KO LAI KUEN v. LI TAK MING AND OTHERS

HCA 1731/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1731 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN
	KO LAI KUEN	Plaintiff
and
	LI TAK MING	1st Defendant
	MARKETING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (PACIFIC) LIMITED	2nd Defendant
	MILLENNIUM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LIMITED	3rd Defendant
____________

Before: Hon Chung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 6 June 2012

Date of Decision: 13 June 2012

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

Introduction

1.  This is the defendants’ application to set aside the judgment entered on 3 September 2011 in default of defence.

2.  The background leading to this application can be summarized as follows.

3.  It is common ground the plaintiff was a successful business lady, and the 1^st defendant (“Li”) was an experienced bullion trader and he introduced himself as such to the plaintiff.

4.  The plaintiff was introduced to Li in mid-April 2009.  She told Li she had no idea about investing in the bullion market.  Li on the other hand told her of his experience and track records in investment.

5.  They met again in September 2009 when the plaintiff indicated she was interested in investing in bullion through Li.  At this point the parties’ version of event diverge.

6.  Li claims that he introduced two investment plans to the plaintiff: a basic plan which was supposedly more conservative and a high risk plan which was more aggressive.  He says the plaintiff chose the high risk plan.

7.  On the other hand, the plaintiff says in September 2009 she still could not decide whether to invest in bullion.  Li kept boosting his expertise and previous successes in the matter.  A prospectus outlining the basic plan was given to the plaintiff by Li.

8.  Finally, in October 2009, the plaintiff signed several documents:

(a) 交易主約dated 7 October 2009 (translated as “the Investment Agreement (Chinese)” by the plaintiff and “the Master Trading Agreement” by the defendants);

(b) 補充協議 (undated) (“the Supplemental Agreement”);

(c) 居間合同 dated 7 October 2009 (“the Agency Agreement”).

9.  The net effect of the above documents was that the plaintiff authorized the 2^nd defendant (“Marketing Strategic Mgt”) to manage her fund of US$500,000.  Li claims that the authorization was for aggressive trading in bullion (which term would include gold and silver) whereas the plaintiff says she only authorized Li to make mid-term investment in bullion (judging from the contents of her 2^nd affirmation, she considered this to refer to gold only).

Issues in this application

10.  The parties’ dispute in this action, gathered from the contents of the statement of claim and the parties’ affirmations, is factual in nature.

11.  On the plaintiff’s part, she asserts in gist that:

(1)  the defendants would buy gold for her when its price fell below US$1,050 per ounce and sell the same when its price rose above US$1,200 (a price gain of US$150, or 14.286% above US$1,050);

(2)  the expected capital gain would be 25% within a short time;

(3)  the defendants would report to the plaintiff regularly and do so in any event if she should suffer a capital loss of 50% or more.

The plaintiff’s fund (US$500,000) was deposited with the 3^rd defendant (“Millennium”) in two respective sums on 9 October and 13 October 2009.

12.  On the defendants’ part, it is said that the plaintiff chose the high risk investment plan.  Her loss was caused by the subsequent unfavourable investment environment, and not the defendants’ fault. It is also the defence case Li has fully explained the investment risks to the plaintiff, and that she was kept abreast of the state of her investment account until its liquidation.

13.  According to the account statement attached to Li’s 4^th affirmation (exhibit “LTM-11”):

(a)  by 13 November 2009 (just over one month after the plaintiff’s deposits) about half of the plaintiff’s fund has already been lost in bullion trades conducted during the period;

(b)  the plaintiff’s capital was completely lost by 24 March 2010 (about 5 months after the plaintiff’s fund deposits) but for Millennium’s further deposits into the plaintiff’s trading account;

(c)   however, because of the defendants’ further deposits (totalling US$740,000), the plaintiff’s trading capital was not exhausted until 23 April 2010 (when the total loss suffered was about US$1.238 million in total);

(d)  in other words, bullion trading of the plaintiff’s account continued from 24 March to 23 April 2010 (a period of about one month) only because of Millennium’s fund injections.

14.  For the reasons set out below, I do not accept the defendants’ version of events to be believable.

15.  First, Li asserts in his 4^th affirmation:

“[on] or about 27^th or 28^th October 2009, I called the Plaintiff and told her that if the gold price fell further, we had to stop all trading. … ” (para 41 thereof).

Li has not explained why he would do so at the end of October 2009.  As stated above, the plaintiff’s capital was half lost only by mid-November 2009 (para 13(a) above).  In addition, for reasons not immediately apparent, instead of ceasing trading at any time before 24 March 2010, Millennium kept injecting funds into the plaintiff’s account since 29 October 2009.

16.  Secondly, also according to Li’s 4^th affirmation:

“… On 24^th March 2010, the Plaintiff went to the office of one of my associated company in Hangzhou. When I saw the Plaintiff, I gave her a detail statement of account and informed her that her investment had suffered a total loss. The Plaintiff then demanded that I should refund her US$500,000 on or before the 15^th of April 2010 and she further threatened me that if I did not sign a document stating that I agreed to pay her back the money she would use means to prevent me from leaving Hangzhou … For fear of my own safety I wrote out the Plaintiff’s demand and signed on it under duress and without my agreement … ” (para 47 and 48 thereof).

17.  The transaction details in the account statement (see para 13(a) to (d) above) do not support what Li told the plaintiff.

18.  It is not entirely accurate to say the plaintiff’s investment “had suffered a total loss” on 24 March 2010.  As stated above, trading could continue beyond 24 March 2010 (up to 23 April 2010) because of Millennium’s further deposits into the plaintiff’s trading account (see para 13(c) and (d) above).

19.  In other words, if the 24 March 2010 events were as deposed to by Li, he has not told the plaintiff the whole story in relation to her investment capital.

20.  Moreover, allegation of the written promise to refund the plaintiff’s capital having been obtained by threat (para 16 above) (which logically should have brought about an end to the plaintiff’s investment) is inconsistent with the trading activities in the plaintiff’s account afterwards.  If these reflect the defendants’ attempt to recoup their financial loss, this shows an extremely cavalier attitude on the defendants’ part with regard to the good practice of keeping client’s fund separately from their own.

21.  Apart from the above, Li’s assertion about offering the so-called basic investment plan would not have made any practical difference (whatever the precise terms of such plan were).  This is because as long as the plaintiff has authorized Marketing Strategic Mgt to trade in bullion on her behalf, precisely the same loss would still be incurred during the same period (9 October 2009 to 23 April 2010).

22.  In view of the above matters, I have grave doubt as to Li’s credibility with regard to the other parts of his 4^th affirmation.

Conclusion

23.  The guiding principles for the exercise of the court’s discretion in a setting aside default judgment application are trite. The defendants accept that they have the burden of showing a real prospect of success on the merits of their defence.

24.  Because I have rejected Li’s evidence for lack of credibility, the defendants have not been able to discharge the burden.

25.  Li also argues that it is the plaintiff’s own pleaded case the misrepresentations were those of Marketing Strategic Mgt and Millennium, and he was only their agent (para 10, statement of claim).  It is not the law an agent can never be held liable for tortuous act(s) he committed as an agent.  The factual context of this case shows that Li ought to be held liable as well.  After all, Li must have been the individual in whom the plaintiff reposed trust and it must have been Li’s words which led her to enter into the agreement to invest in bullion.

26.  Millennium also argues that the plaintiff has sued the wrong party: she has expressly pleaded that she was suing a Hong Kong company.  However, it can be seen from the Investment Agreement (Chinese) that the other contracting party was a BVI company.

27.  Several things should be noted in this connection:

(1)  the Hong Kong company and the BVI company have precisely the same name;

(2)  Li was a shareholder and director of both companies;

(3)  the plaintiff was directed by Li to, and she did, (i) sign the Investment Agreement (Chinese) with the BVI company, but (ii) deposit her fund into the Hong Kong company’s bank account.

28.  It can be inferred from the above that both companies were part of the same scheme devised by Li (either alone or with others) to entice the plaintiff (perhaps also other investors) to take part in the investment plan promoted by Li.  The judgment against Millennium cannot therefore be considered erroneous.

29.  For the above reasons, this application is dismissed.

Costs order nisi

30.  There is no apparent reason to depart from the usual rule that costs should follow the event.  There will accordingly be a costs order nisi pursuant to Ord 42 r 5B(6) that the costs of this application be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff.

31.  I consider summary assessment of costs to be appropriate.  The above costs shall thus be so assessed.  For this purpose:

(a)  the plaintiff be at liberty to lodge with court and serve a statement of costs within 7 days from today;

(b)  the defendants be at liberty to lodge with court and serve a statement of objections within 7 days thereafter.

(Andrew Chung) Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court

Mr Peter K C Wong, instructed by Chan, Wong & Lam, for the plaintiff

Mr Paul H M Leung, instructed by Yeong & Co, for the defendants

Please refer to CACV141/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

HCA1731/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1731 OF 2010

------------------------

BETWEEN
	KO LAI KUEN	Plaintiff
	and
	LI TAK MING	1st Defendant
	MARKETING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (PACIFIC) LIMITED	2nd Defendant
	MILLENNIUM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LIMITED	3rd Defendant
-------------------------

Before : Hon Suffiad J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 21 March 2011

Date of Decision : 16 May 2011

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DECISION

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1.  The defendant makes this application by Summons dated 30 December 2010 seeking to stay the present proceedings on the grounds :

(1) that the plaintiff is bound by an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Customer Agreement giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in the Republic of Indonesia to adjudicate all disputes arising from the Agreement; and

(2) that the courts in the Republic of Indonesia is the forum conveniens to deal with the present dispute. 

2.  The application is brought under Order 12 rule 8(1)(a), (1)(g), (2)(b) and (2A)(b) as well as the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 

Background

3.  The plaintiff came to know the 1^st defendant through a friend in the PRC in April 2009. 

4.  The 1^st defendant held himself out to the plaintiff as an experienced investor. 

5.  There were further meetings between the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant in September 2009 in the PRC and again in October 2009 in Hong Kong. 

6.  The 1^st defendant is a director of, controls, manages and operates the 2^nd and 3^rd defendant companies, both of which are BVI companies.  The 1^st defendant is also a director of, controls, manages and operates a Hong Kong company which has exactly the same name as the 3^rd defendant.

7.  Resulting from the discussions between the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant in those meetings, the plaintiff entered into a written Customer Agreement with the 3^rd defendant on 7 October 2009 (“the Customer Agreement”). 

8.  The plaintiff also entered into an Investment Agreement with the 1^st and 2^nd defendants on the same day (“the Investment Agreement”). 

9.  The Investment Agreement was partly oral and partly in writing.  In so far as it was oral, it was the plaintiff’s case that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants agreed to buy gold at US$1,050 per ounce on behalf of the plaintiff and to hold the gold for medium to long term until gold price reached US$1,500 per ounce whereupon the gold would be sold at a profit to the plaintiff.  The 1^st and 2^nd defendants also agreed to report to the plaintiff on her investment on a regular basis and in any event if her trading losses reached 50% or over of her overall investment.

10.  In so far as the Investment Agreement was in writing, it included a written Agency Agreement and a written supplemental Agreement both signed also on 7 October 2009. 

11.  Pursuant to the Customer Agreement and the Investment Agreement, the plaintiff had deposited into the 2^nd defendant’s bank account US$500,000 for investment purposes (“the Investment Sum”). 

12.  Firstly, the plaintiff now claims against all the defendants on the basis that the 1^st defendant had made certain representations to the plaintiff on each of the three occasions when they met in April, September and October 2009 to induce the plaintiff into entering the Customer Agreement and the Investment Agreement with the defendants but which representations were false.  The particulars as to the misrepresentation alleged by the plaintiff has been pleaded in the Statement of Claim.  For present purposes, it will not be necessary to repeat those particulars. 

13.  The plaintiff also claims against all the defendants for breach of the Customer Agreement and the Investment Agreement.  Again the particulars of the breaches alleged by the plaintiff have been pleaded in the Statement of Claim and it will not be necessary for present purposes to repeat in detail the alleged breaches. 

14.  The plaintiff also claims against the defendants for negligence in the handling of the investment for her.  Once again there is no need to go into the details of the negligence alleged against the defendants suffice to say that the particulars relating to the negligence claim have also been pleaded in the Statement of Claim. 

Whether exclusive jurisdiction clause

15.  In making this application, the first and primary ground relied on by the defendants is that there exist an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Customer Agreement whereby exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts in Indonesia to litigate all disputes arising from the Customer Agreement. 

16.  In this respects, the defendant rely on clause 11 of the Customer Agreement, the translation of which states :

“ GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION

11.1 This Agreement and each Contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Indonesia.

11.2 The Customer [i.e. plaintiff] irrevocably waives, to the fullest extent permitted by the applicable law, with respect to itself and its revenue and assets, all immunity on the grounds of sovereignty or other similar grounds from suit, jurisdiction of any court, relief by way of injunction order for specific performance or for recovery of property, attachment of its assets (whether before or after judgment) and executions or enforcement of any judgment to which it or its revenue or assets might otherwise be entitled in any legal proceedings in the courts of any jurisdiction and irrevocably agrees that it will not claim any such immunity.

11.3   The Customer irrevocably and unconditionally submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Indonesia to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, and hereby agrees that any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in connection with this Agreement may be brought in those courts.  Nothing in the foregoing shall however limit the Company [i.e.3^rd defendant].”

17.  In particular, the defendants rely on 11.3 to submit that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of Indonesia.  In so submitting, the defendants rely on the words “irrevocably and unconditionally submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Indonesia” and also the later words “hereby agrees that any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in connection with this Agreement may be brought in those courts”. 

18.  The defendants therefore say that a combination of those words relied on show clearly, on the proper construction of clause 11.3, that exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the courts of Indonesia. 

19.  I do not accept that submission by the defendants.  

20.  In determining whether a particular clause in a contract tantamounts to an exclusive jurisdiction clause is a matter of construction of the clause in question.  In this case that would be clause 11.3 of the Customer Agreement relied on by the defendants.  In construing the relevant clause, the wording of the particular clause is to be looked at and all discussions or negotiations between the parties leading up to the Customer Agreement is irrelevant and should be ignored. 

21.  It is also generally accepted that the word “exclusive” need not be used in an exclusive jurisdiction clause to make it such.  The test however, is whether the particular clause, when properly construed on its wording, obliges a plaintiff to bring the action in the relevant jurisdiction, in this case the courts of Indonesia. 

22.  On a proper construction of clause 11.3, I am of the view that all clause 11.3 says is that the plaintiff irrevocably and unconditionally submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Indonesia to settle any disputes arising from or in connection with the Customer Agreement.  The effect of that would be that if the 3^rd defendant chooses to bring litigation against the plaintiff in the courts of Indonesia on the Customer Agreement, then the plaintiff would not be able to dispute the jurisdiction of the Indonesian courts since the plaintiff has already submitted irrevocably and unconditionally to that jurisdiction by reason of clause 11.3. 

23.  However, the following words “may be brought in those courts”, being permissive, make it quite clear that exclusive jurisdiction is not conferred on the courts of Indonesia. 

24.  The last sentence in clause 11.3 where it says “Nothing in the foregoing shall however limit the Company” further amplifies the fact that the 3^rd defendant may litigate in some other jurisdiction other than the courts of Indonesia. 

25.  In my view, clause 11.3 is very limited in scope and it is limited to only where the plaintiff is being sued by the 3^rd defendant on the Customer Agreement in the Indonesian courts. 

26.  There is nothing in the wording of clause 11.3 which would oblige the plaintiff to bring or start litigation in the courts of Indonesia on the Customer Agreement. 

27.  In reaching this conclusion on the interpretation of the wording of clause 11.3, I have not lost sight of the fact that the applicable law to the Customer Agreement is Indonesian law and therefore clause 11.3 ought to be interpreted in accordance with Indonesian law.  However, the defendants have not adduced any evidence of Indonesian law relevant to the interpretation of clause 11.3.  In the circumstances, I must presume that Indonesian law as to interpretation is no different from Hong Kong law on the matter (see Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v Laser Media International Ltd HCA19408/1999 Hartmann J citing and applying the Parchim [1918] AC 157 at 161). 

28.  For these reasons I do not accept the submission of the defendants that clause 11.3 is an exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of Indonesia in respect of any dispute on the Customer Agreement. 

Forum conveniens

29.   Having come to the conclusion above that clause 11.3 of the Customer Agreement does not amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, I now turn to consider whether I should exercise my discretion to order a stay of proceedings on the second ground put forward by the defendants, namely, that the Indonesian courts, rather than the Hong Kong courts, is the forum conveniens. 

30.  Since the defendant has failed to establish an exclusive jurisdiction clause to the Customer Agreement, and it follows therefrom that jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts has been established as of right, the onus is upon the defendant to show that there should be granted a stay of proceedings in favour of some other jurisdiction. 

31.  The applicable test (see Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws 13^th ed. Vol. 1 para. 12-117) whether a court should or should not exercise its discretion to order a stay, is that the court should consider all the circumstances of the case, and to take into account the following particular matters :

(1) in which country the evidence is available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of a trial in England or abroad;

(2) whether the contract is governed by the law of the foreign country in question, and if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respect;

(3) with what country either party is connected, and how closely;

(4) whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in a foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages;

(5) whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because they would be deprived of security for their claim, or be unable to enforce the judgment in their favour, or be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England, or for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial. 

32.  In that respect, the defendants invite the following matters to be taken into account. 

33.  Firstly, the governing law of the Customer Agreement was expressly agreed to be Indonesian law.  It was submitted by the defendants that the Customer Agreement was so inextricably linked with the Investment Agreement as well as with the Agency Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement that they should all be looked at as part and parcel of the same agreement even though, strictly speaking, the parties are not the same. 

34.  Secondly, the defendant says that the acts of investment were not done solely in Hong Kong but by a team of traders and assistants located in Indonesia, Hong Kong, Thailand and Taiwan utilizing an internet platform. 

35.  Thirdly, it is said that the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants are BVI companies and a director of the 3^rd defendant is an Indonesian company called Victory Halm. 

36.  Fourthly, it is said that service upon the 1^st and 3^rd defendants could be effected within Indonesia if Indonesian proceedings are issued. 

37.  On the other hand, these matters highlighted by the defendants need to be weighed and balanced against the following factors. 

38.  Both the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant are permanent residents in Hong Kong with the 1^st defendant holding himself out to be an experienced investor in Hong Kong. 

39.  The representations, the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim in misrepresentation, were made in either Hong Kong or the PRC. 

40.  Negotiations and discussions leading up to the Customer Agreement and the Investment Agreement were conducted in Cantonese between the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant. 

41.  The 2^nd defendant, although a BVI company, has a place of business in Hong Kong. 

42.  The 1^st defendant is a shareholder and director of the 3^rd defendant, and although the 3^rd defendant is a BVI company, it has a business address, telephone and fax numbers in Hong Kong. 

43.  The Customer Agreement, the Investment Agreement, the Agency Agreement and the supplemental Agreement were all entered into in Hong Kong at the office of the 1^st defendant in Wanchai.  All the aforesaid agreements were written in simplified Chinese. 

44.  The Investment Sum was deposited by the plaintiff into the bank account of the 2^nd defendant in Hong Kong. 

45.  The plaintiff’s witnesses as well as the 1^st defendant are all Cantonese speakers which is likely the language in which the evidence will be given by them. 

46.  One of the witness to be called by the plaintiff is only prepared to come to Hong Kong to give evidence in this matter. 

47.  Given the above matters, it would appear that this case has a far greater and real connection with Hong Kong than with Indonesia.  The one real connection with Indonesia would be the fact that the Customer Agreement is to be governed by Indonesian law. 

48.  However, there are other matters which I need also to take into account before coming to a final decision whether or not my discretion should be exercised. 

49.  The plaintiff’s claim for breach of the Customer Agreement is put on the basis of breach of an implied term, namely, that it was an implied term of the Customer Agreement that the 3^rd defendant would report the investment activities and transactions of the Investment Account whenever such investment transactions were entered into by the 3^rd defendant on behalf of the plaintiff, but that the 3^rd defendant failed to do so and was therefore in breach of such implied term. 

50.  As already stated, there was no evidence produced to show what is the law in Indonesia on implied terms and whether such law would be different from Hong Kong law on the subject. 

51.  However, the issue as to implied terms is not an issue which has to be adjudicated here and now, but is a matter for trial.  If the trial takes place in Indonesia, the Indonesian courts will be able to apply Indonesian law.  If the trial takes place in Hong Kong, it is still possible for expert evidence as to what the Indonesian law is on the issue of implied terms to be adduced by the parties and for the Hong Kong courts then to apply that law. 

52.  On the other hand, one of the plaintiff’s claim is a claim for breach of section 108 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) in that the gold bullion trading proposed to the plaintiff by the 3^rd defendant comes within the definition of “regulated investment agreement” as defined in the Ordinance and that there has been a breach of section 108 of the Ordinance by the 3^rd defendant because section 108 of the Ordinance provides as follows :

“(1) Where a person makes any fraudulent misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation by which another person is induced-

(a) to enter into or offer to enter into-

(i) …

(ii) a regulated investment agreement;

…

the first-mentioned person shall, whether or not he also incurs any other liability (whether under this Part of otherwise), be liable to pay compensation by way of damages to the other person for any pecuniary loss that the other person has sustained as a result of the reliance by the other person on the misrepresentation.”

53.  The Ordinance defines “regulated investment agreement” as meaning “an agreement the purpose or effect, or pretended purpose or effect, of which is to provide, whether conditionally or unconditionally, to any party to the agreement a profit, income or other returns calculated by reference to changes in the value of any property, but does not include an interest in a collective investment scheme.”

54.  The plaintiff makes the point that this cause of action under section 108 of the Ordinance would require interpretation of Hong Kong law, namely the Ordinance, and for this to be litigated in Indonesia would require expert evidence on Hong Kong statutes and would lead to unnecessary expenses and inconvenience. 

55.  A further point taken by the plaintiff is that under the Foreign Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance, Indonesia is not listed in either Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 thereof, which means there is no reciprocal treatment in the enforcement of orders in Hong Kong of any order made or damages awarded in an Indonesian court against the defendants. 

56.  In the circumstances, if this dispute is to be litigated in the Hong Kong courts it will be necessary for expert evidence on Indonesian law to be adduced.  On the other hand, if it is to be litigated in the Indonesian courts, it will also require expert evidence of Hong Kong law to be adduced in those courts. 

57.  In this sense, that factor requiring evidence of foreign law to be adduced cancels out each other whether the forum should properly be Hong Kong or Indonesia. 

58.  Given all the other factors present in this case I come to the conclusion that Hong Kong must be the forum conveniens for the parties to litigate this dispute. 

Conclusion

59.  For the reasons given above, the application of the defendants made by Summons dated 30 December 2010 is dismissed with costs to the plaintiff (order nisi) to be taxed and paid forthwith if not agreed. 

(A.R. Suffiad) High Court

Mr Peter K.C. Wong, instructed by Messrs Chan, Wong & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Kay K.W. Chan, instructed by Messrs Christopher K.Y. Wong, for the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants