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Personal Injuries Action2009

黃任蘭 訴 傲勝(香港)有限公司

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73696-CH-2010-11-05

黃任蘭 訴 傲勝(香港)有限公司

HTML content

 

DCPI 1885 / 2009

 

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟2009年第1885號

________________________

 黃任蘭原告人
 對 
 傲勝(香港)有限公司被告人

________________________

 

主審法官:暫委區域法院法官李慶年公開聆訊

聆訊日期:2010年11月5日

判案書日期:2010年11月5日

 

____________

判案書

____________

 

1.  原告人不服本席於2010年7月23日的判決,現申請上訴許可。

2.  本案的背景事實, 證據分析及案情在本席的判案書已有交代,在此不再重複。原告人的上訴許可申請理由,在她的上訴許可申請傳票中已詳細列出。主要有4點: (1) 被告人擬備的審訊文件夾沒有包括聯合醫院的醫療記錄;(2) 本席不應裁定她不可信及不可靠; (3) 本席不應接納被告一方傳召的骨科專家的證供; (4) 現在希望呈交9張新文件,因為該些文件可反敗為勝。

3.  就第一點而言,原告人在2010年6月28日的聆訊或開審時沒有提及這點。這點也與事實不符, 聯合醫院的醫療記錄可參考審訊文件夾E, 第3至28頁。查實, 原告人在開審時沒有携帶被告人送達給她的審訊文件夾,共2個。本席指示被告人的律師借另外一套給她,審訊得以順利進行。

4.  就第二及第三點而言, 本席已在判案書已有詳細交代, 在此不打算重覆。

5.  就第四點而言, 原告人忽然在本聆訊中要求呈交9張紙的文件,以下稱為P(1-9), 當中第4至8頁在審訊文件夾已覆蓋(即E 文件夾, 第3, 6, 7, 10及11頁),第1, 2, 3及9頁的新文件似乎是物理治療部在2006年10月26日的筆記, 本席詢問原告人這些文件可如何反敗為勝,她稱聽說可反敗為勝, 但不能加以解釋。本席注意到該些文件內容記載2006年10月26日物理治療師引述原告人稱在2006年9月18日試用修腰帶後疼痛(應是2006年9月16日) 。這些文件不但違反案例Ladd v Marshal [1954] 3 ALL ER 745的原則(即盡了合理努力在審前也不能獲得證據),本席亦看不出這些文件對案情有實質幫助。

6.  根據《區域法院條例》第63A(2)條,除非所擬上訴具備合理成功的前景,或為秉行公義而須由上訴法院考慮,否則法庭不可以許可申請人提出上訴。

7.  基於上述情況,本席不認為原告人的上訴理據有合理的成功機會,亦不認為有其他利於秉行公義的理由進行上訴。本席撤銷原告人的上訴許可申請,原告人須付被告人是次申請而招致的訟費,簡而評定為$9,600, 14天支付。

                                             

 李慶年
區域法院暫委法官
  
原告人: 無法律代表, 親自應訊
被告人: 由的近律師行延聘的大律師王志光先生代表
72079-CH-2010-07-23

黃任蘭 訴 傲勝(香港)有限公司

HTML content

DCPI 1885 /2009

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟2009年第1885號

________________________

 黃任蘭原告人

及

 傲勝(香港)有限公司被告人

________________________

主審法官:暫委區域法院法官李慶年公開聆訊

審訊日期:2010年7月2日及5日

判案書日期:2010年7月23日

________________________

判案書

________________________

 

甲.      引言

1.    被告人為一間香港成立的有限公司,專營各類機械式健康產品。原告人聲稱於2006年9月16日進入被告人在德福商場專門店 (下稱 “該店”)內試用被告人陳列於該店內之產品,即型號OS-8500 iGallop一款「騎馬機」及型號OS-1160 uZap一款「修腰帶」。

2.    原告人聲稱於當日下午約4時進入該店內試用上述產品時,因被告人的員工疏忽而導致她身體受傷, 尤其是頸及右肩痛症, 需要丈夫停工照顧及聘請傭工打理家務,及後更需要燕窩, 花旗參和麝香調理身體, 因此而向被告人索償HK$968,000.00。

乙-1:原告人的申索主旨

3.      原告人在申索陳述書聲稱一名被告人所僱的店員 (下稱“該店員”) 上前招呼原告人及介紹原告人試用「騎馬機」。由於該店員的疏忽,原告人在試用「騎馬機」期間感到不適及/或受傷。

4.      原告人指控她受傷是因為被告人及該店員的疏忽。疏忽詳情如下:

(a)    該店員完全沒有考慮原告人是否可以承受「騎馬機」的搖擺力度。

(b)    該店員在沒有考慮及/或詢問原告人是否可以承受相當搖擺力度前就將力度調高。

(c)    該店員在完全沒有預示或警告之前就將「騎馬機」力度調高。

(d)    在上述情況之下,該店員並沒有以一個合理的人的標準行事,以避免原告人在試用「騎馬機」期間受傷及/或不適。

5.      原告人又聲稱在感不適後立刻要求該店員關上「騎馬機」。原告人離開「騎馬機」後,繼續試用「修腰帶」。原告人將「修腰帶」配戴於頸上試用後即時感到頭痛、頭暈及作嘔。

6.      該店員見及原告人上述情況,馬上關上「修腰帶」電源及扶原告人去該店的沙發坐下休息。

7.      休息期間原告人向該店員提及原告人認為自己頸及手臂比較粗,及後嘗試在頸及手臂使用「修腰帶」,原告人稱她曾指出其身體仍感到不適,擔心試用會使其狀況惡化。該店員着原告人不要擔心,指「修腰帶」在頸及手臂使用不會有問題。該店員隨即將「修腰帶」裝上原告人頸上。試用了3分鐘後原告便感頸部疼痛,要求該店員將「修腰帶」除下。除下後原告人仍感痛楚。該店員隨即將「修腰帶」裝在原告人右前臂上。試用約3分鐘原告人再感疼痛,要求該店員將「修腰帶」除下。除下後原告人仍感痛楚。

8.      原告人稱她的受傷是該店員疏忽所致。

9.      原告人向被告人申索損害賠償書中所列之損失及賠償, 合共HK$968,000.00。

乙-2: 被告人之抗辯主旨

10.  被告人不承認亦不否認有關原告人於9月16日下午4 時曾到過該店試用「騎馬機」及「修腰帶」。儘管原告人可能在當日曾到過該店試用「騎馬機」及「修腰帶」, 被告人指原告人沒有表示不適或受傷。被告人指原告人誇大痛症。就算有痛症,只屬輕微痛症,被告人依靠骨科專家葉國興醫生的報告, 指這些輕微痛症是由退化或骨刺產生,是由長期勞損產生,不會是一次性創傷而產生的。

11.  此外,被告人否認其僱員疏忽。

12.  假設2006年9月16日事件導致原告人受傷,被告人認為原告人所得之賠償是否應按如下計算:

-   痛苦、苦楚及喪失生活情趣  不超過$30,000

-   專項損害賠償             不超過$5,000

-   收入損失                 沒有

丙: 本案焦點

13.  訴訟雙方狀書所披露之議題, 本席進一步收窄如下:-

責任議題:

(1)  原告人於2006年9月16日是否曾在傲勝(香港)有限公司德褔分店逗留?

(2)  原告人是否曾試用「騎馬機」及後再試用「修腰帶」?

(3)  原告人在試用「騎馬機」及後再試用「修腰帶」之後是否有感到不適及曾經向店員表示不適?

(4)  究竟原告人及後驗傷的徵狀是在事件前已存在還是由於該次事件所導致?

賠償議題

(5)  原告人聲稱在事件後的徵狀,即頸痛、右肩痛,右上臂痛之痛症而導致不能工作, 不能照顧孩子及打理家務是否過份誇張?

丁: 證據

14.  原告人作供,沒有傳召其他證人。被告人傳召了當時當值的三位店員,即林綺雯女仕(“DW1”),蔡明芽女仕(“DW2”)及林婉芬女仕(“DW3”)作供。此外,由於原告人沒有法律代表,被告人亦傳召了其骨科專家葉國興醫生出庭作供(“DW4”)。

15.  原告人的證詞如上述描述一樣。她的證人陳述書及證詞進一步提及事件後有關係的證供如下:-

(1)   當日的事件後,即9月16日,原告人回到家中休息,但一直感覺不適,頸膊和手臂緊痛,在家服用止痛成藥和外塗藥膏及藥酒。

(2)   9月17日和18日,原告人到藥房購買內服和外塗的止痛產品,到18日晚上,原告人感覺全身都不能移動,痛苦難受。

(3)   9月19日早上,原告人到中醫診所求診,她指稱有關中醫師指她痛情嚴重,建議她向西醫求診,同日她便到康健醫務中心求診。康健醫務中心的西醫陶偉龍醫生於2007年7月23日發出他在2006年9月16日為原告人診症的証明。引述當日原告人稱頸痛,右肩及右前臂痛,痛症已維持了兩天。她移動右肩時便感覺更加疼痛,但她不能記起是甚麼原因造成她的痛症。檢驗顯示她的右三角肌位置有觸痛跡像,但沒有肉眼可見的瘀傷,肩膊的移動亦顯示正常。左頸移動範圍減少,其他頸部移動範圍正常。初步診斷為頸部扭傷,原因不明。陶醫生為他注射止痛針,及處方止痛藥和止痛膏。

(4)   同日晚上,原告人指稱痛苦難耐,到基督教聯合醫院急症室求診,9月20日清晨獲急症室駐診醫生黃嘉輝為原告人診症,黃醫生詢問原告人是否因做運動而受傷,原告人便向黃醫生指出曾經在德福商場試用被告之產品, 黃醫生便認定是被告人產品弄傷原告人。

(5)   2008年10月28日, 原告人應被告一方要求,到香港骨科及關節微創中心接受骨科專家醫生葉國興醫生的檢驗。原告人要求葉醫生安排進行磁力共振檢查,但不獲受理。

(6)   原告人聲稱該次事件令她受盡折磨及家庭曾經破散,亦需經常前往內地接受中醫治療和購買昂貴中藥材作治療用途。

16.  林綺雯女仕(“DW1”),蔡明芽女仕(“DW2”)及林婉芬女仕(“DW3”)有關係的證供如下:

(1)   她們均是在2006年9月10日在德福分店當值的店務員或銷售員,她們均異口同聲指出事發當日沒有印象曾經發生過如原告人所述有顧客在試用產品過程後感覺痛楚或受傷的事件。若然有特別事情發生, 銷售員必定通知分店主管,但當天並沒有原告人所述的事件發生,更加談不上有客戶使用騎馬機及修腰帶後感到身體痛楚或嚴重不適。

(2)   她們亦指出,讓顧客試用產品前必定先了解客人的需要及詢問客人是否懷孕、有骨折或有任何身體不適的情況,才決定是否讓客人使用有關產品。

(3)   就使用有關騎馬機的情況, 銷售員先讓客人穩妥地坐在騎馬機上, 雙手握著把手, 然後啟動騎馬機, 由低速開始作熱身運動,約五分鐘後, 若然客人能夠接受有關速度及在客人同意的情況下才把有關速度逐漸加強, 以達至運動的效果。

(4)   使用修腰帶的情況大致一樣, 先告訴客人會感覺有一些痕癢及拍打的動作,待客人適應及客人同意下才會逐漸加速, 每次使用也不會超過十分鐘。

17.  骨科專家葉國興醫生作供(“DW4”)有關係的證供如下:

(1)   葉醫生於2008年10月28日檢驗原告人,檢驗為時約一小時。葉醫生引述他的報告5.4段顯示在檢驗前已加以觀察原告人的手部及頸部動作, 動作相當自然,到原告人獲告知作正式檢驗後動作改變很大, 尤其是他要求原告人往下望的時候,她的頭部沒有向下垂低,眼睛向下望,他認為檢驗與事發日相隔約兩年,若然原告人的狀況在事發後兩年仍然如此嚴重, 原告人的肌肉應該是有收縮的跡象。但沒有客觀的醫學証據顯示有肌肉收縮的跡象。

(2)   此外,葉醫生亦引述他的報告5.12段, 顯示原告人作左手及右手握力測試時,數據顯示原告人左手握力測試正常, 右手握力測試有異常數據, 顯示原告人沒有盡力進行握力測試,有關數據是0和1, 是接近癱瘓才會產生類似的數據。

(3)   葉醫生亦引述報告5.7段, X光檢驗顯示原告人的頸椎的C5及C6段有退化跡象或骨刺跡象, 不可能是一次創傷造成,是經年累月勞損才產生的跡象。

(4)   葉醫生亦引述報告的7.1段指出, 原告人表示事件前曾「睏禮頸」。

(5)   葉醫生亦引述康健醫務中心陶醫生的描述, 原告人不能指出導致她所聲稱的痛症原因,葉醫生認為這部分顯示原告人所聲稱的痛症並不是她所稱的事件所致。

(6)   葉醫生認為原告人誇大她的痛症, 她所聲稱的痛症也沒有客觀醫學証據支持。如需要給予病假, 極其量也只是7天。此外, 原告人沒有失去任何工作能力。

(7)   葉醫生亦在庭上補充, 檢驗當日及審訊當日原告人穿著緊身衣服,葉醫生指出, 若然原告人的痛症如她所述那麼嚴重,該等病人並不會選擇穿著緊身衣服,因為穿上或脫下會感到嚴重痛楚。

戌: 討論

18.  舉証責任在原告人,原告人必須證明在相對可能性的衡量標準下 (balance of probabilities), 她的說法是較為可信。

19.  法庭在閱讀原告人的文件後、及聽取證詞及觀察原告人在法庭的作供舉止及態度, 認為原告人並不是一位可信或可靠的證人。原因如下:

(1)  若然9月16日事件後痛苦難耐,沒理由三天才向醫生求診。

(2)  2006年9月19日向康健醫務中心的陶醫生求診時,原告人表示頸痛,右肩及右前臂痛, 但完全沒有提及可能是被告人的產品弄傷她。這顯示她在事件前已有痛症,若然她之前沒有痛症,而是該次事件引發創傷性痛症,她應提及可能是試用傲勝產品有關。

(3)  9月20日清晨獲急症室駐診醫生黃嘉輝為原告人診症,原告人稱黃醫生認定是被告產品弄傷原告人。但是,黃醫生的診症記錄顯示原告人稱四天前使用被告人的騎馬機後感覺頸及右肩疼痛。檢驗顯示原告人右頸肌肉位置有觸痛跡象,但右肩移動正常,黃醫生為她處方止痛藥。黃醫生只是引述原告人所稱是試用騎馬機後感覺頸及右肩疼痛,黃醫生並沒有如原告人所述認定是被告人的產品弄傷原告人。

(4)  如原告人在試用騎馬機後感覺嚴重不適,沒有合理理由她繼續主動要求試用收腰帶。更加沒有合理理由讓店務員為她在頸上套上修腰帶。

(5)  若然在事件前,她的頸部或右肩是沒有痛症,即是在試用騎馬機及修腰帶後才產生嚴重痛症,沒有理由在事件後的3天向陶醫生指出不知痛症原因。原告人如遇到對她不利的供詞便推諉說不明白或不清楚。例如:她一方面說9月16日的事件令她畢生難忘,另一方面她卻沒有合理解釋為何不向康健醫務中心陶醫生說她因在被告人的店內試「騎馬機」及「修腰帶」後嚴重不適,她解說很痛及沒有穿內衣。

(6)  更甚的是,原告人所指稱的主觀痛症,並沒有客觀醫學証據支持。

20.  此外,本席亦相信被告人所傳召證人的証詞及葉醫生的專家證供。他們的證供與客觀事實及文件不謀而合。因此,本席不接納原告人的證供,本席接納被告人的證供, 除非雙方沒有爭議而言。

21.  尤其是葉醫生亦引述報告5.7段, X光檢驗顯示原告人的頸椎的C5及C6段有退化跡象或骨刺跡象, 不可能是一次創傷造成,是經年累月勞損才產生的跡象。

22.  本席就上述議題作出事實裁斷如下。

個別議題

曾否到德褔分店逗留?

23.            辯方不承認亦不否認原告人曾在當日到訪該店,本席接納原告人曾在當日到訪該店。

原告人曾否試用「騎馬機」及後再試「修腰帶」/及曾否投訴?

24.  辯方不承認亦不否認原告人曾在當日試用「騎馬機」及「修腰帶」。本席接納原告人曾在當日試用「騎馬機」及「修腰帶」。但原告人關於現場的情況令人難以信服。她在盤問時亦承認,縱使在試用有關產品後感覺嚴重不適,沒有向店務員投訴,只向同伴李小姐提及,但沒有傳召李小姐作供,原因為事件後少了聯絡。

原告人的驗傷徵狀,是否由2006年9月16日事件引致?

25.  如果原告人因事件引致受傷,為什麼她不直接向陶醫生投訴?如果原告人所說是黃嘉輝醫生指出被告人產品「整傷」她,為什麼黃醫生的報告卻是指原告人「訴說」(complain) 試「騎馬機」後有頸及背痛?葉國興醫生指出根據醫學証據的可能性較高的衡量,原告人的所稱的痛症是輕微痛症,是由長期勞損所致,不是創傷性痛症,所以並不是由於該事件引致。而原告人選擇不援引醫學專家証據。所以本席認為原告人所稱的輕微痛症,不是由於該事件引致。

26.  以上分析達至一項結論,原告人的頸及右肩痛症,是退化或骨刺跡象所產生,在事件前已產生。就算原告人試用有關產品,也沒有產生創傷性痛症。

27.  因此,原告人未能證明被告人店務員有疏忽,造成原告人所稱的痛症。被告人無須負上法律責任,申索予以撤銷。

賠償議題

28.  就算被告人須負上法律責任,賠償金額也須調整。本席先羅列原告人就損害賠償的細明。

甲、   痛苦,苦楚及喪失生活樂趣的賠償 HK$100,000.

乙、   專項損害賠償:

(a)  醫療費用:    HK$10,000

(b)  交通費用:    HK$10,000

(c)  補品費用:    HK$40,000

(d)  中醫費用:    HK$170,000

丙、   收入損失:   

(1)  HK$380,000 (因痛症不能如期在2006年10月1日在酒家工作,損失每月HK$8000薪金,以47.5月計,合共HK$380,000);

(2)  HK$18,000 (因痛症而須聘用家庭傭工照顧原告人及打理家務, 由2006年9月20日至2006年12月19日,以每月HK$6000計3個月,合共HK$18,000);

(3)  HK$90,000(因痛症而須繼續聘用兼職家庭傭工打理家務, 由2006年12月20日至審前,以每天HK$200計, 平均1個月10天,以45月計,合共HK$90,000);

(4)  HK$60,000 (因痛症而須丈夫停工3個月照顧兒子及家庭, 以每月HK$20,000計3個月,合共HK$60,000);

(5)  HK$90,000(因痛症而須丈夫往轉為兼職照顧家庭, 工資只得一半,以每月HK$10,000計9個月,合共HK$90,000)。

29.  如上述,康健醫務中心的陶醫生檢驗原告人時,除了原告人投訴頸,右肩及右臂痛外,只發現原告人右肩三角肌有觸痛(tenderness),沒有明顯創傷,肩的活動並無任何阻礙。聯合醫院的黃醫生發現原告人右頸有觸痛。右肩沒有觸痛及能夠活動如常。黃醫生給被告人兩天病假。所有X-光檢驗顯示痛症部位正常。

30.  葉醫生認為原告人誇大她的痛症, 她所聲稱的痛症也沒有客觀醫學証據支持。最重要的是,原告人沒有失去任何工作能力。因此原告人如有任何痛症的話,都非常輕微。

31.  因此,本席不接受因輕微痛症而不能工作或担任侍應工作,不接受因輕微痛症而不能照顧兒子及打理家務,不接受因輕微痛症而須聘請傭工及丈夫停工的說法。所以,本席認為整個收入損失部份不予批淮。

32.  以輕微痛症為大前提, 原告人的傷勢屬輕度(mild),痛苦,苦楚及喪失生活樂趣的賠償合理額為大約$30,000。參考 Siu Leung Shang Peter v Chung Wai Ming HCPI 43/2006 dated 16th March 2007by Deputy High Court Judge Gill.

33.  就專項損害賠償方面, 原告人在醫療費用(西醫部份)提供的單據合共約HK$2,200, 本地中醫部份約6次,每次HK$200計,應為HK$1,200。但她申索的醫療費用是HK$10,000, 當中中山市小欖鎮余武業診所一張單覆蓋3年診金及藥材達32,680元(假設為人民幣),既然原告人在本港不時求診中醫,費用有限,難以接受要花上3萬多元到了內地中醫求診,所以,本席只能批淮本地中西醫醫療費用HK$3,400。

34.  以上述醫療費用的單據反映合理往返醫院或醫務所總次數約為30次(來回為一次), 每次HK$200計, 合理交通費用應為HK$6,000, 而不是申索的HK$10,000。

35.  至於補品費用, 原告人申索HK$40,000。而藥材及藥品方面,她申索HK$170,000, 她並提供20張單據,當中藥材及藥品包括田七,燕窩, 麝香,花旗參,冬蟲草等價值達11萬元。以輕微痛症為假設,要用上燕窩,名貴麝香,花旗參,冬蟲草, 實在是超越合理水平, 亦沒有中醫專家印證頸痛是有必要用上燕窩,名貴麝香,花旗參,冬蟲草等藥材及藥品。本席只能批淮HK$5,000為合理補品及藥材費用。

賠償額

36.  因此,就算被告人須負上法律責任,賠償金額應該如下述:

甲、   痛苦,苦楚及喪失生活樂趣的賠償 HK$30,000.

乙、   專項損害賠償:

(a)  醫療費用(包括中西醫): HK$3,400

(b)  交通費用:                HK$6,000

(c)  補品及藥品費用:      HK$5,000

丙、   收入損失:                    沒有

己:總結

37.  原告人申索予以撤銷。

38.  至於訟費問題,本席作出訟費暫准令,原告人須支付被告人是次訴訟的訟費,若訟費金額有爭議,由聆案官評定。除非與訟任何一方於今天起計14天內以傳票方式申請更改以上訟費暫准令,否則由今天起計14天後訟費暫准令便成為正式訟費命令。

 (李慶年)
 區域法院暫委法官

原告人:

無法律代表, 親自應訊表qmv表

被告人:

由的近律師行延聘的大律師王志光先生代表表qmv表

71773-EN-2010-06-28

HUANG NEERACHA V. OSIM (HK) CO. LTD

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DCPI 1885 of 2009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 1885 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 HUANG NEERACHAPlaintiff
and
 OSIM (HK) CO. LIMITEDDefendant

____________

 

Coram: Deputy District Judge C. Lee in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 28th June 2010

Date of Decision: 28th June 2010

_______________

DECISION

_______________

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This hearing is held to consider the Plaintiff’s application to vacate the trial dates fixed in the fixture list and the Defendant’s application to uplift the automatic stay under the Legal Aid Ordinance.   At the time of the Plaintiff’s application dated 11th June 2010, she was represented by Messrs. Christine M. Koo & Ip.  In this morning, a notice to act in person was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff.  As a result of the short notice, the Plaintiff became unrepresented again.    Another short notice is a memorandum of notification dated 23rd June 2010 and filed on 25th June 2010 in that the Plaintiff was refused legal aid.  This Court received the said memorandum this morning.    The said memorandum makes the argument on the uplift of the legal aid stay academic but I am still obliged to make rulings on the Plaintiff’s application to vacate the trial dates and the Defendant’s application to uplift the legal aid stay.  The Plaintiff said that she was appealing against the legal aid refusal made on 23rd June 2010.

B. BACKGROUND

2.  By a letter dated 11th June 2010, the former solicitors for the Plaintiff wrote to the Registrar to vacate the trial dates fixed on 2nd and 5th July 2010 on the ground that the Plaintiff has applied for legal aid and the relevant memorandum dated 7th June 2010 was filed on 10th June 2010.  According to section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance and Regulation 7A of the Legal Aid Regulations, Cap. 91, there shall be an automatic stay of 42 days until 22nd July 2010. 

3.  The said letter was placed before me for consideration and I directed this pre-trial review hearing.  I also directed the Parties to lodge their written submissions specifically on 3 aspects (i) whether the Plaintiff was late in making application for legal aid, if so, why; (ii) when the case was set down for trial on 7th May 2010, whether the Plaintiff represented to the Master verbally or in writing in the checklist that she had no outstanding matter and she was ready for trial; (iii) whether belated application for legal aid amounts to exceptional circumstance under O.25, r.3 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”).

4.  The above are also the main issues in this hearing.

C. DISCUSSION

5.  It is common ground that when the case was set down for trial, the Plaintiff was unrepresented. 

6.  From the Plaintiff’s affirmation filed on 21st June 2010 and the letter dated 21st June 2010 from her former solicitors, the gist of the Plaintiff’s explanation on the respective issues are: (i) the Plaintiff has been diligently conducting the claim.  She has done nothing to delay the proceedings; (ii) when the case was set down for trial on 7th May 2010, she did indicate that “she was not ready for trial pending the arrangement of mediation”.  She was impressed that “if mediation fails, then go to trial.”; (iii) the court should be slow to lift the stay, especially if a point of law had to be dealt with by a layman.  However, if the court is satisfied that the application for legal aid was an abuse of process, then the court should exercise its discretion to lift the stay. See Her Honour Judge Ng in Chan Shing Ching v Hong Kong District Security Limited  DCPI No. 910 of 2005 dated 10th April 2007, applying the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Lee Shiu Ming v Yep Hiap Seng (Hong Kong) Limited, CACV 39 of 1993 dated  14th July 1993). 

7.  In this hearing, the Plaintiff also added that the Defendant’s solicitors asked her not to retain a lawyer sometime around the end of September 2006.  She only received the medical expert report of Dr. Yip recently.

8.  The Defendant replied on the respective issues by way of the letter dated 24th June 2010 as follows: (i) the Plaintiff applied for legal aid twice in June 2007 and April 2009 and the applications were refused for failing the “means test”.   In short, the application for legal aid on 7th June 2010 was the third time.   Further, although the Plaintiff was on record unrepresented, she was receiving legal assistance as reflected from her pleadings and questionnaires filed for the checklist review hearings.  The Defendant also relied on what they said a similar case in Chan Chun Shing v Chang Chen Chin HCPI 395/2008 dated 4th May 2009 where the stay was uplifted; (ii) while the Plaintiff did indicate the desire to have mediation on 7th May 2010, the Master also indicated that he would not stay the proceedings for mediation when the case was ready for trial.  The Plaintiff also stated that she was ready for trial and there was no outstanding matter; (iii) the Defendant also relied on the Practice Direction (“PD”) 5.2 paragraph 42 to stress that “late instructions from client, change in the team of lawyers” does not amount to exceptional circumstances under O.25, r.3 of the RDC (same provision as O.25, r.1B of the Rules of the High Court).  

9.  In respect of the new allegations made in this hearing, Ms. Sy, solicitors for the Defendant stood to correct that Dr. Yip’s report was served in February 2010.  Further, the Plaintiff in the checklist review hearing, stated to the Master that she elected not to adduce medical expert evidence.

10.  The ultimate question in this case is whether the Court shall uplift the stay or the trial may proceed as scheduled.  Another question is whether the late and repeated application for legal aid amounts to exceptional circumstances under O.25, r.3 of the RDC, if not, the Plaintiff’s application for vacating the trial dates should be refused. 

11.  I do not intend to set out the provisions on automatic stay and uplift of stay under section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance.  I agree to the legal proposition advanced by the Plaintiff’s former solicitors.

12.  Another relevant provision is Order 25, r.3(2)(3) which provides that:

“(2)

A party may apply to the Court if he wishes to vary a milestone date.

(3)

The Court shall not grant an application under paragraph (2) unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation.”

13.  In this case, the date of the accident was 16th September 2006.  The Statement of Claim was filed on 15th September 2009.  The Statement of Damages was filed on 16th November 2009.  The Plaintiff’s list and copies of medical reports were filed on 25th February 2010.  Her witness statement was filed on 15th April 2010.   This shows objectively, the Plaintiff was ready for trial.

14.  The Plaintiff simply failed to explain reasonably as to why she was late in making the application for legal aid for the third time.  The mere fact that she was unrepresented was not a reasonable explanation.  Assuming a litigant in person may not familiar with legal procedures or the availability of legal aid, a reasonable and prudent litigant would have asked if they do not know.  Such possible enquiry would have been conducted timely.  From the Plaintiff’s pleadings and documents, it is apparent that she prepared the documents with legal assistance.     She knew the availability of legal aid as she said her applications were refused twice before.   Had she been so ignorant on 7th May 2010 when the case was set down for trial, she could have taken the initiative to ask and enquire before or shortly after hearing, she could have then applied for legal aid before or shortly after the hearing.  If that is the case, the legal aid stay, if any, would be expired before the trial dates on 2nd and 5th July 2010.  However, her notice of application for legal aid was filed one month after the case was set down for trial. 

15.  Secondly,  when the case was set down for trial in the fixture list on 7th May 2010, save and except the desire to have mediation, the Plaintiff was ready for trial whether it was considered subjectively or objectively.   The pre-action protocol of PD 18.1 in respect of “the Personal Injuries List” and PD 5.2 in respect of “Case Management” in other civil cases provides a mechanism for exploration for settlement or mediation at early stage of proceedings, when a plaintiff’s claim is disclosed or after the pleadings are closed.   It is unlikely that the Court will stay the proceedings for mediation at a late stage of the proceedings.  Having said that, there is usually a substantial period between the hearing when the case is set down for trial and the trial dates, as in this case, a period of 8 weeks.  Any litigant may explore for settlement or mediation without a stay and get prepared for litigation at the same time in the event that the last attempt fails.   In essence, I do not see an indication to have mediation during the 2nd checklist review hearing or during a case management conference is a valid reason to vacate a milestone date, especially the trial dates.

16.  In essence, I am of the view that the Plaintiff’s litigating conduct amount to an abuse of process.  Simply put, she applied for legal aid twice before and were refused.   She was not ignorant as she knew how to obtain legal assistance and prepared the succinct and concise pleadings and related documents.   If she was so ignorant, she could have asked and applied for legal aid again before or shortly after the case was set down for trial on 7th May 2010.  But a notice of application for legal aid was filed on 7th June 2010.   There has been inordinate and inexcusable delay in making the third application for legal aid. I am of the view that the belated application for legal aid was an abuse of process. 

17.  Another question is whether the belated application for legal aid amounts to exceptional circumstances under O.25, r.3.

18.  In Chan Chun Shing v Chang Chen Chin HCPI 395/2008 dated 4th May 2009, a represented Plaintiff made a last minute application for legal aid.  Fung J was of the view that the Plaintiff failed to explain reasonably why the Plaintiff was late in applying for legal aid.  Further, the Plaintiff failed to show an exceptional reason to change a milestone date, thus His Lordship directed that “the action not be stayed notwithstanding the Legal Aid application, and the solicitors for the Plaintiff do stay on the record and do proceed to instruct counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff without any costs of accounts being placed.”  

19.  While the facts of that case are not identical to the present case, they were similar.  Unlike that case which involved the first application for legal aid, in the present case, the Plaintiff made the third attempt.  I would adopt the same approach.  

20.  As a result, I am of the view that the Plaintiff failed to establish “exceptional circumstances” under O.25, r.3 of the RDC and the application to vacate the trial dates should be refused.  

21.  The Defendant also by way of a letter dated 24th June 2010 applied for leave to file an answer to the statement of damages.  Although it was filed and served on 23rd June 2010, leave is yet to be obtained.  The Defendant explained that due to an oversight, the said answer was not filed and served when the case was set down on 7th May 2010 until they received an index to the pre-trial review bundle on 23rd June 2010.  I concern two questions, firstly, whether there was reasonable explanation for failing to file the answer before or at the time the case was set down.  Secondly, whether the refusal of leave to file the said answer would prevent the Defendant from taking issue on quantum.  In my view, belated but important application requires satisfactory explanation, failing which the Court may refuse a belated application on that ground alone if a milestone date would be affected.  In the present case, there were two checklist review hearings before the case was set down for trial and the Defendant still failed to discover the failure to file and serve the answer.  The duty to conduct a final check is particularly essential when the Defendant asked for leave to set down for trial, bearing in mind the Plaintiff was acting in person at that time.  However, the Defendant was in breach of the duty despite there were ample opportunities.  It was the Defendant who brought itself to this situation and they should take the consequence arising out of their mistake.  The answer was served on 23rd June 2010, just 9 days before the trial.  If reasonable time should be given to the Plaintiff, say 14 days, to consider the answer, the trial has to collapse.  Secondly, even without the said answer, Ms. Sy said that they could still put the Plaintiff to the strict proof on both liability and quantum as they did in their Defence.  As a result, I refused leave to the Defendant to file the said answer and it shall be expunged accordingly.      I am of the view that there be no order as to costs for this application.   The trial dates fixed on 2nd and 5th July 2010 remain unchanged.

C. CONCLUSION

22.  In the premises, I make the following orders:-

(1)

The Plaintiff’s application to vacate the trial dates be refused.

(2)

The Defendant’s application to uplift the automatic stay be allowed.

(3)

Cost of and occasioned by the above applications be to the Defendant assessed summarily in sum of $2,930 payable by the Plaintiff within 14 days.

(4)

The Defendant’s application to file the answer to the statement of damages be refused and the said answer shall be expunged accordingly. There be no order as to costs of this application.

(5)

The pre-trial review bundle prepared by the Plaintiff’s former solicitors do stand as the trial bundle.

(6)

The Defendant is directed to draw up these orders in Chinese, file and serve the same.

 (Clement Lee)
 Deputy District Judge

The Plaintiff appears in person.

Ms. C. Sy of Messrs Deacons for the Defendant

Note: This judgment is pronounced in Punti.  Any party wishes to have the Chinese translation of the written judgment must apply in writing on or before 19th July 2010.

注意: 此判決是以本地話宣讀。如訴訟一方欲索取書面判決中文譯本,必須於2010年7月19日前申請。