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LEUNG KANG WAI v. DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LTD

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90410-CH-2013-11-29

梁鏡雄 對 嘉捷香港有限公司

HTML content

DCPI 297/2010

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟案件2010年第297號

___________________

 梁鏡雄原告人

及

 嘉捷香港有限公司被告人

___________________

主審法官: 區域法院暫委法官杜淦堃(內庭聆訊)
審訊日期: 2013年10月17日
判案書日期: 2013年11月29日

___________________

有關訟費之判案書

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本申請

1. 本席於2013年9月30日頒下判案書,判令原告人在本申索中得不到任何賠償,因而敗訴,並作出暫准訟費令,下令原告人支付被告人的訟費。

2. 被告人現向法庭提出以下申請:

(1)   原告人需支付被告人本案直至及包括2010年5月13日之訟費,按訴訟各方對評基準評定,雙方如有異議,則待法庭評定 (“申請一”);

(2)   原告人需支付被告人本案由及包括2010年5月13日起之後按彌償基準計算的訟費連同大律師證書。訟費金額方面,雙方如有異議,則待法庭評定 (“申請二”);

(3)   原告人需支付由被告人支付李步前專科醫生報告費用$13,000元的利息,利息以年利率9% 計算,由2010年7月22日至2013年9月30日止 (“申請三”);

(4)   原告人需支付由被告人支付監察報告費用$12,800元的利息,利息以年利率9% 計算,由2011年1月5日至2013年9月30日止 (“申請四”);

(5)   原告人需支付由被告人支付大律師費用$105,000元的利息,利息以年利率9% 計算,由2012年12月10日至2013年9月30日止 (“申請五”);

(6)   被告人繳存之附帶條件款項港幤$230,000元連行息,如有的話,退回給被告人代表律師梁鳯慈律師行 (“申請六”)。

被告人的申請理據

3. 根據被告人代表律師的誓章,在本案進行期間,被告人分別在2010年4月15日、2010年8月19日及2011年2月9日向法庭存入附帶條件款項HK$120,000、HK$50,000及HK$60,000 (總計HK$230,000)。原告人沒有接受該些款項。

4. 被告人代表律師的誓章亦指出原告人曾於2012年1月16日向被告人發出調解通知書,建議於2個月內展開調解;而被告人於2012年1月19日以調解回覆書向原告人作出回應,建議於1個月展開調解。此後原告人再沒有回覆,以致調解未能展開。

申請一、二及六

5. 《區域法院規則》第22號命令第23(4)(a)條規則規定,如原告人未能取得比附帶條件款項更佳的賠償,區域法院可命令被告人獲付他在原告人本可無需法庭許可而接受有關付款或提議的最後日期後的按彌償基準計算的訟費。

6. 《區域法院規則》第22號命令第23(5)條規則規定,「凡本條規則適用,法庭須作出第(2)、(3)及(4)款提述的命令,但如法庭認為作出該等命令並不公正,則不可作出該等命令。」

7. 由於原告人未能獲得任何賠償,因此被告人於2010年4月15日存入的附帶條件款項HK$120,000已較法院的最後判決為佳。而本案中原告人本可無需法庭許可而接受有關付款或提議的最後日期為2010年5月13日,亦即2010年4月15日的28日之後 (見《區域法院規則》第22號命令第15(1)條)。

8. 原告人缺席是次聆訊。基於以上不受爭議的事實,本席認為按「彌償基準」計算訟費不會產生不公正的現象。原告人令被告人不必要地動用更多訟費,敗訴後應予以適當補償。本席故此批准申請一及二。

9. 本席亦看不到任何理由被告人繳存之附帶條件款項需繼續保留於法庭。本席故此批准申請六。

申請三、四及五

10. 《區域法院規則》第22號命令第23(4)(b)條規則規定,如原告人未能取得比附帶條件款項更佳的賠償,區域法院可命令被告人獲付按不高於判定利率10% 的利率計算有關訟費的利息。

11. 被告人代表律師的誓章提供了有關訟費的資料,證明了被告人就申請三、四、五所牽涉的訟費已分別在2010年7月22日、2011年1月5日及2012年12月10日付出了金錢。本席認為就申請三、四、五所牽涉的訟費作出訟費利息的命令實屬恰當。

12. 被告人要求利息以年利率9%計算。根據Golden Eagle International (Group) Ltd v GR Investment Holdings Ltd [2010] 3 HKLRD 273 一案第19段,林文瀚法官(當時為高等法院原訟法庭法官) 指出9%的年利率 (判定利率1% 之上) 是有關訟費利息恰當且大方的計算。本席並無理由不跟隨Golden Eagle一案的指引。

13. 基於上述原因,本席批准申請三、四及五。

結論

14. 本席廢除2013年9月30日的臨時訟費令,並作出載於此判案書第2(1)至(6)段的命令。

15. 就本申請而言,本席作出臨時訟費令,要原告人支付本傳票的訟費予被告人。若訟費金額有爭議,則由聆案官評定。若雙方不在今天後的14天內,申請修改此臨時訟費令,此令將會自動作實。

(杜淦堃)
區域法院暫委法官

原告人缺席聆訊

被告人由梁鳯慈律師行麥曉晴律師代表

89389-CH-2013-09-30

梁鏡雄 對 嘉捷香港有限公司

HTML content

DCPI 297/2010

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟2010年第297號

--------------------

原告人梁鏡雄 

對

被告人嘉捷香港有限公司 
--------------------
主審法官:區域法院暫委法官杜淦堃
聆訊日期:2012年11月9日、12日及14日
判案書日期:2013年9月30日

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判案書

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背景

1.  原告人因一宗工業意外受傷,向被告人追討疏忽賠償。原告人在案發時受僱於被告人,在香港國際機場超級一號貨運站工作。在意外發生時,原告人被指派到G層停車場清理雜物。

2.  原告人指現場雜物太高、太多和零亂,堆積如山。雜物包括鋁板、木卡板、膠布和膠芯。其間他踏著一塊蓋著膠布的鋁板上,因而跌倒。他亦發現原來膠布與鋁板間有一個圓柱膠芯,令他失足跌倒。他又指於意外前曾經向上級要求提供剷車,但遭拒絕。

3.  另外,原告人稱他從未接受被告人另一位員工Supapon Woratap的工作指示,而被告人亦沒有每月安排安全指示訓練例會。

4.  被告人同意當時的確有一宗意外發生,而原告人亦有受傷。但被告人之「科文」陳家保先生指事前已有提供安全例會及張貼安全告示。在安全例會上,所有清潔工均獲告知工作時不要踏在其他物件上,以策安全。

5.  另外被告人亦稱他們沒有剷車。即使有剷車,亦非清理意外現場雜物的可行方法。而其員工Supapon Worata在意外發生前也特別指示原告人不要踏在膠布上。

6.  本案主要爭議事項如下:-

(1) 原告人受傷是否因被告疏忽所導致。就這方面: -

(a) 有關意外的工作內在風險(inherent risk)是否可以移除?

(b) 被告人作為僱主,有沒有採取合理措施保障工人安全?

(2) 原告人在意外上有沒有需要負起共分疏忽之責任(contributory negligence)?

(3) 原告人應得賠償金額。

各名事實證人的評述

7.  原告人在他的證人陳述書對有關事發經過陳述如下:-

(1) 他從2006年3月10日起受聘於被告人公司任職「卡板員」,他被指派到機場超級一號貨運站停車場落貨區工作,主要負責清理貨車工人上落貨後丟棄在地上的木卡板。

(2) 有關意外發生於2007年5月27日。晚上約9時,公司部門主管陳先生致電給原告人,指地下G層停車場的落貨區堆積了很多雜物,阻塞貨車停泊及上落貨,並要求他立即到該落貨區清理雜物。

(3) 當他到達落貨區時,已有2名臨時清潔女工站在雜物旁等待原告人合力清理雜物。他發現有大量的雜物零亂的堆疊在地上,包括約5塊鋁板,數十塊木卡板,不同顏色的膠布、膠紙和8至10個圓柱膠芯等。

(4) 由於現場環境非常混亂,他擔心清理雜物時會發生倒塌危險,所以他認為應以剷車協助清理。他於是致電陳主管要求安排剷車協助清理,但陳主管以貨車急需落貨車位及等待剷車需時為由拒絕了他。

(5) 原告人於是聽從陳主管指示著手清理雜物並負責移走卡板。當他移走了8至10塊卡板後,在移走另一塊木卡板時,他踏在一塊蓋著膠布的鋁板上,右腳突然向前滑,失去平衝並向後跌倒。他的尾龍骨及腎部著地,左後肩亦撞倒硬物。他即時感到尾龍骨、背部及後肩劇痛。其後他發現他失足的位置的膠布下有一個膠芯,夾在鋁板和膠布中間。

(6) 他稱入職被告人公司一年多,公司從來沒有在每個月安排安全指示訓練例會,亦沒有提示員工工作時要注意的地方和工作安全問題。

8.  被告人共有兩份證人陳述書,證人分別是陳家保(科文)及Supapon Woratap(清潔工人)。

9.  陳家保指原告人是一名清潔工人,他的主要職責是搬運、清理及棄置運貨板等。雖然他沒有目睹意外的經過,但他確認在發生意外前,有關位置地上有大量膠紙及運貨板需要處理。他亦稱被告人每月會有例行會議向所有清潔部員工提示近期工作要注意的地方及工作安全問題,例如正確的姿勢等。被告人亦有製作告示張貼在清潔部員工房內,連同照片指示如何正確搬運物件和正確的姿勢等。

10.  Supapon Woratap稱原告人在意外發生時是一名清潔工人。她指稱當時她已負責「科文」的工作。在意外發生前,她在現場發現有大量的棄置貨板,因此要求增加人手。她稱當時一共有六名清潔工人(包括原告人)在現場清理雜物,她有指示原告人不要踏在膠布上。雖然她亦沒有目睹意外的經過,但她確認原告人在跌倒後有向她報告意外受傷。原告人當時報稱傷勢並不嚴重,可以繼續工作。當他們回到休息室後,原告人說手腕還感到痛。她於是把事情向陳家保報告。陳先生要求原告人回家休息。這名證人最後沒有出庭作供,所以本席不能接受她在證人陳述書中的證供。

討論

(1)責任問題-事實裁斷

11.  雖然陳先生沒有目睹原告人跌倒時的情況,但原告人事後有向他報告。原告人在被盤問時就意外發生的經過有一些前後不符的地方,例如當時他究竟站在一些雜物上或站在地上;他踏著的膠布的下面是否有一個膠芯等。但最後原告人的說法與其證人陳述書大體一致。就這方面,本席接納原告人所述的意外發生情況及經過。

12.  本席亦接納原告人就案發時現場的情況作出的描述。當時原告人及其他清潔工需要清理的雜物堆積如山,有大量的木卡板需要在短時間內被移走。相反,本席並不接納被告人就工作內在風險的陳詞。雖然大部分工作都有一些內在的風險,但這並不等於被告人沒有責任就有關的風險向原告人提出適當的警告。

13.  在這方面,被告人的科文陳先生指稱在每個月的例行會議上,被告人有向員工提示要注意的地方及工作安全問題,但他的證供有以下值得留意的地方:-

(1) 他的證人陳述書就跣倒的風險隻字不提。在本席向他澄清時,他亦同意在例會上沒有特別提到跣倒的風險。會中主要談及的是搬運物件時的正確姿勢。

(2) 雖然他強調在會中曾經提到有要求員工在工作時要「腳踏實地」,但他在複問時指他或其他員工並沒有解釋何謂「腳踏實地」。

(3) 他指稱曾經叫員工「在清理雜物時看不見的地方不要踩下去」,但本席認為被告人實際上根本沒有考慮員工在清理雜物時跌倒的風險。陳先生就這方面的證供混亂及不可信。本席不接納陳先生在這方面的證供,裁定被告人根本沒有向原告人就清理雜物時跌倒的風險提出任何警告。

14.  本席認為在意外發生時在停車場地上的各種雜物對在現場進行清理工作的員工造成了跌倒的風險。作為他們的僱主,被告人有責任向員工提供適當的培訓或警告,提醒他們要留意的地方。有關的法律原則十分清晰。例如在Ho Foon Cheung v Shun Yip Engineering Company Limited(CACV33/2011, 7 November 2011)一案中,鄧國楨法官(當時為上訴法庭副庭長)在第十八段說:-

“Even if a hazard is obvious I do not believe an employer is entitled to leave his employee to fend for himself. If a workplace contains an obvious hazard but the danger could be removed or reduced, by training, warning or otherwise it is the duty of the employer to do so.”

15.  因此,本席認為被告人作為原告人的僱主,在這次意外之前並沒有採取合理的措施保障原告人的安全。本席因此認為原告人是因被告人的疏忽或失責而遇到意外。

16.  本席同時亦接納原告人在意外發生當日曾經有向陳先生要求提供剷車協助,但遭拒絕。但本席同意被告人的說法,考慮到當時現場的情況和所需要清理的雜物,剷車並非清理意外發生時現場雜物的可行方法。因為無論有沒有剷車,原告人也要在地上用人手執拾雜物,這對原告人跣倒的風險沒有影響。

(2)共分疏忽

17.  被告人指在有關意外上的共分疏忽應在25% - 40%之間。被告人指原告人在不知道膠布下有什麼東西的情況下仍然踏在膠布上,這對一般合理的人來說,已經是妄顧自身安全的行為。

18.  就這方面,被告人的代表大律師在盤問時指出如果在膠布下藏著膠芯,膠布必然會拱起。原告人回答時首先指膠布沒有拱起。其後他又指因當時環境太黑,故看不到膠布是否拱起。但當本席向他查詢有關現場光線情況時,原告人描述現場的照明只是比法庭略暗。此後,他又指膠布當時是拱起的。

19.  被告人一方引用了Lam Shui Chun v Leung Ting Ping Metal Factory Limited(HCPI 75/97)和Ng Sin Cho v The Incorporated Owners of Jardine Court(DCPI 976/05)兩宗案例,提出就被告人沒有指示原告人不要踏在膠布上的情況而言,有關共分疏忽應為百分之二十五。

20.  本席認為在當時地上有大量雜物的情況下,原告人有一定的責任去留意地面的情況。雖然本席同意原告人有共分疏忽之處,但本席認為被告人所提出的比例在本案的案情來說實屬過高,因此本席裁定原告人須承擔百分之十五的共分疏忽責任。

賠償金額

21.  原告人的總申索為HK$943,000.00,在減去HK$357,307,60僱員補償金額後為HK$585,692.40。

原告人的傷勢和治療-骨科

22.  根據經編正損害賠償書,原告人之傷勢為:-

(1) 背部與左肩受傷;

(2) 創傷後壓力紊亂(“PTSD”)及/或帶有各軀體綜合症之再發性抑鬱紊亂(recurrent depressive disorder moderate with somatic syndrome)。

23.  兩位骨科專家(原告人之高醫生及被告人之李醫生)在確診上分歧輕微。高醫生認為:(1)原告人左肩扭傷/挫傷導致肌腱炎;(2)腰背扭傷/挫傷及帶有右邊坐骨神經痛。李醫生則指原告人只是腰背及左肩扭傷/挫傷。無論如何,高醫生認為原告人坐骨神經痛已經解決及消退。

24.  雙方專家亦同意原告人背部多節出現意外前退化病變(pre-existing degenerative changes in multiple levels)。李醫生認為即使沒有意外,原告人也很可能會在7 - 8年內出現同樣的腰背病徵。對此,高醫生沒有表達相反意見。雖然原告人在作供時表示不同意2位專家指出的舊患(pre-existing injuries),但被告人認為這只是原告人自己主觀的認知。

25.  對於原告人左肩之肌腱炎,高醫生認為是意外導致的,並以左肩之肌肉萎縮顯示原告人左肩有痛及僵硬情況。但李醫生指原告人已良好痊癒,並以原告人之左上臂比右上臂更粗壯為證,指原告人左上臂移動頻密程度和右臂一樣。這顯示即使原告人左肩有痛及僵硬,也不影響原告人之左肩功能。對此高醫生亦未有反駁。

26.  除了有關骨科專家證據外,本席亦考慮了被告人呈堂的兩段調查影片。這兩段影片均顯示原告人行動正常,其間沒有任何不適。影片所顯示的情況跟原告人在其證人陳述書所敘述的病徵有一定的出入。例如原告人在證人陳述書中提到步行約十五至二十分鐘腰部會扯痛,若步伐較大或較急促時腰部痛楚會加劇。但原告人在2009年2月4日被攝得步行超過1小時,期間步行姿勢、速度、耐力和步履均正常,沒有任何不妥跡象。

27.  再者,根據雙方專家的聯合報告,他們均同意原告人對其傷勢有誇大其詞。高醫生更表示原告誇大徵狀,而且Waddell測試顯示原告人非常誇張。

28.  本席在考慮了原告人的陳述、有關骨科專家報告及被告人呈堂的影片後,並不認為原告人是裝病或裝傷(malinger)。這亦不是被告人的立場。但原告人就自己傷勢的描述的確有誇大其詞,誇大了其受傷的程度。

原告人的傷勢和治療-精神科

29.  原告人指他在瑪嘉烈醫院骨科覆診期間,骨科醫生發現他的情緒不穩定,遂轉介他到明愛醫院臨床心理科接受治療,經專家診斷後認為他的情緒不穩由意外造成。

30.  原告人原本向法庭申請委派精神科專家撰寫報告,但有關申請均被各級法庭駁回。詳情見上訴庭的2011年12月29日之判決書及區域法院暫委法官Shipp分別在2011年7月27日及2011年10月11日之判決書。最重要的是各級法院均在判決書中裁定原告人之精神科問題與意外沒足夠關係(sufficient nexus)。

31.  而從主治醫生報告中,可見:-

(1) 原告人在1993年遭遇上一次意外,當時確診患上創傷後壓力紊亂(“PTSD”)及抑鬱。其後,醫生修改確診為輕度認知紊亂(mild cognitive disorder)及器質性情緒紊亂(organic mood disorder)。但至2010年9月時原告人已沒有抑鬱。另一方面,原告人現在患上的是週期性抑鬱紊亂,帶有軀幹綜合症狀。亦因上述兩個不同的病症,暫委法官Shipp在其判詞中裁定原告人當時或入稟申索陳述書時並沒有患上PTSD。

(2) 雖然原告人在意外後感到痛楚,但在意外後的兩年期間,原告依然沒有抑鬱徵兆。只不過其後在2009年,當他未能成功到前任僱主處理復工(因前任僱主並不熱衷讓他復工),導致他面對經濟問題,及受訴訟影響,他才開始有抑鬱徵兆。

因此,正如各級法庭的判決書指出的情況一樣,被告人認為原告人現有的精神科問題與意外沒有關係。

32.  此外,原告人亦呈上一份日期為2011年10月21日,由一位Dr Cheng Kim Shing撰寫的報告。有關報告中提到:“The accident was a possible cause for the recurrent depressive disorder and depressive features.”(意外是導致原告人精神科問題的一個可能原因)。

33.  本席接納被告人的陳詞,裁定有關報告並不能呈堂。撰寫報告的鄭醫生為原告人的主治醫生,並不是精神科醫生。再者,作為原告人的主治醫生,本席對鄭醫生作為專家證人的資格亦有保留。

34.  此外,有關報告內容對原告人的幫助亦不大。鄭醫生不但沒有就其報告的有關意見提出任何理據或解釋,報告中提到的「可能」亦不足以令原告人在相對可能性下證明意外是導致原告精神科問題的一個很可能(probable)的原因。

35.  總括而言,原告不能夠證明他所指稱的精神科問題為有關意外所致。

痛楚、痛苦或喪失生活便利方面

36.  原告人在證人陳述書第25段列出他現有的病徴,他指身體多處仍感到痛楚及不適,在晚上經常發惡夢扎醒,影響睡眠並需要服用精神科藥物。他亦不能與家人進行羽毛球和乒乓球等運動。腰部疼痛亦使他脾氣變得暴躁,影響了他和家人的感情。他亦無法與妻子行房,影響了夫妻間的生活和感情。

37.  原告人沒有律師代表,本席不能預期他可以提供案例作比較。代表被告人的鍾大律師則引述了以下的案例作比較:-

(1) Wu Leung Kui Jacky v Leung Ming Yun(DCPI  1154/08)(2011年3月7日):原告人意外時30歲,是一名推銷員,他指稱在工作時受到襲擊,頸部受傷,手腳及肩亦有其他輕微損傷。他亦指稱在意外後患上創傷後壓力紊亂(PTSD)。在該案中身體受傷的PSLA被評為HK$90,000,而精神科問題的PSLA則被評定為HK$215,000。

(2) Tse Siu Yee v Wing Wah Cake Shop Limited (DCPI  1618/10)(2011年7月19日):原告人為餅店的店員/收銀員。她指稱在搬運「老婆餅」時扭傷背部及大腿。她後來亦指稱腿部及腰部感到麻痺。同時她亦患上了調整混亂(adjustment disorder)及恐慌(panic disorder)。在該案中PSLA被評定為HK$175,000。

(3) 潘國榮訴香港機場管理局(HCPI 305/04)(2008年11月18日):原告人為機場管理局及車輛之督導員,負責指揮交通。他在機場搭乘一部由L5層下行至L3層的自動電梯時,電梯突然停頓,使他失足,翻滾至自動電梯下端受傷。原告人在意外時55歲,意外導致的傷勢為震蕩、頸部及背部挫傷,左膝及左足踝扭傷。原告人投訴頸痛、腰痛及腳踝痛,不能站立,行走或坐下超過30分鐘。他亦投訴神經衰弱及不舉。法庭評定PSLA為HK$100,000。

(4) Chan Chung v Greenroll t/a Conrad Hong Kong (HCPI 275/05)(2005年12月20日):原告人在意外時37歲,在酒店任職侍應。他在酒店廚房濕滑的地上滑倒,背部軟組織受傷,顯示出L4-L5腰椎盤輕微衰退。意外亦導致原告人某程度的抑鬱症。法庭裁定這個情況下適當的PSLA應在HK$150,000至HK$200,000之間。在該案中PSLA被評定為HK$180,000。

(5) Wong Yan Lam v Lam Wing Kei (HCPI 438/09)(2011年6月10日):原告人在意外時23歲,她分別在2006年11月及2007年1月的兩次交通意外中受傷。在兩次意外中原告人均在巴士上因突然急煞車被抛到車廂內的地上受傷。兩次意外分別傷及她身體多處包括頭、頸、背、盆骨等。她亦患上PTSD。法庭裁定PSLA為HK$200,000。

38.  在考慮了以上案例及本案的案情下,本席認為鍾大律師所建議的賠償額HK$150,000比較低。本席認為合理的賠償額應為HK$200,000。

39.  但本席亦認同被告人一方就舊患問題的陳詞。李醫生認為原告人即使在沒有意外的情況下,他也很有可能會在7-8年內出現同樣的腰背病徵。這點高醫生沒有相反的意見。這與Chan Kam Hoi v Dragges et Travaux Publics [1998] 2 HKLRD 958及潘國榮一案的情況類同。本席認為在這情況下應給予25%的折扣。以HK$200,000為基準,有關賠償為:-

 HK$200,000 x (100% - 25%) = HK$150,000

審訊前收入損失

40.  原告人以一共有740天的病假紙作為病假證據。他指若沒有需要那麼長的病假,醫生亦不會開出病假紙。但病假紙並非決定性的。法庭要考慮所有證據來決定有關收入的損失。見Tam Fu Yip Fip v Sincere Engineering and Trading Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 210。

41.  根據聯合骨科專家報告,高醫生同意病假紙上所列的病假(28/3/07 - 26/3/09;18/4/09 - 26/4/09),但沒有列出任何原因。但另一方面,李醫生建議6個月病假,這是基於原告人在意外後7個月已不再出席物理治療(當時原告人只進行了8次物理治療)。而有關原告下腹麻痺的投訴,更沒有客觀醫學證據支持。

42.  對於上述李醫生之醫學分析,高醫生未能提出任何反駁,本席認為高醫生之建議是一個過高的評估。

43.  就這方面原告人指他從未缺席物理治療。這與物理治療師報告背道而馳。根據原告人之證供,物理治療師與他關係良好,所以該報告之內容不可能作假。物理治療師指原告人先後在2輪物理治療期間開始缺席,致令治療停止。這份報告必然由物理治療師根據即時診治記錄(contemporaneous treatment record)所編寫。兩次均出錯的說法內在不可置信。

44.  考慮了有關證據,本席認為7個月的病假較為合理。本席亦會再給原告人3個月的時間尋找新的工作。固此有關審訊前收入的損失應為:-

 HK$6,000(原告人意外前每月收入) x 10 = HK$60,000

未來收入損失

45.  在這方面,主要爭議在於原告人能否復職。李醫生認為原告人能夠復工。高醫生則說「不理想」,建議原告人從事一些相對體力要求較低的工作,例如收銀員、電話接線生或在油站工作。考慮了有關報告的內容,本席接受李醫生的意見。

46.  被告人指卡板只是10-20公斤,並非如原告人所說那麼重。原告人指稱不能復工是因腰背問題,從調查影片可見,原告人的腰背問題對他影響有限。

47.  正如以上所說,本席認為原告人就有關意外對他的影響有所誇大。本席認為他有能力復工。本席因此不批准此方面的賠償。

失去工作能力的賠償

48.  李醫生指原告人傷勢對他的工作效率影響輕微,在職場上求職的不利因素亦屬輕微。高醫生評估原告人有6%的個人永久傷殘,而李醫生則認為有4%。本席亦考慮到原告人意外前有舊的傷患。但本席同意這次意外對原告人有一定程度的影響,所以裁定以原告人意外前6個月的收入為基礎的總額,即HK$36,000,反映有關不利的因素。

其他特別損害賠償

49.  雖然原告人在賠償陳述書指醫療費用是HK$5,000,但其披露的單據的醫療費用只有HK$3,900。被告人同意原告人申索的交通費用(HK$2,000)。本席固此判原告人HK$5,900作為此項的賠償。

50.  總括來說,原告可得之賠償如下:-

(1)             痛楚、痛苦和喪失生活便利
HK$150,000.00
(2)             審訊前收入損失
HK$60,000.00
(3)             未來收入損失
HK$0.00
(4)             失去工作能力賠償
HK$36,000.00
(5)             其他特別損害賠償    
HK$5,900.00
 
_____________
小計:
HK$251,900.00
扣除:共分疏忽(15%)
(HK$37,785.00)
 
_____________
小計: 
HK$214,115.00
扣除:已支付僱員補償 
(HK$357,307.60)
 
_____________
 
HK$0.00

51.  原告人需從上述賠償額扣除已支付的僱員補償。由於原告人所得的賠償比僱員補償小,所以在本申索中得不到任何賠償。

52.  基於以上原因,本席裁定原告人敗訴。本席作出暫准訟費令,要原告人支付被告人的訟費,包括大律師費用。若訟費金額有爭議,則由聆案官評定。除非任何一方14日內提出申請,暫准命令轉為絕對命令。原告人在有律師代表時的訟費,須根據法律援助規例作出評定。

( 杜淦堃 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人:沒有律師代表,並親自應訟

被告人:鍾加康大律師,由梁鳯慈律師行轉聘

78542-EN-2011-10-11

LEUNG KANG WAI v. DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LTD

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DCPI 297/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 297 OF 2010

--------------------

BETWEEN

LEUNG KANG WAIPlaintiff
and
DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LIMITED
formerly known as
P. DUSSMANN HONG KONG LIMITED
Defendant

---------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge Shipp in Chambers (open to public)

Date of hearing : 23 September 2011

Date of handing down decision : 11 October 2011

DECISION

1.  This is an application by the plaintiff to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the Order dated 29 July 2011.  The factual background of this case has been sufficiently set out in my Ruling of 29 July 2011.  I take this opportunity to set out some of the relevant background of this case which was raised during the hearing on 23 September 2011.

2.  The following was pleaded in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim:-

“As a result of the Accident, the Plaintiff suffered serious injuries to his back and left shoulder and subsequently developed post-traumatic stress disorder”

3.  It was on this basis that the plaintiff sought leave by way of summons on 11 March 2011 from Master J. Chow to adduce psychiatric evidence.  Master J. Chow dismissed the application on 25 May 2011. The defendant appealed and the appeal was heard before me on 29 July 2011.  I dismissed the appeal for the reasons set out in my Ruling.  During the hearing on 29 July 2011, the defendant’s arguments have shifted from PTSD to depression i.e. the defendant was suffering from depression rather than PTSD.

4.  The defendant’s arguments have shifted again, albeit not drastically, that by reason of the pain caused by the accident, the defendant was/is suffering from depression.  Thus there is a causal link between the accident and the defendant’s depression.  Mr. Chan concedes there is no diagnosis of PTSD.

5.  Mr. Chan argues that the defendant had been diagnosed with recurrent depressive disorder, moderate with somatic syndrome by Dr. Cheng on 19 August 2010.  Mr. Chan says this is attributed to the pain caused by the accident and I was taken to paragraph 3 of the report of Ms. Valda Cho, a clinical psychologist at Caritas Medical Centre, where she referred to the defendant’s difficulties adjusting to the pain.  However, Ms. Valda Cho did not say the defendant was suffering from depression. 

6.  Mr. Chan also referred to several psychiatric reports prepared by Dr. Cheng.  Mr. Chan submits that looking at these reports at face value, one should discern that the depression was caused by the pain and the pain was caused by the accident.  Thus, there is causation. 

7.  Mr. Chan referred to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the case of Farman Khan v Lau Lai Hong HCPI 850/2008, 29/4/2010 Fung J (unreported), in support of his submission that the court should order psychiatric reports on whether the accident is a possible cause for the depression. 

8.  The case of Farman Khan is of no assistance to Mr. Chan.  One should look at the case of Farman Khan in its own factual context. The court did not order a full expert opinion in that case but simply asked the plaintiff to consult his treatment doctors to see if there is some explanation of a possible link between the accident  and other ailments of the plaintiff. 

9.  Mr. Cheng for the defendant referred to the case summaries prepared by Dr. Cheng.  Dr. Cheng first saw the plaintiff on 23 February 2010.  According to Dr. Cheng’s notes, the plaintiff had no depressive features in the first 2 years after the accident despite experiencing some degree of pain.  It was only in 2009 that the plaintiff began to have “depressive features” because he was bothered by financial problems.

10.  I was also reminded by Mr. Cheng of the high threshold required in applications of this nature.  In light of paragraph 9 herein, I am not convinced I have erred in the exercise of my discretion.  I am not convinced that the plaintiff has a prospect of success, let alone a high prospect of success in his intended appeal. 

11.  Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs to the defendant.  The plaintiff’s costs are to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.  The costs order will be made absolute within 14 days.

(COLIN ANDREW SHIPP)
Deputy District Judge

Mr. Alwin CHAN, instructed by Messrs. Au & Vrijmoed, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid for the Plaintiff

Mr. Alfred C P CHENG, instructed by Messrs. Winnie Leung & Co., for the Defendant

77698-EN-2011-07-29

LEUNG KANG WAI v. DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LTD

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DCPI297/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 297 OF 2010

________________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG KANG WAIPlaintiff
and
DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LIMITEDDefendant
 Formerly known as P. DUSSMANN HONG KONG LIMITED 

________________________

Before: Deputy District Judge Shipp in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing: 29 July 2011

Date of Ruling: 29 July 2011

________________________

R U L I N G

________________________

 

1.  The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a cleaner.  On 27 March 2007 whilst working at the Hong Kong International Airport, the plaintiff stepped on a plastic sheet with a plastic film roll underneath.  He slipped and fell on the ground, landing on his buttocks first and then his left shoulder.  According to the joint expert report of two orthopaedic surgeons, the plaintiff did not lose any consciousness nor suffer from any head injury.  The plaintiff was x-rayed and he suffered no bone injury.  In fact, the plaintiff was treated and discharged on the same day of admission.  It was what is called a ‘slip and fall’ accident.

2.  Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim dated 16 March 2010 pleaded that as a result of the accident the plaintiff developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  The only basis for one to plead PTSD as at the date of the Statement of Claim was a report dated 25 February 2009 prepared by Miss Cho, a clinical psychologist at the Caritas Medical Centre.  Miss Cho said the plaintiff was seen on 14 March 2008, a year after the accident, and Miss Cho stated in paragraph 3 of her report the following:

“According to Mr Leung’s information, he suffered from sleeping difficulties, irritability, excessive worries, death wish, nightmare about the accident, mild intrusions and avoidant behaviours after an accident at workplace which happened in March 2007. He was found to be suffering from symptoms of PTSD. He was also found to have difficulties adjusting to the pain and a new role in the family after the incident.”

3.  Two issues arise from Miss Cho’s report.  The first issue is that Miss Cho said the plaintiff was suffering from symptoms of PTSD and not suffering from PTSD itself.  She never made any clinical diagnosis that the plaintiff was suffering from PTSD.  The second issue is that PTSD is a very serious condition.  Medical literature suggests that for PTSD to develop a person has experienced or witnessed or was confronted with an unusually traumatic event that has both of these elements: 

(1) the event involved actual or threatened death or serious injury to that person or to others; and

(2) the person felt intense fear, horror or helplessness (quoted from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition at page 435).

4.  In the present case, the plaintiff’s accident was a slip and fall one and can by no stretch of imagination come within a trauma of such magnitude.  I refer to Ho Man Fong v Sime Darby Motor Service Limited, HCPI1096/2003, unreported, Suffiad J, 19 July 2005, at paragraphs 54 to 56.

5.  Based on the opinion of a clinical psychologist that the plaintiff was suffering from symptoms of PTSD, the plaintiff’s lawyers took it upon themselves to plead paragraph 2 of the Statement of Claim the way it is so pleaded.  It was only on 25 August 2010 that the plaintiff’s lawyers obtained the first of four reports from Dr Cheng, a psychiatrist.  From that report we now learn that the plaintiff was in a traffic accident in 1993 and was awarded in excess of $600,000 in damages.  The plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from PTSD as a result of the accident in 1995.  The plaintiff was diagnosed to be suffering from recurrent depressive disorder, moderate, with somatic syndrome and not PTSD in August 2010.

6.  In the second report of Dr Cheng dated 20 December 2010 he gave a fuller background of the plaintiff’s PTSD caused by the plaintiff’s accident in 1993.  The plaintiff was receiving psychiatric treatment on and off between 1995 and 2002.  The diagnosis was reversed from PTSD to mild cognitive mood disorder and organic mood disorder in 2001.  In paragraph 7 of the said report the doctor said that the plaintiff was no longer depressed.

7.  The last two reports were dated 1 February and 29 April 2011.  Dr Cheng basically stated that the plaintiff was still bothered by the pain and he would be depressed at times when stressed.  That is understandable.

8.  It is clear that the plaintiff was not suffering from PTSD now or at the time when the Statement of Claim was filed.  There was no basis for the plea and no basis to adduce evidence from a psychiatrist on the issue of PTSD.  However, Mr Chan, counsel for the plaintiff, now seeks to argue in paragraph 17 of his submissions, and I quote:

“For the court to deny psychiatric expert evidence would amount to making a finding summarily that the plaintiff does not have depression.”

9.  I do not think that is the proper issue.  The issue is assuming that the plaintiff is suffering from depression, is psychiatric evidence relevant, necessary and probative?

10.  Depression is no longer a rare human condition in modern urban society.  People suffer from depression from all sorts of reasons ranging from unhappy human relationships to money issues. 

11.  The defendant does not deny that the plaintiff is suffering from depression but argues just because the plaintiff is suffering from depression after the accident it does not mean that the accident caused the depression.

12.  In light of the medical reports of Dr Cheng, I fail to see any relevance between the plaintiff’s depression and the accident. 

13.  If I accept the plaintiff’s argument in paragraph 17 of Mr Chan’s written submissions, then in each and every case where a person who suffers from depression after an accident, expert psychiatric evidence should be ordered. That is the logical conclusion of his argument.  The outcome of the plaintiff’s argument is contrary to what the courts have said regarding the proliferation of expert evidence.  I refer to the cases of Ip Sau Lin v The Hospital Authority, DCEC584/2007, unreported, HH Judge Ng, 9 April 2009 at 43; Ho Man Fong v Sime Darby Motors at paragraph 100.

14.  Furthermore, even if the issue of relevance is satisfied, the expert evidence is not necessary in this case.  The trial judge can come to a decision on the issues of PSLA and the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity by looking at the medical reports. 

15.  The psychological treatment received by the plaintiff concentrated on pain treatment and depression arising from his relationship with his employer and stress from litigation.  Further explanation by psychiatrists are unlikely to be required as necessary in the sense of being useful to the trial judge (I refer to the case of Ip Sau Lin, paragraphs 40 to 42).

16.  By reason of the foregoing, expert psychiatric evidence is neither necessary nor cost-effective.

(Discussion re costs)

1. The plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.

2. Costs of the appeal to the defendant, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

3. The plaintiff’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

Deputy District Judge Shipp

Mr Alwin Chan, instructed by Messrs Au & Vrijmoed, for the Plaintiff

Mr Alfred C P Cheng, instructed by Winnie Leung & Co., for the Defendant

Plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to HCMP2098/2011 dated 29 December 2011

76614-EN-2011-05-25

LEUNG KANG WAI v. DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LTD

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DCPI 297/10

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION DCPI 297 of 2010

________________________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG KANG WAIPlaintiff

And

 DUSSMANN SERVICE HONG KONG LIMITED formerly known as P. DUSSMANN HONG KONG LIMITEDDefendant
__________________________________

Coram: Before Master J Chow in Chambers

Date of Handing Down Decision : 25th May 2011 (by way of paper disposal)

________________________

DECISION

________________________

 

Introduction

1. The Plaintiff took out a summons on 11th March 2011 for leave to adduce psychiatric expert evidence at trial. The Defendant objected on the grounds that it is not relevant, not necessary and without probative value.

Background

2. The Plaintiff suffered injuries in the course of his employment on 27th March 2007. At the material times, he was working as a cleaning worker with the Defendant at the Ground Floor of the HACTL Super Terminal 1 of the Hong Kong International Airport. He slipped and fell backwards as he had stepped onto a plastic roll covered by a plastic sheet (“the Accident”).  

3. Parties agreed to adduce a joint orthopaedic expert report by the Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Peter Ko and the Defendant’s expert, Dr. Lee Po Chin dated 6th July 2010 without calling the makers thereof.  In para 11.1 of the said report, both experts opined the Plaintiff suffered “left shoulder sprain or contusion or contusion to the low back”.  In para 11.5, both experts agreed the Plaintiff has reached maximal medical improvement and further treatment is not necessary. 

4. Nevertheless, in respect of the Plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries, Dr. Ko said in para 11.9, inter alia that he can only assess the Plaintiff’s “muscolo – skeletal condition and injuries and would leave the post – traumatic stress [dis]order to relevant experts for comments and opinion”. On the other hand, Dr. Lee was silent on this point.

5. The Plaintiff claimed he had suffered psychiatric injures arising from this accident and applied for leave to adduce a psychiatric expert report.

The Plaintiff’s justification for leave  

6. The Plaintiff solicitors submitted that the Plaintiff has a history of psychiatric illness since 1993 where he was involved in a traffic accident. In 2002, he recovered and attained stable condition. The Plaintiff ceased to attend further psychiatric treatment since then.

7. The Plaintiff complained of mental distress after the Accident and was referred to psychological trauma clinic for further management on 13th March 2008 (which was almost one year after the Accident).  On record, the Plaintiff was treated 13 times in the Caritis Medical Centre (“CMC”) psychologically from 23rd April 2008 until 19th January 2009. In short, the Plaintiff claimed he has suffered from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the Accident. He was given psychoeducation, improvement was noted accordingly.

8. Interestingly, Dr. Valdo Cho, a clinical psychiatrist of CMC, stated  in para 5 of her letter dated 25th February 2009,

“However, treatment was interrupted by the arrangement of his compensation proceeding. He was impressed to have some excessive worries over it. Sessions were spent in helping him to reinstate his mood, regulating stress management and problem solving skills. He excessive worries and distorted thought about the compensation proceeding were challenged through cognitive restructuring. He was impressed to be more able to handle the compensation proceeding then.

9. Excepts of more updated medical reports by Dr. Cheng Kin Shing of Kwai Chung Hospital are noted as follows:

(i)  1st Report dated 25th October 2010: Dr. Cheng confirmed the Plaintiff’s past history of psychiatric illness from a traffic accident in 1993, he became stable in 2002. Dr. Cheng had seen the Plaintiff since 23 February 2003, he was diagnosed to have suffered from recurrent depressive disorder, moderate with somatic syndrome.

(ii) 2nd Report dated 20th December 2010: Dr. Cheng provided a medical report between the period from January 1993 to 27th March 2007.  Dr. Cheng reconfirmed the Plaintiff had suffered from PTSD since the traffic accident in 1993, he failed to attend follow up treatment from 1998. He came back again for treatment in June 2001 and was transferred to West Kowloon Psychiatric Centre out patient clinic.  The Plaintiff was given medication and did not attend treatment from January 2001.

(iii) 3rd Report dated 1st February 2011: Dr. Cheng said the Plaintiff was seen on 21st December 2010, 18th January 2011, “he was still bothered by pain and he was bothered by having to involve solicitors in the compensation issue.  He felt more irritable and wanted to cry”.  The Plaintiff was administered with anti depressant medication.

10.  In light of the medical report, the Plaintiff articulated it was necessary to adduce psychiatric expert report. I do not intend to repeat the legal propositions relied by the Plaintiff, I agree, those cited were applicable principles. [1]

The Defendant’s Objection

11.The Defendant’s solicitors, succinctly raised in the Affirmation of Leung Fung Chi that the psychiatric illness of the Plaintiff is unrelated to the Accident and thus, the Court shall refuse to grant leave to the Plaintiff to adduce a psychiatric expert report.

12.  The general principles deduced from various authorities cited by the Defendant can be deduced as[2]:

(i)  The expert report must be one of relevance, necessity and probative value;

(ii) The Plaintiff’s symptoms, largely contained in the government hospital medical reports, must demonstrate a link with the subject accident.

(iii) The expert report must be capable of assisting the trial judge, if the materials in the reports of treatment and care by the doctors were sufficiently abundance to assist the trial judge, it will render the expert report unnecessary.

Analysis

13.  Upon consideration of all medical reports made available to me, it is evident that the Plaintiff has psychiatric symptoms.  However, I do not find such symptoms were Accident-related. The Defendant’s solicitors has correctly put it, there must be a link between the Accident and the complaints. It is far from sufficient to justify adducing psychiatric expert report if the Plaintiff can only demonstrate psychiatric symptoms and the occurrence of the Accident.

14.  I accept the Plaintiff is reported to have suffered from psychiatric illness as early as 1993, when he was involved in a traffic accident. He received treatment until 2002.

15.  Subsequently, on 13th March 2008, the Plaintiff claimed he again suffered from PTSD and resorted to regular medical treatments. Even though the Plaintiff has gone through various follow up treatments, it is inappropriate to say the more the number of treatments, the higher the likelihood the Plaintiff has had psychiatric injuries resulted from the Accident. After all, the current psychiatric complaints were noted almost one year after the Accident.

16.  Dr. Cheng clarified in his medical experts that in fact the Plaintiff has defaulted treatments after in 1998 and 2001[3]. I have no evidence before me that the current psychiatric symptoms were or might be a relapse, but at least, I believe the existence of the symptoms and its causation is distinctive.

17.  Neither did the orthorpaedic experts comment on his psychiatric aspect, only that Dr. Peter Ko put it subtly that he would leave the PTSD to relevant experts for comments and opinion. Both experts did not positively recommend the Plaintiff to be examined by a psychiatric expert for his PTSD syndrome.

18.  Apart from that, the Plaintiff seemed concerned with the on-going litigation.  This was noted by Dr. Valdo Cho[4] and also those from Dr. Cheng[5]. The two comments cast serious doubts whether the psychiatric symptoms were Accident- related.

19.  Lastly, this is a classic slip and fall case, the Plaintiff suffered left shoulder sprain and low back contusion, one could expect the impact on the Plaintiff would be far below a traffic accident. I find the Plaintiff has pitched his case too high to say the fall has contributed to PTSD.  Coupled with his past medical history and remarks from the medical officers, the Plaintiff’s allegation that the psychiatric injury was made on shaky grounds, I find his psychiatric symptoms and the Accident coexisted without sufficient nexus.  What follows is, a psychiatric expert report would not be of any assistance to the trial judge.

Conclusion

20.  In the premises, I refuse to grant leave to the Plaintiff for leave to obtain a psychiatric expert report. I therefore dismiss the Plaintiff’s summons.

21.  I see nothing in the application that I shall depart from the usual costs order to follow the event. I make an order nisi that the costs of the summons be to the Defendant, taxed if not agreed. The Checklist Review Hearing was fixed on 25th May 2011 at 2:30 pm in Court 46. I shall hear submissions on costs at the hearing.

(J Chow)
District Court Master

Representation:

Mr. K. Lam of Messrs. Au & Vrijmoed for the Plaintiff

Ms. G. Ko of Messrs. Winnie Leung for the Defendant



[1] Arfan Muhammad v. MPS Engineering Ltd & Ors (unreported, HCPI 457/2003, 20 June 2004);

Lam Siu Kong v. Luck On Enterprise t/a Ocean Super Seafood Restaurant (unreported, HCPI 698/2009, 26 Aug 2010); Wong Ka Yee v. Gay Giano Int Ltd (unreported, DCEC 436/2007, 4 August 2009); Chan Yuet Keung v. Harmony (International) Knitting Factory Ltd [2010] 5 HKLRD 599 and So Cheuk Yi v Pang Harling Harry (unreported, HCPI 526/2007)

[2] Ip Sau Lin v. Hospital Authority (DCEC 584 of 2007); Farman Khan v. Shun Sum Engineering Co. (HCPI 850/2008); Ho May Fong v. Sime Darby Motor Services Ltd (HCPI 1096/2003) and Chan Man Sze v. Chan Siu Wan  & ors (HCPI 290 off 2007)

[3] See para 9(ii) hereinabove.

[4] in para 5 of her letter dated 25th February 2009 (of which I have cited in para 7 hereinabove)

[5] in the 3rd Report dated 1st February 2011(of which I have cited in para 8(iii) hereinabove).