HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2010

HUI SUM AND ANOTHER v. HUI TING NUNG

Files (2)

95366-EN-2014-10-22

HUI SUM AND ANOTHER v. HUI TING NUNG

HTML content

HCA 289/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 289 OF 2010
________________

BETWEEN

 HUI SUM1st Plaintiff
 WONG MEI KUEN2nd Plaintiff

and

 HUI TING NUNGDefendant
____________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Mayo in Court

Dates of Hearing: 7, 8 and 13 October 2014

Date of Judgment: 22 October 2014

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

Introduction

1.  The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of the children.

2.  The first named plaintiff (the father) is the father of the children and the second named plaintiff (the mother) is the mother of the children.

3.  The father died on 9 August 2014 and the mother who had previously been appointed as the fathers guardian pursuant to Order 15, rule 7 represented the father’s interests in this litigation.

4.  The father suffered a serious stroke in 2007.  As a consequence of this his physical and mental condition was seriously impaired and his mental condition thereafter deteriorated.  He suffered from dementia.

5.  In March 2011 the mother applied for an order that she be appointed as the guardian of the father and this application was successful.

6.  After the father and mother came to Hong Kong from China they resided in a property which was registered in the father’s name in the Kowloon Walled City (KWC property).  The Government resumed this property in 1988 and compensation of $300,000 was paid to the father.

7.  The four children of the family are as follows:

(1) Hui Wai Chi (the 1st sister), a daughter who is now aged 59.  She was one of the witnesses who gave evidence for the plaintiffs.

(2) Hui Pui Chee (the 2nd sister) who is now aged 58.

(3) Hui Ting Kau (the elder brother) who is now aged 55 who gave evidence on this Trial.

(4) The defendant who is now aged 48.

8.  The three eldest children had moved out of the KWC property when it was vacated.  They had got married and moved to other accommodation.

9.  The defendant continued to reside with his parents and indeed still lives with the mother.

10.  Subsequent to the resumption of the KWC property the father purchased a flat on the 2nd floor of 350 Ma Tau Wai Road, Kowloon the property which is the subject of the present proceedings (the property). 

11.  The property was bought from a relative for $500,000.

12.  The bulk of the purchase price consisted of the $300,000 compensation earlier referred to and there was some controversy as to how the balance of the purchase price was made up.  On the evidence of the mother the balance was made up from the savings of the father and her savings from her earnings as a hawker.  According to the defendant, he contributed $20,000 towards the purchase.

13.  Be that as it may a decision was made to purchase the property in the name of the defendant.

14.  The main issue in this case is whether the defendant held the property as a trustee for other members of the family or whether the property was in fact a gift to him.  The defendant also calls in aid a presumption of advancement that the father had gifted the property to him.

The evidence for the plaintiffs

15.  Four witnesses gave evidence for the plaintiffs:

(1) the mother;

(2) the father’s brother Hui Yuk Ping;

(3) the elder son; and

(4) the 1st sister.

16.  The mother who is in her eighties is almost completely illiterate. Until about 1993 she had worked as a hawker and her earnings from this had been applied towards the family’s expenses.  Her income was irregular and unpredictable.

17.  Originally it had been hers and the father’s intention to register the property in their joint names.  They had not proceeded with this intention partly as a result of their advanced years and her being illiterate and partly as a result of the father and herself having joined in the application which had been made by the 1st sister and her husband for a flat under the Home Ownership Scheme.  It was never clearly established the extent to which this involvement would constitute some impediment in their being joint owners of the property.

18.  In any event she was adamant that it was the intention of both herself and the father that they were the owners of the property and that no gift of the property had been made to the defendant.

19.  While she accepted that the defendant had made financial contributions towards family expenditure she gave evidence that it had been the father who had paid for the maintenance and repairs of the property.

20.  There was also the question of the title deeds of the property. These had been kept in a safe deposit box which had been opened by herself and the father with the Bank of China at its San Shan Road Branch and when this was closed at their Ma Tau Wai Branch office.  Following the father’s stroke she had taken the deeds out of the safe deposit box and given them to the elder son who in turn had placed them in a deposit box at the Tseung Kwan O branch of the Bank of China.

21.  In 2005 the defendant had married a lady who was a resident in China. Initially she had been unable to come to Hong Kong as she could not obtain a one way permit from the Mainland authorities.  She did however subsequently obtain such a permit and took up residence in Hong Kong.  This was in 2012.

22.  The relationship between herself and the defendant had soured after his marriage.

23.  He had continued to live in the property with his parents.  He, though on numerous occasions, suggested that the property should be sold and that the proceeds of sale should be given to his wife to enable her to fund a proposed business venture namely acquiring a beauty parlour.

24.  This had greatly alarmed her and the father because if the property was sold and the proceeds of sale were not applied towards acquiring an alternative property she and the father would have nowhere to live in the final years of their lives.

25.  It was on account of this that numerous requests were made to the defendant to add the names of his siblings or alternatively the names of the parents to the title deeds of the property.  The defendant had refused to accede to these requests.

26.  The mother produced the medical reports which had been used in support of the application she had made for appointment as a guardian of the father, and it was manifest from these that the father was suffering from dementia and unable to comprehend to any significant extent what was going on around him.

27.  The mother was cross examined at some length by Ms Lam who was representing the defendant.

28.  Ms Lam put it to the mother that she and the father had given the elder son $600,000 for the purpose of decorating his flat.  She denied this and asked where would her husband have been able to obtain such a large sum of money.

29.  Ms Lam then referred the mother to a time deposit which was part of the agreed bundle for over $1.18 million in the joint names of herself and the father.  She admitted that they had had this money and that on 18 July 2009 had transferred the money to a time deposit in the joint names of herself and the elder son.

30.  On being pressed upon what the moneys were intended for she said that it was intended that the moneys be used for hers and her husband’s funeral expenses.

31.  It was definitely my impression that the mother was less than forthcoming on financial matters and that she was reluctant to provide a complete picture of the finances of the family.

32.  The cross examination was then directed towards a tape recording which recorded a telephone conversation between her and the elder son.

33.  The provenance of this tape was by no means made clear.

34.  It appeared from the subject matter that the conversation had taken place shortly after the defendant had declined to add the names of the other siblings to the title deeds of the property.  The mother was represented on the tape as stating that the father had expressed the opinion that the family should not fight with the defendant as the flat had been given to him.

35.  I attach little weight to this tape recording as the conversation in question was between the mother and the elder son, and in all the circumstances there was no assurance that anything which was said took matters any further.

36.  There was on the tape what appeared to be an emotional outburst from the mother who said to the elder brother that if the flat was sold by the defendant and the proceeds of sale had been given to the defendant’s wife, she, the mother, might find herself sleeping on the street.

37.  The mother agreed that when the defendant’s wife had obtained her one way entry permit to Hong Kong she had come to live in the property. 

38.  Unfortunately there had been a number of verbal confrontations with the wife and the relationship deteriorated significantly.

39.  It appears that it was at this time that efforts were made to attempt to get the defendant to add the names of the other siblings to the title deeds.

40.  More particularly at this time two different solicitors’ letters were sent to the defendant on the instruction of the elder brother demanding that he add the names of the other siblings to the deeds.

41.  One aspect of the mother’s evidence which was slightly puzzling was that when the mother was shown the letters she was asked if the object of the exercise had merely been to make provision for the other siblings or whether the primary purpose was to provide for her security.  She was adamant even after being acquainted with the contents of the letters that her sole concern was her own security.

42.  The next witness Hui Yuk Ping can be dealt with very briefly. 

43.  He is the younger brother of the father.

44.  He said that he and the father were very close and that he was aware that the father had purchased the property after the KWC property had been resumed.

45.  Mr Hui said that it was his impression that the property belonged to the father and mother.  He had not heard that it had been gifted to the defendant.

46.  He accepted, however, in cross examination that it could well have been the case that the property had been given to the defendant and that the father had not informed him of this.

47.  This being the case Mr Hui’s evidence does not take matters any further.

48.  The elder brother then gave evidence.  His evidence concerning the siblings’ moving out and getting married was similar to the mother’s.  He accepted that he had received as a gift $100,000 from the father but denied that he had received from him $600,000 to enable him to discharge the mortgage secured on his flat.

49.  When asked how he had managed to pay off the mortgage he said that he had done so out of his earnings as supplemented by the part time earnings of his wife.  His salary as a technician with MTR had been approximately $20,000 per month.  He said that mortgage payments were $15,000 per month.

50.  During the trial the elder brother produced bank pass sheets in support of his denial that the father had given to him funds, to discharge his mortgage.  In fact it appeared from the entries recorded that a sum of $398,000 was paid into his account at the relevant time which would indicate in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the father had indeed provided a substantial sum to assist the elder brother.

51.  He accepted that he had held jointly with the mother the time deposit for $1.18 million.  He said that of that sum approximately $720,000 remained.  He agreed that the money belonged to the mother and that the depletion of the moneys had been attributable to the payment of legal fees in connection with the instant litigation.

52.  The elder brother confirmed that he had given instructions to the two different firms of solicitors addressed to the defendant requiring him to agree to adding the names of the siblings to the title deeds.  The defendant had not complied with the requests.  He did not give any reason why the requests for the names of the siblings to be added rather than the names of his parents.  He said that he had not given any consideration in depth on this.

53.  Overall his evidence did not take matters much further as the elder brother did not claim to have any direct knowledge as to what had transpired in 1989 at the time when the property was acquired.

54.  The final witness to give evidence for the plaintiffs was the 1st sister. She gave evidence concerning her and her husband’s application for a Home Ownership Scheme flat.  She said that the father and mother had joined in the application as she thought that this was the reason why the property had been bought in the defendant’s name.

55.  She went on to express the opinion that her parents had not breached the conditions relating to Home Ownership Scheme flat simply on account of not residing themselves in the flat.

Evidence for the defendant

56.  No one other than the defendant gave viva voce evidence.

57.  He said that his family comprised of his parents, two elder sisters, an older brother and himself.

58.  They lived at the KWC property.  In 1988 the Hong Kong Government resumed the property and the father received compensation of $300,000.

59.  His siblings had all got married and had moved away to be with their families.  He however remained with his parents. 

60.  As they were advancing in years he assisted in looking after them.

61.  The defendant said that he left school when aged 16.  However he trained to become a technician.  During his training he received a small salary but on attaining requisite qualifications his remuneration was substantially increased.

62.  He made financial contributions to his father who assumed the role as head of the family.  He paid what he could afford.

63.  After qualification he paid his father $2,000 per month.  In 1998 this had increased to $4,000 per month.

64.  When the KWC property was resumed he and his father made a decision to purchase a property nearby and to apply the compensation which had been paid for this purpose. 

65.  They found a suitable flat namely the property which belonged to a cousin Hui Fuk Sang which was for sale.

66.  The purchase price was agreed at $500,000.

67.  A week or two before the completion of the purchase of the flat the father and he had a discussion in the KWC property.

68.  He said that as his siblings had all moved away and had obtained alternative accommodation the father had decided to make a gift of the property to him so that he would always have somewhere to live.  This was on the basis that he would continue to live with his parents in the property and take care of them.

69.  No other member of the family was present during this conversation.

70.  His father asked him to contribute $20,000 to $30,000 towards the purchase price.  He was able to provide $20,000 from savings he had been able to make.

71.  His father told him that he would be able to make up the balance of the purchase price.  He did not refer to any contribution being made from his mother’s savings.

72.  He and his father attended at the solicitors office for the completion of the purchase.  His mother, siblings and the vendor were not present and he denied that anyone had stated at the meeting that he was holding the property as a trustee as referred to in the statement of claim.

73.  From that time onward his father had never said that the property was not a gift to him or asked him to transfer it back to him.

74.  He said that after he received the letter dated 7 August 2009 from the elder brother’s solicitor requiring him to add the names of his siblings to the title deeds he had discussed the matter with his father.

75.  His father advised him not to do so as the property had been gifted to him.

76.  He also said that he had contributed $100,000 towards the purchase of the elder brother’s Home Ownership Scheme flat and paid him $600,000 to enable him to redeem the mortgage on his flat.

77.  On the basis of his father’s advice he had declined the requests which had been made by the solicitors.

78.  The defendant agreed that three building orders had been issued in relation to the property.  He also agreed that as his finances were tight at that time his father had assisted him in providing funds to enable him to comply with the orders.

79.  The next area of evidence canvassed was his matrimonial situation.

80.  In 2005 he had married a woman who lived in Mainland China.  She gave birth to his daughter in 2006.

81.  It had not been possible for her to obtain residence in Hong Kong and she was only able to acquire a one way permit in 2011. While the wife and daughter were living in China the defendant visited them over the weekends.

82.  When they did get the permit the wife and daughter came to Hong Kong and took up residence with him and his parents at the property.

83.  When Mr Ko, for the plaintiffs, put it to him that the relationship between his wife and his parents was acrimonious and unhappy he did not agree.

84.  He said that the wife had assisted him in looking after his parents and had been kind to them.  He accepted that there had been trivial disputes and disagreements over minor matters but this was inevitable when considering the different backgrounds they had had respectively.

85.  One matter upon which he was emphatic was that at no time had he ever said that he was contemplating the sale of the property.

86.  Far less than it had been in his mind that if the property was to have been sold that the proceeds of sale would be applied towards investing in a beauty parlour for his wife.

87.  Even if there were concerns in this connection they no longer had any basis.  This was because the defendant’s marriage had been dissolved in May 2014 by the mutual agreement of the parties.  The defendant had not been ordered to pay maintenance for his ex‑wife or daughter.  They continued to reside in Hong Kong.

88.  The defendant was subjected to a lengthy cross examination by Mr Ko.  His evidence was never seriously shaken.

89.  One of the lines of approach adopted by Mr Ko was to invite the defendant to comment upon the fact that he had not objected to his parents having the custody of the title deeds of the property when it was his case that the beneficial ownership of the property was vested in him.  His answer to this was that until much later in the relationship there was no reason not to trust his parents and siblings.  He had lived harmoniously with his parents who he looked after.

90.  In all the circumstances this appeared to be a convincing explanation.

91.  Overall I obtained a favourable impression of this witness.  He appeared to be a truthful and reliable witness.

Analysis of evidence and finding of facts

92.  I regret that I was not very impressed by the mother as a witness.

93.  It appeared to me that her main concern was to say what she thought was in her best interests rather than what was the truth.

94.  I do not believe that there was any serious discussion with the defendant concerning the sale of the property and the application of the proceeds of sale towards investing in a beauty parlour for the defendant’s wife.

95.  I do not believe that the mother attended the completion of the purchase with her other children and then together with the father informed the assembled company that the defendant was holding the property as trustee for the parents and the other siblings.

96.  As I have stated earlier I found the defendant to have been a truthful and reliable witness and where there are disparities between his evidence and the evidence of the mother I much prefer his evidence.

97.  Clearly the crux of this matter relates to what happened when the property was purchased.  The issue simply being was a gift of the property made to the defendant.

98.  When consideration is also given to all the surrounding circumstances, it would appear to be overwhelmingly likely that the explanation for the title to the property being vested in the defendant was that a gift was being made to him.

99.  What has to be borne in mind is that all of the other siblings had their own accommodation with their respective families.

100.  The defendant did not.  It is a notorious fact that real estate prices in Hong Kong are extremely high and for anyone in the defendant’s financial position it would be difficult for him to purchase a flat.

101.  Over and above this the defendant was at the relevant time living with his elderly parents and taking care of them.

102.  Even the mother in her evidence accepted that at that time the defendant was a good son.

103.  Having considered all of these matters I make a finding of fact that the property was gifted to the son in the manner he described in his evidence.

104.  One of the matters raised by Mr Ko in his final submissions was that the mother claimed to have a beneficial interest in the property and she had given evidence that she had not at any time made a gift of her interest to the defendant.  

105.  As indicated earlier in this judgment there was a paucity of evidence concerning the earnings of the mother as a hawker.

106.  It was definitely my impression that the moneys she had earned had been applied towards the upkeep of the family and this being the case the amount of the savings she could have made would have been very limited.

107.  In the overall context of the amount which was required for the purchase I do not think it would be realistic to attempt to allocate to her any significant share or percentage interest in the beneficial ownership of the property.

The law

108.  During the course of the trial various references were made by counsel to the presumption of advancement.

109.  There can be no doubt that in the present case where the alleged gift is made by a father to his son the presumption of a gift would arise if there was either no evidence concerning this or that whatever evidence had been adduced was equivocal.

110.  In the present case I have made clear findings of fact in favour of the defendant and that being the case there is no need for the defendant to have to place reliance upon the presumption.

111.  The law on this was helpfully expounded by Rogers VP on page 3 of Cheung Cho Kam v Cheung Chor Chun Stella and Cheung Yuet Ying Rose, unreported, CACV 178/2008.

“7. On this appeal Mr Yip has manfully tried to argue that the judge should have applied the presumption of advancement. He says that the judge should have started with that. But the fact of the matter is that the presumption of advancement is only a presumption which is applied when there are no facts upon which the court can operate which would determine one way or the other where the particular property was intended to be owned. Once the judge has made findings of fact, as has the judge in this case, there is no scope, in my view, for the presumption of advancement. ”

Conclusion

112.  The result of this is that the plaintiffs’ application is dismissed.

113.  I make an order nisi that the defendant is to have his costs.

114.  Finally I would like to express the hope that the defendant will continue to allow the mother to reside at the property and that the title deeds of the property be given to him.

(Simon Mayo)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Tony Ko, instructed by Kent Tam & Co, for the plaintiffs

Ms Priscilia TY Lam, instructed by Carol Lam & Co, for the defendant

87356-EN-2013-05-28

HUI SUM AND ANOTHER v. HUI TING NUNG

HTML content

HCA289/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 289OF 2010

_________________

BETWEEN

 HUI SUM
(by his wife and next friend WONG MEI KUEN)
1st Plaintiff
 WONG MEI KUEN2nd Plaintiff
 AND
 HUI TING NUNGDefendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge B Chu in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 May 2013
Date of Decision: 10 May 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 28 May 2013

-------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR DECISION

--------------------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1.  The Defendant (“D”) issued a summons for striking out all parts of the statement of claim relating to the 1st Plaintiff, D’s father (“Father”), under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) and/or inherent jurisdiction.  The 2nd Plaintiff is D’s mother (“Mother”).

2.  The writ with the statement of claim was filed on 1 March 2010 (“Claim Date”). The first and primary ground of D’s application is that Father was mentally incapable of suing in his name on Claim Date.  His alternative ground is that even if Father was mentally capable of suing on Claim Date, he was forced or manipulated by Mother and/or D’s siblings in doing so against his true wish, and this amounts to at least an abuse of court process if not also maintenance or champerty on the part of Mother and D’s siblings.

3.  After the issue of D’s summons, on the application of the Mother, an order was made on 30 March 2011 appointing the Mother to act as Father’s next friend and that the Father’s claim be continued by the Mother on behalf of the Father (“Appointment Order”).

4.  On 10 May 2013, I have orally dismissed D’s summons, and the reasons are set out hereinafter.

Brief Background

5.  The family dispute arose out of a property in Ma Tau Wai Road in Kowloon (“Property”), which was assigned to D by his cousin in May 1989 for a consideration of HK$500,000.  D was about 23 years old at the time.

6.  Since the above assignment, Father, Mother and D have been residing under the same roof in the Property, where they continue to reside.

7.  Prior to moving to the Property, D was living with his parents in premises in the Kowloon Walled City registered in the sole name of the Father.  D has said that the consideration of HK$500,000 for the Property came partly from the compensation money received by Father as a result of resumption of their previous home by the Government, and partly from Father’s savings.

8.  It is the case of the Father and the Mother that D holds the Property in trust for them, whereas D’s case is that the Property was a gift to him from the Father.

Father’s Mental Capacity

9.  There is no direct evidence as to D’s mental capacity at the Claim Date. Mother had produced a bundle of medical reports on D’s mental capacity, and relied on two doctors, a Dr Tam and a Dr Wong, as her experts. D, on the other hand, had instructed a Dr Ho to prepare an expert opinion, based on all the medical reports produced by the Mother.

10.  Father is now about 88 years old. There was no dispute between the parties that he suffered a stroke about 6 years ago in October 2007, and the chronology which appeared from the medical reports was as follows:

30.10.07 Father transferred to Kowloon Hospital from Queen Elizabeth Hospital where he was first admitted after a stroke
05.11.07 Father underwent a Mini Mental State Examination (“MMSE test”)

MMSE Result: 5 out of 30
21.11.07 Father discharged, at time of discharge –Mental state: confused
22.11.07 Father underwent AMT test at Convalescent Department of Kowloon Hospital
Test Result: Alert
15.01.08 Case Close Date
17.10.08 First Home Visit by Hospital –
Mental state: Orientated
01.06.09 Case Close Date

11.  Although the Father’s MMSE result in early November 2007 was 5 out of a maximum of 30, it seems from the above that thereafter there was improvement and by October 2008, Father’s mental state was stated to be orientated and his case was closed by the Kowloon Hospital in June 2009.

12.  Three months thereafter, the Father was taken to see a private general practitioner, a Dr Lo, in September 2009.  According to Dr Lo, D’s elder brother who accompanied the Father on that visit informed the doctor of Father’s past history of heart diseases, stroke, dementia & hypertension. Father was then referred back to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital for follow-up. There was no test performed by Dr Lo or any diagnosis of Father’s mental state at that time.

13.  On 25 November 2009, Father was referred to a specialist in rheumatology, a Dr Lee, at the Union Hospital and the Father underwent a MMSE on that day.  The result was 11 out of 30 and Dr Lee’s then diagnosis was “dementia”[1].  The information received by Dr Lee from the son who accompanied the Father at that time was:

“Recently noted to have deterioration of memory

Not able to recognize his grand-children

Confused with his own daughters name

Forget that his visits by his children

No episode of forgetting turning off stove or water tap

(wearing label/card)

Sleep pattern okay

No sundowning feature”

14.  There was no stage of dementia stated under diagnosis, although Dr Lee noted that his clinical impression of the Father was he had moderate to severe dementia.  In a more detailed report prepared subsequently[2], Dr Lee stated that at the time of consultation, in the performance of his daily activities, the Father was able to go out for morning tea with his wife everyday and performing walking exercise in the garden.  Dr Lee noted that the Father was attending day care in Tung Wah Group day centre (with exercise) 3 times per week.  He was able to bathe himself and to dress himself (upper or lower garment).  He was noted to be alert conscious and was not depressed looking.

15.  Thereafter, the Father was taken for a general consultation by a Dr Leung at a Government clinic on 9 February 2010 regarding his heart disease, constipation and hearing problems.  All Dr Leung noted was “? Dementia/ET attended private 12/09”.  Again, this was not a diagnosis, and the doctor seemed to be noting down what was informed to him, and in fact , Dr Leung put a “?” before dementia.

16.  From the above, it can be seen that the last MMSE and only diagnosis of dementia of the Father, prior to the Claim Date, was on 25 November 2009. The MMSE result that day in fact showed a marked improvement from the Father’s MMSE result 2 years earlier in November 2007.

17.  D’s expert Dr Ho opined that the Father’s cognitive functioning has been unsatisfactory since July 2009, and that the MMSE result of 11 out of 30 conducted by Dr Lee on 25 November 2009 is compatible with the range for patients suffering from moderate to severe dementia.  This together with the Father’s condition as reported to Dr Lee on that day, according to Dr Ho, would suggest the Father’s cognitive function was already poor around March 2010.  Dr Ho is of the opinion that it is more probable that Father was by reasons of dementia to be not capable of managing and administering the present litigation at the material time (ie March 2010), and  that it was unlikely that Father was capable of “fully understanding the case as stated in the statement of claim or to manage and administer it at the material time in order to give reasonable instructions to lawyers and endorse the contents as stated in the statement of claim”[3] (emphasis added).  Dr Ho has never seen the Father, and his opinion is based on the medical reports produced by the Mother.

18.  The Father and the Mother mainly relied on Dr Tam’s reports.  Dr Tam saw Father the 1st time only on 13 December 2010, and then saw him 3 times between 10-15 June 2011.  Dr Tam’s 1st report was prepared for the Guardianship Board, and he stated therein that Father had mental disorder for 6 months[4].  6 months prior to December would be in June 2010.

19.  Dr Tam prepared two further reports for the purpose of this application.  He considered it a safe and reasonable medical opinion that the Father recovered fairly well from his stroke between 2007 and 2010[5]. He relied on the following:

(i)      In November 2008, the Father’s Higher Disability Allowance was suspended because his condition was ‘too good’, and he had not gone back on that allowance again. The medical assessment form for this allowance also stated that the Father was mentally fit to make a statement[6].

(ii)     As late as the latter part of 2009, Father was able to switch on the television at specific hours to watch the programme of his choice and also to change channels according to his wish. He could also instruct his wife to go to the bank regularly to check on his financial situations.

(iii)    In March 2010, Father was able to instruct his son to purchase tickets for him to go to Toi Shan to visit his relatives.

20.  (i) above was the only documentary evidence apart from all the medical reports.  (ii) and (iii) were  hearsay in that that was what was reported to Dr Tam by the Mother and family members.

21.  A “person under disability” under Order 80 r1 of RHC means a person who is a minor or a mentally incapacitated person, and a “mentally incapacitated person” means a mentally disordered person or a mentally handicapped person (within the meaning of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap 136) who, by reason of mental disorder or mental handicap is incapable of managing and administering his property and affairs, or for all other purposes, a patient or a mentally handicapped person.

22.  Father was clearly diagnosed with dementia on 25 November 2009.  His score of 11 out of 30 was according to Dr Ho in the range compatible with moderate to severe dementia, and Dr Tam did not dispute this.  Both experts agreed that the Father had been suffering from vascular dementia, and that his condition would be progressively deteriorating, and by December 2010, Father was a mentally incapacitated person.

23.  By 15 December 2010, according to the other expert witness for the Father, Dr Wong, who saw the Father on that day, the Father performed poorly and scored only 5 out of 30 out of a MMSE test. According to Dr Wong, Father had been attending the Tung Wah Hospital Group Day Care Centre for the Elderly for dementia day care “for the past year” although his overall well-being was said to have improved since attending the day care centre.  Further according to Dr Wong’s report to the Guardianship Board, Father had the mental disorder for 7-8 months.  7-8 months earlier would be some time in April/May 2010.  In December 2010 Father was said by Dr Wong to be in a mid to late stage dementia.

24.  The issue is really whether at the Claim Date in March 2010, the Father was mentally capable of managing and administering his property and affairs.

25.  A person diagnosed with dementia does not necessarily mean he is a mentally incapacitated person.  Dr Ho accepted that the MMSE score could fluctuate depending on the person’s physical state at the time of the test or other situational factors, but he opined that 11 out of 30 was probably the highest score the Father achieved , which was in November 2009.

26.  D has relied on the following to allege Father’s lack of mental capacity at the Claim Date[7]:

(i)      All along he had been living with his parents and was in a position to observe the demeanour of Father and  his interaction with D raised suspicion as to Father’s mental capacity;

(ii)     D was able to observe Father’s demeanour during the mediation session on 25 October 2010.

(iii)    D made a recording of a telephone conversation between Mother and his eldest brother on 26 October 2010  (“Telephone Recording”) which revealed that Father was suffering from dementia and could not understand other people or think or talk sensibly;

27.  D’s defence to the statement of claim was filed in April 2010.  The mediation session and the Telephone Recording took place in October 2010.  It was not until 7 December 2010 that D’s solicitors first wrote to Father’s and Mother’s solicitors raising the issue on the Father’s mental incapacity[8] (“D’s Letter”).  According to D’s Letter, it was at around that time D received notice that Father was alleged by the Mother and his brother to be mentally ill to a degree that Father was unable to deal with matters in relation to the proceedings. 

28.  I find the present case a borderline one, and the difficulty lies in the lack of sufficient medical evidence as to the Father’s mental capacity at around the time of the Claim Date.

29.  It seems although D himself had all along been living with his parents under the same roof and had interaction with the Father, it was only after the mediation and after the Telephone Recording in October 2010 that he seemed to be more certain of his suspicion, although D said in his 1st affirmation that he had raised his concerns at the early stage of these proceedings and had instructed his lawyers to issue the present application in November 2010.  D’s Letter was only sent in December 2010.  D’s position seems contradictory at times, as on one hand his case is that Father has been mentally incapacitated on and since the Claim Date, if not earlier, and but on the other hand, he seems also to be relying on the Telephone Recording and the Mother’s conversation with the Father as evidence that the Father agreed that the Property had been given to him[9].

30.  What the Mother said in her affirmation and what was reported to Dr Tam about the Father’s condition by the Mother and/or D’s brother and the fact that Father did not go back to the Higher Disability Allowance after November 2008 led Dr Tam to opine that more than certain the Father was in possession of his faculty to the stage that he was able to instruct his family to conduct legal proceedings on his behalf at Claim Date (emphasis added). There is no reason to doubt the Mother’s or Dr Tam’s evidence at this stage, without hearing oral evidence.  The Father’s claim is in fact a relatively simple one and does not involve complex issues.  The main issue is whether the Property was a gift to D or whether D has merely been a trustee for his parents.

31.  Having weighed the evidence available before me, I am unable to come to the view that as at Claim Date, the Father was already a mentally incapacitated person within the definition of the Mental Health Ordinance, and a person under disability under Order 80 r1 of RHC.  I, however, accept that his mental condition would have progressively deteriorated by October 2010 to the extent that he was not able to participate meaningfully during the mediation.

Whether the Father’s acts before the Appointment Order can be ratified even if he lacked the mental capacity to sue at Claim Date

32.  Even if the Father did lack the mental capacity to sue at Claim Date, it does not follow necessarily that his claim should be struck out now.

33.  So far as legal principles are concerned, it is not disputed that if a defendant desires to question the authority to sue in a plaintiff’s name, he must apply to strike out the plaintiff’s name at an early stage; he cannot by his defence dispute the authority, nor can he do so at the trial[10].  Further, if there is any real doubt about the authority to sue, the question must be resolved first, before the case should be allowed to proceed any further[11].

34.  It is clear from the above that an allegation that a party lacks authority to sue must be raised early and not at trial by way of defence.

35.  As mentioned earlier, after D issued his summons, the Mother then obtained the Appointment Order, but Mr Poon, D’s Counsel, argued that the Mother is only entitled to ratify solicitor’s authority back to the date of the Appointment Order, namely 30 March 2011, and not earlier.

36.  Mr Ko, Counsel for the Father and the Mother, has referred this court to the Court of Appeal decision in Ng Hong Ki and Leung Fong Kiu[12], which was on Mr Poon’s list of authorities on the issue that the test of mental incapacity is “issue specific”.

37.  In the case of Ng Hong Ki, it was held, among other things, that where steps in proceedings were taken before lack of capacity due to disability under O 80 of RHC was raised, the court was not powerless to act and did not have to direct the parties to start all over again[13].  Kwan JA said that under O2 r1(1) the failure to comply with O80 r2(1) would be treated as an irregularity and would not be nullified by reason of the non-compliance provided everyone had acted in good faith and there had been no manifest disadvantage to the person subsequently found to be under disability, the court had power to regularize the position retrospectively[14]

38.  Mr Poon has tried to distinguish Ng’s case from the present case in that (i) Mother and her family members deliberately concealed Father’s mental capacity, and even allow mediation to go ahead; and (ii) in Ng’s case, the defendant was alleging himself to be mentally incapacitated to set aside a judgment against him, and so he was trying to take advantage of his own omission or fault at the expense of the innocent opponent.

39.  I have said earlier that the first time D raised the issue of the Father’s mental capacity with his parent’s solicitors was in D’s Letter in December 2010.

40.  D’s Letter was met with a strong objection from solicitors for the Father and the Mother at the time.  Notwithstanding their strong objection, D’s Letter did prompt action on the part of the Mother.

41.  According to the Mother, she noticed the deterioration of the Father’s mental capacity in October 2010, but as she was not very well educated and did not know about legal procedure, it did not occur to her that she should tell her solicitors.  She said after the receipt of the D’s Letter, she realized she should apply to the Guardianship Board to take care of Father’s welfare, and she took steps to appoint herself as next friend for the Father to continue these proceedings[15].

42.  Subsequently, it turns out that the Mother’s application to the Guardianship Board was misconceived in that she was applying for the sole purpose for the Father to continue the present legal proceedings and she was subsequently explained by the Guardianship Board that this was out of the jurisdiction of the Guardianship Board.  This led to her making an application to the court for the Appointment Order.

43.  There is no sufficient evidence to doubt that the Mother only first noticed the deterioration of the Father’s mental capacity in October 2010. D has not denied that the Mother is uneducated and does not know the legal procedure.  Less than 4 months after D’s Letter, the Mother obtained the Appointment Order. There was no sufficient evidence to say that the Father or the Mother, or any one else had not acted in good faith.  D said that the Mother and “her family” had “deliberately concealed” Father’s mental capacity, and even “allowed mediation to go ahead”.  In fact, had the Mother and “her family” realized that the Father was not mentally capable in attending mediation, one would have thought they would NOT allow him to attend mediation, rather than the opposite.  Allowing the Father to attend mediation would only expose his mental capacity, and in my view, there was certainly no deliberate concealment.

44.  As eventually the Appointment Order was obtained, there was no manifest disadvantage to the Father, apart from some delay in the proceedings. 

45.  Having considered the above circumstances, I come to the view that the position should be regularized retrospectively, irrespective of whether or not D was mentally incapacitated or under disability at the Claim Date or thereafter until the Appointment Order.

Abuse of Court Process

46.  D’s alternative ground for his application is that even if Father was mentally capable of suing on Claim Date, he was forced or manipulated by Mother and/or D’s siblings in doing so against his true wish, and that this amounts to an abuse of court process if not also maintenance or champerty on the part of Mother and D’s siblings.  D mainly relied on the Telephone Recording in support of this ground.

47.  As I have said the Father’s mental capacity would have deteriorated to such an extent in October 2010 that he was not able to participate meaningfully in the mediation.  The Telephone Recording was the day after the mediation. Father’s mental disorder seemed to start in about April/May 2010.  There is no sufficient evidence as to the Father’s true wish in October 2010.  According to D’s expert, it would not have be ascertainable.

48.  In any event, I do not find there is sufficient evidence to say there has been abuse of process by the Father, or the Mother.

Conflict of Interest

49.  D has also alleged that there is a conflict of interest between the Father and the Mother, and the Mother should not be appointed the next friend of the Father.  As I understand it, D’s case seems to be that the consideration of the Property came solely from the Father, and if in future this Court should come to the view that D is only holding the beneficial interest in the Property as a trustee only, then he holds it solely for the benefit of the Father who paid for the consideration, and not the Mother.  Thus, there is a potential conflict between the Father and the Mother.

50.  The time to raise this issue should really be at the time of the Mother’s application for the Appointment Order.  D did not oppose Mother’s application at that time, although his solicitors wrote to say this was on an entirely without prejudice basis to D’s position taken in the striking out application[16].

51.  The marriage between the Father and the Mother was a long one, and the Mother said in her affirmation that the Property was purchased using the money of hers and the Father’s[17].  There is no sufficient evidence at this stage as to whether the source of money for the consideration of the Property came from the Father, the Mother, or jointly. The Mother has made an affirmation confirming that there is no conflict of interest between the Father and her.

52.  At this stage there is simply no sufficient evidence to support D’s claim that there is a conflict of interest between the Father and the Mother, and even if there were, any application to replace the Mother as the next friend should be a separate application.

Conclusion/Order

53.  For the above reasons, I have dismissed the Defendant’s application. 

54.  I have also made an order that costs of this application be to the Plaintiffs’, save for the issue of the Defendant’s summon.  This is because I am of the view that D was justified in issuing the summons.  For the avoidance of doubt, the issue of the summons includes the Defendant’s 1st affirmation in support of his summons filed on the same date.  I have further ordered the costs be summarily assessed and the Plaintiffs are to file their statement of costs within 14 days, and the Defendant is to file his opposition within 7 days thereafter.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Tony Ko, instructed by Kent Tam & Co, for the 1st & 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Kevin Poon, instructed by Chui & Lau, for the defendant



[1] C:316

[2] A:104-24

[3] Para 19, A: 101

[4] A:75

[5] PB: 3

[6] A: 104-25

[7] Para 4, A:51

[8] B:203

[9] Para 21, A:57

[10] Para 18/19/24, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013 Vol 1, pg 427; see Richmond v Branson [1914] 1 Ch 968

[11]   See above, and per A Cheung J in Kammy Town v Super Glory Corp Ltd, HCA 3524 of 2003 (unreported), 14 January, 2005

[12] [2012] 1 HKLRD 435

[13] Headnote (3), Ng Hong Ki

[14] Paras 40-42, Ng Hong Ki

[15] A:45, Paras 15-17

[16] C: 322

[17] Para 21, A: 46