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Civil Action2009

WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A. v. MONG HENRY

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69792-EN-2010-02-12

WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A. v. MONG HENRY

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HCA192/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 192 OF 2009

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BETWEEN

 WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A.Plaintiff
 and 
 MONG HENRY (孟享利)
(also known as MENG HENGLI) 
Defendant

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Before : Hon Chu J in chambers

Date of Hearing : 8 September 2009

Date of Judgment : 12 February 2010

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  This is the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment.  

The facts

2.  The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Briefly stated, the plaintiff is the owner and operator of a casino and gaming resort in the Macau SAR.  The defendant was a patron of the casino.

3.  In October 2006, the defendant entered into an undated credit agreement (“the Credit Agreement”) with the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff agreed to lend to the defendant by way of advancing a credit line on the terms and conditions contained therein.

4.  For the present purpose, the following terms and conditions of the Credit Agreement are relevant:

(1)  Before drawing on his line of credit, if granted, the defendant shall sign credit instruments in the amount of the draw.

(2)  The defendant will pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of execution of the credit instruments and all costs of collection, including attorney fees and court fees.

(3)  Macau SAR law exclusively governs the terms of the credit line, advances or credit instruments.

5.  On or about 3 August 2008, the defendant received from the plaintiff credit in the sum of HK$30,000,000 for gambling at the plaintiff’s casino.  When he obtained the credit, the defendant had signed a credit instrument commonly known as a Marker in the same amount. 

6.  The defendant made partial repayments to the plaintiff in the total sum of HK$1,058,363.  In August 2008, the defendant gave the plaintiff a cheque in the sum of HK$28,941,637, but it was dishonoured upon presentation for payment.

The claim

7.  The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for the outstanding balance of HK$28,941,637 together with interest at 18% p.a. from 3 August 2008 until judgment and thereafter at judgment rate.  The plaintiff’s case is that the money was advanced to the defendant pursuant to the Credit Agreement and represents a debt evidenced by the defendant’s signature on the Marker.  In this summary judgment application, the other pleaded claim on the basis of the Marker as a promissory note is not pursued.

The defence

8.  The principal defence raised by the defendant is that the Credit Agreement is null and void and unenforceable.  The defendant’s case is that Article 8.2 of Ordinance No. 5 of 2004 of Macau SAR (“Ordinance No. 5/2004”) requires the plaintiff to submit a sample or pro forma credit agreement to the Macau SAR Government for approval.  As the plaintiff has failed to do so, the Credit Agreement is rendered null and void by section 287 of the Macau Civil Code.

9.  In reply, the plaintiff says that Article 8.2 of Ordinance No. 5/2004 only governs Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts (as defined below) and has no application to the Credit Agreement, which is an agreement between the casino and a gambler. 

The issue

10.  Accordingly, the core issue in this application is the construction of Article 8.2 of Ordinance No. 5/2004.  On this issue, both parties have put in expert evidence on Macanese law with specific reference to the interpretation of Article 8.2 of Ordinance No. 5/2004.  For the defendant, he relies on the legal opinions of Mr Henrique Miguel Cravo, a Macau lawyer.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, relies on the opinions given by two lawyers practising in Macau, Mr Miguel de Pedro Saldanha and Mr Rui Luis Cabral Sousa. 

Ordinance No. 5/2004

11.  Ordinance No. 5/2004 was passed on 31 May 2004 and took effect on 1 July 2004.  Prior to its enactment, the law of Macau did not permit credit for gaming and it was a criminal offence to grant gaming credit.  The effect of Ordinance No.5/2004 is the decriminalisation of the extension of credit for gaming in casino.

12.  The statute contains 18 Articles. For the present application, it will suffice to consider Articles 1 to 8.  The English translation of these Articles is set out in the Annexure to this Judgment.

13.  Article 1 describes the object of the Ordinance, which is the regulation of gaming and credit betting in casinos in Macau.  Article 2 defines gaming credit. 

14.  Article 3 defines credit entities, being entities allowed by law to grant gaming credit.  Under Article 3.1, Concessionaire and Sub-Concessionaire are permitted to provide gaming credit.  The plaintiff is one of the three Concessionaires in Macau.  Under Article 3.2, a Gaming Promoter may also grant gaming credit if he contracts with a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire.  Article 3.6 further makes it clear that a credit relationship can only arise between: (i) a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler or punter; (ii) a Gaming Promoter and a gambler or punter; and (iii) a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a Gaming Promoter.  The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant comes within the first credit relationship.

15.  Under Article 5.3, a Gaming Promoter or a management company of a Concessionaire may by means of an authorisation or agency contract, do legal acts or execute contracts in the name of and for the benefit of a credit entity.  Other than this, Article 5 prohibits the transfer of the qualification of the credit entity to a third party. 

16.  Article 4 provides that the credits advanced shall have the effect of legal debts.  Articles 6 and 7 deal with the obligations of a credit entity to cooperate with the Macau Government and to comply with the relevant laws and regulations.

17.  Article 8 is entitled “contract”.  Article 8.1 expressly relates to two types of contracts: (i) contracts referred to under Article 3.2, namely, contracts made between Gaming Promoters and Concessionaires or Sub-Concessionaires (“Promoter Contracts”); and (ii) contracts referred to in Article 5.3, namely, authorisation or agency contracts made between Gaming Promoters or management companies and Concessionaires or Sub-Concessionaires (“Agency Contracts”).   Article 8.1 requires these two types of contracts to be executed in written form and in three original copies, with the signatures being verified at the scene. 

18.  Article 8.2, with which this case is directly concerned, deals with the requirement of government approval.  It reads:

“Any contract, documents supplemental to the contract, and drafts amending those documents shall be approved by the Government.  The Government may order any provisions in the aforesaid drafts to be amended on the ground of principles of legality or public interest.”

19.  Articles 8.3 and 8.4 require Concessionaires and Sub-Concessionaires to submit to the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (“DICJ”) an original copy of the contract and the supplemental documents after they have been executed and also the amended copies if there is any amendment.  Articles 8.5 and 8.6 relate to the declaration and provision on governing law and jurisdiction that are required to be included in the contracts.  Article 8.7, which is the last clause in Article 8, provides that any provision in the contracts, supplemental documents and amendments that are inconsistent with the drafts as approved by the Government shall be ineffective.

The defendant’s expert evidence

20.  The basic tenet of the legal opinion given by the defendant’s expert, Mr Cravo, is that Article 8.2 as well as the remainder of the clauses in Article 8 (except clause 1) can apply to contracts made between the parties referred to in Article 3.6, including contracts between a Concessionaire and a gambler such as the Credit Agreement.  His reasons are several.  First, although Article 8.1 specifically refers to Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts, it does not necessarily follow that the scope of the remaining clauses in Article 8 are limited to these two types of contracts.  Second, Article 8.2 and the other clauses in Article 8 do not contain words that limit their scope of application to Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts.  Third, the purpose and object of Ordinance No. 5/2004 is the regulation of the business of gaming and credit betting as a whole and not only the non-credit contracts referred to in Article 8.1.  Five contractual relationships are covered by the Ordinance, namely, Promoter Contracts under Article 3.2, Agency Contracts under Article 5.3 and also the three credit relationships under Article 3.6.  There is no reason to exclude the credit contracts between the parties referred to in Article 3.6 from the application of Articles 8.2 to 8.7.  Further, the exclusion of such credit contracts will hamper the ability of the DICJ to supervise the credit business and frustrate the primary intent and object of the Ordinance.

21.   In support of his opinion, Mr Cravo refers to two documents issued by the DICJ.  The first is a Certification dated 8 April 2009 issued upon a request from the defendant’s solicitors.  The English translation of the relevant part of the Certification states: “it is hereby certified that, as of today, no draft contracts or documents supplemental thereto referred to in Article 8.2 of Law No. 5/2004 that governs credit concession for betting in games of chance in casino in the Macau SAR, have been approved and therefore we are not able to issue to [the plaintiff] a certificate of the draft of the credit agreement approved by the Government of the Macau SAR.”  The second is DICJ’s Reply given on 15 May 2009 to the written Interpellation of a member of the Macau Legislative Assembly.  The English translation of paragraph 8 of the Reply reads: “Nevertheless, a casino gaming contract or a credit agreement must be made in accordance with the sample contract as approved by the Government of Macau Special Administrative Region, otherwise the provisions of the contract are null and void.  This also applies to the documents supplemental to the credit agreement. (See Section 2 and Section 7 of Article 8)”.

22. In Mr Cravo’s opinion, these documents show that the DICJ also holds the view that Article 8.2 applies to a credit agreement.  It is said that DICJ’s views and understanding of Ordinance No. 5/2004 and, in particular, Article 8.2 should carry significant weight, having regard to its role in the supervision and monitoring of the activities of Concessionaires.

The plaintiff’s expert evidence

23. The opinion of the plaintiff’s experts, on the other hand, is that the entire Article 8 only applies to the two types of contracts referred to in Article 8.1 (i.e. Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts).  The reasoning of Mr Saldanha is that in the absence of express provision to the contrary, the other clauses in Article 8, which follow on from clause 1, should be construed as applying to the two types of contracts referred to in Article 8.1.  He draws support from Article 8.3, which requires a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire to submit an original copy of the contract to the DICJ.  He points out that if this Article also applies to a credit agreement (in addition to Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts), it will create an oddity in that there is no concurrent obligation to submit an original copy of a contract between a Gambling Promoter and a gambler.

24. In addition to agreeing with the reasoning of Mr Saldanha, Mr Sousa says that as a matter of structure and logical sequence of Article 8, Article 8.2 should be read as having the same scope as Article 8.1.  This is because if the legislator had intended a wider scope for the other clauses in Article 8, the best solution would be to state so expressly.  And if the legislator does not distinguish between the clauses, then Article 8.2 should be construed as maintaining the same scope as Article 1, instead of extending or widening its scope. 

25. With regard to the intent and object of Ordinance No. 5/2004, Mr Sousa says that they are best ascertained by looking at two documents that introduced and explained the bill.  They are: (i) the Foreword of the bill upon its first presentation to the Legislative Assembly; and (ii) Opinion no. 1/II/2004 issued by the 3rd Permanent Commission of the Legislative Assembly on 25 May 2004. 

26. In respect of the Foreword, it is said that it makes clear that the legislative intent is not to regulate and control each and every detail of gambling credit activities and gambling contracts.  When referring to what is now Articles 5 to 8 of the Ordinance, the Foreword states that management companies and Gaming Promoters are permitted to enter into credit agreements in the name of and for the benefit of the credit grantors (i.e. the Concessionaires and Sub-Concessionaires) through the adoption of authorisation or agency agreements.  The Foreword goes on to indicate that such authorisation is subject to government approval and the agreements are required to be in writing with the Government being given notice of their execution and any amendments thereto.  Mr Sousa observes that in the context of Articles 5 to 8, the Foreword has made no reference to credit agreement between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler.  This, he says, shows that Article 8 is not intended to extend to credit agreement between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler. 

27. As for Opinion 1/II/2004, it is in the nature of a report of the 3rd Permanent Commission, which was entrusted with the task of scrutinizing the bill.  Section 3 of the Opinion contains a detailed account and explanations of the changes made to each of the Articles in the final version of the law.  When dealing with Article 8, the Opinion states that while Promoter Contracts (under Article 3.2) and Agency Contracts (under Article 5.3) are subject to government regulation after they come into existence, the insertion of Article 8.2 serves to perfect the regulatory mechanism by enabling the exercise of government control before or during the creation of the contracts.  In explaining Articles 8.3 and 8.4, the Opinion states that the statutory obligations (to submit contract, supplemental document or amendment) should be carried out by the Concessionaires or Sub-Concessionaires who enter into Promoter Contracts under Article 3.2 or Agency Contracts under Article 5.3.

28. Mr Sousa’s opinion is that the Opinion is a clear illustration that the legislature only intends Article 8 to apply to Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts and that Article 8.2 is not applicable to credit agreement between Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and gambler. 

29. In addition, Mr Sousa also refers to the principle of the unity of the legal system, which is a principle of legislative interpretation under Macanese law. The principle requires that when interpreting a statutory provision, regard should be made to the complete structure, wording and system of the statute.  Applying the principle and noting that Ordinance No. 5/2004 is structured according to topics and Article 8 contains no reference to gaming credit activity, Mr Sousa concludes that Article 8 should not be read as setting out to regulate gaming credit activity.

30.  In relation to the role of DICJ, Mr Sousa refers to Administrative Regulations 34/2003 dated 3 November 2003, under which the role and duties of DICJ are set out.  He points out that interpretation of legislations is not part of DICJ’s legal role and responsibilities and that the power of legislative interpretation lies with the Legislative Assembly.  As such, the views expressed by DICJ on the meaning and scope of Article 8.2 are not officially binding.  It is also Mr Sousa’s opinion that the view of the DICJ in the Reply dated 15 May 2009 that a credit agreement must conform to the draft previously approved by the Government is incorrect.

Interpretation of Article 8.2

31.  It is plain from the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue that there is as yet in Macau no conclusive or binding interpretation of the general scope of Article 8 or the particular meaning and scope of Article 8.2.  It is therefore for this court to come to a view as to whether Article 8.2 covers a credit agreement made between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler or whether it only governs the two types of contracts referred to in Article 8.1.

32.  Before dealing with the point, I will first deal with Mr Lau’s submission that this court cannot and should not resolve the differences in opinions between the experts without hearing their evidence and subjecting them to cross-examination.  It is also Mr Lau’s submission that there is a need to call evidence from the DICJ.  The expertise and credibility of the experts is not in issue.  Each of them has given detailed and extensive reasons for their opinions.  Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the contents of their affidavits, I agree with Mr Hunsworth that oral evidence or cross-examinations of the experts or witnesses from the DICJ will not take the matter any further.  The bulk of the relevant evidence is already before the court.  This court is therefore in as good a position as it is at trial to decide on the dispute between the parties. 

33.  I now turn to the issue that underlies this case.  In my view, in ascertaining the meaning and scope of the Article 8.2, the starting point must be its language and its context in the light of Article 8 and Ordinance No. 5/2004 as a whole.  It is true that when read alone, Article 8.2 contains no express word that limits its scope to Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts.  However, it is equally true that Article 8.2 is one of a series of clauses within an Article dealing with contracts.  Accordingly, Article 8.2 cannot be read in isolation in establishing what contracts are covered by it.  It is common ground that Article 8.1, being the first clause in Article 8, makes specific reference to only two types of contracts.  It is also not in dispute that the remaining six clauses in Article 8 when referring to “contract” or “document”, do not define or specify what contract or document is being covered.  Having regard to the layout and arrangement of Article 8, I am of the view that the clauses in it should receive a consistent construction.  Hence, the references to “contract” in Articles 8.2 to 8.7 should bear the same meaning as that in Article 8.1 and references to “document” are references to documents supplemental to the two types of contracts referred to in Article 8.1. 

34.  Such a construction is also consistent with the general structure of Ordinance No. 5/2004.  The articles in the Ordinance are structured by topics and follow a logical sequence.  The legal framework for the conduct of gaming credit business is set out between Articles 2 to 8, with each article dealing with a specific aspect of it.  Article 8 is the provision dealing specifically with the formalities and requirements of contracts.  This lends support to the conclusion that each Article should receive a consistent and coherent interpretation.  Further, throughout the Ordinance, only two types of contracts (Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts) are being specified.  Mr Cravo has referred to Article 3.6, but it is only dealing with credit relationships and the legislature has chosen not to describe them as credit contracts or make specific reference to contracts between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler or punter and contacts between a gaming Promoter and a gambler or punter.  Considering the principle of the unity of the legal system referred to by Mr Sousa, the applicability of which does not appear to be disputed by Mr Cravo, it will show that the contracts intended to be covered by Article 8.2 and Article 8 as a whole are the Promoter Contracts and Agency Contracts.

35.  As to the views expressed by the DICJ in the two documents they had issued, they are one piece of evidence to be considered by this court when deciding on what should be the proper construction of Article 8.2.  The DICJ’s views are not binding or conclusive on the point.  Similarly, the Foreword and Opinion 1/II/2004 provide other pieces of relevant evidence for consideration by this court on the issue of  interpretation. 

36.  In my view, Opinion 1/II/2004 gives a direct and helpful indication of the legislative intent underlying the enactment of Article 8.2, and in turn the types of contracts that it sets out to govern.  It offers support to the conclusion that Article 8.2 should receive the same construction as Article 8.1 in terms of what types of contracts are required to be approved by the Government.  By contrast, the DICJ had given no indication as to the reasons or basis for its view that Article 8.2 requires a credit agreement to be approved by the Government.         

Conclusion

37.  For the above reasons, I prefer the opinion of Mr Saldanha and Mr Sousa to that of Mr Cravo.  Article 8.2 of Ordinance No. 5/2004 has no application to a credit agreement made between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and a gambler.  I do not consider the defence that the Credit Agreement is null and void and unenforceable by reason of non-compliance with Article 8.2 gives rise to any triable issue.  The plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment as  claimed. 

38.  Accordingly, I enter summary judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of HK$28,941,637 together with interest thereon at 18% p.a. from 3 August 2008 to the date of this Judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.

39.  Applying the normal rule of costs follow event, there is also an order that the defendant pays the plaintiff the costs of this action, including the costs of this application and all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed.

                 

 (C Chu)
Judge of Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Nicholas Hunsworth of Messrs JSM for the plaintiff.

Mr Eric Y N Lau instructed by Messrs Livasiri & Co for the defendant.


Annexure

Articles 1 to 8 of Ordinance No. 5 of 2004 of the Macau SAR

Article 1—Object

This law regulates the business of gaming or credit betting within the casino gaming areas in Macao Special Administrative Region (‘credit’).

Article 2—Credit

1.      Credit shall be established only where a credit entity transfers its ownership rights of the chips used for casino gaming to a third person, but there is no immediate payment of ready money in relation to such transfer.

2.      For the purposes of the above Clause, the following shall be considered as ready money:

(i)      cash;

(ii)     traveller’s cheques;

(iii)    certified cheques;

(iv)    cashier’s orders or cashier’s cheques;

(v)     money orders;

(vi)    postal orders;

(vii)   deposits into bank of any transfer notes which can be directly converted into cash balance;

(viii)  deposits into bank pursuant to transactions such as bank transfer, fund transfer or setting-off between accounts;

(ix)    Electronic Funds Transfer made by way of electronic payment devices;

(x)     any marketable notes offered by concessionaire which operates casino gaming or other forms of gaming (‘Concessionaire’) or sub-concessionaire which operates casino gaming or other forms of gaming (‘Sub-concessionaire’), without requiring any consideration, to gamblers or punters and accepted to be a payment device for the transfer as referred to in the above Clause;

(xi)    any other conduct, transaction or device which is stipulated by way of approval by the Chief Executive as equivalent to ready money.

3.      For the purposes of Sub-clause (ix) of the Clause above, the following shall be considered as electronic payment devices;

(i)      cards for making payment, including credit cards and debit cards;

(ii)     electronic money devices which make use of electronic software to save the amount onto a card, or electronic money devices which record the cash balance onto the saving device of a computer.

4.      If any creditor’s rights created pursuant to a transfer as referred to in Clause 1 are embodied in debt instruments, such debt instruments can be bearer securities, or order instruments, including order instruments issued in series.

Article 3—Credit Entity

1.   The following entities are conferred the qualification to engage in credit business :

(i)      Concessionaire;

(ii)     Sub-Concessionaire.

2.   A casino gaming promoter (‘Gaming Promoter’) is also conferred the qualification to, via contracting with a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire, engage in credit business.

3.   If a credit entity is in material breach of the laws or regulations applicable to credit business, or if it has displayed an apparent want of technical capability to engage in credit business, the Government of Macao Special Administrative Region (‘Government’) may order that credit entity to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business, or may impose conditions for its engagement in credit business, without prejudice to any proceedings in relation to administrative illegalities that should be initiated or any civil or criminal liabilities that should be borne.

4.   If a credit entity is ordered to terminate its engagement in credit business pursuant to the above Clause, it shall lose its qualification to engage in credit business.

5.   If a person who has been ordered to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business under Clause 3 is a Gaming Promoter, then, depending on whether he is ordered to suspend or to terminate its engagement in credit business, the relevant Gaming Promoter shall be forbidden temporarily or absolutely to carry out any legal activity or to execute any contract in respect of credit business pursuant to Clause 3 of Article 5.

6.   A credit relationship can only arise:

(i)      between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire being a credit entity and a gambler or punter being a borrower;

(ii)     between a Gaming Promoter being a credit entity and a gambler or punter being a borrower; or

(iii)    between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire being a credit entity and a Gaming Promoter being a borrower.

Article 4—Effect

Credits advanced under this law shall have the effect of creating legal debts.

Article 5—Non-transferability

1.   A credit entity shall not engage in credit business through another party or entity.

2.   Any conduct or contract the object of which is to transfer the qualification of the credit entity to a third person in any form or any name shall be ineffective.

3.   A management company with the right to manage a casino gaming operation or any other form of gaming operation of a Concessionaire (‘Management Company’), or a Gaming Promoter, may, by means of an authorisation contract or an agency contract, do legal acts or execute contracts in the name and for the interest of a credit entity as stated in Clause 1 of Article 3, but without prejudice to the applicability of the two Clauses above.

4.   If a Management Company or a Gaming Promoter is in material breach of the laws or regulations applicable to credit business, or if it has displayed an apparent want of technical capability to engage in credit business, the Government may order the relevant Management Company or Gaming Promoter to suspend, temporarily or absolutely, from doing any legal act or executing any contract in respect of credit business in accordance with the Clause above, without prejudice to the applicability of Clause 3 of Article 3; in the case of a Gaming Promoter, the Government may additionally order the relevant Gaming Promoter to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business which it is otherwise qualified to engage in pursuant to Clause 2 of Article 3.

5.   Where the circumstances as referred to in Clause 3 arise, Articles 6 and 7 shall be applicable to a Management Company or a Gaming Promoter after necessary adaptation.

Article 6—Obligation to cooperate

A credit entity shall have a special obligation to cooperate with the Government.  Accordingly, upon the request of the Government, a credit entity shall produce all documents, information or evidence, and shall give any permission.

Article 7—General principle

A credit entity shall comply with all the laws and regulations applicable to credit business; any violation of such regulations shall be taken into account in determining whether or not it has the suitable qualifications to be a Concessionaire, Sub-Concessionaire or Gaming Promoter, without prejudice to the applicability of Clause 3 of Article 3.

Article 8—Contract

1.   The contract as stated in Clause 2 of Article 3 and Clause 3 of Article 5 must be executed in written form and in three original identical copies, and all the relevant signatures shall be verified at the scene by a notary public.

2.    Any contract, documents supplemental to the contract, and drafts amending those documents shall be approved by the Government.  The Government may order any provisions in the aforesaid drafts to be amended on the ground of principles of legality or public interest.

3.   Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire shall, within fifteen days after execution of contract, submit one original copy of the contract and copies of all the supplemental documents to the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau of Macau (‘DICJ’).

4.   If there is any amendment to the contract or the supplemental documents, the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire shall submit the amended copies to DICJ within fifteen days.

5.   The supplemental documents as referred to in Clause 3 and Clause 4 shall enclose a declaration which is signed by the legal delegate of the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and is binding on the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire.  The signature and identity shall be verified by a notary public.  The declaration shall provide that the legal delegate shall with his honour undertake and declare that the information as contained in the relevant documents are accurate and up-to-date, and declare that those documents are copies of the originals.

6.   The contract shall include relevant provisions stating that the parties to the contract have agreed to surrender to be governed by any jurisdiction outside Macao Special Administrative Region, and shall be bound by the laws of Macao Special Administrative Region as currently applicable.  If it is a contract as stated in Clause 3 of Article 5, it shall include a provision stating that it has surrendered to appoint a delegate or an agent, depending on whether it is an authorisation contract or an agency contract.

7.   Any provision as contained in the contract, documents supplemental to the contract and any provision amending those documents which are inconsistent with the relevant drafts as approved by the Government shall be considered as ineffective.

67017-EN-2009-08-10

WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A. v. MONG HENRY

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66441-EN-2009-06-29

WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A. v. MONG HENRY

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HCA192/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 192 OF 2009

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BETWEEN  
    WYNN RESORTS (MACAU) S.A.Plaintiff
 and 
 MONG HENRY(孟亨利)
(also known as MONG HENGLI)
Defendant

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Before : Deputy High Court Judge Bharwaney SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 18 May 2009

Date of Judgment : 29 June 2009

 

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  This is an application by the defendant for a stay of proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens.  The defendant seeks a stay of proceedings on the ground that the court in the Macau SAR is the more convenient and appropriate forum for the trial of this action.

2.  The plaintiff owns and operates a casino and a resort in the Macau SAR.  The defendant was a patron of the casino operated by the plaintiff.  In or about October 2006, the defendant entered into a Credit Agreement with the plaintiff.  The credit requested for by the defendant at the time of entering into the Credit Agreement was HK$3,000,000.  The Credit Agreement also contained the defendant’s express agreement to sign credit instruments in the amount of the draw, before drawing on its line of credit, if granted.  The Credit Agreement further provided that Macau SAR law exclusively governed the terms of the credit line, advances or credit instruments and that the plaintiff could litigate any dispute involving the credit line, the debt or the payee in any court in Macau SAR and that the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of any court in Macau SAR.

3.  On 2 August 2008, the plaintiff advanced to the defendant a sum of HK$30,000,000 to gamble at the plaintiff’s casino, and the defendant signed a document, commonly known as a “Marker”, which recorded that HK$30,000,000 was payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. 

4.  In these proceedings, the plaintiff claims that sum from the defendant less the sum of about HK$1,000,000 which had previously been paid by the defendant.  

5.  It is pleaded in the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim that the loan of HK$30,000,000 made on 2 August 2008 was made pursuant to the Credit Agreement. 

6.  By §11 of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff brought action against the defendant in respect of 3 separate causes of action under the laws of the Macau SAR, namely, by suing under the Credit Agreement, by suing upon the Marker, and by suing on the debt represented by the Marker.

7.  However, in his submissions before me, Mr Nicholas Hunsworth (“Mr Hunsworth”), who appeared for the plaintiff, disavowed any intention to sue on the Marker as a Promissory Note.  He limited the plaintiff’s claims to a claim under the Credit Agreement and to a claim for the repayment of debt evidenced by the Marker. 

8.  It is not disputed that the defendant received the sum of HK$30,000,000 from the plaintiff on 2 August 2008 and that he signed the Marker for the same amount. 

9.  Ms Catrina Lam (“Ms Lam”) who appeared on behalf of the defendant submitted that the principal issues likely to arise at trial included :

(1) whether the alleged loan was advanced to the defendant pursuant to the credit line granted by the plaintiff under the Credit Agreement;

(2) if the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the Credit Agreement to claim repayment of the alleged loan, whether the Credit Agreement and the Marker were null and void by reason of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Article 8.2 of Ordinance No.5 of 2004;

(3) if the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the Credit Agreement, whether the plaintiff could nevertheless rely on the Marker to enforce the alleged loan notwithstanding its non-compliance with the requirements of a promissory note as set out in s. 1208 of the Macau Commercial Code;

As the plaintiff has made clear that it is not suing on the Marker as a promissory note, this issue no longer arises.

(4) alternatively, whether the plaintiff can nevertheless enforce the Marker against the defendant as a debt instrument under s.677(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

10.  I take, as a starting point, the principles summarised by Cheung JA in Pei Zheng Middle School & anor v China Pui Ching Education Foundation Ltd & ors [2006] HKCU 292 (CACV262/2005, 21 February 2006, unreported) as follows :

“1. The single question to be decided is whether there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of an action i.e. in which the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice?

2.   In order to answer this question, the application for the stay has to establish that first, Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum (‘appropriate’ in this context means the forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action) and second, there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong.  Failure by the application to establish these two matters at this stage is fatal.   

3.   If the applicant is able to establish both of these two matters, then the plaintiff in the Hong Kong proceedings has to show that he will be deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action is tried in a forum other than Hong Kong.

4.   If the plaintiff is able to establish this, the court will have to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer.  Deprivation of one or more personal advantages will not necessarily be fatal to the applicant for the stay if he is able to establish to the court’s satisfaction that substantial justice will be done in the available appropriate forum.

…”  [emphasis added]

11.  I agree with Ms Lam’s submissions that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum or the forum having the most real and substantial and connection with the action.  That forum has to be Macau for the reason that Macanese law is the governing law of the relevant transactions and because all the relevant events took place in Macau.  In addition, the plaintiff is a company incorporated under the laws of Macau.

12.  The main contest between the parties turned on the 2nd limb of the question, namely, whether Macau was clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong as a forum for the determination of this case. 

13.  Ms Lam submitted that the fact that all the relevant events took place in Macau and the fact that the plaintiff is a company incorporated under the laws of Macau made Macau clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong.  I do not agree.  Documentary evidence can be adduced in the courts of Hong Kong and witnesses can come to Hong Kong to give evidence, if required to do so.  The fact that the plaintiff is willing to submit to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong neutralises any weight to be placed on the fact that it is incorporated in Macau. 

14.  The defendant has no connection with Macau apart from the fact that he gambles there.  He does have a connection to Hong Kong in that he stays in Hong Kong for about 60 days in a year and appears to have some interests in a property in Hong Kong in which he resides and which is owned by a BVI company of which he is the sole director.  He also holds at least two bank accounts in Hong Kong.  Any judgment obtained by the plaintiff in Hong Kong is therefore capable of immediate enforcement here.  On the other hand, a Macau Judgment is not directly enforceable:  the plaintiff would need to apply for summary judgment based on the Macau Judgment as a foreign judgment. 

15.  Furthermore, the availability of Macau as a forum for the trial of this action does not make it clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum than Hong Kong.  The fact that the defendant has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Macau Courts by the express terms of the Credit Agreement and is willing to give an undertaking that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the Macau Courts is a factor which carries less weight when contrasted with the fact that he has a close connection to Hong Kong.

16.  Further, the terms of the Credit Agreement, which expressly provide that the plaintiff may litigate any disputes against foreign defendants in Macau, do not prevent the plaintiff from suing the defendant outside Macau, and is not a factor which makes Macau clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum than Hong Kong.

17.  As Ms Lam developed her oral submissions, it became clear that the main point being made on behalf of the defendant, in support of the submission that Macau was clearly or distinctly the more appropriate forum, was that the case raised difficult issues of Macau law which the Macau courts were better equipped to deal with than the Hong Kong courts.  On this matter, I am guided by the observations of Recorder Geoffrey Ma SC, as he then was, in Rambas Marketing Co. LLC v Chow Kam Fai David [2001] 3 HKC 250 at p. 266F-267A :

“Conclusion on foreign law

In cases where substantial and difficult issues of foreign law are involved, the court may well be compelled to stay the proceedings where there is an appreciable risk that justice will not be done.  This risk may in certain circumstances be attributable to factors such as expense, but in the usual case would arise where the court was somehow concerned with the possibility that it might reach a wrong conclusion on an important aspect of foreign law.  In Credit Chimique, at p. 136, Lord Jauncey said : ‘In the present case the risk of the Scottish court reaching the wrong conclusion on one or more of the questions of law involved is by no means remote whereas it must be presumed that such a risk does not exist in the French court’.  The courts in Hong Kong (particularly the Commercial Court and the Admiralty Court), given the international identity and nature of the type of commercial litigation and litigants here, are often accustomed to dealing with aspects of foreign law.  It does not therefore follow at all that once it is shown that issues of foreign law arise, that this will necessarily be a powerful, much less a decisive, factor in favour of a stay.  On the other hand, however, it is unrealistic not to acknowledge the fact that complicated issues of foreign law may arise with which the Hong Kong courts will not feel itself confident to deal; it is all a question of degree : see Muduroglu Ltd v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi [1986] QB 1225, 1246A-F (English Court of Appeal), per Mustill LJ.”

18.  Ms Lam submitted that there was a real risk that injustice would result from a Hong Kong Court reaching the wrong decision on one or more issues of Macanese law.  She submitted that it would be far more satisfactory for complex issues of Macanese law to be decided by their own courts where those issues would be appealable as issues of law whereas the same would be treated as questions of fact decided on expert evidence with limited scope for appeal in Hong Kong.  In addition, she submitted that the Cambridgeshire factor (referred to in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 at 485E-486C) did not arise in this case given that, unlike cases heard in Hong Kong involving Nevada law, there has been no adjudication by a Hong Kong court dealing with the Macanese law on casino gaming or credit betting.  Finally, she submitted that the trial of these issues in Hong Kong would require an exposition by experts in Macanese law, which would add considerably to the expense of the proceedings both in terms of time and costs. 

19.  These submissions require me to focus on the issues of Macanese law raised in this case.  It is only by considering those issues that I can determine whether or not there is a real risk that injustice would result from a Hong Kong Court reaching a wrong conclusion on such issues. 

20.  The first point of Macanese law which is raised by the defendant is that the plaintiff was obliged to submit a sample or proforma credit agreement to the Macanese Government for approval under Article 8.2 of Ordinance No.5 of 2004, failing which the Credit Agreement made by the defendant and the Marker signed by the defendant were rendered null and void by virtue of s. 287 of the Macau Civil Code.  In this connection, the defendant relied on a Certification Letter dated 8 April 2009 issued by the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau to support the construction that Article 8.2 applied to Credit Agreements and that the Bureau required approval of sample or proforma credit agreements as a matter of practice. 

21.  The plaintiff’s case on this point is that, as a matter of statutory construction, Article 8 only applies to promoter contracts and agency contracts and has no application to credit agreements between the casino and the gambler. 

22.  In support of their respective submissions, the defendant relied upon the legal opinion of one, Mr Miguel Cravo (“Mr Cravo”), and the plaintiff relied on the legal opinion of one, Mr Henrique Saldanha (“Mr Saldanha”).  I have had regard to their legal opinions which have been exhibited to the 2nd Affirmation of the defendant and which were also contained in the Affidavits of Mr Cravo and Mr Saldanha filed in these proceedings.

23.  Articles 1-8 of Ordinance No.5 of 2004 of the Macau SAR provides as follows :

“Article 1—Object

This law regulates the business of gaming or credit betting within the casino gaming areas in Macao Special Administrative Region (‘credit’).

Article 2—Credit

1.   Credit shall be established only where a credit entity transfers its ownership rights of the chips used for casino gaming to a third person, but there is no immediate payment of ready money in relation to such transfer.

2.   For the purposes of the above Clause, the following shall be considered as ready money :

(i)   cash;

(ii)  traveller’s cheques;

(iii) certified cheques;

(iv) cashier’s orders or cashier’s cheques;

(v)  money orders;

(vi) postal orders;

(vii)    deposits into bank of any transfer notes which can be directly converted into cash balance;

(viii)   deposits into bank pursuant to transactions such as bank transfer, fund transfer or setting-off between accounts;

(ix) Electronic Funds Transfer made by way of electronic payment devices;

(x)  any marketable notes offered by concessionaire which operates casino gaming or other forms of gaming (‘Concessionaire’) or sub-concessionaire which operates casino gaming or other forms of gaming (‘Sub-concessionaire’), without requiring any consideration, to gamblers or punters and accepted to be a payment device for the transfer as referred to in the above Clause;

(xi) any other conduct, transaction or device which is stipulated by way of approval by the Chief Executive as equivalent to ready money.

3.   For the purposes of Sub-clause (ix) of the Clause above, the following shall be considered as electronic payment devices ;

(i)   cards for making payment, including credit cards and debit cards;

(ii)  electronic money devices which make use of electronic software to save the amount onto a card, or electronic money devices which record the cash balance onto the saving device of a computer.

4.   If any creditor’s rights created pursuant to a transfer as referred to in Clause 1 are embodied in debt instruments, such debt instruments can be bearer securities, or order instruments, including order instruments issued in series.

Article 3—Credit Entity

1.   The following entities are conferred the qualification to engage in credit business :

(i)   Concessionaire;

(ii)  Sub-Concessionaire.

2.   A casino gaming promoter (‘Gaming Promoter’) is also conferred the qualification to, via contracting with a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire, engage in credit business.

3.   If a credit entity is in material breach of the laws or regulations applicable to credit business, or if it has displayed an apparent want of technical capability to engage in credit business, the Government of Macao Special Administrative Region (‘Government’) may order that credit entity to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business, or may impose conditions for its engagement in credit business, without prejudice to any proceedings in relation to administrative illegalities that should be initiated or any civil or criminal liabilities that should be borne.

4.   If a credit entity is ordered to terminate its engagement in credit business pursuant to the above Clause, it shall lose its qualification to engage in credit business.

5.   If a person who has been ordered to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business under Clause 3 is a Gaming Promoter, then, depending on whether he is ordered to suspend or to terminate its engagement in credit business, the relevant Gaming Promoter shall be forbidden temporarily or absolutely to carry out any legal activity or to execute any contract in respect of credit business pursuant to Clause 3 of Article 5.

6.   A credit relationship can only arise :

(i)   between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire being a credit entity and a gambler or punter being a borrower;

(ii)  between a Gaming Promoter being a credit entity and a gambler or punter being a borrower; or

(iii) between a Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire being a credit entity and a Gaming Promoter being a borrower.

Article 4—Effect

Credits advanced under this law shall have the effect of creating legal debts.

Article 5—Non-transferability

1.   A credit entity shall not engage in credit business through another party or entity.

2.   Any conduct or contract the object of which is to transfer the qualification of the credit entity to a third person in any form or any name shall be ineffective.

3.   A management company with the right to manage a casino gaming operation or any other form of gaming operation of a Concessionaire (‘Management Company’), or a Gaming Promoter, may, by means of an authorisation contract or an agency contract, do legal acts or execute contracts in the name and for the interest of a credit entity as stated in Clause 1 of Article 3, but without prejudice to the applicability of the two Clauses above.

4.   If a Management Company or a Gaming Promoter is in material breach of the laws or regulations applicable to credit business, or if it has displayed an apparent want of technical capability to engage in credit business, the Government may order the relevant Management Company or Gaming Promoter to suspend, temporarily or absolutely, from doing any legal act or executing any contract in respect of credit business in accordance with the Clause above, without prejudice to the applicability of Clause 3 of Article 3; in the case of a Gaming Promoter, the Government may additionally order the relevant Gaming Promoter to suspend or terminate its engagement in credit business which it is otherwise qualified to engage in pursuant to Clause 2 of Article 3.

5.   Where the circumstances as referred to in Clause 3 arise, Articles 6 and 7 shall be applicable to a Management Company or a Gaming Promoter after necessary adaptation.

Article 6—Obligation to cooperate

A credit entity shall have a special obligation to cooperate with the Government.  Accordingly, upon the request of the Government, a credit entity shall produce all documents, information or evidence, and shall give any permission.

Article 7—General principle

A credit entity shall comply with all the laws and regulations applicable to credit business; any violation of such regulations shall be taken into account in determining whether or not it has the suitable qualifications to be a Concessionaire, Sub-Concessionaire or Gaming Promoter, without prejudice to the applicability of Clause 3 of Article 3.

Article 8—Contract

1.   The contract as stated in Clause 2 of Article 3 and Clause 3 of Article 5 must be executed in written form and in three original identical copies, and all the relevant signatures shall be verified at the scene by a notary public.

2.   Any contract, documents supplemental to the contract, and drafts amending those documents shall be approved by the Government.  The Government may order any provisions in the aforesaid drafts to be amended on the ground of principles of legality or public interest.

3.   Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire shall, without fifteen days after execution of contract, submit one original copy of the contract and copies of all the supplemental documents to the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau of Macau (‘DICJ’).

4.   If there is any amendment to the contract or the supplemental documents, the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire shall submit the amended copies to DICJ within fifteen days.

5.   The supplemental documents as referred to in Clause 3 and Clause 4 shall enclose a declaration which is signed by the legal delegate of the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire and is binding on the Concessionaire or Sub-Concessionaire.  The signature and identity shall be verified by a notary public.  The declaration shall provide that the legal delegate shall with his honour undertake and declare that the information as contained in the relevant documents are accurate and up-to-date, and declare that those documents are copies of the originals.

6.   The contract shall include relevant provisions stating that the parties to the contract have agreed to surrender to be governed by any jurisdiction outside Macao Special Administrative Region, and shall be bound by the laws of Macao Special Administrative Region as currently applicable.  If it is a contract as stated in Clause 3 of Article 5, it shall include a provision stating that it has surrendered to appoint a delegate or an agent, depending on whether it is an authorisation contract or an agency contract.

7.   Any provision as contained in the contract, documents supplemental to the contract and any provision amending those documents which are inconsistent with the relevant drafts as approved by the Government shall be considered as ineffective.”

24.  To my mind, it is a simple point of construction whether the reference to “any contract” in Article 8.2 is a reference to promoter contracts and agency contracts referred to in Article 8.1 or whether it also includes credit agreements between the Concessionaire or Sub-concessionaire and the gambler or punter. 

25.  I do not rehearse the submissions made by Ms Lam and Mr Hunsworth for and against the proposition that Article 8.2 applies to credit agreements, nor will I determine the point.  I also leave open the question whether or not the Certification Letter dated 8 April 2009 issued by the Macau Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau is of assistance on the issue.  Notwithstanding that this is the first time that a Hong Kong Court has been asked to determine this issue of Macanese law, I find that the issue turns on a simple point of construction and is an issue which the Hong Kong Court is well able to deal with.  It is not an issue which gives rise to a real risk that injustice will result from the Hong Kong Court reaching the wrong conclusion on the matter.  The evidence of the experts on Macau law has already been filed in these proceedings and can be adduced without further expense if the parties dispensed with the need to cross-examine the experts.  Obviously, the matter would be dealt with on affidavits on the plaintiff’s intended application for summary judgment.  However, even if this case proceeded to a full trial and cross-examination of the experts was to be required at trial, the additional costs generated by the cross-examination of the experts would not, in my judgment, make Macau clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong as a forum to adjudicate this dispute.

26.  Given the fact that the plaintiff no longer pursues a claim on the Marker as a promissory note, are there any other issues of Macanese law which have to be considered in this case?

27.  A substantial part of Ms Lam’s submissions centred on the issue of whether or not the Marker complied with the requirements of the Macau Commercial Code in respect of promissory notes.  However, these submissions fell away when Mr Hunsworth indicated that the plaintiff was not suing on the Marker as a promissory note but as evidence of the debt owed by the defendant.  Further, whether or not the Marker constituted a debt instrument for the purposes of s. 677(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure of Macau, which entitles the creditor to proceed to enforce his debt without first having to obtain a judgment, it is clear that the present proceedings are not enforcement proceedings pursuant to that provision but an action to obtain a judgment for the repayment of the loan made to the defendant.  The question of law as to the application of s. 677(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Marker in question simply does not arise in these proceedings.

28.  Finally, Mr Miguel Cravo does not raise any question of Macanese law on the issue of whether or not the Marker can be adduced as evidence of the debt owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.  He leaves the matter open in §24 of his Affidavit sworn on 13 May 2009 in which he said :

“Finally, as whether the Marker alone serves as a legally enforceable evidence of a debt and the promise of its repayment, it is submitted that such document cannot be construed as a debt instrument in accordance with section 677(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure…”

By §24 of the said Affidavit, I understand Mr Cravo to be saying that, leaving aside the question of whether or not the Marker alone serves as evidence of a debt and the promise of its repayment under Macanese law, such a document is not a debt instrument under s.677(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

29.  Accordingly, I conclude that the issues of Macanese law that arise in these proceedings do not give rise to a real risk that injustice would result from a Hong Kong Court reaching the wrong conclusion on them.

30.  For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the defendant can establish to my satisfaction that Macau is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong as a forum for the adjudication of this dispute.  In the circumstances, I need not address the 3rd and 4th questions posed by Cheung JA in Pei Zheng Middle School.

31.  For these reasons, I dismiss the defendant’s Summons for a stay of the proceedings and order that the defendant pays to the plaintiff the costs of the application, to be taxed, if not agreed. 

   

    (Mohan Bharwaney SC)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Nicholas Hunsworth of Messrs JSM, for the Plaintiff

Ms Catrina Lam, instructed by Messrs Livasiri & Co., for the Defendant