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Matrimonial Causes2010

LPK v. SH also known as HSC AND ANOTHER

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87584-EN-2013-05-15

LPK v. SH also known as HSC AND ANOTHER

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FCMC 11930/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.11930 of 2010

________________________________

BETWEEN

 LPK Petitioner

and

 SH also known as HSC1st Respondent

and

 HSH2nd Respondent

__________________________________

Coram: Before Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 19 April 2013
Date of Handing Down Decision: 15 May 2013

___________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
(Leave to Appeal, Leave to Appeal out of time)

   __________________________

Introduction

1.  This is the 1st Respondent’s application for leave to appeal and the 2nd Respondent’s application for leave to appeal out of time, both against an Anti-suit injunction granted by this Court on 28 July 2011 which is some 21 months ago.  I will, for the sake of brevity, refer to the Petitioner as the “Wife”, the 1st Respondent as the “Husband” and the 2nd Respondent, being the father of the Husband, as the “Father” in these Reasons.

2.  The progress of these proceedings are somehow convoluted due to a number of applications and adjournments, I will for the sake of clarity and completeness set out the chronological background at different stages in so far as they are relevant, necessary and important for these Reasons.

Chronology of Events

3.  The Husband’s Summons for leave to appeal was issued by his then solicitors Messrs. Li, Chow & Company (“LCC”) on 10 August 2011 returnable before this Court on 3 October 2011.   No Grounds of Appeal had ever been filed by LCC or by the Husband himself for today’s hearing. 

4.  By a letter dated 28 September 2011 (that is, 4 days before the scheduled hearing), LCC wrote to this Court saying that the Husband’s Summons for leave to appeal scheduled for hearing on 3 October 2011 had not been served on the Wife or the Father.   Since the Wife had applied legal aid on 19 August 2011 and there being no application for uplifting the legal aid stay by any parties, LCC in this letter sought leave to vacate the hearing of 3 October 2011 and adjourn to a date to be fixed not earlier than the end of October 2011.    This was accepted.  The initial hearing of the Husband’s Summons for leave to appeal was then re-fixed to 2 December 2011.

5.  By a letter dated 7 November 2011 from LCC to this Court and copied to the solicitors for the Wife Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li (“ILL”) and also copied to the solicitors for the Father Messrs. Chiu, Szeto & Cheng (“CSC”), leave was sought to further vacate the hearing of 2 December 2011 and be re-fixed with 1 day reserved in consultation with counsel’s diary.    It is worth noting that as at 7 November 2011, there was no ‘pending’ Summons of the Father, whether issued in the Family Court or in the High Court, for leave to appeal.   I will deal with the Father’s first Summons issued in the High Court by his solicitors CSC for leave to appeal in the following paragraphs.

6.  By a letter dated 22 November 2011 from CSC to this Court and copied to both ILL and LCC, it was said, inter alia, the following :-

“……..

We write to this Honourable Court to explain the position of our client that it was and is our client’s intention to apply for leave to appeal against the Order of the Learned Deputy Judge G. Own dated 28th July 2011.

Due to inadvertent oversight, we had applied for leave to appeal directly to the Court of Appeal without thoroughly considering Order 59, r.2B of the Rules of District Court, Cap.336H, which requires that leave to appeal must first be sought from the Judge whose order is being challenged. By the time we found that an inappropriate application for leave to appeal had been taken out to the Court of Appeal, the time limit for appealing and serving the Application for Leave to Appeal in the Family Court had already expired.

On 25th October 2011 we obtained leave from the Honourable Mr. Justice

Cheung, Justice of Appeal to withdraw our client’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. We now prepare to file Inter-partes Summons for leave to appeal out of time in the Family Court together with an affidavit explaining the reasons for appeal out of time.

However, we are given to understand that by a letter dated 7th November 2011, Messrs. Li, Chow & Company, solicitors for the 1st Respondent herein sought leave from the Learned Judge that the hearing for application for leave to appeal fixed on 2nd December 2011 be vacated and adjourned to a date to be fixed in consultation with counsel’s diaries.

In the premises, even though our client’s application for leave to appeal has already been out of time, we are bound to wait for an order to be made by this Honourable Court to vacate the hearing on 2nd December 2011, if the Court sees fit, before we can formally apply for a hearing of our client’s application for leave to appeal to be heard together with that of the 1st Respondent in consultation with Counsel’s diaries of all parties.

We would be grateful if this Honourable Court would accept our apology and we undertake to promptly take out summons application for leave to appeal to the Family Court on behalf of our client once the hearing on 2nd December 2011 has been formally vacated.

………..”

7.  About a week later on 30 November 2011, CSC again wrote to this Court and copied to both ILL and LCC, it was said, inter alia, the following :-

“……….

As mentioned in our previous letter, it has all along been our understanding that the hearing on 2nd December 2011 will be vacated due to the unavailability of the Petitioner’s Counsel on that day and will be adjourned to a date to be fixed in consultation with Counsel’s diaries.

Pending an order to be made by this Honourable Court to vacate the said hearing, we have undertook in our previous letter to promptly take out summons for our client’s application for leave to appeal out of time which could be dealt together with the 1st Respondent’s application for leave to appeal.

We have instructed Counsel to handle our client’s application for leave to appeal out of time and we have just been informed that the Petitioner’s Counsel is now available and the hearing on 2nd December 2011 is to stand.

Given the time constraint and for the purpose of saving costs, we respectfully ask this Honourable Court to vacate the hearing on 2nd December 2011 and adjourn it to a date to be fixed in consultation with Counsel’s diaries of all parties, so that we shall have time to file the summons for leave to appeal out of time, and that the application for leave to appeal of our client and the 1st Respondent could be dealt with together at the adjourned hearing.

……….”

8.  On 30 November 2011, the following Order was granted and all 3 parties, namely, ILL, LCC and CSC were informed by letter :-

“1. Hearing on 02.12.2011 be vacated;

  2.    Parties to refix date.”

9.  However, it was only some three months later on 6 March 2012 after being notified the hearing on 2 December 2011 was vacated, CSC issued in the Family Court the Summons seeking leave to file and serve the Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal out of time.  This Summons was scheduled for hearing on 3 May 2012 and with 2 hours reserved stated as the time estimate in the Summons.   A draft Application for Leave to Appeal was attached to this Summons which contains 3 Grounds of Appeal settled by Senior Counsel Gerard McCoy and Counsel Pauline Leung.  An Affirmation by a partner of CSC, namely, Chiu Kwok Wing, Benedict, was also filed on the same date seeking time extension for appealing.

10.  There is a joint letter dated 27 April 2012 signed by all parties, that is, ILL, LCC and CSC seeking, inter alia,  :-

(a)     the hearing of CSC’s Summons returnable on 3 May 2012 be vacated and adjourned with 1 day reserved in consultation with Counsel’s diaries;

(b)     the hearing of LCC’s Summons (where no date had been fixed after the Order dated 30 November 2011 - see paragraph 8 above) be fixed to be heard together.

11.  This application was granted by this Court on 30 April 2012.

12.  The 1-day hearing was eventually scheduled for 19 October 2012 and later re-fixed to today.

Appeal to the Court of Appeal?

13.  As a matter of fact, the Father’s first Summons for leave to appeal was issued by CSC back on 10 August 2011.  This was within time prescribed by the relevant Rules.   However, this Summons was issued in the High Court under case no. HCMP 1522 of 2011 seeking leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal the Anti-suit injunction granted by this Court.   A Notice of Intended Application for Leave to Appeal intuited “CACV” was also filed on the same day with this Summons.   On the record, no date was allocated for this Summons issued in the High Court.

14.  On 24 October 2011, all parties, namely, ILL, CLL and CSC endorsed as a Consent Order under the case HCMP No.1522 of 2011 reciting Order 42 rule 5A of the Rules of the High Court to seek leave to withdraw the Father’s first Summons from the Court of Appeal.   A further Order was granted by Mr. Justice Cheung, JA, on the same terms and on the same date.

The applicable principles

15.  It is well settled principle that the appropriate tests when considering whether leave to appeal out of time ought to be given are :-

(a)   the length of the delay;

(b)   the reasons for the delay;

(c)   the prospects of success;

(d)   the extent of prejudice that would be caused to the other party

if leave is granted.

         (see : Norwich and Peterborough Building Society v. Steed[1991]

         WLR 449 followed by Birkenhead Properties & Investments Ltd v.

         Leung Yiu &Ors [1998] 1 HKLRD 257.)

16.  Order 58 rule 2 of the Rules of the District Court, Cap.336H, provides, inter alia,

“……….

(4) An application for leave to appeal must be made to a judge, or to a master in the case of an appeal under paragraph (2), within –

(a)in the case of an appeal from a judgment, order or decision of a master under paragraph (2), 28 days from the date of the judgment, order or decision;

(b)in the case of an appeal from a judgment, order or decision (other than an interlocutory judgment, order or decision) of a judge, 28 days from the date of the judgment, order or decision;

(c)in the case of an appeal from an interlocutory judgment, order or decision of a judge, 14 days from the date of the interlocutory judgment, order or decision.

(4A) If the judge or master (as the case may be) refuses an application for leave made under paragraph (4), a further application for leave may be made to the Court of Appeal within 14 days from the date of refusal.

(4B) An application under paragraph (4) or (4A) must be made inter parte if the proceedings to which the judgment, order or decision relates are inter partes.

(5) So far as is practicable, every application for leave to appeal made to a judge or master shall be made to the judge or the master against whose judgment, order or decision the appeal is sought.

(6) In any case in which the Court of Appeal may so allow, any such application may be made direct to the Court of Appeal.”

17.  Further, Section 63 of the District Court Ordinance, Cap.336 provides that a party may only appeal from the District Court to the Court of Appeal with leave.  If the judge below refuses leave, that party may apply to the Court of Appeal for leave.

18.  Section 63A(2) provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge, the master or the Court of Appeal hearing the application for leave is satisfied that :-

(a)   the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

19.  The applicable test for Section 63A(2) can be found in the case of Ma BikYung v.  Ko Chuen(HCMP No.4303 of 1999) by Leong JA, citing the words of Lord Woolf in the English case of Smith & Cosworth Casting Processes Limited[1997] WLR 1538:

“(1) The Court will only refuse leave if satisfied that the applicant

has no realistic prospect of succeeding on the appeal. This test is not

meant to be any different from that which is sometimes used which is

that the applicant has no arguable case. Why, however, this court has

decided to adopt the former phrase is because of the use of the word

‘realistic’ makes it clear that a fanciful prospect or an unrealistic

argument is not sufficient.

(2) The court can grant the application even if it is not so satisfied. 

There can be many reasons for granting leave even if the court is not

satisfied that the appeal has any prospect of success.  For example, the

issue may be one in which the court considers should in the public

interest be examined by this court, or, to be more specific, this court

may take the view that the case raises an issue where the law requires

clarifying.”

20.  Section 63A, being a post CJR amendment, was considered by Her Honour Judge Marlene Ng in the case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Nam TaiTrading Company Ltd (DCTC No.4250 of 2008) where the learned Judge at paragraph 10 of her Judgment said :-

“10. Has there been any change with the introduction of section 63A

of DCO ? In my view, section 63A(2) merely codifies the pre-existing

threshold test of realistic or reasonable prospect of success adopted by

the local courts when considering whether to grant leave to appeal, and

I see no reason to read such provision differently from the helpful

guidance by Smith considered in Ma Bik Yung.”

21.  Thus, the party seeking leave needs to show that there was a good arguable case in respect of the intended appeal that it had a reasonable and not a fanciful prospect of success (see Commissioner of Inland Revenue v.Nam Tai Trading Co. Ltd[2009] 3 HKC 421).

The Husband’s Application

22.  At today’s hearing, the Husband addressed this Court himself unrepresented.   He had not filed any intended grounds of appeal and simply adopting, or it is more appropriate to use the word ‘relying/referring’ to those grounds of the Father.   His Summons was issued well within the prescribed time.

23.  Accordingly, my findings and decisions on the Father’s prospects of success of the intended appeal also apply to the Husband’s case.

The Father’s Application

24.  I will first deal with the application for leave to appeal out of time.

Length of delay

25.  The prescribed 28-day period expired on 25 August 2011.   Since the Father’s first Summons under HCMP No.1522 of 2011 was issued within time, the question of appealing out of time thus fall upon considering his second Summons dated 2 March 2012. This second Summons was issued some 189 days after the expiry date.  The length of delay, in my view, is substantial.

Reasons for delay

26.  With respect, I do not accept Counsel Mr. Jason Wong’s submission that given the history of events, the present Summons was taken out to correct the former procedural irregularity and was one and the same as the first Summons (see paragraph 10 of Counsel’s skeleton submissions). 

27.  Such so-called procedural irregularity, in the context of issuing the first Summons seeking leave from the Court of Appeal, had long been discovered back to 22 November 2011 when CSC wrote that letter to this Court.   In my view, this was discovered even a month earlier since CSC saw fit to obtain consent of all parties for seeking leave to withdraw their first Summons on 24 October 2011.  

28.  Given the fact that if the Court of Appeal allows, leave may be obtained directly from the Court of Appeal, I myself will refrain from saying that issuing the first Summons was a ‘procedural irregularity’.  I will only use such terminology for the sake of convenience in the following paragraphs of these Reasons.

29.  With due respect to Counsel, I do not quite follow the logic in his submission that the Father’s second Summons was taken out to ‘correct’ the so called ‘procedural irregularity’.  Had there been such an irregularity, it had already been dealt with, or using the plain words ‘removed’ by the withdrawal of that Summons with the leave of Mr. Justice Cheung, JA, on 24 October 2011.   There is simply nothing there for the second Summons to ‘correct’, so to speak.   In particular, I also do not follow the logic of how a Summons issued in the Family Court could be considered as ‘correcting’ a ‘procedural irregularity’, even if there was one, arising from a Summons issued in the High Court.   The second part of Mr. Wong’s submission that the second Summons is one and the same as the first Summons, in my view, is neither here nor there.

30.  I noticed CSC in their letter dated 22 November 2011 stated :  “Due to inadvertent oversight………without thoroughly considering Order 59 r.2B of the Rules of District Court, cap.336H……...”, there is no reference at all in the letter that there was any ‘procedural irregularity’ which CSC is now, at this hearing, trying to explain for the delay.  In my view, a party or its legal representatives, without thoroughly considered certain litigation procedure cannot be equated with that procedure, if undertaken, to then become “irregular”; in particular where that procedure is permissible under certain relevant rules.

31.  There are also submissions as to costs saving exercise for having the leave application for appeal by both the Husband and the Father to be dealt with in one hearing.   I accept this may be a sensible approach and well within the regime of the CJR only if both parties are addressing on the same or substantially the same grounds of appeal.  

32.  In my decision, the issuing of a Summons and scheduling the hearing of it, with proper management, can be quite separate and distinct.   A Summons is needed in any event to apply for leave to appeal.   Having had the first Summons in the High Court successfully withdrawn with leave on 24 October 2011 and being informed by LCC by letter on 7 November 2011 that the Husband’s appeal scheduled for 2 December 2011 was going to be vacated (see CSC’s letter dated 22 November 2011), there is a full period of 14 days (counting from 24/10/2011 to 7/11/2011) within which CSC could have issued their own Summons in the Family Court.  Still further, counting from LCC letter of 7 November 2011 to the date of CSC’s letter of 22nd November 2011, there is also another full period of 14 days when CSC could have issued their Summons.   Why this was not done straight away rather than keep on saying intending to appeal and giving undertaking to issue Summons promptly to the Court ?   There is a total period of 28 days (that is 14 days + 14 days) for CSC to issue the Summons for leave to appeal which is needed in any event.    I must say that the costs of issuing the Summons are always there, whether it was issued within the first 14 days, the subsequent 14 days or eventually on 2 March 2012.   Why the costs of those letters could not be better spent on issuing the Summons which are needed in any event ?

33.  In the same CSC’s letter of 22 November 2011, it was said “……..even though our client’s application for leave to appeal has already been out of time, we are bound to wait (my emphasis) for an order to be made by this Honourable Court to vacate the hearing on 2nd December 2011, if the Court sees fit, before we can formally apply for a hearing of our client’s application for leave to appeal to be heard together with that of the 1st Respondent (my emphasis)…….”

34.  I have two observations to make.

35.  First, it was LCC’s application to vacate the hearing of their Summons issued.  How could CSC consider themselves bound to wait for the Order to be granted when, if granted, only related to LCC’s Summons ?   CSC do not even have a Summons in place on the court record for them to seek the Father and the Husband applications be heard together.   This is the reason that I said there was no ‘pending’ Summons in paragraph 5 above.

36.  Secondly, no grounds of appeal had ever been filed at any time by LCC, even up to this hearing.    I noted CSC at the time of their letter of 22 November 2011 had not filed their grounds of appeal either.  How could CSC be in any position to know their client’s grounds of appeal are the same or substantially the same as LCC’s client, namely, the Husband ?    It is worth mentioning the intended appeal relates to the Anti-suit Injunctions against the Father and the Husband covering, inter alia, the Taiwan proceedings where the Father and the Husband are at different ends, namely as Plaintiff and Defendant respectively.   Unless the Father and the Husband are in some way ‘ad idem’ on their respective grounds of appeals to which this Court had not been informed of formally by the production of their grounds of appeal, there is always a chance that justice may be better served by having the hearing of the applications separate rather than merged or that costs might not be saved by having a merged hearing.   In fact, this is not uncommon.   Thus, in the absence of the Husband’s grounds of appeal, I do not see how CSC could conclude at that stage that they would like their client’s application to be heard together with LCC’s application. 

37.  Again in the same letter of CSC dated 22 November 2011, it was said “…..we undertake to promptly take out summons application for leave to appeal to the Family Court on behalf of our client once the hearing on 2nd December 2011 has been formally vacated (myemphasis).”

38.  It is unfortunate to see CSC issued the second Summons dated 2 March 2012 but only filed it 4 days later on 6 March 2012.   There is a period of 105 days (counting up to 5 March 2012) after the undertaking to issue the Summons application promptly was given to this Court by CSC in their letter of 22 November 2011.   Without having to go to the Oxford’s Dictionary on the exact meaning of the word ‘promptly’, for day-to-day legal practice, it is in all sense fair and reasonable to assume that ‘promptly’ accommodates a time span of a couple of days or, at most a week or so, rather than 105 days which is over 3 calendar months in the present case. 

39.  I noticed CSC saw fit in their subsequent follow-up letter of 30 November 2011, which is 8 days after having given their undertaking to this Court and 2 days before the Husband’s Summons for leave to appeal to be heard, stated  “……Pending an order to be made by this Honourable Court to vacate the said hearing, we have undertook in our previous letter to promptly take out summons (my emphasis) for our client’s application for leave to appeal out of time…….”.

40.  I do not intend to repeat those observations I have made above on CSC’s letter of 22 November 2011.  Suffice for me to say is that CSC re-iterated their undertaking given to the Court to promptly issue the Summons for leave to appeal out of time.   Thus, it can reasonably be taken that the issuing of such Summons was a priority for the Father after the hearing date of 2 December 2011 was vacated.   Nonetheless, it turns out CSC only filed the Summons for leave to appeal 95 days later, which is over 3 calendar months (counting from 2 December 2011 up to 5 March 2012).  

41.  I find the Father’s reasons for delay unconvincing and unacceptable.

Prospects of Success

42.  In the draft attached to CSC’s Summons dated 2 March 2012, the grounds of appeal are :-

“(1) The Court erred in law and/or failed to exercise its discretion to grant leave to the 2nd Respondent to adduce further expert evidence of Mr. Cai Hong Jie.

(2) The Court in continuing the interim interim injunction dated 1 April 2011 and granting the Interim Injunction.

2.1…………..

2,2…………..

(3)    Further, in granting the Anti-suit Injunction, the Court having found the proceedings taken by the 2nd Respondent in the Civil Action could not be said to be vexatious or oppressive (at paragraph 31 of the Judgment) :

3.1    erred in finding that the Petitioner did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Taiwanese Court by obtaining the Provisional Attachment on 17 November 2010 (at paragraph 47 of the Judgment);

3.2    failed to give any and/or sufficient regard that the Taiwanese Properties situate in Taiwan and the Taiwanese Court should be the national forum to decide any dispute over it:  Moor v.Anglo-Italian Bank (1897) 10 Ch 681, at 690;

3.3    failed to give any and/or sufficient regard that the 2nd Respondent is not a party to the marriage and that the Civil Action is not a parallel proceedings for the same relief against the Petitioner (at paragraph 52 of the Judgment);

3.4    erred in finding the Anti-suit Injunction does not offend principles of comity (at paragraph 54 of the Judgment).”

43.  Counsel Mr. Jason Wong confirmed the Father would only pursue on ground no. (3) for leave to appeal.  The Husband, being unrepresented, who had indicated to only refer to or rely upon the Father’s grounds of appeal, confirmed that he himself would not pursue either on those abandoned ground nos. (1) and (2).

44.  Before the hearing, I saw the need to seek clarification from Counsel Mr. Jason Wong as to the juridical advantages, if there are any, to the Father for him to now continue with his application for leave to appeal the Anti-suit Injunction out of time.   Reason being that the parties have entered into various terms before Mr. Justice Poon just about a week ago on 12 April 2013 under the case HCMC No. 9 of 2012.   I should at this juncture perhaps mention that these divorce proceedings initially started as a contested divorce on unreasonable behavior under FCMC No.11930 of 2010, progressed along as an uncontested divorce on one year separation under FCMC No.14402 of 2011 which was then transferred to the High Court at the Pre-Trial Review hearing as HCMC No. 9 of 2012.   The parties in the 3 sets of proceedings are all the same.

45.  For the sake of completeness, I shall recite below the terms of the Order of Mr. Justice Poon under HCMC No. 9 of 2012 :-

“Upon hearing Counsel for the Petitioner, Counsel for the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Respondent appearing in person

UPON the 1st and 2nd Respondents accepting and acknowledging and agreeing that :-

(a) they shall not rely upon or refer to the Taiwanese Judgment granted in Taiwan Taipei District Court Civil Action (Case No. Year 100 Tsung Su Chi No.61 案號100年重訴字第61號) obtained on 30th November 2011 by the 2nd Respondent against the 1st Respondent (“the Taiwanese Judgment”) in the course of the ancillary relief proceedings herein;

(b) the Taiwanese Judgment is not binding on the Petitioner herein;

(c) the Hong Kong Court hearing the ancillary relief proceedings of the Petitioner herein shall not be bound by the Taiwanese Judgment;

(d) all references to the Taiwanese Judgment be expunged from the bundles of documents to be placed before the trial Judge hearing the ancillary relief proceedings herein and the same shall not be in evidence in the said proceedings;

(e) no reference or reliance placed on the Taiwanese Judgment shall be made to in the course of the evidence and/or the submissions to the Judge hearing the ancillary proceedings herein.

IT IS ORDERED THAT –

1. All references to the Taiwanese Judgment be expunged from the bundle of documents to be placed before the trial Judge hearing the ancillary relief proceedings herein.

2. No reference shall be made to the Taiwanese Judgment in the course of the evidence and/or the submissions of the parties during the ancillary relief proceedings herein.

3. No reliance shall be placed and no weight given to the Taiwanese Judgment in the course of the ancillary relief proceedings herein.

4. All material purporting to be expert evidence relating to Taiwanese law,

whether substantive or procedural, be expunged from the bundles of documents to be placed before the Judge hearing the ancillary relief proceedings herein.

5. For the purpose of the ancillary relief proceedings, none of the parties shall be entitled to adduce evidence, including expert evidence as to Taiwanese law, whether substantive or procedural.

6. For the avoidance of doubt, the determination of beneficial ownership

of the properties subject matter of the Petitioner’s claims for ancillary relief shall be in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong.

7. The summons of the Petitioner dated 9th January 2013 be adjourned sine die.

8. The summons of the 2nd Respondent dated 10th April 2013 be adjourned sine die.

9. The costs of the Petitioner’s said summons dated 9th January 2013 and the 2nd Respondent’s said summons dated 10th April 2013 be reserved to the Judge dealing with ancillary relief.

10. The remaining issues, including the hearing of the ancillary relief proceedings, the 1st Respondent’s application for a variation of Maintenance Pending Suit dated 3rd April 2012 and the Petitioner’s application for a Judgment Summons dated 19th October 2012 be re-transferred to the Family Court.

11. The costs of today be costs in the cause.

12. The Petitioner’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.”

46.  The agreement, acknowledgement and concession of the Father and the Husband, as per the terms of the Order in HCMC No. 9 of 2012, have had the effect of putting aside and waiving reliance on all elements of Taiwanese law, substantive and procedural, including the Taiwanese Judgment out of consideration by the Hong Kong courts in the ancillary relief trial.   The terms of the Order, as I see it, would not debar the Father and/or the Husband to assert their rights and interests within the Taiwan jurisdiction.   The question then comes along is whether the Father and the Husband, whilst making those agreements and concessions in Hong Kong, had in mind not to take any action whatsoever in Taiwan, including enforcement action, pending the ancillary relief trial in Hong Kong which will likely to be heard before the end of 2013 ?   Had this been the case, whether the Father and the Husband continue to be subjected to the Anti-suit Injunction pending the ancillary relief trial would become academic.  The only need to seek leave to appeal against the Anti-suit Injuction, as I see it myself, is that the Father and/or the Husband would like to have the Taiwanese proceedings and/or Taiwan Judgment already obtained ‘movedalong’ in Taiwan before the ancillary relief trial ends in Hong Kong.  

47.  In reply to my question, Counsel Mr. Wong submitted the Father was rather concerned about the costs under the Anti-suit Injunction which he had been ordered to pay and for that reason the Father  would now like to pursue his leave to appeal. With due respect to Mr. Wong, I am not convinced at all by such an answer. The Father is always entitled to seek leave to appeal on costs only or, at an earlier stage, to seek review of the costs order under the Anti-suit Injunction. Neither of this had ever been attempted by the Father.    In fact, it is also open for the Father to seek stay of execution of that costs order rather than spending further costs now to attempt to overturn a costs order granted 21 months ago.

48.  Upon further instructions taken by Counsel, it was submitted the chances of success on any of those costs-related applications alone without appealing the Anti-suit Injunction are slim for the general rule of costs follow the event. I am not convinced by such an answer either for the simple reason that costs are always in the discretion of the Court. 

49.  I will now deal with those substantive grounds of appeal under ground no. (3). 

50.  To start with, Counsel in his submissions repeatedly referred to my finding that the Taiwanese proceedings taken out by the Father against the Husband cannot be said to be vexatious or oppressive.  That being the finding, it is questionable for the subsequent findings of (a) the Father and the Husband having acted in concert; and (b)  the Husband compelling the Wife to proceed with divorce in Taiwan to be an act intended to remove the Wife’s provisional attachment.

51.  I have clearly stated in paragraph 31 of my Judgment that the concept of vexation or oppression should not be restricted by definition.   Having had the benefit of reading Lord Goff’s Judgment in the Societe Aerospatiale case, I concluded in paragraph 32 of my Judgment that the ultimate question should be, where the justice lies ?  The finding of the Father initiating the Taiwanese proceedings against the Husband (i.e. his Son) not being vexatious or oppressive is no more than recognition of an individual’s right to sue in a court of law.  My other finding of the Father and the Husband having acted in concerted effort was concluded only after  considering all the circumstances from a wider perspective, being those matters which I set out and analysed in paragraphs 33 to 37 of my Judgment.   Further, I have made it clear at paragraph 39 of my Judgment that this Court should not consider the Taiwanese proceedings in isolation as being non-vexatious and non-oppressive when deciding upon Anti-suit Injunction.

52.  My other finding of the Husband compelling the Wife to proceed with divorce in Taiwan; failing which, her provisional attachment would be uplifted was arrived at after consideration of the legal opinion submitted by all parties which I have set out at paragraphs 40 to 42 of my Judgment as opposed to simply relying on the first finding of the Taiwanese proceedings not being vexatious or oppressive at paragraph 31 of my Judgment. 

53.  As for ground no.3.1, my finding of the Wife not having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Taiwanese Court at paragraph 47 of my Judgment was supported by the case of Hwoo Huang Linda v. FuBeing San & others (HCA No.4888/2001).  Counsel Mr. Jason Wong was not able to convince me such case is not applicable to the present facts or is distinguishable.

54.  As for ground no.3.2, it refers to the issue of forum which had not been raised as an issue at the substantive hearing of the Anti-suit Injunction.   Neither was such issue of forum argued at any stage throughout.   There was no application for me to consider such as a live issue at this leave to appeal stage.   This issue could not simply come in at this stage as one of the grounds of appeal without it being raised and argued at the substantive hearing in the first place.

55.  As for ground no.3.3, sufficient consideration had already been given to the fact that the Father is not a party to the marriage and the Taiwanese proceedings not being parallel proceedings.  This is clearly stated in paragraph 52 of my Judgment that the ultimate question is where justice lies rather than the status of the party to be restrained remain to be the main concern of the Courts when granting injunctive reliefs.

56.  As for ground no.3.4, the finding was based upon the established principles in the Societe Aerospatiale case which Counsel Mr. Jason Wong was not able to convince me such case is not applicable to the present facts or is distinguishable.

57.  I noticed Counsel Mr. Jason Wong in his skeleton submissions under sub-headings ‘No Shutting Out of Petitioner” (paragraphs 20 to 27) and “Article 58” (paragraphs 28 to 34) referred to protective measures had been or could have been obtained by the Wife under the law and procedure in Taiwan.   However, it is clear these submissions relate to grounds of appeal no. (2) which was not pursued by the Father for this hearing.

58.  The Husband made no further submissions on his own behalf on his appeal.

59.  For the above reasons, I find there are no reasonable prospects of success on appeal by the Father and/or the Husband.

Prejudice to the Other Party

60.  There are no children of the family and Decree Absolute has been granted under FCMC No.14402 of 2011 on the 19 October 2012.  The only outstanding issue being the Wife’s ancillary reliefs.

61.  The Wife has been on legal aid for some time and substantial costs have already been incurred throughout the 3 sets of proceedings.   As rightly submitted by Counsel for the Wife Miss Remedios, for the Father and the Husband to now further pursue their leave to appeal against the Anti-suit Injunction, costs would be escalated which are unnecessary incurred.  At the end of the day, those unnecessarily costs incurred would have, speaking for the Wife, to come out from any fruits of litigation which the Wife may receive.  More importantly, the Wife’s ancillary relief trial would be further and unnecessarily delayed.

62.  Taking all the relevant factors and circumstances into account, I am satisfied that the Wife would be seriously prejudiced both in terms of time and costs should leave to appeal out of time be given to the Father.   

Any other reasons appeal should be heard ?

63.  Neither Counsel for the Father nor the Husband is able to convince me that there exist any reasons that their appeals should be heard. 

Conclusion

64.  I decided not to exercise my discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time to the Father’s application.

65.  Furthermore, I also decided that the intended appeal against the Anti-suit Injunction of this Court dated 28 July 2011 by the Father and/or the Husband has no reasonable prospects of success.   

66.  Finally, there are no other reasons that any of their appeals should be heard either.

Costs

67.  There is no basis for me to consider departing from the normal rule on costs.  I decided that the Wife should be entitled to the costs of the applications by the Father for leave to appeal out of time and by the Husband for leave to appeal.  

68.  Insofar as any of the costs are intermingled by a joint or merged hearings, I consider it fair and reasonable to be equally apportioned between the Father and the Husband whilst both are legally represented; and be apportioned at 20% to be paid by the Husband and 80% to be paid by the Father whilst the Husband was acting in person.   The Father had been legally represented throughout.

69.  I also consider this a suitable case for granting Certificate for Counsel.

Orders

70.  I now make the following Orders :-

(a)    The 1st Respondent’s Summons dated 9 August 2011 (filed on 10 August 2011) be dismissed;

(b)    The 2nd Respondent’s Summons dated 2 March 2012 (filed on 6 March 2012) be dismissed;

(c)    The costs of and occasioned by the 1st Respondent’s said Summons and the 2nd Respondent’s said Summons be to the Petitioner and be apportioned as per paragraph 68 of these Reasons, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed;

(d)    Petitioner’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations; and

(e)    There be Certificate for Counsel.

71.  Unless any party applies for variation of the costs order within 14 days from the date hereof, such costs order nisi shall become absolute.

Dated the 15 day of May 2013.

(G. Own)
    Deputy District Judge

Miss Corinne Remedios instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li, Solicitors for the Petitioner

The 1st Respondent acting in person

Mr. Jason L.H. Wong instructed by Messrs. Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent

78823-EN-2011-07-28

LPK v. SH also known as HSC AND ANOTHER

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FCMC 11930/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.11930 of 2010

________________________________

BETWEEN

 LPKPetitioner

and

 SH also known as HSC1st Respondent

and

 HSH2nd Respondent

________________________________

Coram: Before Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 4th July 2011

Date of Handing Down Reasons: 28th July 2011

___________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
(Ruling on Summons)

__________________________

 

Background

1.  Today’s hearing is scheduled for argument of the Petitioner’s Summons dated 20th January 2011 applying for interim injunction against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

2.  Since the application involves proceedings taken in Taiwan, parties have filed their respective experts opinion on Taiwanese law with the leave of the Court. 

3.  The 2nd Respondent issued a Summons dated 29th June 2011 which is 4 days before the substantive hearing of interim injunction seeking leave for filing fresh expert evidence by way of affirmation from one Mr. Cai. After hearing submissions, I dismissed the Summons with costs which I now deliver my detailed reasons.

The Application

4.  There is a supporting affirmation filed by the trainee solicitor Wong Ming Kit together with the said Summons. Attached to the Affirmation are 3 exhibits, namely, “WMK-1”, “WMK-2” and “WMK-3”.

5.  Exhibit “WMK-1” is a copy legal opinion in Chinese dated 2nd June 2011.  Exhibit “WMK-2” is another copy legal opinion in Chinese dated 23rd June 2011.  Exhibit “WMK-3” is a draft Affirmation of the intended expert Mr. Cai’s in draft form.

6.  The ground for application is simple and straightforward.   It was submitted that the expert opinions of the Taiwanese lawyers on the part of the Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent contradicted each other.  In order to assist this Court, the intended expert Mr. Cai was arranged to provide his expert opinion. The draft affirmation of Mr. Cai was to incorporate his 2 pieces of legal opinions on Taiwanese law.   The draft affirmation has yet to be signed and notarized which would not be available before the hearing today.

7.  This application was strongly opposed by the Petitioner’s Counsel. Counsel for the 1st Respondent took a somewhat neutral stance.

Grounds of application and opposition

8.  Counsel for the Petitioner raised the following grounds of opposition :-

(a)  The Order of this Court dated 28th January 2011 giving

directions on expert evidence was granted upon a Consent Summons signed by all parties’ legal representatives.  It provides that upon filing of expert evidence by all respective parties, no further evidence be filed except with the leave of the Court.

(b)  Expert evidence can only be adduced with leave of the

Court and normally leave is only granted for 1 expert each party.  Any change in expert requires proper justification.

(c)  No proper explanation on justification of additional expert and/or replacement of an existing expert.

(d)  No proper or any explanation for such introduction before the hearing today and the 2nd Respondent has had nearly 6 months to prepare his case.

(e)  No proper justification to seek the Court’s indulgence to receive a draft affirmation which does not contain the necessary statement of truth.

(f)  The introduction of fresh evidence will have the effect of further delaying the Petitioner’s claim for ancillary reliefs.

(g)  It is disproportionate and contrary to the CJR, also unfair to the Petitioner, to permit the 2nd Respondent to have 2 experts and/or replace his existing expert whether at such late stage or at all.

9.  In reply, Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted that the affirmations or legal opinions already filed are given by the parties’ lawyers in Taiwan rather than experts.  The evidence from these lawyers had not covered those essential matters which this Court has to consider in deciding the injunction application today.

Discussion

10.  Upon review of the records, it is correct to say that all parties’ legal representatives did sign a Consent Summons seeking expert directions in relation to the Petitioner’s Summons for interim injunction scheduled for full argument today.  The learned deputy Judge Tracy Chan made an Order in terms on 11th January 2011. 

11.  Pursuant to the Order on expert directions, the following evidence on Taiwanese law are filed by the respective experts, namely :-

(a)  Affirmation of LYS (for 2nd Respondent) dated 18th February 2011;

(b)  Legal Opinion of LSL (for 1st Respondent) dated 14th March 2011;

(c) 1st Affirmation of YFW (for Petitioner) dated 21st March 2011.

12.  It should be noted that expert evidence will cause special concern for the Court because it may cause delay and waste of expenses for the parties if proper directions are not made for its preparation or, as in the present case, further expert directions are being sought at a late stage.

13.  In the case of Chok Yick Interior Design & Engineering Co Ltd v. Lau Chi Lun trading as Chi Hung Construction Eng. Co. (HCA No.1480/2008), Mr. Justice Lam has vividly described his experience as the trial judge as follows :

“7. I wish to stress that application for expert directions is not a mere formality. It is an integral part of the case management process. As a trial judge, I have seen far too many cases where the lack of proper preparation of expert evidence resulted in unnecessary costs and time spent on evidence which is of no help to the resolution of the dispute. And such wasteful exercise cost the parties a great deal of money, not only in terms of the fees paid to the experts, but also legal costs spent on paying for the lawyers’ reading, understanding of the reports, discussing the matter with the experts and then the time (and costs) of the lawyers explaining and exploring the expert evidence with the judge by way of submissions and the examination and cross-examination of the experts during trial. Very often, it is not only the party responsible for the mismanagement of expert evidence who has to pay such costs, similar costs have to be incurred (at least on an upfront basis) by his opponent.

8.  Such wastage is not consistent with the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A Rule 1.  Thus, the court, in the performance of its case management duty under Order 1A Rule 1, should give expert directions to avoid the mismanagement of expert evidence.  And the parties and their legal representatives have a duty to assist the court in formulating the appropriate directions (Order 1A Rule 3). Further, the parties and their legal representatives have a duty to ensure that, once given, expert directions are strictly adhered to.  The experts, in accordance with their overriding duty to the court, must try their best to comply with the directions.”

14.  At paragraph 28 of the Judgment, the learned Judge said :

“28. The court expects a party seeking indulgence for new evidence to be admitted at so late a stage to be full and frank in the explanation as to why the relevant evidence was not filed in a timely manner…….”

15.  Further, at paragraph 32 of the Judgment, the learned Judge said :

“32. Since the CJR, it is wrong for litigants and their legal representatives to assume that they can put in additional evidence by agreement between themselves after a case has been set down for trial, particularly if the new evidence could proliferate issues, disrupt the readiness of the case for trial or otherwise prolong the trial. In respect of expert evidence, the parties should keep the court informed in order to facilitate the court in the performance of its case management duty. If the new evidence could disrupt the readiness for trial or prolong the trial beyond the time allocated for the case, the court may refuse leave……..”

16.  There is no full and frank reason given in the supporting affirmation as to why the present summons for leave was taken out at such a late stage.  The 2nd Respondent is all along legally represented in these proceedings.  Pursuant to the expert directions given by this Court back in January 2011, the 2nd Respondent in compliance with directions had chosen LYS to provide legal opinion on Taiwanese law on his part.   LYS’s legal opinion dated back to 18th February 2011.  If the legal opinion obtained and filed was considered to be lack of comprehensiveness, the proper way is to seek further directions for filing supplemental legal opinion by the same expert in good time.

17.  The fact that there are conflicting views of experts on both sides is not a justification to call for a third expert to comment on the differences.  It will be for the Court to decide which expert evidence to be accepted subject to the right of a party to call the opponent’s expert and have that expert evidence tested by cross examination.

18.  The interim injunction was scheduled for full argument today about 6 months ago.  I was informed by Counsel for the Petitioner that there was no indication at any stage that there will be a second expert for the 2nd Respondent to provide expert evidence on Taiwanese law.  This came to the Petitioner’s knowledge only when the Summons was served upon the lawyers in the late afternoon of 29th June 2011, which is 4 days before today (including the intervening 1st July which is a holiday and the 3rd July which is a Sunday).   In the supporting affirmation, it was not mentioned as to what would now be the position of LYS’s legal opinion.  Would that be replaced and substituted or that it would only be supplemented?   The legal opinion of Mr. Cai was not translated whereas all previous legal opinions in Chinese have been translated to assist respective parties’ Counsel who remain the same throughout and are English speaking.  Furthermore, the Affirmation of Mr. Cai exhibited to the supporting affirmation was not even signed by Mr. Cai and was in a draft form only.      

19.  Considering all the above circumstances including the Judgment of Mr. Justice Lam which I cited above, I decided to refuse leave to the 2nd Respondent’s application for adducing expert evidence of Mr. Cai.  Accordingly, the Summons is dismissed with costs.   Since this application is simple and straightforward, I will not grant Certificate for Counsel for this application.

20.  I wish to add that with the CJR nowadays, practitioners are always expected to assist the Court to ensure that the underlying objectives under Order 1A Rule 1 are implemented.

Order

(a)  The 2nd Respondent’s Summons dated 29th June 2011 be dismissed;

(b)  Costs of and occasioned by the Summons be to the  Petitioner and the 1st Respondent in any event, to be taxed if not agreed.

(G. Own)
Deputy District Judge

Representation :

Miss Corinne Remedios instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Neil Clough instructed by Messrs. Li, Chow & Co., Solicitors for the 1st Respondent

Miss Pauline Leung instructed by Messrs. Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent

78822-EN-2011-07-28

LPK v. SH also known as HSC AND ANOTHER

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FCMC 11930/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.11930 of 2010

________________________________

BETWEEN

 LPK Petitioner 

and

 SH also known as HSC1st Respondent

and

 HSH2nd Respondent

________________________________

Coram: Before Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 4th July 2011

Date of Handing Down Decision: 28th July 2011

___________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
(Interim Injunction)

   __________________________

 

Introduction

1.  This is the Petitioner’s wife application for interim injunction against the 1st and 2nd Respondents in respect of the following 2 landed properties, namely,

(i)  Flat X, XXth Floor, No.XX Broadway, Mei Foo Sun Chuen, Kowloon, Hong Kong   (“Hong Kong Property”);

(ii)   XXth Floor, XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號XX樓);

(iii)    X of XXth Floor, XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section, Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號XX樓之X); and

(iv)   A car parking space at LGX of XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section, Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號門牌房屋地下X層的一個停車空間).

( (ii) to (iv) above collectively referred as “Taiwan Properties” ).

2.  The Summons for interim injunction was issued on 20th January 2011 which was adjourned for full argument with 2 hours reserved.  It was fixed for today’s hearing.  In light of the waiting time of 6 months, the Petitioner applied and successfully obtained from this Court an “interim interim injunction” on 1st April 2011 (“1st April Injunction”).

3.  The 1st and 2nd Respondents are represented by Mr. Neil Clough (“Mr. Clough”) and Miss Pauline Leung (“Miss Leung”) respectively, both also appeared in the earlier interim interim injunction application.

4.  The 2nd Respondent issued a Summons 4 days before this hearing seeking leave to file affidavit from an expert as to Taiwanese law with consequential directions for expert affidavit in reply.  Having heard submissions from all parties, I dismissed this Summons with costs.  Reasons for dismissal are handed down separately from these Reasons.

5.  For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the Petitioner as the “Wife”, the 1st Respondent as the “Husband” and the 2nd Respondent as the “Father” in the following part of these Reasons.

The injunctive reliefs

6.  The Wife’s application for injunctive reliefs are two-fold, namely :

(a)  restraining the Husband and the Father from disposing of the Hong Kong Property and Taiwan Properties pending final determination of the Wife’s ancillary relief claims or further order (“the Interim  Injunction”) ; and

(b)  restraining the Husband and the Father from taking further steps in the Civil Action in Taiwan including the Husband taking   steps in the proceedings where the Wife had obtained the Provisional Attachment over the Taiwan Properties   (“Anti-suit  Injunction”).

The Applicable Law

7.  The leading case law on Anti-suit injunctions is the Privy Council decision in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale –v- Lee Kui Jak [1987] 1 AC 871 which sets out four fundamental principles :-

a)  The jurisdiction is to be exercised when “the ends of justice” require it;

b)  Where the court decides to grant an injunction restraining proceedings in a foreign court, its order is directed not against the foreign court but against the parties so proceeding or threatening to proceed;

c)  An injunction will only be issued restraining a party who is amendable to the jurisdiction of the court, against whom an injunction will be an effective remedy;

d)  Since such an order indirectly affects the foreign court, the jurisdiction must be exercised with caution.

The parties’ affirmations

8.  The parties have filed the following affirmations for the present application, namely :-

(i)  1st Affirmation of the Father (at pages 124 – 274 of the Bundle);    

(ii)  2nd Affirmation of the Wife (at pages 275 – 285 of the Bundle);

(iii)  2nd Affirmation of the Father (at pages 290 - 293 of the Bundle);

(iv)  2nd Affirmation of the Husband (at pages 497 – 532 of the Bundle);

(v)  6th Affirmation of the Wife (at pages 635 – 674 of the Bundle).

9.  Further, the parties have filed the following as expert evidence on Taiwanese law, namely :-

(i)  Affirmation of LYS (for Father) (at pages 301-309 of the Bundle);

(ii)   Legal Opinion of LSL (for Husband) (at pages 510 – 518 of the  Bundle);

(iii)  1st Affirmation of YFW (for Wife) (at pages 596 – 619 of the Bundle);

(iv)  2nd Affirmation of YFW (for Wife) (at pages 735 – 739 of the Bundle)

10.  Since the Father’s Summons dated 29th June 2011 seeking leave to adduce further expert evidence of Mr. Cai was dismissed, I have not considered any of the matters stated in the draft affirmation of Mr. Cai exhibited to the supporting affirmation to the said Summons.  I am entitled to consider those expert evidence properly filed before this Court.  Counsel for the Father, however, had referred to various paragraphs of Mr. Cai’s Affirmation in her skeleton submissions.

The Husband’s position

11.  Mr. Clough submitted that when the Taiwan Court is dealing with a dispute over Taiwan property, that proceedings are not a sham.  There was no such evidence either adduced by the Wife.

12.  The Civil Action in Taiwan against the Husband was for a declaration on ownership of the Taiwan properties.  There is no application to vary or transfer the existing rights or change the ownership.

13.  It is inappropriate for the Wife to restrain the Father, who being a Taiwan citizen and not a party to the marriage, from exercising his rights under Taiwan law to determine ownership of the Taiwan properties.  The Father commenced the Civil Action only when he came to know that the Taiwan properties were being claimed by the Wife.   The Husband, being the Defendant in the Civil Action, adopted a ‘neutral’ position.   It would likewise be inappropriate for this Court to purport to restrain a Defendant from taking steps in proceedings against him.

The Father’s position

14.  Miss Leung first submitted that the Father is entitled to start the Civil Action in Taiwan.  Such proceedings are neither vexatious nor oppressive. 

15.  Application for injunction will be refused if the grant of relief would cause injustice to the injunction defendant that would outweigh the injustice to the injunction claimant.

16.  By obtaining the Provisional Attachment over the Taiwan properties, the Wife had submitted herself to the Taiwanese jurisdiction in so far as the Taiwan properties are concerned.  Thus it would be vexatious and oppressive for the Wife to restrain the Father to proceed with the Civil Action in Taiwan which also relate to the Taiwan properties.

17.  As the Wife had conceded that it was the Father who paid off the outstanding mortgage of the Taiwan properties back in August 2006, the Father’s case in respect of the Civil Action is not mere allegation and there are serious issues to be tried by the Taiwan Court.

18.  Miss Leung then referred to the legal opinion at paragraph 4 of Mr. Cai’s draft Affirmation that the Provisional Attachment, having been made pursuant to Article 522 and 523 of the Civil Law, the Taiwanese Court must have been satisfied that there would be risk of non-enforcement or difficulty in enforcing the debt.  Thus, the Wife’s interest over the Taiwan properties had been secured.

19.  Again referring to the legal opinion of at paragraph 7 of Mr. Cai’s draft Affirmation that the Wife could not, after having obtained the Provisional Attachment, seek to prevent Husband from disposing of the Taiwan properties and at the same time restraining the Father to declare his interest in the Taiwan properties.

20.  Further referring to the legal opinion paragraph 8 of Mr. Cai’s draft Affirmation, Miss Leung submitted that the Father could not join in or intervene the Provisional Attachment by virtue of Article 58 of the Civil Law.  The Father had no alternative but to commence the Civil Action to protect his interest over the Taiwan properties.

21.  The Civil Action commenced by the Father is not a kind of parallel proceedings where the opposite party to the proceedings initiated another set of proceedings in a foreign court asking for the same relief.  As such, the Court should exercise caution in deciding whether or not to grant the injunction.

22.  Anti-suit injunctions in general will not be granted where to do so would be inconsistent with due respect for comity.  The right to litigate is a basic human right in Taiwan.  For this Court to restrain the Father from proceeding with the Civil Action, it would not only offend principles of comity and would also intervene the Father’s basic human right to litigate.

23.  The fact that the Husband had now conceded the forum to determine the divorce suit is Hong Kong does not, as a matter of course, mean that the Father should be restrained from proceeding the Civil Action in Taiwan.  The properties in dispute are in Taiwan and thus it is not appropriate to grant anti-suit injunction against the Father.

Discussion

(a)     Interim Injunction

24.  First, I will deal with the Interim Injunction.  This is in effect a continuation of the interim interim injunction granted on 1st April 2011.  In my earlier Reasons for Decision dated 1st April 2011 for granting the interim interim injunction, I have set out my preliminary findings and observations based upon the facts of the case which I do not intend to repeat here. 

25.  Since the interim interim injunction was granted, there have been no material change in circumstances which displace my earlier findings and observations nor had there been any challenge made to my findings and observations on appeal or otherwise.  The only change that had occurred is that the hearing of the Father’s Civil Action in Taiwan initially fixed for 14th April 2011 had, probably due to the interim interim injunction of 1st April 2011 granted by this Court, been adjourned but without a date being fixed. 

26.  Having heard submissions from all parties, I am satisfied that there being no material change in circumstances which warrant the discharge or uplift of the interim interim injunction dated 1st April 2011.   I am satisfied that on the facts available the continuation of the interim interim injunction under Section 17 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 is needed.   I will therefore grant the Interim Injunction on the same terms as the interim interim injunction dated 1st April 2011 until final determination of the Wife’s ancillary relief claims or further order. 

(b)  Anti-suit  Injunction

27.  For the Anti-suit Injunction, I agree with Counsel Miss Leung that the consideration which the Court has to take into account is materially different from that of a Hemain or other type of injunction generally or based upon where the balance of convenience lies.  

28.  As decided in the Societe Aerospatiale case (supra), anti-suit injunction is an equitable discretionary remedy, it will be granted only if the ends of justice so require.  It is the Court’s duty to ensure not only the rights of the injunction applicant should be protected but the rights of the injunction defendant not be infringed. This in essence is a balancing exercise having had to regard to all the relevant surrounding circumstances and decided on a case to case basis. 

29.  In the present case, I find the balance tips in favour of the Petitioner.   

30.  The father and son relationship appeared as opposite parties to the Civil Action in Taiwan poses a high tendency or propensity for them to act in concerted effort, even if this is not a fact established by inference or otherwise, to defeat the Wife’s legitimate rights on ancillary reliefs in these proceedings.  The subject matter of the Civil Action being the matrimonial home (i.e. Taiwan properties) which is a valuable asset worth around HK$24 to HK$25.5 million in value forming the bulk of the family assets. 

31.  Although I agree the proceedings taken by the Father in the Civil Action cannot be said to be vexatious or oppressive, it is noteworthy that the concept of vexation or oppression should not be restricted by definition.  In the Societe Aerospatiale case (supra) where Lord Goff said at page 893E to G :

“….As with the basic principle of justice underlying the whole of this jurisdiction, it has been emphasized that the notions of vexation and oppression should not be restricted by definition. As Bowen L.J. said in McHenry v. Lewis, 22 Ch D 397, 507-408 :

I agree that it would be most unwise, unless one was actually driven to do so for the purpose of deciding this case, to lay down any definition of what is vexatious or oppressive, or to draw a circle, so to speak, round this court unnecessarily, and to say that it will not move outside it.  I would much rather rest on the general principle that the court can and will interfere whenever there is vexation and oppression to prevent the administration of justice being perverted for an unjust end.  I would rather do that than attempt to define what vexation and oppression mean; they must vary with the circumstances of each case.”

32.  Bearing in mind notions of vexation and oppression are not to be restrictively defined, it follows that the Court may have to consider a wider perspective rather than simply looking at episodes of any regime.  This perhaps help to explain why Lord Goff and Bowen L.J. used those words “basic principle of justice” and “prevent administration ofjustice being perverted” in their judgments.  The ultimate question is, as I see it, where the justice lies ?

33.  In the legal opinion of Lai Su Lin (for Husband) at page 517 of the Bundle, it refers to :

“Speaking of the order, the property litigation between Mr. Hsu Sheng Hsiang and Mr. Hsu Song Chieh is to determine the actual property owner of such property…….”

34.  In the legal opinion of LYS (for Father) at page 251-2 of the Bundle, it refers to :

“Therefore, all interests of such property shall be vested with HSH …………”

35.  In the Writ issued by the Father at page 256-1 of the Bundle, it refers to :

“For the matter of claiming for transfer and registration of ownership …….”

36.  In the Prayer of the Writ at the same page 256-1 of the Bundle, it refers to :

“1. The Defendant shall transfer the ownership of …….”

37.  Taking all these conjunctively and; in particular, the Writ issued by the Father, it is plain and obvious that the Civil Action taken out by the Father also aimed at transfer of ownership of the Taiwan properties against the Son (i.e. Husband).   The legal opinion on the part of the Husband considered it only to be determination of ownership.  In a later Affirmation of LYS (for Father) at page 302 of the Bundle, the expert confirmed the legal advice he gave to the Father earlier.

38.  The fact that the Husband so far adopted a “neutral” stance in the Civil Action coupled with the fact that the Husband did at one stage attempt to remove the Provisional Attachment over the Taiwan properties supported my observation that it is more likely than not that there are concerted effort between the Father and the Husband.  I agree with Counsel Miss Remedios this is comparable to the 2 brothers in the case of Chan Kin Yuen v. Chan Kin Yip, HCA No.17878/1999.   

39.  Thus, I believe this Court should not simply consider the Father’s Civil Action in isolation as being non-vexatious and non-oppressive in deciding whether or not to grant the anti-suit injunction.  

40.  I now turn to other aspects of contention.  The contention that the Wife could, under Article 58 of the Taiwan Civil Law, join in/intervene in the Civil Action and have her rights protected.   This was stated in the legal opinion on the part of the Father (at page 307 of the Bundle paragraph 3) and also on the part of the Husband (at pages 517 – 518 of the Bundle at paragraph (C)).   However, the legal opinion on the part of the Wife (at page 618 of the Bundle at paragraph 4) suggested otherwise. 

41.  I accept the legal opinion on the part of the Wife.   Article 58 of the Taiwan Civil Law provides, inter alia, that :

“A third person who is legally interested in an action between two parties may, for the purpose of supporting one of them, intervene in the action while it is pending”

42.  The words “for the purpose of supporting one of them” provide a key and necessary condition for invoking Article 58.   The Wife in claiming her personal beneficial interest over the Taiwan properties would definitely neither support the Father nor the Husband in the Civil Action between the 2 of them for obvious reasons.  Hence it will be wrong to say that the Wife’s interest could be protected by relying upon Article 58 to intervene in the Civil Action.   In fact it is quite the converse of the situation that the Wife’s interest over the Taiwan properties, unless properly protected by this Court, would be jeopardized if the Father and the Husband is to proceed with the Civil Action in Taiwan.

43.  Although the Husband as the Defendant in the Civil Action had a minimal role to play, the fact remain is that he did apply on 6th January 2011 to the Taiwan Taipei District Court and obtained an order to compel the Wife to proceed with her divorce suit in Taiwan within 7 days (at page 500 of the Bundle at paragraph 10); failing which, he may under the relevant procedure to apply to uplift the Provisional Attachment over the Taiwan properties.  If the Husband’s stance in the Civil Action remain to be ‘neutral’ as Mr. Clough had submitted, it is rare, if not unusual, for the Husband to take out such application with intent to remove the Provisional Attachment.  The Husband’s application further support my earlier findings that the Father and the Husband are likely to be acting in concerted effort with intent to defeat Wife’s ancillary relief claims.

44.  On the question whether the Wife had submitted herself to the Taiwanese jurisdiction when she obtained the Provisional Attachment over Taiwan properties, the legal opinion on the part of the Husband (at pages 515 – 516 of the Bundle) states, inter alia :

“(A) The provisional seizure system is only for ensuring the request right of the parties in litigation. Each party’s unrestrained right of disposition on its property is temporarily frozen in order that the winning results can be implemented in the future, which will not have any impact on the outcome of litigation.”

45.  The legal opinion on the part of the Wife (at pages 616 – 617 of the Bundle) states, inter alia :

“(2) LPK applied to Taiwan Court for the provisional attachment on 15.11.2010 and applied for execution of the provisional attachment on 2.12.2010. (Her application) falls under ‘principal action not yet initiated’ in the provisional attachment procedure, that is, LPK has not initiated action in the Taiwan Court before commencing the provisional attachment procedure…..”

46.  It is clear from the Husband’s legal opinion that the provisional seizure system (which is referring to the Provisional Attachment) is to temporarily freeze assets to ensure rights of parties and which will not have any impact on the outcome of litigation.   The Wife’s legal opinion went further to suggest that it is a procedure whereby the principal action not yet initiated.  

47.  With respect, I do not agree with Counsel Miss Leung that the Wife had submitted to the Taiwanese Jurisdiction by obtaining the Provisional Attachment.   Quoting the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Reyes (as he then was) in the case of Hwoo Huang Linda –v- Fu Being San & others (HCA 4888/2001) at paragraph 26 :

“26. …….I derive the following guidelines (which are not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the law) for evaluating whether there has been a submission to Hong Kong jurisdiction in the present case :-

(1)……..

(2)…….

(3)A party does not submit to the jurisdiction if he merely acts to preserve the status quo pending the mounting and resolution of an application to challenge forum.

(4)A party does not submit to the jurisdiction if he merely takes defensive action in interlocutory injunction proceedings brought by the other side.

(5)……

(6)……”

48.  Although his Lordship in the Hwoo’s case formulated the guidelines in the context of submission to Hong Kong jurisdiction, I am prepared to find those guidelines also applicable in determining whether there was submission to Taiwan jurisdiction.   In light of the legal opinions on Taiwanese law from the Husband and the Wife on the topic of Provisional Attachment, I find there was no submission to the Taiwan jurisdiction by the Wife.  The Provisional Attachment is, in my view, a step to preserve the status quo rather than a main action to pursue a substantive claim.

49.  The fact that the Provisional Attachment procedure allows the person to whom the attachment is made against to apply to the Court to compel the applicant for the Provisional Attachment to initiate action within a prescribed time dictates the fact that the main action has yet to be commenced.   Thus it is incorrect to say that the main action had been commenced when the Provisional Attachment was obtained and the applicant had already submitted to jurisdiction.

50.  Counsel for the Father further submitted that in the absence of satisfactory expert evidence of foreign law, this Court should apply Hong Kong law to consider the effect of the Provisional Attachment akin to Mareva injunction.   With respect, I do not agree with Counsel.   It is not correct to say there are no satisfactory expert evidence before this Court on foreign law.   The truth is that there is. Parties have already filed their respective expert legal opinion on Taiwanese law.    The fact is that the legal opinion filed on the part of the Father had not covered all the topics.   This may be the reason for the Father to seek leave to adduce further supplemental expert evidence at a very late stage.  Nonetheless, there are legal opinion from experts for the Husband and the Wife which I am entitled to consider and rely upon to determine the effect of the Provisional Attachment in the context of Taiwanese law. 

51.  The other contention that the Father had paid off the mortgage of the Taiwan properties and there being serious issues to be tried should not be a bar to grant anti-suit injunction if the ends of justice so require.

52.  It is also submitted that, so far as the Father is concerned, he is not the other party to the marriage and not taking parallel proceedings for the same relief against the Wife, the Court should exercise caution in granting injunction. Again, where justice lies is the main concern rather than the status of the party against whom the injunction is sought. 

53.  Furthermore, I have also given thoughts to the proceedings taken by the Father and the Husband in Taiwan in the context of their exercise of rights and protection of interest.   I was also invited to consider the principle of comity with respect to the foreign court’s policies and processes.

54.  As stated in the Societe Aerospatiale case (supra), the anti-suit injunctions are directed against the parties individually rather than against the foreign courts.  It does not offend principles of comity as it is directed towards the Husband and Father individually rather than the Taiwan Court.  It should also not be considered as any intrusion or intervention of basic human rights which Counsel Miss Leung had so described in her skeleton submissions.    

55.  Based on all the above, I decided to grant the Anti-suit Injunction in the Wife’s favour against the Husband and the Father.  I will also make a costs order nisi that the Wife shall have her costs of the Summons dated 20th January 2011 including all costs reserved to be paid by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, to be taxed if not agreed.  There be also Certificates for Counsels.  Such costs order nisi shall become absolute within 14 days from today.

Orders

(1)The Father and the Husband whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise be restrained from charging, dealing, transferring or otherwise disposing of the following landed properties until further Order, namely :

(i)  Flat X, XXth Floor, No.XX Broadway, Mei Foo Sun Chuen, Kowloon, Hong Kong   (“Hong Kong Property”);

(ii)   XXth Floor, XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號XX樓);

(iii)    X of XXth Floor, XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section, Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號XX樓之X); and

(iv)   A car parking space at LGX of XXX Min Shiu Road, Peian Section, Sub-Section X, Chung Shan Area, Taipei (XXX) Taiwan (台灣台北市中山區北安段明水路XXX號門牌房屋地下X層的一個停車空間).

( (ii) to (iv) above collectively referred as “Taiwan Properties” ).

(2)The Father and the Husband whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise be restrained until further Order from taking further steps in the Civil Action in Taiwan in respect of the Taiwan properties, and/or any other action affecting the ownership or possession of the Taiwan properties, including any appeal against the restraint order granted in Taiwan on 17th November 2010 and/or the decision of the Taiwan Court refusing an application for transfer of ownership of the Taiwan properties;

(3)The Wife do have the costs of the Summons dated 20th January 2011 including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, and be paid by the Father and the Husband in equal shares;

(4)There be Certificates for Counsels.

(G. Own)
Deputy District Judge

Representation :

Miss Corinne Remedios instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Neil Clough instructed by Messrs. Li, Chow & Co., Solicitors for the 1st Respondent    

Miss Pauline Leung instructed by Messrs. Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, Solicitors for the 2nd Respondent

78821-EN-2011-07-28

LPK v. SH also known as HSC AND ANOTHER

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FCMC 11930/2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.11930 of 2010

________________________________

BETWEEN

 LPKPetitioner

and

 SH also known as HSC1st Respondent

and

 HSH2nd Respondent

________________________________

Coram: Before Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 28th June 2011

Date of Handing Down Decision: 28th July 2011

___________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
(Maintenance Pending Suit)

   __________________________

 

Introduction

1.  This is the Petitioner’s wife application for maintenance pending suit against the 1st Respondent.  The Summons was issued on 10th March 2011 (“MPS Summons”).  By an Order of this Court dated 11th March 2011, the application was adjourned for argument today with 2 hours reserved.

2.  Besides, there is also a Summons dated 8th March 2011 (“Forum Summons”) taken out by the 1st Respondent for a stay of these proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens.  This application was also adjourned for argument today with half a day reserved. 

3.  Counsel for the 1st Respondent confirmed today that the 1st Respondent would not proceed with the “Forum Summons” and that the 1st Respondent would submit to the jurisdiction of this Court.  Hence the “Forum Summons” was withdrawn.  Thus, today’s hearing deal with the application under the “MPS Summons” and the issue of costs arising from the withdrawal of the Forum Summons.  Counsel for the Petitioner seeks a costs order in terms of the Forum Summons and that the same be payable forthwith.   I will deal with the costs aspect after my determination of the maintenance pending suit at the latter part of these Reasons for Decision.

The Applicable Law

4.  Section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”) provides :

“….. the court may order either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the presentation of the petition or making of the application and ending on the date of the determination of the suit, as the court thinks reasonable.”

5.  It is trite law that the Court, in deciding maintenance pending suit applications, has a wide and unfettered discretion.  The Court should take a broad brush approach rather than going into miniature investigation along those criteria under the statutory provisions of Section 25 of the MPPO which the Court would otherwise have to consider in the ancillary relief proper.

6.  Counsels for both parties rightly concede that the Court has jurisdiction in a maintenance pending suit application to also provide for litigation funding (see A v. A [2001] 1WLR 605 and G v.G [2003] 2FLR 71).

Wife’s application

7.  The factual background of the application was set out in the 4th Affirmation of the Petitioner.  Suffice to say that the Petitioner is seeking a monthly expenses of HK$16,366 if she lives in Taiwan or a sum of HK$26,036 if she lives in Hong Kong plus a further sum of around HK$75,000 a month towards funding her legal expenses for the present proceedings in Hong Kong and around HK$5,000 towards funding the Taiwan proceedings (see pages 342 to 343 of the Bundle).

8.  Since it is an undisputed fact that whilst the parties were in harmony, considerable financial support had been received from the 1st Respondent’s father (i.e. the 2nd Respondent). Counsel for the Petitioner submits that this Court when considering the maintenance pending suit application in the present case should apply the “judicious encouragement” principle so much so that the parties’ status quo of the parties’ life-style prior to the breakdown of the marriage should be maintained until full hearing.  Petitioner’s lifestyle has changed drastically whereas the 1st Respondent’s lifestyle remains substantially the same.  Counsel referred this Court to the decision of FMFT v. HKWE [2001] 1HKC.

Husband’s argument

9.  Mr. Clough, Counsel for the 1st Respondent, submitted that the “judicious encouragement” principle does not give carte blanche to make orders that are in effect against third parties.  There has to be inferential basis to conclude that any maintenance pending suit payments will be met.  Though it is conceded that when the parties were living in harmony the 1st Respondent’s father (i.e. 2nd Respondent) had been providing financial support to the parties, such support of the 1st Respondent’s father (i.e. 2nd Respondent) had been withdrawn and remained as a historical fact.

10.  Mr. Clough cited the Judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Mostyn Q.C. (as he then was) in the case of TL v. ML and others at paragraph 124 (v) as follows :-

“(v) Where the paying party has historically been supported through the bounty of an outsider, and where the payer is asserting that the bounty had been curtailed but where the position of the outsider is ambiguous or unclear, then the court is justified in assuming that the third party will continue to supply the bounty, at least until final trial (M v. M)”

11.  Mr. Clough referred the above as the “bounty” principle.   He submitted that there is before this Court the untested evidence of the on affirmation that the “bounty” had ceased.   This piece of evidence available is neither ambiguous nor unclear.   Thus this Court should not simply make assumptions that such bounty still continues or otherwise available (see the case of TL v. ML (supra)).

12.  The other limb of the argument on the “bounty” principle being that the funding of legal costs sought by the Petitioner falls outside the limit of “bounty” which, by definition, refers to the level of support by the outsider.   The learned Judge Bruno Chan in the case of K v. C (FCMC No.5508/2005) after reviewing the latest English Court of Appeal case of Currey v. Currey [2006] EWCA Civil 1338 and other authorities categorized those criteria which have to be met in deciding whether legal fees allowances are to be included in a maintenance pending suit order.  In the present case, the criteria which the Petitioner fails to satisfy is to provide the reason why the Petitioner had not turned to the availability of publicly funded legal help of the legal aid.  

13.  The third limb of argument being that the 1st Respondent’s father (i.e. 2nd Respondent) being an intervening party in the present proceedings is neither a “third party” nor “outsider” within the “bounty” principle cited in the TL v. ML  case (supra).

The Husband’s financial situation

14.  The 1st Respondent filed his 3rd Affirmation in opposition on 15th April 2011 (at pages 628 to 634 of the Bundle).  At paragraph 6 of the Affirmation, the 1st Respondent deposed to the fact that since July 2010, his father (i.e. 2nd Respondent) ceased to provide living expenses for him and the Petitioner.   He went further at paragraph 7 deposed that he had no employment and income.  He had been relying upon loans made available to him drawn upon a Tai-Shin International Bank account to pay off his living expenses and legal fees since withdrawal of financial support from his father after July 2010.  The outstanding loan amount on 29th March 2011 was NT$1,638,468 (around HK$409,617).

15.  I will use an exchange rate of about HK$1 to NT$4 for a better understanding on the amount equivalent in Hong Kong Dollars. 

16.  It is not disputed that the loan facilities which the 1st Respondent drawn upon Tai-Shin International Bank is secured against the Taiwan property in question which, according to the draft Form E of the 1st Respondent dated 18th March 2011 (see pages 134-36 to 134-59 of the Bundle) is a property worth HK$24 to HK$25.5 million (see page 134-40 of the Bundle).  It is the 1st Respondent’s case that this Taiwan property actually belongs to his father (i.e. 2nd Respondent).  The outstanding amount of the loan facilities as at the date of the draft Form E (i.e.  18th March 2011) was NT$1,526,290 (around HK$381,572.50) (at page 134-47 of the Bundle). 

17.  Counsel for the Petitioner referred me to the bank statements of the 1st Respondent’s account with Tai-Shin International Bank (at pages 134-28 to 134-32 of the Bundle) which shows the pattern and amount of withdrawals since 23rd September 2010 (i.e. the date of 090923 according to the Taiwan calendar which appeared in the bank records at page 134-30 of the Bundle).  It is worth noting that these proceedings were commenced on 13th September 2010.

18.  To take a few entries, four withdrawals of NT$20,000 (around HK$5,000) each were made on the same day of  23rd September 2010 resulting in an existing debit entry to increase from NT25,548 (around HK$6,387) to NT$105,548 (around HK$26,387).  Several other sums were then withdrawn resulting in a debit entry of NT$973,750 (around HK$243,437.50) as at 21st January 2010 (i.e. the date of 10000121 according to the Taiwan calendar appeared in the bank records at page 134-32 of the Bundle).  This represents around 9 times increase of the indebtedness in 4 months time.

19.  It is fair to say that the Taiwan property has been the subject matter of a Civil Action in Taiwan taken out by the 1st Respondent’s father (i.e. 2nd Respondent) against his son (i.e. 1st Respondent) seeking declaration of ownership of the Taiwan property to be the father’s.  This Taiwan Civil Action was adjourned without a date fixed and had yet to be tried. 

The Wife’s financial situation

20.  The Petitioner is unemployed and with no income.  In her 4th Affirmation at paragraph 15 (at page 337 of the Bundle), she deposed to the fact that since August 2010, the 1st Respondent ceased paying her maintenance.   At paragraphs 20 and 21, she deposed to the fact that whilst she was in Taiwan, she could only sleep on the floor in the TV/computer room.  Whilst she was in Hong Kong, she could no longer live in the Hong Kong property at Mei Foo Sun Chuen under the joint names of the 1st and 2nd Respondents but have to stay on and off in different relatives’ homes.  Further, at paragraph 22 of the Affirmation, she deposed to the fact that the monthly rental of a flat around 676 sq. ft in the same district of Mei Foo Sun Chuen is about HK$13,000 a month.

21.  At paragraph 16 of the 4th Affirmation, the Petitioner further deposed to the fact that she did not have the means to maintain herself on daily expenses as well as funding the legal proceedings here in Hong Kong and in Taiwan. She had withdrawn moneys from a joint name account with the 1st Respondent with HSBC in Australia, sold some stocks and shares in the 1st Respondent’s security account and withdrew sums of money from 1st Respondent’s security bank account to meet her expenses and legal fees.

22.  At paragraph 19 of the 4th Affirmation, the Petitioner deposed to the fact of also having to obtain financial assistance from her family and had borrowed moneys from her mother about GBP16,892 (around HK$211,150).

Discussion

23.  The first issue is whether this Court should exercise its unfettered discretion in the Petitioner’s favour to order the 1st Respondent to pay maintenance pending suit.  This is a balancing exercise between the immediate and recurring needs of the Petitioner as against the 1st Respondent’s means and ability to meet those needs pending final determination on ancillary reliefs.  The other issue is whether it is just and reasonable so to do in the circumstances of the case.

24.  The 1st Respondent, in his Affirmation in opposition, took no issue over the Petitioner’s financial situation disclosed by her. The contention focuses only upon the inability of the 1st Respondent to provide for interim maintenance rather than that there being no immediate and recurring needs of maintenance by the Petitioner.    

25.  This brings us next to consider whether, on the disclosed evidence, the 1st Respondent is in a position to provide interim maintenance and if so, to what extent.  Mr. Clough argues that since the 1st Respondent’s father financial support had ceased, the 1st Respondent  himself have to rely upon loans from the bank to make ends meet.  The “bounty” of the father which hitherto the parties or the 1st Respondent enjoyed had now ceased and; to that context, there is clear and unambiguous affirmation evidence before the Court.  Hence, this Court should not assume those bounty exists or continue to exist to enable the 1st Respondent to provide interim maintenance.  Miss Remedios, Counsel for the Petitioner, suggests otherwise and invited this Court to consider the principle of “judicious encouragement”.

26.  With respect, I do not agree with Mr. Clough.  I find the 1st Respondent’s financial position changed only in form rather than in substance.   In so far as the Petitioner’s ancillary reliefs claim is concerned, it is the 1st Respondent’s case that the Taiwan property although registered in his sole name in fact belongs to his father (i.e. 2nd Respondent).  The fact that the father had ceased providing financial support in monetary terms should not be taken as being conclusive of having withdrawn the so called “bounty” which the father had hitherto been providing to the 1st Respondent. 

27.  In my view, the fact remains there that the 1st Respondent had been “supported” by or being able to turn to available funds or overdraft facilities drawn against the security of the Taiwan property which the 1st Respondent himself accepts belonged to his father.  Thus the 1st Respondent is in effect deriving financial assistance out of the father’s property and having the same “bounty”, if not more this time, same as what he had previously enjoyed from his father although taking a different form of support.  

28.  Moreover, it is the father’s case that he had initiated proceedings against the 1st Respondent seeking a declaration of ownership of the Taiwan property.  No injunctive or similar reliefs had ever been taken out by the father against the 1st Respondent either restraining him from further withdrawing loans from the bank or claiming back from the 1st Respondent loans which had already been withdrawn in order to preserve the value of the Taiwan property not being diminished by the loan secured against it.   I formed the view that the absence of such action of the father to be some kind of ‘tacit’ support or acquiescence or consent of the father thus forming the “bounty” upon which the principle of “judicious encouragement” applies.

29.  The next issue is the limit to which such “bounty” extend.  Should it be restricted to cover living expenses only as Mr. Clough had submitted.  The answer depends on the peculiar facts of each case.  The 1st Respondent is now having the bank loan facilities to pay off both his living expenses and his legal fees.  In my view, it is incorrect to restrict the limits of “bounty” to just level of living without consideration of the actual scenario, namely, that the withdrawals by the 1st Respondent had been used for paying both living expenses and legal fees.  Whether legal fees allowance should be included in the interim maintenance and if so; to what extent, is yet another issue to be decided.

30.  The argument that the father was providing the “bounty” as an intervenor and not as an outsider or third party is neither here nor there.  The core issue falls upon whether “bounty’’ is being available to the 1st Respondent.  It does not make any material difference if the provider is an outsider, third party or intervenor.  The principle of “judicious encouragement” applies irrespective of the source or status of the provider of the bounty.

31.  All in all, there is a significant disparity between the sources of fund available to the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent upon which they could turn to or rely upon for meeting their immediate living expenses and needs pending final determination of these proceedings.   Leaving aside whether the Petitioner could, at the end, have an interest in the Taiwan property, the fact remain is that the substantial loan facilities secured against the Taiwan property which worth between HK$24 to HK$25.5 million presently available for the 1st Respondent puts him in a considerable advantageous position than the Petitioner wife which, in the interest of fairness, warrant a interim maintenance order.

32.  Considering all the circumstances and the overall evidence available, I am satisfied that this is a proper case for exercising discretion to order maintenance pending suit for the Petitioner.   It is also just and reasonable so to do.

Should there be legal fees allowance ?

33.  The Petitioner is also seeking legal fees allowance on both the Hong Kong and Taiwan proceedings.   The principles enunciated in Curreyv. Currey (supra) are clear which were reviewed and adopted in the Hong Kong case of K v. C (supra).   I agree with Mr. Clough that it is inappropriate in the present case to disregard the Currey principles by including legal fees allowance without the Petitioner first showing that she cannot secure publicly funded legal help.  With due respect, I do not agree with Miss Remedios that these proceedings are of exceptional or complex nature which falls outside the usual level of expertise provided by the legal aid.

34.  As for the Taiwan proceedings, again I do not see the reason to order the 1st Respondent to fund Petitioner’s legal fees.  First, the 1st and 2nd Respondents are entitled to commence proceedings in Taiwan.  The way in which they have conducted their cases in Taiwan resulted in legal costs having to be incurred by the Petitioner is no basis for seeking those costs to be funded in the maintenance pending suit order.  For otherwise, the 1st Respondent would be deterred of exercising his rights to litigate in Taiwan in fear of ending up with him underwriting the Petitioner’s costs in the Taiwan proceedings. 

35.  Furthermore, my preliminary findings at paragraphs 33 and 36 of my earlier decision dated 1st April 2011 that the 1st and 2nd Respondents, by inference or on balance of probabilities, having acted in concerted efforts also do not, in my view, provide legal justification for those of the Petitioner’s costs for the Taiwan proceedings be included as part of the interim maintenance order here in Hong Kong.  Those costs would no doubt be taken care of at the substantive proceedings in Taiwan.

36.  Hence, for the above reasons, my order for interim maintenance pending suit will not include legal fees allowance for both sets of proceedings in Hong Kong or in Taiwan.

Amount of interim maintenance

37.  Counsel for the Petitioner submitted a comparative schedule of expenses of the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent by extracting from information contained in the parties’ respective Form Es.

38.  Mr. Clough took no issue on the necessity or reasonableness of the items of expenses.  Miss Remedios submitted that the Petitioner’s general expenses in Hong Kong and Taiwan differ mainly due to the living expenses of HK$13,000 in Hong Kong since the Petitioner is not able to stay in the Mei Foo property.   The Petitioner is prepared to exclude the living expenses in Hong Kong if she was allowed to live in the Mei Foo property.  On personal expenses, it is more or less the same whether in Hong Kong or in Taiwan.

39.  The 1st Respondent has now finally decided to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and these proceedings have now being actively pursued with the FDR coming along on 4th October this year.   I decided to allow the Petitioner’s interim maintenance on the Hong Kong standard at the rate of HK$26,000 per month. 

40.  The Petitioner had not received any maintenance since August 2010.  I am satisfied that the moneys she had withdrawn from those joint name accounts with the 1st Respondent and the loans she borrowed from her family members and her mother which I referred to in paragraphs 21 and 22 above had been spent.   I therefore decided that the period for such interim maintenance should start from the commencement of these proceedings which is 13th September 2010 when the Petition was issued.  Thus, the amount of interim maintenance from 13th September 2010 to 12th August 2011 (11 months) is HK$286,000.  There will be further interim maintenance at the same rate of HK$26,000 per month commencing from 13th day of August 2011 and on 13th day of each succeeding month until further Order.

41.  As the 1st Respondent had not offered any amount of interim maintenance despite having been given such a chance to secure his position on costs prior to the hearing, I see no reason why the Petitioner should not have the costs of the MPS Summons dated 10th March 2011 including all costs reserved and of today’s hearing of the MPS Summons which started at 2:50 p.m. until 5:00 p.m.    There will also be Certificate for Counsels.

Costs of the “Forum Summons”

42.  I will now deal with the costs of the Forum Summons which had not been proceeded with and accordingly withdrawn today. Miss Remedios made 2 submissions. 

43.  First, she drew this Court’s attention to the Order of Deputy Judge Tracy Chan made on 6th December 2010 (at pages 117 to 120 of the Bundle).  This was the hearing of the First Appointment which date was given when the Petition was issued.  Nonetheless, a Summons was taken out on 3rd November 2010 (at pages 32 to 35 of the Bundle) by the 1st Respondent disputing jurisdiction and seeking a stay of the entire proceedings.  This Summons was scheduled, as Miss Remedios rightly used the term ‘hi-jacked’, to be heard at the same time as the First Appointment hearing.   This Summons was dismissed on the date of hearing.  The learned deputy Judge made two costs reserved order to separately deal with the costs of the dismissed Summons and the costs of the First Appointment hearing.  Hence, this Court when come to consider the costs of the Forum Summons dated 8th March 2011 should also take note of that part of the costs order dated 6th December 2010.

44.  Secondly, she invited this Court to consider costs to be payable forthwith.  The two applications for stay under the Summons dated 3rd November 2010 and the Forum Summons were dismissed following the 1st Respondent’s “eleventh-hour” submission to the

jurisdiction of this Court.   In those circumstances, costs have already been incurred by the Petitioner in responding to the abandoned applications and the Petitioner is entitled to have those costs received sooner.  Miss Remedios relied upon the case of Midland Business Management Limited & others –v- Lo Man Kui (HCA 1599/2010).

45.  I accept the two submissions made by Miss Remedios.  Although the date of the 6th December 2010 was allocated for the First Appointment, the fact remains there that the 1st Respondent’s Summons dated 3rd November 2010 was dismissed by the Court and there is a separate costs reserved order specifically dealing with the stay application.  I will apportion 50% of it for the stay application with the remaining 50% for the striking out application.  I will therefore order 50% of the costs of that Summons dated 3rd November 2010 be paid by the 1st Respondent to the Petitioner, to be taxed if not agreed.  I will also order the 1st Respondent to pay to the Petitioner the costs of the Forum Summons dated 8th March 2011. 

46.  In my earlier findings, the Petitioner has had spent the drawings she made from the joint name accounts and loans she borrowed on living expenses and funding legal costs.  If there is no order for immediate payment of those abortive costs already spent, the Petitioner would be out of pocket for a substantial sum which is a prejudice to her especially when she was not provided with any maintenance for the past year since August 2010 and that her application for legal fees allowance in the interim maintenance application had failed.

47.  The 1st Respondent has now decided to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court, I see no reason why those abortive costs already spent should not be dealt with at the earliest possible moment and I am entitled to make such order under Order 62 rule 4(1) of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2011 (“HKCP”).  I must stress that the exercise of my discretion in making a costs payable forthwith order should not be taken to mean the 1st Respondent’s applications being unwarranted but rather an approach to promote the underlying objectives under Order 1A r.1(d) of the HKCP.

48.  Accordingly, I also make the order that the above costs be taxed, if not agreed, and be payable forthwith.

Orders

1.    The 1st Respondent’s Forum Summons dated 8th March 2011 be dismissed;

2.    The 1st Respondent do forthwith pay to the Petitioner maintenance pending suit from 13th September 2010 to 12th August 2011 in the sum of HK$286,000  (i.e. HK$26,000 x 11);

3.    The 1st Respondent do pay to the Petitioner further maintenance pending suit at the rate of HK$26,000 per month commencing 13th August 2011 and thereafter on the 13th day of each succeeding month until further Order;

4.    The 1st Respondent do pay to the Petitioner the costs of the MPS Summons dated 10th March 2011 including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed;

5.    The 1st Respondent do pay to the Petitioner half of the costs of the Summons dated 3rd November 2010, to be taxed if not agreed, and payable forthwith;

6.    The  1st Respondent do pay to the Petitioner the costs of the Forum Summons dated 8th March 2011 including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, and payable forthwith;

7.    There be Certificates for Counsels for all the above costs order.

(G. Own)
Deputy District Judge

Representation :

Miss Corinne Remedios instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Neil Clough instructed by Messrs. Li, Chow & Co., Solicitors for the 1st Respondent