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Civil Action2009

FOURWAY (HK) LTD v. CHINA NANTONG HARBOUR LOGISTICS LTD

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78543-EN-2011-09-30

FOURWAY (HK) LTD v. CHINA NANTONG HARBOUR LOGISTICS LTD

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HCA 1618/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1618 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 FOURWAY (HK) LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
 CHINA NANTONG HARBOUR LOGISTICS LIMITEDDefendant
 (previously known as CHINA GROUP LOGISTICS LIMITED) 

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge L. Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 30 September 2011

Date of Decision: 30 September 2011

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  This is an appeal by the defendant against a summary judgment entered by a master and a refusal by the master to admit further evidence. The application to put in further evidence was made five days before the hearing before the master.

Background

2.  The plaintiff sued the defendant for repayment of a loan of US$4,042,800 (or the equivalent at about HK$31.5 million).  The loan was allegedly advanced on 21 November 2006 by two transfers from the plaintiff’s bank account to the defendant’s bank account.  The plaintiff alleged it to be an interest-free and unsecured loan repayable on demand. Demand was made on 8 July 2009.  Apart from the two pages of bank transfer documents, the plaintiff has not produced any more document to support the case that there was this loan.  The director who made the affirmation in support of the application for summary judgment also relied on hearsay evidence that there was this loan as he was not with the plaintiff at the material time.

3.  The defendant opposed the application.  It said that the plaintiff and the defendant were both controlled by one Zhu Ming at the material time.  Zhu directly and indirectly owned 75% of the plaintiff’s shares.  He also owned 55% of the defendant’s shares and another investor owned the remaining 45%.  Despite the two companies were being controlled by Zhu, they were not in the same group and neither held any share of the other. Despite the allegation of the loan, the audited account of the defendant for the relevant period did not show that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for the alleged loan or at all. 

4.  The defendant further alleged that in early 2009 when Zhu and his associates left the defendant, they took away most of the defendant’s accounting documents and the defendant could not provide any further explanation on this transaction.

5.  Five days before the hearing below, the defendant sought to produce a further affidavit to explain that the money channelled from the plaintiff’s account to the defendant on 21 November 2006 in fact came from the defendant’s wholly-owned mainland subsidiary. Hence, there was no loan due to the plaintiff.  The scheme as alleged by the defendant was a transfer that could have amounted to a contravention of the mainland’s law of currency control.

Analyses

6.  At the hearing below, the master refused the defendant’s application to admit further evidence as there were no exceptional circumstances as required by Order 32, rule 11(4) of the Rules of the High Court.  The master also placed no weight on the defendant’s audited account. He took the view that since money had been paid to the defendant and the defendant could not discharge the burden by explaining why it was not a loan, then it would be presumed to be a loan repayable on demand (see Seldon v Davidson [1968] 1WLR 1083 and Mak Ka Hing v Pang Ming Chung [2011] 1 HKLRD 347 at para 23).  The master then entered judgment for the plaintiff with costs. 

7.  However, a study of the evidence, in particular the audited account of the defendant for the year ending 31 December 2006, reveals that there are significant features that warrant consideration. The audited account of the defendant was signed off by the chairman of the defendant’s board on 23 July 2007.  At that time, Zhu’s camp was still in control of the defendant’s board and Zhu was the chairman who signed off the account.  Zhu in particular signed the balance sheet of the defendant’s group and the balance sheet of the defendant itself which were parts of the audited account.  Hence, the Zhu camp and, in particular, Zhu himself was aware of the information in the audited account. 

8.  If the plaintiff should have lent US$4,042,800 to the defendant, there was no reason for the loan not to be shown in the defendant’s audited account.  Mr Zhu would also not have signed the account and the balance sheets without the acknowledgement of the debt due to the plaintiff as he directly and indirectly owned 75% of the plaintiff but only 55% of the defendant.

9.  The audited account of the defendant showed no liability to the plaintiff or anyone to the tune of US$4,042,800.  The significant liabilities were a sum of HK$164,168,868 due to its immediate holding company, Nantong Xinda Harbour Investment Limited, and a loan of HK$32,456,015 due to its wholly-owned mainland subsidiary.  There was another liability of ¨other payables and accruals¨ at a small sum of HK$4,033,701 due from a subsidiary of the defendant to an unnamed third party.  This could not have been the loan advanced by the plaintiff.

10.  As pointed out above, the defendant’s audited account has been verified by Zhu’s signature.  If the plaintiff’s case is truthful, then the defendant’s audited account has an anomaly in not showing this liability at US$4,042,800 due to the plaintiff.  But Zhu or his associates have not offered any explanation for this anomaly.  

11.  If there was such a loan advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant, the auditors of the plaintiff in the course of auditing the plaintiff’s account would have asked for a written acknowledgement by the defendant to confirm the existence of the loan.  Since the defendant was under the control of Zhu’s camp up to 22 December 2008 when two of Zhu’s associates resigned from the defendant’s board, if there was indeed such a loan and that an acknowledgement had been asked for by the plaintiff’s auditors, there was no reason why the defendant would have failed or refused to provide the acknowledgement.  Hence, if there was indeed this loan, it would have been confirmed by the defendant in an acknowledgement and then recorded in the plaintiff’s audited account covering the date in question.  The loan may appear in the audited account of the plaintiff as a loan due from the defendant or an unnamed third party or as part of some loans due from third parties to the plaintiff and totalling more than US$4,042,800, but the plaintiff has not produced its relevant audited account or the acknowledgement by the defendant to prove the loan.  The situation remained even after the defendant had produced its own audited account covering the relevant date and showing that there was no such loan.  I think this is surprising.

12.  When the defendant borrowed loans from a bank, there was a resolution by the defendant´s board which had been produced by the plaintiff.  There was, however, no copy of any resolution of the board of the plaintiff which approved the loan of US$4,042,800 to be advanced to the defendant on terms of interest-free, unsecured and repayable on demand.  The plaintiff and the defendant were not in the same group though they were both in the control of Zhu.  I see no reason for the plaintiff’s board not to make a resolution to authorise the advancement of this loan.

13.  There is also no explanation why the plaintiff, not being the holding company or subsidiary or in the same group of the defendant, would have agreed to advance so much money to the defendant on terms of no security, interest-free and repayable only on demand and not recorded in any loan documentation.

14.  Furthermore, the alleged loan has been outstanding from 21 November 2006 to 8 July 2009 (2 years and 229 days) interest-free.  Even a 5% per annum interest rate on the loan would have produced interest at US$531,102.08 (or the equivalent in HK$4,042,596.22).  The rate of 5% per annum is lower than the best lending rate of HSBC at all times since 2006.  The best lending rate is normally available only to clients of good standing and with good security provided to the bank. There is no explanation why the plaintiff should have been so generous to the defendant and exposed itself to such risk by advancing the huge sum interest-free and unsecured to the plaintiff.  I think this appears odd.

15.  Furthermore, note No. 11 of the notes to the audited account of the defendant at page 460 of the bundle shows a loan at HK$32,456,015 which was unsecured and interest-free and had no fixed term of repayment, and that was due from the defendant to its wholly-owned mainland subsidiary.  This sum is quite close to the amount of the alleged loan.

16.  There is no dispute that US$4,042,800 has indeed gone from the plaintiff’s bank account to the defendant’s bank account, but that might or might not have been payment by the plaintiff in its own right to the defendant as a matter of accounting.  The audited account of the defendant showed that the defendant was indebted to its holding company and its wholly-owned subsidiary, but not to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff might have paid money in its own right to the defendant or it might have paid the money on behalf of the defendant’s holding company or wholly-owned subsidiary instead of out of its own resources. 

Decision

17.  The plaintiff is seeking payment of US$4,042,800 on the strength of two transfer documents plus the verbal assertion of an affirmant who has no first-hand information on the matter.  I think the matters discussed above are significant matters that warrant investigation before the plaintiff should be given judgment for this huge sum. 

18.  If payment of this huge sum should now be made to the plaintiff pursuant to the judgment, there is a real possibility that the defendant, its holding company or wholly-owned subsidiary might be defrauded. I therefore allow the appeal on the judgment and set aside the judgment.  I also give the defendant unconditional leave to defend.

19.  Regarding the defendant’s application for admission of further evidence, the defendant has not said a word on why it suddenly saw the need and wisdom to go to its mainland subsidiary to investigate the matter there and then found the answer to the problem.  I do not think any exceptional circumstances have been shown to justify the admission of evidence at that late stage.  I therefore dismiss that part of the appeal in relation to the master’s refusal to admit evidence.

Costs order nisi

20.  I now make a costs order nisi.  I order the plaintiff to pay the defendant the costs of the appeal for setting aside the judgment; the costs of the hearing below for summary judgment be in the cause; and the defendant do pay the plaintiff the costs of the part of the appeal in relation to the admission of further evidence and the hearing below for this.  I also direct the parties to fix a 9:30 am appointment outside the next 21 days for summary assessment of these costs unless an application shall have been made within the next 14 days for variation of the costs order nisi.

(L. Chan)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Jat Sew Tong, SC and Mr Keith Lam, instructed by Messrs Stephen Mok & Co., for the Plaintiff

Mr Jean-Paul Wou, instructed by Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co., for the Defendant

69311-EN-2010-01-13

FOURWAY (HK) LTD v. CHINA NANTONG HARBOUR LOGISTICS LTD

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HCA 1618/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1618 OF 2009

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 FOURWAY (HK) LIMITEDPlaintiff
 And 
 CHINA NANTONG HARBOUR LOGISTICS LIMITED
(previously known as CHINA GROUP LOGISTICS LIMITED)
Defendant

----------------------

Coram : Before Master J. Wong in Chambers

Date of Hearing :   17 November 2009

Date of Decision   :   13 January 2010

----------------------

D E C I S I O N

----------------------

 

Introduction

1. This is an application for summary judgment by the Plaintiff.

Background

2. On 20 July 2009, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings against the Defendant to recover 2 advancements totalling USD4,042,800 (USD2,912,800 + USD1,130,000), interest and costs.

3. The Defendant contested the proceedings and filed a Defence.  Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Jat, S.C., summed up it succinctly in the followings:

“5.  ……

(1)    There is no record of any liability to Fourway (the Plaintiff) in the audited accounts of CNHL for the year 2006 ……

(2)    Mr Zhu Ming, a former director of both Fourway (the Plaintiff) and CNHL (the Defendant), was the de facto controller of both companies at the time the Advances were made ……

(3)    Fourway (the Plaintiff) refused to provide proper and full answers to CNHL’s (the Defendant’s) requests for Further and Better Particulars ……”

(Mr. Jat’s skeleton dated 12 November 2009)

4. Regarding the lack of Further and Better Particulars, later, by consent, on 14 September 2009, the Plaintiff provided them to the Defendant.  In short, the Plaintiff answered that the advancements were loans made to the Defendant.  The Plaintiff did transfer the sums to the Defendant who then used them to settle its debts to a bank.  No interest was charged on the advancements but they were repayable on demand.  On the same date, the Plaintiff also issued the present application for summary judgment.

5. The Defendant was not satisfied with the Answers and sought a stay of the proceedings, including the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application, pending the Further and Better Particulars it had asked.  On 2 October 2009, Madam Registrar Au-Yeung ordered, inter alia, a dismissal of the Defendant’s application for Further and Better Particulars.  She further adjourned the Order 14 application for argument with 2 hours reserved, together with usual directions for filing and serving of affidavit evidence.  The learned Registrar also directed that no further affidavit was to be filed without leave of the Court.

6. There has been no appeal of the order of Madam Registrar.

7. Regarding the Order 14 application, the following evidence were filed and served:

(a)  Affirmation of Chen Ye (support) 14 September 2009

(b) Affirmation of Leung Ping Herman (opposition) 30 September 2009

(c)  2nd Affirmation of Chen Ye (reply) 4 November 2009

Briefly, in the said affirmation of opposition, the Defendant repeated the above summing up by Mr. Jat, S.C. as per paragraph 3 herein.  It further complained that the Plaintiff had not sufficiently dealt with its Request for Further and Better Particulars.  Nonetheless, apparently, Madam Registrar had rejected such argument when she dismissed the Defendant’s application as aforesaid.

8. I heard the Order 14 application on 17 November 2009.

Late application to adduce evidence

9. 5 days before the substantive hearing, the Defendant issued a summons seeking to adduce a supplemental affirmation in opposition.  Having heard from both Counsel, I refused the same and agreed to give reasons later.  Here are them.

(a)   To avoid last-minute evidence, the new Order 32 rule 11(4) RHC states that:

“Where the determination of the application is adjourned for the hearing of the summons, no further evidence may be adduced unless it appears to the Court that there are exceptional circumstances (emphasis added) making it desirable that further evidence should be adduced.”

(b)   Mr. Wou, Counsel for the Defendant, has not been able to satisfy me that there are exceptional circumstances herein.  The main argument of the Defendant lied on the complaint that the Plaintiff had failed to make full and frank disclosure to the Court.  Without the Particulars the Defendant wanted, it was not difficult, if not impossible, to deal with the case.  However, upon the dismissal by Madam Registrar Au-Yeung of the Request for Further and Better Particulars, the Defendant could no longer rely on such argument.

(c)   Further, as suggested by Mr. Jat, S.C., it was:

“7. Now, for the first time, various allegations of wrongdoing are made, including that:

(1)  The Advances on which Fourway (the Plaintiff) is claiming were in fact part of a scheme to overcome PRC foreign exchange restrictions;

(2)  Zhu Ming and Chong misappropriated funds from the Xinda Group;

(3)  Zhu Ming has removed unlawfully the accounts and books of CNHL (the Defendant).

……

8.  ……

9.  CNHL (the Defendant) had every opportunity to raise the matters in Leung 2nd either in Leung 1st or the Directions Hearings on 2 October 2009.”

(Mr. Jat’s supplemental skeleton dated 6 November 2009)

(d)   While I need not go so far to the extent, as suggested by Mr. Jat, S.C., that the late application is to ambush the Plaintiff, it clearly will delay the proceedings so that the case is not dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.

(e)   Last, but not least, the Defendant has not satisfied me of any ground as laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1489, including that the new evidence could not have been adduced with reasonable diligence (para. 32/11/3, HKCP 2010, at page 676).

The Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment

10. With the above in mind, including the dismissal of the Defendant’s application for Further and Better Particulars on the Statement of Claim, the case of the Defendant left is a denial of the Plaintiff’s claim.  Should summary judgment be entered for the Plaintiff as prayed?

11. At this juncture, I remind myself of the general principles relating to summary judgment.  The underlying policy of Order 14 application is to prevent the defendant from delaying the plaintiff to obtain judgment in a case where the defendant clearly has no defence.  Facing such application, the Court asks 2 questions.

(a)   Factually, is what the defendant says believable in light of the undisputed or indisputable circumstances?  In so doing, the Court is entitled to take into account the commercial reality as well as contemporaneous documents.  However, mini-trial on affidavit evidence shall not be embarked.  Bare assertion is sufficient and the defendant must condescend upon particulars.

(b)   Legally, if what the defendant says is believable, does it amount to an arguable defence in law?

In the end, the burden lies on the defendant to show triable issue or some other reasons for a trial.

12. Upon consideration of the evidence, authorities and submissions before me, I have decided to allow the Plaintiff’s application in the circumstances.

(a)   It is not disputed or undisputable that the Plaintiff did transfer the 2 advancements to the Defendant who then used them to repay its bank.

(b)   The documents are presumed to be a loan repayable on demand, unless proven otherwise (Seldon v Davidson [1968] 1 WLR 1083 and Mak Ka Hing v Pang Ming Chung CACV 215/2002, unreported, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 23).

(c)   The Defendant simply denied that they were not loans.  Bare denial is clearly not good enough to raise triable issue or some other reason for trial.

(d)   I also agree with Mr. Jat, S.C. that:

“11.   A closer look at the matters relied on by CNHL sheds no light on what defence it is relying on.  The matters raised by CNHL, even if true, do not go to show that the Advances were not a loan.

(1)  Whether Mr Zhu was the “de facto controller” of both Fourway and CNHL at the time does not show that the Advances were not a loan.

(2)  As to CNHL’s audited accounts for the year 2006, this of itself shows nothing.  There is no evidence as to how the accounts were prepared, what information were provided to the auditors, or whether the Advances have been reflected in the items appearing in the accounts.”

(Skeleton of Mr. Jat dated 12 November 2009)

Conclusion

13. To conclude, I will make the following orders.

(a)   As to the Defendant’s summons filed on 12 November 2009, the application to adduce new evidence is dismissed with an order nisi that the Defendant shall bear costs of the Plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed.

(b)   Regarding the Plaintiff’s summons filed on 14 September 2009, summary judgment is allowed with an order nisi that the Plaintiff will have costs thereof as well as the whole action, including all costs reserved and Certificate for one Counsel for hearing on 17 November 2009, to be taxed if not agreed.

(c)   The Defendant’s application for leave to file and serve an Amended Defence as contained in the summons filed on 28 September 2009 is dismissed with a costs order nisi for the Plaintiff, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed.

   

 (Jack Wong)
Master of the High Court

Mr. S.T. Jat, S.C. instructed by Messrs. Stephen Mok & Co. for Plaintiff.

Mr. Jean-Paul Wou instructed by Messrs. Stevenson Wong & Co. for Defendant.