 3rd and the 4th defendants.

13. Mr. Clark has also submitted that if the court is minded, to grant security, security should only be given for extra costs that would be incurred by the defendants in seeking to enforce the costs award in Italy.  This has been the approach followed in recent years in England (albeit in case law not followed, by Recorder Wong SC).  (See paragraph 51 of Lim Yi Shenn).

14. Order 23 rule 1 provides:

“(1) Where, on the application of a defendant to an action or other proceeding in the Court of First Instance, it appears to the Court -

(a) that the plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction, or

(b)  … … having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it may order the plaintiff to give such security for the defendant's costs of the action or other proceeding as it thinks just.”

15. The purpose of order security for costs under Order 23 against the foreign corporation is clearly set out in Hui Yin Sang’s case, at paragraph 46:

‘It is important to bear in mind, in the context of O.23, that:

“The purpose of ordering security for costs against a plaintiff ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction is to ensure that a successful defendant will have a fund available within the jurisdiction of this court (emphasis added) against which it can enforce the judgment for costs. It is not, in the ordinary case, in any sense designed to provide a defendant with security for costs against a plaintiff who lacks funds. The risk of defending a case brought by a penurious plaintiff is as applicable to plaintiffs coming from outside the jurisdiction as it is to plaintiffs resident within the jurisdiction.”

(Per Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC (as he then was) in Porzelack KC v Porzelack (UK) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 420 at p. 422H – cited in Akai Holdings Ltd v Ernst & Young (2009) 12 HKCFAR 376 at §14).”’

The Court of Final Appeal in the Akai case was discussing the jurisdiction of the court making an order for security for costs and at §15 of the judgment, P. Chan PJ, with others concurring, said: “Hence, if it can be shown that a foreign plaintiff has substantial assets in Hong Kong on which to execute the costs order, the court may not require security. …”  Thus, the court will be concerned with whether, on the evidence available, it can be shown that the plaintiff has substantial assets in Hong Kong to satisfy the costs order without going into the exact amount that will be sufficient to cover the defendant’s costs, such as to provide an indemnity to the defendant for the costs.  See 23/3/32 of HKCP 2013 Vol. 1 on “sufficient” security.

16. Mr. Clark’s suggestion of providing security for the costs of enforcing the costs order, if it is granted by the court in Italy, a civil law jurisdiction should, in my view, not be adopted for the following reasons:

a.  It is inconsistent with the intention of Order 23 rule 1, as explained by the Court of Appeal and the Court of Final Appeal, supra;

b.  Although the plaintiff has given affidavit evidence as to the procedures for enforcement of a court order in Italy, which, as Mr. Clark submits, is not disputed by the defendants, it will incur more costs if this Court entertain this suggestion, making the defendants seek legal advice on the procedures as alleged by the plaintiff;

c.  The time for this Court to consider those issues above will be increased, so will be the costs as well;

d.  All in all, it will be disproportionate in terms of costs and time for the Court to adopt Mr. Clark’s suggestion.

Conclusion

17. For those reasons above, I consider that the Court should adopt the orthodox way of having the security for costs deposited in Court.

18. Since Mr. Clark has not argued on the amount on the draft bills, I shall rely upon them for the assessment of the costs for the security.  Although Mr. Clark has commented on the bill of the 1st and 2nd defendants, I consider that no substantial argument has been put forth.  I shall therefore accede to their request of $2 million.  As to the 3rd and the 4th defendants, Mr. Clark does not dispute their quantum.  I accede to their request too.

19. As to the costs of this application, including the costs for the hearing today, Mr. Clark concedes that the costs should follow the event and he agrees that counsel’s certificates should also be given.  But he disputes the costs as appeared on the schedules of costs of the defendants.  Having considered submissions from counsel before me, I have to say that the costs are inflated.  Given the facts and legal issues involved for today, I do not consider that the solicitors’ charges should be about 3 times the fees charged by counsel.  On a broad-brush approach, the costs for the 1st and the 2nd defendants be assessed under Order 62 rule 9A to be $75,000 and the costs of the 3rd and the 4th defendants to be $70,000, taking into account of seniority of counsel.

20. I shall now make an order in terms as follows:

a.  The plaintiff shall within 28 days from the date of this order make another payment of costs as further security for the costs of the 1st and the 2nd defendants up to and including the trial for the amount of $2,000,000;

b.  The plaintiff shall within 28 days from the date of this order make payment of costs as security for the costs of the 3rd defendant and the 4th defendant up to and including the trial for the amount of $800,000;

c.  The plaintiff may, instead of making cash payment into court, provide a bank guarantee by a bank in Hong Kong for same amounts in the terms as agreed by the parties, or to be approved by the Registrar within 28 days from the date of this order;

d.  All further proceedings shall be stayed except for this order to be carried out;

e.  If the plaintiff fails to provide further security or the security herein provided within the specified time, the plaintiff’s claims be dismissed and its action struck out, with costs to the defendants;

f.   The costs of this application, including the costs reserved and the hearing today (with counsel certificates) are to be assessed at $75,000 for D1 and D2 and $70,000 for D3 and D4 respectively, to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants within 28 days from the date hereof.

 (K.W. Lung)
 Registrar, High Court
  

Mr. Douglas Clark, instructed by King & Wood Mallesons, for the plaintiff

Mr. Ling Chun Wai, instructed by ATL Law Offices, for the 1st and 2nd defendants

Mr Benny Lo, instructed by Lily Fenn & Partners, for the 3rd and 4th defendants



[1] §25 of written submissions

67865-EN-2009-10-02

ALVIERO MARTINI S.P.A. v. BUBBLE RETAIL MANAGEMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1937/2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1937 OF 2008

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 ALVIERO MARTINI S.P.A.Plaintiff
 and 
 BUBBLE RETAIL MANAGEMENT LIMITED
(百寶龍有限公司)
1st Defendant
 LAU KAI YIU (劉繼堯)2nd Defendant

----------------------

Before: Deputy High Court Judge L. Chan in Chambers

Date of Written Submissions: 28 September 2009

Date of Decision on Costs: 2 October 2009

----------------------------------

DECISION  ON  COSTS

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1.  This is a decision on costs.  The plaintiff applied for summary judgment.  The application was disposed of by consent.  The parties agreed that the defendants should be given unconditional leave to defend.  The costs of the application up to 7 September 2009 were also agreed to be in the cause.  The costs of the application thereafter are to be determined by the court. 

2.  The plaintiff submits that the costs incurred after 7th September 2009 should also be in the cause as the plaintiff has offered the defendant unconditional leave to defend on 11 September 2009.  The offer was made after the plaintiff’s consideration of the defendant’s affirmations in opposition.  The defendants however submitted that the costs after 7 September should be to the defendants in any event.

3.  Counsel for the plaintiff has set out the progress of the action for my consideration.  The plaintiff’s solicitors served the writ of summons endorsed with a statement of claim on the defendants’ solicitors on 9 October 2008.  The plaintiff’s claims are for infringement of copyright, infringement of trademark and passing off.

4.  The defendants’ solicitors filed the Acknowledgment of Service on 22 October 2009.  The defence was to be due on 5 November 2009.  The plaintiff’s solicitors notified the defendants’ solicitors on 4 November 2009 that an amended statement of claim would be served.  The parties then agreed that the filing of the defence would be postponed.

5.  On 31 March 2009, the plaintiff’s solicitors served on the defendants’ solicitors an amended writ endorsed with an amended statement of claim, a summons for summary judgment for copyright infringement and passing off and two affirmations in support of the summons.  The summons was issued on 30 March 2009 and returnable on 22 April 2009.

6.  The original deadline for the defendants to file and serve their affirmations in opposition was 14 April 2009.  The defendants on that day sought an extension of 35 days to file these affirmations.  The plaintiff agreed to the extension though the plaintiff’s counsel now submits that the defendants were dilatory.  A consent order was then made by Sakhrani J extending the time for the defendants to file their affirmations in opposition to 20 May 2009.  The plaintiff was allowed to file its reply affidavit within 14 days thereafter.  The application for summary judgment was also set down for hearing with one day reserved.  The parties then appeared before the Listing Officer on 28 April 2009 and fixed the hearing on 24 September 2009.

7.  On 18 May 2009, the defendants sought a further extension to 1 June 2009 for filing their affirmations in opposition.  The plaintiff agreed to it and a consent order was made by Registrar Au Yeung.

8.  On 1 June 2009, the defendants sought a further extension to 15 June 2009.  The plaintiff again consented to it. 

9.  On 15 June, the defendants again asked for an extension to 30 June 2009 and the plaintiff agreed.

10.  So far, the plaintiff has been most accommodating to the defendants’ requests for extension.  But the defendants still could not come up with their affidavits by the extended deadline.

11.  On 26 June 2009, the defendants again asked for an extension to 13 July 2009.  On 30 June 2009, Master de Souza extended the time to 21 July 2009 with an unless order.  Simply by looking at the chronology, I think there was already sufficient justification for an unless order at the beginning of June 2009. 

12.  In the end, a further extension of two days was given because the defendants’ Taiwanese witness was delayed by typhoon in his journey to Hong Kong.  The defendants’ affirmations in opposition were then filed on 23 July 2009.  The time for the plaintiff to file its affidavit in reply was also extended to 7 September 2009.  There were 6 weeks for the plaintiff to prepare its affidavits in reply.

13.  Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the defendants’ affidavits were lengthy and required investigation in various jurisdictions.  These affidavits were made after many extensions of time.  Despite these submissions, the plaintiff did not at any time suggest that the 6 week period was not enough for it to file the affidavit in reply.  It also did not apply for any extension of time.  The plaintiff’s solicitors and counsel also attended the office of the defendants’ solicitors to inspect the defendants’ bulky affidavits on 12 August 2009. 

14.  I am alive to the fact that the hearing was fixed on 24 September 2009 and the deadline for the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply was 7 September 2009 which was only two weeks before the hearing.  But it did not mean that the deadline could not be extended or the hearing date could not be postponed.

15.  Monday, 7 September 2009 came and went.  The plaintiff’s solicitors did not file any affidavit in reply or asked for any extension of time.  It did not tell the defendants whether it would file any affidavit in reply or would just argue the matter out without such affidavit.  Then on Friday, 11 September, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendants’ solicitors and proposed to give the defendants unconditional leave to defend. 

16.  On 14 September, the plaintiff’s solicitors enclosed to the defendants’ solicitors a draft consent summons proposing unconditional leave for the defendants to defend with costs of the application for summary judgment be in the cause.

17.  The defendants’ solicitors replied on 16 September 2009 that when they did not receive the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply on 7 September, they just thought that the plaintiff would proceed with the argument of the application without such affidavit.  They had therefore proceeded to prepare for the substantive hearing.  Brief to counsel had also been delivered on 10 September which was two weeks before the hearing. 

18.  They also said that the plaintiff must have decided not to file any affidavit in reply and to give the defendants’ unconditional leave to defend before 7 September as time would have been required for drafting the affidavit if the plaintiff should have decided otherwise and to file the affidavit on 7 September.  Hence, they said that the plaintiff’s solicitors should have advised them earlier and at the latest by the deadline of 7 September of the decision not to pursue summary judgment.  They therefore only agreed that the costs of the application accruing up to 7 September be in the cause and the costs thereafter be to the defendants in any event.  Prima facie, this is a reasonable stance.

19.  Counsel for the plaintiff now submits that the cut-off date of 7 September is chosen by the defendants arbitrarily and without justification.  I disagree.  That was the date when the defendants could expect to receive the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply and to consider the strength of their opposition to the application for summary judgment.  If the plaintiff should have decided on or before that day not to file the affidavit in reply and not to pursue the application, the plaintiff should let them know of the decision at the latest by that day.  If there was no indication from the plaintiff, they could reasonably expect that the plaintiff would continue with the application. 

20.  Counsel for the plaintifffurther submits that if 7 September was a critical date, the defendants had failed to act properly for the purpose of saving time and costs as they had failed to alert the plaintiff that the deadline for the plaintiff’s affidavit in reply had expired.  Counsel further submitted that the defendants should have enquired with the plaintiff whether it would continue with the application as the defendants were going to issue brief to counsel. 

21.  I find this argument difficult to accept.  The deadline of 7 September was for the plaintiff to file the affidavit in reply.  I do not see why the defendants should have any responsibility to alert the plaintiff of its expiry.  The responsibility was instead on the plaintiff to tell the defendants that it was not going to file any affidavit in reply and was prepared to let the defendants have unconditional leave to defend.  The plaintiff had not done that and should bear the consequence of its failure. 

22.  The plaintiff further argues that the defendants were only given unconditional leave to defend and they never argued for dismissal of the Order 14 Summons.  Therefore, the costs order should be the usual one of costs be in the costs when unconditional leave is granted.

23.  This submission reflects a misunderstanding of the defendants’ position.  The defendants accept the usual order of costs to be in the course save and except the costs incurred after 7 September.  They say that those costs were incurred by the default of the plaintiff in not telling them at the latest on 7 September that no more costs need be incurred for the application.  In other words, these costs could have been saved but for the fault of the plaintiff.

24.  Counsel for the plaintiffin fact accepts that as soon as the plaintiff was sufficiently aware of a triable issue based upon the affirmationin opposition, the plaintiff should fairly and properly withdraw its application (see Skink Ltd (In Liquidation) v Comtowell Ltd & Anor, CACV 74 of 1994 per Godfrey JA at page 10).

25.  I am of the view that 7 September was the time for the plaintiff to fairly and properly advise the defendants of its change of position.  If the plaintiff was still considering what to do, it should at least have informed the defendants on a without prejudice save as to costs basis about its consideration and requested the defendants not to incur further costs.  I am not sure if such notification made on or about 7 September could or could not have saved the further costs as the hearing date was approaching and counsel’s availability had to be secured.  However, silence would surely not assist the plaintiff.

26.  One further point raised by counsel for the plaintiff is that even if the matter should have proceeded to argument, the defendants would only have obtained at best unconditional leave to defend with costs to be in the cause.  I think there is a mistaken assumption that the court would invariably order costs to be in the course if unconditional leave to defend is given.  If the defendant’s affidavit in opposition should reveal an entitlement to unconditional leave to defend, but the plaintiff still pursues the application for summary judgment without good reason, then the plaintiff should be ordered to bear all costs incurred from the time when the defendants’ case has been properly revealed.  Such costs would normally include the costs of the hearing.

27.  For the above reasons, I agree with the position taken by the defendants.  The fact that the plaintiff has been most accommodating to the defendants’ repeated requests for indulgence cannot be a factor for consideration of the incidence of these costs.  I order that the costs incurred by the defendants in the Order 14 Summons after 7 September 2009 including the costs for this paper argument be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants in any event.

 (L. Chan)
 Deputy High Court Judge

 

Mr Norman Hui, instructed by Messrs Chan, Tang & Kwok, for the Plaintiff

Ms Winnie Tam, SC and Mr C W Ling, instructed by Messrs ATL Law Office, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants