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Matrimonial Causes2010

姚源國 對 鄧佳穎前稱鄧琇珍

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  • FCMC10917/2006The Estate of CWT, Deceased v. YYK

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[2022] HKFC 218-CH-2022-10-07

姚源國 對 鄧佳穎前稱鄧琇珍

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FCMC 5141 / 2010

[2022] HKFC 218

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟案件編號 2010年第 5141號

————————————————

 姚源國呈請人
 及 
 鄧佳穎前稱鄧琇珍答辯人

————————————————

主審法官 : 區域法院關天敏法官席前審理
審訊日期 : 2022年 2 月 17 日
答辯人書面結案陳詞 : 2022 年 3 月 17 日
呈請人書面結案陳詞 : 2022年 4 月 14 日
判決日期 : 2022年 10 月 7 日

-----------------------

判案書
( 交付羈押 )

-----------------------

1.  本案答辯人,也是判定債權人,於2021年6月30日存檔申請交付羈押傳票。

2.  在本判案書中,判定債權人和判定債務人分別稱為女方和男方。

背景

3.  此案件的背景已在區域法院翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)於2015年1月29日頒下的判決書列出,所以不會在此處重複。

此案件法律程序的時序

4.  男方於2010年4月以不合理行為為由提出離婚,暫准離婚令於 2010年10月6日發出。

5.  本案於2015年1月29日由翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)經審訊後作出以下的命令,男方須付予女方以下款項:

(1)  絕對離婚令後,一次過付款港幣$1,627,200 (“整筆款項”);及

(2)  由2015年2月1日起每月贍養費港幣$15,000 (“定期贍養費”)。

6.  翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)於2015年3月23日就女方申請,根據婚姻訴訟規則第65(4) 條,將2010年10月6日所頒布之暫准判令轉為絕對判令。然而女方的代表律師則在2015年12月才正式申請離婚判令,所以絕對離婚令則於2016年1月12日才正式頒發。

7.  男方只曾於2015年2月及3月支付定期贍養費,總共港幣$30,000;他亦沒有於絕對離婚令後支付該整筆款項。女方於2016年2月16日提出判決傳票。從2015年4月1日至此交付羈押聆訊約七年的時間,男方並沒有再付任何款項予女方。

8.  女方的判決傳票,追討男方的以下欠款:

(1)  整筆款項港幣$1,627,200;

(2)  由2015年4月至2016年2月所欠的定期贍養費,每月港幣$15,000,總共11個月;即港幣$165,000 。

9.  男方於2016年10月11日聆訊以向高等法院申請破產為由,獲得翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)頒令將判決傳票無限期押後,但容許女方隨時可提出申請恢復判決傳票的法律程序。

10.  女方的判決傳票聆訊在2018年1月恢復進行。中間經過多次的延期,其中原因包括男方被法律援助署撤銷代表以及他向法援提出上訴,最終在2020年12月9日才進行訊問聆訊。

11.  訊問聆訊完成後,女方亦根據實務指引SL10.2,於2021年6月9日向法庭申請對男方作出交付羈押令的許可,法庭亦於6月21日批准申請。女方於2021年6月30日發出交付羈押傳票,此時所欠的定期贍養費已累積74個月。

12.  此交付羈押審訊於2022年2月17日進行,女方在庭上宣誓作供支持其案情。而男方則行使保持緘默的權利,沒有在審訊中作供。

男方的破產申請

13.  男方於2015年3月23日向高等法院申請破產,於2017年9月5日被駁回。以下是高等法院原訟法庭法官陳健強的判決書中的重要的摘錄。

14.  關於男方的一個在中國的銀行戶口:

“[Petitioner] has completely failed to account for the whereabouts of the sum or its equivalent. Therefore there is no answer to the complaint of lack of full and frank disclosure.” (Paragraph 9)

“ It should be added that the bank documents of the account show that it was opened in February 2011 with a sum of about RMB2.89 million. During the period from opening of the account to about October 2012 the account was quite active with many large transactions. They reflect the fact that [Petitioner] had access to large sums of money. The court has not been provided with a satisfactory account on how his fortune has taken a dramatic turn.” (Paragraph 12)

15.  關於男方說他欠兄長的債項港幣$450,000:

“… the [Family] Court clearly declined to include it in the computation of assets due to the fact that the loan “was not supported by evidence both as to the existence and the cause of it””. ( Paragraph 13)

“In the evidence found in these proceedings, [Petitioner] had produced certain handwritten records from himself in support of the loan, which was made up of nothing but figures (no dates can be found), and a simple document containing only figures as a record of [the brother]. There is no explanation as to why such evidence was not before the Family Court, nor is there an affirmation from [the brother] to verify his record. I am unable to accept the loan is genuine. (Paragraph 14)

16.  關於男方說他入不敷出:

“Finally, there is force in [Respondent’s counsel] submission that if [Petitioner] is living beyond his means as he contends, it is surprising that there is no evidence of outstanding credit card payments or any borrowing from banks or finance house or an increase in borrowing from [the brother]. (Paragraph 17)

17.  高等法院亦指出他利用破產申請來逃避債務:

“…. this case bears the hallmark of an indignant ex-husband who is determined not to pay his ex-wife despite having been ordered by the court to do so. Having considered these matters with care, I agree that these proceedings were launched with the aim to circumvent the Judgment* and constitute an abuse of process. (Paragraph 20)

*“Judgement” 指翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)2015年的判決書。

女方的案情

18.  根據女方的說法,男方只是在2015年2月及3月支付過兩次定期贍養費,總數是港幣$30,000。男方並沒有爭議。

19.  女方亦指出男方亦沒有付支付那整筆款項。男方亦沒有爭議。

20.  所以男方由2015年4月至此審訊前的2022年1月所欠的贍養費,及他未付的整筆款項總共欠額為港幣$2,857,200。

21.  女方的代表律師在開案陳詞中,特別列出法庭命令關於那整筆款項的英文原文,如下:

(A) lump sum of $1,627,200 within 14 days from the date of the decree nisi being made absolute”

22.  根據女方代表律師指出,法庭於2015年3月23日將暫准離婚令轉為絕對判令;所以他認為那整筆款項到期日期為2015年4月6日。

23.  女方指出男方並沒有於2015年的命令提出上訴 ,亦從沒有向法庭申請更改定期贍養費。

24.  女方亦指出男方在2015年1月29日命令之後是有經濟能力繳付全部或部份所拖欠的款項。這包括他擁有的兩份保單,還有他於訊問聆訊中曾經承認他起碼可從月薪每月支付女方港幣$1000贍養費。另外翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)曾裁定男方中國農業銀行戶口內的錢為他所有,但他從沒有交代該戶口內的款項的去向。

25.  女方陷於經濟困境,她居住公共房屋,靠政府補助為生,生活水準與婚姻期間差距很大。

男方於程序上面的抗辯及討論

26.  在男方於2021年8月21日的反對交付羈押陳述書中,男方抗辯女方無權追討超過12個月的欠款,並說明女方的代表律師濫用司法程序騷擾他。他提出香港法例第192章婚姻法律程序與財產條例第12條款,內容如下:

「… 如在申請執行繳付欠款的法律程序開始前,該等欠款已逾期未繳超過12個月,則任何人在未得到法庭許可前,均無權透過法庭執行繳付欠款。」

27.  就這一點, 男方有以下的說法:

「答辯人的法律代表在2016年2月8日就2015年1月29日的法令向法庭申請判決傳票。相信任何人也可以計算得到答辯人的法律代表在作出申請的時候已經超過12個月。答辯人不但沒有向法庭申請許可, 更過份的是,多次要求排期甚至強迫本人於2020年12月9日在沒有根據法例上,法庭許可的情況下向法庭要求聆訊裁決傳票。」

「即使答辯人判決傳票及交付羈押的申請被否決,並不代表答辯人不能夠追討有關的金錢。今次失誤是答辯人的法律代表出錯。是答辯人的法律代表刻意濫用司法程序,因為他們知道不能夠圓滿解釋得到為何答辯人在頒令之後12個月之內作出申請,因此抱着「搏一搏」以及「打茅波」的態度進行申請,更可惡的,答辯人的法律代表這種「博一博」及「打茅波」的做法竟然可以「瞞天過海」獲得法官審訊了判決傳票。」

28.  翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)於2021年8月30日的聆訊命令要女方的代表律師做一份法律觀點回覆書,以回應男方以上的論據。

29.  男方對第192章第12條款有錯誤的了解。此條款所提及的12個月是由付款一方開始欠款起計。在此案件中,就有兩個關鍵的日子:其一,是男方沒有支付定期贍養費,即2015年4月1日之後起。其二,關於那整筆款項,是絕對離婚令頒布日期2016年1月12日後的14天,即是2016年1月26日;男方於此日期後並沒有支付那整筆款項。這些事實,男方並沒有爭議。所以女方2016年2月16日的判決傳票回看12個月,女方是正確地追討了男方之前11個月的定期贍養費及那整筆款項的欠款。此欠款總共計算如下:

(1)   由2015年4月1日至2016年2月共11個月的定期贍養費,即$15,000 x11 = $165,000

(2)   那一次過款項 =$1,627,200

合共$1,729,200。

30.  在男方的開案陳詞內,繼續他在法律程序上的抗辯。他提出以下三點:

(1)  他說女方的律師並沒有申請逾期12個月過期追討欠款的准許

(2)  他說交付羈押傳票應該親自送達給他

(3)  他說女方律師並沒有向法庭申請罰則通知,交付羈押傳票並沒有罰則通知書。

31.  男方認為「拖欠贍養費並不是一個容許債權人作出交付羈押申請的理據」,並指控對方律師濫用司法程序恫嚇他。

32.  男方還說女方的判決傳票便箋完全沒有提及過期申請許可,他亦聲稱女方代表律師在其陳詞中提及過申請追討超過12個月的欠款許可。

33.  事實上女方代表律師在他的法律觀點回覆書清楚表明,已申請有關192章第12條的許可。女方代表律師是指向法庭要求發出判決傳票的申請,這是根據婚姻訴訟規則第87(2) 條的程序。女方律師並沒有表示她申請逾期12個月欠款追討的許可。再者,如上文29段,女方的判決傳票的時間性是正確的,申請判決傳票的時候她根本不需要作任何逾期申請。

34.  2016年2月16日的判決傳票,以及2021年6月30日的交付羈押傳票先後亦有女方律師存檔的送達誓章。尤其是交付羈押傳票是用面交方式送達男方,在女方律師的一份送達誓章中述明男方2021年7月6日在女方代表律師樓收取該傳票, 並在中文信函上簽收。在此審訊中女方的律師亦向男方確認他當時在那信函上的簽名。

35.  在程序上,女方律師並不需要向法庭申請罰則通知。事實上,2016年2月16日的判決傳票已有交付監獄的警告;於2021年6月30日所發出的交付羈押傳票亦已隨附法律上需要的警告通知。再者,當女方在男方完結破產申請後重新繼續判決傳票的時候,翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)於2018年1月15日的命令也有罰則通知。

36.  男方提出的所有程序上的抗辯,完全不成立。

37.  還有,男方的開案陳詞完全沒有提及他的經濟狀況。

法律原則

關於民事藐視法庭的法律

38.  民事藐視法庭法律的目的是確保訴訟雙方認識到遵守法院命令的重要性。

39.  Kao, Lee & Yip v. Donald Koo(2009)HKCFAR 830定下的原則可總結成以下的三個階段測試︰

a.  法庭必須詮釋有關的法庭命令,以確定其涵義和效力;

b.  決定被告人事實上已否遵從在如此詮釋下的有關命令;以及

c.  考慮任何不遵從是否附隨所需的思想狀態,以確立可予懲處的藐視法庭。

(香港民事訴訟程序 52/1/16)

40.  在最近的 Koo Ming Kown v Chan Chi Mong, Hopkins一案 [2020] HKCFI 2827,高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如在該案第16段進一步闡述︰

“至於民事藐視法庭所需的精神狀態,無須證明被指控人的行為是拒不服從的,即他直接有意圖不服從命令︰只要證明 (a)他知道那些使他的作為或不作為成為藐視法庭的事實,以及(b) 該作為或不作為並非偶然的。(香港民事訴訟程序2021 52/1/17)

41.  民事藐視法庭而交付羈押是一件嚴重的事。判定債務人有舉證責任,女方需要證明對男方指控的行為,要達到刑事水準,即是毫無合理懷疑。

42.  以上提出的實務指示SL10.2清楚說明,如法庭信納判定債務人:

(1)  目前或自該命令日期以來有經濟能力繳付其所拖欠的款項;及

(2)  曾經拒絕或忽略付款或現在仍拒絕或忽略付款,則可酌情作出針對判定債務人的交付羈押令。

討論

43.  上文已提及,男方於此審訊並沒有作供。然而,他在他的結案陳詞內曾用未經宣誓的証供以回應女方代表律師的結案陳詞。但陳詞並非証供,本席不會考慮他結案陳詞內這些反駁及回應。

44.  女方的代表律師在結案陳詞內提出四點支持女方的申請。

保單一

45.  男方於2018年1月30日存檔的Form E,報稱他有一份保誠保單,而他是保單的持有人;在訊問聆訊中,男方承認他已經於「前幾日…將自己儲蓄保取消埋, 攞咗港幣$150,000出嚟」。

46.  就此申請,女方只要證明男方曾經有經濟能力繳付欠款,及拒絕或忽略付款,已經足夠。很明顯,男方曾經擁有港幣$150,000,而沒有向女方繳付甚至部份所欠款項。

保單二

47.  男方亦曾經擁有一份宏利保單。該保單現時的持有人是他的兄長。女方的指控是男方於命令發出後,他以欠兄長債務為由,在兄長及大嫂的壓力下,將保單轉給他兄長。根據女方代表律師指出,此保單於2018年2月的現金價值是港幣$55,900,還有紅利港幣$21,952.77,所以金額大約值港幣$78,000。

48.  男方說這份保單的受保人是他的兒子。在訊問聆訊中,女方代表律師問男方為何將此保單轉給他兄長,他的答案如下:

「因為呢個佢…嗰陣時呢個Legal Aid嗰時問我,佢話「喂,你擁有你仔仔嘅..」」

49.  之後,男方又說:

「因為當時轉就係話佢…嗰時同屋企人嘈嘅,因為我爭我哥哥係幾十萬要還錢,佢就話…咁嗰陣時佢有啲保單,我攞咗錢出嚟係還債嘅,因為阿嫂追得好犀利,係阿嫂嘅意見最大嘅,咁亦都有講過,佢呢個保單嗰陣時係畀過…呢個仔係讀書嘅單嚟嘅,咁你爭人咁多錢,你會唔會拎咗啲錢去用啊?」

50.  最後他似乎說,轉個保單給他的兄長是因為避免自己會用此保單去借錢,而兄長可以繼續供保險,以照顧他的兒子。

51.  男方前後提供了三個理由 ,他的第一個反應是跟申請法援有關,之後便説他大嫂追債,最後是因為要讓他兄長繼續供這份保單給他的兒子。

52.  就他以上的解釋,本席並不信納。男方呈交此保單2018年2月27日的紀錄,歸納而言,此保單的持有人及受益人是男方的兄長, 而受保人是他的兒子。就此証供,本席曾考慮到,男方的兒子今年已22歲,這份以兒子讀書為目的的保單將如何處理?身為保單持有人的兄長若要取消保單取回現金值,這筆款項又歸誰所有?再者,男方多年來擁有多份保單,亦有曾經用他的保單借錢。他亦清楚知到,作為一個保單持有人,是可以取出保單的現金值(如上述保誠保單) 以向女方支付欠款, 然而他選擇將保單轉給他兄長。

53.  我同意女方代表律師的說法,無論男方的兄嫂給他什麼壓力,又或是他說要保障兒子將保單轉給兄長,都不能改變男方曾經可以有一筆款項支付女方的欠債。明顯地,男方將依從法庭命令放在一個十分低的位置。

每月起碼可以支付出港幣$1000

54.  男方於上述的Form E 內曾申報他有月薪港幣$26,000。以下是他在法庭上的證供:

問︰  …你亦都喺2015年3月喺呢個安心公司工作,就係以你自己所講嘅,實際上每個月或多或少你係有呢個能力支付一個數量嘅贍養費畀你嘅前妻,你同唔同意?

答︰  如 -- 呢度你 -- 如果我得24,700鈫喇,我係冇辦法畀到15,000鈫佢囉。

問︰  但你起碼…

答︰  畀到15,000鈫之後,嗰10,000鈫我個仔嗰度都可能去咗喇。

問︰  好呀,或多或少,1,000 鈫畀唔畀到?

答︰  有可能畀到嘅,呢個。

問︰  2,000鈫畀唔畀到?

答︰  不一定,不一定。

問︰  咁即係你係冇盡力去尊重法庭嘅命令喇?

答︰  但我可唔可 -- 法庭容唔容許我畀個咁嘅數?

問︰  法庭梗係容許你,好過你1毫子都唔畀。

答︰  但如果咁講…

問︰  你嘅 – 我諗全部可以同你指出喇,…

答︰  如果咁講 …

問︰  … 過去咁多個年夾埋已經欠到七十幾萬。

55.  很明顯,根據他自己的供詞,已承認他有能力支付港幣$1,000。

56.  根據男方存檔的Form E, 他於2015 年3 月開始一份工作, 月薪為港幣$26,000,但他申報的支出也是剛好港幣$26,000。但是單看他的食物開支($4,000)及外出用膳($1,780),還有港幣$800的假期消費, 已合共港幣$6,580。此總數已超過女方從綜援收到的每月資金。

57.  於訊問聆訊中,女方代表律師亦有盤問男方的支出,包括他信用咭紀錄中的消遣項目。顯而易見,他選擇將他的薪金用在自己和兒子身上,而刻意忽略法庭命令下的持續責任。

58.  本席認為就着他的薪金,他是絕對可以節省開支,將部份來支付女方。

農業銀行的戶口

59.  女方指出於珠海中國農業銀行有一個戶口是男方單名擁有。

60.  從翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)2015年的判決書中,可見男方最初根本沒有披露這個銀行戶口,直至女方的弟弟(曾經與男方有工作上的往來)指出這個戶口的存在。他當時的解釋是:他的回鄉證被人盜用,並用來開這個戶口;直到現在,他仍然堅持這個說法。翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)並沒有接受他這個解釋,並裁決農業銀行的戶口內的金錢是屬於男方的。再者,他亦認為男方沒有完全披露他的資產。當時,翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)判定男方的資產共約港幣$2,718,000,當中包括農業銀行的戶口內港幣$1,898,088;而用了60/40的分配,以裁定那整筆款項給女方。男方從沒有上訴翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)的決定。

61.  當女方於2018年初重啟她的判決傳票時,男方被問及這個戶口內金錢的去向。就當時的一份問卷,他於2018年5月提交了這個戶口從2011年2月至2013年1月的支出紀錄 。在訊問聆訊的盤問中,他亦確認了他提取的資料只是關於戶口的支出,亦繼續堅持這些金錢的支出不為他操控,全部是網上的交易。更重要是,女方的代表律師向他指出,由此銀行其他月結單的紀錄可見,在同一段時間內是有金錢存入這個戶口的。可見男方選擇性地只是提交這個戶口部份的交易紀錄給女方。

62.  還有在之後的一份問卷中,關於這戶口的交易他有以下的回應。女方向他問:

Q: Please provide the explanations (with documentary proof) of the following transactions in the Agricultural Bank of China bank account.

A: The Petitioner has no recollection as and to these transactions and particulars of the transferee is unable to provide any documents. (emphasis added)

63.  然而,在訊問聆訊中他說他「不認識」此戶口支出款項的收款人。女方的代表律師向他指出 “no recollection” (沒有記憶) 與不認識是兩回事。

64.  本席認為,就這個戶口的答問,男方有逃避問題之嫌,他的証供亦不可信。

65.  這個戶口內的金錢是可以支付那整筆款項,但在離婚的過程中,此戶口的金錢不翼而飛;而男方根本沒有交代此筆款項的去向。

66.  還有,男方指出根據實務指引10.2,女方代表律師應該得到判決傳票的判決,才可以繼續做交付羈押程序,不可能單憑審訊謄本證明他違抗命令。

67.  男方亦抗辯訊問聆訊與交付羈押聆訊不應該有兩個不同的法官審理,因為他認為法官應要觀察他作供的神態是否可信,再考慮他的證供,所以單憑審訊謄本來推斷他是否違反法令是不恰當的。

68.  男方對此法律程序亦有誤解。本席的決定是可以倚賴訊問聆訊的審訊謄本及男方呈上的其他証供作判決。在此案中,有幾件事實:他從保誠保單提取的現金值、他從宏利保單可以提取的現金值、他有能力用保單的現金值借錢、他從薪金可以節省到的數目,及他就宏利保單及農業銀行戶口金錢的去向諸多疑點的解釋。

結論

69.  翁喬奇暫委法官(當時官階)的命令十分清晰。男方亦沒有反駁女方對他欠款的指控。歸納以上的分析,本席毫無合理懷疑地認為男方在相關時間內,是有經濟能力支付至少部份的贍養費,以及那整筆款項。他欠款多年,但每當他有財政能力時,甚至連支付部份贍養費也沒有。

70.  很明顯,男方對女方的需要置之不理,漠不關心,刻意選擇不遵守法庭的命令。根據以上理由,本席裁定男方藐視法庭罪的罪名成立。

量刑原則

71.  高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如在Bruno Arboit as sole liquidator of Highfit Development Co Ltd v Koo Siu Ying (No 2) [2016] 3 HKLRD 154 一案的第2 至第 8段總結相關的量刑原則如下︰

“2.  其起點是承認藐視民事法庭命令是一個嚴肅的問題,法庭命令必須得到遵守。法庭在判决藐視法庭罪時的首要考慮是“向訴訟人表明這些法庭命令務必遵守的重要性”。所謂“訴訟人”,顯然是泛指所有的訴訟人,而不僅僅是指藐視者本人。

3.  判刑的目的是懲罰違反法庭命令的行為,並履行強制職能,即通過提出未來懲罰的威脅作為確保命令得以落實這個主要目的的保護手段。……法庭必須平衡這兩個目標。

4.  藐視法庭罪的刑罰可以從罰款到有期徒刑不等。英國1981年《藐視法庭法》規定最高刑期為監禁2年,但香港沒有該法定期限。

5.  監禁應被視為最後的制裁手段。任何監禁刑期都應盡可能短,以符合案件的情况。

6.  法庭可按其認為適當的期限或條件暫緩執行監禁︰……第52號命令第7條規則。這是一項 “絕對酌情權”,但當沒有任何行動可以遵守命令,很難想像在什麼情况下應作出暫緩執行的命令。

7.  法庭要考慮是否存在︰

(a)  加重處罰的因素;

(b)  減輕處罰的因素;以及

(c)  移除蔑視的行為。

8.  相關因素(並非詳盡無遺)包括︰

(a)  所涉命令和違反的性質,以及違反的程度。

(b)  藐視行為是拒不服從的還是無意的,其原因、動機和精神狀態。

(c)  申索人是否因藐視法庭罪而受到損害,以及損害是否可以補救。

(d)  藐視者是否意識到故意違反的嚴重性。

(e)  藐視者是否合作。”

72.  在該案中,歐陽桂如法官繼續說︰

“法院應審查藐視法庭產生的背景、違反命令對申請人的影響、加重處罰的因素、減輕處罰的因素以及答辯人的個人情况。”

判刑考慮

73.  以下是本席考慮判刑的因素:

(1)  男方已超過七年沒有向女方付款。

(2)  雖然女方的判決傳票申請只是11個月的定期贍養費,及那整筆款項$1,627,200,男方實在的積欠欠款還有判決傳票後的定期贍養費截至2022年1月(此交付羈押聆訊前)共$1,230,000,總金額為$2,857,200。

(3)  女方的生活水準一落千丈,她在婚姻期間住私人樓宇,有自用車及家庭傭工;現在她住公屋,靠約港幣$5,000綜援為生。對女方造成嚴重的身心傷害。

(4)  男方於此程序當中,遲遲欠交農業銀行的交易紀錄,申請破產(敗訴),上訴法援,有拖延時間之嫌。

(5)  從男方於此案的參與及他的陳詞,可以看到他有查究法律知識,甚至曾經有法律代表;但他竟說不知道可以向女方支付部份的欠額。

(6)  從他的訊問聆訊的證供中,可見他繼續他自己的生活模式,當有經濟能力的時候,就用在自己或兒子身上,刻意拒絕支付一分一毫給女方。

(7)  男方從沒有與女方商討其他付款的方案,亦沒有根據法律程序申請下調贍養費;他只是單方面停止付款。

(8)  他沒有作出任何移除藐視的行為。

命令

74.  本席下令男方因藐視法庭罪判監三個月。

75.  這藐視法庭的法律程序的訟費由男方承擔,包括所有保留訟費。此乃暫准訟費命令,如在本命令日期起計14天內沒有人申請更改,則14天後轉為絕對訟費命令。

76.  答辯人本身的訟費則按照法律援助規則予以評定。

  ( 關天敏 )
區域法院法官

呈請人:無律師代表,親自進行審訊

答辯人:由法律援助署委派廖蔡陳律師行,黃炎漢大律師代表

99352-EN-2015-01-29

YYK V. TSCJ (now known as TKW)

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FCMC 5141 / 2010

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 5141 OF 2010

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 YYKPetitioner
 and
 TSCJ (now known as TKW)Respondent

----------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing:22nd, 23rd, 24th October 2013, 15th November 2013, 20th February 2014 and 23rd April 2014
Dates of Closing Submission: 21st May 2014
Date of Submission in Reply: 18th June 2014
Date of Judgment: 29th January 2015

-------------------------

J U D G M E N T
(Ancillary Reliefs)

-------------------------

Background

1.  This is the trial of the Respondent Wife (“Wife”) claim against the Petitioner Husband (“Husband”) for ancillary reliefs.

2.  The parties were married on 20th December 1997 in Hong Kong.  There is one child born out of the marriage, a boy, who is at the age just over 12 ½ years at the commencement of this trial.  These divorce proceedings were commenced by the Husband in April 2010 relying on the fact of “Unreasonable Behaviour”.  Decree Nisi was granted on 6th October 2010.  On 25th October 2010, His Honour Judge K.W. Wong adjourned the question of custody for trial with 2 days reserved.

3.  On 14th September 2010, a Notice of Application for Ancillary Relief was filed by the Wife’s lawyers.

4.  On 16th June 2011, a Consent Order was granted by His Honour Judge K.W. Wong whereby custody of the child was granted to the Husband with reasonable access be given to the Wife.

5.  At the commencement of trial, the Husband was aged 43 and his reported occupation was ritual attendant/marketing consultant.  The Wife was aged 39 and was a housewife. 

6.  Both parties are legally represented at the time of trial and have agreed that the trial be conducted in English.   The Wife arranged her father as witness to testify and also issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Husband’s brother for attending the trial to produce certain documents.

Joint Statement of Issues

7.  Parties have set forth and signed a Joint Statement of Issues as follows :-

(a)  To ascertain the assets of the Wife which would fall within the matrimonial assets available for distribution. More specifically whether the sum of $600,000 given to her by her father still exists and whether this sum (or the remainder of it) is matrimonial asset.

(b)   What has been and is the income of Husband.  More specifically, does he still earn $100,000 per month ?

(c)  What were the businesses owned fully and partly and operated solely or jointly by Husband at the time of the Petition and what are these now.  What are the income derived and the share of net assets therein.

(d)  What are the other assets of Husband.  More specifically whether his statements and figures in Form E are accurate.

(e)  Does Husband have any beneficial interest in Property B and if yes, what proportion.

8.  For the sake of completeness, Property B refers to the property at Flat D, 1st Floor, Block xx, XXXX, No.xx Siu Lek Yuen Road, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong, which was registered in the sole name of the Husband’s brother.  Property B was used by the Husband and the child of the family since around 2007 up until now after the Husband disposed of the former matrimonial home around 2006.

The Wife’s latest Open Proposals

9.  The Wife proposed as follows :

“- Periodic Payment : $15,000 per month

- Lump sum : $2,000,000 (may be by instalments)

- (Difference between maintenance pending suit and Periodic Payment of $10,000 per month to be paid to Wife for the past period from 7/2010 to the present.)

-Costs (to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid

-Regulations to be paid by Husband)

The Husband’s latest Open Proposals

10.  The Husband proposed as follows :

“呈請人一方願意以下條件作為此案最終解決方案 :-

(一)呈請人支付答辯人每月港幣柒仟元正 (由每月十日或之前支付);

(二)其支付直至任何一方死亡或答辯人再婚;

(三)日後任何一方可作申請更改;

(四)無任何訟費命令;

(五)答辯人的訟費根據法律援助署規則評定。”

The question of “Illegality”

11.  In the afternoon of the first day of trial (that is, 22/10/2013) after the Wife has started her evidence in chief, Mr. Eric C.K. So acting for the Husband suddenly made an oral submission for immediate dismissal of the Wife’s ancillary reliefs claim in its entirety.  The basis of such application was that the Wife at paragraph 15 of her 1st Affirmation (at Trial Bundle TB – page 84) deposed that the Husband, apart from other business activities, had also engaged in business like illegal off-course soccer betting and also Mark Six betting.  She adopted such affirmation as her evidence in chief.  

12.  I should say such application came up ‘out of the blue’ of which, on all fairness, advance notice should have been given to the Wife’s Counsel.  Considering the draconian nature of the application, the trial was temporarily suspended in order to receive oral submission from Mr. So.  It was then adjourned to the following day (that is, 23/10/2013) for further disposal with directions for Mr. So to submit his written formal application and grounds of application.  Trial on ancillary reliefs in family cases procedurally differ from trials in criminal cases, especially those in magistrate courts, where from time to time defence counsel may seek a ruling from the court to ‘stay’ the criminal trial without any notice being given to the prosecution. 

13.  On the following day, Mr. So continued his submission and Counsel Mr. Wong for the Wife had also replied.  Leave was granted for Mr. So to file a proper Summons by 11:00 a.m. on the following day, namely, on 24 October 2013.

14.  Upon consideration, this Court granted the following Orders in respect of Mr. So’s application and an ex tempore Decision was delivered :-

(a)  Petitioner’s Summons for dismissal of the Respondent’s ancillary reliefs claim be dismissed;

(b)  Petitioner to pay the Respondent’s costs (apportioned 5 hours);

(c)  Basis of costs to be reserved until conclusion of the trial;

(d)  Respondent’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with  Legal Aid Regulations.

15.  Strangely enough, the Husband’s solicitors Mr. Eric C.K. So in his written Final Submission of this ancillary relief trial re-visited the question of illegality.  As rightly submitted by the Wife’s Counsel in the written Closing Submission in reply, such question has been decided and thus was res judicata.  No appeal was launched by the Husband for the Court’s decision and in now so doing, the Husband or his lawyers are simply attempting a second bite of the cheery, if not an abuse of process.

16.  I agree with Counsel Mr. Wong. There will be no consideration of this part of Mr. So’s written Final Submission by this Court.

The Law on Ancillary Relief

17.  The jurisdiction of the Court in granting financial relief for a party is governed by section 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192(“MPPO”) which provides:

“4. Financial provision for party to a marriage in cases of divorce, etc.

(1) On granting a decree of divorce, a decree of nullity of marriage or a decree of judicial separation or at any time thereafter (whether, in the case of a decree of divorce or of nullity of marriage, before or after the decree is made absolute), the court may, subject to the provisions of section 25(1), make any one or more of the following orders, that is to say-

(a)an order that either party to the marriage shall make to the other such periodical payments and for such term as may be specified in the order;

((b)an order that either party to the marriage shall secure to the other to the satisfaction of the court, such periodical payments and for such term as may be so specified;

(c)an order that either party to the marriage shall pay to the other such lump sum or sums as may be so specified.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)(c), an order under this section that a party to a marriage shall pay a lump sum to the other party-

(a) may be made for the purpose of enabling that other party to  meet any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred by him or her in maintaining himself or herself or any child of the family before making an application for an order under this section;

(b) may provide for the payment of that sum by instalments of such amount as may be specified in the order and may require the payment of the instalments to be secured to the satisfaction of the court.“

18.  The governing principles in relation to the distribution of the family assets in dissolution of marriage are set out in section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192, (“section 7 factors”) which states as follows:

(1)It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 4, 6 or 6A in relation to a party to the marriage and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d)the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e)any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f)the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;

(g)in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.

19.  In the leading case of LKW v DD[1] the Court of Final Appeal sets out 4 principles as to how section 7 shall be approached, which are stated as follows:

a.   The first is that the implicit objective of a section 7 exercise is to arrive at a distribution of assets which is fair as between the parties[2];

b.   The second is that the concept of fairness requires the refutation of any gender or role discrimination[3];

c.   The third principle is that, with a view to eliminating insidious discrimination and promoting fairness, judges should check their tentative views on distribution against a “yardstick of equal division” which should be departed from only for good, articulated reasons[4];

d.   The fourth principle is that the court should not countenance any attempt to engage in costly and often futile retrospective investigations of the failed marriage which tend to deplete the parties’ (and the courts’) resources and to increase antagonism and discourage settlement[5]. 

20.  The Court of Final Appeal went further to lay down 5 steps as to how the Court should do when exercising section 7 as follows:

a.   The first step in the exercise is to ascertain the financial resources of each of the parties calculated as at the date of the hearing[6];

b.   The next step is for the court to assess the parties’ financial needs[7];

c.   If surplus assets would remain after the parties’ needs have been catered for, the next step in the exercise should generally be for the court to apply the sharing principle to the parties’ total assets, leaving the “needs” question previously considered to be dealt with under that principle[8];

d.   The fourth step therefore involves considering whether good reasons exist for departing from the principle of equal division[9];

e.   When deciding the outcome, the court is not bound to depart from equality in the division of the parties’ assets even if one or more of the factors considered are engaged on the facts.  The weight to be given to such considerations is a matter of discretion for the court[10]

The five (5) Issues

Issue (a) - The sum of $600,000 received by the Wife

21.  It is undisputed that the Wife had received a sum of $600,000 from her father around 2007.  The Wife’s case is that such sum was placed with her on trust for her father for investment in the stock market.  All the moneys were lost by 2008/2009 in the stock market.

22.  The Wife’s case on this issue had not been challenged by the Husband’s lawyers.  According to the records of hearing, not a single question was put by Mr. Eric C.K. So, who represented the Husband at trial, to the Wife’s father during cross examination to discredit the Wife’s case of the sum of HK$600,000.  In Mr. So’s written Closing Submission, there is no submission either as to why no such question was put to the Wife’s father.

23.  In the absence of any contradictory evidence or challenge, I find for the Wife that the sum of HK$600,000 was money held on trust for her father and therefore did not fall within the pool of family assets for distribution.

Issue (b) – What has been and is the income of the Husband ?

24.  The Husband’s evidence is that prior to 2009 he was engaged in different businesses including trading in electrical goods and piece goods wholesale in Mainland China, also in the business of selling the so-called ‘twisted- eggs’ and some electronic games in Hong Kong.  On 1st March 2009, he was employed by a Macanese company by the name Kyle Support & Adm Software Overseas Limited (‘Kyle’) as a ritual attendant/marketing consultant.  His role and job duties with Kyle were to arrange hotels, ferry tickets and catering for customers (either from Mainland China or Hong Kong) who were interested to travel to and gamble in Macau.  His salary was allegedly $50,000 at the beginning but was reduced to $30,000 around September 2010.  The Husband’s case is that since the source of income was earned outside Hong Kong, he was not required to report his salary for tax purposes in Hong Kong and thus could not produce any official proof of income. The only documentary evidence available, insofar as his employment and income is concerned, is a letter issued by Kyle dated 27/9/2010 (at Trial Bundle TB - 1470).

25.  Eventually, Kyle closed down in October 2010 and he remained unemployed until 2011 when he returned to the same line of business as Kyle with some of his friends.  No company had ever been formed or his business activities been registered up until now.  His present level of income allegedly was variable between $20,000 and $30,000 per month.  There is also no documentary evidence or tax return to support such alleged income of the Husband.

26.  Under cross examination, the Husband stated that he had had no other business since he was employed by Kyle.  At one stage he was involved, only on a temporary and short term part time basis, in sales activities for a printing company and a security equipment company but both of which did not yield any income to him.

27.  Counsel Mr. Wong for the Wife submitted that the only piece of documentary evidence of Kyle adduced by the Husband cannot be conclusive proof of his income.  Reference was then made to the records of the personal bank accounts of the Husband.  There are numerous entries of transactions where different sums of moneys were deposited and withdrawn, some of which were of large amount.  There were transactions running up to $400,000 and also one transaction of about 1 million of which the Husband, in his evidence, explained that it was a loan to Kyle for payment to the casino in Macau.  This incident arose out of a ‘miscount’ of bank notes and he had to seek his brother’s assistance for a loan of $400,000.  The Husband deposed that those transactions appeared in his personal bank account were either payments received from or paid to his customers or received from or paid to the casinos.  Those were not his income.

28.  The Wife in her 4th Affirmation stated that before the separation, she believed the Husband’s monthly income was already not less than $100,000.  She deposed that the household expenses in the few years before separation was about $60,000.  By that time the Husband was paying her a monthly maintenance of $15,000 and that the Husband himself was spending about $20,000 a month.  All these sums, say, $60,000 plus $15,000 and $20,000 added together was close to $100,000.  Moreover, the Husband would go to Macau every Thursday for some meetings and would also be receiving a fixed sum of $50,000 as remuneration.

29.  According to the documents produced by the Husband, for the years between 2008, 2009 and 2010 a total sum of $817,420 was paid by the Husband either into the Wife’s father’s bank account or the joint name account of the Wife and her father.  For the breakdown, a total sum of $125,420 was paid in 2008, another total sum of $329,700 was paid in 2009 and a further total sum of $362,300 was paid in 2010 (see paragraph 16(1) of the Wife’s 4th Affirmation). 

30.  The Husband also received a sum of $231,900 from his Macau business between 2008 and 2010 (see paragraph 16(2) of the Wife’s 4th Affirmation).

31.  Besides, there are other sources of income from his business of sale of twisted-eggs, electronic games and computer products which was revealed by the Husband’s documents or his answers to questionnaires adding up to $1,374,342 between the years 2008 and 2010 (see paragraph 16(3) of the Wife’s 4th Affirmation).

32.  The Wife in her 10th Affirmation deposed that her younger brother had once worked for the Husband in Mainland China for a few years.  This was confirmed by the Wife’s father’s testimony in Court and in his affirmation filed on 19 March 2012.  Such fact was not disputed by the Husband.

33.  The Wife in her 10th Affirmation produced as an exhibit marked “TKW-18” which is a list (at Trial Bundle TB - 552) obtained by the Wife’s younger brother from his ICBC Bank account No.6222xxxxx004050xxxx showing the following sums were transferred to a bank account at the Zhu Hai branch of the Agricultural Bank of China (“ABC”) No. 6228xxxxx003725xxxx with the Husband’s sole name as account holder. This ABC bank account had never been disclosed by the Husband.   

Date of transferAmount (RMB)
2nd March 201170000000
23rd March 201150000000
10th May 201120000000
10th June 20117174000
6th July 201111000000
158174000

34.  Besides, within the same exhibit, there was an outgoing entry of transfer from the Husband’s ABC bank account to the Wife’s younger brother’s ICBC Bank account in the sum of RMB 2000000 on 26th July 2011.

35.  The Wife in her 12th Affirmation produced as an exhibit marked “TKW-24” (at Trial Bundle TB – pages 1283 to 1294) documents received from the Zhu Hai branch of the Agricultural Bank of China which consists of details of breakdown of entries for the Husband’s ABC Bank account.  Upon checking and comparing the figures in this exhibit with Exhibit marked “TKW-18”, it can be seen that the amount of those transactions which appeared in exhibit “TKW-18” should in fact read as follows :-

Date of transferAmount (RMB)
2nd March 2011700,000.00 (at page 1283)
23rd March 2011500,000.00 (at page 1285)
10th May 2011200,000.00 (at page 1285)
10th June 201171,740.00 (at page 1286)
6th July 2011
1,581,740.00110,000.00 (at page 1286)

36.  Thus, the exact amount transferred by the Wife’s younger brother to the Husband as per the 5 transactions appeared in exhibit “TKW-18” should be RMB 1,581,740 instead of RMB 158,174,000 (that is to say, with the decimals included).  Applying an exchange rate of, say, RMB 1 to HK$1.20, this is equivalent to HK$1,898,088. 

37.  Putting all these together, the Wife believed the Husband has undisclosed bank account where there were substantial sums of monetary transactions which call for full explanation.  The Wife deposed that she believed the then monthly income of the Husband between 2009 and 2011 was in the region of $100,000 or above.

38.  The Husband in reply said over the years he had been relying upon his personal savings and also the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home in 2006, the proceeds of sale of his securities investment and proceeds of sale of those remaining stock-in-trade of twisted-eggs to make up the monthly shortfall between income and expenses.  This can be seen from his Form E filed on 4th October 2010 where his reduced monthly salary income from Kyle of $30,000 was not sufficient to cover his then monthly expenses of $45,724.83 (at Trial Bundle TB – 157 to 180).  The Husband maintained his monthly income had never exceeded $50,000 in the past years.

39.  In reply to those transactions revealed in the ABC bank account, the Husband in his oral testimony stated he had no idea of having that account.  He claimed that he had lost his China Return Permit (回鄉咭) at one time and wondered whether the ABC bank account was opened by someone using his lost China Return Permit (回鄉咭).  Although he said he had made a report to the Chinese Authorities about the lost of his China Return Permit (回鄉咭), no proof of such report was produced to this Court.  He could say no more than that as to the existence of the ABC Bank account with his name as the account holder. 

40.  Counsel Mr. Wong for the Wife in his written Closing Submission invited the Court to draw inference of the Husband’s income by considering the Husband’s expenses level and the surrounding circumstances, namely, those numerous transactions adding up to large sum of moneys over the years in and out of the Husband’s personal bank account of which no satisfactory explanation could be provided.  Had the Husband been telling the truth, why would those moneys allegedly belonging to Kyle or Kyle’s customers would have gone through the account of Kyle’s employee (namely, the Husband’s) personal bank account and not the company account of Kyle ?  There is no reliable evidence, documentary or otherwise, to support the Husband’s explanation except his own bare allegation.  Likewise, there is also no evidence to show his level of income since he set up his business activities of ritual attendant (similar to that of Kyle’s business after Kyle closed down) from 2011 until now is between $20,000 and $30,000.  Again this is no more than his bare allegation.

41.  Upon detailed consideration of the evidence available, I accept those bank transactions adding up to substantial sum of moneys in and out of the Husband’s personal bank account does attract scepticism which warrant full explanation by cogent evidence rather than by bare allegation.  The Husband’s ‘explanation’, if I may so call it, is unbelievable and not being accepted. 

42.  With the benefit of legal advice and assistance, there is no challenge by the Husband as to the contents and authenticity of Exhibits “TKW-18” and “TKW-24” produced by the Wife, namely, the records of money transfer between the Wife’s younger brother and the Husband and the breakdown of entries of transactions of the ABC Bank account. The Husband had not arranged the younger brother of the Wife to give evidence to discredit the Wife’s case against him on Exhibit “TKW-18” and “TKW-24”.

43.  Under cross examination in the morning of the last day of trial (that is, 23rd April 2014), the Husband agreed to Exhibit “TKW-24” was obtained by the Wife’s lawyers on the strength of a written authorisation to the ABC Bank signed by him.  He deposed that the ABC Bank refused his request to cancel the account and get the money back.  The reason given by the ABC Bank was that there was 1 digit difference in the numbers of his China Return Permit (回鄉咭) and the bank records of the same document.  He further requested to get back the money in the account but was also refused for the reason that he did not possess the bank card.  The Husband then explained to the Court that for replacement of the China Return Permit (回鄉咭), the last digit number would be increased by 1.

44.  Question was then put by Counsel Mr. Wong to the Husband as to why he wanted to get the money back since he claimed the account was not his, he had no knowledge how this account came about, no operation of it and the money in there not belonged to him ?  The Husband answered that he wanted to get the money back because he did not open the account and want to cancel it !

45.  Upon analysis, the Husband’s explanation as to the existence of the ABC Bank account is totally unbelievable and defies all common sense.  If the ABC Bank account was opened by somebody who had picked his lost China Return Permit (回鄉咭), as the Husband so alleged or suspected, how would that person be able to sign a specimen signature same as the Husband’s signature in the authorisation letter which authorized the Bank to release the documents as per Exhibit “TKW-24” to the Wife’s lawyers ? There is no specimen signature anywhere in the China Return Permit (回鄉咭) which facilitate that person who had picked the lost China Return Permit (回鄉咭) the chance to try to forge the signature of the holder.  Further, the Husband’s evidence that he wanted to get the money back also suggested that the account is, on balance of probabilities, his account.  If he was not the account holder and had no idea of such account whatsoever, how could and why would he want to get the money out of the account which belongs to others ? 

46.  Accordingly, I find as a fact that the name of YYK (in the same Chinese characters as that of the Husband) recorded in Exhibit “TKW-18” is actually the Husband and not any other third party with the same name and family name.  I also find whatever moneys standing in credit within the ABC Bank account, in the absence of any contrary evidence, belongs to the Husband.    

47.  For the above reasons, I find on balance of all probabilities that there are undisclosed monetary entries of bank transactions by the Husband.  As rightly submitted by Counsel Mr. Wong, this is a case of material non disclosure of which adverse inference could readily be drawn to the Wife’s favour (see H v. W, K & B (HCMC No.8 of 2008) where Madam Justice Au-Yeung citing the judgment of Lam J (as he then was) at paragraphs 197 to 199 in L v. L (HCMC No.1 of 2003)).  The standard of proof required to infer the existence and amount of assets which a spouse declines to reveal to the court should be the balance of probabilities (per paragraph 50 of her Ladyship’s judgment in H v. W, K & B, supra).

48.  In the English case of NG v. SG [2012] 1 FLR 1211 where Mostyn J at paragraph 16 of the Judgment sets out a list of factors to be considered in circumstances where the court is satisfied that a party’s disclosure has been materially deficient.  The factors are :-

“(a) The court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden.

(b) But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, the court is satisfied he has not got.

(c) If the court concludes that funds have been hidden then it should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those funds, even in the broadest terms.

(d) In making its judgment as to quantification the court will first look to direct evidence such as documentation and observations made by the other party.

(e) The court will then look to the scale of business activities and at lifestyle.

(f) Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third parties is inadmissible in the exercise.

(g) The Al-Khatib v. Masry technique of concluding that the non-discloser must have assets of at least twice what the claimant is seeking should not be used as the sole metric of quantification.

(h) The court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told.  If the result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better than that the court should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the claimant.”

49.  The question which follows next is quantification, namely, what is the present level of income of the Husband and what is the likely amount of hidden funds or assets (see NG v. SG, supra). 

50.  Taking into account of all the evidence available, I accept the Wife’s case that the Husband’s disclosed income of $20,000 to $30,000 per month at present does not reflect his actual earnings.  I do not accept the letter issued by Kyle dated 27/9/2010 (at Trial Bundle TB - 1470) as sufficient proof of his present income.  Applying factors (c), (d) and (e) set out in the case of NG v. SG supra, I am entitled to draw adverse inference on the Husband’s present level of income by looking at historical monetary transactions.  I find the Husband’s present income by adverse inference remain in the region of $50,000 per month.

51.  As regards the likely amount of his assets, I find the moneys as revealed by Exhibit “TKW-18” in the currency of renminbi in credit in the Husband’s ABC Account of RMB 158,174,000 or, say, HK$1,898,088 to be the hidden assets.    

Issue (c) – Businesses owned fully and partly by Husband, income derived, share of

net assets etc

52.  I accept Counsel’s submission that since the Husband had not fully disclosed his assets, this issue could not be resolved or there being any further grounds upon which inference could be readily drawn upon.

Issue (d) – Any other assets of the Husband; accuracy of his Form E

53.  Likewise, I also agree with Counsel Mr. Wong that this issue could not be resolved or there being any further grounds upon which inference, adverse or otherwise, could readily be drawn upon by reason of the Husband’s material non disclosure as found by this Court.

Issue (e) – Does the Husband have any beneficial interest in Property B ?

54.  Counsel Mr. Wong fairly conceded that the only evidence of Husband having a beneficial interest in Property B is limited to the evidence of the Wife by way of her oral testimonies and affirmations.  This Court is, however, invited to compare the credentials and evidence of the parties.

55.  In my decision, the Wife is unable to come up with cogent and sufficient evidence to prove the Husband having a beneficial interest in Property B.  The documents produced by the Husband’s brother on this issue do not support the Wife’s case either.

Other Issues

(a)  The cash sum of $400,000

56.  Apart from the Joint Statement of Issues, it is the Husband’s case that a cash sum of $400,000 was given by him to the Wife on 11th September 2006 out of the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home.  According to the records of hearing on the 3rd day of trial (that is, 24 October 2013) between 12:24 pm to 12:29 pm, Mr. So in his cross examination challenged the Wife of not having denied in any of her Affirmations after the Husband had deposed in his 1st Affirmation that he had given her such sum of money.  The answer given by the Wife there and then was that it was impossible that the Husband had given her $400,000.  She was only aware of this sum of $400,000 from these proceedings.  Counsel Mr. Wong also objected the appropriateness of Mr. So’s question on 2 grounds.  Firstly, there is the doctrine of implied joinder.  Secondly, as a matter of law, silence cannot equate admission.

57.  Mr. So further attempted to ask the Wife whether she would agree to having received such sum of $400,000. This question was immediately objected to by Counsel Mr. Wong relying upon the rule of ‘finality of answers’ to questions in cross examination.  This objection was accepted by the Court.  The Wife was not required to answer this further question.  In such circumstances, I do not see how Mr. So could now said the following in his written Final Submission at paragraph 32 :-

“32. There has been no denial that the Respondent had received a sum of HK$400,000 from the Petitioner when the Petitioner sold Property A (please see ‘xxx 第一確認書’ at paragraph 8 on page 203 in Box 1). During cross examination the Petitioner reinstated that he had given such sum to the Respondent and there is no suggestion to the contrary. The question is, therefore, where did this sum of $400,000 go ?”

58.  The bank statement entry of withdrawal of $400,000 appeared at page 14 of Exhibit “YYK-2” (at Trial Bundle TB – page 1320) was recorded as ‘CW – Cash Withdrawal $400,000’.  Considering the amount being substantial, why would the Husband have to withdraw cash notes and not simply issuing a cheque or bank draft to the Wife if he was minded or decided to give such sum to her ?  According to the bank statement, he had a current account at that time.  Alternatively, the Husband could instruct the lawyers handling the property conveyance to split $400,000 out of the net proceeds of sale of $787,856.67 to the Wife rather than him withdrawing cash notes from the bank and give to the Wife.  It is noted that the net proceeds of sale of matrimonial home is $787,856.67 and in the form of a cheque deposit on 8 September 2006 (which is a Friday).  The cash withdrawal of $400,000 was on 11 September 2006 (that is 2 days later, the following Monday) apparently after the cheque of $787,856.67 was cleared.  I do not believe that the alleged withdrawal of $400,000 to the Wife was a decision formed over the weekend (that is, between the two days of 8th and 9th September 2006). There is also no evidence of there being any urgency for the Husband to have to withdraw cash notes to the Wife the following Monday soon after the cheque was cleared.  There is no evidence or explanation from the Husband either save and except himself alleged having paid the sum of $400,000 to the Wife.  Considering all the circumstances and on balance, I do not believe the Husband’s evidence that he had given $400,000 to the Wife.  On the contrary, I find the Wife’s evidence credible.  Apart from saying it was impossible for the Husband giving her $400,000, she also said if that was the case, the Husband would have transferred the money to her, the Wife then said she did not know why the Husband kept accusing her ! (我邊有可能收到佢40萬現金呀, 佢要俾佢都係過數俾我呀, 我完全都唔知lei個數目, 我都係依家先知道lei 40萬, 係咁冤枉我做咩野, 我都唔明 !)

59.  I wish to add that since it is the Husband’s case that he had given $400,000 to the Wife, it is for him to prove by evidence on balance of probabilities the truth of it rather than, as what Mr. Eric C.K. So for the Husband attempted, to rely upon the Wife’s ‘non denial’ or any ‘implied admission’, so to speak.  

60.  For the reasons above, I find against the Husband.  He had not given $400,000 to the Wife out of the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home of $787,856.67.  He had kept the entire proceeds of sale to himself.

(b)  The missing jewelleries

61.  The other contention is that the Wife had, as revealed by her credit card statement with Aeon Credit Service (Asia) Co. Ltd (at Trial Bundle TB – page 72) spent $60,738 in the month of July 2010 for purchase of jewelleries which are luxuries but had not been accounted for in her evidence or their whereabouts disclosed (at Trial Bundle TB – pages 71 to 72).  The Husband submitted that the Wife had incurred heavy debts and loans on purchase of other luxuries such as handbags of which debts were all repaid by the Husband.  This had caused the Husband have to ‘control’ the Wife’s money spending by making those maintenance to the Wife indirectly through her father. 

62.  The Husband’s solicitor, Mr. Eric C.K. So, submitted a letter to this Court after the filing of his written Closing Submission to seek indulgence of the Court for replacement of paragraph 29 of his written Closing Submission.  This letter was copied to the Wife’s solicitors.  The gist of the replacement is to question the Wife how could she afford to buy jewelleries of $60,738 in July 2010 when allegedly she was only having a monthly income of $6,340 ?

63.  It is obvious the jewelleries were purchased and paid by way of the credit card of the Wife, namely, with Aeon Credit Service (Asia) Co. Ltd.  The Wife explained those spending happened after she had taken medication for her psychiatric illness. Those spending had not been repeated.  There was an entry of debt and liabilities at Item 2.13 of the Wife’s Form E owing to the same credit card company a sum of $66,487.02 (as at 16/9/2010).  The amount spent and the time of spending in the jewelleries purchase matched with each other.  The Husband’s queries had been fully answered.

64.  Regarding the whereabouts of the jewelleries purchased in July 2010, it is noted that at Item 2.10 of the Wife’s Form E dated 30 September 2010, there was 1 pair of diamond ear ring worth $30,000 but pawned for $20,000.  The Wife’s evidence is that the Husband stopped paying her maintenance since July 2010.  She had to borrow money from friends and utilize funds obtained through credit card to maintain a living (see Item 5.1 of her Form E).  Accordingly and on balance of probabilities, I find for the Wife that the jewelleries purchased were sold for her living expenses.  I noted the difference in amount as to the diamond ear ring and the amount of the jewelleries purchase.  Bearing in mind the Wife’s explanation for the purchase was because of medication she took, I am prepared to accept there might possibly be some other jewelleries which the Wife had disposed of but not being able to recall with precision and state in her Form E. 

(c)   Any maintenance payment to the Wife ?

65.  Under cross examination, the Wife disagreed the Husband had paid her maintenance through her father since July 2010.  She maintained that before the separation the Husband would pay maintenance of $15,000 per month directly to her.

66.  The Wife’s father in his testimony adopted the contents of his Affirmation as evidence in chief.  Under cross examination, he denied having any knowledge about the Husband making payments into his bank account between the years 2008 and 2010.  He himself had not retrieved any single dollar from the sum of $817,420 deposited by the Husband. Upon recollection, between the years 2008 and 2010 he had, and still has, a bank account with HSBC and a bank card through which withdrawals can be made in Hong Kong or Mainland China.  Since the Wife’s younger brother (that is, his younger son) worked for the Husband during those years and would be receiving salary, the younger son had asked for the bank card in order for him to receive his salary from the Husband, whether in Hong Kong or Mainland China.  This part of his testimony had not been discredited by Mr. Eric C.K. So through cross examination.  Upon Re-examination, he deposed the Husband had not told him before or after the divorce that money had been deposited into his bank account for his use and also for his daughter (that is, the Wife).  Such evidence supports the case that the Husband deposited moneys into the Wife’s father was for payment to the Wife’s younger brother.  Given careful consideration and assessment of his testimonies, I find him credible and accept his evidence more probable than not to be the truth of the case. 

67.  On this issue, I find the Husband had not paid maintenance to the Wife through the Wife’s father’s bank account as he so alleged. 

(d)  Disclosure of HSBC bank account and BOC securities account

68.  The next contention of the Husband is that the Wife had not disclosed that she possessed a bank account with HSBC and also a securities account with the Bank of China (“BOC”).  There was a credit balance of $132,306.74 as at 8th December 2007 with the HSBC bank account which went unexplained.  There was a credit balance of $683 as at 18th April 2008 with the securities account of Bank of China which also went unexplained. 

69.  The contention of $600,000 held by the Wife had been found to be moneys held on trust for her father for stock investment.  Thus, the securities account at Bank of China where those investments for the father were made had not been disclosed would not have any significant ramifications upon the parties’ respective claims against each other.  The credit balance of $683 would not fall into the pool of family assets for distribution.

70.  As can be seen in the Wife’s bank statement with HSBC which the Husband produced as his Exhibit “YYK-1” (at Trial Bundle TB – page 1302), the credit balance of $132,306.74 was placed under the description of ‘Total Balance in Investment Services’ of an earlier entry of $132,051.90.  Accordingly and likewise, such credit balance also would not form part of the pool of family assets for distribution.

The Parties’ Form Es

71.  Both parties filed their Form Es back in October 2010.  They were given the time and chance to update their latest financial situation and expenses by oral testimonies during trial.

(a)The Wife’s present expenses

72.  At paragraph 4 of the Wife’s 4th Affirmation filed on 17/2/2012 (at Trial Bundle TB – page 106), she deposed as follows :

“在2010年12月離開父親自住後港幣
每月只能維持糊口生活之支出(直到現時)
租金$ 2,700
早、午、晚三餐$ 1,500
電視及寬頻$ 380
手提電話費$ 300
藥費$ 200
門診費$ 480
交通費$ 200
電費$ 100
個人儀容開支$ 300
其他$ 180
總共 : $6,340”

73.  During cross examination by Mr. So, the Wife updated paragraph 4 of her 4th Affirmation on the monthly expenses as follows :-

“港幣
租金 $ 將增至$4,000
早、午、晚三餐$ 3,000
電視及寬頻$ 0 (沒有寬頻)
手提電話費 $ 300
藥費$ 約 $1,500
門診費$ 180
交通費$ 200
電費$ 500
個人儀容開支$ 500
其他$ 180
總共 : $10,360”

74.  Further, during cross examination, the Wife was referred to paragraph 6 of her 4th Affirmation on the items there under and testified that the latest figures should be as follows :-

“比較合理每月生活支出 (以個人計算)港幣
租金$ 4,000
早、午、晚三餐$ 3,000
差餉、水、電、煤$ 700
家中用品支出$ 1,000
交通費$ 500
衣服$ 2,000
醫藥費用$ 1,500
個人支出$ 1,000
個人消遣
總共 : $ 14,200”

75.  The Wife is a psychiatric patient and is not able to find or hold a job.  She is financially depending upon the maintenance pending suit of $5,000 per month from the Husband and a monthly disability allowance of $1,540 from the Government.  However, due to the Legal Aid First Charge, $200 was deducted from the $5,000 maintenance pending suit so she is only receiving $6,340 (that is, $5,000 - $200 + $1,540) a month.  The Wife has no other source of income.

76.  According to the bank records and statements produced, the Wife has no major financial assets save and except two insurance policies with Manulife (at Item 2.8 of Form E), one of which attached with a policy loan.  The net total value as at May 2010 was around $3,580.57.

(b)The Husband’s present position

77.  During his evidence in chief, the Husband was referred to his Form E and provided the updates, adopting the item numbers of the Form E, as follows :-

“Item 2.3 : The same bank accounts were there with balances :-

“HSBC (Savings) No.558-xxxxxx-833$ 29,000 (approx)
Hang Seng Bank (Savings)
 No.348-xxxxxx-668
$ 1,000 (approx)
Standard Chartered 320xxxxx238$ 10 (approx)
Standard Chartered 321xxxxx985$ 1,400 (approx)
Standard Chartered 337xxxxx004
 (RMB currency)
cancelled $
$ 31,410 (approx)

Item 2.8 : The Insurance Policy still there but unable to provide a value.

Item 2.13 : The amount of indebtedness has been reduced to about

$400,000.

Item 3.1 : The present average income is $30,000 a month, may be

slightly more but unstable.

Item 4.1 : General Expenses

Utilities (electricity, gas, rates,
 telephone & water)
$ 600
Food$ 5,000
Insurance premia $ 1,800
$ 7,400

Item 4.2 : Personal Expenses

Meals out of home $ 1,500
Transport$ 1,800
Clothing/Shoes$ 200
Personal Grooming$ 100
Entertainment/presents$ 300
$ 3,900

Item 4.3 : Children’s Expenses

School Fees$ 6,440
Extra Tuition Fees$ 6,800
School books and stationery$ 130
Transport to school (including school bus)$ 1,000
Extra Curricular Activities$ 50
$14,420”

78.  The total amount of Husband’s monthly expenses is about $25,720 per month (including the child’s expenses).

Identification of Assets

79.  Counsel Mr. Wong for the Wife invited this Court to view the case in a broad brush approach. 

80.  Given the fact that the progress of this case at the pre-trial stage has been prolonged by the discovery process, the 6-day trial proper stretched over a year and the Court’s finding of hidden assets of the Husband in respect of which the quantity and exact amount could only be determined by adverse inference, I am prepared to consider Mr. Wong’s submission whilst applying the established principles laid down in the leading case of LKW v. DD (supra) and considering the section 7 factors.  I have reminded myself that in any event the ultimate aim is to achieve fairness to the parties.

81.  As found by this Court, the Husband’s undisclosed assets are $1,898,088 (see paragraph 51 above).  The disclosed assets at trial added up to $31,410 (see paragraph 77 above).  In addition, there are the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home which the Husband confirmed at paragraph 7 of his 1st Affirmation (at page 14 of Exhibit “YYK-2” at Trial Bundle TB – page 1320) was $787,856.67. 

82.  The alleged indebtedness of $400,000 by the Husband to his elder brother was not supported by evidence both as to the existence and the cause of it.  This amount would not be considered in the computation process.

83.  The Husband also possessed one insurance policy of which no updated value was produced at trial.  The Wife’s two insurance policies were valued at $3,580.57 in her Form E back in May 2010 (one of which attached with a loan) of which also no updated value was produced at trial.  In the absence of documentary evidence, I decided not to put into the computation process the values of both parties’ respective insurance policies.

84.  The Wife has no assets and was so found by the Court.  The Wife’s indebtedness to Aeon Credit Service (Asia) Co. Ltd. would be excluded from the computation process for two reasons. First, such indebtedness was accepted and found by the Court to have arisen from purchase of jewelleries of which the Wife had utilised for her living expenses due to lack of maintenance from the Husband.  To take into account such liabilities when computing the total pool of matrimonial assets may pose unfairness to the Husband since the lack of maintenance would have to be considered under those section 7 factors, such as ‘conduct of the parties’, ‘responsibilities’ or ‘contributions’ etc.  Secondly, there is also no updated documentary evidence as to the latest amount of this indebtedness at trial.

85.  The total capital assets (both disclosed and undisclosed) of the Husband is therefore $2,717,354.67 (that is $1,898,088 + $31,410 + $787,856.67) or, say, round up to $2,718,000 for easy calculation. 

86.  In my decision, this is also the total amount of family assets since the Wife has no capital assets.

Assessing the parties’ financial needs

87.  The next step is for the Court to assess the parties’ financial needs.

Income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources

88.  As found by this Court, the Husband’s present level of income remain in the region of $50,000 a month (see paragraph 50 above).  On all the evidence considered objectively, the Husband is believed and so found by the Court to possess high earning capacity. Over the years he has been able to handle and manage business activities of unrelated nature both inshore and offshore, namely, Hong Kong and Macau.  He has been the sole bread winner since marriage.  There are no debts incurred notwithstanding that he claimed not being able to make ends meet each month without recourse to his savings.  His alleged indebtedness of $400,000 to his elder brother had not been accepted by this Court.

89.  Again as found by this Court, the Husband possessed capital assets which he had not fully disclosed.  Taking into consideration the amount and frequency of monetary transactions and turnover in his bank accounts and his ‘explanation’, it is probable that the amount of assets so found and determined by adverse inference might be just ‘the tip of an iceberg’.

90.  The Wife has no earning income.  She has been a housewife and depended entirely on the Husband financially. At present, she has no earning capacity and living upon the Husband’s maintenance pending suit of $5,000 per month (undertook by the Husband and embodied in an Order of this Court in October 2010).  She is also receiving a disability allowance of $1,540 each month.

Financial needs, obligations and responsibilities etc

91.  The child of the family whose custody, care and control rests with the Husband.  It is agreed that the child is suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (過度活躍症) (“ADHD”).  At present, the child is at the age of 15.  No evidence was adduced by the Husband as to any extra financial needs of the child for the ADHD except those usual monthly expenditure items in the Form E.  The Husband has no physical or health problems requiring extra financial needs.

92.  On the other hand, the financial needs of the Wife are wanting, both in terms of her mental health treatment and usual monthly expenditures. 

93.  In the medical report by Dr. Benjamin Lai (specialist in psychiatry) dated 6 October 2010 (at Trial Bundle – page 1776), the Wife was diagnosed suffering from depressive illness associated with anxiety, obsessional symptoms, and suicidal behaviour and require medical treatment.  She was also found to be under stress of relationship problem with her Husband.  In another Psychiatric Report by Dr. Lee Hou Tao, Louis, of Department of Psychiatry, NTEC dated 16 November 2010 (at Trial Bundle TB – page 1779), it was recommended that she should continue with her psychiatric follow-up.  In a further medical report by Dr. K.L. Wong of Castle Peak Hospital dated 30 December 2011, she was also diagnosed to have Bipolar Affective Disorder.  Her condition had been fluctuating and was given mood-stabilizing agent, antipsychotic, anxiolytic and hypnotics.  Further follow up session was also arranged for her.

94.  In the latest medical report by Dr. Greg Mak of Castle Peak Hospital dated 12 July 2013, of which I recite the following important passages :-

“She has been suffering from sleeping difficulties and mood disorder since 2004, which was precipitated by the chronic marital discord since then. She used to follow up in private psychiatrist on medications. In August 2009, she had overdosed herself by consuming softener after a heated quarrel with her husband who did not let her to take care of her son. She has been admitted to the psychiatric unit in Shatin Hospital for 3 days. She then continued her follow-up in private after discharge. In early 2010, she drove a car to the hillside and she was then admitted to the United Christian Hospital. Since then she was followed up at the psychiatric clinic in the Prince of Wales Hospital and was later transferred to Castle Peak Hospital for further care due to geographic reason. She was diagnosed to have Bipolar Affective Disorder type II and Borderline Personality Disorder. She was given medications including mood stabilizers and hypnotics. Psychological treatment was also provided.

Her mental condition was largely settled in the past 2 years as she had good response to the drug regime. Yet there were still episode unstable emotions but they had identifiable precipitating factors e.g. provocation from her ex-husband who refused her seeing her sonand refused to pay her alimony (my emphasis). She felt very disturbed in mood whenever she had to deal with these two issues with her husband……….”

95.  It is thus plain and obvious that there are financial needs of the Wife both immediate and in the foreseeable future which the Court has to consider when deciding her financial claims.

Standard of living before breakdown of marriage

96.  As deposed by the Wife of which the Husband took no issue, the parties lived in a private residential flat in Shatin of an area around 700 sq. ft with clubhouse facilities.  There was the service of a foreign domestic helper.  There were 2 trips of travelling to South East Asia countries each year.  The standard of living is moderately good and above average.

Age of each party and duration of marriage

97.  At present, the Husband is aged 45 (born in 1970).  The Wife is aged 41 (born in 1974).  As at the date of the Decree Nisi in October 2010, the marriage had lasted for about 13 years. This can be said to be within the spectrum of long marriage.

Physical or Mental disability of either of the parties

98.  As said, only the Wife has mental disability.  The Husband is both physically and mentally sound.

Contribution made by each parties to the welfare of the family

99.  After marriage, the Wife has been a full time housewife and mother looking after the child of the family.  The Husband was the sole bread winner. 

100.  In my decision, the contribution of the parties to the welfare of the family was about the same.

Compensation

101.  The parties have no dispute on this factor.

Applying the sharing principle

102.  The pool of family assets as found by this Court are readily sufficient to go beyond to meet both parties’ financial needs.  Generally, the Court will decide that the sharing principle applies to the total assets, so that they should be divided equally between the parties unless there are good reasons for departing from the principle of equal division (see LKW v. DD, supra). 

103.  In my decision, the principle of equal division will also be applied to this case subject to departure as hereinafter stated. 

Consideration of any good reasons for departing from equal division

104.  The proper question to be asked is whether there are good and articulated reasons for departing from the ‘yardstick of equal division’ (see LKW v. DD, supra) ?

105.  On the facts of this case, I am inclined to provide a 10% departure from equal division in favour of the Wife.  The reasons for such departure are as follows :-

(a)there are material non disclosure by the Husband of his assets of which adverse inference had to be drawn, both in terms of his capital assets and monthly income; and

(b)the Wife, having no income or earning capacity since breakdown of the marriage and throughout these proceedings, had not been adequately maintained by the Husband.  The maintenance pending suit of $5,000 a month (1st payment on 1/11/2010 as per the Husband’s Undertaking embodied in the Order dated 25/10/2010) is insufficient to cover her basic needs and expenses.  Thus, the Wife has been actually suffering a financial loss since 1/11/2010 for over 4 years.

106.  I wish to add that the Court has already taken into full account and consideration of the Husband having to take care of and financially support the child of the family solely who is suffering from ADHD when arriving at such percentage of departure from equal division.

Deciding the Outcome

107.  Considering all the factual circumstances and the evidence, I find this is not a suitable case for a ‘clean break’ for the parties when deciding the Wife’s ancillary relief claims.  In my decision, justice and fairness dictate a lump sum award and a periodical payment order to be granted for the Wife’s ancillary relief claims.

108.  Applying the 60:40 ratio upon the total amount of family assets found by this Court, the Wife’s share of 60% is $1,627,200 (that is, $2,712,000 x 60%) which will be the lump sum award.

109.  Since the entirety of the family assets found by this Court is in the possession of the Husband, the lump sum award of $1,627,200 will have to be paid to the Wife (subject to Legal Aid First Charge) by the Husband.  Such payment to be made within 14 days from the date of the decree nisi granted on 6 October 2010 being made absolute.  It has been noted by the Court that the Wife in her Open Proposals had accepted lump sum to be payable by instalments.  However, in my decision, any lump sum by instalments order would have to be decided upon application by the Husband, if any in due course.  There is no basis of making any lump sum by instalments order.

110.  Since the Wife is the Respondent against whom the decree nisi was granted, I direct the Wife’s solicitors to file the appropriate application under Rule 65 (4) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A, for the decree nisi to be made absolute.

111.  For periodical payments, the Husband’s present income as found by the Court in the region of $50,000 a month.  The total expenses for the Husband and the child add up to around $25,720 a month (see paragraph 78 above).  There is a surplus of, say, around $24,280 a month (that is, $50,000 - $25,720).

112.  The Wife’s present expenses are around $14,200 per month (see paragraph 74 above). 

113.  This Court accepts the amount of monthly expenses claimed by the parties.  For easy calculation, the Husband’s monthly expenses would be rounded up to $26,000 and that of the Wife’s would be rounded up to $15,000. 

114.  In view of the fact that there would be a surplus from the Husband’s income of around $24,000 a month, I also order that there be monthly periodical payments of $15,000 (subject to Legal Aid First Charge) by the Husband to the Wife commencing 1 February 2015 until re-marriage of the Wife or the joint lives of the parties, whichever is the shorter.  Having made such payment, the Husband would still be left with a surplus of around $9,000 a month. 

115.  I have considered the Wife’s Open Proposals of the periodical payments to take into account the maintenance pending suit and whatever amount of difference to be back dated to July 2010 (that is, over 4 years ago).  I do not consider such mode of calculation is fair since the monthly expenses at present may differ from 4 years ago.  I believed the departure of 10% from equal sharing would have sufficiently compensated for whatever deficit the Wife is entitled to in terms of her periodical payments since July 2010.    

Maintenance for the Child of the family

116.  In light of the financial situation and health condition of the Wife, the Husband would have to continue solely maintaining the child of the family.  In any event, there is no cross application by the Husband for contribution to the child’s maintenance although any such application at this stage would be futile.

Costs

117.  Taking into account the outcome of this case and the latest Open Proposals of the Husband, the normal rule as to costs should apply.  Thus I order the Husband to pay all the costs of the Wife’s ancillary relief claims, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed on party and party basis.

118.  I also order the basis of the costs order dated 23 October 2013 to be on party and party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

119.  I also grant Certificate for Counsel for the ancillary reliefs trial and for the Costs Order dated 23 October 2013.

Orders

120.  I now make the following orders and directions on the Wife’s ancillary reliefs claim :

(1)Subject to the First Charge of the Director of Legal Aid, the Husband (Petitioner) do pay to the Wife (Respondent) the following ancillary reliefs : -

(a) Lump sum of $1,627,200 within 14 days from the date of the decree nisi being made absolute; and

(b)Periodical Payments at the rate of $15,000 per month commencing 1st February 2015 and thereafter on or before the 1st day of each and every succeeding month until the re-marriage of the Wife (Respondent) or joint lives of the parties, whichever is the shorter.

(2)The Wife’s (Respondent’s) solicitors do issue a Summons under Rule 65 (4) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A within 14 days from the date of this Decision ;

(3)The Husband (Petitioner) do pay all the costs of the Wife (Respondent) ancillary reliefs claim including all costs reserved, to be taxed on party and party basis, if not agreed;

(4)The basis of costs as per the Costs Order dated 23 October 2013 to be on party and party basis, to be taxed if not agreed;

(5)There be Certificate for Counsel for the ancillary reliefs trial

and the Costs Order dated 23 October 2013;

(6)The Respondent’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations;

(7)There be liberty to apply for implementation of this Order.

121.  This costs order nisi will become absolute unless any party apply to vary the same within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

Section 18 declaration

122.  I also grant a declaration under Section 18(1)(b)(i) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192.

123.  Last but not least, I wish to express my gratitude to both parties’ legal representatives for their assistance in this case.

(George Own)
Deputy District Judge

Mr Eric C.K. So of Messrs. Ivan Tang & Co., Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr Timothy Y.H. Wong instructed by Messrs. Liu, Choi & Chan on the

instructions of the Director of Legal Aid, Solicitors for the Respondent


[1] FACV No. 16 of 2008

[2] At §§56

[3] At §§57

[4] At §§58-61

[5] At §§62-70

[6] At §§71-73

[7] At §§74-79

[8] At §§80-82

[9] At §§83-130

[10]At §§131-132