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Magistracy Appeal2008

HKSAR v. KIT CHOY DEVELOPMENT LTD

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Files (2)

64522-EN-2009-02-13

HKSAR v. KIT CHOY DEVELOPMENT LTD

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HCMA 386/2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 386 OF 2008

(ON APPEAL FROM ESS 32357/2006)

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BETWEEN  
 HKSARRespondent
 and 
 KIT CHOY DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDAppellant

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge E Toh in Court

Date of Hearing: 13 February 2009

Date of Decision: 13 February 2009

 

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  The appellant company is represented by Mr Choy, and the notice of motion asks this court to certify the points of law for the Court of Final Appeal because it is a matter of great and general importance.

2.  The points of law that I have been asked to certify are these:

(1) Whether it is an independent criminal case for a case when a prosecution is based upon a court order made and signed by a magistrate which differs in law and in substance from other criminal cases based upon statutory directions issued by an administrative authority over the same subject matter; and

(2) whether it is the essence of criminal law to call upon the maker of a court order to be the material witness for cross-examination by defence on the workability of the court order which is the root of the conviction.

3.  The relevant statutory section dealing with applications of such nature is enshrined in the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Chapter 484, section 32(2) of the Ordinance.  It is clear that the court has to consider whether this is a matter of law that is of great and general importance in order to certify it.

4.  Mr Choy has many grievances.  Contrary to what he believes, each of us, judges, do not act, according to him, in a “birdcage”.  We have to consider each case on its merits.  The matter of the appeal, which was handled by myself in the magistracy appeal, has dealt with his grounds of appeal, and I do not consider that the questions formulated by Mr Choy, on behalf of his company, are matters of law of great and general importance.

5.  Mr Chung, in his submission, states that it is impossible for a magistrate to be called.  That is not the case, that really depends on the circumstances of each case and relevance and materiality.  In this case, the learned Magistrate had considered the matter and it was decided that it was not material nor, at the end of the day, affected his ruling on the matter.

6.  Mr Choy is feeling very aggrieved by this.  However, that does not make the questions that he had formulated into one of great and general importance.  Mr Choy knows that if his application is refused today, he still has the opportunity to go directly to the Court of Final Appeal and asks for leave to appeal on the basis that the conviction was unfair.

7.  As for the certificate, I do not feel that the question that has been raised is of great and general importance and, therefore, I decline the motion.  The application is refused.

 (E Toh)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Frederick Chung, Senior Public Prosecutor, for the Respondent

The Appellant, represented by Mr Choy Bing-wing

63629-CH-2008-11-25

香港特別行政區 訴 傑才發展有限公司

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HCMA 386/2008

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

定罪上訴

案件編號:高院裁判法院上訴案件2008年第386號

(原東區裁判法院傳票2006年第32357號)

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答辯人香港特別行政區 
 訴 
上訴人傑才發展有限公司 

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主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官杜麗冰

聆訊日期:2008年11月25日

裁決日期:2008年11月25日

 

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判案書

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1.  上訴公司於裁判法院被控一項沒有遵從在2005年6月7日發出的「改善消防安全令」,違反《香港法例》第502章《消防安全(商業處所)條例》第6(8)(b)條。上訴公司由蔡炳榮先生代表。他否認控罪。經審訊後被裁定罪名成立,現上訴公司不服定罪,提出上訴。

2.  上訴公司的主要上訴理由指控方未有履行其嚴格舉證的責任而沒有傳召證人呈遞改善消防安全令 (控方證物2)。上訴公司投訴在控方第一及第二證人在庭上接受盤問時裁判法官干擾及制止辯方盤問有關該證人作假證供的指稱,沒有適當地考慮上訴公司沒有可能履行改善消防安全令。

3.  在第一次上訴聆訊時(2008年7月10日),蔡先生代表上訴公司要求索取審訊時的謄本,本席亦向蔡先生解釋,如果他要索取謄本,本席會批准,但他一定要支付所需費用,才可索取謄本。最後,蔡先生要求索取審訊時的錄音帶,索取之後他會請人替他做謄本,把謄本交給法庭及答辯人,再另作一個詳細的書面陳詞。但本席得知在蔡先生索取錄音帶時,法庭的程序一定要蔡先生簽署一份承諾書以保證不會將其用作其它用途,因蔡先生拒絕簽該份承諾書,所以他不能索取到錄音帶。

4.  今天上訴聆訊時,蔡先生投訴法庭這個程序不公平,而且透明度不足,他認為繼續上訴,也沒有什麼可以作陳詞。

5.  本席頒令今天的上訴必須繼續,蔡先生指稱在裁判法院裁判法官是弄錯了,上訴公司在不清楚及不明不白之下,被裁判法官定罪,蔡先生因沒有索取到所需資料,所以他無話可說。

6.  本席在此參照裁判法官在審訊時的情況,裁判法官在裁斷陳述書中指出這命令的來龍去脈,裁判法官在裁斷陳述書亦指出其實在審訊時,上訴公司並不否認其公司沒有遵從安全令進行任何的改善工程的事實,但上訴公司在審訊時指出原因是該「改善消防安全令」內的要求根本不能做到。

7.  在裁斷陳述書中第7段指出上訴公司曾要求傳召葉佐文裁判法官作供,審訊的裁判法官亦有處理該問題,他認為這樣是不適當的,上訴公司的說法即使屬實也不構成答辯理據。裁判法官參閱所有證據及證供之後,他認為無可抗拒的推論是上訴公司沒有依從命令內容進行改善工程。因此,他判上訴公司罪名成立。

8.  在上訴時,蔡先生代表上訴公司作出了本席以上所提出的幾項上訴理由。本席參閱裁判法官的裁斷陳述書後,認為裁判法官已適當地考慮到控方的證據。正如代表答辯人的陳大律師在書面陳詞指出,裁判法官是正確地裁定上訴公司所指不可能遵從安全令要求進行改善,並非可構成辯護的理由。陳大律師呈遞法庭參考以下的案例:HKSAR v The Incorporated Owners of No. 10 Bonham Strand, HCMA 239/2004 及 HKSAR v Kit Choy Development Limited, HCMA 62/2005。

9.  本席在此也毋須再重複這兩件案件的案情,因為這兩宗案件蔡先生也參與其中,上訴公司應該清楚了解該些案件。在本案中,上訴公司再次透過蔡先生作出同樣的反對埋由,本席同意該法官的判決,該等理由不構成辯護,本席認為裁判法官的定罪並沒有任何不安全或不穩妥的情況。因此,上訴被駁回,維持原判。

 (杜麗冰)
 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

答辯人:由律政司陳淑慧高級檢控官代表香港特別行政區

上訴人:無律師代表,由蔡炳榮先生代表出席應訊