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Civil Action2009

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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[2023] HKCFI 93-EN-2023-01-20

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE

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HCA 1479/2009

[2023] HKCFI 93

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1479 OF 2009

____________________

BETWEEN  
 HUI CHI MING(許智銘)Plaintiff
 and 
 KOON WING YEE(官永義)1st Defendant

____________________

Before: Mr. Recorder William Wong, SC in Court
Dates of Hearing: 3, 5-7, 10-15, 17-19 October & 28 December 2022
Date of Judgment:20 January 2023

___________________

JUDGMENT

___________________

INTRODUCTION

1.  The facts of the present case can be filmed and put on screen as they are both dramatic and extraordinary.

2.  The Plaintiff, Mr Hui Chi Ming (“Mr Hui”), an ex-chairman and the former majority shareholder of a Hong Kong listed company, Sino Union Petroleum & Chemical International Limited (“Sino Union”), says that on a day in mid to end of March 2009, a gang of triad society members led by the 4th Defendant, nicknamed “大圈尻Dee”, turned up in his office uninvited, on the instructions of the 1st Defendant, Mr Koon Wing Yee (“Mr Koon”) and threatened and blackmailed him. Under threats to his personal life and his family’s safety, by reason of duress, coercion and intimidation on the part of Mr Koon and his agents, namely, “大圈尻Dee” and his gang, Mr Hui transferred 100 million shares of Sino Union (the “Shares”) (via one Zhou Aiguo (“Mr Zhou”) from whom Mr Hui borrowed the Shares) to the 3rd Defendant as the nominee of Mr Koon on 26 March 2009 for no consideration (the “Transfer”). There is no dispute that the 3rd Defendant was the nominee of Mr Koon and there is no consideration for the said transfer of the Shares. Mr Hui, thus, claims for the return of the Shares and/or the sale proceeds thereof and/or loss and damages caused by the Transfer.

3.  Mr Koon’s case is that he could not possibly have turned up at Mr Hui’s office out of the blue and sent gangsters to demand the Transfer. What actually happened was that Mr Hui was interested in boosting and/or maintaining the share price of Sino Union. Thus, on 27 December 2007, Mr Hui and Mr Koon entered into an oral agreement that in consideration of Mr Koon’s purchase of Sino Union’s shares up to a total value of HK$200 million (including what Mr Koon had already bought in the market), Mr Hui would give or gift a further 250 million shares of Sino Union to Mr Koon (the “Oral Agreement”). Mr Koon refines his pleaded case in this action to spending up to HK$200 million instead of purchasing shares up to the value of HK$200 million. Mr Koon claims that, by March 2009, Mr Hui had already transferred 50.7 million to him via third parties (the details will be addressed below). Hence, the Transfer was part consideration for his full performance of the Oral Agreement. He denies that he was involved in any coercion, duress or intimidation which caused the Transfer. He also said that “大圈尻Dee” was only a business acquaintance and he did not know about his background. Pursuant to the Oral Agreement, Mr Koon also counterclaims against Mr Hui for 99,930,000 shares of Sino Union, the remaining balance of the 250 million consideration shares.

4.  In Mr Koon’s opening, Mr Chain strongly relied on the fact that 50.7 million Sino Union shares were arranged by Mr Hui to be transferred to Mr Koon’s nominees. It was submitted that but for the Oral Agreement, there was no conceivable reason for such transfers. Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr Koon spent at least HK$200 million in acquiring the shares of Sino Union. The Oral Agreement is the only plausible explanation for Mr Koon’s investment in such third-tier or fourth-tier shares in the market. Furthermore, it is against common sense for Mr Koon to have suddenly turned up on a day in March 2009 and demanded Mr Hui to make the Transfer. Context is everything, Mr Chain submitted. An important context here is the Oral Agreement. The Oral Agreement does not exist in a vacuum by itself.

5.  Mr Fung SC on behalf of Mr Hui submitted that the Oral Agreement is a fabrication by Mr Koon. The allegation of the Oral Agreement came very late, about 5 to 6 years after the commencement of the present action by Mr Hui. The terms of the Oral Agreement does not make any common and commercial sense. Further, there is not an iota of written record, contemporaneous documents or electronic footprints of the Oral Agreement. For a transaction of such scale, it is incredible that there is no trace of the Oral Agreement in any form, other than Mr Koon’s bare allegation. It was stressed that Mr Hui had the habit of documenting every transaction in detail the absence of which shows that the Oral Agreement is nothing but a concoction by Mr Koon.

6.  Mr Koon himself repeatedly stressed the point that Mr Hui failed to call many essential witnesses, including Mr Xie Xinhua (“Xie”) and Guo Weihua (“Guo”) who were Mr Hui’s nominees and transferred 50.7 million Sino Union shares to Mr Koon’s nominees. Mr Koon repeatedly called them “invisible witnesses”.

7.  Mr Koon also relied heavily on the point that he was acquitted in the criminal trial against him and Mr Hui’s evidence was not accepted by the jury. Having said that, Mr Chain for Mr Koon fairly agreed that the standard of proof in the present trial is different from the criminal trial. I agree that the acquittal itself is of limited weight but Mr Koon can certainly rely on what Mr Hui said under oath during the criminal trial.

8.  Mr Chain is also right that the one essential disputed fact is the existence of the Oral Agreement as to which Mr Koon carries the burden of proof. On the other hand, Mr Hui carries the burden to prove the existence of duress, coercion and intimidation, as a result of which Mr Hui transferred the Shares to the 3rd Defendant as nominee for Mr Koon. The evidence of both parties on these critical issues is diametrically opposite.

9.  Another comparatively minor disputed fact is whether the payment of HK$1.5 million by Mr Koon to Mr Hui was the result of duress, coercion and intimidation by Shanghai Boy上海仔, another triad society member, said to be engaged by Mr Hui to intimidate Mr Koon.

10.  The Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd Defendant, Ng Chi Keung (“Mr Ng”), the 3rd Defendant and the 4th Defendant have all been settled.

THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE

11.  The Plaintiff’s case is that by 1 March 2009, Mr Koon, a business acquaintance, had suffered a very substantial loss in trading Sino Union shares resulting in a realised net loss of just under HK$80 million, specifically HK$79,366,901.92, according to the table prepared by Mr Koon himself and adduced in evidence at trial.

12.  On the morning of 1 March 2009, Mr Koon turned up uninvited at Mr Hui’s office (“Mr Hui’s Office”) and demanded that Mr Hui give him, by way of compensation for his aforesaid loss, 100 million Sino Union shares which were last trading at HK$0.77 as of 25 February 2009 (being the last trading day before 1 March 2009) as appeared from Yahoo Finance and agreed by the parties.

13.  Mr Hui rejected such demand on the basis that he bore no liability for Mr Koon’s trading loss.

14.  Then, one afternoon around mid-to-late March 2009, two strangers (one of whom being “大圈尻Dee”) turned up uninvited at Mr Hui’s Office and told Mr Hui in the office conference room that they were there on behalf of Mr Koon to collect 100 million shares from Mr Hui.

15.  “大圈尻Dee” warned Mr Hui in a very loud and aggressive manner not to report the matter to the police; otherwise he would burn down Mr Hui’s Office.

16.  The other stranger left the conference room and returned minutes later with another 7-8 men whom he had let in through the office main entrance.

17.  The gang of some 9-10 men then forcefully threw down their backpacks on the conference room table making a loud clatter, revealing the presence of metal implements inside the backpacks.

18.  “大圈尻Dee” warned Mr Hui that he had 3 days to make all necessary arrangement for the transfer of the 100 million shares, failing which they would not treat Mr Hui with courtesy. “大圈尻Dee” and the gang left thereafter.

19.  Mr Koon turned up at Mr Hui’s Office the following afternoon accompanied by Mr Ng Chi Keung, the 2nd Defendant (“Mr Ng”) who was at all material times a licensed stockbroker and was the director and majority shareholder of Cheer Union Securities Limited (“Cheer Union”) whereupon:

(1)  Mr Koon told Mr Hui that “大圈尻Dee” had also invested in the shares of Sino Union and suffered loss.

(2)  Mr Koon reiterated that should Mr Hui refuse to hand over the 100 million shares, Mr Hui would suffer serious bodily harm including being killed by the gang of “大圈尻Dee”.

(3)  Mr Ng specifically informed Mr Hui that “大圈尻Dee” was a subordinate of Cheung Tze Keung, the notorious triad serial kidnapper of Victor Lee (the elder son of Lee Ka Shing) and Walter Kwok (the eldest son of the Sun Hung Kai property development dynasty).

20.  On the same occasion, in order to induce Mr Hui to yield more readily to Mr Koon’s duress, coercion and intimidation:-

(1)  Mr Koon told Mr Hui that he would not dispose of the 100 million shares of Sino Union for three months.

(2)  Mr Ng told Mr Hui that he would act as guarantor for Mr Koon’s observance of this lockup period.

(3)  Mr Koon told Mr Hui that the 3rd Defendant would be his nominee to receive the 100 million shares from Mr Hui.

(4)  Mr Koon stressed that Mr Hui should immediately arrange for the transfer of the 100 million shares, or else Mr Hui’s life would be endangered or Mr Hui would at the very least suffer grievous bodily harm.

(5)  Mr Koon told Mr Hui that he would come the next day to complete the formalities.

21.  Under such duress, coercion and intimidation, Mr Hui yielded to Mr Koon’s demand for the 100 million shares.

22.  In the same afternoon following the conclusion of the above meeting, Mr Hui telephoned Mr Zhou, a substantial shareholder in Sino Union, requesting to borrow from him 100 million shares on an urgent basis in consideration of payment to Mr Zhou of HK$135 million.

23.  Mr Zhou agreed and attended Mr Hui’s Office the next day to implement the share transfer by executing a tripartite share purchase agreement (the “Share Purchase Agreement”) prepared by Mr Ng with Mr Zhou as transferor, the 3rd Defendant as transferee and Mr Ng as guarantor.

24.  Following the execution of the Share Purchase Agreement, Mr Zhou transferred in late March 2009 to the 3rd Defendant the 100 million shares but received no payment, let alone HK$135 million, in return.

25.  In the afternoon of 2 April 2009, Mr Hui received a cry for help by phone from Mr Zhou in Shenzhen complaining that he was surrounded in a coffee shop by a gang of 5-6 hostile men led by Mr Ng and was not allowed to leave the coffee shop unless he signed an acknowledgement of receipt purporting to acknowledge, falsely, that he, Mr Zhou, had been paid HK$135 million for the transfer of the 100 million shares.

26.  To avoid harm befalling Mr Zhou, Mr Hui advised Mr Zhou to sign the acknowledgment of receipt whereupon Mr Zhou did so and left the coffee shop.

27.  On 3 April 2009, following the handover of the 100 million shares, Mr Koon invited Mr Hui to meet him for lunch at the Macau Jockey Club where, in the presence of Mr Ng who was also in attendance, Mr Koon told Mr Hui that he would pay Mr Hui HK$1.5 million tea money as a token of appreciation and gratitude for such handover with apologies for any inconvenience caused to Mr Hui.

28.  Later that same afternoon, Mr Hui discovered that Mr Ng had left in Mr Hui’s Office directly above and in the same building as the Macau Jockey Club a paper bag containing HK$1.5 million cash.

29.  On 13 May 2009, Mr Hui reported the blackmail to the Hong Kong Police. Mr Hui confirmed the above under oath in his testimony for the prosecution in the criminal trial of the Defendants herein and one Mr Shum Man Keung, nicknamed Wu Tsz胡子.  Mr. Hui, whose evidence remained unchallenged throughout, testified that:-

“因為呢個係我冇收據,若果我唔誠實嘅話,我可以唔講嘅,冇依據嘅。”

30.  Mr Hui further testified that he was subjected to further intimidation and coercion following the handing over of yet another 100 million shares of Sino Union.

31.  On 24 April 2009, Mr Koon together with other men went to Mr Hui’s Office unannounced, demanding to see Mr Hui, but on being told that Mr Hui was not in the office but travelling overseas, Mr Koon and his party left. Mr Hui was at the time in Indonesia.

32.  On the night of 24 April 2009, “大圈尻Dee” telephoned Mr Hui in Indonesia to explain that the 100 million shares which Mr Hui had already delivered was insufficient such that he must hand over another 100 million shares.

33.  In the afternoon of the following day on 25 April 2009, “大圈尻Dee” telephoned Mr Hui again to demand that Mr Hui follow Mr Koon’s instructions or else Mr Hui would be in deep trouble.

34.  On 28 April 2009, after Mr Hui had returned to Hong Kong, Mr Ng telephoned Mr Hui demanding that the latter attend a lunch meeting on the following day at the Kimberly Hotel with Mr Koon and Mr Ng, failing which “大圈尻Dee” and his gang would harm Mr Hui and his family.

35.  On 29 April 2009, Mr Hui went alone to the Kimberly Hotel at or around 1 pm.

36.  On arrival and on being shown into a large VIP room of the Chinese restaurant in the Kimberly Hotel, Mr Hui saw Mr Koon, Mr Ng, “大圈尻Dee” inside together with a gang of men none of whom he recognised.

37.  “大圈尻Dee” asked Mr Hui whether he was ready (“一切準備就緒沒有”).

38.  “大圈尻Dee” thereupon told Mr Koon, Mr Ng and Mr Hui to adjourn to a smaller room adjacent to the VIP room to discuss next steps (“相量應該怎樣做”).

39.  Inside this smaller room, Mr Koon told Mr Hui in the presence of Mr Ng that “大圈尻Dee” and his gang next door in the VIP room were extremely troublesome (“十分麻煩”) but the matter had to be settled (“事情總要解決”) and so demanded that Mr Hui hand over 50 million in cash or shares of equivalent value to settle such matter.

40.  Mr Koon further told Mr Hui that “大圈尻Dee” and his gang possessed firearms and that if Mr Hui did not comply with the wishes of “大圈尻Dee”, they would eliminate Mr Hui from the face of the earth (“黃先生一夥人有槍有炮, 若然本人不遵照黃先生的意思行事, 他們將會滅了本人及令本人在地球上消失”).

41.  Following such intimidation and coercion, Mr Hui acceded to Mr Koon’s demand. Mr Koon, Mr Ng and Mr Hui then returned to the VIP room.

42.  Upon returning to the VIP room, “大圈尻Dee” introduced Mr Hui to a gang member present known as Wu Tsz 胡子whom “大圈尻Dee” described as prominent and unafraid of death (“鼎鼎有名的胡子, 胡子是不怕死的”).

43.  Mr Ng elaborated to Mr Hui that Wu Tsz 胡子was a very famous triad member who had once served a sentence of imprisonment exceeding ten years (“胡子是非常有名的三合會成員, 曾經在監獄裡渡過10年多”).

44.  Wu Tsz 胡子then pronounced Mr Hui to be unusually lucky, since the latter’s dialogue with Mr Koon had proceeded most happily, or else Wu Tsz 胡子would have to serve Mr Hui “pig’s knuckles”, meaning that Mr Hui would be killed (“胡子說本人非常幸運, 因為本人與官先生的對話非常愉快, 否則本人就需要吃豬腳, 意思即是本人不和他們合作的話, 本人將會被槍殺”).

45.  On 30 April 2009, at noon, while Mr Hui was out of town, a few men showed up at Mr Hui’s Office waving placards and posters inscribed with intimidating threats (“寫有恐嚇字句之海報及咭紙”).

46.  In the same afternoon, Mr Hui who was then in Shenzhen was followed by several strangers one of whom warned Mr Hui not to be so arrogant (“本人發現自己被數個陌生人跟蹤. 其中一名告訴本人: ‘唔好咁寸’”).

47.  That same evening, “大圈尻Dee” telephoned Mr Hui demanding that he deliver the shares to him, failing which they would kidnap Mr Hui, take him to the high seas, cut his back with a knife and throw him overboard to feed the sharks (“黃生致電給本人, 要求本人儘快交出股票, 否則他們會挾本人到公海, 在本人背上劃幾刀後, 拋本人到海裡餵鯊魚”).

48.  On 10 May 2009, in the afternoon, “大圈尻Dee” telephoned Mr Hui asking him whether he knew a Mr Yeung also known as Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光. He told Mr Hui that Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光was his big brother and that he had heard that Mr Hui knew a person in Beijing known as Brother Sung 宋大哥. He then suggested to Mr Hui that the two of them get together with Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光and Brother Sung宋大哥to discuss an amicable solution to resolve the matter. (“在2009年5月10日下午時分, 黃先生致電給本人, 詢間本人是否識一名叫楊光先生, 外號肥佬光的人士. 黃先生說肥佬光是他的大哥, 黃先生亦告訴本人, 他聽說本人認識他另一位北京朋友叫宋大哥. 黃先生說本人可以在肥佬光及宋大哥的陪同下找他, 大家一同談判及友好地解決問題”).

49.  Shortly thereafter, Brother Sung宋大哥telephoned Mr Hui to say that he had known Mr Hui for a long time; he was very close to “大圈尻Dee”; and he had known Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光for more than ten years.  (“宋大哥就致電給本人, 謂他與黃先生十分親近, 而宋大哥認識本人已有很長的時間, 而他也認識肥佬光十餘年.”)

50.  After assuring Mr Hui that he would guarantee the latter’s safety, Brother Sung 宋大哥asked Mr Hui to go to the café on the 4/F of the Royal Garden Hotel in Tsim Sha Tsui East for a discussion at 4 pm that same day (“宋大哥說他可以擔保本人的人身安全, 宋大哥要求本人, 在大概4時到尖沙嘴帝苑酒店4樓的咖啡室談判”).

51.  Proceeding on the assurance that Brother Sung宋大哥 would be there to protect him, Mr Hui went to the café on the 4/F of the Royal Garden Hotel at 4 pm and there met “大圈尻Dee”, Wu Tsz 胡子, Brother Sung 宋大哥 and Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光.

52.  “大圈尻Dee” kicked off the discussion by declaring that, for the sake of everyone’s convenience, the simplest way to resolve the matter would be for Mr Hui as chairman of Sino Union to print out the shares which they required as well as an extra few hundred million shares for “大圈尻Dee” where after “大圈尻Dee” and Mr Hui would become good friends (“黃先生首先開腔講話, 謂為了大家方便, 最簡單直接解決事情的方法, 是本人以上市公司主席的身份, 把他們需要的股票打印出來, 本人更可以多打印幾億股票給他, 那麼我們便能成為好朋友”).

53.  Brother Sung宋大哥and Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光told “大圈尻Dee” that since both Mr Hui and “大圈尻Dee” were their good friends, Mr Hui and “大圈尻Dee” should take the time slowly to discuss and find a solution and that, in addition, Mr Hui should meet “大圈尻Dee” alone to discuss the solution (“宋大哥及肥佬光告訴黃先生, 本人及黃先生都是他們的好朋友, 我們應該慢慢討論以尋求解決方案, 他們並提議本人單獨與黃先生商討解決辦法”).

54.  “大圈尻Dee” thereupon guided Mr Hui to a sofa in the corridor on the 1/F of the hotel where “大圈尻Dee” said that whereas he had originally required only 100 million shares, now that he “大圈尻Dee” had to enlist the assistance of two big brothers Brother Sung 宋大哥and Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光to settle the matter, he “大圈尻Dee” now required an extra 200 million shares, that is, 300 million shares in total, before Mr Hui could become friends with “大圈尻Dee” (“黃先生說由於宋大哥及肥佬光兩個都是大哥, 本來他只需要本人交出100,000,000股票, 可是現在需要動用到兩位大哥的共同努力去擺平事件, 他需要額外的200,000,000股票. 所以本人需要交出共300,000,000股票以成為黃先生的朋友”).

55.  “大圈尻Dee” warned Mr Hui that if he further delayed in the delivery of the shares, “大圈尻Dee” would lose his temper (“如果本人再拖延下去, 他的脾氣不會那麼好”).

56.  At the same time, “大圈尻Dee” revealed to Mr Hui a pistol-like object under his jacket and told Mr Hui that his pistol might be fired if he was angry (“黃先生當時曾故意顯露在他外套下一支類似槍械的物體, 並告訴本人他的槍, 有時候會在他生氣時走火”).

57.  “大圈尻Dee” thereupon returned with Mr Hui to the café on the 4/F of the hotel where they found only Brother Sung宋大哥who took them to the bar on the 5/F of the hotel where Wu Tsz 胡子and Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光were located.

58.  Wu Tsz 胡子told Mr Hui that he had many firearms and said that Mr Hui was extremely wealthy and earned a lot whereas they earned a little, and that should Mr Hui cooperate, everyone would be happy (“胡子告訴本人他有很多槍械, 並說你就有大把錢, 其實你賺大錢, 我哋賺少錢, 你合作就大家開心’”).

59.  Wu Tsz 胡子further declared that they were unafraid of death and that on the earlier occasion at the Kimberly Hotel, they had brought along 6-7 firearms (“我哋係唔怕死嘅. 果日喺君怡酒店, 我哋都帶咗6-7支搶去架”).

60.  Mr Hui requested Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光to plead for him to get a discount, but Fei Lo Kwong 肥佬光merely replied that Mr Hui and “大圈尻Dee” needed to resolve the matter among themselves (“本人要求肥佬光幫忙求情減價, 接著肥佬光告訴事情需要靠我們自己解決”).

61.  “大圈尻Dee” proposed continuing this discussion after dinner (“黃先生建議我們可在飯後繼續討”).

62.  Mr Hui pretended to agree to this proposal but thereafter left the hotel by all possible means (“本人假裝同意黃先生的提議, 及後設法離開帝苑酒店”).

63.  Mr Hui testified in cross-examination that it was during the above exchanges that he became very disappointed and realised that Brother Sung宋大哥and Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光were unable or unwilling to help protect him or secure for him any justice.

64.  In the early hours of 11 May 2009, Brother Sung 宋大哥telephoned Mr Hui telling him that “大圈尻Dee” had agreed to reduce his demand to 220 million shares.  Mr Hui rejected this demand.  Brother Sung 宋大哥then told Mr Hui to take care of himself and to be careful in handling this situation before hanging up (“在2009年5月11日凌晨, 宋大哥致電本人, 謂黃先生同意減價至220,000,000股票, 本人向其表示不會接受. 之後, 宋大哥告訴本人要照顧自己, 小心應對這種情況”).

65.  At about 11 am later that same morning being 11 May 2009:-

(1)  A group of masked individuals turned up at the front entrance of Mr Hui’s Office carrying placards displaying Mr Hui’s photograph with threats inscribed thereon and taking photographs and video-taping the event (“一群帶著口罩的人, 手持有本人相片及寫有恐嚇字句紙牌, 正在公司門口錄影同拍照”);

(2)  One of them told Mr Hui’s Office staff that if Mr Hui still refused to contact “大圈尻Dee”, much high drama would follow (“同時有人對公司職員說, 若然本人仍然不與黃先生聯絡, 到時將會有很多好戲上演”).

66.  In the afternoon of the same day being 11 May 2009, Mr Hui who was then in Shenzhen was again followed by strangers.  By that time, Mr Hui felt that even if he were to accede to the demands of “大圈尻Dee”, there would be no guarantee of no further intimidation or that Mr Hui would be spared from harm in the future (“2009年5月11日下午時份,本人在深圳再次被人跟蹤。那時候,本人意識到即使本人今次遵照他們的要求去辦,也難以確保眾被告人在將來不會再勒索及傷害本人”).

67.  Accordingly, Mr Hui resolved to report the matter to the Security Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, which he did at 9 pm that same evening (“因此,本人決定在當晚9時到深圳市公安局正式報案”).

68.  Over the following two days being 12 May 2009 and 13 May 2009:-

(1)  Again, a group of masked individuals sat down at the front entrance of Mr Hui’s Office carrying placards displaying Mr Hui’s photograph with threats inscribed thereon and taking photographs (“在2009年5月12日及5月13日期間,本人的秘書向本人報告,有戴著口罩的人手持貼有本人相片及寫有恐嚇字句字牌,坐在公司門口展示及拍照”).

(2)  Mr Hui’s Office staff also received telephone calls demanding that Mr Hui resolve the problem with “大圈尻Dee” or else Mr Hui would have to bear the consequences (“公司職員亦收到電話,內容是要求本人與黃先生解決問題,否則後果自負”).

69.  On the morning of 13 May 2009, “大圈尻Dee” telephoned Mr Hui twice:-

(1)  Demanding that Mr Hui deliver the shares to him within two days, failing which his gang would inflict bodily harm on Mr Hui and his family members, an outcome that not even he “大圈尻Dee” would be able to control (“在5月13日上午,黃先生曾致電兩次給本人,要求本人在兩日之內交出股票,否則他的同黨會對本人及本人的家人造成人身傷害,黃先生說他自己也不能控制這件事情發生”); and

(2)  Declaring that he would bad-mouth Mr Hui to the media in Hong Kong and would also do so by distributing pamphlets on the street and displaying banners in the MTR (“另外,黃先生亦聲稱會在全港向媒體發報本人的壞話、在街道上派發傳單及在港鐵張掛橫額”).

70.  In the afternoon of the same day on 13 May 2009, Mr Hui reported the matter to the Hong Kong Police.

71.  Mr Fung SC for Mr Hui submitted that Mr Hui was never challenged, by way of cross-examination, on any of his evidence, set out in paragraphs 45 to 69 above.

72.  On 14 May 2009, the Hong Kong Police set up a command centre in the City Garden Hotel in North Point where they asked Mr Hui to stay for his personal safety and protection as well as for better communication with Mr Hui in pursuit of their investigation including tape-recording Mr Hui’s conversations with Mr Koon, Mr Ng, “大圈尻Dee” and his gang.

73.  On the same day being a Thursday:

(1)  Brother Sung宋大哥telephoned Mr Hui on the morning to suggest lunch at the Macau Jockey Club;

(2)  At around 1 pm, Mr Hui went to the Macau Jockey Club carrying on his person a hidden tape recorder and accompanied by his assistant Cui 崔;

(3)  Mr Hui tape-recorded his lunch conversation with Brother Sung 宋大哥 covertly without the latter’s knowledge.

74.  Over lunch, Brother Sung 宋大哥told Mr Hui that the matter must be resolved before noon, the following day being a Friday, whereafter Mr Hui would return with Brother Sung 宋大哥to Beijing over the weekend to take a rest (“星期五啊, 中午以前把這事了了, 你週末你跟我回北京, 咱們休息休息”).

75.  Mr Hui complained that Mr Koon’s demands were wholly excessive in that, having received 100 million shares, another demand was made for another 100 million shares (“這確實是他媽的太過份了, 原來他們說收一億, 拿了一億, 再加一億, 了不起再加一億”). Brother Sung 宋大哥concluded by saying that he would arrange for Mr Hui to meet with them at noon the next day (“那我就跟他們約明天中午”).

76.  Brother Sung 宋大哥had arranged for such meeting to take place the following lunchtime at the Chinese restaurant in the Kowloon Shangri-la Hotel.

77.  Later that same afternoon at 5 pm:-

(1)  Mr Hui who had by then returned to the Police Command Centre at City Garden Hotel in North Point received a phone call from Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光;

(2)  This telephone conversation was tape-recorded by the Hong Kong Police;

(3)  Mr Hui complained to Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光in the telephone conversation that having received 100 million shares, Mr Koon demanded another 100 million shares, then increased to 300 million shares, now reduced to 170 million shares upon giving face to Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光 (“上一次攞左一億到手啦, 跟住又話再加多1億, 依家又話3億, 咁樣, 跟住依家佢, 當然你出面, 佢依家比面你啦, 就話1 億7千”);

(4)  Brother Sung 宋大哥joined the call halfway through the conversation to tell Mr Hui to meet Mr Koon and the others at noon the next day (being Friday 15 May 2009) to resolve the matter in a couple of sentences (“你明天, 你明天12點, 不是, 你明天12點到了以後, 我們兩個幾句話傾完”).

78.  Later that same evening in the Police Command Centre, Mr Hui received a phone call at 10:56 pm from “大圈尻Dee” who was tape-recorded by the Hong Kong Police telling Mr Hui that:-

(1)  “大圈尻Dee” had been friends with Mr Koon for more than 20 years (“嗱,佢 [Mr Koon] 都係我廿幾年嘅朋友”);

(2)  Mr Koon had helped “大圈尻Dee” over many matters (“佢亦都幫咗我好多嘢”);

(3)  “大圈尻Dee” had pumped a lot of money into Mr Koon (“我哋有好多錢都係揼係佢嗰度㗎”);

(4)  “大圈尻Dee” had lost money and asked Mr Hui to make good his loss. (“喂我蝕咗去嘅,你幫幫手,得唔得).

79.  The following day being Friday 15 May 2009, the Hong Kong Police set up an undercover sting operation at the Chinese restaurant in the Kowloon Shangri-la Hotel to catch red-handed and arrest Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant, “大圈尻Dee” and the rest of their gang.  However, Mr Hui got cold feet and the operation had to be aborted. One of the reasons which caused him to get cold feet was that Brother Sung 宋大哥 was a member of the National Security Bureau of the People’s Republic of China. He did not want to get into a situation where he caused a member of the National Security Bureau of the People’s Republic of China to be arrested for blackmail in Hong Kong.

80.  I should say that the sequence of events set out above covering the period from 14 May 2009 to 15 May 2009 did not surface in the criminal trial. Such evidence came out as a result of this Court’s request for sight of the prosecution’s unused materials in the criminal trial comprising the three taped conversations set out above.

81.  Mr Fung SC for Mr Hui submitted that the three taped  conversations revealed that:-

(1)  Mr Koon’s repeated demands made on Mr Hui to hand over shares to him was not based on the Oral Agreement;

(2)  The contemporaneous evidence shows that no one – whether Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant, “大圈尻Dee”, Wu Tsz 胡子, Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光, Brother Sung宋大哥or the rest of the gang – ever breathed a word of or mentioned the Oral Agreement;

(3)  Mr Koon consorted with a notorious triad gangster “大圈尻Dee” for over 20 years, was friends with him, helped “大圈尻Dee” out over many matters and received a lot of money pumped into him by “大圈尻Dee” who then lost money and required compensation.

82.  As will be analysed below, in such a fact-sensitive case as the present one, this Court attaches great weight to contemporaneous records which are critical in revealing the truth of what happened many years ago since such materials are clearly more reliable than the oral testimony of witnesses attempting to recollect events which had occurred more than a decade ago (in this case, 13 – 15 years ago).

83.  It is also the Plaintiff’s submission that given that the above events took place more than 13 years ago, the dates of the events pleaded in the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim can scarcely be expected to be exact.  That said, the evidence shows clearly that:-

(1)  The duress, coercion and intimidation by Mr Koon, Mr Ng and “大圈尻Dee” and his gang took place “in or around mid-to-late March 2009”. (See Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim at §10(3)).

(2)  The Share Purchase Agreement (though dated 26 March 2009) was signed “on or around 26.3.09”. (See Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim at §10(12)).

(3)  The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that all the above events took place in mid-to-late March 2009;

(4)  Although Share Purchase Agreement is dated 26 March 2009, it was not necessarily signed on that specific date but the evidence shows that such agreement was executed in mid-to-late March 2009.

THE 1st DEFENDANT’S CASE

84.  The 1st Defendant, Mr Koon strenuously denies the existence of the 1 March 2009 meeting or encounter.

85.  His case is that in early or mid-2007, through Mr Ng’s introduction, he met Mr Hui for the first time. Mr Hui told him that Sino Union had good prospects, and persuaded him to purchase shares in Sino Union. He was attracted and after some study, he began trading in the shares of Sino Union on the market in 2007. He did not tell Mr Hui about his trading though.

86.  On 11 December 2007, Mr Hui invited Mr Koon to dinner. At that time, Mr Koon held 1,100,000 shares in Sino Union. During the dinner, Mr Hui told Mr Koon that the prospects of Sino Union were promising and highlighted that Goldman Sachs and Mr Lee Shau Kee (founder of Henderson Land Development Limited) had also invested in Sino Union. Mr Hui again persuaded Mr Koon to purchase shares in Sino Union.  In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that on 14 April 2008, Sino Union held a press conference at Four Seasons Hotel during which Mr Hui informed the press that Dr Lee Shau Kee and/or his company had purchased Sino Union shares.

87.  During the dinner, Mr Hui also gave Mr Koon a piece of paper and explained to Mr Koon that he had control and/or influence over about 4.5 billion shares of Sino Union shares.

88.  After the dinner, Mr Koon, after some study, did purchase more shares in Sino Union, holding 49,650,000 shares as at 18 December 2007.

89.  On 17 December 2017, Sino Union announced its interim results for the 6 months ended 30 September 2007 and that the profits from operating activities was about HK$4.4 billion, which suggested profits of about HK$1 for each of the about 4.6 billion issued shares.

90.  From 17 December 2007 to 18 December 2007, Mr Koon, upon noting the apparently good interim results of Sino Union, spent a total of HK$74 million on, and purchased a total of about 46 million of, Sino Union shares.

91.  However, from 19 December 2007 to 27 December 2007, noting no significant increase in market price, despite the apparently good interim results, Mr Koon sold a net total of 17,250,000 shares in Sino Union. After the close of the market on 27 December 2007, Mr Koon was holding 31.4 million shares for which he had spent about HK$50 million to purchase.

92.  On 27 December 2007, Mr Ng telephoned Mr Koon mentioning that there had been a lot of people selling shares in Sino Union recently. Mr Koon disclosed to Mr Ng it was him. On the same day, Mr Ng telephoned Mr Koon again and said that Mr Hui would like to meet him. They met in Tsim Sha Tsui, talking about Mr Koon’s recent sale of the shares in Sino Union. Having ascertained the details of the shares then still held by Mr Koon, Mr Hui, to entice Mr Koon to purchase more shares in Sino Union, “offered to transfer to [Mr Koon] 250,000,000 Shares free of charge if [Mr Koon] would buy more Shares in the open market and spent up to a total of at least HK$200,000,000 in buying the Shares.” (See §26 of Mr Koon’s witness statement.)

93.  Mr Hui explained that upon that offer, the average cost of all the shares Mr Koon would hold (together with the 250,000,000 shares free of charge) would be HK$0.5 per share only.

94.  Mr Koon accepted this offer and continued to buy Sino Union shares in the market.

95.  Mr Koon duly performed the Oral Agreement by purchasing 151,290,000 shares in Sino Union from 28 December 2017 to 16 April 2008 for a total price of HK$235,569,589.09.

96.  From 28 December 2007 to 11 March 2008, Patrick Tsang Kwok Man (“Mr Tsang”), an executive director of Sino Union, on Mr Hui’s instructions, applied to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for copies of daily CCASS Participating Shareholding Reports of Sino Union (“PSH Reports”). Such PSH Reports were not available to the public and were available only to directors or authorised persons of listed company. It is Mr Koon’s case that Mr Hui and Mr Tsang, for the purpose of the Oral Agreement, delivered a total of 23 Sino Union PSH Reports to Mr Koon, with the first report dated 28 December 2007 and the last one dated 11 March 2008.

97.  It is Mr Koon’s case that after he duly performed the Oral Agreement, Mr Koon informed Mr Hui about that and requested him to transfer 250,000,000 shares to him free of charge as agreed under the Oral Agreement.

98.  After 16 April 2008, Mr Hui and Mr Koon met for tea or meals from time to time and during one such get together, Mr Hui gave some confidential financial information of Sino Union to Mr Koon, told Mr Koon that the prospect of Sino Union was very good, and persuaded Mr Koon to continue to purchase Sino Union shares.

99.  In early June 2008, Mr Hui, in discharge of his contractual obligation under the Oral Agreement, caused Xie and Guo to transfer a total of 50,070,000 shares in Sino Union to Mr Koon’s nominees for free.

100.  From June 2008 to early 2009, Mr Koon reminded Mr Hui from time to time to transfer the remaining shares to him for free pursuant to the Oral Agreement.

101.  On 20 June 2008, Sino Union published its 2008 Annual Report and stated, inter alia, that there was a material error made in the 2007 Interim Results, namely the profits from ordinary activities was not about HK$4.4 billion but only about HK$1.9 billion.

102.  In August 2008, Mr Hui gave 5 tickets for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Opening Ceremony to Mr Koon and one of the 5 tickets was for a seat next to the Ambassador of the Republic of Madagascar in Beijing.

103.  From May to December 2008, Mr Koon sold all his Sino Union shares in the open market slowly over a period of 8 months and the loss was a total sum of HK$79,366,901.92.

104.  On 16 March 2009, at a lunch gathering among Mr Hui, Mr Koon, Mr Ng and Mr Zhou, Mr Hui introduced Mr Zhou to Mr Koon and Mr Ng and said that he would place 250,000,000 shares to Mr Zhou and Mr Zhou would then transfer 100,000,000 shares to Mr Koon. Mr Hui further said that he would then arrange for the transfer of the remaining 100,000,000 shares in due course.

105.  On 16 March 2009, by a 股份買賣協議 (Sale and Purchase of Shares Agreement), Sukapeak Holdings Limited (“Sukapeak”) (represented by Hui) agreed to sell and Mr Zhou agreed to purchase 250 million Sino Union shares at HK$1.2 per share, which was at a premium of 57.89% above the closing price of HK$0.76 per share on 13 March 2009.

106.  On 18 March 2009, Mr Zhou, in Guo’s accompany, came to the office of Cheer Union, was attended to by Mr Ng, and attempted to open a security trading account but was unsuccessful because Mr Zhou failed to provide his address proof.  Nonetheless, Mr Zhou deposited 10 share certificates each of 10 million Sino Union shares no. 019038 – 019047 in the name of Sukapeak at Cheer Union.

107.  On 19 March 2009, Mr Zhou was issued 100 million shares under his own name.

108.  On 23 March 2009, Mr Ng told Mr Koon that the 100,000,000 shares could not be transferred simply by signing bought and sold notes and stamping of the same. Mr Ng said that Mr Hui would like to sign a share purchase agreement. While Mr Koon felt the request strange, he agreed to do so because he would like to have the shares as soon as possible.

109.  On 26 March 2009, the Share Purchase Agreement was signed. However, no shares were transferred.

110.  On 29 March 2009, Mr Koon telephoned Mr Hui about the 100 million shares, and Mr Hui asked Mr Koon to go to his office on 30 March 2009 to get the 200 million shares outstanding under the Oral Agreement from Shanghai Boy 上海仔, person-in-charge of 勝和 (Shing Wo), who was an infamous figure of a triad society.

111.  Mr Koon did not want to talk to Shanghai Boy 上海仔 and asked around for assistance. Eventually, Mr Koon found “大圈尻Dee” who agreed to assist and talk to “Shanghai Boy” 上海仔for the shares.

112.  On 30 March 2009, “大圈尻Dee” visited Mr Hui’s office and met Mr Hui, Shanghai Boy上海仔 and Ching Meng Ky (“Mr Ching”), an executive director of Sino Union, whereupon Mr Hui agreed to give 100 million shares to Koon the following day and the last batch of 100 million shares under the Oral Agreement to Mr Koon soon.  After “大圈尻Dee” left, he told Mr Koon to collect the 100 million shares from Mr Hui the following day. Upon being asked by Mr Hui, Mr Ng also called Mr Koon to have lunch with Mr Hui the following day to collect the 100 million shares.

113.  On 31 March 2009, at the lunch, Mr Hui demanded “yum cha” money of HK$5,000,000 for the members of the triad society he had arranged to come to the next door. Upon Mr Koon’s negotiation, Mr Hui agreed to reduce the “yum cha” money to HK$1,500,000, saying that if it were not paid, Mr Koon’s family would encounter problem.

114.  Feeling intimidated, Mr Koon agreed but having no sufficient cash, he said that he would give the cash a few days later. The lunch ended. Mr Koon left, and did not report the intimidation to the police. Instead, he asked the 3rd Defendant to get the shares.

115.  On 31 March 2009, the 3rd Defendant signed bought and sold notes.

116.  On 2 April 2009, Mr Ng informed the 3rd Defendant that Mr Zhou had already signed a receipt for the transfer of the 100,000,000 shares, and later passed on the receipt to the 3rd Defendant.

117.  On 3 April 2009, the 3rd Defendant was issued 20 certificates no. 019875 – 019894 each of 5 million Sino Union shares.

118.  On 3 April 2009, the 3rd Defendant signed a Standard Form of Transfer to transfer the 100 million shares to Mr Chan Kuok Keong at a total consideration of $77 million but the fact is that Mr Chan Kuok Keong never paid any money to the 3rd Defendant for the shares, because both of them were holding the 100 million shares as Mr Koon’s nominee.

119.  From April to May 2009, Mr Chan Kuok Keong sold the 45.12 million and the 100 million shares (received from Xie in June 2008 and from the 3rd Defendant in April 2009 respectively) in the open market and the sale proceeds was a total sum of $107,567,659.17.

120.  Mr Chan Kuok Keong also sold 4.95 million shares received from Guo in June 2008 in the open market and the sale proceeds amounted to a total sum of about HK$2.5 million.

121.  On 6 April 2009, Mr Ng gave HK$1.5 million in cash (Mr Koon’s money) to Mr Hui at Mr Hui’s Office. Despite the transfer of the 100,000,000 shares already, Mr Koon, fearing revenge, still gave HK$1,500,000 in cash to Mr Hui via Mr Ng. (See §62 of Mr Koon’s witness statement.)

122.  On 29 April 2009,     upon Mr Hui’s invitation, Mr Koon, Mr Ng, “大圈尻Dee” and Mr Shum Man Keung, nicknamed “Wu Tsz” went to Kimberley Hotel at about 1 pm and met Mr Hui, Mr Ching, Shanghai Boy上海仔, Mr Ben Siu and other people.

123.  In respect of the last batch 100 million shares, Mr Hui said he would give 50 million shares to Mr Koon first. In respect of the last batch of 50 million shares, he would give to Mr Koon after he had purchased more shares of Sino Union in the open market so as to push up its market price, but Mr Koon refused.

124.  Mr Koon and his party left and Mr Hui stayed behind until about 3 pm and paid the bill.

125.  On 10 May 2009, Mr Hui met “大圈尻Dee”, Wu Tsz, one 宋大哥 and one 肥佬光 at Royal Garden Hotel in Tsim Sha Tsui East, and Mr Hui said he was threatened by “大圈尻Dee”.

126.  On 13 May 2009, Mr Hui made a report to the Hong Kong Police of blackmail and theft of the 100 million shares against Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant, “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子. Mr Hui made a total of 10 police statements afterwards.

127.  On 14 May 2009, Mr Hui met 宋大哥 at lunch and their conversation was audio-recorded by Mr Hui.

128.  On 14 May 2009, Guo withdrew the last and remaining 1.56 million shares from his account at Cheer Union.

129.  On 16 June 2009, Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant, “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz were arrested by the Hong Kong Police for blackmail and theft of 100 million shares.

130.  On 17 June 2009, Xie made a complaint to the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) and the Hong Kong Police against Cheer Union and Mr Ng for theft of 45.12 million shares from his account at Cheer Union.

131.  On 25 June 2009, Mr Hui commenced the present proceedings HCA No. 1479 of 2009 against Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant and “大圈尻Dee”.

132.  In June 2009, Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant, “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子were charged with blackmail and theft of 100 million shares in ESCC No. 5461 of 2009.

133.  On 20 January 2010, Guo made a statement to the police asserting that Cheer Union and Mr Ng had stolen 4.95 million shares from his account at Cheer Union.

134.  On 21 and 22 January 2010, Xie made 2 statements to the Hong Kong Police asserting Cheer Union and Mr Ng had stolen 45.12 million shares from his account at Cheer Union.

135.  On 25 March 2010, Xie filed his Statement of Claim in HCA No. 287 of 2010 against Cheer Union and Mr Ng for having stolen 45.12 million shares from his account at Cheer Union.

136.  On 2 June 2010, Mr Ng filed his Defence in HCA No. 287 of 2010.

137.  On 30 July 2010, Mr Hui resigned as the Chairman and executive director of Sino Union.

138.  On 17 September 2010, Mr Hui sold all his Sino Union shares.

139.  On 6 October 2010, Mr Ching resigned as an executive director of Sino Union.

140.  On 17 April 2012, as a result of Xie’s complaint to the SFC that Mr Ng had stolen 45.12 million shares from his account at Cheer Union, the SFC investigated the matter and reached an agreement with Mr Ng that Mr Ng be prohibited from taking part in any regulated activity for 10 years, for misconduct under the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the SFC.

141.  On 26 October 2012, Mr Koon commenced HCA No. 2004 of 2012 against Mr Hui to claim 99.93 million shares outstanding under the Oral Agreement.

142.  From 10 February 2014 to 26 March 2014, trial of HCCC No. 66 of 2010 took place and Mr Koon and all other defendants were acquitted of all charges and awarded costs.

143.  On 7 May 2015, Mr Koon filed his Defence and Counterclaim in the present proceedings. Out of the 250,000,000 shares agreed under the Oral Agreement, 50,070,000 shares were transferred in June 2008 and 100,000,000 shares were transferred in March 2009. There remain 99,930,000 shares yet to be transferred under the Oral Agreement.

144.  Hence, Mr Koon counterclaims:-

(1)  based on the Oral Agreement, for the remaining 99,930,000 shares and/or damages; and

(2)  based on duress or “for consideration which wholly failed in the event the Plaintiff’s promise to perform his existing contractual obligation to give and transfer the remaining 100 million shares to the 1st Defendant pursuant to Agreement was consideration”, for the “yum cha” money of HK$1,500,000. (See §34 of the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim of the 1st Defendant.)

APPROACH TO EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

145.  As can be seen from the narrative of the diametrically opposite account of events, this case turns essentially on the Court’s assessment of the credibility of the parties’ respective case. Central to this exercise is the assessment of the existence of the Oral Agreement.

146.  Lord Bingham in his book The Business of Judging at pp 5 – 6 insightfully said:

“Let me then turn to the central questions. Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially effecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties’ lives or fortune, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? How, as between competing experts in a field not his own, is a judge to determine where the truth lies? Is our existing way of resolving expert conflicts the best way? I shall begin by considering the resolution of issues of primary fact, the choice between first-hand eye-witnesses. Then I shall turn to expert evidence.

The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified, but often do not) such facts as shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letter or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time ….

The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis. In this he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full:

‘Credibility’ involves wider problems than mere ‘demeanour’ which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or, though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection even subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by over-much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part.

Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue. There are, no doubt, witnesses who follow the guidance of the Good Soldier Sveyk that ‘The main thing is always to say in court what isn’t true,’ as a matter of principle, but more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case:

(1) the consistency of the witness’s evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred;

(2) the internal consistency of the witness’s evidence;

(3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions;

(4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation;

(5) the demeanour of the witness.

The first three of these tests may in general be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness’s evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred, or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable, and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility.” (Emphasis added).

147.  In Lee Fu Wing v Yan Paul Po Ting [2009] 5 HKLRD 513, Deputy High Court Judge Au (as he then was) at 524 helpfully set out the well-established approach as to assessment of witnesses:

(1)  whether the party’s case is inherently plausible or implausible;

(2)  whether the party’s case is, in a material way, contradicted by other evidence (documentary or otherwise) which is undisputed or indisputable;

(3)  where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has given evidence using the above tests.  This is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility; and

(4)  the demeanour of the witnesses.

148.  In Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George HCA2576/2005, unreported, 5 May 2011, Chu J at §§40-41 said:

“40. Mr Chain has referred me to what Lord Devlin said extra-judicially in The Judge (Oxford University Press, 1979) at p.63, where he endorsed the words of Mr Justice MacKenna in a paper entitled “Discretion” read at University College, Dublin on 21 January 1973 (printed in the Irish Jurist, vol.IX, new series, p.1) as follows:

“This is now I go about the business of finding facts. I start from the undisputed facts which both sides accept. I add to them such other facts as seem very likely to be true, as for example, those recorded in contemporary documents or spoken to by independent witness like the policeman giving evidence in a running down case about the marks on the road. I judge a witness to be unreliable if his evidence is, in any serious respect, inconsistent with these undisputed or indisputable facts, or of course if he contradicts himself on important points. I rely as little as possible on such deceptive matters as his demeanour. When I have done my best to separate the true from the false by these more or less objective tests, I say which story seems to me the more probable, the Plaintiff’s or the Defendant’s”

I respectfully agree.

41. I also agree what was said by Peter Smith J in EPI Environment Technologies Inc & Anor v Symphony Plastic Technologies plc & Anor [2005] 1 WLR 3456, 3470-3471 at para.74, that it is essential to have regard to the entirety of a witness’ evidence. As he observed, witnesses can make mistakes, but the mistakes do not necessarily affect other parts of their evidence. Likewise, witnesses can regularly lie. However, lies themselves do not mean necessarily that the entirety of that witness’ evidence is to be rejected. A witness may lie in a stupid attempt to bolster his case, but the actual case nevertheless remains good irrespective of the lie.”

149.  On fact finding, especially in civil cases, the law is binary. In re B [2009] 1 AC 11, Lord Hoffmann at §2 (p.17) said

“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a “fact in issue”), a judge, or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are zero and one. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of zero is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of one is returned and the fact is treated as having happened.” (Emphasis added.)

150.  In Lo Ming Chi Charles and another. v Full power Investment Holdings Corp and another[2021] HKCFI 3073, Mimmie Chan J. at §10 insightfully said:

“The Court is the finder of facts, but the finding of facts in any case cannot be equated with the ascertainment of the truth.” (Emphasis added.)

151.  I find the above guidelines helpful and will apply the same in assessing the credibility of the parties’ diametrically different versions of events.

ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

The Oral Agreement

152.  I have carefully considered all the evidence presented to this Court, including the oral testimony of the witnesses. I have no doubt that this Court was not informed of the full facts or the whole truth of the present dispute. However, the role of this Court is to make factual findings according to the available evidence and to its best ability in a fair and equitable manner.

153.  Doing the best this Court can, on balance, I am not convinced that Mr Koon has discharged his burden of proving the existence of the Oral Agreement. In fact, for the reasons to be set out below, I am of the view that the Oral Agreement never existed.

154.  First and foremost, I find the contemporaneous tape recordings illuminating. In particular, the transcript of the phone recording dated 14 May 2009 from 10:57 pm to 11:07 pm shows the following important exchange between Mr Hui (B) and “大圈尻Dee”:

“34.  B:  我純粹呢,當次呢係,即係講係俾面你,我哋先 至傾啫因為呢(C:多謝你吖。),因為呢,當時你都知呢亞官呢佢就話呢有晤..股票損失,到依家佢都無咗去(C:我嗱,呀,呀。)始終呢,我就肯定聽你,依家聽你(C:呀。)啦,啫係一直。

35.  C:  嗱,佢都係我廿幾年嘅朋友(B:喺,喺。),佢亦都幫我咗好多嘢(B:喺,喺,喺。)我哋啲,我哋有好多錢都係揼係佢嗰度,不係我希望即係我亦都唔想講咁多嘢,如估係你話需要亞官(B:啫係。)都可以去幫吓你手嘅無問題。(B:呢,啫係以前呢,即係,係。)我覺得啫係大家從聽日開始解决咗問題呢大家做番,做朋友做兄弟都無乜所謂嘅,將你,喂我蝕咗去嘅,你幫幫手,得唔得(B:唔,唔,唔。)我覺得都無乜困難。” (Emphasis added.)

155.  I am of the view that the above dialogue between Mr Hui and “大圈尻Dee” whom Mr Koon admitted to be his agent sits well with and gives credence to Mr Hui’s case that Mr Koon made substantial loss in his investment in Sino Union’s shares in which “大圈尻Dee” also participated. Mr Koon and “大圈尻Dee” were no doubt looking to Mr Hui to make good their losses. This is understandable because on Mr Koon’s case, Mr Hui did persuade him to invest in the shares of Sino Union by giving him a rather rosy picture of the prospect of Sino Union.

156.  I notice that after the press conference held by Sino Union on 14 April 2008 at Four Seasons Hotel during which Mr Hui said Dr Lee Shau Kee and/or his company had purchased Sino Union shares, Mr Koon spent HK$50,158,223.84 to purchase a total of 27,700,000 Sino Union shares on 15 April 2008 at HK$1.81 per share. On the following day, he spent HK$27,236,228.24 to purchase 15,090,000 Sino Union shares at HK$1.80 per share and HK$4,697,804.79 to purchase 2,600,000 shares at HK$1.81 per share. In other words, in two days’ time after Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment was made known to the market, Mr Koon invested a total of HK$82,092,256.87 to purchase the shares of Sino Union, a third-tier or fourth-tier stock as Mr Chain put it.

157.  The closing price of Sino Union was HK$1.49 per share on 3 April 2008 before the market closed for a holiday. Its closing price on 14 April 2008 (the day of the information) was HK$1.60 per share. The closing price on 15 and 16 April 2008 was HK$1.81 per share. The trading volume hit a record high on 15 April 2008 at 122,440,000 shares. The trading volume on 16 April 2008 was 67,690,000 shares.

158.  However, the rally in share price was short-lived. After a record high at HK$2.02 per share on 23 April 2008, the share price of Sino Union continued to go south from HK$1.81 per share on 28 April 2008 to a depressing low price at HK$0.77 per share on 25 February 2009. The price movement was, by and large, a continuous fall. Accordingly, by the last trading day in February 2009, Mr Koon would have lost $1.04 per share.

159.  Indeed, Mr Koon’s case is that he sold all his Sino Union shares in the open market slowly over a period of 8 months from May to December 2008 and the loss was a total sum of HK$79,366,901.92. This is, by any standard, not a small sum. This undisputed factual situation sits well with the tape transcript which records that Mr Koon had suffered significant loss in his trading in Sino Union shares in which “大圈尻Dee” also participated. They were then looking to Mr Hui for compensation. 100 million shares in Sino Union were then worth about HK$77 million, roughly the loss suffered by Mr Koon and “大圈尻Dee”.

160.  I am of the firm view that this contemporaneous tape recording has a high probative value because had “大圈尻Dee” simply been a debt collection agent pursuant to the Oral Agreement, he would not have referred to his own loss as well. He looked to Mr Hui for “some help” (“幫幫手”) no doubt because first, he along with Mr Koon suffered an actual loss and secondly, they were under the impression that as the majority shareholder and the chairman of the board of directors of Sino Union, it was within the power of Mr Hui to “print” more shares to make up for their losses.

161.  Indeed, this Court expressed its concern during the trial that the loss of “大圈尻Dee” in the share investment with Mr Koon, on a balance of probabilities, seems to tally with Mr Hui’s case that Mr Koon invested in the shares with the expectation that the price of the shares would rise, but in the end, he suffered a substantial loss of almost HK$80 million, and thus thought that Mr Hui had misled Mr Koon into buying the shares. Mr Koon wished to hold Mr Hui accountable by extorting the 100 million shares from him.

162.  Mr Chain for Mr Koon submitted that the transcripts should be read as a whole as we do not have the audio recording. To that I agree. However, even if one were to read all three transcripts as a whole, in my view, they point not to the existence of the Oral Agreement but an illegitimate attempt to hold Mr Hui accountable for the substantial loss suffered by Mr Koon and “大圈尻Dee”.

163.  According to Mr Koon’s witness statement at §49, Mr Koon briefed “大圈尻Dee about the Oral Agreement and Mr Hui’s obligation to give Mr Koon 250 million shares. Yet, in all of the three tape transcripts, there was no reference at all to the Oral Agreement. I am of the view that this fact, by itself, is an indicium that there was simply no oral agreement between Mr Hui and Mr Koon. Mr Chain for Mr Koon submitted that by that time Mr Hui had already agreed to pay more such that there was no need to make reference to the Oral Agreement. I do not agree. There are many references or complaints by Mr Hui to being first demanded to pay over 100 million shares, then 200 million shares, then 300 million shares. Assuming the Oral Agreement exists, it is inexplicable as to why “大圈尻Dee” did not refer to Mr Hui’s obligations under the Oral Agreement. It is inherently more probable that there was no reference to the Oral Agreement because it simply did not exist.

164.  I reject Mr Chain’s submission that “大圈尻Dee” on that occasion was trying his best to appease Mr Hui, and that “大圈尻Dee” would say anything Mr Hui wanted (or “大圈尻Dee” thought Mr Hui wanted) to hear in order not to rock the boat, so that came the next day, Mr Hui would hand over the shares and the gangsters would pocket the extra 65 million shares. There was no need for “大圈尻Dee” to appease Mr Hui at all because by that time he had already successfully extorted 100 million shares from Mr Hui. I do not find it necessary for “大圈尻Dee”  qua oppressor to deliberately give a false story about his loss in share investment with Mr Koon in order to appease Mr Hui.

165.  Secondly, I am of the view that Mr Koon’s pattern of trading in the shares of Sino Union does not sit well with the existence of the Oral Agreement. Mr Koon, by any standard, is a very successful and seasoned businessman. If he were to invest a total of HK$200 million into the shares of Sino Union as required under the Oral Agreement, a third-tier or fourth-tier stock, he would have paced his purchases in such a way so as not to cause any unnecessary increase in share price. It was in his interest to devise and implement an investment strategy to acquire the maximum possible number of shares with his HK$200 million. However, this was not what happened. Instead:-

(1)  Within two days’ time after Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment in Sino Union was announced, Mr. Koon carried out a massive purchase of 45,390,000 Sino Union shares at a total cost of HK$82,092,256.87. This does not sit well with the behaviour of someone who was trading to build a position with minimum costs and maximum benefit to himself pursuant to a commercial agreement (i.e. the Oral Agreement), but is rather the conduct of someone who is purely speculating that the shares would abruptly appreciate in value upon the release of favourable news.

(2)  For completeness, I note that the above pattern of trading is consistent with Mr Koon’s earlier conduct before the Oral Agreement was allegedly reached. Shortly after the 2007 Interim Results were announced, Mr. Koon purchased a substantial amount of Sino Union shares, i.e. a total of 27,720,000 shares, at a total cost of HK$45,618.467.85; when he discovered that such announcement did not result in a spike in the share price of Sino Union, he abruptly caused 10,150,000 shares to be sold for a total sum of HK$17,678,306.22.  In my view, such abrupt selling of shares sits better with the behaviour of a stock speculator.

166.  I also note that in fact, Mr Koon actually sold 80,000 shares at HK$0.9 per shares on 4 April 2008. Mr Fung SC submitted that if Mr Koon were to build a position, there was no reason why he would have sold shares before he had accumulated enough. There is force in Mr Fung SC’s submission, and I accept that had the Oral Agreement existed, Mr Koon would unlikely have sold 80,000 shares on 4 April 2008.

167.  Mr Chain, on the other hand, drew my attention to the fact that Mr Koon stopped purchasing shares in Sino Union after 16 April 2008, apparently because Mr Koon had already performed his part of the Oral Agreement by spending a total of HK$200 million in acquiring the same. However, I note that Mr Koon’s cessation in buying more shares after 16 April 2008 does not necessarily prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. His cessation in buying more shares is also consistent with his evidence that he noticed that there was no increase in share price after the announcement of Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment. In fact, on 15 April 2008, Mr Koon’s purchase constituted 22.62% of the total trading volume in the market (27,700,000/122,440,000). Yet, there was no substantial increase in share price. Indeed, Mr Koon, as an experienced trader in the stock market, gave evidence in court that he then realised that some parties were actually unloading shares in the market and they might be friends of Mr Hui. With such perception, it was not surprising that in Mr Koon’s mind, Mr Hui should be responsible for his loss.

168.  Thirdly, Mr Chain for Mr Koon relied heavily on the transfer of 50.07 million shares of Sino Union by Mr Hui to Mr Koon’s nominees (Chan Kuok Keong and the 3rd Defendant) in June 2008 as strong objective evidence that the parties actually acted upon the Oral Agreement. This partial performance is, by itself, evidence of the Oral Agreement. Mr Chain submitted that if this Court finds as a matter of fact that the 50.07 million shares transfer was effected as part performance of the Oral Agreement, then this Court should be left with little or no doubt about the existence of the Oral Agreement. As a matter of logic, I agree. In fact, I am of the view that if established, this is a strong indicium evidencing the existence of the Oral Agreement.

169.  However, the evidence does not prove that the 50.07 million shares were transferred to the nominees of Mr Koon as part performance of the Oral Agreement. Mr Koon’s pleaded case on this issue is that Guo and Xie held the 50.07 million shares as Mr Hui’s nominees. Mr Hui suggested to Mr Koon “to make use of a nominee arrangement for holding the said shares to avoid other third parties being aware of the Agreement.” (See §19(2)(a) and (b) of the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim of the 1st Defendant.)

170.  Mr Koon bears the burden in making good his pleaded case, including the nominee relationships. However, such nominee relationships are contradicted by the evidence of Mr Ng who testified that he and his staff had conducted due diligence on the source of funds for the purchase of the 50.07 million shares and were satisfied that such funds came from Guo and Xie and that Guo and Xie held the shares acquired with such funds beneficially. In my view, this not only completely negates Mr Koon’s pleaded case on the nominee relationships, it also adversely affects the credibility of Mr Koon’s evidence and testimony.

171.  Mr Fung SC for Mr Hui rightly submitted that Mr Koon has produced no evidence to prove the nominee relationships. He further relied on the following evidence to prove the contrary:

(1)  When opening their accounts with Cheer Union, Guo and Xie respectively signed a declaration form declaring “本人乃上述戶口之最終受益人及最終風險承擔人,絕無利用或被他人利用本人名義作為第三者之代理人,以從事上述戶口買賣的交易活動”.  Compelling evidence is required to prove that Guo and Xie lied in making this declaration.  However, no such evidence, let alone compelling evidence, has been adduced.

(2)  Mr Ng does not challenge Xie’s statement made to the Hong Kong Police on 21 January 2010 including, in particular, the fact that Xie had ceased working for Mr Hui’s company since July 2006; and purchased the shares on the advice of the general manager of Huaheng Petroleum being a centrally controlled state-owned enterprise which, according to Mr Hui’s evidence, Xie joined in July 2006 as a senior manager after leaving the employment of Mr Hui’s company.

172.  Mr Chain saw the force of Mr Ng’s evidence on the source of funds of the 50.07 million shares and the lack of evidential basis to establish or prove the nominee relationships. However, Mr Chain submitted even if the 50.07 million shares belonged to Xie and Guo beneficially, it does not mean that Mr Hui did not give instructions to Mr Ng to withdraw shares from their accounts and physically passed the said shares to Mr Koon’s nominees. Technically that is correct. However, on balance, I find it inherently improbable that Mr Hui would have simply appropriated (or misappropriated) someone else’s shares and passed the same to Mr Koon’s nominees.

173.  I note that for a receipt of 50.07 million shares, there is no documentary proof at all. Mr Chain also recognises the absence of Mr Hui’s “foot-print” in relation to the transfer of the 50.07 million shares. In my view, this is inexplicable for at least two reasons:-

(1)  First, on Mr Koon’s case, he was entitled to the 250 million shares as from 16 April 2008 when he performed his contractual duties under the Oral Agreement. On 2 June 2008, the price of Sino Union’s shares dropped to HK$1.5 per share. By then, he would have already made a loss by reason of the delay in handling over the 250 million shares by Mr Hui. However, there is no documentary evidence that he had chased for the same from Mr Hui.

(2)  Secondly, on his case, when Mr Hui caused third parties to transfer shares under the name of third parties to him, he did not request for a receipt to prove that the shares were actually transferred by Mr Hui. This is to be contrasted with Mr Koon’s demand for a receipt of the 100 million shares that were transferred to his nominee in April 2009.  As a seasoned businessman, there is no reason why Mr Koon would not be alerted to the risk of receiving substantial shares in the names of third parties without any documentary proof. There is the obvious risk that Xie and Guo could sue him for the return of the said shares as evidenced by the subsequent legal proceedings commenced by Xie and Guo.

174.  Mr Chain for Mr Koon also relied on the following facts to prove that the 50.07 million shares were transferred on the instructions of Mr Hui to Mr Koon’s nominee as part performance of the Oral Agreement.

(1)  Mr Hui’s company Barta Holdings opened a trading account at Cheer Union. Mr Tsang, Hui’s associate, brought Xie to open an account at Cheer Union. Guo (rather coincidentally) also opened an account at Cheer Union.

(2)  Pun Tak Hung and Chan Chau Lan, both being Mr Hui’s staff, were authorised by Xie and Guo to operate their accounts at Cheer Union, and Mr Hui appointed the same two persons to operate the security trading account of Mr Hui’s company, Golden Nova.

(3)  Xie and Guo, all of a sudden, found out that shares were missing from their accounts at the same time when Mr Hui made a report to the Hong Kong Police on 13th May 2009. Xie and Guo made police statements on two consecutive days in January 2010.

175.  Also, it defies common sense to suggest the other possibility, namely, that Mr Ng stole the shares, not for his own benefit, but to give them to Mr Koon. On the evidence, the fact is that neither Xie nor Guo is making any realistic claim to recover “their” shares. Mr Koon’s evidence is that he had those shares and their proceeds of sale; strangely enough, he was not prosecuted for theft of the same and Xie and Guo had not proceeded with their claims against him.

176.  I agree that there are features in Xie and Guo’s claims which call for proper explanations. However, this Court is not seized of the actions commenced by Xie and Guo. There are facts of the present dispute that the parties have chosen not to disclose to this Court. I am of the view that there is a quantum leap to be taken between the features as identified by Mr Chain and the conclusion that, on balance, Mr Hui deployed the shares  under Xie and Guo’s name and delivered the same to Mr Koon’s nominees as part performance of the Oral Agreement.

177.  For example, as Mr Fung SC submitted, the fact that Xie did not pursue to trial the action he commenced in HCA 287/2010 cannot ipso facto prove that his account was owned by Mr Hui or that Mr Hui was free to handle the shares under his account.  It is axiomatic that there could be multifarious reasons for any plaintiff not to pursue to conclusion any action commenced.

178.  Similarly, although the allegation that somehow Mr Ng had stolen Xie and Guo’s shares, on its fact, is extraordinary, it is, in my view, also quite extraordinary for Mr Ng, as a licenced broker, not to require any documentary proof and to simply hand over the said 50.07 million shares to Mr Koon’s nominees. A receipt of the same would be particularly important given that Xie and Guo, rather than Mr Hui, were the transferors. Absent any receipt, it would be easy for Mr Koon to deny that he had ever received any shares from Mr Hui.

179.  Insofar as Mr Koon relied on the preliminary views of the SFC, although it is stated that SFC took the preliminary view that Mr Ng knew that Xie and Guo’s accounts were nominee accounts, I accept Mr Fung SC’s submissions that first, such preliminary view based on Mr Ng’s own admissions were part and parcel of the settlement he had reached with the SFC in order to avoid more draconian sanctions should such disciplinary action continue. Secondly, such admission is contradictory to the oral testimony of Mr Ng in court.

180.  I also agree that it is clear that the SFC set out no reasons or evidential basis for such preliminary view. Such preliminary view involved no findings of fact in respect of the ownership of Guo and Xie’s respective accounts. Further, footnote 3 to the press release contained in Appendix 2 to the SFC Agreement made it clear that “There is insufficient evidence, at the present time, to establish that the account was part of any manipulative trading activity.”

181.  Importantly, for the reasons to be set out below, I am of the view that the evidence of Mr Koon and Mr Ng are not credible and they are not honest witnesses. This also impacts on the Court’s finding that the 50.07 million shares were not transferred on Mr Hui’s instructions and delivered to Mr Koon’s nominees as part performance of the Oral Agreement.

182.  As Mr Chain quite rightly pointed out, on fact finding, in particular in civil cases, the law is binary. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of zero is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. In view of the lack of cogent evidence, although there are troubling features of the transfer of 50.07 million shares of Sino Union, I have to return a value of zero to the assertion of part performance by Mr Koon. That, in my view, tends to negate the existence of the Oral Agreement.

183.  There is also one unexplained inconsistency on the transfer of the 50.07 million shares. Mr Koon has made mutually contradictory allegations to explain the extra 70,000 shares transferred from Guo and Xie to him.  In §15 of his statement made to the Hong Kong Police on 1 December 2011, Mr Koon stated that this extra amount of shares just happened to be the amount transferred by the brokerage firm (因為他剛好用這數量從股票行出貨). However, in his witness statement in this trial at §36, Mr Koon stated that Mr Hui told him “the 70,000 Shares would be regarded as compensation to me for the various fees and expenses associated with the transaction”. It is not clear what these various fees and expenses are. Further, if indeed, the 70,000 shares were to compensate Mr Koon for the various fees and expenses associated with the transaction, he would have claimed for 100 million shares instead of 99,930,000 shares in the present action.

184.  Hence, on balance, I reject Mr Koon’s case that the 50.07 million shares were delivered to his nominees on the specific instructions of Mr Hui as part performance of the Oral Agreement.

185.  Fourthly, I also find it inherently improbable and unbelievable that given the downward movement of the share price of Sino Union since 16 April 2008, had the Oral Agreement existed, Mr Koon would not have taken active steps to chase and/or demand Mr Hui to perform his part of the Oral Agreement. The value of 250 million shares as at 16 April 2008 is very different from its value in June 2008, not to say its value in Mach or April 2009. The value of 250 million shares as at 16 April 2008 is HK$1.81 x 250,000,000 = HK$452,500,000. The value of 250 million shares as at 3 April 2009 is HK$0.77 x 250,000,000 = HK$192,500,000. The difference in value is HK$260,000,000. This is, by any standard, not a small sum of money. If the Oral Agreement had indeed existed, I find it difficult to imagine that a seasoned businessman like Mr Koon would have sit and waited for Mr Hui to deliver up the same and would not have taken any active steps to chase for the same. It is difficult to fathom why Mr Koon only made various oral demands in view of the continuous and escalating loss. In the financial market, it makes a huge difference as to when one could dispose of shares in the market.

186.  Even if the relationship between Mr Hui and Mr Koon were good at the material time as suggested by Mr Koon, it is still difficult to fathom the relative inactivity on the part of Mr Koon to chase for the same. At the end of the day, business is business.

187.  What is even more disturbing and troubling is that when Mr Koon demanded for the 100 million shares in March or April 2009, he simply demanded for the said lot of shares without taking into account the drop in share price between 14 April 2008 and 3 April 2009. I am of the view that this is again an indicium that the Oral Agreement simply never existed. Indeed, up to the filing of the written Closing Submissions, Mr Koon was still claiming for the outstanding 99,930,000 shares rather than its value as at 14 April 2008. This does not sit well with the conduct of a savvy businessman who was trying to enforce the Oral Agreement. Rather, on balance, it sits better with Mr Hui’s case that it was an extortion of 100 million shares to compensate Mr Koon’s trading loss as at around March or April 2009.

188.  In addition, I also find Mr Koon’s explanation as to why he did not chase for the shares, which, according to him, were due immediately on 16 April 2008 under the Oral Agreement, incredible. First, he said that he was willing to wait because Mr Hui had told him that Dr Lee Shau Kee would invest in Sino Union, and this would boost the share price and thus he was willing to wait for the shares which he expected would appreciate in value in any event because of Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment. This is hardly credible because on Mr Koon’s case, he knew that the share price of Sino Union did not rise despite the public becoming aware of Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment. Hence, he slowly sold off his holding of Sino Union shares and thus made a substantial loss. Given such factual situation, it is incredible that Mr Koon still chose to wait for the share price to rebound.

189.  As a matter of fact, the news of the investment by Dr Lee Shau Kee (or his associates) was already public knowledge by 14 April 2008, two days before 16 April 2008.  It should be all the more urgent for Mr Koon to demand immediate delivery of the shares so that he could capture as high a profit as possible. As set out above, the price of Sino Union surged from the closing price of HK$1.60 on 14 April 2008 to the peak of HK$2.02 on 23 April 2008, whereafter the trading price started a gradual but inexorable decline.

190.  I am of the view that by the time the price of the shares had started to decline after 23 April 2008, an astute stock investor like Mr Koon would have chased Mr Hui for immediate delivery up of the 250 million shares.  Mr Koon’s failure to do so speaks volumes as to the non-existence of the Oral Agreement.

191.  It is also strange that on Mr Koon’s case, he was content to receive a mere 50,070,000 shares in early June 2008 by which time the price of the shares had already been declining for over a month and had by then lost about 25% of their market value, declining from HK$2.02 on 23 April 2008 to HK$1.50 on 5 June 2008. It fell to HK$0.77 on 3 April 2009. It is inherently improbable that Mr Koon would simply make various oral demands only from June 2008 to March or April 2009 whilst watching the share price of Sino Union drop continuously.

192.  Mr Fung SC submitted that it is incredible that Mr Koon was content with making mere oral demands on Mr Hui for the delivery of the shares.  Mr Koon’s failure to issue any written demand letter or letter before action and failure to commence legal proceedings to recover the 250 million shares again speaks volumes as to the non-existence of the Oral Agreement. I agree.

193.  In my view, what is most damaging to Mr Koon’s case is that he did not chase for the value of the 250 million shares as at 16 April 2008.  He appears to be content with the number of shares irrespective of its market price. This is hardly the normal behaviour of a seasoned businessman. I agree with Mr Fung SC that it is simply unbelievable that Mr Hui and Mr Koon’s relationship remained good despite Mr Hui’s clear default in failing to immediately transfer the 250 million shares to Mr Koon on 16 April 2008, particularly in the light of Mr Koon’s own evidence that he had been making repeated oral demands on Mr Hui for transfer of such shares.

194.  Mr Koon told this Court under cross-examination that his instructions to his legal advisers were all along to claim monetary relief rather than the shares. However, in his Statement of Claim at §§14-15 in HCA 2004/2012 and his Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim at §§32-33, Mr Koon claimed the shares as his primary relief. In Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim at §32, he even went so far as to plead that he “would not be adequately compensated by damages”.

195.  When confronted with such a glaring discrepancy, Mr Koon’s answer was that he had given clear instructions to his legal advisers and had no idea why such instructions were not properly reflected in his pleadings or, more specifically, reflected in a manner directly antithetical to his express instructions. However, these pleadings are all verified by the Statement of Truth signed by Mr Koon himself repeatedly.  This seriously affects his credibility.

196.  In any event, an inescapable fact is that in or about March or April 2009, he demanded for 100 million shares rather than the value of such 100 million shares as at 16 April 2008. In my view, this seriously negates the existence of the Oral Agreement.

197.  Fifthly, I find it hard to fathom Mr Koon’s conduct in that, having engaged “大圈尻Dee” as his agent to collect the 100 million shares from Mr Hui, he did not demand or ask for the outstanding 200 million shares in one go under the Oral Agreement. As reflected in the transcripts of various tape recordings, Mr Koon did not demand such shares in one go:

(1)  In the transcript of the tape recording on 14 May 2009, Mr Hui complained that Mr Koon’s demands were wholly excessive in that, having received 100 million shares, another demand was made for another 100 million shares (“這確實是他媽的太過份了, 原來他們說收一億, 拿了一億, 再加一億, 了不起再加一億”).

(2)  In the transcript of the tape recording of the same afternoon at 5 pm, Mr Hui complained to Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光in the telephone conversation that having received 100 million shares, Mr Koon demanded another 100 million shares, then increased to 300 million shares, now reduced to 170 million shares upon giving face to Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光. (“上一次攞左億到右手啦, 跟住又話再加多1億, 依家又話3億, 咁樣, 跟住依家佢, 當然你出面, 佢依家比面你啦, 就話1 億7千”)

198.  By the time when one has to resort to the involvement of triad society members, one normally does not do it in a piecemeal manner.  I am of the view that if the Oral Agreement existed, it is more likely than not that Mr Koon would have engaged “大圈尻Dee” to collect all outstanding shares pursuant to the Oral Agreement rather than simply collecting from Mr Hui the 100 million shares.  I am therefore also of the view that the conduct of Mr Koon is more consistent with Mr Hui’s case that there was continuous extortion by Mr Koon and/or “大圈尻Dee” rather than the existence of the Oral Agreement.

199.  Sixthly, I find it hard to believe that, if the Oral Agreement had existed, Mr Koon would not have raised it as early as 2009 when he was arrested. In October 2012, Mr Koon, for the first time raised the existence of the Oral Agreement being almost 5 years after 27 December 2007. Such claim was raised for the first time in HCA 2004/2012.

200.  When asked why he did not raise the Oral Agreement earlier, Mr Koon’s answer was that he would like to remain silent in the light of his imminent criminal trial. This is hardly credible because he raised it in 2012 and his criminal trial would not take place till March 2014.

201.  Further, Mr Koon’s explanation based on his decision to remain silent is contradicted by his voluntary disclosure of the Oral Agreement to the Hong Kong Police on 1 December 2011. Yet, in the said statement to the Hong Kong Police, Mr Koon never mentioned the date of the making of the Oral Agreement.

202.  I also note that Mr Koon first asserted that the Oral Agreement was made on 28 December 2007 being the same day when the PSH/CCASS Reports were delivered to him. On 8 May 2015, some 7.5 years later, Mr Koon brought forward the date of the making of the Oral Agreement to 27 December 2007 without any explanation.

203.  I am of the view that if the Oral Agreement really exists, faced with Mr Hui’s claim, there is no good reason as to why Mr Koon did not raise and rely on its full terms and effects at the first available opportunity. Mr Koon’s failure to do so further weakens his case on the Oral Agreement. In particular, I note that:

(1)  After the commencement of the present action on 23 June 2009, Mr Koon remained silent and did not raise the Oral Agreement in his Defence and Counterclaim until almost 6 years later, namely, 8 May 2015.

(2)  Mr Koon’s plea of the Oral Agreement in his Defence and Counterclaim dated 8 May 2015 would have been time-barred (given that, according to his case, the Oral Agreement was made in December 2007) but for his plea of the Oral Agreement in his Statement of Claim in HCA 2004/2012 dated 26 October 2012 which was almost 5 years after the event in question but not technically time-barred,

(3)  Subsequently, HCA 2004/2012 was subsumed (although not technically consolidated) under the present Action pursuant to the suggestion of Anthony Chan J made on 10 May 2017.

(4)  The first time Mr Koon raised the existence of the Oral Agreement was on 1 December 2011 (being 4 years after the event in question) in his statement volunteered to the Hong Kong Police Commercial Crimes Bureau of the same date, even though such allegation did not appear in his pleadings until it surfaced in his Statement of Claim in HCA 2004/2012 on 26 October 2012 (being almost 5 years after the event in question) and his Defence and Counterclaim in the present Action on 8 May 2015.

204.  I also note that in his statement volunteered to the police on 1 December 2011, Mr Koon:-

(1)  Gave no date as to when the Oral Agreement was made;

(2)  Made no mention of Mr Hui’s discovery that Mr Koon had sold on the open market a substantial amount of shares thereby prompting Mr Hui to suggest to Mr Koon that they meet to discuss the matter;

(3)  Stated that the extra 70,000 shares happened to be the amount of extra shares the brokerage firm transferred (“因為他剛好用這數量從股票行出貨”) – percontra his position in the present action that Mr Hui transferred the extra 70,000 shares to him by way of compensation for fees and expenses incurred by the latter in such transfer.

205.  In his Statement of Claim in HCA 2004/2012, Mr Koon:-

(1)  Again made no mention of Mr Hui’s discovery that Mr Koon had sold on the open market a substantial amount of shares thereby prompting Mr Hui to suggest to Mr Koon that they meet to discuss the matter.

(2)  Mr Fung SC submitted that the above appears to be a later invention by Mr Koon made 7 years later and almost 10 years after the event in question as set out in §§23-24 of his witness statement dated 28 July 2017 in the present action.

(3)  Asserted that the Oral Agreement was made on 28 December 2007: see §6 of his Statement of Claim in HCA 2004/12  – per contra Mr Koon’s allegation that the Oral Agreement was made on 27 December 2007 both in his Defence and Counterclaim as well as in his oral testimony at the trial of the present action.

206.  Importantly, it is pleaded in §6(b) of his Statement of Claim in HCA 2004/12 that “[Mr Hui] orally offered to transfer to [Mr Koon] 250,000,000 Shares free of charge if [Mr Koon] bought the Shares up to an equivalent value of HK$200,000,000” (Emphasis added.).  This plea is verified by Mr Koon to be true and accurate. However, according to this plea, the fulfilment of this condition precedent would depend on the price of the shares which would fluctuate from time to time even in the course of a single trading day.

207.  In the present action, Mr Koon changed the plea by asserting that such condition precedent consisted of him spending up to HK$200 million to purchase Sino Union shares on the open market (See Mr Koon’s witness statement at §§26-27; his Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim at §10(6)(f)).

208.  I am of the view the above conduct of Mr Koon does not sit well with the existence of the Oral Agreement.

209.  Seventhly, I am also of the view that the terms of the Oral Agreement as pleaded by Mr Koon do not make any common and commercial sense. According to Mr Koon and he confirmed the same in court that under the Oral Agreement, there is no time limit for him to spend up to HK$200 million to purchase the shares of Sino Union. He could have done it in one month, in one year, in 10 years or even in 20 years. This Court proceeds on the basis that both Mr Hui and Mr Koon are seasoned commercial men. I really cannot see what commercial reasons would prompt Mr Hui to enter into such an oral agreement with Mr Koon pursuant to which Mr Koon could take all the time in the world to spend his HK$200 million to purchase shares of Sino Union. Given the unlimited timeframe, there is really no benefit to Mr Hui in entering such an agreement, not to mention at the costs of 250 million shares.

210.  Further, there is no lock-up period in the Oral Agreement. Mr Koon is free to sell his holding at any point in time and thus could push down the share price of Sino Union at his wishes. There is really no conceivable reason why Mr Hui would have entered into such an agreement given that according to Mr Koon, Mr Hui was then seriously concerned that Mr Koon was selling Sino Union’s shares in the market. It is difficult to fathom as to why Mr Hui would create a bigger problem for himself at the costs of 250 million shares. It just does not make any common and commercial sense. On balance, I do not find it credible that the parties would enter into such a useless agreement.

211.  Mr Chain for Mr Koon submitted that the court can imply into the Oral Agreement terms as to reasonable time to spend the HK$200 million. However, Mr Fung SC is correct that no implied terms have ever been pleaded and no implied terms were put to Mr Hui in cross-examination. In fact, Mr Koon’s evidence is contradictory to an implied term that he had to spend the HK$200 million within a reasonable period of time. I agree that a term would only be implied to give effect to the presumed intention of the parties. (See Marks & Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2016] AC 742, per Lord Neuberger PSC (with whom Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge JJSC agreed) at §15). In the present case, both Mr Koon and Mr Ng’s evidence is that the time for performance of the Oral Agreement could be indefinite. Hence, the Court cannot imply a term to contradict Mr Koon’s intention in relation to the Oral Agreement.

212.  In any event, it is difficult for this Court to imply a lock-up period when the same is absent from the pleaded terms of the Oral Agreement. It is inherently improbable that the parties would have entered into a useless agreement or an agreement which does not make any commercial sense.

213.  Eighthly and importantly, this Court has carefully considered Mr Koon’s evidence including his oral testimony in court. I do not find him to be a credible witness and I find his evidence, on many material factual issues, to be unbelievable. Apart from the analysis set out above,

(1)  First, I find Mr Koon’s evidence that he was a mere acquaintance of “大圈尻Dee”, meeting him only 2-3 times at cocktail receptions over the past 10 years incredible.

(2)  In the transcript of the covert recording of the telephone conversation between Mr Hui and “大圈尻Dee” over the phone at 10:57pm – 11:57pm on 14 May 2009, constituting the prosecution’s unused materials in the criminal trial kept by Mr Koon since at least 2014, “大圈尻Dee” said at §35:-

“35. C [大圈尻Dee]: 嗱,佢[Mr Koon]都係我廿幾年嘅朋友(B [Mr Hui]:喺,喺。),佢亦都幫我咗好多嘢(B:喺,喺,喺。),我哋啲,我哋有好多錢都係揼係佢嗰度㗎…” (emphases added)

(3)  “大圈尻Dee” did not know that his conversation with Mr Hui was being recorded.  There was no reason for him to fabricate any story under such circumstances.

(4)  Hence, I am of the view that Mr Koon’s attempts to distance himself from “大圈尻Dee” severely undermines his credibility.

(5)  Secondly and similarly, it is utterly incredible for Mr Koon to tell this Court that he did not know about the background of “大圈尻Dee” and that he would not have resorted to duress or intimidation in order to obtain 100 million shares from Mr Hui.

(a)  He gave evidence that he paid “大圈尻Dee” 30% of the value of 100 million shares for his services, namely, HK$21 million in cash divided into three bags delivered on three separate days.

(b)  No one would naively paid over such sum of money in cash not knowing what actions “大圈尻Dee” and his gang would take in order to help him to get the 100 million shares from Mr Hui.

(c)  In fact, Mr Koon repeatedly testified in court that at his meeting with “大圈尻Dee” on 29 March 2009, the latter told him that, per “江湖規矩” or the custom of the underworld, a 30% commission or service fee would be charged on monies recovered. Mr Koon agreed and did engage the services of “大圈尻Dee”.

(d)  I find that Mr Koon was not honest with this Court when he said that he had no idea about the background of “大圈尻Dee” and whether he would resort to criminal activities in order to extort the 100 million shares from Mr Hui.

(e)  I further find that Mr Koon knowingly engaged “大圈尻Dee” and his agent to intimidate Mr Hui in order to extort the 100 million shares from him.

(f)  In fact, Mr Chain fairly concedes that Mr Koon did engage “undesirable elements” to obtain the 100 million shares. But he said that it was in response to Mr Hui’s engagement of Shanghai Boy上海仔. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Mr Koon’s evidence on this material issue is incredible.

(g)  I find that on receipt from Mr Hui of the 100 million shares carrying at the material times a market value of about HK$70 million, Mr Koon immediately sold the shares thereby triggering his obligation to pay “大圈尻Dee” HK$21 million.  Further, I find that Mr Koon did pay “大圈尻Dee” HK$21 million by hand-delivering in person three bags of cash on different dates to “大圈尻Dee” in face-to-face meetings (instead of remitting the above sums through bank transfers or writing “大圈尻Dee” a cheque) because he did not want to leave a paper trail for such criminal activities despite the grave risk of losing one or more of three bags of cash or having them stolen.

(h)  The total absence of documentation evidencing the cash payments of HK$21 million is entirely consistent with Mr Koon’s repeated evidence that if he were to commit a crime, he “would not be so stupid as to leave a paper trail”. When asked in cross examination as to whether he knew that “大圈尻Dee” would go to Mr Hui’s Office to collect the shares, Mr Koon’s initial answer was that he had no idea.  This answer is flatly contradicted by Mr Koon’s own witness statement at §49 where he said that “大圈尻Dee” would go to Mr Hui’s Office to collect the shares.

(i)  Mr Koon’s answer is also contradicted by his own evidence given in the criminal trial that “大圈尻Dee” “would enlist friends to go up [to Mr Hui’s Office] to talk to Mr Hui” (“佢會搵朋友上去同佢傾”). When confronted in cross-examination by the above contradiction as between his answer and his evidence in the criminal trial, Mr Koon was driven to concede that “I do not think I have better memory than that day” being the day he gave the above evidence in the criminal trial on 4 March 2014.

(j)  For the above reasons, I have no difficulty in finding that Mr Koon well knew that “大圈尻Dee” would resort to the criminal intimidation of Mr Hui in order to extort the 100 million shares from him.

(6)  Thirdly, Mr Koon’s attempts in the same vein to distance himself from Wu Tsz 胡子 are not credible.  According to Mr Koon, his first encounter with Wu Tsz胡子took place on 24 April 2009.  On 24 April 2009, he met “大圈尻Dee” at the San Diego Hotel in Jordan to engage “大圈尻Dee” to obtain the 100 million shares from Mr Hui.  At the end of Mr Koon’s meeting with “大圈尻Dee”, Wu Tsz 胡子showed up and the three of them proceeded to Mr Hui’s Office.

(7)  It is Mr Koon’s evidence that he did not know why Wu Tsz 胡子showed up. He did not know why “大圈尻Dee” had asked Wu Tsz 胡子to join them. He did not know the role to be played by Wu Tsz 胡子 and he did not ask. I find this hard to believe.

(8)  According to Mr Koon, his second encounter with Wu Tsz胡子took place on 29 April 2009 before the Kimberly Hotel meeting with Mr Hui. I note there is a discrepancy between Mr Koon’s evidence and Mr Ng’s evidence as to where Mr Koon met up with Wu Tsz 胡子. According to Mr Ng, both “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子were already in Mr Koon’s office before Mr Ng joined them to set off for the Kimberly Hotel. According to Mr Koon, only him, Mr Ng and “大圈尻Dee” set off together for the Kimberly Hotel, and Wu Tsz 胡子showed up separately at the Kimberly Hotel.

(9)  I agree that, on balance, the fact that Mr Koon needed not and did not ask why Wu Tsz 胡子was also present at the Kimberly Hotel meant that he well knew that Wu Tsz 胡子was there to offer his assistance to intimidate and coerce Mr Hui into handing over the 100 million shares.

(10)  I find that Mr Koon was not honest with the Court and he had full knowledge that Wu Tsz 胡子was up to no good and was there to render criminal assistance to “大圈尻Dee” in the intimidation of Mr Hui. He knew that Wu Tsz  胡子was another triad gangster enlisted by “大圈尻Dee” to help in intimidating Mr Hui so as to force the latter to hand over the 100 million shares.

(11)  Fourthly, for the Kimberly Hotel lunch on 29 April 2009, it is not in dispute that Mr Koon booked a VIP room for 12 people. When asked why he would book a room for so many people, I do not find his answers credible at all. He said that he expected the lunch to be the usual lunch involving only Mr Ng, Mr Hui and himself, as in the past.  This can hardly sit well with the fact that it was Mr Koon who booked a room for 12. This, I agree, must mean that Mr Koon was expecting more people to attend the lunch meeting including “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子.  He actually took them to lunch. “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子 did not attend the lunch for no particular purpose. On balance, I am of the view that Mr Koon brought along “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子 to the lunch so as to intimidate Mr Hui to give him more shares having already received the benefit of the successful extortion in March or early April 2009.

(12)  Fifthly, I find Mr Koon’s case that somehow on 31 March 2009, having successfully deployed“大圈尻Dee” and his gang to “sort things out” and basically neutralized Shanghai Boy上海仔, nevertheless, he was intimidated and coerced to handover HK$1.5 million in cash as “yum cha” money to Mr Hui so that he could pay Mr Ching (boss of “Chuk Luen Bong” in Taiwan) hardly credible. If Mr Hui were able, with the assistance of Mr Ching and Shanghai Boy上海仔, to coerce Mr Koon, he would not have to transfer the 100 million shares to Mr Koon. Mr Koon has not given any evidence as to what Mr Ching had done in order to deserve HK$1.5 million.

(13)  Mr Koon also said that Mr Hui initially asked for HK$5 million but upon negotiation, he reduced the asking “yum cha” money to HK$1.5 million and said that upon the payment of HK$1.5 million cash, he would give the last batch of 100 million shares under the Oral Agreement to Mr Koon, to which Mr Koon agreed. I find this hardly capable of being believed. I reject Mr Koon’s evidence on this issue. It is incredible that Mr Hui somehow was in a position to demand the HK$5 million and then Mr Koon, the subject of  intimidation, was able to negotiate the “yum cha” money down substantially. Further, it was said that having gone through the episode with “大圈尻Dee”, somehow Mr Hui was able to impose the payment of HK$1.5 million in cash as a condition for the performance of the Oral Agreement. Still further, it was said that somehow, after Mr Hui received the cash of HK$1.5 million, he decided not to transfer the other 100 million shares and waited for another intimidation from “大圈尻Dee”. In my view, these allegations are all very fanciful and incredible.

(14)  It is also not very clear as to whether the HK$1.5 million was intended to pay Mr Ching or Shanghai Boy 上海仔. If the former, as said, Mr Ching appeared to have done nothing to deserve such compensation. If the latter, it should be noted that Shanghai Boy上海仔, having utterly failed to either defend or uphold Mr Hui’s interests, was basically neutralized by “大圈尻Dee” and his gang. There was no logical reason for Mr Hui to demand from Mr Koon any tea money or other fees to compensate Shanghai Boy 上海仔 for services rendered since the latter had completely failed to render any such services. It is simply counter-intuitive that somehow an oppressor had agreed to pay the oppressed.

(15)  Sixthly, I also find it incredible that Mr Hui would have borrowed money from Mr Koon or his company Planetic International Limited, through Pun Tak Hung, Cao Yu and his wife. The loans were borrowed not in the name of Mr Hui, and the same were repaid in full by the borrowers. The fact that Mr Hui signed as a personal guarantor for repayment of the loans does not mean that he was the real borrower. There is simply no evidence to support Mr Koon’s case on this issue.

(16)  In relation to the submission that what Mr Hui said in this trial is different from what he told the police since Mr Hui said at the criminal trial that his cheques has nothing to do with the loans, I accept Mr Fung SC’s submission that Mr Hui made his statement to the Hong Kong Police dated 5 January 2010 to reconstruct events which had occurred two years previously. He did enter an express caveat in Answer 7 in his statement to the Hong Kong Police stating as a matter of fact that he did not have before him the relevant documents regarding the loans and the cheques.

“因為我手頭上無任何文件可以幫我記返起, 可能係開俾曹宇, 亦可能係其他人, 因為我經開過好多支票俾朋友用嚟做借錢擔保用…”

(17)  Seventhly, I also find Mr Koon’s evidence that he had not read Mr Ng’s witness statements incredible. Mr Koon told this Court that it was his decision to call Mr Ng to give evidence first. Nonetheless, he repeatedly told this Court that he had never read Mr Ng’s witness statements. It is simply unbelievable that in deciding whether to call Mr Ng to give evidence first, he would not have considered the evidence of Mr Ng. I note in particular that Mr Ng actually proposed amendments to his witness statement in his examination-in-chief.

(18)  Mr Ng’s witness statement was filed on 25 July 2017.  He further filed his supplemental witness statement on 11 July 2019. It is unbelievable that when preparing his own supplemental witness statement, Mr Koon would not have read the other parties’ prior witness statements or had the contents drawn to his attention by his own legal team. It is even more incredible that in preparation of the present trial, he would not have read the content of Mr Ng’s witness statements. If so, what is the point of calling Mr Ng to give evidence to support his case?

(19)  Eighthly, Mr Koon is not honest with the Court when he gave evidence that he had not seen “大圈尻Dee” since 29 April 2009. I note that “大圈尻Dee” categorically states at §§6-7 of his witness statement that:-

“6. On or about 29th April 2009, I met the 2nd Defendant for the first time at the 1st Defendant’s office… Then, I met the 2nd Defendant again on or about 15th May 2009 at the 1st Defendant’s office.

7. Regarding the 3rd Defendant, the 1st Defendant introduced him to me on or about 15th May 2009 and I had only met him once on that day.” (emphases added)

(20) When confronted during cross-examination at trial with the above witness statement, Mr Koon’s only retort was to say that “大圈尻Dee” lied. However, I agree that there was no reason for “大圈尻Dee” to specifically lie on this issue. I note that when Mr Hui took the witness stand to give his oral evidence, Mr Hui had never made any allegations against any of the defendants in relation to the events taking place on or around 14 May 2009 to 15 May 2009. The assertion of “大圈尻Dee” in his witness statement that Mr Koon introduced Mr Ng and the 3rd Defendant to him on 15 May 2009 was not prompted by anything said by Mr Hui or his witnesses.

(21) I agree with Mr Fung SC’s submission that Mr Koon’s assertion that he did not meet “大圈尻Dee” after 29 April 2009 is a lie. Mr Fung SC also referred this Court to the transcripts of the three telephone recordings made on 14 May 2009 at respectively 1pm, 5pm and 10pm which reveal that a meeting had been arranged for Mr Hui to meet, among others, Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant and “大圈尻Dee” the next day being 15 May 2009 and that Wu Tsz胡子would also be present at such meeting. In the meantime, the Hong Kong Police had organised an undercover sting operation to catch and arrest Mr Koon, Mr Ng, the 3rd Defendant and “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz 胡子red-handed at the Chinese restaurant of the Kowloon Shangri-la Hotel.

(22) Mr Fung SC submitted that in the face of such overwhelming inculpatory evidence set out in the tape recordings, Mr Koon nevertheless attempted to deny in oral testimony at trial any involvement in such proposed meeting. Mr Koon could not however explain away the contents of the tape recordings, save only to repeat that he could not control what the others had said. All these conversations were recorded covertly leaving, therefore, no room for the possibility that Fei Lo Kwong肥佬光, Brother Sung宋大哥and “大圈尻Dee” had to make up any story to frame Mr Koon. I am of the view that there is force in Mr Fung SC’s submission that the preponderance of probability is that Mr Koon met “大圈尻Dee” on the morning of 15 May 2009, whether at the Chinese restaurant at the Kowloon Shangri-la Hotel or elsewhere prior to proceeding to the said hotel at the lunch hour.

(23) Ninthly, I am also of the view that Mr Koon’s evidence that he did not think it necessary to reduce the Oral Agreement into writing is inherently unbelievable, particularly in the light of his being a seasoned businessman. Mr Koon has been continuously involved in various businesses since he started engaging in garment manufacturing business in the 1980s. By the time of making the Oral Agreement, Mr Koon had already been in business for well over two decades.

(24) I find Mr Koon’s evidence that in garment trading, transactions were customarily carried out without any written documentation unpersuasive and simply incredible.

(25) Mr Koon’s case is that there is nothing illegal about the Oral Agreement. That being the case, I find it hard to believe that the parties would not reduce the Oral Agreement into written form. I note that Mr Hui’s transaction with Dr Lee Shau Kee, Mr Zhou etc were all documented.

(26) I also note that Mr Koon’s evidence under cross-examination is that both he and Mr Ng understood that the Share Purchase Agreement was signed to avoid some “grey area in the securities regulations”. If so, it is all the more important that the Oral Agreement should be reduced in writing.

(27) The lack of documentary trail of the Oral Agreement, whether in the form of a written agreement or any foot prints in any form, electronic or otherwise, I agree, is more consistent with the fact that no such Oral Agreement was ever made.

(28) Tenthly, I also find Mr Koon’s evidence that the share price on any given day, or indeed within a certain period, is not a matter of particular concern or significance to him hardly credible. I agree that it is inherently incredible that Mr Koon, being a seasoned trader and speculator and having so much at stake, would not pay close attention to the fluctuating price of the shares of Sino Union on any given trading day. I fully accept that by the time the price of the shares had started to decline after 23 April 2008, any reasonable person standing in the shoes of Mr Koon would have actively chased Mr Hui for the immediate delivery up of the 250 million shares if the Oral Agreement indeed existed.

(29) Finally, Mr Fung SC for Mr Hui submitted that in assessing the credibility of Mr Koon’s evidence, this Court must take into account the fact that Mr Ng gave evidence prior to Mr Koon’s evidence. While Mr Koon (and his counsel) has the prerogative of deciding the order of witnesses, this does not mean that the Court should disregard common sense, in particular the fact that Mr Koon and his personal assistant were present in Court throughout Mr Ng’s evidence and took copious notes resulting in Mr Koon securing for himself a clear tactical advantage of being able to tailor his evidence when it came to his turn to enter the witness box: see HKSAR v Yeung Ka-sing, Carson, DCCC 860/2011, 28 February 2014, Ruling on the defendant’s application to reserve his decision to give evidence until after calling his defence witnesses §54.

(30) A fortiori this must be the case when prior to Mr Koon’s counsel calling Mr Ng to testify first, Mr Hui through counsel had already specifically drawn to Mr Koon’s attention, citing Yeung Ka-sing, Carson, that adopting such an unusual order of witnesses may well adversely impact the credibility of Mr Koon’s evidence. Despite such express warning, Mr Koon nevertheless pressed ahead with calling Mr Ng to testify first thereby accepting, with open eyes, the substantial risk of undermining his own credibility. Accordingly, Mr Koon must bear the full consequences of proceeding in such unorthodox manner.

(31) However, this is a civil trial. Mr Koon and his counsel have the prerogative to decide on the order of his witnesses. This Court duly exercises its judicial functions impartially, independently and professionally. I am of the view that the order of witnesses Mr Koon decides to adopt has no bearing on his credibility and I so rule.

(32) Nonetheless, for all the reasons stated above, I do not find Mr Koon to be a credible and honest witness. He obviously, contrary to his testimony in court, engaged “大圈尻Dee” and his gang to intimidate and coerce Mr Hui to hand over 100 million shares reflecting at the material time an approximate market value of HK$70 million; and he paid “大圈尻Dee” a hefty sum of HK$21 million in cash for his “services”.

214.  Regrettably, I find Mr Koon to be an unreliable and dishonest witness. This has a substantial bearing on this Court’s rejection of his case on the Oral Agreement.

215.  Ninthly, I have no difficulties in finding Mr Ng to be a completely incredible and dishonest witness. Even Mr Koon himself considered Mr Ng’s evidence inaccurate.

(1)  First, although Mr Chain most fairly informed this Court, prior to Mr Ng’s oral testimony, and as confirmed by Mr Koon’s testimony, that he and his instructing solicitors had conducted a few interviews with Mr Ng before he was to give oral evidence, Mr Ng repeatedly lied to this Court by asserting categorically that he had not met any of Mr Koon’s legal team before giving oral evidence.  This is appalling.

(2)  Mr Ng also lied to this Court in saying that he never told Mr Koon or his legal team that he would like to correct the alleged “mistake” in §21 of his witness Statement, but somehow Mr Koon’s counsel just happened to ask him if he had any “corrections” he would like to make to his witness statement. This is a blatant lie. It reveals that Mr Ng wished to conceal his discussions with Mr Koon and his legal team which focused on those parts of Mr Ng’s witness statement which flatly contradict and undermine Mr Koon’s case and which give rise to the need for Mr Ng to change his evidence so as to support Mr Koon’s case. I find that Mr Ng is a hired-gun for Mr Koon.

(3)  Secondly, I find Mr Ng to be dishonest in changing his evidence in order to suit Mr Koon’s case. During his examination-in-chief, Mr Ng sought to amend his witness statement by deleting the last sentence of §21 of his Witness Statement dated 25 July 2017, namely, “I therefore proceeded to prepare an initial simple draft of the Purported Share Purchase Agreement based on the precedent I had.”

(4)  That sentence supports Mr Hui’s case that the draft had been prepared by Mr Ng and undermines not merely Mr Koon’s evidence in the criminal trial of HCCC 66/10 against the Defendants and Wu Tsz胡子but also Mr Koon’s evidence that the draft was prepared by Mr Hui.

(5)  I do not find Mr Ng’s evidence on this issue credible at all:

(a)  He verified his Witness Statement including §21 by signing the Statement of Truth.

(b)  He also stated that §30 of his Witness Statement contained “some mistake” concerning who prepared the draft Share Purchase Agreement, without specifying which sentence was a mistake.  I agree that this is totally unbelievable given that in §30 of his Witness Statement, he emphasised that the contents of the finalised Share Purchase Agreement “contained far more details than the initial draft provided by me”. It is inconceivable that the solicitors preparing his Witness Statement would add such elaboration without his specific instructions and input.

(c)  Further, the Witness Statement is not the only occasion where Mr Ng verified the fact that he had prepared the Share Purchase Agreement. In his Re-Re-Amended Defence at §6(4), he pleaded that “The Purported Share Purchase Agreement was prepared by or caused to be prepared [by] the 2nd Defendant”. §6 of his Re-Re-Amended Defence sets out in clear terms for over 7 years his position as stated in his original Defence dated 17 September 2015. As a matter of fact and history, he verified for four times the truth of his pleaded position.

(d)  Asked when he first discovered this alleged “mistake”, Mr Ng was unable to give any clear answer to this Court except to allege that he discovered this “mistake” during the criminal trial.  If so, there is no reason as to why in both his Re-Re-Amended Defence and his Witness Statement, he verified that he drafted the Share Purchase Agreement.

(e)  Mr Ng’s allegation that he did tell his solicitor Ms Fong but the latter misunderstood him, and/or he did not make himself clear is incredible to say the least. On his evidence, a solicitor would have misunderstood the witness four times in the pleadings and for a fifth time in her client’s Witness Statement. Mr Ng would have verified the truth of the same assertion four times in the pleadings and for a fifth time in his Witness Statement the contents whereof flatly contradict his instructions to his solicitors who are qualified and presumably competent practitioners. This is simply incredible.

(f)  I have no difficulties in finding that Mr Ng has no respect for the truth and did not give his evidence in an honest manner.

(6)  Thirdly, in relation to the Share Purchase Agreement, Mr Ng’s evidence under cross-examination is that both he and Mr Koon understood that the Share Purchase Agreement was signed to avoid some “grey area in the securities regulations”. However, when confronted with his own evidence in his Witness Statement at §22 where he said that Mr Koon was “bemused as to why such arrangement [namely, the signing of the Share Purchase Agreement] was required”, Mr Ng simply could not give any explanation as to this glaring inconsistency, but only rambled about the good relationship between Mr Hui and Mr Koon at the time and no one wishing to talk about the grey area in writing.

(7)  Fourthly, in his oral evidence in relation to the 31 March 2009 lunch meeting at Macau Jockey Club, Mr Ng asserted that Mr Hui asked Mr Ching to leave, and that out of concern for such an old man being asked to leave, he accompanied him out of the room. However, in his Witness Statement at §37, his evidence was that Mr Hui asked both him and Mr Ching to leave.

(8)  When confronted with such inconsistency, Mr Ng told the Court that Mr Hui did not ask him to leave.

(9)  Fifthly, during his cross-examination, Mr Ng said that he did not read either Mr Hui’s or Mr Zhou’s statements made to the Hong Kong Police either in detail or at all. He said that he had no idea of the allegations made in those statements, not even those allegations specifically made against him. He only relied upon his then solicitors to briefly explain the contents of the above statements to him.

(10)  I find this evidence of Mr Ng simply defies belief.  The evidence he gave under cross-examination is contradicted by his own Witness Statement at §§95-96, particularly where he had himself referred verbatim to extensive parts of Mr Hui’s statements made to the Hong Kong Police.

(11)  Further, the criminal prosecution of Mr Ng starting in May 2009 and finishing only with the completion of his trial in March 2014 was a serious matter, with any possible conviction resulting in a very long custodial sentence. It is inherently improbable that Mr Ng would take such light attitude in relation to Mr Hui’s statements made to the Hong Kong Police even if he genuinely believed himself to be innocent.

(12)  Sixthly, I also find Mr Ng’s account of his meeting up with Mr Koon, “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子in Mr Koon’s office before proceeding to the Kimberly Hotel on 29 April 2009 not credible. Mr Ng’s evidence is that that was the first time he had ever met “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子. He said that he was expecting the lunch on 29 April 2009 to be the usual, casual lunch involving only Mr Hui, Mr Koon and himself as in the past. This is contradicted by his own witness statement at §45 where he states categorically his expectation that there would be a total of 8 persons at the lunch.

(13)  It is also Mr Ng’s testimony that, upon seeing “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子in Mr Koon’s office (which, according to Mr Ng, was the first time he had ever met “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子), nonetheless, he never inquired what these strangers were doing there. Subsequently, he proceeded to the Kimberly Hotel with Mr Koon accompanied by “大圈尻Dee” and Wu Tsz胡子; still he never asked why the latter two were also coming along to the supposed “casual, usual lunch” involving only Mr Koon, Mr Hui and himself. I find this hardly believable.

(14)  Seventhly, in his oral evidence regarding the 29 April 2009 Kimberly Hotel lunch, Mr Ng said that Mr Hui offered to transfer 50 million shares outright to Mr Koon on condition that Mr Koon would thereafter acquire a further 50 million shares to push up the stock price on the market. Mr Fung SC is right that such oral testimony is contradicted by his own witness statement at §47 where Mr Ng made no mention of any offer by Mr Hui to transfer 50 million shares to Mr Koon at all.

(15)  Eighthly, Mr Ng asserted in his witness statement at §§66 and  87 that Guo’s account and Xie’s account were ultimately beneficially owned by Mr Hui. However, such assertion is contradicted by his own admission that he and his staff at Cheer Union had done due diligence and were satisfied that the investment money for the Guo and Xie accounts came from Guo and Xie personally.

(16)  Mr Ng also conceded during his oral testimony at trial that he did not challenge what Xie had told the Hong Kong Police in his statement made on 21 January 2010 that he made the share purchase in question on the advice of the general manager of a Central Government controlled SOE (央企), namely, Huaheng Petroleum (华橫石油) which, according to Mr Hui’s evidence, Xie joined in July 2006 as senior manager.

(17)  Mr Fung SC also referred this Court to the Account Opening Forms signed by respectively Guo and Xie, each of them declared that he was “the ultimate beneficial owner of the account and had absolutely not been used by any third party as their agent to undergo any transactions using such account” (“本人乃上述戶口之最終受益人及最終風險承擔人,絕無利用或被他人利用本人名義作為第三者之代理人,以從事上述戶口買賣的交易活動”).

(18)  Ninthly, while Mr Ng accepted and was well aware that he was under a legal obligation to verify that the source of funds paid into and held in the various accounts maintained with Cheer Union came from the account holder so as to comply with anti-money laundering requirements, he conceded that he knew “大圈尻Dee” had paid money into Mr Koon’s account maintained with Cheer Union for the purpose of joint stock investment, but took no steps to reject such funds or to report the matter to the SFC or to ask Mr Koon to take immediate remedial action.

(19)  The fact that “大圈尻Dee” paid money into Mr Koon’s account maintained with Cheer Union for the purpose of joint stock investment gives credence to the statement by “大圈尻Dee” that he “pumped” money into Mr Koon’s account and lost money. This evidence corroborates Mr Hui’s case that Mr Koon and “大圈尻Dee” considered him liable for their investment loss to the tune of about HK$70 million in March or April 2009.

(20)  Tenthly, on his first day giving testimony in the witness box, Mr Ng asserted that he suffered a stroke in 2008 leading to brain damage and memory impairment; such memory impairment had recently seriously worsened; and he could produce medical reports to substantiate the same.

(21)  This Court gave special leave to Mr Koon’s legal team to approach Mr Ng to obtain such medical reports. However, Mr Chain, leading counsel for Mr Koon fairly informed this court that Mr Ng supplied the name of a doctor in Central Building to substantiate his brain damage, but such doctor declined to attend Court saying that that he had been consulted merely to treat Mr Ng’s hernia.  I agree that absent any medical evidence, the correct approach is for this Court to simply ignore Mr Ng’s assertion about his memory impairment (See Lee Cheung Ching v Lok Hsiao Pei, John, HCA 978/04, 17 March 2008 at §63 per Deputy High Court Judge L Chan (as he then was)).

(22)  I also take note that after the Court’s inquiry into the matter as outlined above, Mr Ng no longer repeated his story of brain damage. In fact, he gave evidence in a coherent manner.

216.  I find as a matter of fact that Mr Ng is not an impartial and independent witness. He gave incredible evidence in order to bolster Mr Koon’s case. He applied to commence private prosecutions against Xie and Guo and a series of judicial review applications when his application failed. He appealed all the way to the Court of Appeal. I agree that there is no doubt that the legal costs incurred were substantial. But incredibly, Mr Ng said that he had no idea how much legal costs he had incurred.  Mr Fung SC submitted that it is no mere coincidence that Mr Koon also commenced a series of private prosecutions against Mr Hui.

217.  Further, Mr Ng told this Court that when he was arrested for intimidation back in June 2009, it was Mr Koon who “put up the bail money of HK$1.5 million” for him.  Mr Koon did not deny Mr Ng’s evidence on this issue, but simply said that his memory was blurred as to whether he lent or put up the bail money for Mr Ng.

218.  Mr Ng’s evidence is so incredible that even Mr Koon under cross-examination expressly invited this Court to disregard, if not ignore, Mr Ng’s evidence saying that “You have to bear with him as he is over 80 years old.  He may have mixed up his recollections.”

219.  Regrettably, I find Mr Ng to be an unreliable and dishonest witness. This also adversely impacts on this Court’s assessment of the credibility of the Oral Agreement.

220.  In view of the above evidence, Mr Chain for Mr Koon admirably submitted that the Court should look at all the objective  and subsequent acts which are all one-sided and are only consistent with, and point to the existence of the Oral Agreement. First, amongst all the disputed facts, there is one objective fact which stands out and is or cannot be disputed, namely, that between 28 December 2007 and 16 April 2008, Mr Koon paid over HK$185 million to acquire a total of about 120 million shares in Sino Union, which is a 3rd or 4th liner. The purchases are fully documented. It is submitted this act on Mr Koon’s part is inexplicable without the Oral Agreement, and it points strongly to the existence of the Oral Agreement. I disagree. As analysed above, the pattern of Mr Koon’s trading in Sino Union’s share was perfectly consistent with a seasoned stock operator who invested on “good news” for the purpose of making a big killing in the market. It is not unusual for such operations to take place amongst 3rd or 4th liners. In fact, just on the two days after the release of the information relating to Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment, Mr Koon spent about HK$80 million in accumulating shares of Sino Union, no doubt, with the expectation to make a big killing. The same applies to Sino Union’s announcement of its 2007 Interim Results. I am of the view that this Court cannot infer from Mr Koon’s purchase of a very substantial amount of Sino Union shares that the Oral Agreement exists.

221.  Secondly, as I analysed above, Mr Chain relied heavily on the transfer of the 50.07 million shares from Xie and Guo to Chan Kuok Keong and the 3rd Defendant. I have to say that I was impressed with this submission initially. However, given Mr Ng’s evidence that he and his staff had carried out due diligence and were satisfied that the shares in the accounts of Xie and Guo belonged to them beneficially, as analysed above, this Court cannot make its findings based on speculations. I make the finding that Mr Koon has failed to discharge his burden of proof that, on balance of probabilities, the 50.07 million shares were indeed delivered to Mr Koon’s nominees on the instructions of Mr Hui.

222.  Mr Chain submitted that even if the 50.07 million shares were not beneficially owned by Mr Hui, it could still be possible for Mr Hui to direct Mr Ng to withdraw the shares and hand over the same to Mr Koon’s nominees. Given that I find both Mr Koon and Mr Ng to be unreliable witnesses, and the evidence relied on by Mr Koon on this issue is purely his and Mr Ng’s account of events, I find it hard to accept this submission. Xie and Guo might or might not have answers to Mr Chain’s queries. However, as a matter of principle, I cannot rule that simply because certain queries may be answered at this stage (e.g. why Xie and Guo had not checked their monthly statements, why they had not reported to the Hong Kong Police earlier, why they have not proceeded with their civil actions and the fact that Mr Hui’s employees were authorized to operate Xie and Guo’s accounts etc.), therefore, on balance, Mr Hui had instructed Mr Ng to withdraw the 50.07 million shares from their accounts and delivered the same to Mr Koon’s nominees.

223.  Further, I do not find it fair to label Xie and Guo as “invisible witnesses”. The transfer of the 50.07 million shares as part performance of the Oral Agreement is an allegation raised by Mr Koon. In civil cases, whoever asserts a positive case carries the burden of proof. This is an issue raised by Mr Koon. His failure to discharge his burden of proof in fact tends to show that the Oral Agreement never exists.

224.  Thirdly, Mr Chain submitted that if the Court rejects Mr Hui’s case of duress, the subsequent act of the transfer of the 100 million shares becomes the best evidence to prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. As a matter of logic, I agree with Mr Chain’s analysis. But as I have no doubt and found that the transfer of the 100 million shares was the result of duress, coercion and intimidation by Mr Koon’s agent, “大圈尻Dee” and his gang, this negates rather than confirms the existence of the Oral Agreement.

225.  Fourthly, Mr Chain submitted that all the objective evidence plainly establishes that Mr Zhou did not own or “lend” the 100 million shares to Mr Hui. I disagree. The sale of a total of 250 million shares to Mr Zhou was publicly announced. The authenticity of the receipt of the 100 million shares issued by Mr Zhou is not challenged.

226.  Mr Chain also submitted that Mr Hui’s explanation for his borrowing of 100 million shares from Mr Zhou, namely, he had to borrow from Mr Zhou as Mr Koon demanded 100 million shares and it was impossible to purchase 100 million shares on the market without affecting the price, incredible. When the Court followed up and asked “Is it your evidence now that if one is to purchase 100 million shares in the open market, the share price would rise significantly to $3?”, Mr Hui answered “Yes, if the purchase was to be completed within one day.” Mr Hui said the same during the criminal trial. Mr Chain queried and submitted that the above explanation does not explain why Mr Hui did not at least try or offer to pay cash. I am unable to accept the submission. The answer to Mr Chain’s query is simply that Mr Koon demanded the 100 million shares to be delivered within a short period of time. It is difficult to purchase so many shares from the market within a short time and an announcement of a sale by the majority shareholder would inevitably affect Sino Union’s share price. In any event, it is easy with the benefit of hindsight to suggest that Mr Hui could have bargained with Mr Koon.

227.  I accept Mr Fung SC’s submission that the evidence which emerged at trial shows that both Mr Hui and Mr Koon, being seasoned market traders and speculators, appreciated that shares as opposed to cash would be a lot more useful to Mr Koon, whether for the reason that such shares could be used to short the stock and even enable, with margin calls, the takeover of the company on the cheap.

228.  I appreciate that the evidence also shows that the reality faced by Mr Hui at the material time was that “大圈尻Dee” and his gang of triads had intimidated him at his office, and the following day, Mr Koon and Mr Ng appeared at Mr Hui’s Office to threaten harm to Mr Hui and members of Mr Hui’s family if the shares were not transferred to Mr Koon as demanded.

229.  The criticism of Mr Hui’s apparent failure to bargain or negotiate down the demands of Mr Koon, Mr Ng and D1, D2 and “大圈尻Dee” has to be viewed in the above context and reality and Mr Hui’s compelling need under immense pressure to protect himself and his family.

230.  Mr Chain also submitted that it must be a spectacular coincidence that after the transfer, Mr Zhou then approached none other than Mr Ng to open an account, and to deposit, not 250 million shares, but exactly 100 million shares. There is no conceivable reason why Mr Zhou would want to deal with (in this instance only to have the shares transferred into his name) the 100 million shares separately, and it must be another remarkable coincidence that Mr Zhou happened to ask Mr Ng to deal with exactly 100 (not 50, not 150) million shares, the exact quantity Mr Hui later asked for.

231.  I accept that there is force in Mr Chain’s submission on this point. There is coincidence. The question is how far one can go from this coincidence to make a factual finding as requested by Mr Chain. In view of all the evidence I have considered and for all the reasons I have discussed above, it is unsafe for this Court to jump from this happenstance or coincidence to the conclusion that the transfer of the 100 million shares from Mr Zhou and its preparatory steps are proof on a balance of probabilities of the existence of the Oral Agreement.

232.  Mr Chain very powerfully and skilfully submitted that if this Court finds that Mr Hui had voluntarily agreed to transfer the 100 million shares to Mr Koon (hence the arrangement with Mr Zhou on or around 16 March 2009 well before the alleged duress, intimidation and coercion), then this Court should find that it was because Mr Hui reneged on his promise by engaging Shanghai Boy上海仔 that Mr Koon had to engage “大圈尻Dee” to neutralize him. Such facts thus proved the existence of the Oral Agreement.

233.  Mr Fung SC submitted that such submissions must be rejected since the same amount to speculation masquerading as submissions by competent and experienced counsel unsupported by an iota of evidence. Such speculations were never explored, let alone established as truth by Mr Chain, at trial. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the sale to Mr Zhou by way of the Sukapeak Agreement involving 250 million shares was made known to the public including Mr Koon by the shareholding disclosures dated 16 March 2009.

234.  I am of the clear view that this Court cannot jump from such coincidences to the conclusion that the Oral Agreement exists and that Mr Zhou’s deposit of 100 million shares into Cheer Union’s account was a voluntary preparatory step to perform the Oral Agreement. There are many possibilities. It could well be that the truth is Mr Koon did hold Mr Hui responsible for his trading losses and Mr Hui initially agreed to make good such trading losses and thereafter he decided that he in fact should not be responsible. He might even have engaged Shanghai Boy 上海仔. All these are speculations. But these speculations and coincidences, in my view, could not prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. I am keenly aware of the fact that these speculations are not the parties’ cases. I have carefully considered Mr Chain’s submissions, but, on the existing evidence, I have come to the finding that the Oral Agreement never existed and the 100 million shares were transferred as a result of the duress, coercion and intimidation of “大圈尻Dee” and his gang, qua agent of Mr Koon. I am of the view that it is not proper and right for this Court to jump to the conclusion that because of such coincidences, the Oral Agreement must exist. I also note that as a matter of fact, quite a number of Mr Hui’s friends did open accounts with Cheer Union. This Court has to proceed on cogent evidence and not speculations.

235.  For the avoidance of doubt, on balance, I find that Mr Hui has proved that he did pay Mr Zhou for the 100 million shares. The receipt signed by Mr Zhou on 28 May 2009 does acknowledge Mr Zhou’s receipt of 24 payments from Mr Hui totalling the RMB equivalent of HK$135 million.  There is no challenge to the authenticity of this document. It is also inherently improbable that Mr Zhou would have simply gifted 100 million shares to Mr Hui. Insofar as the suggestion that Mr Zhou was the nominee of Mr Hui is concerned, there is no evidence to prove the same.

236.  In relation to Mr Chain’s submission that as a matter of record, there is nothing to show Mr Zhou has dealt with the remaining 150 million shares, I am of the view that there is no need for this Court to resolve whether in view of the profit guarantee under the Sukapeak Agreement, it is credible that Mr Zhou had sold them in the market. As Mr Fung SC rightly submitted the profit guarantee under the Sunkapeak Agreement may not be sufficiently commercially attractive since such guarantee was conditional upon a 6-month lockup period. There is no need for this Court to speculate on the reason or reasons underlying the sale at a loss.  It is a fact of commercial life that multifarious reasons arise in the business world from day-to-day such as liquidity issues or Mr Zhou encountering better alternative investments etc.

237.  Fifthly, in relation to the sale of 63.5 million shares to Mr Chan Ping Che (Chemay Inc.), Mr Koon’s case is that on 16 April 2008, when Mr Koon told Mr Hui that Mr Koon has completed the purchase obligation under the Oral Agreement, Mr Hui then asked Mr Koon to sell 63.5 million shares to Mr Hui’s friend, Mr Chan Ping Che, at HK$1.2 per share. The then market price was about HK$1.8 per share. Mr Hui assured Mr Koon that Mr Koon would not suffer any financial loss because Mr Hui would pay the difference between HK$1.8 and HK$1.2 per share to Mr Koon in cash. Mr Hui also told Mr Koon that Mr Hui would instruct the security trading company Cheer Union and Mr Ng to handle the sale.

238.  Mr Hui arranged Mr Chan Ping Che’s solely owned company, Chemay Inc., to purchase the 63.5 million shares at HK$1.2 per share on 17 April 2008 and 18 April 2008. The purchase price of 63.5 million shares x HK$1.2 per share = HK$76.2 million (with transaction expenses deducted) was paid to Mr Koon through the security company. Mr Hui paid the balance in a total sum of 63.5 million shares x HK$0.6 per share = HK$38.1 million, in cash, to Mr Koon on several occasions. Mr Koon had used some of the cash received and he deposited a total sum of HK$22.65 million into his bank account.

239.  It is submitted that Mr Koon’s agreeing to Mr Hui’s request to sell 63.5 million shares shows that Mr Koon had no special interest in the shares. More importantly, the sale was at HK$1.2 per share on paper when the market price in mid-April 2008 was about HK$1.8 per share. As a matter of fact, on the two previous trading days, namely, 15 April 2008 and 16 April 2008, Mr Koon purchased a total of 45.39 million shares at HK$1.8 or HK$1.81 per share. The sale to Chemay Inc., on paper, would suggest Mr Koon would suffer a loss of HK$63.5 million shares x HK$0.60 per share = HK$38.1 million. But for Mr Hui’s instructions, it is inconceivable that Mr Koon would do so. Mr Koon explained that he did not know Mr Chan Ping Che or Chemay Inc. and he did not contact or speak to Mr Chan Ping Che about the sale of 63.5 million shares, and the sale was requested by Mr Hui.

240.  When Mr Hui was asked about the matter during cross-examination, he agreed that Mr Chan Ping Che had no business dealing with Mr Koon and Mr Chan had nothing to do with Mr Koon. Mr Hui said that when he read Mr Koon’s supplemental witness statement dated 11 July 2019, he asked Mr Chan what happened and Mr Chan told Mr Hui that it was Mr Ng who asked Mr Chan if Mr Chan was interested in buying the 63.5 million shares, because “someone” was trading on margin and suffered huge loss of more than HK$39 million and was at the risk of 斬倉 (forced sale) and that “someone” was in urgent need to sell 63.5 million shares to raise cash. Mr Hui said he was further told by Mr Chan that Mr Ng said Mr Chan could buy the 63.5 million shares at HK$1.2 per share, albeit the then market price was about HK$1.8, if Mr Chan could pay by a cash cheque. Mr Hui was told by Mr Chan that Mr Chan agreed to Mr Ng’s proposal. Mr Hui was told by Mr Chan that Mr Chan never met or talked with Mr Koon in respect of the matter. Mr Hui finally said Mr Chan was very happy because the share price rose to more than HK$2 on the following trading day (that was 23 April 2008, the market close price was HK$2.02 per share and Mr Chan earned very good profits of HK$63.5 million shares x (HK$2 – HK$1.2) per share = HK$50.8 million in just a few days.

241.  Mr Chain submitted that all of these were only revealed when Mr Hui was cross-examined. Mr Hui did not call Mr Chan as a witness and has not even tried to obtain a witness statement. When being asked by the Court why Mr Hui did not tell what he was told by Mr Chan and the matters summarised above in Mr Hui’s supplemental witness statement dated 13 February 2020, which was in reply to Mr Koon’s supplemental witness statement dated 11 September 2019, Mr Hui did not give any direct answer but merely said “I deny what Koon has said is the truth.”

242.  Mr Chain further submitted that there is no evidence that Mr Koon traded on margin, suffered huge loss of more than HK$39 million, was at the risk of 斬倉 (forced sale), and was in urgent need to sell 63.5 million shares. Mr Koon’s trading record shows that after Mr Koon had sold 63.5 million shares to Mr Chan (Chemay Inc.) on 17 April 2008 and 18 April 2008, Mr Koon slowly and gradually sold the remaining shares that he was holding over a long period of 8 months until 22 December 2008. Mr Koon was not in urgent need to sell his shares. There is no valid reason that Mr Koon should agree to sell 63.5 million shares to Chan at a loss of HK$38.1 million.

243.  Indeed, after 18 April 2008, apart from switching his shares from one account to another account, not only that Koon did not sell any shares urgently, he actually purchased a further 4.95 million shares on 29 April 2008. Mr Chain thus submitted that this sale of 63.5 million shares to Mr Chan Ping Che (Chemay Inc.), on 17 April 2008 and 18 April 2008, provides solid evidence to prove (1) the existence of the Oral Agreement, (2) Mr Koon has told Mr Hui that Mr Koon has completed his obligation under the Oral Agreement of spending no less than HK$200 million to purchase Sino Union shares by 16 April 2008, and (3) Mr Hui took no issue with that.

244.  However, apart from the evidence of Mr Koon and Mr Ng as to which this Court has reservations, a key evidential issue is the absence of any evidential proof of the payment of HK$38.1 million in cash by Mr Hui to Mr Koon. Had there been such evidence, I agree with Mr Chain that this would be a powerful piece of objective fact to prove the existence of the Oral Agreement. However, there is none. Mr Fung SC is right that there is not an iota of evidence supporting such alleged cash payments. There are no particulars whatsoever as to how, when and/or by how many instalments Mr Hui allegedly made such cash payments to Mr Koon. No receipt or receipts have ever been produced by Mr Koon of any such alleged cash payments totalling such an extraordinary large amount of money. There is also no allegation that there is something illegal or shabby about this transaction with Mr Chan. I find it hard to believe that for a transaction of such magnitude, there is again the absence of any documentary trail.

245.  I also agree that it is unthinkable and simply unbelievable that Mr Hui would have parted with such a large amount of cash without requiring a single receipt from Mr Koon evidencing such payments.

246.  I also note that the alleged HK$22.65 million cash receipts in Mr Koon’s bank accounts cannot, as a matter of evidence, be proved to have been deposited by Mr Hui.

247.  As to Mr Chain’s submission that but for the Oral Agreement, some of the conduct of Mr Koon could not be explained, I am of the view that on the facts of the present case, that is not a proper and safe way of finding out what the facts are. For example, it is Mr Koon’s evidence that after the release of the news concerning Dr Lee Shau Kee’s investment, the share price of Sino Union did not increase, in particular, given the volume of his own purchases. He gave evidence that he then realized that some entities must be unloading the shares of Sino Union at the material time. Given that he was then holding a very substantial volume of Sino Union, a 3rd or 4th liner, it is not surprising that he would have Mr Ng to find investors to unload part of his shares. As a matter of fact, up to March or April 2009, he suffered a total loss of about HK$79 million.

248.  I agree that it would have been better if Mr Hui had solicited Mr Chan to give evidence to this Court. But I also bear in mind that the burden of proof on this issue rests with Mr Koon. Base on the evidence, in particular, the absence of proof, documentary or otherwise, of the payment of HK$38.1 million cash by Mr Hui to Mr Koon, and the incredibility of Mr Koon and Mr Ng’s evidence, I have to return a value of zero to Mr Koon’s case on this factual issue.

249.  I also agree with Mr Fung SC’s submission that the sale, being a bilateral transaction between Mr Koon and Mr Chan Ping Che, cannot ipso facto constitute evidence of the Oral Agreement between Mr Hui and Mr Koon. Mr Koon’s suggestion that he would not have sold such shares but for Mr Hui’s direction is a circular argument since Mr Koon must first prove by cogent and compelling evidence that he did so at Mr Hui’s direction.  I agree that Mr Koon has failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of Mr Hui’s direction.

250.  Sixthly, Mr Chain relies on the provision of daily CCASS Participating Shareholding Reports (“PSH Reports) of Sino Union which would show the updated holding of the shares by the traders.

251.  Mr Koon said that under the Oral Agreement, Mr Hui provided to him the daily PSH reports of Sino Union and that Koon received a total of 23 such reports, a total of 322 pages, from Mr Hui and/or Mr Tsang Kwok Man (“Mr Tsang”); the first report was dated 28 December 2007. Mr Hui denied Mr Koon’s evidence during this trial as well as in the criminal trial. Mr Hui said the reports were available to the public and on the internet. This is not correct. Mr Hui tried hard to distance himself from those reports. Mr Hui said in this trial “I do not know where they (the reports) come from.”

252.  Mr Tsang accepted he was familiar with the reports as he was an executive director of Sino Union. Initially he said anybody could get and obtain such reports, and these reports were available on the internet, the ET Net. Subsequently, when faced with a Hong Kong Stock Exchange document, he agreed that the reports were not available to anyone in the public but said “These (PSH) reports were not asked by me.”

253.  However, when Mr Tsang was referred to two of the PSH reports where it was stated “Attn. : Mr. Patrick Tsang Kwok Man” (indeed all the 23 reports were issued and Attn. : Mr. Patrick Tsang Kwok Man), and when it was put to Tsang “These reports were generated and supplied to you at your request”, his answer was “Did it say so?”

254.  When Mr Tsang was then referred to the statement of the HKEX officer, in particular para. 11 thereof, his answer was “I do not recall I have applied for and obtained the reports. Do you have the e-mail that I sent out (to apply for the reports)?” It is recalled that a fee of $500 was paid for each of the 23 PSH reports. When the matter was put to Mr Tsang again, he answered “I do not recall I have requested for the reports” and “I do not recall what I did with those reports”.

255.  I accept that both Mr Hui and Mr Tsang were not telling the Court the truth in relation to this issue. However, I remind myself that a witness may lie in a misguided attempt to bolster his case, but the actual case nevertheless remains good irrespective of the lie. Mr Chain submitted the provision of the 23 PSH reports is strong evidence that Mr Hui has made the Oral Agreement with Mr Koon on 27 December 2007. Mr Fung SC submitted otherwise. He submitted that it was Mr Koon’s own evidence or admission under cross-examination that the PSH/CCASS Reports were of “no use” to him in implementing the Oral Agreement. Mr Koon agreed that the CCASS reports are of no use to anyone unless there is only one buyer and only one seller and they did not tell you anything but just consolidated numbers of daily trading.

256.  I am of the view that given the fact that Mr Koon was then a substantial shareholder of Sino Union, even if the PSH/CCASS Reports were supplied to him by Mr Hui and/or Mr Tsang, that very act itself does not, ipso facto, proves the existence of the Oral Agreement. It is not even Mr Koon’s pleaded case that the provision of the PSH/CCASS Reports is a term of the Oral Agreement.

257.  Seventhly, Mr Chain submitted that Mr Koon could not have come up to Mr Hui’s Office on 1 March 2009. Mr Hui’s case is that he first met Mr Koon in dinner in early 2007 and the two of them had several meals afterwards in 2007, which were no more than usual social gathering and Mr Ng was present in most of those meals. Mr Hui did not say there was any contact, business dealing or social get-together with Mr Koon and/or Mr Ng in the entire year of 2008. Then, entirely out of the blue, in early March 2009 (not specifying the exact date and time), Mr Koon came to Mr Hui’s Office to ask to “borrow” 100 million Sino Union shares because Mr Koon was facing serious financial difficulty. Mr Hui elaborated during this trial that Mr Koon said he suffered huge loss as a result of security trading and the residential flat of Mr Koon’s mother had been taken possession of by the mortgagee bank. Mr Hui said Mr Koon did not say the loss was the result of trading of Sino Union shares, but Mr Hui said in the criminal trial that Mr Koon said he suffered loss as a result of trading of Sino Union shares.

258.  Mr Chain submitted that Mr Hui’s allegation about Mr Koon’s visit in early March 2009 is just untrue and impossible. On Mr Hui’s case, Mr Koon, for no apparent reason, suddenly came to Mr Hui’s office. Hui testified in this trial that he and Mr Koon were not close friends and they had met only a few times. Mr Hui did not ask Mr Koon and Mr Koon did not tell Mr Hui why Mr Koon chose to come to Mr Hui for financial assistance. Mr Chain submitted that:

“Hui’s submission (theory) is that Koon suffered a loss of $70 million for trading in Sino Union shares between August 2007 and December 2008, and Koon just (presumably on a day in late February 2009) sat down and calculated his loss, and for no conceivable reason (and none is suggested), decided to “hold Hui accountable”, and then made an almost inexplicable unannounced/unarranged visit to Hui at his office on a Sunday morning to ask for a “loan” of 100 million shares which at the then market price would about cover his loss!”

259.  This Court has similar questions at the beginning of the trial. However, as evidence revealed including the transcripts of the three tape recordings, it becomes clear that as in March 2009, Mr Koon (together with “大圈尻Dee”) did suffer substantial loss in their trading in Sino Union shares. For reasons this Court was not informed about and best known to the parties, it does appear that Mr Koon and “大圈尻Dee” held Mr Hui personally accountable for their losses.

260.  Indeed, it is Mr Koon’s own evidence that on 24 April 2009, he, “大圈尻Dee”, and Wu Tsz胡子turned up at Mr Hui’s Office unannounced and uninvited demanding to see Mr Hui but, on being told that Mr Hui was not in Hong Kong, the three of them left. This is consistent with Mr Koon turning up uninvited on 1 March 2009 to seek compensation from Mr Hui.

261.  Mr Chain relied heavily on Mr Hui’s mistaken recollection of the exact date and time of Mr Koon’s unannounced and uninvited meeting in early March 2009. He referred to his shift of evidence on this part during the criminal trial and his change of evidence to 1 March 2009 (a Sunday). It is submitted that if Mr Koon really came on 1 March 2009 (a Sunday), in the morning, when Mr Hui was busy working in the office and preparing to leave Hong Kong for Beijing for the Two Sessions in the afternoon, Mr Hui certainly would have remembered that and told the police of the precise date and time when Mr Hui made the first police statement on 13 May 2009.

262.  However, I agree with Mr Fung SC that a trial is not a memory test. A fortiori this must be the case where the material events took place 5 years before the criminal trial in 2014 and 13 years before the present trial. What is material is that:-

(1)  Mr Koon did turn up unannounced at Mr Hui’s Office in March 2009 asking for 100 million shares, a demand which Mr Hui rejected outright.

(2)  Shortly thereafter, in mid-to-late March 2009, “大圈尻Dee” and his gang turned up unannounced at Mr Hui’s Office to intimidate Mr Hui and coerce him into handing over the 100 million shares, and spat out a clear warning to Mr Hui in a very loud and aggressive manner not to report the matter to the police, otherwise “大圈尻Dee” and his gang would burn down Mr Hui’s Office.

(3)  On the very next day, Mr Koon and Mr Ng turned up unannounced at Mr Hui’s Office and specifically reminded Mr Hui of “大圈尻Dee” and his gang’s visit the day before, Mr Koon threatening Mr Hui that if he failed to hand over the 100 million shares, Mr Hui’s life would be endangered or Mr Hui would at the very least suffer grievous bodily harm.

(4)  Thereafter, Mr Hui caused Mr Zhou to transfer 100 million shares to the 3rd Defendant at Mr Koon’s specific direction.

263.  As Mr Chain submitted that this event could only have happened on 1 March 2009, I find that as a matter of fact it did happen in the way as described by Mr Hui. I find his evidence on this aspect credible.

264.  Eighthly, it is reasonable for Mr Chain to submit that it does not make common sense that a criminal blackmails and demands for 100 million shares but not HK$100 million cash or money. Indeed, this Court raised this issue at the beginning of the trial. This Court was puzzled as to:

“Why would a criminal, who has suffered huge loss in stock trading and was in urgent need of money, blackmail and demand a victim to give 100 million shares but not $100 million money, in cash or by cheque? Why shares but not cash?”

265.  However, having heard the evidence, it appears to this Court that, for whatever reasons, indeed “大圈尻Dee” and his gang did demand for up to 300 million Sino Union shares and not cash. This is a fact. “大圈尻Dee” simply asked Mr Hui, as the majority shareholder, to print more shares to help his friends.

266.  Mr Hui testified that he surmised that the advantage accruing to Mr Koon demanding shares instead of cash is that he could short-sell the shares to make a market killing or simply dump the shares to depress the stock price thereby triggering margin calls on all holders of margin accounts including Mr Hui, which would in turn lead to the liquidation of such margin accounts in a rapidly falling market, thereby enabling Mr Koon to acquire the shares at depressed prices leading ultimately to the acquisition of control of Sino Union by Mr Koon.

267.  It is correct that Mr Hui did not tell the Hong Kong Police about his conjectures as to why Mr Koon demanded shares instead of cash. However, I am of the view that his failure to do so and/or the reasonableness of his conjectures do not materially alter the Court’s assessment of whether illegitimate demands for shares of Sino Union were made or not. Plainly, they were made by Mr Koon and his agent “大圈尻Dee”.

268.  Ninthly, on the Share Purchase Agreement, I find that the draft came from Mr Ng, no doubt on the instructions of Mr Koon. Indeed, the very existence of the Share Purchase Agreement tends to negate the Oral Agreement. If the Oral Agreement exists, there was no need to dress up the transfer of the 100 million shares as a share purchase agreement between Mr Zhou and Mr Koon’s nominee.

269.  I also note that in the Share Purchase Agreement, there was a 3-month lock-up period provision. This gives credence to Mr Hui’s evidence that he was worried about the transfer of 100 million shares to Mr Koon who might have dumped the same in the open market and thus adversely affected its share price. In response, Mr Koon offered that he would not sell the said shares for a period of 3-month. Mr Ng also offered himself to be a guarantor for such an obligation. In my view, this explains why the parties came up with the Share Purchase Agreement. According to Mr Ng’s evidence, the parties did spend time on revising and finalizing the terms of the Share Purchase Agreement. If the Share Purchase Agreement was a mere formality and a sham, the lock-up period and the guarantee by Mr Ng would not be necessary. According to Mr Ng’s evidence, time was spent to amend the tripartite agreement and he had to come back the next day. If it were a mere formality, it is difficult to understand why the parties needed to spend so much time on it. As it turned out, Mr Koon sold all the 100 million shares almost immediately instead of observing his obligations pursuant to the lock-up period provision.

270.  The Share Purchase Agreement also shows that there were no difficulties if the parties would like to record their agreements in written form. I find it inherently improbable that according to Mr Koon’s case, Mr Hui had to dress up the 100 million shares transfer as a sale and purchase agreement, but he was perfectly comfortable to transfer 50.07 million shares to Mr Koon with no documentation at all.

271.  Tenthly, in relation to the receipt dated 2 April 2009, given the previous intimidation conduct by “大圈尻Dee” and his gang and the receipt was for the benefit none other than Mr Koon, on balance, I find that Mr Zhou was coerced by Mr Ng and a group of people in a coffee shop in Shenzhen as a result of which Mr Zhou signed a receipt to acknowledge having received HK$135 million for the 100 million shares.

272.  On this issue, I find Mr Ng’ evidence particularly incredible. Though never mentioned in his witness statement, Mr Ng alleged during his oral testimony that he would not have dared to intimidate Mr Zhou because Mr Hui told him that Mr Zhou was among the richest in Shenzhen and “黑白兩道都吃得開”. I agree that such evidence purports to explain why he did not intimidate Mr Zhou, but such critical evidence had never previously been mentioned.

273.  I also find as a matter of fact that it was Mr Koon who instructed Mr Ng to obtain a receipt of the HK$135 million from Mr Zhou. The receipt is only useful for Mr Koon to prove that the 100 million shares were paid. There was no need for Mr Hui to specifically ask Mr Zhou to prepare such a receipt. The fact that Mr Koon insisted on getting a false receipt also tends to negate the existence of the Oral Agreement.

274.  Eleventhly, on the issue of who engaged Shanghai Boy 上海仔, Mr Chain submitted that Shanghai Boy上海仔plainly played an important role in the incident, but according to Mr Hui, he was almost invisible. It is submitted the only reason was because when reporting to the police, Mr Hui could not mention or involve him because it would then be known that Shanghai Boy上海仔was on his side. Mr Hui never mentioned or referred to Shanghai Boy上海仔in any of his police statement.

275.  I have my doubts on this issue. However, there is no cogent evidence for this Court to find that Mr Hui did engage Shanghai Boy上海仔. In particular, there is no evidence on how, if Mr Hui engaged Shanghai Boy上海仔, and despite being neutralized by “大圈尻Dee”, he was able to demand the “yum cha” money from Mr Koon.

276.  Further, I note that it is Mr Fung SC’s submission that only Mr Koon, but not any of the defendants in this action, reported the matter to the police, not just the Hong Kong Police but also the Shenzhen Security Bureau. I agree that it is inherently improbable that Mr Hui would report the matter to both the Hong Kong Police and the Shenzhen Security Bureau if he himself engaged Shanghai Boy 上海仔and was involved in any illegal misconduct or criminal misbehaviour as against Mr Koon.

277.  On balance, I find there is no sufficient evidence to prove that Shanghai Boy 上海仔 was engaged by Mr Hui.

278.  Twelfthly, on the relationship between Mr Hui and Mr Koon from 2007 to March or April 2009, I do not accept Mr Koon’s case that he and/or his company lent substantial money to Mr Hui due to their good relationship. As I analysed above, Mr Hui’s willingness to act as guarantor shows at most a good relationship between Mr Hui and the borrowers, not vis-à-vis the lender. Critically, Mr Koon’s own evidence adduced at trial confirms that the borrowers (rather than Mr Hui or third parties) repaid the loans. I also agree that there was neither evidence adduced nor reason advanced as to why Mr Hui needed to borrow; nor was any reason advanced as to why, if (hypothetically) Mr Hui needed to borrow, he had to do so through nominees.

279.  I do not think anything turns on whether Mr Hui gave Olympic tickets to Mr Koon in 2008 showing that the two of them enjoyed a good relationship. Mr Hui concedes that he was acquainted with Mr Koon throughout 2008. Even if Mr Hui gave Olympic tickets directly to Mr Koon, the same was not inconsistent with such acquaintanceship.

280.  However, I agree that Mr Hui has downplayed his relationship with Mr Koon. I am of the view that Mr Hui’s relationship with Mr Koon is something more than a mere acquaintanceship but short of a good or deep friendship. Nonetheless, I am inclined to the view the relationship was one which obviously allowed Mr Koon to place trust on Mr Hui when he made substantial investments in the shares of Sino Union to which Mr Koon, from his perspective, found it legitimate to hold Mr Hui accountable. For reasons best known to the parties themselves, no evidence was led on this specific issue and I therefore make no specific findings thereon.

281.  Thirteenthly, Mr Chain submitted that there were ample examples of what Mr Hui would do to “manipulate” the shares:-

(1)  By a sale and purchase agreement and another mortgage document, both dated 12 December 2007, Sino Kinetic Limited (“Sino Kinetic”), a company related to Dr. Lee Shau Kee agreed to purchase 220.64 million shares from Wisdom On, Mr Hui’s company, at HK$1.25 per share for a total price of HK$275.8 million. Sino Kinetic did not have to pay any purchase money upfront, but instead the shares were mortgaged to Wisdom On to the extent of 100% of the purchase price. In the event that the share price rose during the mortgage period of 5 years, Sino Kinetic could simply repay the mortgage and pocket the profits. Otherwise Sino Kinetic could simply resell the shares to Wisdom On within 5 years at the same price.

(2)  On 16 March 2009, Mr Hui’s company Sukapeak sold 250 million shares to Mr Zhou at HK$1.2 per share, which was at a premium of 57.89% over the closing price of HK$0.76 on the previous trading day. Mr Hui would 核算 (take an account) with Mr Zhou after 6 months and Mr Hui would pay compensation to Mr Zhou if the price dropped lower than HK$1.25 per share. In other words, Mr Zhou was not exposed to any loss in the event the share price dropped.

(3)  Mr Hui was prepared to pay 5% of the purchase price as commission to Lew Mong Hung for introducing purchasers of the shares. On the sale to Mr Hui Wing Mau’s company alone, Mr Lew’s commission was HK$12.5 million.

282.  Hence, Mr Chain submitted that it is more probable than not Mr Hui would have entered into the Oral Agreement with Mr Koon. I disagree. The agreements with Sino Kinetic and Mr Hui Wing Mau are all well documented unlike the Oral Agreement. Even if the shares Mr Hui transferred to Dr Lee Shau Kee amounted to a free gift, there is a difference between gifting shares to Dr Lee Shau Kee which would bring in Sino Union a strategic investor and Mr Koon who was looking for profits from trading in the shares of Sino Union. According to the evidence, Dr Lee Shau Kee was renowned as “the God of stocks in Asia” (亞洲股神), which explains why Mr Hui was willing to give Dr Lee favoured treatment. At the end of the day, I do not think that the existence of the above three transactions prove the existence of the Oral Agreement.

283.  Finally, I find Mr Hui’s evidence and oral testimony, on the whole, credible and reliable. Obviously, he did not tell the whole truth to the Court, for example, in relation to the PSH Reports and his relationship with Mr Koon. However, in relation to the material issues like the Oral Agreement and the acts of intimidation, duress and coercion, I have no difficulties in accepting that Mr Hui was telling the truth to the Court. As Mr Chain rightly pointed out, witnesses sometimes tell half-truth to the Court. I am of the view that, overall, Mr Hui is a credible and honest witness.

284.  I do not find Mr Lew’s evidence highly relevant.

285.  I do not find Mr Tsang to be a credible witness.

The Counterclaim of HK$1.5 million

286.  In relation to Mr Koon’s counterclaim of HK$1.5 million, as I find above, I am not convinced that Mr Hui and/or Shanghai Boy上海仔 was in a position to intimidate, duress, or coerce Mr Koon to hand over HK$1.5 million in cash as “yum cha” money.

287.  Mr Fung SC submitted that Mr Hui’s volunteering to the Hong Kong Police the fact of his undocumented receipt from Mr Koon of HK$1.5 million in cash on 3 April 2009 underscores the high unlikelihood that such sum constituted tea money demanded by Mr Hui for his engagement of the notorious triad gangster Shanghai Boy 上海仔, thereby directly undermining Mr Koon’s allegation to the same effect.  Put another way, if Mr Koon’s allegation above were true, it would be highly unlikely for Mr Hui to volunteer to the Hong Kong Police the fact of his undocumented receipt from Mr Hui of HK$1.5 million cash since police inquiries and investigations of this incident would lead to and reveal that Mr Hui had engaged triad gangsters to resist Mr Koon’s demand for the 100 million shares.

288.  It is further submitted that the fact that Mr Koon did not even demand any receipt from Mr Hui in respect of the HK$1.5 million in cash payment underscores the overwhelming likelihood that the payment was made in appreciation and gratitude for the handover of the shares together with apologies for any inconvenience caused to Mr Hui as well as, more significantly, as “hush money” (“掩口費”) as described by Mr Hui in his witness statement at §64.

289.  Insofar as Mr Koon’s reliance on the plea that he paid the said sum in return for Mr Hui’s promise to transfer the balance of another 100 million shares under the Oral Agreement is concerned, as I find as a matter of fact the Oral Agreement never exist, I also reject the said plea.

290.  Further, on Mr Koon’s case, he paid over the said sum as a result of intimidation by Mr Hui and/or his agents. That happened on 3 April 2009. It is therefore time-barred in any event.

291.  I accept Mr Fung SC’s submissions that based on Mr Koon’s pleaded causes of action in relation to the counterclaim of HK$1.5 million should be dismissed.

292.  Although I also have reservations over Mr Hui’s explanation that the oppressor would somehow give a token of appreciation to the oppressed, comparatively speaking, Mr Koon’s case is even more incredible. As Mr Koon bears the burden of proving his counterclaim, I would have to return a value of zero to his counterclaim. Accordingly, his counterclaim is dismissed.

293.  For the sake of completeness, I should mention that I have duly considered Mr Fung SC and Mr Chain’s very helpful written and oral submissions. The fact that I do not specifically deal with each and every point does not mean that I have not considered the same.

294.  Also as a result of the findings by this Court, in particular, the Oral Agreement never exists, I do not find it necessary to deal with the illegality issue.

DISPOSITION

295.  For all the reasons stated above I make an order that:

(1)  The 1st Defendant do pay the Plaintiff damages in the sum of HK$135,000,000, together with interest thereon at HSBC prime rate plus 1% from 23 June 2009 until date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment;

(2)  The 1st Defendant’s counterclaim set out in the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim be dismissed.

296.  As far as costs is concerned, it is an abuse of process for a litigant, with full knowledge of the facts, to dishonestly invent a claim, and the Court will award costs on an indemnity basis against such a litigant: see Lai Sin Yan Elsie v Tata Communications (Hong Kong) Ltd [2020] 4 HKLRD 363 at §7, where Bharwaney J adopted the observations by Moses LJ in South Wales Fires and Rescue Service v Smith [2011] EWHC 1749 (Admin) at §§2-4:-

“[2] For many years the courts have sought to underline how serious false and lying claims are to the administration of justice. False claims undermine a system whereby those who are injured as a result of the fault of their employer or a defendant can receive just compensation.

[3] They undermine that system in a number of serious ways. They impose upon those liable for such claims the burden of analysis, the burden of searching out those claims which are justified and those claims which are unjustified. They impose a burden upon honest claimants and honest claims, when in response to those claims, understandably those who are liable are required to discern those which are deserving and those which are not.

[4] Quite apart from that effect on those involved in such litigation is the effect upon the court. Our system of adversarial justice depends upon openness, upon transparency and above all upon honesty. The system is seriously damaged by lying claims. It is in those circumstances that the courts have on numerous occasions sought to emphasise how serious it is for someone to make a false claim, either in relation to liability or in relation to claims for compensation as a result of liability.”

297.  In the present case, I agree that Mr Koon well knew that he had obtained the 100 million shares by intimidation and coercion.  Given the success of such intimidation and coercion and not being satisfied with the 100 million shares already obtained, Mr Koon concocted the Oral Agreement to disguise such intimidation and coercion and to demand yet more Shares. If indeed the Oral Agreement existed, he could have commenced a proper High Court Action to claim for it. This was what he did in 2012.

298.  It is also deplorable for him to engage “大圈尻Dee” and his gang, not once but twice, to extort further substantial number of Sino Union shares from Mr Hui. This shows little respect to our legal system.

299.  I am of the view that Mr Koon’s conduct should be met by an order for costs against him to be taxed on an indemnity basis.

300.  Accordingly, I also make a cost order nisi that the 1st Defendant do pay the costs of and occasioned by this action (including the costs of and occasioned by the 1st Defendant’s counterclaim and any costs reserved) to the Plaintiff on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.

301.  At the invitation of both counsel teams, for the purpose of taxation, I also certify 4 refreshers for the written Closing Submissions and 3 refreshers for the written Reply Closing Submissions.

302.  Finally, it remains for this Court to thank both counsel team, Mr Fung SC and Mr Lam for Mr Hui, Mr Chain and Mr Lam for Mr Koon for their most able and admirable assistance rendered to this Court.

 ( William Wong SC )
 Recorder of the High Court

  

Mr Daniel R Fung SC & Gary CC Lam instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong for the Plaintiff

Mr Benjamin Chain & Mr Allen Lam instructed by Edward Ko & Company for the 1st Defendant

  

101916-EN-2015-12-18

HUI CHI MING (PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS X) v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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HCA 1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1479 OF 2009

_________________________

BETWEEN  
 HUI CHI MING (許智明) (PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS X)Plaintiff
 and
 KOON WING YEE (官永義)1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG (吳志強)2nd Defendant
 CHAN KWAI NAM (陳桂南)3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK (黃展億)4th Defendant
 LUI YUK CHU (雷玉珠)5th Defendant
 KWONG JIMMY CHEUNG TIM (鄺長添)6th Defendant

_________________________

Before : Master Leong in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing : 1 December 2015
Date of Handing Down Decision : 18 December 2015

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  This is an application by the Plaintiff to set aside the interlocutory judgment on the 3rd Defendant’s counterclaim.

Background

2.  The plaintiff commenced action in 2009 claiming for damages as a result of being procured to transfer certain company shares by “duress, illegitimate coercion and unlawful intimidation” by the 1st to 4th defendants.

3.  An injunction was granted to restrain, inter alia, the 3rd defendant from dealing with his respective assets until trial or further court order.

4.  The action was stayed pending criminal proceedings in which the 3rd defendant was charged and prosecuted for conspiracy with others to blackmail the plaintiff for the shares and conspiracy with others to steal the shares.

5.  The 3rd defendant was subsequently acquitted and he later served and filed his Defence and Counterclaim on 11 February 2015.

6.  The counterclaim was based upon the allegation that “the plaintiff had wrongfully and maliciously procured the prosecution against the 3rd defendant”.

7.  On 17 March 2015, the plaintiff obtained leave to file and serve a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim within 21 days but failed to do so.

8.  The 3rd defendant entered judgment for his counterclaim on 4 May 2015. There is no dispute that the judgment was regular.

9.  The plaintiff took out the current application on 5 June 2015.

The issues in dispute

10.  “The power of to set aside a default judgment which has been entered regularly is discretionary and such power is unconditional. The court should not lay down rigid rules...The purpose...is to avoid the injustice...if judgment follows automatically on default.” (White Book 2016 13/9/12)

11.  Thus the court should look all circumstances of the case to determine whether there would be injustice “if judgment follows automatically on default”.

12.  Mr. Adrian Bell S.C., acting for the 3rd defendant, is relying on the “not guilty” verdict in the criminal case as evidence for this “malicious prosecution” counterclaim.

13.  He submitted that “P is not open to suggest that D3 failed to prove “malicious prosecution” upon the evidence so far adduced. Indeed, D3 is not obliged to do so, because D3 already obtained the Judgment regarding the Counterclaim, which is binding upon P. It seems very absurd and wrong to say that D3, having obtained the Judgment, is nevertheless required to prove each and every elements of his case again....”

14.  I am not persuaded by this line of argument.

15.  The Court’s discretion to set aside a default judgment does not require the claimant to “prove each and every element of his case again”, but neither is the Court prevented from looking at the merit of the claim (counterclaim in this case) as well as the merit of the defence, both of which must be part of “the relevant circumstances of the case” to “avoid injustice”.

16.  To suggest that a default judgment is somehow “binding” so the Court cannot assess the merit of the claim (the counterclaim in this case) itself is not only illogical but is imposing a “rigid rule which deprives the Court of the jurisdiction” to decide what is “just” under the circumstances.

17.  Mr. Bell criticised that the affidavits of the plaintiff in support of the application were made not by the plaintiff personally but by his solicitor.

18.  Whilst this may goes to the question of credibility with regard to factual disputes in the main claim, the merits of counterclaim and its defence are not significantly affected: much of the circumstances of the criminal proceedings relevant to the allegation of “malicious prosecution” (e.g. the various investigations conducted by the police, the decision of the police and the Department of Justice to prosecute, the charges, the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution at trial and the verdict etc.) are not disputed.

19.  The law on malicious prosecution is trite (Martin v Watson [1996] 1AC 74, Jae Hoon Oh v Richdale [2005] 2 HKLRD 285 etc.) and I need not repeat them here. The court’s role here is not to conduct a “mini-trial” but I am satisfied that, on the basis of the undisputed evidence alone (as stated in paragraph 17 above), the plaintiff has a real prospect of a successful defence against the counterclaim.

20.  Mr. Bell also criticised the plaintiff’s solicitors’ explanation of how the default came about.

21.  Whilst Mr. Bell might think that “an oversight by a staff” was an unsatisfactory explanation, I am of the view that further details like the identity of the “staff” or details on how the error came about may not help the court further. It is clear that the plaintiff has all along intended to defend the counterclaim and there was no evidence to show that he has tried to delay, stall or otherwise neglected the proceedings, and thus the default could only be an innocent slip :-

a. there were substantial factual disputes of the circumstances of the main claim;

b. it was the plaintiff who took out the application for time to file and serve the defence to the counterclaim; and

c. the plaintiff did not delay in taking out the current application to set aside the default judgment.

22.  I see no prejudice to the 3rd defendant’s position and any delay caused by this slip should be adequately compensated by costs.

23.  Given the circumstances, I am of the view that it would be unjust to deny the plaintiff a defence for the 3rd defendant’s counterclaim. I also consider it inappropriate for the court to impose any conditions for setting aside the default judgment.

Order

24.  I will therefore make the order that:

(i) The interlocutory judgment on the 3rd defendant’s counterclaim dated 4 May 2015 that had been entered against the plaintiff be set aside.

(ii) The plaintiff do have unconditional leave to file and serve his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim of the 3rd defendant within 14 days from the date of the order to be made herein.

(iii) The costs of this application be to the 3rd defendant to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate granted to one Counsel.

(Harold Leong)
Master of the High Court

Ms. Kiasey Kang, instructed by Peter Cheung & Co., for the plaintiff

Mr. Adrian Bell S.C. and Mr Paul Wong, instructed by Ong & Chung for the 3rd defendant

 

76464-EN-2011-05-16

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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HCA1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1479 OF 2009

---------------------

BETWEEN

 HUI CHI MING (許智明)
(previously known as X)
Plaintiff

and

 KOON WING YEE (官永義)1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG (吳志強)2nd Defendant
 CHAN KWAI NAM (陳桂南)3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK (黃展億)4th Defendant
 LUI YUK CHU (雷玉珠)5th Defendant
 KWONG JIMMY CHEUNG TIM (鄺長添)6th Defendant
---------------------

Before : Hon Suffiad J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 11 January 2011

Date of Judgment : 16 May 2011

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J U D G M E N T

------------------------

 

1.  This is an appeal by the 5th and 6th defendants against the Order of Master de Souza given on 6 October 2010 upon the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons dated 29 September 2010 seeking to join Lui Yuk Chu as the 5th defendant and Kwong Jimmy Cheung Tim as the 6th defendant in this action.

2.  At the hearing of the plaintiff’s summons referred to above on 6 October 2010 (which was the usual 3 minutes call over hearing) the then intended 5th and 6th defendants appeared by counsel who opposed the plaintiff’s application and requested the Master to give leave for the intended 5th and 6th defendants to file affirmations in opposition and to adjourn the matter for argument.

3.  After hearing submissions by both parties, including counsel for the intended 5th and 6th defendants for some 40 minutes, the Master refused the application for adjournment and for the intended 5th and 6th defendants to file affirmations in opposition, but acceded to the plaintiff’s summons by joining the intended 5th and 6th defendants as defendants in this action.

4.  Accordingly, the Amended Writ of Summons and Amended Statement of Claim was filed on 8 October 2010.

5.  By Notice of Appeal dated 11 October 2010, the 5th and 6th defendants sought to set aside the Order of the Master and sought the directions as contained in the Notice of Appeal, namely, for leave to be given to the 5th and 6th defendants to file affirmations in opposition to the application by the plaintiff to join them herein as defendants and for the plaintiff’s application to join the 5th and 6th defendants to be adjourned for argument.

Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st to 4th defendants

6.  The plaintiff was at all material times the chairman and executive director of Sino Union Petroleum & Chemical International Limited (“Sino”), a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

7.  The 1st defendant is a Hong Kong resident and the chairman of Easy Concepts International Holdings Limited, Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited before his conviction in 2005 for Insider Dealings by the Insider Dealing Tribunal.

8.  The 2nd defendant is a Hong Kong resident and a licensed broker and director and part owner of a securities brokerage, Cheer Union Securities Limited.

9.  The 3rd and 4th defendants are both Hong Kong residents with the 4th defendant being also a triad member with a number of criminal convictions.

10.  It is the plaintiff’s case that in early 2009, the 1st defendant had told the plaintiff that the 1st defendant had incurred substantial losses trading in the shares of Sino and requested assistance from the plaintiff.

11.  Thereafter in early March 2009, the 1st defendant had attended the plaintiff’s office uninvited and had demanded from the plaintiff 100 million shares of Sino which demand was rejected by the plaintiff.

12.  Shortly thereafter, two unknown men had attended the office of the plaintiff saying that they represented the 1st defendant and were there to collect the 100 million shares of Sino.  One of them, being the 4th defendant identified himself as a triad member and made threats of burning down the plaintiff’s office.

13.  Some days later, the 1st and 2nd defendants attended the plaintiff’s office with the 1st defendant saying to the plaintiff that if the 100 million shares of Sino were not handed over, the 4th defendant and his gang would do something harmful to the plaintiff.  It was also made clear to the plaintiff that if the 100 million shares of Sino were not handed over, the plaintiff would suffer grievous bodily harm or be killed.

14.  In the circumstances, the plaintiff contacted one Zhou Aigu to purchase 100 million shares of Sino from Zhou at totally HK$135 million which was fully paid by the plaintiff to Zhou between 27 April and 27 May 2009.

15.  On 26 March 2009 a Share Purchase Agreement in respect of 100 million shares of Sino was executed in the office of the plaintiff by Zhou as transferor, the 3rd defendant as transferee and the 2nd defendant as guarantor.  The consideration was stated in the Share Purchase Agreement to be HK$135 million.

16.  On 2 April 2009, Zhou was contacted by the 2nd defendant and agreed to meet the 2nd defendant in a coffee shop in Union Plaza in Shenzhen, PRC.  At that meeting, as soon as Zhou arrived, he was surrounded by the 2nd defendant and a group of some five to six men all behaving in a threatening manner and Zhou was forced into signing a document which purports to acknowledge receipt from the 3rd defendant an amount in RMB equivalent to HK$135 million as being payment for the 100 million shares in Sino.  Zhou, fearing for his life, acceded to their demands and signed that document.

17.  It is the plaintiff’s case that the 100 million shares of Sino were transferred to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants as a result of their duress, illegitimate coercion and unlawful intimidation.

The involvement of the 5th and 6th defendants

18.  The 5th defendant is the wife of the 1st defendant.

19.  The 6th defendant is a Hong Kong resident and is an executive director and chairman of Easyknit International Holdings Limited and its subsidiaries including Planetic International Limited.

20.  It is the plaintiff’s case that the 5th and 6th defendants were acting as nominees, agents or servants and are under the control or direction of the 1st defendant.

21.  In the case of the 5th defendant, the plaintiff’s case is that a sham trust in the Bahamas was set up either by the 1st defendant or through the 5th defendant and which included the “Magical 2000 Trust” which was used as the 1st defendant’s nominee, agent or trustee for the purpose of assets holding.

22.  The “Magical 2000 Trust” was set up soon after the 1st defendant was being investigated by the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) for insider dealing and into which the 1st defendant had injected all his assets including his controlling shares in Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited.  The beneficiaries of the Magical 2000 Trust includes the 5th defendant and her four children but not the 1st defendant.

23.  After a disqualification order was made by the Insider Dealing Tribunal on 19 January 2006 against the 1st defendant, and on the same day, the 5th defendant was appointed as Vice President of Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited as well as a member of the  Remuneration Committee of the Board.

24.  The 1st defendant continued to exercise the rights attached to those shares of Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited injected into the Magical 2000 Trust through the 5th defendant.

25.  It is also the case of the plaintiff that the 5th defendant received, handled and laundered the said 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof directly or indirectly from the 1st to the 4th defendants via the Magical 2000 Trust and Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited including one of the subsidiary Planetic International Limited.

26.  As for the 6th defendant he is the executive chairman of Easyknit International Holdings Limited and its subsidiaries including Planetic International Limited.  It is the plaintiff’s case that Easyknit International Holdings Limited, Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited as well as Planetic International Limited were set up, either by the 1st defendant or by the 6th defendant on the instructions of the 1st defendant, as the nominee, agent or trustee of the 1st defendant for the purpose of asset holding.

27.  It is also the plaintiff’s case that the 6th defendant was the nominee, agent or trustee of the 1st defendant and under his control to receive, keep, handle and launder the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof directly or indirectly from the 1st to 4th defendants.

28.  In this respect, one of the matters relied on by the plaintiff is the fact that the 6th defendant was arrested by the police in relation to the offence of money laundering in connection with the sale of the 100 million shares of Sino by Planetic International Limited.

29.  It is therefore the case of the plaintiff that Easyknit International Holdings Limited, Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited, the Magical 2000 Trust and Planetic International Limited were all used by the 1st defendant to receive, keep, handle and launder the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof directly or indirectly from the 1st to 4th defendants and that the 5th and 6th defendants played a part as being the nominee, agent or trustee of the 1st defendant in the receiving, keeping, handling or laundering of the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof and therefore both the 5th and 6th defendants now hold the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof as a resulting or constructive trustee for the plaintiff and are liable to account and deliver same to the plaintiff.

The appeal

30.  This appeal by the 5th and 6th defendants is brought on the following basis :

(a) the application of the plaintiff to join the 5th and 6th defendants as defendants in this action is supported by what is alleged in the 5th Affirmation of Cheung Bing Keung Peter and the exhibits referred to therein.  On that basis the plaintiff says it is just and convenient to add the 5th and 6th defendants as defendants herein;

(b) the decision of the Master was therefore made on the basis of the 5th Affirmation of Cheung Bing Keung Peter without hearing what would be said from the intended 5th and 6th defendants by way of affirmation in opposition, and therefore made without the benefit of full arguments from the parties;

(c) this is contrary to the underlying objectives stated in Order 1A, rule 1 of the RHC which is to ensure fairness between the parties;

(d) it is further submitted by the 5th and 6th defendants that pursuant to natural justice the Master ought to have given a fair and reasonable opportunity to the intended 5th and 6th defendants to oppose the plaintiff’s application to join them as defendants, but that the Master erred in failing to do so but relying only on the 5th Affirmation of Cheung Bing Keung Peter; and

(e) in the process the 5th and 6th defendants did not have a fair hearing, a matter provided for by the Bill of Rights.

Decision

31.  In coming to a decision on this appeal, there is some further background which I will need to deal with.

32.  In the hearing before Master de Souza on 6 October 2010, both the 5th and 6th defendants were represented by counsel due to the fact that the summons taken out by the plaintiff for joinder of the 5th and 6th defendants were served on both of them out of courtesy albeit that there was no obligation for that summons to be served on the intended defendants.

33.  Master de Souza heard arguments from the parties on the issue of joinder for some 40 minutes. During that argument before the Master, counsel for the 5th and 6th defendants (not Mr McCoy, SC) played his cards close to his chest in that the grounds of opposition to the joinder application was not disclosed to the Master.  Counsel for the 5th and 6th defendants merely argued that the 5th and 6th defendants should be allowed to file affidavit evidence in opposition to the joinder application and that the substantive argument on the joinder application be adjourned for full argument. That course as suggested by defence counsel did not find favour with the Master who then dealt with the joinder application on the evidence which was before him.

34.  On 25 October 2010, the 5th and 6th defendants made an application by summons seeking leave to stay the filing of their Defence and Counterclaim for 28 days until after determination of this appeal from Master de Souza on the same basis as this appeal.  That stay application was heard by the Registrar.  Even at that hearing, again the grounds of objection to the joinder was not made known to the Registrar in the written skeleton arguments of counsel for the 5th and 6th defendants.  In the circumstances, the Registrar was critical of the failure to disclose the grounds of objection to the joinder application and refused the defendant’s application for stay.

35.  In the present appeal before me, again no grounds for objection to the joinder appeared in counsel’s written skeleton and the only point made in the skeleton submission of Mr McCoy was that the Master was wrong to have denied the 5th and 6th defendants a reasonable chance to adduced affidavit evidence opposing the joinder application and in that sense fairness and natural justice had not been done by the Master.

36.  However, at the hearing, when asked what were the 5th and 6th defendants’ grounds of the opposition to the joinder application of the plaintiff, I was informed by Mr McCoy rather briefly that the grounds of opposition are twofolds:

(1) that the application for joinder based on the allegation of the plaintiff that the 5th and 6th defendants are in control of a trust substantively conflicts with a decision given in this matter by Fok J (as he then was) and therefore issue estoppel arises; and

(2) the plaintiff’s application for joinder of the 6th defendant is predicated on the 6th defendant being arrested by the police and being investigated with suspicion of money laundering in relation to the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof, but that on 13 December 2010 the police have already completed their investigation of the 6th defendant and have indicated that there is no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the 6th defendant and no prosecution will be brought against the 6th defendant in respect of his arrest.

37.  These are therefore the matters which the 5th and 6th defendants will wish to put on affidavit to oppose the joinder application.

38.  In so far as the complaint is made that there was breach of natural justice or that the Master had failed to ensure fairness between the parties are concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting that complaint by the 5th and 6th defendants.

39.  The Master had heard arguments including submissions made by counsel for the 5th and 6th defendants for some 40 minutes.  During that time, if counsel for the 5th and 6th defendants could not or would not disclose their grounds of opposition to the Master, then counsel has only himself to blame for that and the 5th and 6th defendants cannot now complain that the Master had decided on the joinder application only on the evidence before him then.

40.  Indeed, disclosure of the grounds of opposition relied on by the 5th and 6th defendants would have been an important and relevant matter for the Master to decide whether or not to exercise his discretion in allowing affidavit evidence to be filed by the defendants in opposition.  Such disclosure not having been made to the Master, the Master cannot be faulted for deciding in the way that he did.

41.  Moreover, of the two matters now disclosed by Mr McCoy as being the grounds of opposition by the defendants to the joinder application, the second of those matters could not have been a ground before the Master since the decision by the police not to prosecute the 6th defendant was only made on 13 December 2010 when the hearing before the Master took place on 6 October 2010.

42.  In my view therefore, the Master was perfectly right to have decided the matter in the way he did given all the circumstances at the time of the hearing before the Master.

43.  In the appeal hearing before me the main contention by the 5th and 6th defendants were that they were not afforded the opportunity by the Master to file the affidavit evidence which they intended in opposition to the joinder application.

44.  Notwithstanding that contention, if the 5th and 6th defendants had been seriously in their desire to file affidavit in opposition, they had every opportunity of filing such affidavit between the time of their Notice of Appeal and the hearing of that appeal before me.  Yet it has to be noted that no affidavit or affirmation had been filed by either the 5th or 6th defendant or on their behalf during that interval of time, albeit that the hearing of an appeal from a decision of a Master is a complete rehearing of the application before the Master.

45.  Since the appeal is a complete rehearing of the application before the Master, I will need to deal with the two grounds of opposition indicated by Mr McCoy for the 5th and 6th defendants.

46.  The first ground is said to be based on issue estoppel.  That in turn is based upon a decision of Fok J given in this matter arising from an application before Fok J by the plaintiff to extend the ambit of a Mareva Injunction obtained by the plaintiff against the 1st to 4th defendant to also cover the assets held under the Magical 2000 Trust.

47.  In that application before Fok J, the 5th defendant, though not at that time a party to the present proceedings, was served with the summons by the plaintiff (on the basis that she was a beneficiary of the Magical 2000 Trust) and did take part in opposing that application, being represented by counsel in that hearing, to extend the ambit of the Mareva Injunction.  Needless to say that application was also opposed by the 1st defendant.

48.  The application to so extend the Mareva Injunction was dismissed by Fok J on the basis that the plaintiff was not able to persuade the court that there was good reason to suppose that the assets of the Magical 2000 Trusts are, in substantive reality, controlled by the 1st defendant.

49.  This is the part of Fok J’s decision which the 5th and 6th defendant now seek to rely on to say that that matter has already been decided by Fok J and that issue estopple arises.

50.  I do not accept that submission by the defendants for the following reasons.  Even accepting that Fok J has decided that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in the application to extend the ambit of the Mareva Injunction did not go far enough to show that the 1st defendant had substantive control over the assets of the Magical 2000 Trust, such decision of Fok J only relates to the control of the 1st defendant over the assets of the Magical 2000 Trust.

51.  The fact that the 1st defendant did not have substantive control over the assets of the Magical 2000 Trust does not equate with the 1st defendant not having control over the 5th defendant or that what was done by the 5th defendant was not done with a view to assisting the 1st to 4th defendants in receiving, handling or laundering the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof which is the case of the plaintiff in respect of the involvement of the 5th defendant.

52.  The Magical 2000 Trust was but one of the facet whereby, upon the plaintiff’s case, the 5th defendant was alleged to have received, handled and laundered the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof on behalf of the 1st to 4th defendants.

53.  However, the case of the plaintiff in respect of the involvement of the 5th defendant in this matter go further than the Magical 2000 Trust.

54.  It is also the case of the plaintiff that the 5th defendant was made Vice President of Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited as well as a member of the Remuneration Committee of the Board soon after the disqualification order against the 1st defendant, and that the 5th defendant had received, handled and laundered the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof via both Easyknit International Holdings Limited and Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited including the subsidiary Planetic Inernational Limited.

55.  That decision of Fok J, while it relates to the Magical 2000 Trust, does not begin to touch on Easyknit International Holdings Limited or Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited.

56.  In those circumstances, the plaintiff cannot be shut out from proceeding against the 5th defendant on the case as alleged by the plaintiff against her.

57.  As for the second ground of opposition, that the police have decided on 13 December 2010 not to bring any prosecution against the 6th defendant in respect of the investigation by them and for which the 6th defendant had been arrested earlier in 2010, that is a matter pleaded by way of particulars in the Statement of Claim.

58.  It is submitted by counsel for the 6th defendant that the factual sub-strata of what is pleaded in the Statement of Claim against the 6th defendant has now disappeared due to that decision by the police not to bring any prosecution against the 6th defendant.

59.  I do not agree with that statement.

60.  The arrest of the 6th defendant in the earlier part of 2010 was a matter given in the particulars of the pleading as to his involvement.  However that was not the only basis upon which the plaintiff sought to join in the 6th defendant in this matter.

61.  It is the plaintiff’s case that the 6th defendant was the executive director and chairman of Easyknit International Holdings Limited, Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited as well as Planetic International Limited and that those companies as well as the 6th defendant, acting as the nominee, agent or trustee of the 1st defendant, had received, handled and laundered the 100 million shares of Sino or the proceeds thereof directly or indirectly from the 1st to 4th defendants.

62.  Therefore the fact that there will be no prosecution and therefore conviction of the 6th defendant in respect of money laundering relating to the 100 million shares of Sino and/or its sale proceeds simply mean that the plaintiff cannot rely on such a conviction to establish its case against the 6th defendant.  However, the plaintiff will still be able to prove that allegation against the 6th defendant on its own available evidence on the civil standard of proof.

63.  In the circumstances, even though the 6th defendant will not now be prosecuted by the police, the plaintiff’s case against the 6th defendant and his involvement in this matter has not changed.

64.  Furthermore it is accepted by all concerned that a very low threshold is needed to show that it is just and convenient to join in further defendants in a litigation already started.

65.  Given the above reasons, this appeal must be dismissed with costs to the plaintiff to be taxed and paid forthwith if not agreed, the costs order being an order nisi.

(A.R. Suffiad)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Raymond Ho, instructed by Messrs Peter Cheung & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Gerard McCoy, SC, Mr Paul Wong and Ms Shrina Daswani, instructed by Messrs Hon & Co., for the 5th and 6th Defendants

75618-EN-2011-03-10

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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HCA1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1479 OF 2009

--------------------------

BETWEEN

 HUI CHI MINGPlaintiff
 (previously known as X) 

and

 KOON WING YEE1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG2nd Defendant
 CHAN WAI NAM3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK4th Defendant
 LUI YUK CHU5th Defendant
 KWONG JIMMY CHEUNG TIM6th Defendant

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Before : Deputy High Court Judge Burrell in Chambers

Dates of Hearing : 3 March 2011

Date of Judgment : 10 March 2011

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  This is an application by the 2nd and 3rd defendants for fortification of the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages on a Mareva injunction which had been granted by order of Tong J on 25 June 2009.

2.  On 25 November 2010 the 1st defendant made an identical application which was granted by Deputy High Court Judge Coleman SC.  He ordered the plaintiff to provide $5 million as security by way of a bank guarantee.

3.  For the purposes of this application the plaintiff has conceded that an order can be made.  The only issues have therefore been the amount of the order and the form of the order.  The circumstances which enable the court to make an order are, briefly stated, that the plaintiff has since June 2009, encashed his entire shareholding in “the Company” (said to be worth $3 billion) and, in July 2010, resigned as Chairman and Executive Director.  Thus as he is no longer Chairman and as nothing is known of the proceeds of the sale of his shares he should provide security to fortify his undertaking as to damages.

QUANTUM

(a) The 2nd defendant

4.  The 2nd defendant, represented by Mr Jin Pao of counsel, seeks an order of $5-$6 million.  Mr Raymond Ho, counsel for the plaintiff submits that $2.5 million would be more appropriate.

5.  The simple basis of the claim, as far as quantum is concerned, is that as a result of the Mareva injunction the 2nd defendant was forced to sell certain securities in order to meet a margin account call. There is no dispute about this.  Had those shares not been sold and were they still owned by the 2nd defendant they would now be worth about $5 million more than they were worth at the time of sale.  The stock market in Hong Kong having made significant gains since 2009.

6.  It seems reasonable to me to accept this straightforward approach.  Simply stated, it is likely that at the time of this application the 2nd defendant would have been about $5-$6 million better off but for the consequences of the Mareva Order.

7.  I make an order of $6 million on the 2nd defendant’s application.

(b) The 3rd defendant

8.  The 3rd defendant, represented by Mr Gerard McCoy SC and Mr Paul Wong, is in a different situation.

9.  According to his own affirmation evidence the 3rd defendant had assets of approximately $11 million at the time of the Mareva injunction.  Since then, and by consent, he has spent about $6 million on legal fees and living expenses.

10.  His assets at the time of the Mareva included about $9 million worth of securities.  The value of those securities would now be $12 million more than in 2009.  However, in July 2010 (by consent and in order to pay legal fees) he sold shares in a company called Easyknit, which in 2009 had been worth about $7 million, for about $12 million.  He therefore made a $5 million profit and still holds the balance of his shareholding after the Easyknit sale.  After paying his legal fees his net worth is now $7 million plus the value of his remaining shareholding. Mr McCoy estimates this to be around $11 million.  This figure would seem to be about right.

11.  The question is — what has he lost? In money terms it could well be argued that he has lost nothing.  In fact, thanks to the Hong Kong stock market he has done very well.

12.  Mr McCoy’s real submission is that the 3rd defendant, who is an experienced, successful investor in securities, has lost “many investment opportunities” as a consequence of the Mareva injunction.  He estimates that had he been able to take those opportunities he would have been $15 million better off net of the profit already realized on the Easyknit shares.

13.  Mr McCoy correctly submits that the court should take a “broad view” of the matter and try to “assess the risk” of what profitable opportunities have been denied him as a consequence of the injunction?

14.  In the 3rd defendant’s case it is a wholly speculative exercise.  He has done well already.  Mr McCoy submits he would have done even better and there is a real risk that he will lose the fruits of even better lucrative investments.

15.  In my judgment $6 million adequately meets that highly speculative, unquantifiable risk.  Apart from anything else the 3rd defendant’s estimate depends on a continuing favourable market and virtually all decisions to buy or sell resulting in gains.  There is no basis for the $15 million estimate other than rose-tinted optimism.

16.  In the 3rd defendant’s case I make an order in the sum of $6 million.

FORM OF ORDER

17.  Coleman DHCJ ordered the fortification to be by way of bank guarantee.  The alternative form of a payment into court was not argued.  In this application however the defendants seek a payment in whereas the plaintiff favours a bank guarantee.

18.  The defendants submit that they are entitled to know that the money exists in a real form in the hands of the court.  A guarantee is subject to bank regulations, and administration and annual renewal.

19.  The granting of a bank guarantee in the 1st defendant’s application has proved to be unproblematic and uncontentious.  In my judgment both options are equally secure and for the sake of consistency I prefer the bank guarantee.  I so order.

COSTS

20.  I invited submissions on costs at the conclusion of the hearing.  Points were made both ways.  Looking at the whole matter I think the appropriate order in this particular case is that costs be in the cause.

ORDER

(1) The plaintiff do within 28 days fortify the cross-undertaking in damages given by him as a condition for the grant of the Mareva injunction against the 2nd defendant pursuant to the Order of the Honourable Mr Justice Tong dated 25 June 2009 and continued by Recorder Fok SC (as he then was) on 3 July 2009, and by the Honourable Mr Justice Poon on 25 September 2009 by way of bank guarantee in the amount of HK$6 million, failing which the Mareva injunction shall lapse.

(2) The plaintiff do within 28 days fortify the cross-undertaking in damages given by him as a condition for the grant of the Mareva injunction against the 3rd defendant pursuant to the Order of the Honourable Mr Justice Tong dated 25 June 2009 and continued by Recorder Fok SC (as he then was) on 3 July 2009, and by the Honourable Mr Justice Poon on 25 September 2009 by way of bank guarantee in the amount of HK$6 million, failing which the Mareva injunction shall lapse.

(3) The costs of this application shall be in the cause.

(M.P. Burrell)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Raymond Ho, instructed by Messrs Peter Cheung & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Jin Pao, instructed by Messrs Tung, Ng, Tse & Heung, for the 2nd Defendant

Mr Gerard McCoy SC and Mr Paul Wong, instructed by Messrs Hau, Lau, Li & Yeung, for the 3rd Defendant

74214-EN-2010-11-25

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1479 OF 2009

---------------------

BETWEEN

 HUI CHI MING
(Previously known as X)
Plaintiff

and

 KOON WING YEE(官永義)1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG(吳志強)2nd Defendant
 CHAN KWAI NAM(陳桂南)3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK(黃展億)4th Defendant
 LUI YUK CHU (雷玉珠)5th Defendant
 KWONG JIMMY CHEUNG TIM (鄺長添) 6th Defendant

---------------------

Before : Deputy High Court Judge Coleman SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 25 November 2010

Date of Judgment : 25 November 2010

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1.  On 24 June 2009, the plaintiff applied ex parte for a Mareva injunction against each of the four defendants.  After the application was supplemented by letter on 25 June 2009, on that day an injunction was granted by Tong J.

2.  The claim, to which the injunction was ancillary, arises out of the alleged blackmail or illegitimate coercion and unlawful intimidation of the plaintiff by the defendants in respect of the transfer of a parcel of shares from a Mr Zhao to the 3rd defendant, but where the purchase price of HK$135 million was paid by the plaintiff as a result of the alleged coercion and intimidation.

3.  The “ceiling” figure of the Mareva injunction is the sum of HK$135 million, and for the grant of the injunction the plaintiff gave the usual cross-undertaking in damages in the standard form of words provided for in the relevant Practice Direction, namely:

“If the court later finds that this Order has caused loss to the Defendants or any other party and decides that the Defendants or the party should be compensated for that loss, the Plaintiff will comply with any order the Court may make.”

4.  In his Affirmation leading the application for the injunction, the plaintiff offered his cross-undertaking (at paragraph 49) as follows:

“I am willing to give an undertaking in damages in the event it is so ordered by this Honourable Court. I believe I have sufficient means to honour my undertaking since the value of my unencumbranced [sic] shareholding in the Company alone is worth about HK$3.06 billion as at 22nd June 2009.”

5.  The “Company” in question is Sino Union Petroleum & Chemical International Limited, a company incorporated in Bermuda but listed for public trading on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  At the time the plaintiff made his affirmation, he was the Chairman and an Executive Director of the Company.

6.  The Mareva injunction was continued on the 3 July 2009 by Mr Recorder Fok SC (as he then was).  On 8 and 9 September 2009, Poon J heard the defendants’ application for discharge of the Mareva injunction.  The grounds for that discharge sought included that there was no arguable case, no real risk of dissipation of assets, delay and material non-disclosure.  These arguments were rejected by Poon J, and he continued the Mareva injunction until trial or further order.

7.  It is to be noted that there was no challenge to the injunction on the basis that the plaintiff was not “good” for his cross-undertaking, and there was no application for fortification of the cross-undertaking.

The application

8.  By summons dated 30 September 2010, the 1st defendant (only) applies for fortification of the cross-undertaking in damages, by payment into Court of such amount (or by some other means) as the Court thinks fit.

9.  That application is led by the 5th Affirmation of the 1st defendant.Although directions have been given permitting the plaintiff to file evidence in response to the application, no such evidence has been filed.

10.  I should point out that, prior to the issue of the application, fortification had been sought from the plaintiff in solicitors’ correspondence.  Although the proper basis for the need for any fortification was denied, the plaintiff nevertheless offered to provide a bank guarantee in the sum of HK$5 million.

11.  This sum was refused as being insufficient, though neither the summons, nor the Affirmation of the 1st defendant, nor the skeleton argument filed by Mr Gerard McCoy SC (appearing for the 1st defendant) suggested what sum would be sufficient fortification, or precisely what sum of fortification was to be sought.

12.  As to this point, by a supplemental skeleton argument filed shortly before the hearing, Mr Bernard Man (appearing for the plaintiff) submitted that the first question to address must be the quantum of the fortification sought by the 1st defendant.  He argued that if the offered HK$5 million is thought by the Court to be reasonable, then the whole hearing would be unnecessary.  If any higher figure were to be sought by the 1st defendant, Mr Man argued that it should be identified for the plaintiff to be able to consider it.

13.  At the beginning of the hearing, I asked Mr McCoy SC if there was a particular figure of fortification being sought, and the basis for any such figure.  He told me (as I think he had shortly before told Mr Man) that the fortification was sought in the sum of HK$8 million.   This was said to be calculated by reference to a combination of fixed numbers and variables, essentially seeking to establish some reasonable estimate of profitability in relation to the 1st defendant’s use of his assets, were that not to be restrained by injunction.

14.  Mr McCoy SC further submitted that the 1st defendant’s potential losses extended well beyond the opportunity costs and the ability to have carried on normal commercial business, to the effect on his reputation which is directly linked to the ability to create wealth.

15.  As it turned out therefore, the “battleground” on the application was as to the difference in the amounts of fortification between the HK$5 million offered by the plaintiff and the HK$8 million sought by the 1st defendant.

The law

16.  Apart from one aspect, there is not, nor can there be, much dispute as to the applicable principles on this application.

17.  In a proper case of an application for a Mareva injunction, the Court may impose a condition to the effect that the plaintiff’s undertaking should be fortified by his giving some form of security.  Should such a condition be imposed, but the plaintiff is not willing and able to provide the security, the injunction would not be granted, or if granted would not take effect.

18.  Ordinarily, a defendant should apply for security at the time when the injunction is first granted and the undertaking is given.  But the question might arise as to whether or not the Court has power subsequently to impose an additional term as to fortification.

19.  In Note 29/1/25 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2011, it is suggested that:

“A defendant should apply for the security at the time when the injunction is granted and the undertaking is given. The court has no power subsequently to impose such an additional term on the grant of an injunction (Commodity Ocean Transport Corp v. Basford Unicorn industries Ltd; ‘The Mito’ [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 197). It would seem, however, that since the court could later discharge an injunction in appropriate circumstances, it might permit the continuance of the injunction, in an appropriate case, on the giving of security.”

20.  It is unfortunate that this note remains in the 2011 version of this text.  First, the note is at least not entirely borne out by the authority of “The Mito”.  Secondly, this fact was pointed out as long ago as June 2000 by Deputy Judge Susan Kwan (as she then was) in Elegant Jump Limited v. Tribune Bridge Limited [2000] 3 HKC 133 (at 137I).

21.  In that case, neither counsel—in my view, entirely correctly—suggested that the Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the relevant application, and (at 138I), the Deputy Judge stated:

“In my judgment, the court does have power to order fortification be given subsequently notwithstanding that no application for security was sought when the injunction was granted and the cross-undertaking in damages given as part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court to exercise control over process.”

22.  The Deputy Judge then went on to consider the circumstances in which that power is to be exercised.  She agreed (at 139A) that the objections in principle stated in “The Mito” are powerful considerations that a defendant should not be given a second bite of the cherry, and she accepted the submission that there is a distinction to be drawn between the situation where an interlocutory injunction had already been discharged by the time the subsequent application for security was made and the usual case where the interlocutory injunction or the undertaking given in lieu of the undertaking is still in force.

23.  The distinction apparently suggested is that where there is no injunction in force at the time of the application for security or fortification of the cross-undertaking, the imposition of the condition of security enables the plaintiff to know at once what is the burden he might face so that he can decide whether or not to put up the security or instead not to pursue the injunction, whereas the position is different if the plaintiff already has the benefit of an injunction and he is subsequently asked to fortify his cross-undertaking.

24.  I am not sure I see that distinction.  Indeed, the Deputy Judge herself recognized the point (at 139D) that in a case where the injunction or undertaking is still in force, it is possible for a plaintiff faced with a late application from the defendant either to fortify his undertaking in damages or to let go the injunction.

25.  But the Deputy Judge then stated (at 139D–E):

“Nevertheless, in that kind of situation, it is still ‘an important and substantive extra burden over and above the undertaking in fact given’ if the court were to order fortification when no security was sought at the time the plaintiff provided his cross-undertaking in damages. In my view, the objections in principle in The Mito are nonetheless relevant and pertinent considerations in an application of this kind in the usual situation where the injunction or undertaking in lieu is still in force.”

26.  She concluded (at 139I–140A) that:

“In view of the objections in principle set out in The Mito, I am inclined to think a subsequent application for fortification when no security was sought in the first place will not usually be entertained, unless the circumstances are compelling.”

27.  In support of that conclusion she relied also on the observations of Buckley LJ in Chanel Ltd v. FW Woolworth & Co. Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 485, at 492H–493A that:

“Even in interlocutory matters a party cannot fight over again the battle which has already been fought unless there has been some significant change of circumstances, or the party has become aware of facts which he could not reasonably have known, or found out, in time for the first encounter.”

28.  The question which then seems to me to rise is this: is the search for “some significant change of circumstances” or “compelling circumstances” limited to establishing whether or not the late application for fortification should be entertained at all, or should that search also colour the approach to the application if it is entertained?

29.  Mr McCoy SC argued for the former approach, and Mr Man for the latter.

30.  The test to be applied at the time of an original application for an injunction and the offering of the cross-undertaking in damages appears settled. 

31.  In the case of Chatwani v. Bhimji (No. 2) [1992] BCLC 387, at 404, it was held that:

“Where a company against whom an injunction is granted wishes to obtain fortification of a cross-undertaking in damages, it must show the likelihood of a significant loss arising as a result of the injunction, and to demonstrate why it believes the other party will be unable to make good that loss”.

32.  (In passing, I would note that the reference to the earlier reported decision of Chatwani v. Bhimji [1991] 1 WLR 989, as also appears in Note 29/1/25 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2011, also seems misplaced as that decision is not concerned with the point in the note.)

33.  In Chow Chor-Leung trading as Rayontex Trading Co. v. Rafaella Sportswear Inc [1990] 1 HKLR 449, at 453 it was held that:

“The court will order fortification where it appears just and proper to protect the defendant by making such an order; and in arriving at the amount to be put up by way of fortification, the court has to take a broad view. Indeed, there have been cases where the courts have said that if a detailed enquiry were necessary, that may be a very good reason for not ordering fortification. That is not to say that the party seeking fortification does not have to make out a case for fortification and provide the court with some material for the purposes of selecting a figure. What it does mean is that if there are arguments and counter-arguments on the amount, the court has to take a broad view without resolving all those arguments.”

34.  In essence, at least where there is an application for fortification at the time of the original grant of the injunction, a court can order the fortification where it appears just and proper to protect the defendant by making such an order, and it falls to the defendant to show that there is a likelihood of a significant loss arising as a result of the injunction granted, and that there is a basis for the belief that the plaintiff would be unable to make good the loss.

35.  I cannot see why the test should be any different upon an application for fortification made subsequent to the grant of the original injunction and the giving of the cross-undertaking.

36.  I readily understand why there may be a burden facing a late applicant for fortification to establish some reason why the late application should be entertained, hence the need to show “some significant change of circumstances” or “compelling circumstances”.  But it seems to me that once a Court has been persuaded that it should deal with the application, albeit ‘late’, the test to be applied is the ordinary test as to the grant or refusal of an order of fortification.

37.  If the circumstances which have subsequently arisen were the circumstances pertaining at the time of the original injunction and giving of the cross-undertaking, there is no doubt that the ordinary test would have applied.  That test would have been considered against those circumstances, and fortification would only have been ordered by a Court had the Court been satisfied that it was necessary for the protection of the defendant. 

38.  I cannot see why the defendant should face some higher burden than the ordinary test simply because the circumstances have arisen, or been discovered, at some later stage.  Either those circumstances are such as require or justify fortification, or they are not.  Whether or not those circumstances require or justify fortification does not seem to me to be determined by reference to when those circumstances arose or were reasonably discovered.

39.  If circumstances exist as make the order for fortification just and proper, it should make no difference that those circumstances have only recently arisen, or could not reasonably have been earlier discovered, so that the Court (proceeding on the basis of different circumstances) has so far been content to allow an injunction without security for the cross-undertaking.

40.  In both scenarios, it seems to me, the plaintiff faces the same choice as to whether or not to provide the security which the Court considers fit and proper for the existence of an injunction.  If the plaintiff is willing and able to provide the security, the injunction will either come into existence, or continue in existence.  If the plaintiff is not willing and able to provide the security, the injunction will either not come into existence or effect, or will cease to have effect.

41.  Insofar as it might be thought that I have differed from the approach of the Deputy Judge (as she then was) in the Elegant Jump case, I do not necessarily read her judgment in that way.  It seems to me that she decided on the need for “compelling reasons” or a “significant change of circumstances” to be able to entertain the application, but she then went on to determine the application before her on its merits.

42.  It is not clear that she did so applying any higher test than would have been applied at an application for fortification upon the original grant of an injunction.  But if I have differed from her approach, I have done so with diffidence, and for the analytical reasons I have identified.

43.  Two other principles of law might also be usefully highlighted.  They seem to be correct as a matter of argument from first principles, but they can also be taken from the authorities to which I have already referred.

44.  First, the burden of showing the need for fortification and the appropriate quantum of any fortification falls on the defendant seeking that fortification.

45.  Secondly, there is no obligation on a plaintiff to give full and frank disclosure of his own financial circumstances so as to oppose an order for fortification (or to argue for a lesser amount of security than is being sought).  Nevertheless, circumstances might arise where the absence of financial disclosure by a plaintiff might entitle the drawing of an adverse inference as to his ability to meet his cross-undertaking in damages.

Significant change in circumstances?

46.  In the light of the offer of security in the sum of HK$5 million already made, Mr Man for the plaintiff was content to argue this application by reference to quantum only.  Nevertheless, it seems to me that I should satisfy myself that there is a proper basis for entertaining this application at this time.

47.  The significant changes of circumstances relied upon by the 1st defendant in his 5th Affirmation are as follows.

48.  Whereas at the time of the original grant of injunction and giving of the cross-undertaking the plaintiff was Chairman and an Executive Director of the Company and held shares in the Company of the value in excess of HK$3 billion (representing over 56% of the issued shares), in July 2010 the plaintiff resigned from his posts as Chairman and Executive Director, and he has since January 2010 continually disposed of large parcels of the shares in the Company reducing his current shareholding to zero.

49.  Although Mr Man is strictly correct in his submission that all that has occurred is that the plaintiff as changed an asset in one form (shares) to another (cash), I am prepared to accept that this is a sufficiently significant change in circumstances as would justify the Court in entertaining the application now made for fortification.

50.  I take into account that it was this holding of shares in particular upon which the plaintiff relied as identifying his sufficient means to honour his cross-undertaking.  I accept that this was the only specific asset identified, which does not mean that the plaintiff did not have other assets which might be relied upon for meeting any award of damages on the cross-undertaking, but the Court has not been told of any other specific assets or their value or location.  Further, though I do not think it necessary to draw the kind of adverse inference invited by Mr McCoy—particularly when the plaintiff sold his shares with full disclosure to the regulatory authorities and in the public eye—there is some force in his submission that the Court has been left deliberately in the dark as to the reasons why the entire shareholding was sold, and what might have become of the proceeds of sale.

51.  On the other hand, even on Mr McCoy’s own calculations, the proceeds of sale were around HK$2.8 billion, against which figure the sum of security sought seems almost trivial.

52.  It is also suggested by the 1st defendant that the plaintiff has become the subject of an investigation by the SFC on charges of manipulating share prices, and that the plaintiff is as a result preparing to dispose of all or most of his assets within the jurisdiction and to flee Hong Kong to avoid criminal prosecution.

53.  In the light of the fact that I have already found sufficient change of circumstances to deal with this application on its merits, I do not intend to comment much on this suggestion.  Suffice it to say, however, that I am not persuaded that there is enough evidence for me to form any proper view as to the nature of any “involvement” of the plaintiff in any investigation by the regulatory authorities, or that the plaintiff is about to abscond from Hong Kong.

54.  I should point out that I do not take against the plaintiff any delay in the progress of this action, albeit that most civil actions in which a Mareva injunction has been obtained should be progressed with vigour.  In this case, the defendants are yet to file a Defence.  This is no doubt for reasons similar to the reasons which led to their not raising positive matters in their own defence before Poon J in September last year, for fear that whatever might be said in the civil claim context might impact their position in the criminal proceedings.

Amount of security

55.  As I have already pointed out, the real contest in this application turned out to centre on the quantum of any security as might be ordered in fortification of the cross-undertaking.

56.  Strictly, therefore, I do not need to decide whether fortification of any amount ought to be provided.  Nevertheless, I am persuaded that this is a case on and against its current circumstances as would justify the provision of some amount of security in fortification of the plaintiff’s cross-undertaking.

57.  The 1st defendant suggests he has already suffered significant losses as a result of the injunction being in place.  These losses are said to have come from missed opportunities to have purchased various properties in deals which, by virtue of the increase in property prices, would have yielded a profit of some HK$428.8 million.

58.  I note that the 1st defendant does not say that he would have sold any such properties purchased, or when he might have done so, as the calculation of claimed lost profit is by reference to “today’s value”.  There is no independent evidence either which supports the assertion that the particular properties had in fact been “offered” to him, nor as to the asserted “today’s value”.

59.  In any event, on this aspect, I accept Mr Man’s submission that by reference to the asset disclosure provided by the 1st defendant as discovery under the Mareva injunction, it is at least extremely difficult to see how the 1st defendant could actually have been able to take advantage of these offers if they had been made. 

60.  Further, no real reliance was placed in Mr McCoy’s arguments on this alleged earlier loss.  Particularly by reference to the amount of security as was sought at the hearing, namely just HK$8 million, the assertions in the 1st defendant’s evidence would appear to be extravagant.  Such claims do not do much to establish the bona fides of the application as it was originally framed.

61.  Against the “ceiling” figure of the Mareva injunction, and by reference to the assets disclosed by the 1st defendant, it might be thought that there is not a vast difference between the sums of HK$5 million and HK$8 million, and that neither sum is (independently viewed) necessarily unreasonable.

62.  But I have to resolve the contest, and to choose what seems to me to be the reasonable figure, whether it is one of those offered or neither of them.

63.  In doing so, I take the broad view indicated by the authorities, and I bear in mind the burden is on the 1st defendant.

64.  I have set out above the broad basis on which Mr McCoy seeks to justify the figure of HK$8 million.  Mr Man seeks to justify to the figure of HK$5 million by rough arithmetic.  He says that the assets disclosed by the 1st defendant total approximately HK$13 million, of which HK$9 million has been released to him to provide for legal fees in the criminal proceedings arising out of the incidents giving rise to this civil claim.  Assuming that the 1st defendant must have spent some of the other assets, and without knowledge as to his income stream, it would be fair to consider that he might have available assets in the order of HK$2 or 3 million.  Were he to be an investor of that sort of sum, a more than reasonable return might generate something in the order of HK$5 million.

65.  Taking a broad view, and taking into account all the circumstances as have been outlined to me, I am not persuaded that the 1st defendant has made out his burden of showing his proffered figure of HK$8 million is the appropriate figure for any security I would order.  In all the circumstances, I am prepared to accept the figure of HK$5 million as being just and proper for the protection of the defendant in fortification of the cross-undertaking in damages given by the plaintiff.

66.  I therefore order the plaintiff to provide HK$5 million as security to fortify his cross-undertaking, and to do so within 14 days, failing which the Mareva injunction shall lapse.  The security has been offered in the form of a bank guarantee, and I assume that is acceptable to the 1st defendant.  If there is any argument as to form of security, that matter can be listed before me at short notice.

[Argument on costs]

67.  Having heard the parties on costs, and where there is consensus as to the correct approach, I order the 1st defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of the application as were incurred after 25 October 2010.  I assess those costs on a gross sum basis in the agreed amount of HK$92,000, which is to be paid (by consent) within 14 days. The remainder of the costs of the application is to be in the cause.

(Russell Coleman SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Bernard Man and Mr. Raymond Ho, instructed by Messrs Peter Cheung & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Gerard McCoy, SC, instructed by Messrs Philip K.H. Wong, Kennedy Y.H. Wong & Co., for the 1st Defendant

73911-EN-2010-11-19

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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HCA 1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1479 OF 2009

_________________________

BETWEEN

 HUI CHI MING (許智明)
(PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS X)
Plaintiff
 and
 KOON WING YEE (官永義)1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG (吳志強)2nd Defendant
 CHAN KWAI NAM (陳桂南)3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK (黃展億)4th Defendant
 LUI YUK CHU (雷玉珠)5th Defendant
 KWONG JIMMY CHEUNG TIM (鄺長添)6th Defendant

_________________________

Coram :

Before Mr. Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers
(Open to the public)

Date of Hearing : 29 October 2010

Date of Decision : 19 November 2010

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 19 November 2010

 

___________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

___________________________________

 

1.  This application was heard in the 3-minute chamber hearing and it was contested. By consent, it is now dealt with on the papers, the parties having submitted the affidavit evidence and their written submissions already.

2.  The application was taken out by the 5th and the 6th defendants for an extension of time for filing and serving their Defence and Counterclaim within 28 days after the determination of their appeal to be heard on 11 January 2011 against Master de Souza’s order made on 6 October 2010, which allowed the plaintiff to join the 5th and the 6th defendants as parties to this proceeding, giving leave the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim as well.

3.  The plaintiff opposes this application because, if granted, it amounts to a stay of the proceedings regarding the 5th and the 6th defendants.

4.  The reason of the 5th and the 6th defendants in support of their application is that Master de Souza made the decisions without allowing them to submit affidavit evidence in support of their opposition. They maintain that Master de Souza should not allow the plaintiff to join them as defendants in the proceedings. However, in their counsel’s written submission, they still have not disclosed the reasons for their opposition. Nor am I able to find the reasons for opposition in Master de Souza’s notes of proceedings. That Master de Souza had not allowed the 5th and 6th defendants to file and serve their affidavits of opposition does not bar the 5th and the 6th defendants from stating the grounds of objection in the written submission. Obviously, the 5th and 6th defendants have elected not to disclose their grounds of objection for my consideration.

5.  The plaintiff opposes this application simply on the ground that absent any grounds against leave for joining the 5th and 6th defendants, the court should not assume that the appeal will stand a good chance of success and stay the proceedings for about 4 months.

6.  Both parties rely upon the spirit of CJR in support of their argument – to save time and costs for their respective clients. The 5th and 6th defendants say that costs for preparing the Defence and Counterclaim will be wasted if their appeal is allowed. The plaintiff says that if the court grants the application without valid reason, the matter will be delayed for 4 months. There is no ground to assume that the 5th and 6th defendants have a good chance of success in their appeal.

7.  Having considered the affidavit evidence and the written submissions from the parties, I decide to dismiss the summons of the 5th and 6th defendants for the reasons below.

8.  I have checked the file notes of Master de Souza made on the date of hearing on 6 October 2010, in which it was recorded that both the plaintiff and the 5th and 6th defendants were represented by counsel, who had made submissions before him. Mr. Wong for the 5th and 6th defendants had submitted that the matter should be adjourned for argument and the defendants should be given 28 days to file and serve the affidavit and that senior counsel would be instructed. Mr. Ho for the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff had the right to join the defendants and there was no need to adjourn the matter.

9.  It is obvious that the matter had been argued before Master de Souza, who made the decision after considering the arguments. If the 5th and 6th defendants refused to give their reasons for objection to the plaintiff’s application at the hearing before the Master, they should not complain that they had not been given the opportunity of putting in the reasons for their objection. After all, it is not mandatory for the defendants to give their reasons of opposition on affidavit. The court will not refuse to consider the reasons given by counsel at the hearing.

10.  There is no material before me that can show that the appeal has any chance of success. I therefore find that there is no reason for the matter to be stayed as proposed by the 5th and 6th defendants in their summons, which I now dismiss with costs.

11.  As to costs of this application, the parties have, upon request by this court, submitted their skeleton bill of costs. The costs of the plaintiff are summarily assessed to be $12,000.00. This is a relatively simple case fixed for 3 minutes. The hearing is not appropriate for counsel’s attendance. The fees for counsel’s attendance and for solicitor attending counsel are disallowed. This costs order in nisi shall be absolute 14 days after delivery of this Decision under O.42 rule 5B(6) of the Rules of The High Court unless an application has been made to vary it.

 

 

(K.W. Lung)
Registrar, High Court

 

Mr. R. Ho instructed by Messrs Peter Cheung & Co. for the Plaintiff.

Mr. P. Leung instructed by Messrs. Hon & Co. for the 5th and 6th Defendants.

70780-EN-2010-04-01

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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HCA 1479/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1479 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 HUI CHI MING (Previously known as X) Plaintiff
 and 
 KOON WING YEE(官永義)1st Defendant
 NG CHI KEUNG(吳志強)2nd Defendant
 CHAN KWAI NAM(陳桂南)3rd Defendant
 WONG CHIN YICK(黃展億)4th Defendant

______________

Before: The Hon Fok J in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 16 March 2010

Date of Judgment: 1 April 2010

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Introduction

1.  This is an application by the plaintiff by summons dated 13 January 2010 to extend the ambit of a Mareva injunction to cover the assets held under a trust called “The Magical 2000 Trust” (“the Trust”).

2.  The extension is opposed by the 1st Defendant.

3.  It is also opposed by Madam Lui Yuk Chu, the 1st Defendant’s wife, who is a beneficiary under the Trust.  Madam Lui is named in and was served with a copy of the plaintiff’s summons seeking the extension of the Mareva injunction. 

4.  The summons was also served on Hang Seng Bank Trustee International Limited (“HSBTIL”), the present trustee of the Trust, but it did not attend the hearing or file any evidence in respect of the application.

Background facts

5.  The background circumstances of the action are set out in the judgment of Poon J dated 25 September 2009 extending the Mareva injunction after a contested inter partes hearing.  It is unnecessary to repeat that background at length in this judgment.

6.  In essence, the plaintiff’s claim in this action is for relief arising from a Share Purchase Agreement made on 26 March 2009 which the plaintiff says was procured by duress and/or illegitimate coercion and/or unlawful intimidation exercised on him by each of the defendants and/or at their direction.

7.  The action was commenced shortly after the four defendants were arrested and charged with conspiracy to blackmail in respect of the matters giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims.

8.  On 25 June 2009, Tong J granted the Mareva injunction now in place to restrain the defendants from removing, disposing or otherwise dealing with “any of their assets which are within Hong Kong, whether in their own names or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, up to the value of HK$135,000,000” and also ordered disclosure by the defendants of all assets “of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in his own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value location and details of all such assets”.

9.  The 1st Defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 2 July 2009 in response to the order of Tong J enclosing a list of assets of the 1st Defendant.  In that letter, the 1st Defendant’s solicitors also stated:-

“In addition to the information contained in the List of Assets, for full and frank disclosure, we further inform you that our client set up a trust, ‘The Magical 2000 Trust’, in 2000.  The shares in Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Ltd are held by the said Trust.  Our client is and was not a beneficiary of the Trust.”

10.  Shortly thereafter, on 16 July 2009, in his first affirmation in these proceedings, the 1st Defendant said of the Trust:-

“… I do not and did not on 25th June 2009 own the 31.7% equity of Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Ltd (‘Easyknit interest’) referred to in the said affirmation [of the plaintiff].  The Easyknit interest was and is still owned by the Magical 2000 Trust which was set up by my mother in 2000 and administered by Hang Seng Bank Trustee International Ltd.  I have no beneficiary interest under the said Trust at all.  My wife and children are the only beneficiaries under the said Trust.”

11.  The Trust Deed has been disclosed by the 1st Defendant.  This shows that (1) the Trust was established on 14 July 2000, (2) the 1st Defendant’s mother is the settlor of the Trust, (3) Centre Trustees Limited was the trustee of the Trust on its being established, (4) the Trust is a discretionary trust, (5) the Eligible Beneficiaries include the 1st Defendant’s wife and her four children, (6) the 1st Defendant’s mother can nominate by deed a person to the office of appointor, and (6) the appointor has the power to remove and appoint the trustee.

12.  In his fourth affirmation, made in opposition to this application, the 1st Defendant states that, in about the middle of 1999, his family, including his parents, decided that a trust should be set up “to avoid risk of Hong Kong and/or Global financial crisis and also to avoid estate tax”.  He states that instructions were given to Messrs Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to set up a trust with his mother as settlor in 1999.  This led to the execution of the trust deed on 14 July 2000.  After the Trust was set up, the 1st Defendant injected his “family wealth”, including shares of Easyknit International Holdings Limited (“Easyknit”), into the Trust.

13.  By virtue of the 1st Defendant’s injection of assets into the Trust, he was a Notional Settlor under the Trust Deed.  A Notional Settlor is not within the Excluded Class of persons and can therefore be added by the trustee (exercising its powers under clause 26) to the list of Eligible Beneficiaries under the Trust Deed.

14.  The trustee under the Trust Deed (“the Trustee”) was originally Centre Trustees Limited.  In 2002, apparently because the individual at Centre Trustees Limited changed employment, the Trustee was changed to Newcourt Trustee Limited.  In 2004, because the same individual again changed employment, the Trustee was changed to Trustcorp Limited.  In 2007, the Trustee was again changed, this time to HSBTIL, the present trustee.

15.  In 2000, the 1st Defendant and others were subject to an investigation by the SFC into suspected insider dealing in the shares of Easyknit and Easy Concepts International Holdings Ltd in relation to an announcement on 18 February 2000 concerning the acquisition by the Pollon Group of a 75% interest in Easy Concepts International Holdings Ltd.

16.  On 19 January 2006, the Insider Dealing Tribunal found the 1st Defendant to have been an insider dealer in respect of that transaction and made a number of orders against him including the disgorgement of profits, a fine and a disqualification order. The next day, 20 January 2006, the 1st Defendant resigned from all his corporate positions in Easyknit and his wife, Madam Lui Yuk Chu (“Madam Lui”), was appointed Vice President of that company and a member of the Remuneration Committee of the Board.

17.  On 23 January 2006, Easyknit published an announcement stating that Madam Lui was deemed to have an interest in 36.74% of the issued share capital of the company within the meaning of Part XV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance and that the shares were:-

“… beneficially owned by Magical Profits Limited, which is wholly-owned by Accumulate More Profits Limited which in turn is wholly-owned by Trustcorp Limited as trustee of The Magical 2000 Trust (the beneficiaries of which include [Madam] Lui and her family members other than spouse). She is also a director of Magical Profits Limited and Accumulate More Profits Limited, which are substantial shareholders of the Company with[in] the meaning of Part XV of the SFO.”

18.  On 25 September 2009, as noted above, Poon J continued the Mareva injunction against the defendants after a contested inter partes hearing.

19.  On 16 October 2009, Easyknit issued a public announcement that a very substantial acquisition and connected transaction had been undertaken, involving the acquisition by Easyknit from Madam Lui as vendor of the entire share capital of two companies, namely Grow Well Profits Ltd (“Grow Well”) and Supertop Investment Ltd (“Supertop”).

20.  On 4 December 2009, Easyknit issued a further public announcement regarding the Grow Well and Supertop transactions.

21.  The plaintiff contends that the Grow Well and Supertop transactions are highly unusual.  It will be necessary to return to them in due course.

22.  The summons now before me seeks the extension of the Mareva injunction to include a new paragraph 2(5) in the following terms:-

“(5)    All the assets held purportedly under ‘The Magical 2000 Trust’ administered by Hang Seng Trustee International Limited (‘the Trustee’) including, but not limited to, the following, namely:-

(a)     all the shares in Easyknit International Holdings Limited registered in the name of Magical Profits Limited; and

(b)     all the shares in Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited registered in the name of Landmark Profits Limited”.

The summons also seeks disclosure by the Trustee of the assets of the Trust.

23.  Evidence has now been filed, on behalf of Madam Lui, to the effect that the shares of Easyknit Enterprises Holdings Limited are owned by Landmark Profits Limited, which is wholly-owned by Easyknit, and therefore not owned by the Trust.  The plaintiff accepts this means the addition of paragraph 2(5)(b) to the Mareva injunction cannot be pursued.

The applicable principles

24.  It is trite that the purpose of a Mareva injunction is to prevent injustice to a successful plaintiff by preserving the assets of a defendant and guarding against the risk of the disposal or dissipation of those assets by the defendant with a view to defeating the plaintiff’s attempts to execute a judgment in his favour.

25.  In the context of a Mareva injunction, the assets of a defendant refers to assets belonging to that person and not to assets belonging to another person: Federal Bank of the Middle East Ltd v. Hadkinson [2000] 1 WLR 1695 at 1709F.  Assets and funds which belong, or are assumed to belong, beneficially to someone else will not be available to satisfy the claim against the defendant: ibid. at 1709H.

26.  However, it is established that the Mareva jurisdiction may be exercised against non-parties.

27.  In S.C.F. Finance Co v. Masri [1985] 1 WLR 876 Lloyd LJ (as he then was) summarised the principles in relation to third party interests sought to be included within a Mareva injunction as follows (at 884B-E):-

“(i) Where a plaintiff invites the court to include within the scope of a Mareva injunction assets which appear on their face to belong to a third party, e.g. a bank account in the name of a third party, the court should not accede to the invitation without good reason for supposing that the assets are in truth the assets of the defendant.  (ii) Where the defendant asserts that the assets belong to a third party, the court is not obliged to accept that assertion without inquiry, but may do so depending on the circumstances. The same applies where it is the third party who makes the assertion, on an application to intervene.  (iii) In deciding whether to accept the assertion of a defendant or a third party, without further inquiry, the court will be guided by what is just and convenient, not only between the plaintiff and the defendant, but also between the plaintiff, the defendant and the third party.  (iv) Where the court decides not to accept the assertion without further inquiry, it may order an issue to be tried between the plaintiff and the third party in advance of the main action, or it may order that the issue await the outcome of the main action, again depending in each case on what is just and convenient.”

28.  The test of “good reason” in principle (i) above is a higher standard of proof or threshold than the test of a serious issue to be tried as to the ownership of the assets.  The purpose of requiring the higher standard of proof or threshold is to protect the rights of innocent third parties: Allied Arab Bank v. Taj El Arefin Hajjar and others, unrep., The Times, 11 January 1988.

29.  The above principles were not controversial between the parties.  Where there was some disagreement, however, was in respect of whether it was necessary for the party seeking injunctive relief to show that the assets held by the third party were the defendant’s assets and that they were assets available to satisfy a judgment by way of execution.  This was the submission of Mr John Yan SC, leading counsel for the 1st Defendant, which submission was adopted by Mr Horace Wong SC, leading counsel for Madam Lui.

30.  However, I agree with the submission of Mr Johnny Mok SC, leading counsel for the plaintiff, that it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate, at the injunction stage, that the assets sought to be frozen belong to the defendant.  In this regard, Mr Mok SC relied on Dadourian Group International Inc v. Azuri Ltd [2005] EWHC 1768 (Ch) (Westlaw Transcript 2005 WL 1686886), where Deputy Judge Edward Bartley Jones QC, held (at p.6 of the transcript):-

         “For my part, I do not believe it is necessary to establish beneficial ownership in a strict trust law sense. Clearly, if assets are held on a bare trust then the Chabra jurisdiction can be exercised. But, in my judgment, even if the relevant defendant to the substantive claim has no legal or equitable right to the assets in question (in the strict trust law sense) the Chabra jurisdiction can still be exercised if the defendant has some right in respect of, or control over, or other rights of access to, the assets. The important issue, to my mind, is substantive control. The view expressed in Gee on Commercial Injunctions 5th Edition 2004 at 13.007 is that if a network of trusts and companies has been set up by a defendant to hold assets over which that defendant has control and that this has, apparently, been done to make himself judgment-proof, then such would be an appropriate case for the granting of freezing relief against a relevant non-party. I agree. What needs to be considered is the substantive reality of control, not a strict trust law analysis as to whether the third party is a bare trustee. Thus, in my judgment, placing assets in a discretionary trust would not prevent the Chabra jurisdiction being exercised against that discretionary trust if the substantive reality were that the relevant defendant controlled the exercise of the discretionary trust. Any other analysis would entirely defeat the ability of the English courts to take drastic action and would allow the court’s orders to be evaded by manipulations, entirely contrary to the court’s powers and duties as identified by Robert Walker J in International Credit and Investment Co (Overseas) Limited v Adham (above). Whether this be described as identifying the discretionary trust as a ‘sham’, as piercing the corporate veil, or as seeking to identify a controlled discretionary trust as a bare trust does not, to my mind, particularly matter. Certainly, at the interim stage, all that matters is to ascertain whether there is good reason to suppose that the relevant defendant controlled the assets in the discretionary trust.” (Emphasis added)

31.  So, a Mareva injunction may be granted over assets where it is shown that there is good reason to suppose as against a non-party that the assets of or held by the non-party would be susceptible to a procedure which would lead to satisfaction of a judgment.  Whether that ultimately proves to be the case, for example on the basis that a trust is to be disregarded as a sham, or by reason of a lifting of the corporate veil, or as a bare trust for the benefit of the defendant, is a separate issue to be determined at a later stage, either on a preliminary issue or at trial or in the process of execution.

32.  For present purposes, therefore, I approach the plaintiff’s application by asking whether he has shown that there is good reason to suppose the assets of the Trust are assets which would be susceptible to a procedure which would lead to satisfaction of a judgment in his favour.

33.  In this regard, however, where the grant of a Mareva injunction is sought to restrain the disposal or removal of assets held by third parties it must be shown that the person against whom judgment may be obtained has some right in respect of, or control over, or other access, direct or indirect, to the relevant assets so that they or the proceeds of their sale or other disposition could be required to be applied in discharge of the judgment debt.  It is not sufficient to show that the person sought to be enjoined might be persuaded to make the assets available: Winter v. Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 11 at 12G-13B.

The basis for the plaintiff’s application

34.  In support of the application to extend the Mareva injunction to include assets which appear on their face to be held by the Trust, Mr Mok SC stressed a number of factors which, he submitted, demonstrate there is a good arguable case that the assets of the Trust are in fact controlled by persons other than the Trustee.  He submitted that the only candidates are the 1st Defendant and Madam Lui.

35.  I propose to consider each of these factors in turn.

Factor 1: the timing of the setting up of the Trust

36.  The first matter Mr Mok SC relied upon was the timing of the setting up of the Trust.  The Trust was established by the Trust Deed dated 14 July 2000.  This was shortly after the 1st Defendant was interviewed on 31 May 2000 by the SFC in relation to the acquisition by the Pollon Group of a 75% interest in Easy Concepts International Holdings Ltd.

37.  I do not think the timing of the setting up of the Trust demonstrates that the Trust is not a genuine trust or that the Trustee is not independent. 

38.  The evidence of the 1st Defendant and Madam Lui is that instructions were given to Messrs Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu in 1999 to set up the Trust.  If so, this pre-dated the transaction giving rise to the SFC investigation and therefore demonstrates that the establishment of the Trust was not a reaction to that investigation.  Mr Mok SC submitted that the 1st Defendant’s and Madam Lui’s evidence should be disregarded since there was no evidence from Messrs Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu or any correspondence to support the 1999 date as the date when instructions were given for the setting up of the Trust.

39.  But, even if the 1st Defendant’s and Madam Lui’s evidence is to be discounted, I am not persuaded that the timing of the establishment of the Trust gives rise to an inference that it was a step taken by the 1st Defendant to make himself judgment-proof.  All that had happened by 14 July 2000 was that the SFC had commenced an investigation into insider dealing.  There is no logical nexus between the setting up of the Trust and the SFC investigation and there is no obvious reason to suppose that the Trust was established to defeat any orders that might be made against him by an Insider Dealing Tribunal.  Indeed, after the Insider Dealing Tribunal found against the 1st Defendant in January 2006, the 1st Defendant satisfied the various monetary awards against him.

40.  It is also relevant to bear in mind that the Trust was set up long before the events giving rise to this action.  So there is certainly no reason to infer that the setting up of the Trust was designed to dissipate assets to prevent a judgment in this action being satisfied.  The Trust does not have the appearance of being part of a “network of trusts and companies” apparently done to make the 1st Defendant judgment-proof.

41.  Whilst Poon J found (at §32 of his judgment dated 25 September 2009) that the evidence of the defendants’ behaviour disclosed an unacceptably low standard of commercial morality or questionable integrity entitling the court to conclude there was a sufficient risk of dissipation to justify the continuation of the Mareva injunction, there is no good reason to transfer the suspicions arising from that evidence, which relates to the events giving rise to this action which occurred in March and April 2009, to the setting up of the Trust in 2000.

42.  Mr Mok SC also referred to the inconsistent statements in the 1st Defendant’s solicitors’ letter of 2 July 2009, that he set up the Trust, and in his affirmation dated 16 July 2009, that his mother set up the Trust.  Whilst the statements are inconsistent, I do not consider that this requires an adverse inference to be drawn as regards the genuineness of the Trust.  It is a fact that the 1st Defendant’s mother is the settlor under the Trust Deed.  But it is also a fact that the 1st Defendant injected assets, which included the 36.74% interest in Easyknit, into the Trust at the time it was set up in July 2000 and this most probably explains why his solicitors wrote as they did.

Factor 2: the 1st Defendant’s continued role in Easyknit after the establishment of the Trust and his wife’s appointments after his removal

43.  Next, Mr Mok SC submitted that, even after the setting up of the Trust, the 1st Defendant remained in full control of Easyknit, occupying the positions of President, Chief Executive Officer, executive director, authorised representative, and member and Chairman of the Executive Committee and the Remuneration Committee of the Board.

44.  It was only after disqualification orders were made against him by the Insider Dealing Tribunal on 19 January 2006, that the 1st Defendant resigned from his various positions on the following day.  On the same day, Madam Lui was appointed as Vice President of Easyknit and a member of the Remuneration Committee of the Board.

45.  Mr Mok SC submitted that this showed that, even after the Trust was set up and the Easyknit shares were injected into it, the 1st Defendant continued to exercise the rights attaching to those shares and it therefore followed that he was in control of the assets of the Trust.  There was no evidence, he submitted, of any authorisation or direction from the Trustee to the 1st Defendant in respect of the shares.

46.  In my judgment, it does not follow that the 1st Defendant’s continued occupation of various corporate positions in Easyknit after the injection of the shares into the Trust demonstrates that the 1st Defendant was in control of the Trust’s assets.  Easyknit is a public company and it therefore does not follow that the 1st Defendant’s occupation of the various positions he held equates to full control of that company as contended for.  The fact is that the 1st Defendant was the founder of Easyknit and occupied senior corporate positions even before the Trust was established.  The continuity of his occupation of those positions after the establishment of the Trust is consistent with the Trustee reasonably taking the view that the 1st Defendant was the best person to occupy those positions.

Factor 3: the recently disclosed documents relating to the Trust

47.  By an affirmation dated 12 March 2010, shortly before the hearing, Madam Lui disclosed various documents relating to the Trust.  These included a letter of wishes dated 12 November 2002 addressed to the then Trustee, Newcourt Trustees Limited, (“the Letter of Wishes”), a deed of variation between the settlor and HSBTIL dated 29 June 2007 (“the Deed of Variation”) and a deed of appointment dated 14 July 2000 (“the Deed of Appointment”).

48.  Mr Mok SC relied on these documents to support his submission that the substantial reality was that the 1st Defendant controlled the assets of the Trust.  It is necessary to consider each of these documents in turn.

49.  The Deed of Appointment was executed by the 1st Defendant’s mother, as settlor of the Trust, and appointed Mr Kun Wing Ning, the 1st Defendant’s brother, as the Appointor under the Trust.  Under the Trust Deed, the Appointor has the power to appoint a new trustee in place of the existing trustee and the various changes of Trustee of the Trust were accordingly effected by Mr Kun pursuant to several deeds.  As Appointor, depending on whether sufficient prior notice of the intention to distribute the Grow Well shares to Madam Lui was given by the Trustee, he may have exercised a discretion in relation to the Trustee’s exercise of its powers in respect of the Grow Well transaction (as to which, see further below).

50.  The Letter of Wishes is from the 1st Defendant to the Trustee of the Trust and consists of recommendations from the 1st Defendant as to how the Trustee should exercise its discretionary powers and duties under the Trust.  This included a recommendation that, in the exercise of those powers and duties, the Trustee should consult with the 1st Defendant and take account of his recommendations during his lifetime.  It also set out his wishes in the event of his death.  However, as is usual, the Letter of Wishes is expressed not to impose any binding trust or obligation on the Trustee. 

51.  Mr Mok SC pointed to the fact that the Letter of Wishes referred to the existence of “former letters of wishes”, which have not been disclosed.  He also pointed to the fact that the 1st Defendant made no mention of the Letter of Wishes when addressing the Trust in his 4th affirmation, in which he claimed he had no right, control of, or benefit, under the Trust and stated that the Grow Well transaction was a decision of the Trustee and beneficiary and had nothing to do with him. 

52.  Mr Mok SC submitted that these statements were blatantly untrue in the light of the Letter of Wishes.  There was no reason to suppose the Trustee, as a professional trustee, would not have consulted with the 1st Defendant, as requested under paragraph 1 of the Letter of Wishes, before exercising its powers in respect of the Grow Well transaction.

53.  As for the Deed of Variation, this provided for the creation of a new position of Protector under the Trust and for the appointment of Madam Lui to that position.  Mr Mok SC submitted that the provisions of the Deed of Variation, including the exemption from liability, showed that the Protector must be involved in the administration of the Trust.  The Deed of Variation provided that if no Protector was named, any natural person who settled property into the Trust, and this would therefore include the 1st Defendant, would be the Protector.

54.  I do not consider that the terms and effect of these documents are sufficient to demonstrate good reason to suppose the assets of the Trust are, in substantial reality, controlled by the 1st Defendant.

55.  The appointment of the 1st Defendant’s brother as Appointor under the Trust does not, it seems to me, give rise to any adverse inference against the 1st Defendant.  The Trust was set up as a family trust for the benefit of the 1st Defendant’s wife and children and it is therefore not surprising to find a member of the family appointed to the role of Appointor.  The Appointor is in the Excluded Class and so cannot be one of the Eligible Beneficiaries under the Trust.  The fact that the Appointor might have exercised a discretion in respect of the Grow Well transaction (as to which see paragraph 67 below) does not, in my view, assist the plaintiff to show that the 1st Defendant was in control of the Trust or its assets.

56.  As for the Letter of Wishes, although this is expressed to be non-binding on the Trustee, Mr Mok SC referred to a passage in Lewin on Trusts (18th Ed.) at §29-150 which states that it is “well-established that the trustees are entitled to take serious account of the settlor’s wishes and it is the better view that they are bound to do so”.  Thus, Mr Mok SC submits that it must be assumed that the Trustee would consult with the 1st Defendant in relation to any exercise of power on its part and this demonstrates that the 1st Defendant exercised control over the Trust.  On this assumption, he submitted, the statement in the 1st Defendant’s 4th affirmation that he played no part in the Grow Well transaction is untrue.

57.  I do not think the conclusion that the 1st Defendant was in control of the Trust follows, even if one assumes the premise on which it is based, namely that the Trustee consulted him before exercising its powers.  That trustees may be bound to take serious account of the views expressed in a letter of wishes may be so, but this does not make the views so expressed binding on them.  The next paragraph of the text (§29-151) makes it clear that trustees must form their own view when exercising their dispositive powers and must not unthinkingly act as ciphers for the settlor and that to do so is to act in breach of trust.  The text also notes that, where a letter of wishes is expressed not to be binding, it would not be a ground for challenging the exercise of a discretion that the trustees had thereby departed from the settlor’s wishes.

58.  Whilst the fact of consultation by the Trustee with him would render the 1st Defendant’s statement that he played no part in the transaction untrue, I do not think that conclusion, which is based on assumption, is sufficient to lead to the inference that the 1st Defendant is in control of the Trust and its assets.

59.  Therefore, the existence of the Letter of Wishes and the recommendations of the 1st Defendant to the Trustee do not, in my view, demonstrate as a matter of substantive reality that the 1st Defendant controls the Trust or its assets.

60.  Finally, the Deed of Variation does not, in my opinion, add any material substance to the plaintiff’s contentions.  The amendments to the Trust Deed introduced by the Deed of Variation appear to show that the purpose of introducing the Protector was to provide the Protector with a power to direct the Trustee to the extent that the Trustee might be involved in the management, conduct of business or administration of any Special Company in the Trust.  This power of direction on the part of the Protector does not detract from the fact that the primary responsibility for the trust assets rests with the Trustee, who must act in accordance with the terms of the Trust Deed.

61.  It is noteworthy that the Deed of Variation was entered into on the same date HSBTIL was appointed Trustee in place of Trustcorp Limited.  A natural inference that arises from the timing of the Deed of Variation is that the various provisions it added to the Trust Deed were provisions which the new Trustee considered appropriate.  This conclusion seems likely when, for example, the provisions of the new Clause 14AA of the Trust Deed are read: in substance, the provisions in that clause are for the protection of the Trustee.

62.  Mr Mok SC’s submission that the creation of the position of Protector and the appointment of Madam Lui to that position demonstrates that she must have played a part in the administration of the Trust does not, in my view, take the matter any further.  Even assuming the correctness of the contention that the Protector had a role to play in the administration of the Trust, that person is not the 1st Defendant.  Although Madam Lui is the 1st Defendant’s wife, it is necessary to exercise caution in treating husband and wife as one and the same person, as the plaintiff’s submission in effect invites me to do. The mere fact that the 1st Defendant, as husband of the Protector, might be able to exert influence to persuade her to cause decisions to be made by the Trustee is not, in my view, sufficient, on its own, to lead to the inference that the Trust or its assets are controlled by the 1st Defendant.  Put simply, directions of the Protector to the Trustee, being those of a separate person, are not directions of the 1st Defendant.

Factor 4: the Grow Well and Supertop transactions

63.  By these transactions, the shares in Grow Well and Supertop were sold to Easyknit by Madam Lui in the capacity of vendor.  Grow Well owned various properties in Singapore and Supertop owned various properties in Hong Kong.  The sale and purchase agreements were dated 14 October 2009.  In the Grow Well transaction, the consideration was HK$123,120,000 and in the Supertop transaction, the consideration was HK$104,350,000.

64.  Whereas the shares of Supertop were owned by Madam Lui personally, the shares of Grow Well were owned by Accumulate More Profits Limited, which was in turn owned by HSBTIL as Trustee for the Trust.

65.  Mr Mok SC submitted that the transactions were highly unusual because they were substantial acquisitions entered into with a connected party, the deposit paid to Madam Lui under each agreement was unusually substantial, amounting to 40% of the total consideration in each case, and the deposits were paid even before the transactions were approved by the independent shareholders of Easyknit.  He also relied on the fact that the transactions took place shortly after the judgment of Poon J on 25 September 2009 continuing the Mareva injunction in this action.

66.  Of even more significance, submitted Mr Mok SC, it transpires (as announced by Easyknit on 4 December 2009) that as at the date of the sale and purchase agreement for the Grow Well transaction and the payment of the initial deposit thereunder, Madam Lui did not have title to the Grow Well shares.  These were only transferred to her from Accumulate More Profits Limited on 23 October 2009.  Yet the sale and purchase agreement was not conditional on the Trustee transferring the Grow Well shares to Madam Lui.

67.  Mr Mok SC submitted that, in order for the Trustee to have approved the disposal of the Grow Well shares to Madam Lui under the Trust, further steps would have been, or may have needed to be, taken by the Trustee.  It would have been necessary for the Trustee to consult the 1st Defendant under the Letter of Wishes.  Depending on when the Trustee decided to exercise its power and when it gave notice to distribute the Grow Well shares to Madam Lui, it may have been necessary for the Trustee to obtain the consent of the Appointor in writing (under clause 29(b) of the Trust Deed).

68.  All this showed, submitted Mr Mok SC, that the 1st Defendant had a very large degree of control over the assets of the Trust and that the substantial reality was that he controlled those assets.

69.  There are certainly unusual features of the Grow Well and Supertop transactions.  But I am not persuaded that those unusual features necessarily point to control over the assets of the Trust by the 1st Defendant.  The suggestion that the transactions were entered into in the immediate aftermath of the continuation of the Mareva injunction by Poon J with a view to rendering the 1st Defendant judgment-proof seems somewhat strained, in my opinion.  The Grow Well shares were already assets of the Trust.  There was no suggestion at the time of the transaction that those assets were already covered by the Mareva injunction, since the plaintiff’s present application to extend the injunction was not issued until 13 January 2010.

70.  If the 1st Defendant’s intention was to dissipate the assets of the Trust with a view to avoiding a judgment against him, the Grow Well transaction seems a rather inefficient and clumsy way in which to do so.  The most obvious way to dissipate the assets of the Trust would be to transfer the Grow Well shares to Madam Lui and for her to seek to sell them clandestinely.  Yet the sale of the Grow Well shares to Easyknit would inevitably require a public announcement to be made and this would necessarily run the risk of alerting the plaintiff to it.

71.  Furthermore, the effect of the Grow Well transaction was, in substance, to transfer the Singapore properties into Easyknit.  Since the Trust owned 36.74% of Easyknit, the exercise to dissipate assets from the Trust would have failed to that extent since part of the underlying assets would remain with the Trust.

72.  The simultaneous Supertop transaction, by which Madam Lui in effect transferred the Hong Kong properties into Easyknit and therefore indirectly into the Trust, can be regarded as lending credence to the genuineness of both the transactions and refuting the fact that they were steps taken to dissipate the assets of the Trust.

73.  As against the unusual features of the transactions, it is also the case that the transactions were approved by the independent shareholders of Easyknit, at a meeting in which Madam Lui was precluded from voting, and was supported by independent valuations and independent advice.

74.  In short, I do not consider the Grow Well or Supertop transactions support the plaintiff’s contention that the substantive reality is that the 1st Defendant is in control of the Trust and its assets.

Conclusion as to whether plaintiff has shown good reason to suppose assets of Trust controlled by 1st Defendant

75.  I have not lost sight of the fact that most of the documentation in respect of the Trust was disclosed only lately in Madam Lui’s affirmation, nor that the Trustee has not filed any evidence to corroborate the 1st Defendant’s denial of control.  Also, the 1st Defendant’s evidence in his 4th affirmation does give rise to questions as to whether he was entirely forthcoming about the Trust in that affirmation.

76.  However, against these matters, there is no question that HSBTIL is a genuine third-party trustee company and no reason to assume that it does not and will not comply with its obligations to act as an independent trustee of the Trust.  The situation in the present case is far removed, in my view, from that in Akai Holdings Limited (in compulsory liquidation) v. Ho Wing On Christopher and others, unrep., HCCL 37/2005 and HCCL 40/2005, 1.9.09.  There, the court found the defendant, Mr Ho, was the settlor of the trust and that, pursuant to his letter of wishes, the entire income and capital of the trust was to be held for him absolutely.  Also, the directors of the trustee company, Accolade Inc., were Mr Ho’s sister, his long-time employee and his brother-in-law so that the court found there was manifestly no cogent evidence of independence.

77.  Ultimately, the burden is on the plaintiff to persuade the court that there is good reason to suppose the assets of the Trust are, in substantive reality, controlled by the 1st Defendant.

78.  For the reasons set out above, I do not think the evidence and various factors presently relied upon by the plaintiff, even when considered cumulatively, demonstrate good reason to suppose that to be the case.

Disposition and costs

79.  I therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s summons dated 13 January 2010.

80.  I make an order nisi that the plaintiff pay the 1st Defendant’s costs of the summons and also those of Madam Lui, to be taxed, if not agreed, with a certificate for two counsel.

    (Joseph Fok)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Johnny Mok, SC and Mr Raymond Ho, instructed by Peter Cheung & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr John M Y, SC and Mr Dominic W H Pun, instructed by Philip K H Wong, Kennedy Y H Wong & Co., for the 1st Defendant

The 2nd Defendant (Absent)

The 3rd Defendant (Absent)

The 4th Defendant (Absent)

Mr Horace Wong SC, and Mr Paul W P Mak, instructed by Ho & Co., for Lui Yuk Chu

67773-EN-2009-09-25

HUI CHI MING v. KOON WING YEE AND OTHERS

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