葉錦聰 訴 過小潔及李中強經營De Cut Salon

DCEC 797/2009

香港特別行政區

區域法院

僱員補償案件編號2009年第797號

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判案書

甲  背景

1.  申請人葉錦聰先生（以下簡稱 “葉”或申請人）根據《僱員補償條例》香港法例第282章的第9條、第10條及第10A條向答辯人提出申索。根據區域法院潘法官於2010年7月23日所作出之命令，本席先審理責任問題。

2.  根據申請人2009年9月4日經修訂的申請書及在庭上的澄清，他指稱2008年1月2日, 當申請人向過小潔表示辭職後, 她向申請人恐嚇勒索HK$80,000，令他失眠症及驚恐症復發, 致使他衝出答辯人在金鐘經營的髮型屋, 企圖跳下行人天橋自殺不遂，被到場消防員及警員救回，申請人指上述事情令他精神創傷，即令他已患有的失眠症及驚恐症進一步惡化。當日事發後, 他被送到瑪麗醫院接受檢驗, 急症室醫生認為他情緒穩定，企圖自殺只是一時衝動,但申請人拒絕將他轉介給醫管局精神科醫生跟進，並表示會自行求診於私家醫生。

3.  答辯人否認上述指控，過小潔（以下簡稱 “過”）及李中強（以下簡稱 “李”）指出在2008年1月2日, 申請人向過提出即時集體辭職，即聯同數名員工一起辭職, 他既不願意給予一個月通知期，也不願意補貼一個月代通知金，更辯稱收了別公司的「過檔費」非走不可，因為當時公司在運作中，過女仕希望在當天的晚上待下班以後再詳談，其間過與葉之間的對話中，根本沒有勒索和威脅的意味。

乙  本案焦點

4.  訴訟雙方均沒有法律代表。雙方同意本案議題有兩點: (1) 究竟2008年1月2日發生甚麼事情，過女仕有沒有向葉勒索?申請人有沒有 “因工而遭遇意外以致身體受傷”?(2) 申請人在事發前是否已患上失眠症及驚恐症，事發後他的失眠症及驚恐症有沒有因該意外而惡化?

丙   相關法律

5.  《僱員補償條例》香港法例第282章的第5條第1至3節有以下條文:-

僱主就意外引致僱員死亡或喪失工作能力而支付補償的法律責任

(1) 除第(2)及(3)款另有規定外，不論受僱於任何工作的僱員，如在受僱工作期間因工遭遇意外以致身體受傷，其僱主須負有按照本條例支付補償的法律責任。
(2) 對於下列情況，無須根據本條例支付補償─

(a) 有關損傷不會使僱員無能力賺取其受僱工作的十足工資，但引致永久地部分喪失工作能力的損傷除外； (由1996年第67號第2條修訂)
(b) 因蓄意自傷而引致喪失工作能力或死亡；
(c) 因身體受傷引致喪失工作能力或死亡，而僱員曾在任何時間明知所作陳述是虛假而向僱主陳述他沒有或以往沒有受該損傷或受類似的損傷；或
(d) 損傷因意外而導致，而意外可直接歸因於僱員的毒癮或其在意外發生時所受的酒精影響，且損傷沒有引致死亡或永久地嚴重喪失工作能力。

(3) 在根據本條例進行的任何法律程序中，如經證明僱員受傷可歸因於其本身犯有嚴重和故意的不當行為，或僱員蓄意加重其在受僱工作期間因工遭遇意外所致的傷勢，則有關該損傷的補償申索須予拒准；但如損傷引致死亡或嚴重喪失工作能力，則法院在考慮所有情況後，可判給本條例訂定的補償或其中其認為適當的部分。

丁  證人證詞

6.  申請人相關證詞如下:-

(1)  2008年1月2日, 約下午1時，申請人向過女仕表示辭職不幹, 並要求出糧, 此外申請人亦向過女仕表示之前向過女仕售賣的生財工具仍有餘款未付。但過女仕表示申請人不可以這樣辭職, 並要求最少賠償八萬元，不賠就找律師告他或召警察「鎖」起他。申請人表示過女仕不講道理和她是「傻」的，過女仕告訴申請人若沒有錢賠償可以問他的媽媽索取。這句說話令申請人非常激動和憤怒, 申請人便打算跳橋自殺, 這樣便什麼都不用賠。申請人便走到附近一行人天橋,爬出欄杆,點起一枝香煙,心想食完該枝煙後便跳下, 約五至六分鐘後，警察和消防人員到場, 他亦見有記者在場,便拿出一把剪刀架在頸上，並喝令警察不要走近。此刻, 有消防員搶走了申請人手中的剪刀,申請人再拿出第二把剪刀,他解釋他的剪髮工具袋一共有六把髮剪。並大叫「無良僱主屈員工錢」，期間消防員和警察合力將申請人拉回安全地方,整個過程為時約十五分鐘。

(2)  2008年1月8日，申請人亦曾經報警要求警方協助索回剪髮工具。

(3)  申請人亦發覺, 答辯人於2008年2月尾至3月頭期間刊登廣告售賣屬於他的生財工具, 包括一台日本Takara洗頭機,價值約十萬元。

(4)  申請人亦聯同另三位員工入稟勞資審裁處，向答辯人追討欠薪,一干人等亦於2008年2月29日出席審裁處的聆訊。2008年4月18日, 該申索以和解方式解決。

(5)  但申請人指出過女仕竟然夠膽於2008年2月29日的和解討論中在審裁官席前再次向他勒索達六十萬元。申請人指出該等勒索對話記載在錄音謄本, 即法庭準備的審訊文件夾第146頁及第154頁。

7.  過女仕相關證詞如下:-

(1)  2008年1月2日, 約中午時份，申請人向她提出即時集體辭職，即聯同數名員工一起辭職, 他既不願意給予一個月通知期，也不願意補貼一個月代通知金，更辯稱收了別公司的「過檔費」非走不可，因為當時公司在運作中，過希望在當天的晚上待下班以後再詳談，其間過與葉之間的對話中，根本沒有勒索和威脅的意味。

(2)  過女仕表示他很憎李,即她的丈夫。原因是早在2007年11月，當時申請人乞求李先生聘請他，稱他債台高築及婚姻出現問題。過女仕眼見申請人神情有異, 食飯時又手震和須要服藥,便勸阻李先生不要僱用申請人。但李先生只顧幫助昔日的徒弟，不理她的勸阻,導致今天的訴訟。

8.  李先生相關證詞如下:-

(1)  李先生在「企圖自殺事件」後曾在網上發現申請人已聯同另兩位前員工加入另一髮型屋，李先生向法庭展示文件夾第38頁的網頁列印，是2008年1月16日的網頁,並描述申請人的英文名「Kenneth」, 申請人在網頁宣佈他與另兩位前員工「Ming」及「Nick」已於2008年1月12日加入了「ZicA x HAIR」, 並留下聯絡電話及地址。

(2)  李先生亦列印了另一類似網頁,日期為2008年2月５日, 顯示申請人當時轉往皇后大道中另一髮廊工作。

9.  申請人亦傳召了精神科專家余偉德醫生作供,他的相關證詞如下:-

(1)  他一共為申請人撰寫了5份陳述書，日期分別為2008年１月４日，2008年３月１０日，2008年１１月２５日，2009年７月22日及2010年５月19日(見申請人文件夾分別第58, 52, 53, 47及45頁)。

(2)  余醫生在2008年1月4日的陳述書指出，早在2002年已為申請人作出診症，並診斷他患上失眠症及驚恐症。最近有惡化跡象,並導致申請人工作能力損失,但預期他於1個月內康復。(“I first examined Mr. Ip on 11March 2002.  He has Insomnia and Panic Disorder.  He has exacerbation recently and

suffers loss of work capacity.  I expect him to recover in one month。”)

(3)  余醫生在2008年3月10日的陳述書指出, 他在2002年３月１１日第一次為申請人診症,當時申請人被診斷為患上失眠症及驚恐症, 經治療後, 於2004年初,申請人精神狀態良好一直維持至2007年尾, 當時申請人精神狀態因工作壓力轉壞, 給予輔導後情況好轉。申請人因精神病只剩50%工作能力。 (“I first examined Mr. Ip on 11 March 2002.  He has Insomnia and Panic Disorder.  He has suffered from sleep problem from 1995 onwards ... . He improved steadily and was mentally well by early 2004.  He remained well till late 2007.  The mental symptoms worsened apparently due to work stress. He improved upon intensive counseling... .I last examined on 5 March 2008.  He has not recovered fully and is vulnerable to stress.  He only has 50% work capacity due to mental ill health.”)

(4)  余醫生在2008年11月25日的陳述書內容與2008年3月10日的陳述書相若,並加上以下內容:

「2008年1月3日，申請人描述他較早一天發生的企圖自殺事件，他的僱主威嚇他令他受到精神創傷,及後接受瑪麗醫院急症室醫生的治療。申請人的精神病徵狀因該次事件明顯惡化,對緊密的治療效果反應輕微。申請人有抑鬱情緒症狀,過份憂慮及睡眠障礙。他只能兼職工作, 不能全職工作。申請人現在的精神現像大致歸咎於2008年1月2日所發生的事情,因此他失去50%工作的能力及10%人身損害。(“On 3 January 2008, he described a suicide attempt the day before. His employer threatened him and he suffered psychic trauma. He was treated at the Emergency Department of Queen Mary Hospital. His mental symptoms have worsened significantly since the incident. The response to intensive treatment was slight only. He has depressive mood, excess worries and sleep impairment. He works part-time only, as full time work is beyond him. His current mental suffering is largely attributed to the incident on 2 January 2008. Currently, he has 50% loss of earning capacity and 10% impairment of whole person.”)

(5) 余醫生在2009年7月22日的陳述書內容與2008年11月25日的相若,只就 “10%人身損害(impairment of whole person)”加上10%人身損害是基於綜合因素如日常生活, 社交能力，集中能力及工作上的適應能力。(“10% impairment of whole person is based on combining minimal impairment of activities of daily living, mild impairment of social functioning, moderate impairment of concentration, and moderate to severe impairment of work adaptation.”)

(6) 余醫生在2010年5月19日的陳述書內容與2009年7月22日的相若, 將原先50%工作能力的損失修訂為60%。

(7) 在庭上, 余醫生亦補充了若干資料: 2008年１月３日沒有和申請人見面診症,只是透過電話通話認為申請人可能精神狀態轉壞。對上一次為申請人診症發生在2007年11月17日，該次診症亦是沒有見面, 而是透過電話對話診症, 余醫生認為該次對話(2007年11月17日)顯示申請人沒有驚恐症發作或睡眠問題, 但他的這項意見是沒有書面記錄,只憑記憶。再對上一次電話對話，日期為2006年６月13日,余醫生表示對話顯示申請人沒有睡眠問題, 但他的這項意見是沒有書面記錄, 只憑記憶。再對上一次電話對話，日期為2006年3月1日, 余醫生表示對話顯示申請人沒有睡眠問題, 該次意見是有書面記錄。

(8) 2006年３月１日至2007年11月17日共約21月期間, 他從沒有與申請人作面對面的診症, 只是就上述三次電話對話, 便在期間為申請人處方約75次抗抑鬱藥及安眠藥(平均每月3至4次),當中安眠藥屬於高劑量, 每天需要服10至20多粒。

(9) 他認為申請人的精神狀態，尤其是失眠症於2008年１月２日後有明顯惡化跡象, 情况介乎穩定至嚴重之間, 縱使如此, 往後的日子他為申請人處方藥物及劑量均與事發前兩年沒有改變。

(10) 余醫生在2008年1月10日有為申請人見面診症，並獲他告知2008年１月2日的事情，申請人指出他將生財工具轉讓給僱主, 但得不到所有貨款, 還被克扣工資, 但當日申請人沒有提及被勒索一事。

戍  僱員補償的討論和分析

10.  就本案焦點而言，究竟2008年1月2日發生甚麼事情，過女仕有沒有向葉勒索? 申請人有沒有“因工而遭遇意外以致身體受傷”? 申請人在事發前是否已患上失眠症及驚恐症，事發後他的失眠症及驚恐症有沒有因該意外而惡化?

11.  本席考慮了雙方的狀書、證人陳述書、文件及庭上的証供，除非雙方沒有爭議,本席認為答辯人一方的證供較申請人的證供較為可信，原因如下：

(1)  申請人指稱過女仕在2008年１月２日曾經勒索他港幣八萬元,但瑪麗醫院急症室醫生在該日記錄顯示申請人只提及與前僱主有爭拗，沒有提及被僱主勒索一事。

(2)  申請人花了很大篇幅及努力指稱答辯人在2008年2月29日在勞資審裁處的聆訊當中過女仕再次向他勒索六十萬元，申請人並表示有聆訊謄本作証。但是聆訊謄本完全沒有反映過女仕有任何勒索的語調，過女仕只是在該調解聆訊當中提及申請人的集體辭職令答辯人的髮型屋結束營業, 損失達六十萬元,並要求申請人賠償六十萬元。

(3)  余醫生在2008年1月10日有為申請人見面診症，並獲他告知2008年1月2日的事情，申請人指出他將生財工具轉讓給僱主, 但得不到所有貨款, 還被克扣工資, 但當日申請人沒有提及被勒索一事。

12.  由此可見，申請人就勒索一事的証供既不可信，亦不可靠, 他的証詞誇張失實。若然過女仕在2008年1月2日真的向申請人勒索，沒有理由申請人沒有向急症室醫生投訴，更沒有理由在2008年1月10月見面診症時不向自己的私家精神科醫生投訴被勒索,而導致精神不穩。

13.  因此申請人指稱因答辯人向他勒索導致他精神病進一步惡化的指控, 尤其是「勒索」的指控, 並不成立。

14.  在責任議題上,申請人依靠余醫生一份2008年11月25日的陳述書, 當中曾經提及: 「申請人現在的精神狀況大致歸咎於2008年1月2日所發生的事情。」但余醫生的陳述書沒有具體提及2008年1月2日發生何事? 申請人當時的精神狀況(2008年11月25日)是怎樣的? 更甚的是余醫生在2008年1月4日及3月10日的陳述書裏完全沒有提及1月2日發生了什麼特別事情, 忽然在第三份陳述書提及申請人聲稱被勒索一事, 但具體內容欠奉, 就跳進這樣結論「申請人現在的精神狀況大致歸咎於2008年1月2日所發生的事情」, 欠缺專家應有的案情理解、假設、典據、分析、論述和結論。

15.  此外,余醫生不能夠合理地解釋, 若然申請人的精神狀況在2008年1月2日後更為惡化, 介乎穩定和嚴重之間,為何在事發前和事發後處方的藥物及劑量沒有改變。

16.  再者,他的2008年１月４日陳述書預期申請人於1個月內康復，為何在2008年11月25日, 申請人的精神狀況不但沒有改善, 更進一步惡化。余醫生不能夠合理地解釋。

17.  余醫生在2008年3月10日的陳述書指出, 他在2002年３月１１日第一次為申請人診症,當時申請人被診斷為患上失眠症及驚恐症, 經治療後2004年初精神狀態良好一直維持至2007年尾。若然申請人在2006年3月至2007年11月期間的精神狀態是如此良好的，余醫生不能夠合理地解釋為何在該二十一個月內只有三次電話問症便向申請人處方七十五次藥物包括抗抑鬱藥及高劑量的安眠藥。情況令人憂慮及關注。

18.  因此，本席不接納余醫生的專家證據，尤其是他指出申請人的精神狀態的惡化原因, 大致歸咎於2008年１月２日的事件。

19.  就本案焦點的事實裁斷而言, 本席認為2008年1月2日過女仕沒有向申請人勒索。 申請人沒有“因工而遭遇意外以致身體受傷”。申請人在事發前已患上失眠症及驚恐症，事發後他的失眠症及驚恐症沒有因2008年1月2日的事情而惡化。

己  判決

20.  申請人的申索予以撤銷。

21.  至於訟費問題，本席作出訟費暫准令，申請人須支付答辯人是次訴訟的訟費,若訟費金額有爭議,由聆案官評定。除非與訟任何一方於今天起計14天內以傳票方式申請更改以上訟費暫准令,否則由今天起計14天後訟費暫准令便成為正式訟費命令。

DCEC 797 / 2009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION NO. 797 OF 2009

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR DIRECTIONS

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A.   INTRODUCTION 

2.  I said that the Post-CJR statements were in flagrant breach because (i) each statement comprises of one page document without stating the qualifications and analysis of the psychiatrist as to how he arrived at 50% (later increased to 60%) of loss of earning capacity and 10% impairment of the whole person; (ii) they have not been verified by the statement of truth pursuant to O.41A of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”); (iii) the said statements do not contain a declaration that the proposed expert was supplied with a copy of the code of conduct and agrees to be bound by it, in addition to a declaration that he understands his duty to the Court as stipulated under O.38 rule 37A of the RDC. There are 3 more statements prepared by the same Dr. Yu dated 4^th January 2008, 10^th March 2008 and 25^th November 2008. These Pre-CJR statements are treating doctor’s notes in nature.

3.  It must be noted that the Applicant hinges his claim on the proposed expert evidence because Dr. Yu opined that the Applicant’s current mental condition (as at 21^st April 2010) is largely attributed to the incident on 2^nd January 2008 and he estimated the Applicant’s loss of earning capacity as 60%, in addition to 10% impairment of the whole person.  However, the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board assessed the Applicant on 19^th February 2010.  The conclusion is 2% of loss of earning capacity permanently caused by the injury “threatened resulting in depressed mood, poor concentration and sleep disturbance”, subject to the question of liability.

B.   THE CLAIM

4.  Suitable expert directions can only be made by referring to the background of this case.  This claim concerns Mr. Ip Kam Chung Kenneth’s (“Mr. Ip”) application for compensation under section 10 of the Employees Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282).   The alleged accident took place on 2^nd January 2008.  Mr. Ip said that on that date, he expressed his intention to resign but the employer blackmailed him and unreasonably asked for compensation in the sum of HK$600,000.  The employer also coerced him to borrow money from his old aged mother to repay the compensation, otherwise, the employer would summon police to arrest him or get a lawyer to sue him.  He thus attempted suicide.  He said that upon consultation with psychiatrist, he was assessed to have (i) loss of 50% of earning capacity because of depression and (ii) loss of 10% earning capacity because of panic disorder.  His wife also divorced from him as a result.

C.  DEFENCE

5.  The 1^st and 2^nd Respondents each filed their statement of defence.  They both denied the serious allegations.  The 1^st Respondent stated that in or about November 2007, the Applicant said that he was in poverty and begged her husband to employ him.  The Applicant appeared to her to be mentally unstable and seemed to be drug abuser, she asked her husband not to employ him.  However, out of kindness, the 2^nd Respondent permitted the Applicant to join De Cut Salon in November 2007.    On or about 2^nd January 2008, the Applicant told the 1^st Respondent that he wanted to quit the job. The 1^st Respondent asked him to discuss the issue with the 2^nd Respondent later.  The Applicant then called the media and pretended to commit suicide.  On 8^th January 2008, he repeated the trick again and called Apply Daily before attempted suicide. 

6.  The 2^nd Respondent gave similar statement.  He added that soon after the incident on 2^nd January 2008, the Applicant was found working in other salon on 3^rd January 2008.  That was admitted in a hearing held in the Labour Tribunal.  De Cut Salon also ceased conducting business in May 2008 because the Applicant procured his camp of staffs left De Cut Salon shortly before the lunar New Year in 2008, hence severely damaged the business.  In a statement dated 3^rd June 2010, the Respondents referred to the medical statements of Dr. Peter W.T. Yu and Dr. Ng Man Hon.  In about 2002, Dr. Yu diagnosed the Applicant of suffering from insomnia and panic disorder.  Dr. Ng has been providing treatment to the Applicant since 2005.    In short, the Respondents contended that the Applicant’s mental problem, if any, was pre-existing and was not caused by the incident on 2^nd January 2008. 

D.  DISCUSSION

7.  The Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board assessed the Applicant on 19^th February 2010.  The conclusion is 2% of loss of earning capacity permanently caused by the injury “threatened resulting in depressed mood, poor concentration and sleep disturbance.”  The concluding remarks in the certificate states clearly that “This Board only assesses the quantum of loss caused by the injury and does not arbitrate any dispute about liability for compensation. 

8.  By a statement dated 19^th May 2010, Dr. Yu opined that the Applicant’s current mental condition is largely attributed to the incident on 2^nd January 2008 and he estimated the loss of earning capacity as 60%. 

9.  The Applicant once filed a claim against the Respondents in the Labour Tribunal and the case was concluded by settlement on 18^th April 2008. 

10.  From what appears from the parties’ statements and documents, it is common ground that the Applicant was employed by the Respondents before 2^nd January 2008. The ultimate questions for trial are whether the Applicant left the Respondent’s employment on or about 2^nd January 2008,  whether the mental problem of the Applicant as alleged was pre-existing.        

11.  In Siu Fook Cheong v Siu Kwok Fai and others HCPI 768 of 2009 dated 27^th January 2010, the learned Master Ms. Marlene Ng has propounded a succinct approach in obtaining medical expert evidence.

III.  Approach to obtaining expert medical evidence

20.    The underlying objectives in Order 1A of the RHC place emphasis on the need “to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable”, “to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings” and “to ensure fairness between the parties”.  The parties and their legal representatives should assist the court to further such underlying objectives.

21.    Even before the implementation of the CJR, the court has encouraged the parties and their legal representatives to adopt a joint approach to obtaining expert medical evidence by (a) arranging joint medical examination of the injured person by the parties’ respective medical experts and (b) compiling joint expert medical report that set out the matters on which they agreed and/or disagreed and the reasons for non-agreement.

22.    In Ansar Mohammad v Global Legend Transportation Limited DCEC1090/2006 (unreported, 8 May 2007), I have set out some of the advantages of such joint approach:

“ (a) to prevent confusion and time-wasting when it is discovered at an advanced stage of the legal proceedings that the parties’ respective medical experts are proceeding on different medical background of the party to be examined, different complaints by such party, and/or different findings from the physical examination/other investigation;

(b) to identify at an early stage the medical issues, the relative merits of the claim and the areas in which the parties may reach agreement;

(c) to facilitate settlement or (if settlement cannot be achieved) facilitate preparation for trial that will be focused on the issues in dispute”. (paragraph 46)

23.In Lau Lai Shan v Hospital Authority DCEC784/2007 (unreported, 29 February 2008), I have expanded on the above observations as follows:

“ 31. I have in paragraphs 46-47 of my decision in Ansar Mohammad set out the case management objectives and advantages in requiring parties in employees’ compensation cases to produce joint expert medical reports pursuant to a joint medical examination by their respective medical experts in order to identify the agreed matters and to identify/reduce the areas of dispute thereby minimising time and costs of litigation. Early focus on the real medical issues to be resolved is plainly a laudable case management objective in any personal injuries litigation.

32. A joint medical examination also alleviates the risk of dispute on history taking and on observations (which may include objective or subjective signs, eg in the orthopaedic context, muscle wasting, muscle guarding/spasm, Waddell’s signs) during physical examination by competing medical experts. This is of some moment because disputes on such matters go to the underlying assumptions that form the basis of expert opinion and such disputes compound the court’s difficulty in assessing competing medical opinion and in answering the ultimate medical issues. By capturing such information and observations in a single medical examination, areas of dispute over expert opinion will obviously be reduced.

33.    A joint expert report requires the medical experts to confer, which has the advantage of minimising extreme views. When a medical expert has to justify his opinion to a fellow professional, partisan opinion tends to become more balanced and/or moderated.  The discussion between experts may also reveal relevant facts or information that are not appreciated by one of them and may help in identifying and putting aside peripheral issues.  The joint discussion and the exercise of drafting the joint report can lead to greater focus on narrowing the medical issues and expert opinion, and on defining significant areas of disagreement, which coincide with the fundamental purpose of case management. …… such approach should facilitate reasonable and honest settlement, and even if it does not result in settlement, it will ensure efficiency of the trial by bringing the essential issues into sharper relief.  All this translates into savings in time and costs.  To harness the advantages discussed above, it is essential for the medical experts to confer at the earliest stage to ensure they consider the same primary information, address the same issues and give opinion on the same medical questions.”

24.    The above approach in relation to employees’ compensation cases echoes the guidance in the Guidance Note to the pre-CJR Practice Direction 18.1 for personal injuries cases.  Such guidance laid emphasis on the objective of fair and expeditious determination of claims and the need to avoid proliferation of expert evidence:

“Paragraph 2

Many practitioners obtain reports in every conceivable medical or quasi-medical discipline before they establish sensible contact with the insurance company concerned or their solicitors e.g. orthopaedic, neurological, urological and psychiatric reports, and reports from an occupational therapist, physiotherapist, rehabilitation consultant, surveyor etc. What they should be doing instead of this ‘front-loading’ exercise on costs is to invite the Defendants to take part in a joint examination by respective experts, or in a joint instruction to an agreed expert. Failure to do so is likely to result in the Plaintiff's’ practitioners not recovering such costs from Defendants in the event of a settlement or a judgement against the Plaintiff.

The Court will be alert to prevent, when it can, practitioners from recovering such costs from the Plaintiff or out of the Plaintiff’s damages.”

12.  While the Court may deal with litigant in person with laxity, failure to comply with the statutory requirements cause substantive injustice to the Respondents who  are entitled to expect the Applicant and his expert to comply with the rules.   The relevant proposed expert should have known his duty owed to the Court (see O.38, r.35A), including the requirement to make a statement of truth (see O.38, r.37A).  The rules also impose a duty on a litigant to provide his expert with a copy of the code of conduct (see O.38, r.37B of the RDC). 

13.  In Leung Wai Kee v Tam Yuet Sheung [2009] HKEC 776, the court held that if either expert fails to comply with the Order, the party on whose behalf the expert’s earlier report was filed shall be barred from adducing the expert report and will not be allowed to adduce any further expert report without the leave of the court.  The court also warned the parties that any further non-compliance with the Order will result in the party having to bear the consequences of non-compliance and breach of order, including the payment into court of money as security (see also Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010 edition, Vol. 1, para. 38/35A/3.)

14.  I will adopt the similar approach.  In light of the flagrant breach of the above rules and practice directions, including PD 5.2 (case management) section F and PD 18.2 (employees’ compensation list) section G that represents the core values and the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform, I shall make the directions as follows:-

(1)Unless the Applicant do file and serve the statement of truth and the declaration of compliance with the code of conduct of Dr. Peter W. T. Yu regarding Dr. Yu’s statements of opinion dated 22^nd July 2009 and 19^th May 2010 by 4:00 pm, 4^th October 2010, the said statements be expunged from the Court’s file without further order and the Applicant is barred from adducing further expert evidence at trial. 

(2)The trial bundle prepared by the Applicant was confused, untidy and incomplete.  The pre-trial review be adjourned to 6^th October 2010 at 3:30 pm Court No.4 Lands Tribunal (1 hour reserved) so as to confirm with the parties the trial bundle to be prepared by the Court.

(3)Cost of this pre-trial review hearing be in the cause and assessed summarily in the sum of $400. 

(4)Court’s clerk do draw up this order in Chinese, file and serve the same.

15.  I decided not to call for a report of a single joint expert because firstly, the Applicant has obtained statements of his proposed expert, secondly,  trial dates have been fixed and it is going to start shortly.

Note: This judgment is pronounced in Punti.  Any party wishes to have the Chinese translation of the written judgment must apply in writing on or before 27th September 2010.

注意: 此判決是以本地話宣讀。如訴訟一方欲索取書面判決中文譯本，必須於2010年9月27日前的以書面申請。