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Miscellaneous Proceedings2010

LEUNG SHUI LING NICOLE 對 CHAN SIU SHEUNG HELEN

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93100-CH-2012-12-13

LEUNG SHUI LING NICOLE 對 CHAN SIU SHEUNG HELEN

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DCMP 1573/2010

香港特別行政區

區域法院

雜項案件編號2010年第1573號

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原告人LEUNG SHUI LING NICOLE 
對 
被告人CHAN SIU SHEUNG HELEN 

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主審法官: 區域法院法官周兆熊內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊日期: 2012年12月13日
判決書日期: 2012年12月13日

判決書

 

1. 2012年7月24日,本庭對原告人中期付款的申請作出裁決。

2. 今天,本庭需要處理原告人兩張傳票的申請,第一張是關於臨時訟費的命令,第二張傳票是原告人要求本庭給予上訴許可的申請。

3. 本庭先處理第一張傳票:原告人要求臨時訟費的命令。有關本庭給予被告人兩位大律師證書的命令,改為給予一位大律師。在7月24日,被告人是由Liza Wong資深大律師以及Elaine Liu大律師所代表的,一位資深大律師帶領一位大律師代表訴訟其中一方,是正常的做法,本庭看不到任何改變這做法的理由。被告人指稱,她有個人經濟的困難,因此要求本庭將給予兩位大律師的證書改為給予一位大律師,這不是有效的更改臨時訟費命令的理由,因此,本庭撤銷第一張傳票的申請。

4. 第二張傳票是關於原告人要求本庭給予上訴許可的申請。在支持傳票的申請,原告人列出7個理由。第一個理由是:

“The learned judge erred in law in failing to apply section 7(3)of the Inheritance(Provision for Family and Dependants)Ordinance, which provides that the Court should apply section 5, so far as the urgency of the case admits, but instead adopted at paragraph 8 of the Judgment the approach urged by the Defendant that the Court must apply all the provisions in section 5 of the Inheritance(Provision for Family and Dependants)Ordinance before he may make an order of interim payment”。

5. 原告人沒有指出為甚麼本庭犯錯,她只是指出本庭犯錯的地方。

6. 本庭在判決書的第8段和第9段,詳細列出有關該條例第73條以及第5A條的條款適用於本案的地方。簡單來說,就高等法院原訟庭有關遺囑認證的訴訟案件,在未得到結果之前,本庭難以界定本庭應該用甚麼法律基礎決定遺產的分配。如果在該高等法院的案件中,被告人勝訴的話,判決書第9段詳細列出該高等法院訴訟的案件對本案的影響。簡單來說,就是該案件未有結果之前,本庭不應該對原告人中期付款的申請作出任何決定,因此,被告人要求本庭把原告人中期付款的申請不作出決定,直至該高等法院遺囑認證的訴訟得到結果之前,這是正確的決定。

7. 原告人在支持上訴的理由中列出其他的理由,例如第2、第3、第4、第5、第6,該些理由都不能支持原告人的指稱(本庭把中期付款的申請延期,直至原訟庭的訴訟的案件得到結果為止),本庭看不出任何理由,去改變在7月24日所作出的裁決。核心的理由詳盡列於裁決書的第8和第9段。

8. 原告人在第7個支持上訴的理由指出,本庭命令原告人支付被告人的訟費命令,沒有決定原告人的中期付款的申請是正確或是錯誤的申請。這完全是不正確的,本庭所要決定的就是被告人要求把原告人的申請延期是否正確,原告人反對該延期的申請,反對不能成立,因此她要為反對而付出訴訟的代價,她反對的理由不能成立。因此,訟費須以結果決定訴訟哪一方支付。原告人反對被告人的傳票申請,因此本庭在7月24日所作出的決定是正確的。

9. 被告人要求給予上訴許可的申請不能成立,因為即使本庭給予該許可,她在上訴庭之前亦不會有任何成功的機會,因此,本庭撤銷原告人傳票的申請。

(法官與雙方討論有關訟費申請事宜)

10. 就是次兩張傳票的申請,原告人須支付予被告人訟費(包括被告人聘請大律師的費用);如與訟雙方未能同意訟費的款額,訟費款額由法庭評估。

 (周兆熊)
 區域法院法官

原告人:無律師代表,親自應訊

被告人:由周振文洪珀姿律師事務所延聘廖玉玲大律師代表

82776-EN-2012-07-24

LEUNG SHUI LING NICOLE v. CHAN SIU SHEUNG HELEN

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DCMP 1573/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1573 OF 2010

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BETWEEN

 LEUNG SHUI LING NICOLEPlaintiff

and

 CHAN SIU SHEUNG HELENDefendant
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Before: H H Judge Chow

Date of hearing: 12 June 2012

Date of handing down Decision: 24th July 2012

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DECISION

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1.  This Court has to deal with two summonses, namely, the Plaintiff’s summons dated 6 January 2012, and the defendant’s summons dated 8 February, 2012. In her summons, the plaintiff applied for the following orders:-

“1. The defendant do pay an interim payment of HK$2,000,000 to the plaintiff within 7 days from the date of Order hereof, with liberty to apply.

2. The plaintiff’s Originating Summons be fixed for a 4-day trial,

(1) with the affirmations filed by the parties standing as evidence-in-chief;

(2) with leave to parties to cross-examine the deponents of the affirmations.”

In her summons, the defendant applied for an order that the proceedings in this case, including the plaintiff’s summons dated 6 January 2012, be stayed pending the outcome of the Probate Action (HCAP No 30 of 2011) (“the Probate Action”).

2.  Pursuant to the consent of both parties, in respect of the Defendant’s summons I made an order that “these proceedings shall not be set down for trial until the final determination of the Probate Action or further order”.  The remaining issue for this Court to consider is whether the defendant’s application for stay of proceedings, pending the outcome of the Probate Action, should also apply to the plaintiff’s application for an interim payment of HK $2,000,000.

3.  In the present action, the plaintiff claims to have been in an intimate relationship with Chow Wai Lam, William (“the Deceased”) before his death, when he supported her and her son financially.  The defendant is the lawful widow the Deceased, and is the sole administratrix by virtue of letters of administration granted on 22 December 2009. The Deceased passed away in August 2009, leaving behind him a number of assets.

4.  On 8 June 2010, the plaintiff took out these originating summons, pursuant to section 4 and section 7 of the Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependants) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”), against the Defendant, for the following order:-

(1)   that the plaintiff be paid such lump sum payments under section 4 of the Ordinance out of the Deceased’s net estate;

(2)   an order that the plaintiff be paid such interim periodical payments under section 7 of the Ordinance out of the Deceased net estate.

5.  On 14 December 2011, a Madam Leung Woon Lin Irene (“Leung”) instituted the Probate Action in the Court of First Instance.  In the Statement of Claim, Leung claims that she is the sole executrix and sole beneficiary named in the true last will and testament dated 20 November 1992 of the Deceased,  She claims against the defendant to have the Letters of Administration granted to the defendant on 22 December 2009 to be revoked, on the ground that it had been obtained by an incorrect statement, in that the Deceased in fact died testate, leaving the said true last will and testament dated 20 November 1992, as opposed to dying intestate.

6.  Section 4(1) of the Ordinance provides:-

“(1) Where an application is made for an order under this section, the court may, if it is satisfied that the disposition of the deceased’s estate effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination if his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant, make any one or more of the following orders –

(a) …..

…..

(e)     ….. ”

7.  Section 7 of the Ordinance is the provision relating to the application for interim payment.  It reads:-

“(1) Where on an application for an order under section 4 it appears to the court –

(a) that the applicant is in immediate need of financial assistances, but it is not yet possible to determine what order (if any) should be made under that section; and

(b) the property forming part of the net estate of the deceased is or can be made available to meet the need of the applicant, the court may order that, subject to such conditions or restrictions, if any, as the court may impose and to any further order of the court, there shall be paid to the applicant out of the net estate of the deceased such sum or sums and (if more than one) at such intervals as the court thinks reasonable; and the court may order that, subject to this Ordinance, such payments are to be made until such date as the court may specify, not being later than the date on which the court either makes an order under section 4 or decides not to exercise its powers under that section.

(2) Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 4 shall apply in relation to an order under this section as they apply in relation to an order under that section.

(3) In determining what order, if any, should be made under this section the court shall, so far as the urgency of the case admits, have regard to the same matters as those to which the court is required to have regard under section 5”.

8.  Section 7(3) requires this court to have regard to the same matters as those to which the court is required to have regard under section 5.  Section 5(a) provides: –

“Where an application is made for an order under section 4, the court shall, in determining whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate effected by his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is such as to make reasonable provision for the applicant and, if the court considers that reasonable financial provision has not been made, in determining whether and in what manner it shall exercise its powers under that section, have regard to the following matters – ”

9.  To determine, under section 5 (a), whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate has made reasonable provision for the applicant who has made an application for interim payment, the court has to consider whether the disposition of a deceased’s estate is effected by his will, or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and the law relating to intestacy.  The different bases upon which the dispositioin of a deceased’s estate is effected will produce different results on the issue of whether the disposition of the deceased’s estate has made reasonable provision for the applicant.  In the present case, it is not yet known whether the disposition of the Deceased’s estate is effected by the law relating to intestacy, as evidenced by the Letters of Administratix granted to the defendant, or effected by his will, as claimed by Leung in the Probate Action.  This issue must be resolved first before this Court can proceed to apply the relevant provisions under section 5 of the Ordinance, and this issue can only be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the Probate Action.  After this issue has been resolved, then this Court will have a proper basis to decide whether the disposition of the Deceased’s estate has made reasonable provision for the plaintiff.  But this is on the assumption that Leung fails in the Probate Action, and the disposition of the Deceased’s estate is effected by the law relating to intestacy.  If Leung succeeds in establishing her case and revokes the Letters of Administration granted to the defendant, then the defendant has no power to deal with the Deceased’s property.  In that case, the proper person to be sued by the Plaintiff for interim payment is Leung, and not the defendant.  Thus, the adjudication in the Probate Action is fundamentally important to the course to be taken by this Court in the present case.  So the Probate Case should be adjudicated first.  Accordingly I order that the application for interim payment be stayed pending the determination of the Probate Action.

Costs

10.  I make an order nisi, to be made absolute in 14 days’ time, that regarding the application under paragraph 1 of the plaintiff’s summons, the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendants costs, to be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for Counsels.  In respect of the application under paragraph 2 of the Plaintiffs summons, there be cost in the cause of these proceedings.

 

 

 (S Chow)
 District Judge

The plaintiff: represented by Mr. Lam Chin Ching, Gary, instructed by M/S Lo, Wong & Tsui, Solicitors

The defendant: represented by Miss Lisa Wong, SC and Elaine Liu, instructed by M/S Chaine Chow & Barbara Hung, Solicitors

Please refer to HCMP2870/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.