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Civil Action2009

LI GUOZHU v. MA HONGQI AND OTHERS

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93055-EN-2014-05-05

LI GUOZHU v. MA HONGQI AND OTHERS

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HCA 2023/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2023 OF 2009

______________________

BETWEEN

 LI GUOZHU (李国柱)Plaintiff

and

 MA HONGQI (马红其)1st Defendant
 CAI HONGMING (蔡鸿铭)2nd Defendant
 SHU WEIMIN (殳伟民)3rd Defendant
 ZHANG ZHENG (张正)4th Defendant
 HUANG SHU (黄舒)5th Defendant
 ZOU XIANGZHUANG (邹宪壮)6th Defendant
 MIAO CHENWEI (缪晨炜)7th Defendant
 LI ANPING (李安平)8th Defendant
 SHANG JIONG (尚炯)9th Defendant
 JIANG WENSONG (姜文松)10th Defendant
 NEW CENTURY IATRICAL INV. MANAGEMENT LIMITED
(新世纪医疗投资管理有限公司)
11th Defendant
 MAO RUIQI (茆瑞琪)12th Defendant
 XIAO JIN (肖迸)13th Defendant
______________________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Wilson Chan in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 5 May 2014
Date of Decision: 5 May 2014

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1. By the order made on 2 May 2014 with the consent of the plaintiff on the one hand, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 10th, 12th and 13th defendants (“the said Defendants”) on the other, the applications by the said Defendants to strike out these proceedings or alternatively to discharge the interlocutory injunction granted by Deputy High Court Judge Carlson on 9 October 2009 (“theInterlocutoryInjunction”) have been disposed of in the following manner:

(1) These proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) be stayed as against the said Defendants;

(2) The striking out application issued by the said Defendants be withdrawn;

(3) The Interlocutory Injunction shall cease to have any effect on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 12th and 13th defendants, and their respective names shall be removed from the Interlocutory Injunction, save and except that the same shall continue to be binding on the 11th defendant;

(4)   Each party shall bear his/her own costs of the application.

2. Therefore, it only leaves the application for final judgment and post‑judgment injunction by the plaintiff against the 11th defendant company.  The application for the extension of the validity of the writ will be adjourned sine die by reason of the order to stay these proceedings.

3. On 18 December 2009, the 11th defendant company filed its Acknowledgement of Service stating that it did not intend to contest these proceedings.

4. By Summons dated 3 April 2014, the plaintiff applies to enter final judgment against the 11th defendant and post-judgment injunction.

5. It is trite law that the power to make binding declaration of right is a discretionary power.  Usually, a declaration can only be made after proper argument and cannot be made by consent or in default without a trial.

6. The plaintiff submits that a declaration can be granted without trial, if the plaintiff has a genuine need for such relief and the court could properly grant it based on the merits of the case.

7. Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that I should exercise my discretion to grant the declaration in favour of the plaintiff against the 11th defendant.

(1) The 11th defendant is very much a nominal defendant in this action.  No cause of action is pleaded against the 11th defendant in the Statement of Claim.  The real fight is between the plaintiff and the said Defendants over the control of the 11th defendant.

(2) The plaintiff is the majority shareholder and in control of the 11th defendant. Not surprisingly, the 11th defendant has not contested this action.

(3) There are ongoing legal proceedings in the People’s Republic of China between the plaintiff and the said Defendants regarding the validity of the company resolutions of the 11th defendant, the subject matter of the declaration sought.  This makes it wholly inappropriate for this court to make any binding and final declaration of right, even if it only relates to the 11th defendant.

(4) According to the plaintiff, there is a need for the declaration and an injunction to prevent any attempt to file improper company returns with the Companies Registry.  In this regard, I am of the view that the plaintiff’s position is sufficiently protected by the Interlocutory Injunction, which is to remain binding on the 11th defendant notwithstanding the stay of this action as against the said Defendants.  Accordingly, in my view, the plaintiff cannot be said to have a genuine need for the declaration sought.

8. For the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s Summons dated 3 April 2014 is dismissed.

 (Wilson Chan)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr William Wong, SC, leading Mr Dennis Kwok, instructed by K Y Lo & Co,   for the plaintiff

The 1st to 3rd, 10th, 12th and 13th defendants, represented by Yip, Tse & Tang,  appearance exempted

The 11th defendant was not represented and did not appear

72792-EN-2010-09-07

LI GUOZHU v. MA HONGQI AND OTHERS

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HCA 2023/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2023 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 LI GUOZHU (李国柱)Plaintiff
and
 MA HONGQI (马红其)1st Defendant
 CAI HONGMING (蔡鸿铭)2nd Defendant
 SHU WEIMIN (殳伟民)3rd Defendant
 ZHANG ZHENG (张正)4th Defendant
 HUANG SHU (黄舒)5th Defendant
 ZOU XIANGZHUANG (邹宪壮)6th Defendant
 MIAO CHENWEI (缪晨炜)7th Defendant
 LI ANPING (李安平)8th Defendant
 SHANG JIONG (尚炯)9th Defendant
 JIANG WENSONG (姜文松)10th Defendant
 NEW CENTURY IATRICAL INV.11th Defendant
 MANAGEMEMTN LIMITED 
 (新世纪医疗投资管理有限公司) 
 MAO RUIQI (茆瑞琪)12th Defendant
 XIAO JIN (肖进)13th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 24 August 2010

Date of Ruling (Handed Down): 7 September 2010

__________

R U L I N G

__________

 

1.  This is an application by the Plaintiff for leave to appeal against an order made by me on 23 March this year discharging an interlocutory injunction as it applied against the 10th Defendant.

2.  Leave to appeal can only be granted if the court decides that the appeal is one with reasonable prospects of success.  What this means is that more than an arguable case is required although the would-be appellant does not have to go so far as showing that the appeal will probably succeed [SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125].

3.  Miss Liang, who did not appear at the original hearing, has advanced five grounds of appeal.  Before I consider those grounds, it may be helpful to re-visit the conduct of the Plaintiff in relation to the litigation and in his approach to the Defendants.

4.  As appears in the judgment, the Plaintiff has only served the 11th Defendant with the writ, a Hong Kong-registered company controlled by him.  Unsurprisingly, the 11th Defendant has been completely pliant.  It has not contested the injunction and it has entered an acknowledgment of service indicating that it will not be defending the action. Once the injunction was obtained leave was sought to serve the other defendants with notice of the injunction on the Mainland, which was effected through cross-border channels established for that purpose.  The 10th Defendant has been the only defendant who has attempted to address the action in Hong Kong. Miss Liang submits that, contrary to my finding that the 10th  Defendant was not served with the writ, the fact is that the 10th Defendant came to Hong Kong to seek legal advice here and went to the Plaintiff’s solicitors offices where he was given a copy of the writ and the inter parties order in respect of the injunction.  She submits that he must be taken to have been personally served with the writ in accordance with RHC, O.65 r.2.

5.  That submission is completely at odds with the Plaintiff’s stance to the 10th Defendant’s attempt to have the injunction discharged.  There was a hearing before me on 1 December 2009.  The Plaintiff’s position was that the 10th Defendant had no locus to seek a discharge of the injunction because the injunction was only directed to the 11th Defendant (the company).  I ruled that because the injunction, as drawn up, affected him he had sufficient standing to apply for the discharge of its effects against him.  By his stance on 1 December, the Plaintiff was not to seeking to rely on any service of the writ on 10th Defendant nor was any mention made of that fact by the Plaintiff’s counsel (not Miss Liang) on that occasion.  To have done so would have been seen to give the 10th Defendant standing to fully engage in the action.

6.  As appears in the judgment which discharged the injunction, I was greatly troubled by the overall conduct of the Plaintiff in the way that he has approached the Defendants other than the 11th Defendant which he controls.  By not serving the other defendants, and I am satisfied that he ought not to be heard to be saying that the 10th Defendant was served with the writ in circumstances where he appears to have disavowed that fact on 1 December (to which no reference had been made by his counsel on that occasion) in seeking to suggest that this defendant did not have a sufficient interest in the action to be permitted to discharge the injunction.  He should not be allowed to shift his ground on this when it appears to suit him.

7.  The fact of the matter is that he has chosen not to serve the other defendants with the writ, although the 10th Defendant has to accept that he had notice of the writ by 1 December following his visit to the 11th Defendant’s solicitors offices when he was provided with a copy of it as he was with a copy of the injunction.  The effect of his conduct therefore was, as described in the judgment, to seek to bind the other defendants by merely obtaining an order from the court that they should be given notice of the injunction on the Mainland and when one of them came to this court to have it discharged, it was then submitted on the Plaintiff’s behalf that this individual lacked standing to make the application.

8.  In the exercise of what is a discretionary jurisdiction that sort of conduct ought to be taken into account against the applicant for the injunction, as is the general approach taken by him in shaping the litigation as he has.

9.  From these observations, I turn to the proposed grounds of appeal.

10.  The first ground of appeal suggests that I fell into error in suggesting that the 10th Defendant had been deprived of an opportunity not to challenge the court’s jurisdiction or to apply for a stay. This is based on the fact, drawn to my attention for the first time on this application, that the 10th Defendant had gone to the Plaintiff’s solicitors offices and had been given a copy of the writ, and of course he had notice of the injunction which had, in any event, been served on him on the Mainland.

11.  With this ground, as with all grounds of appeal, the judge against whose orders an appeal is sought to be brought needs to be entirely objective in deciding whether to give leave based on the perceived merit of the appeal.  I have decided that when faced with the shape of the action, as it has been imposed on all the parties who have not been served with the writ — no application having been made by the Plaintiff to serve them, it lies ill in the mouth of the Plaintiff to suggest otherwise in the case of this 10th Defendant against whom it had been suggested on 1 December that he had no standing to discharge the injunction.  I have previously made these points.  In respect of this ground therefore I conclude that there are no reasonably arguable grounds of appeal.

12.  The next two grounds relate to my view that the appropriate forum for this dispute is the court at Bao Ying.  Complaint is made that this was a premature conclusion as well as a wrong one.  The fact is that proceedings have now been started, and in my view wisely so, at Bao Ying.  It seemed to me that I was entitled to form this view of the matter having regard to my general appreciation of the affirmation evidence.  In deciding whether to retain or discharge the injunction as against this defendant  I was entitled to look the matter overall and come to this conclusion.  I do not consider that this affords a reasonably arguable ground of appeal.

13.  The next ground is specifically directed to the fact that the 10th Defendant was personally served with the writ on 20 October 2009.  I take the view, and I have dealt with this already, that in submitting that the 10th Defendant had no locus to argue for a discharge of the injunction, the Plaintiff must be held to be saying that this did not amount to formal service of the writ on him.  The Plaintiff cannot blow hot and cold on such an important matter.  He made his election in the course of the argument on 1 December 2009.

14.  Finally, it is said that I erred in discharging the injunction when it was directed against the 11th Defendant only.  I have not discharged the injunction.  It remains in place against the 11th Defendant, to whom it is directed and I specifically said nothing about its effect against the other defendants, save for the 10th.  I have held that its effects do not bind him for the reasons that I gave.  This ground adds nothing to the argument and it must therefore fail.

15.  Accordingly, I refuse leave to appeal.  The application must stand dismissed with costs.

(Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ella Liang, instructed by Messrs K Y Lo & Co. for the Plaintiff

Alan M. S. Ng, instructed by Messrs Yip, Tse & Tang for the 10th Defendant

The 1st to 9th and 11th to 13th Defendants, in person did not appear and were not represented

70356-EN-2010-03-23

LI GUOZHU v. MA HONGQI AND OTHERS

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HCA 2023/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2023 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 LI GUOZHU (李国柱)Plaintiff
 and
 MA HONGQI (马红其)1st Defendant
 CAI HONGMING (蔡鸿铭)2nd Defendant
 SHU WEIMIN (殳伟民)3rd Defendant
 ZHANG ZHENG (张正)4th Defendant
 HUANG SHU (黄舒)5th Defendant
 ZOU XIANGZHUANG (邹宪壮)6th Defendant
 MIAO CHENWEI (缪晨炜)7th Defendant
 LI ANPING (李安平)8th Defendant
 SHANG JIONG (尚炯)9th Defendant
 JIANG WENSONG (姜文松)10th Defendant
 NEW CENTURY IATRICAL INV.11th Defendant
 MANAGEMEMTN LIMITED
 (新世纪医疗投资管理有限公司)
 MAO RUIQI (茆瑞琪)12th Defendant
 XIAO JIN (肖进)13th Defendant

____________

 

Before:     Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Chambers

Date of Hearing:     18 March 2010

Date of Delivery of Judgment :     23 March 2010

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

 

Introduction

1.  There are two summonses before me. Firstly, an application by the 10th Defendant, Mr Jiang Wensong to set aside an injunction made by 9 October last year which continued a previous ex parte injunction made on 29 September 2009 by Beeson J. There is also an application on behalf of the Plaintiff to commit Mr Jiang for breaching the injunction. I am bound to say that this is a case with a number of unusual and in many ways unsatisfactory features which I will describe as I set out the background and history of the matter.

2.  The first point to observe is that the only Defendant to have been served with the writ has been the 11th Defendant which is a Hong Kong registered company. All the other Defendants are individuals who, as the spelling of their names suggests, are from Mainland China and are resident there.

3.  It is just as well to begin by setting out the material terms of the injunction. The order says this [A/46/1-3]:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:-

The Ex parte Order given by Madam Justice Beeson herein on 29th day of September, 2009 be continued until Judgment or further order of this Court, i.e. that the 11th Defendant (whether acting by itself, its directors, officers, employees, servants, agents or otherwise howsoever (including the 1st to 10th and the 12th to 13th Intended Defendants, namely, Ma Hongqi (马红其), Cai Hongming (蔡鸿铭), Shu Weimin (殳伟民), Zhang Zheng (张正), Huang Shu (黄舒), Zou Xiangzhuang (邹宪壮), Miao Chenwei (缪晨炜), Li Anping (李安平), Shang Jiong (尚烔), Jiang Wensong (姜文松), Mao Ruiqui (茆瑞琪) and Xiao Jin (肖进) be restrained, until Judgement or further order of this Court; from:-

(1)  implementing or otherwise carrying into effect the resolutions (‘the Resolutions’) of the 11th Intended Defendant dated 25th August 2009 and 26th August 2009 passed on the meetings of, namely:-

(a)  the Board of Directors Meeting; and

(b)  the Shareholders/former shareholders;

copy of which are annexed hereto (together with its English translation);

(2)  Purporting to pass any resolutions, doing any acts and/or passing any resolutions of the same effect as the Resolutions;

(3)  Costs of and occasioned by this Application including the costs of the ex parte application on 29th September, 2009 be to the Plaintiff’s costs in the cause with certificate for counsel;

(4)  Leave be granted to the Plaintiff to serve this Inter Partes Order out of the jurisdiction on the 1st to 10th and 12th to 13th Defendants pursuant to Order 11(1)(c) Rules of High Court, Cap. 4; and

(5)  Liberty to apply.”

4.  The order is, I think, self-explanatory but what can be noted is that the court gave leave to serve the individual defendants with the Order out of the jurisdiction.

5.  The 11th Defendant, the company, against which the order was primarily directed has taken no part in the proceedings. Of the 12 individual defendants only the 10th Defendant has sought to have the order discharged. Why he has done so will become clear when I recount the background to dispute which I will now do.

6.  With a view to going into partnership with the Department of Health of Bao Ying County and to operate a hospital with it in its locality, the Plaintiff, Defendants one to nine and two other individuals raised capital of RMB7 million between them. The individual contributions varied from RMB1 million to as little as RMB100,000. The other two investors, Zhao Xiying and Zhou Lihui have not been named in the writ. All 12 entered into an agreement in writing dated 27 May 2004. It was expressed to be in conformity with the requirements of PRC company law and apart from its contractual nature it also purports to be the primary constitutional document which governs the [11th Defendant’s] company’s management. In the event of future disputes, its terms would need to be looked at and any dispute would fall to be decided in accordance with PRC company law.

7.  On 10 June 2004, the 11th Defendant was incorporated in Hong Kong. The subscribers to it were Defendants one to nine, Mr Zhao Xiying and Mr Zhou Lihui. Additionally, D4 became the managing director and D1 the vice-management director.

8.  On 15 November 2004, the 11th Defendant entered into a partnership agreement (“the Partnership Agreement”) with the Department of Health at Bao Ying County to manage and invest in the hospital. Under this agreement, the Plaintiff became the person in charge of the hospital and D4 its Legal Representative.

9.  On 10 June 2005, the Plaintiff, D1, D2 and D4 each agreed to invest a further RMB500,000. The hospital went on to operate successfully although, thus far, no dividend has been distributed to the shareholders.

10.  As at the end of July 2009, D1, D2 and D3 decided that they wanted to sell their shares in the 11th Defendant to D10, D12 and D13. The agreement of 27 May 2004 requires that any shareholders wishing to sell their share must give the existing shareholders the right of first refusal. This they did by Offer Notices which indicated that the prospective purchasers were willing to pay three times their individual contributions in the 11th Defendant. The Plaintiff declined to pay the share offer price in the Offer Notice. In circumstances were none of the shareholders and directors were willing to take up their options to purchase, D1, D2 and D3 proceeded to transfer their shares to D10, D12 and D13. On 25 August 2009, the respective transfer agreements were entered into.

11.  Before that, on 19 August 2009, D1 gave notice to the other directors (and shareholders) including the Plaintiff that a meeting was to be convened on 26 August 2009 to resolve a number of issues including the change of directors and the appointment of a new managing director.

12.  On 25 August, following the entering of the share transfer agreement between D1, D2 and D3 by which they transferred their shares to D10, D12 and D13, a meeting of the Directors of the Company took place at which D6, D7, D8 and D9 transferred all of their shares to D1 with the result that the company’s directorships and shareholdings became these: D1 [RMB2.5 million], D2 [RMB1.5 million], D4[RMB1.5 million], D10 [RMB1.5 million], D12 [RMB1.5 million], the Plaintiff [RMB1.5 million], somebody called Cui Guoyan [RMB2.59 million], Zhao Xiying [RMB250,000] and Zhou Lihui [RMB500,000].

13.  On 26 August, at the meeting asked for by D1 on 19 August, various resolutions were passed including the appointment of D10 as managing director of the company. The Plaintiff, D4, Zhao Xiying and Zhou Lihui were not present at these meeting. On the recommendation of those present [that is to say D1, D2, D10, D12 and D13], D10 was recommended to be the Administrator of the hospital and on 3 September that recommendation was implemented by D10’s election to that position.

The Proceedings

14.  The Plaintiff asserting that these transfers in the various shareholdings are invalid as to the appointment of D10 to the position of hospital administrator has brought this action and sought and obtained the injunction ex parte from Beeson J and continued inter partes by myself. These injunctions have been challenged by D10 who is the only defendant who has concerned himself with this process in Hong Kong. A question had arisen as to whether D10 had any locus to challenge the making of the injunction in view of the fact that the injunction had only been directed against D11, the company, although of course D10 had been served with it. I directed that as the injunction affected him challenging as it did his position as the hospital administrator that he did have a sufficient interest to address the court and seek relief albeit, that the company itself has taken no steps to have the injunction varied or discharged. This therefore is the basis upon which he is now seeking to either discharge or vary the injunction. For his part, the Plaintiff is seeking D10’s committal failing to observe the terms of the injunction by continuing to carry out the duties of the hospital administrator.

15.  It is to the D10’s credit that he has troubled to involve himself in these proceedings because by being resident in the PRC and not having been served with the writ he could have adopted the stance of the other Defendants, all of whom have also been served with the injunction, and ignored the order of the court on this side of the border. He has no assets in Hong Kong which could be attached and he could only be arrested in respect of any contempt of court if he chose to come to Hong Kong which, at present, he is not inclined to do.

16.  Additionally, Mr Alan Ng, who appears for him, has shown me correspondence passing between D10 and the county officials in Bao Ying in which D10 had asked for them to release him from his duties at the hospital, which would at least have removed from him the threat of contempt proceedings in this court, but the county has replied to say that it is unwilling to do so and that he must continue in post. I cannot tell at this stage how genuine this correspondence is — that is something for the trial, but this is, at all events, the current state of his evidence.

17.  Mr Ng has challenged the making of the injunction by me at which hearing none of the Defendants except the company are said to have been served with the notice of the hearing, on a number of grounds including the failure to serve the notice of the hearing, material non-disclosure of aspects of the dispute between the parties and on the validity of the various transactions and resolutions which he submits were valid and demonstrate that the Plaintiff can have no case in now seeking to challenge these, their alleged invalidity being his justification for this action. Additionally, if all else fails, Mr Ng says damages would be an adequate remedy and for that reason there is no need for the injunction.

The Failure to Serve the Writ on the Individual Defendants

18.  The question of service of the notices of the hearing on these Defendants may be an issue but the real contest, it seems to me must centre on the validity of the various share transfers and the validity of the consequent resolutions implemented on 25 and 26 August as well as D10’s election as hospital administrator on 3 September. The agreement to form D11 [the company] is to the effect that disputes are to be resolved in accordance with PRC company law and to this aspect I will return in a moment.

19.  The matter which does concern me is that by not serving the writ on the individual defendants, all of whom are PRC residents, the Plaintiff has deprived them of the opportunity to address these proceedings by, for example, challenging the court’s jurisdiction over them and/or by applying for a stay of the action on the basis that Hong Kong is forumnon conveniens in favour of a nominated court at Bao Ying County. Instead the Plaintiff has restricted himself to the relatively easy task of only serving D11 [a Hong Kong company], obtaining the injunction and seeking to enforce it and have it carried out by serving it on the individual defendants.

20.  I appreciate that the Plaintiff would have up to a year to serve the writ and that a named Defendant can, under Order 12 RHC, ask the court to direct that he should be served with the writ, but I regard the principal duty for such service to lie on the Plaintiff as the party having carriage of the action.

21.  In this case, I am of the view that the Plaintiff should not be allowed to punch from a distance by obtaining an injunction in Hong Kong against the Hong Kong Defendant and seeking to bind all the other overseas defendants and yet not serving them with the writ.

22.  In this discretionary jurisdiction, I propose to discharge the effects of the injunction against D10 for this reason alone but additionally, I also propose to discharge it because it seems to me that the proper place to litigate this dispute is before the appropriate court at Bao Ying. Everything that has happened in this case happened there. The hospital is there. The parties are there and the law governing the dispute is there. These individual defendants should be pursued in those courts and not in this one. The court at Bao Ying is best placed to decide what PRC law says about these various transactions and how best to apply the appropriate remedies.

23.  And so, for these two separate reasons, I do not think that it would be right to maintain the current injunction against D10. Whilst my remarks are of general application, only D10 has sought relief from the court which I will give him so that, so far as this court is concerned, he is now at liberty to continue in his position as the hospital administrator. As the other defendants have made no application, I propose to say nothing more about their cases and because D11 [the Hong Kong company] is content to leave matters as they are I will make no further order which affects it, although I hope I have made my views clearly known as to which is the appropriate forum for this litigation.

24.  As to the contempt proceedings, I will give the Plaintiff 7 days to withdraw them. If the Plaintiff wishes some other form of order for those proceedings let his solicitors inform the court by letter within 7 days and I will give appropriate directions.

25.  In respect of the costs of the discharge of the injunction, I will make an order nisi that the Plaintiff should pay D10 his taxed costs on a party and party basis.

 (Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Lorinda Lau, instructed by Messrs K.Y. Lo & Co., for the Plaintiff

Alan M. S. Ng, instructed by Messrs Yip, Tse & Tang, for the 10th Defendant

68761-EN-2009-12-01

LI GUOZHU v. MA HONGQI AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 2023/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2023 OF 2009

____________

BETWEEN

 LI GUOZHU (李國柱)Plaintiff
 and 
 MA HONGQI (馬紅其)1st Defendant
 CAI HONGMING (蔡鴻銘)2nd Defendant
 SHU WEIMIN (殳偉民)3rd Defendant
 ZHANG ZHENG (張正)4th Defendant
 HUANG SHU (黃舒)5th Defendant
 ZOU XIANGZHUANG (鄒憲壯)6th Defendant
 MIAO CHENWEI (繆晨煒)7th Defendant
 LI ANPING (李安平)8th Defendant
 SHANG JIONG (尚炯)9th Defendant
 JIANG WENSONG (姜文松)10thDefendant
 NEW CENTURY LATRICAL INV. MANAGEMENT LIMITED
(新世紀醫療投資管理有限公司)
11th Defendant
 MAO RUIQI (茆瑞琪)12thDefendant
 XIAO JIN (肖進)13th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 1 December 2009

Date of Delivery of Ruling: 1 December 2009

__________

R U L I N G

__________

 

1.  The 10th Defendant is applying to discharge an inter partes injunction made by me on 9 October 2009 against the 11th Defendant which is a Hong Kong company. He has been met with the response, inter alia, that he has no locus to apply for such an order which I am deciding first, as a preliminary issue. If he has no locus, that is an end of the matter so far as he is concerned.

2.  This is a dispute between 14 individuals who live in the mainland (that is to say the Plaintiff and the 1st to 10th Defendants and the 12th and 13th Defendants), and the 11th Defendant, the Hong Kong company. The present state of the litigation is that on 29 September, Beeson J granted the Plaintiff an injunction ex parte in these terms [and I need to set out the terms because they will be material to the issue that I am now required to decide]:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:-

The 11th Intended Defendant (whether acting by itself, its directors, officers, employees, servants, agents or otherwise howsoever (including the 1st to 10th and the 12th to 13th Intended Defendants, namely, Ma Hongqi (馬紅其), Cai Hongming (蔡鴻銘), Shu Weimin (殳偉民), Zhang Zheng (張正), Huang Shu (黃舒), Zou Xiangzhuang (鄒憲壯), Miao Chenwei (繆晨煒), Li Anping (李安平), Shang Jiong (尚炯), Jiang Wensong (姜文松), Mao Ruiqui (茆瑞琪) and Xiao Jin (肖進) be restrained, from:-

(1)  implementing or otherwise carrying into effect the resolutions (‘the Resolutions’) of the 11th Intended Defendant dated 25th August 2009 and 26th August 2009 passed on the meetings of, namely:-

(a)  the Board of Directors Meeting; and

(b)  the Shareholders/former shareholders;

copy of which are annex hereto (together with its English translation);

(2)  purporting to pass any resolutions, doing any acts and/or passing any resolutions of the same effect as the Resolutions;

(3)  Leave be granted to the Plaintiff to serve the said Ex Parte Order out of the jurisdiction on the 1st to 10th and the 12th to 13th Defendants pursuant to Order 11(1)(C) Rules of High Court, Cap.4;

(4)  Costs of and occasioned by this Application be reserved to the hearing of the inter parte summons or any further order of the court; and

(5)  Liberty to apply.”

3.  What is apparent from the Order is that it is an Order against the 11th Defendant [the company] only, although the Order makes clear that the 11th Defendant is enjoined from doing the acts referred to in paras 1-3 of the injunction “whether by itself, (albeit that it is difficult to conceive how a company might do anything by itself where it acts through its directors and those charged with its management)” and thereafter more relevantly “its directors, officers, employees, servants, agents or otherwise howsoever (including in this case all the other Defendants who are named including the 10th Defendant whose application this is)”.

4.  And so, this Defendant is one of the parties named in the Order, which is a matter that I will return to shortly.

5.  The parts of the Order relating to its Duration says that the return date is to be on 9 October 2009 but contemplates that such a hearing need not take place if the 11th Defendant serves notice that it does not require the application to discharge the Order to come back to court, which serves to underline that it is only the 11th Defendant that is the subject of the injunction. Nevertheless, this having been said, the Order provides for Variation or Discharge and says this:

“The Defendants/Intended Defendants (or anyone notified of this Order) be at liberty to apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this Order upon giving 48 hour’s notice to the Applicant’s solicitors of their intention to do so.”

The effect of the Order is also set out — this all being standard form to comply with the relevant Practice Direction:

“A Defendant who is a corporation and which is ordered not to do something must not do it itself or by its directors, officers, employees or agents, or in any other way.”

6.  Leave was also given to serve all the mainland defendants in the PRC — out of the jurisdiction. This was effected by the mainland authorities following well established procedures for service of Hong Kong Orders in the mainland.

7.  The 11th Defendant is a partnership with a mainland China corporation to operate a hospital over there. The 10th Defendant has been appointed as the hospital Administrator. He is not a director nor a shareholder of the 11th Defendant.

8.  Miss Lau, who appears for the Plaintiff, submits that in such circumstances the Defendant can have no standing to ask for a discharge of the injunction against the company (11th Defendant). He is not a shareholder nor is he a director.

9.  Mr Ng’s response on behalf of the 10th Defendant is that his standing to make this application comes from the fact that he has been named in the Order and that he has been served with it. It therefore affects him and he is, in such circumstances, entitled to be heard. To shut him out would be a basic denial of justice.

10.  My mind has wavered in the course of the argument but finally, I have decided that where the 10th Defendant is affected by the Order he must be allowed to say what he wishes to about the Order including that it should be discharged.

11.  It is a big step to completely shout out a party affected by an Order of the court which may ultimately give rise to contempt proceedings with all the potential consequences that such proceedings entail.

12.  And so I am against Miss Lau. There is a difference between completely shutting out a party wishing to be heard on an Order affecting him and which names him and on the other hand regulating how much he can actually say on the merits. Whilst I am prepared to hear Mr Ng because I consider the 10th Defendant, as an affected party, does have sufficient standing and interest in the matter, he may find that in addressing the merits of the injunction and its continuation, variation or otherwise that given his lack of a formal relationship with the company as a non-shareholder or director, that the scope and reach of his submissions on his discharge application may well be seriously limited and I give him due warning of that.

13.  This sort of application is much more appropriately brought by a director and/or a shareholder than a non-member or director of the company. Mr Ng has succeeded in getting his foot in the door, whether he actually gets very much further must be left to the hearing of the merits of his application and to the permissible extent of his submissions given his lack of a formal relationship with the Defendant in circumstances where he is the Administrator of the hospital of which it is a part-owner.

14.  As to costs having heard argument on the matter, it seems to me that the appropriate order is that the costs of this application should be the 10th Defendant’s costs in the cause of the application to discharge the injunction.

 (Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Lorinda Lau, instructed by Messrs K Y Lo & Co., for the Plaintiff

Alan M S Ng, instructed by Messrs Yip, Tse & Tang, for the 10th Defendants