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Civil Action2010

SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHEUNG HING

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV100/2014CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND OTHERS
  • CACV101/2014CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND OTHERS
  • CACV141/2011CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CACV153/2014SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHEUNG HING
  • CACV97/2011CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • DCCJ1567/2018WONG SHING v. CHEUNG HING
  • DCPI181/2019CHEUNG HING v. ROTH & SONS ESTATES MANAGEMENT LTD
  • HCA336/2008CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • HCA925/2010CHEUNG HING v. WONG CHOR CHEUNG AND OTHERS
  • HCMP9/2017CHEUNG HING v. WAH FUNG FOREST RESOURCES LTD

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93877-EN-2014-07-14

SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHEUNG HING

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HCA 829/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 829 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CHEUNG HINGDefendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Court
Date of Hearing: 1 August 2013
Date of Judgment: 14 July 2014

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

1.  Wong Chor Cheung (“Wong”) and the defendant (“Cheung”) each holds 50% issued shares in Wah Fung Forest Resources Ltd (“Wah Fung”). As representative of the plaintiff (“Sidepec”), Wong concluded an agreement for the purchase of Cheung’s shares in Wah Fung. Sidepec seeks specific performance of the sale and purchase agreement. Cheung disputes liability on the basis that the agreement has been terminated upon Sidepec’s default. He counterclaims for declaration to that effect and forfeiture of the payments received.

BACKGROUND

2.  Wong and Cheung had been friends since the 1960s.  In 1991, the two agreed to co-invest in a property, namely, at 3/F, 23 Plantation Road with car parking space B1, the Peak, Hong Kong (“the Property”). Wah Fung was a company owned by Wong and his family members; and now became the corporate vehicle to hold the Property.  Wong and Cheung became holders of 50% (or 6,000 shares) each in Wah Fung.  The Property has since been let for rent.

3.  Since 2002, Cheung wanted to sell the Property, which Wong agreed.  Nothing materialised.  In 2005, Cheung decided instead to dispose of his interest in the Propery by selling his shares in Wah Fung.  Wong had introduced offers to purchase Cheung’s shares in 2005 and 2006, but those offers were admittedly rejected by Cheung.

4.  Finally, Wong introduced Sidepec to purchase Cheung’s shares in Wah Fung.  Acting as Sidepec’s representative, Wong entered into an agreement with Cheung.  The agreement was admittedly partly written and partly orally made.  As far as the written part is concerned, it was written in Chinese and dated 12 July 2006.  The written agreement recorded that the consideration was HK$5,000,000.  The first payment of HK$300,000 was made on the same day.  As to the balance, the written agreement says “上述股份轉讓以总金額付清為准” (or essentially completion upon full payment).

5.  The oral part of the agreement is in dispute.

6.  In October 2006, Cheung received another sum of HK$30,000 from Wong.  In January 2007, he received a further sum of HK$50,000 from Wong’s wife.  Apart from the total sum of HK$380,000, Cheung has received no further payment for the sale of his shares in Wah Fung.

7.  There is no dispute that Wong and Cheung met in June 2007.  What happened during the meeting is in dispute.

8.  In July 2008, Sidepec, through solicitors, demanded and gave notice to complete the sale and purchase of Cheung’s shares on 31 August 2008 allegedly pursuant to the oral part of the agreement between the parties. In reply, Cheung disputed the alleged oral terms of their agreement.  Further correspondence ensued in September 2008, but not since then until some 20 months later.

9.  Due to his dissatisfaction with the situation, Cheung actually commenced action against Wong (HCA 336/2008) in March 2008.  Wah Fung was joined as a defendant.  In other words, Sidepec’s notice to complete mentioned above came after that.  That action was settled in March 2010.  By consent, Wong and Cheung agreed that Wah Fung should sell the Property and the proceeds of sale should be paid into court.

10.  Wong then entered into an agreement on behalf of Wah Fung to sell the Property.  On the ground that the intended sale was a sham and at gross undervalue without his prior knowledge, Cheung commenced another action and managed to obtain an interim injunction restraining the intended sale (HCA 925/2010)[1].

11.  Back to the present case.  After some late amendment of pleading and introduction of supplemental witness statements[2], this case proceeded to trial upon the understanding that Wong as well as Cheung and his wife would testify.

12.  However, 1 week before the trial, Sidepec applied for adjournment of the trial.  I ruled against Sidepec for reasons handed down in writing on 24 July 2013.  I shall not repeat my observations then, perhaps except for mentioning that the application was unmeritorious.

13.  When the case came for trial, Sidepec was no longer legally represented.  Purporting to appear on behalf of Sidepec was one Mr Wong Ka Fai.  This Mr Wong essentially explained that Sidepec had just been sold to his company; and he had just been appointed as a director of Sidepec.

14.  There was no compliance with O.5, r.6(3) of the Rules of the High Court; and it was not for this court to give leave to this Mr Wong to represent Sidepec: see BOC v Expert Promise Limited, HCMP 1136/2003 (17 September 2003) at §5.

15.  Sidepec did not propose to proceed with the trial on that day in any event.  Wong, the person who was behind the steer driving the deal between the parties from conception to conclusion and the only witness for Sidepec, did not show up in court.  When asked about that, the Mr Wong appearing suggested that Wong had just met a traffic accident in the Mainland that prevented him from attending the trial.

16.  According to the affidavit evidence filed for its last attempt to adjourn the trial (which, as mentioned, was dismissed), the former legal representatives of Sidepec were still in contact with Wong and there was no mention of any accident to him by 26 July 2013.  In other words, Wong happened to have met a traffic accident in those few days before the trial.

17.  I was hardly impressed by the development that had all to do with Sidepec and Wong just before the trial.  Considering all the circumstances, I could only treat Sidepec as absent and refuse effectively another attempt to adjourn the trial.

THE ISSUES

18.  The major dispute lies with the following issues:

(1)   the terms of the agreement;

(2)   the party in breach; and

(3)   the entitlement to relief.

19.  Cheung and his wife gave evidence by adopting their respective witness statements.  The latter essentially corroborated Cheung’s evidence in respect of the meeting with Wong on 12 July 2006 when the agreement was made.  Plainly their evidence was unchallenged.

THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT

20.  As mentioned, there is no dispute that the agreement between the parties was partly orally made.  According to Sidepec, or effectively Wong, he met with Cheung in the end of June 2006 at Mei Yee Lim Restaurant in Mongkok.  During the meeting, it was orally agreed that:

(1)   a sum of HK$300,000 would be paid upon entering into the agreement; and the balance of the purchase price for Cheung’s shares in the sum of HK$4,700,000 would be payable by instalments;

(2)   the timing and amount of each instalment would be entirely within the sole discretion of Sidepec; and

(3)   Cheung would have to allow Sidepec time to sell some of its real properties in order to raise the necessary fund; such period was expected to take about 1 to 2 years.

21.  Wong’s version of the oral part of the parties’ agreement was obviously not tested in court.  Yet it should also be noted that such version only came about in the following manner:

(1)   Up to the pre-trial review, the pleaded case of Sidepec (presumably upon the instructions of Wong) was that the oral part of the agreement was made before the meeting on 12 July 2006.  It was allegedly agreed between Wong (on behalf of Sidepec) and Cheung that completion and payment of the balance of the purchase price for Cheung’s shares would take place on a date to be agreed or upon reasonable notice by Sidepec to Cheung.  In other words, the alleged agreement to bilaterally agree on the completion date and Sidepec’s option to fix the completion date unilaterally by notice co-existed.

(2)   In the pre-action correspondence between the parties, Sidepec, through solicitors (again presumably pursuant to the instructions of Wong), put forward the same version of the alleged oral terms as to completion and payment.

(3)   It was only at the pre-trial review that the application to amend the pleading was made (orally).  Neither was there a formal application nor the draft amendment.  The formal application was only subsequently made, argued and allowed[3].

(4)   Now the pleaded case of Sidepec is that the oral agreement was made during the meeting between Wong and Cheung at the time and place as Cheung contends.  But more importantly, the payment terms became that Sidepec had the liberty to pay the balance of the purchase price by instalments at such times and in such amounts at its sole discretion over a period of 1 to 2 years.

(5)   Irrespective of the explanation that might be given for the purpose of the application for amendment, Wong was not available for cross examination in respect of the change of such a crucial part of Sidepec’s case some 3 years after the commencement of action.

22.  As to Cheung, he gave the following account of how the parties’ agreement was reached:

(1)   During the meeting in end of June 2006 at Mei Yee Lim Restaurant in Mongkok, Wong represented to Cheung that it was his rich customer and friend in the Mainland who intended to purchase his shares in Wah Fung.

(2)   There would be an initial payment of HK$500,000 as deposit with completion and the balance of HK$4,500,000 payable in 2 months.

(3)   Cheung therefore attended the accountant’s office for signing an agreement on 12 July 2006.

(4)   However when the written agreement was presented to him, Cheung discovered that he was to be paid only HK$300,000, and Wong represented that the HK$200,000 balance of the deposit would be paid after his sale of some properties in Australia in 2 weeks.

(5)   Upon the above representation, Cheung signed the written agreement and received the HK$300,000.

23.  Cheung’s evidence was unchallenged. Objectively, I also find that Cheung’s version was in line with his circumstances around the time of the agreement.  The evidence, I accept, shows the following:

(1)  It was Wong who proposed the joint investment in the Property in the first place. Wong took charge of the handling of all the necessary procedures and rental collection from the Property while Cheung has his own business to run.

(2)   Since 2001-2002, Cheung became dissatisfied with, among other things, what Wong had done in relation to Wah Fung and the creation of encumbrances over the Property behind his back.  Through solicitors, Cheung put on record his complaints in as early as December 2002.

(3)   Whether the complaints were justified or not, the fact was that Cheung proposed to sell the Property in 2002; and Wong agreed to look for a buyer.

(4)   Without success, Cheung decided in 2005 that he would withdraw from the joint investment and dispose his interest in the Property by selling his shares in Wah Fung instead.

(5)   In November 2005, Wong produced a draft handwritten agreement, representing that one China Mark Asia Ltd offered to purchase Cheung’s shares at HK$5,000,000. Wong described the intended purchaser as an offshore corporation.  The purchase price would be paid by way of 10 monthly instalments, inclusive of a deposit of HK$150,000.  There is no dispute[4] that Cheung rejected this offer because he intended payment in one go or within a short time.

(6)   In February 2006, Wong came up with another offer from one Asia Mark Overseas Ltd to purchase Cheung’s shares at HK$5,000,000.  According to Wong, that was a BVI company.  By then, Cheung was seen prepared to consider payment by instalments and completion by the end of January 2007.  However the offer to Cheung was that the shares would be sold and paid for by instalments over a period of 12 to 24 months.  Further, 50% of the price would be paid in cash and the remaining 50% would be paid by exchange of properties.  There is no dispute[5] that Cheung rejected that offer as well.

(7)   There came the offer from Sidepec, again through Wong.  According to Cheung, Wong represented that this intended purchaser was his rich customer and friend who would pay deposit in the sum of HK$500,000 and the balance of the purchase price within 2 months.

(8)   However, when the written agreement was presented to Cheung on 12 July 2006, the payment terms were actually “付款方式:分批交易至完成全部股份買賣。首批交易:360 股 x @ HKD 833.33/每股。” (in other words, completion and payment by batches and  instalments; and the first batch to be sold would consist of 360 shares).

(9)   Cheung did not accept that.  Therefore Wong agreed to delete such payment term; and replace that by what is now found in the written agreement, namely, “上述股份轉讓以总金額付清為准” (essentially completion upon full payment).  Further, the description of the sum of HK$300,000 as the payment for the first batch of shares sold was deleted and replaced by the same being the first payment under the agreement.

24.  That there was no mention of the completion date in the agreement is obvious.  Yet it was a homemade written agreement.  Cheung specifically explained that he could have but, out of inadvertence, failed to add to the written agreement the other terms as to completion and payment of the balance of the purchase price for his shares.  In any event, both parties accepted and acted on the basis that these other terms were orally made.

25.  Cheung also stated his further conversation with Wong since the agreement in July 2007.  That included the time when he received the second payment of HK$30,000 and the third payment of HK$50,000.  It was about a week after receiving the HK$50,000 from Wong’s wife in January 2007 when Cheung spoke with Wong.  On that occasion, Wong promised Cheung that the completion would take place by the end of March 2007.

26.  The circumstances, as the evidence reveals, were such that Cheung was concerned about severing his tie with Wong and realising his interest in the Property, originally by sale of the Property or subsequently sale of his shares in Wah Fung.  Wah Fung has no business other than holding the Property.  The value of its shares hinges upon the value of the Property, which could be volatile in a market like Hong Kong.  That Cheung was reluctant to wait unduly is objectively understandable.

27.  Earlier on I pointed out the apparent uncertainty of the alleged term as to completion according to Sidepec’s original pleaded case.  The currently pleaded version does not sound better to Cheung.  The alleged completion and payment, not only by instalment but also entirely at the mercy of Sidepec, would mean that Cheung was locked to sell at a price over a possible period of 2 years without any say on the payment of the balance or date of completion or even interest compensation.  That would be even worse than the previous offer from Asia Mark Overseas Limited in February 2006 last rejected by Cheung, whereby interest at the annual rate of 5% was offered as compensation for any extension of the completion beyond 12 months.  In view of the circumstances leading to the agreement, it sounds incredible that Cheung became willing to accept lesser terms, as pleaded by Sidepec.

28.  I find what Cheung said to be the truth.

29.  Mr Lam was prepared to argue what if the terms were those as claimed by Sidepec or Wong[6]. As to that, I see the likelihood that the term as to completion and payment alleged by Sidepec (Wong), be it the original or newly pleaded version, may well be void for uncertainty.  However in view of the above findings, I need say no more on this alternative argument of Mr Lam’s.

THE PARTY IN BREACH

30.  I have considered the correspondence between the parties between 2008 and 2010 prior to the commencement of the present action as well as the explanation of Cheung in his statement.  In answering the purported notice to complete in 2008, Cheung stated in his letter dated 17 July 2008 that the alleged oral agreement (ie the original pleaded version) by Sidepec was untrue.  In reply to the purported notice to complete in 2010, Cheung stated in his letter dated 19 May 2010 that Wong was in breach of the oral agreement in failing to cause the completion and full payment for the shares in 2 months after the signing of the agreement; and that Wong kept on delaying the completion.  Cheung added that in about June 2007, he told Wong face to face that such delay was unacceptable and that the deal came to an end.

31.  Cheung was referring to the meeting with Wong at Nga Yuen Restaurant in Tin Lok Lane, Causeway Bay, in June 2007.  According to him, he informed Wong on that occasion in June 2007 that the deal with Sidepec had come to an end by reason of Wong (or Sidepec)’s failure to complete and to pay up by the extended completion date.  Whilst Sidepec (or Wong) suggested that Cheung only requested reasonable notice to complete as soon as it was ready, the fact was that nothing happened thereafter until the commencement of this action.  Cheung’s wife was present at the meeting and gave evidence in corroboration.

32.  I accept the evidence of Cheung and his wife in this respect.

33.  I also find that Cheung was entitled to terminate the deal.  The sale of the shares was merely the means to the end of disposal of Cheung’s interest in the Property.  In view of such underlying context and the circumstances leading to and surrounding the last extension of the completion date in January 2007 to the end of March 2007, I accept that such time was understood to be essential.

34.  Cheung has an alternative case.  Rescission by reason of misrepresentation is pleaded an alternative to termination.  Tracing the composition of Sidepec through the evidence, I can well understand why it occurred to Cheung that Sidepec was not a truly independent third party purchaser, as Wong represented to him, but somehow associated with Wong and his family members.

35.  However I put Cheung to election of his stance between termination and rescission, and Mr Lam confirmed that termination by reason of Sidepec’s repudiation is indeed his client’s primary case.  In view of the above conclusion, it is not necessary to consider rescission because of the alleged misrepresentation on the part of Wong.

ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF

36.  The declaratory relief sought by Cheung should follow from the above conclusion.  What calls for consideration is the claim for forfeiture of the HK$380,000 that Cheung has received from Sidepec.

37.  Mr Lam accepted that whether Cheung is entitled to keep the amounts received depends on whether the sum was intended to be deposit or mere part payment: see Polyset Ltd v Panhandat Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 234 (at §§7-12; 50-69; 90).  Mr Lam also accepted that the sum was not described as deposit in the written agreement dated 12 July 2006.  According to the documents, the 3 payments were said to be as the first payment, and the subsequent payments as the second payment and part payment respectively.

38.  The following circumstances are relevant:

(1)   The context of the deal between the parties was the disposal of interest in the Property by way of the sale and purchase of shares in the corporate vehicle holding it.  That a deposit was paid upon the entering into of the agreement as in an ordinary case of the sale and purchase of landed property should not be surprising.

(2)   Cheung’s case is that they were part payments of the balance of the agreed deposit of HK$500,000.  There is no principle of law that deposit could not be effected by more than one payment.  The first payment of HK$300,000 was indeed made upon the entering into of the agreement.  There is no evidence that the last 2 payments of HK$30,000 and HK$50,000 respectively were made as payment for particular lots of shares in Wah Fung; and thus mere part payment of the purchase price.

(3)   Through its then solicitors, Sidepec in July 2008 accepted in correspondence that it was to pay deposit for the purchase of the shares; and that was how the first HK$300,000 was paid.

(4)   In the hearing on 24 March 2010 before Yam J in HCA 336/2008, Wong described the payments as “訂金”[7] (ie deposit).

(5)   In his witness statement, Wong also described the first payment as “保證金”[8] (ie security or guarantee money).

39.  I accept Cheung’s evidence that deposit was agreed at HK$500,000.  The circumstances, I also find, suggest that the payments were meant to be part of the agreed deposit and to serve as earnest of performance, albeit serving as part payment of the purchase price as well, had the deal continued.

40.  The deposit represented 10% of the agreed price for Cheung’s shares.  There is no question of extraordinary amount or penalty.  I therefore find that upon Sidepec’s default, Cheung is entitled to forfeit the amounts received.

41.  Cheung is not claiming for the balance of the agreed deposit.  Nor is he claiming damages.

42.  As to Sidepec’s claim, Cheung also takes issue as to Sidepec’s entitlement to specific performance even if the terms of the agreement between the parties were as it alleges.  Referring to the fact that Sidepec is not known to possess any assets other than a real property in Hong Kong, which was subject to various all-moneys mortgages, as well as the correspondence between the parties in this respect, I can see why Mr Lam questioned whether Sidepec was and is ready and able to perform the agreement.  Sidepec’s evidence in this respect did not seem to have improved by the time of the trial.  Yet again, in view of the above conclusion, I propose to say no more on this.

CONCLUSION

43.  For the above reasons, I find that Cheung has terminated the Agreement upon acceptance of Sidepec’s repudiatory breach; and he is entitled to forfeit the part deposit in the sum of HK$380,000 paid by Sidepec under the Agreement.  The declaratory relief sought in these terms should be granted.

ORDER AND COSTS

44.  The claim is dismissed; and judgment on the counterclaim in terms as above.

45.  Following the event, Cheung shall have the costs of this action.  Mr Lam indicated that submissions may be made in respect of costs, in the event that his client succeeds.  I would just make a nisi order that Sidepec shall pay Cheung’s costs of the action, including any costs reserved, to be taxed, if not agreed.  The parties may exercise their liberty to apply for variation in 14 days or this costs order shall become absolute.

                

 (Simon Leung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

 

The plaintiff, in person, absent

Mr Paul LAM SC, instructed by Cheung Wong & Associates, for the defendant



[1] On 7 April 2014, DHCJ Burrell in HCA 925/2010 set aside the relevant sale and purchase agreement and continued the injunction.   See also the succinct summary of the other related actions in that judgment.

[2] See the written decision of this court dated 3 June 2013.

[3] See written decision of this court dated 3 June 2013.

[4] Wong’s witness statement at §24

[5] Wong’s witness statement at §25

[6] Mr Lam indicated that in such event, he would not need to pursue this part of his submission (Section No.8).

[7] Transcript of that hearing was produced.

[8] Wong’s witness statement at §27.

Please refer to CACV153/2014 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

88233-EN-2013-07-24

SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHEUNG HING

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HCA 829/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 829 OF 2010

________________________

BETWEEN

 SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CHEUNG HINGDefendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing and Decision: 23 July 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 24 July 2013

__________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

__________________________

 

1.  Wong Chor Cheung (“Wong”) and the defendant (“Cheung”) each holds 50% issued shares in Wah Fung Forest Resources Ltd. As representative of the plaintiff (“Sidepec”), Wong concluded an agreement for the purchase of Cheung’s shares in Wah Fung. In this action, Sidepec seeks specific performance of the sale and purchase agreement whereas Cheung seeks rescission or termination of the same. Trial, which is estimated to last for 8 days, will commence on 1 August 2013.

2.  Before me were Cheung’s summons for time to file and serve his supplemental witness statement; and Sidepec’s summons for adjournment of the trial.  The two however had no causal link.  At the end of the hearing, I allowed Cheung’s application and dismissed Sidepec’s.  I now give my reasons.

PREVIOUS DIRECTIONS

3.  I last gave the following order in this case on 30 May 2013:

(1)   Sidepec do have leave to amend the statement of claim as per the draft attached to the summons; and that the amended pleading shall be filed and served by 4:00 of the following day (i.e., 31 May 2013);

(2)   Cheung do have leave to file and serve amended defence and counterclaim within 21 days from the date of the order;

(3)   Sidepec do have leave to amend the reply and defence to counterclaim as per the draft attached to the summons but:

(a)    subject to leave to Sidepec to make further amendment strictly consequential upon the amendments to the defence and counterclaim pursuant to (2) above; and

(b)   the amended reply and defence to counterclaim incorporating the amendments pursuant to (a) above shall be filed and served within 14 days after service of the amended defence and counterclaim pursuant to (2) above;

(4)   Sidepec do have leave to file and serve the supplemental witness statement of Wong (as per the draft attached to the summons) and to rely on the same at the trial;

(5)   Cheung do have leave to file and serve supplemental witness statement in respect of the contents of Wong’s supplemental witness statement (under (4) above) within 21 days from the date of the order.

4.  What happened during and after the pre-trial review as well as my reasons for the above order were set out in writing and handed down on 3 June 2013.

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER 30 MAY 2013

5.  On 10 July 2013, Sidepec filed its notice of change of solicitors.  When chased for the trial bundle, Sidepec through solicitors asked Cheung’s solicitors to prepare them instead.  Cheung through solicitors asked for Sidepec’s consent to time extension for the filing of the amended defence and counterclaim.  Sidepec’s solicitors replied that it had no instruction to reply to such request.  This caused Cheung to take out a summons for the time extension on 16 July 2013.

6.  On 18 July 2013, the time requested by Cheung was finally extended by consent, thus saving a hearing at the last minute.  Nevertheless on the same day, Sidepec did 2 other things.  First Sidepec filed and served the supplemental statement of Wong, though leave to do so was given on 30 May 2013.  This caused Cheung to take out his summons on 19 July 2013 for leave to file and serve his supplemental statement in response (which Cheung had leave to do as directed on 30 May 2013).  Second, Sidepec filed its summons applying for adjournment of the tria6l.

CHEUNG’S APPLICATION

7.  Sidepec opposed Cheung’s application.  Its counsel, Mr Liang, argued that Cheung’s application was late and unjustified because the draft of Wong’s supplemental statement was available when the last order was made on 30 May 2013.  He complained that this put his client in difficulty when he had no sight of the draft of Cheung’s supplemental statement.

8.  I found the opposition totally unjustified.  The order on 30 May 2013 was perfectly clear in that leave to Cheung to file his supplemental statement was given on the basis that Sidepec would indeed file the supplemental statement of Wong; and would do so forthwith.  Hence the 21-day period for Cheung to file his supplemental statement in response.  Unless and until Sidepec did so, Cheung was not obliged to file his supplemental statement as there was simply no supplemental statement on behalf of Sidepec for Cheung to respond to.

9.  The fact was that Sidepec somehow decided to file the supplemental statement of Wong one and a half months after the order.  Not only did Sidepec offer no explanation for that, but it also maintained its opposition to what was effectively a consequential time summons taken out by Cheung.  This was wholly unjustified.

10.  As indicated during the hearing, Cheung could actually file his supplemental statement within the day.  I therefore gave leave to Cheung to do so with costs to Cheung, summarily assessed at HK$800 and payable in 14 days.

SIDEPEC’S APPLICATION

11.  O.25, r.1B(3) of the Rules of High Court and Practice Direction 5.2 provide that a milestone date, such as the trial date, shall not be varied unless in exceptional circumstances.  The ground now put forward was that Chan Sai King (“Chan”), a witness for Sidepec, would be unable to attend the trial due to illness.

12.  Counsel referred to Lam Yin Pok Bosco v Dr Chan Yee Shing & Anor, HCMP 2256/2012 (2 November 2012) and Arko Ship Leasing Ltd v Winsmart International Shipping Ltd [2013] 2 HKLRD 121.  Relevant to the circumstances of the present case were the following considerations:

(1)   The illness of a party or a witness may, depending on the circumstances of the case, justify vacating and re-fixing the trial date.  But the court is entitled to be satisfied that the inability of the litigant or witness to be present is genuine and the onus is on the applying party to prove the need for such an adjournment.

(2)   As far as medical evidence is concerned, it may be relevant to know if any ameliorative measures could be put in place if the party or witness were to have to give evidence; and to explain, if it were the case, why such ameliorative measures might not be sufficient to address the perceived difficulties.  An unexplained recommendation for an adjournment, even if accompanied by a diagnosis of the condition of the patient and the proposed course of treatment, does not serve the purpose.

(3)   It is necessary to consider whether the adjournment is likely to address the problem faced by the applying party.

(4)   It is also necessary to consider the nature of the evidence the witness intends to give, how important it is, and whether he is the only possible source of such evidence.

(5)   The risk of prejudice or disadvantages to the other party if the adjournment is granted should be considered.

(6)   The application must also be viewed in terms of the wider implications on the administration of justice.  This includes the public interest in the efficient despatch of the court’s business, and the effect on the interests of future litigants of vacating a hearing close to the date and possibly leaving the court empty.  In other words, the timing of the application for adjournment is important.

13.  For the purpose of the last hearing dated 30 May 2013, Sidepec already suggested that Chan’s health condition has been unwell since October 2012.  Medical evidence was produced.  I shall not repeat my observation about that as already set out in my reasons for decision handed down on 3 June 2013.  There was then no indication of inability of Chan to attend the trial or intention to apply for an adjournment of the trial.  By applying for adjournment of the trial now, Sidepec had to be suggesting that the condition of Chan has deteriorated since then.

14.  The medical records now produced suggested that Chan attended the hospital again on 13 June 2013.  The diagnosis was coronary heart disease, angina pectoris and hypertension.  Chan refused to be admitted and left with medication.  According to Wong, Chan could not quit all his scheduled jobs.

15.  Chan was eventually admitted to the hospital in Dongguan on 10 July 2013.  Diagnosis remained the same but his condition, as described, sounded like it was poorer than before.  Hospitalisation for half a year was recommended.  Recommendation against emotional excitement, agitation and travelling was made, or he might run the risk of triggering his disease and danger to life.

16.  Further medical records were produced by way of affirmation filed in the afternoon before the hearing.  The more up-to-date record suggested that Chan’s condition further deteriorated.  Whilst the condition was described as crisis, the recommendation remained that of hospitalisation for half a year.

17.  In view of the medical evidence, I was prepared to consider the application, assuming that Chan were prevented by illness from attending the trial.

18.  It was suggested that the trial would not be fair without the presence and evidence of Chan.  I found that to be exaggeration.

19.  Quite irrespective of the alleged beneficial interest of Chan in Sidepec, he was indeed neither a shareholder nor a director of the company.  There is no issue of the presence of Sidepec (which is legally represented anyway) in the trial, even if Chan is absent.  His role in the trial would really be that of a witness for Sidepec.

20.  As I observed in my written decision handed down on 3 June 2013, Wong was evidently behind the steer driving the deal between the parties from conception to conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement.  Wong is obviously the key witness for Sidepec in respect of the pleaded issues in dispute.

21.  Mr Liang specifically referred to Cheung’s allegation that Wong misrepresented that Sidepec was a company of his Mainland customer and friend and that Sidepec was in fact owned or controlled by Wong.  Mr Liang emphasized the importance of Chan’s evidence in rebuttal of that.

22.  The evidence that Chan would give is contained in his statement which is not more than the full length of 2 pages.  The material paragraphs of his statement aim at one point, namely, Wong dealt with Cheung pursuant to his authorisation and instruction.  As to the actual dealings between Wong and Cheung, Chan was not involved and had to rely on Wong’s reports.  When Sidepec saw the need to file supplemental evidence, including that of the detailed background of the dealings between Chan and Wong as well as the alleged beneficial interest of Chan in Sidepec, it was still Wong, not Chan, who made the supplemental statement (as mentioned above).

23.  In the premises, there is simply nothing that Chan plans to say in evidence (as those set out in his statement) that Wong would not be saying in his evidence and perhaps in even greater details.  Even assuming that Chan does not give evidence, Sidepec will not suffer from any handicap in its evidence.  The perceived risk due to the lack of corroboration by Chan of what Wong would say in evidence relating to a particular aspect of the case does not entitle Sidepec to seek an adjournment of the trial in the circumstances.

24.  Mr Liang suggested that there would be difficulty in obtaining instruction, if Chan was not present at the trial.  I doubt that.  I shall not repeat my observation about the role of Wong throughout this matter.  But it should be noted that the condition of Chan has not actually prevented Sidepec’s legal representatives from taking steps in this action.  The notice of change of solicitors was actually filed on the very day when Chan was admitted to the hospital.  Both parties should be ready now for what lies ahead in less than 2 weeks; and Sidepec is still fully represented, though by a completely different legal team.

25.  I disagree with the suggestion that an adjournment of the trial would not entail prejudice to Cheung that could not be compensated by way of costs.  This is an action to enforce an agreement concluded some 7 years ago.  There are other related proceedings between Wong and Cheung.  Then there was the timing of the adjournment being sought.  Allowing the adjournment at this stage and in these circumstances, when it is also not wholly justified, would have frustrated the proper administration of justice.

26.  I therefore dismissed Sidepec’s application for adjournment with costs.  Had the adjournment been granted, Sidepec would have expected an adverse order as to the costs to be taxed on a higher basis.  Now a failure, the application has occasioned to Cheung costs, which likewise ought to be taxed on a higher basis.  I summarily assessed such costs to be HK$95,000, which Sidepec shall pay within 14 days.

(Simon Leung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Alfred LIANG, instructed by Messrs W K To & Co for the plaintiff

Mr Paul LAM SC, instructed by Messrs Cheung Wong & Associates for the defendant

87449-EN-2013-06-03

SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHEUNG HING

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HCA 829/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 829 OF 2010

________________________

BETWEEN

 SIDEPEC INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CHEUNG HINGDefendant
________________________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing and Decision: 30 May 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 3 June 2013

__________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

__________________________

 

1.  Wong Chor Cheung (“Wong”) and the defendant each holds 50% issued shares in Wah Fung Forest Resources Ltd (“the Company”). As representative of the plaintiff, Wong concluded an agreement for the purchase of the defendant’s shares in the Company. The plaintiff is now seeking specific performance of the sale and purchase agreement. The defendant disputes liability; and counterclaims for, amongst others, rescission or termination of the agreement. Trial will commence on 1 August 2013; and is expected to last for 8 days.

2.  This was the plaintiff’s application for amendment of pleadings and introduction of additional evidence, oral and documentary.  The defendant opposed.  At the end of the hearing, I allowed the application for reasons which I now give.

3.  §34 of Practice Direction 5.2 regarding late application need no introduction.  Counsel referred to numerous cases, each of them demonstrating how the court exercised the discretion in different circumstances.  During the hearing, I referred counsel to Parsad v Great Wealthy Engineering Co Ltd [2012] 3 HKLRD 705. Bharwaney J said (at §6):

“Whilst the primary aim is to secure the just resolution of the dispute in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties, and which must include the right of a party to rely on admissible, relevant and probative factual evidence, the Court must also have regard to other relevant circumstances, such as the potential disruption to the trial, the prejudice to the other parties, and the explanation offered by the applicant for the late application. These matters have to be considered and weighed in the light of and against the underlying objectives of Civil Justice Reform to ensure cost effectiveness and economy, expedition, proportionality, and fairness between the parties.”

4.  His lordship said so in relation to late application for adducing supplemental factual evidence.  I see no reason why the same cannot be said to be true in relation to late application for amendment of pleading.  With respect, I say the above best summarises how the various concerns and factors would operate in the court’s mind when faced with an application like this in any given case.

LATE APPLICATION

5.  This was undoubtedly late application.

6.  By its listing questionnaire and submission during the case management conference in September 2012, the plaintiff’s solicitors already sought to amend its pleading and to adduce supplemental witness statement.  While giving leave to set down the case for trial, the court also gave 14 days to the plaintiff to take out any interlocutory application.  However nothing had since been done.

7.  At the pre-trial review on 8 May 2013, which was some 7 months later, Miss Tong for the plaintiff made an oral application for the plaintiff’s abovementioned purpose.  There was no explanation for the delay by way of affidavit.  Nor was there any draft amendment or witness statement for the defendant or the court to consider.  In this regard, the court has warned that an application for leave to adduce supplemental witness statements after the case has been or is ready to be set down for trial will not be considered without the provision of the signed statements containing statement of truth: see Parsad (at §7).  I see no reason why the same cannot be said about an application to amend pleadings taken out in similar circumstances.

8.  I therefore refused to entertain the oral application; but gave the plaintiff 14 days to take out a proper application.  The plaintiff did so in time by summons supported by the affirmation of Wong.  Hence this hearing.

9.  Wong essentially gave 2 reasons for the delay.  First, Chan Sai King (“Chan”), allegedly the beneficial owner of the plaintiff, has been physically unwell since October 2012 and had thus been prevented from confirming instruction to take out the application.  Second, Wong was too preoccupied by his own litigation with the defendant; and had been unable to give instruction to the plaintiff’s solicitors for the purpose of preparing for the plaintiff’s intended application.

10.  By indicating to the court prior to the last case management conference and seeking to amend the pleading and to adduce supplemental witness statements at the case management conference, the plaintiff’s solicitors must have already obtained instruction to do so from the plaintiff.  That Chan was unwell whether before or after that time could not be an excuse.

11.  Likewise, the physical condition of Chan had nothing to do with the preparation for the actual application.  From the existing pleading and witness statements, it is apparent that Wong was behind the steer driving the deal between the plaintiff and the defendant from conception to conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement. This became abundantly clear when the supplemental witness statement sought to be adduced was also that of Wong, not Chan.  As mentioned, the affirmation in support of the application also came from Wong, not Chan.

12.  The record of the case management conference revealed that it was the plaintiff’s solicitors who proposed 14 days for taking out the application.  In any event, there was then no indication of potential difficulty in meeting the deadline as directed.  As submitted by Mr Lam SC (appearing with Mr Lung), it was not the case that all the other litigations between Wong and the defendant were commenced in late 2012.

13.  Further, those other litigations between the Wong and the defendant actually concerned the Company as their property holding vehicle.  By the existing pleading, the defendant actually put in issue the relevance of the background for those other litigations between him and Wong.  In his supplemental witness statement, Wong indeed sought to deal with the defendant’s allegations in this respect.  In the circumstances, describing his litigation with the defendant as distraction from what he was supposed to deal with in the present case was also not entirely accurate.

14.  In short, I did not find the explanation for the delay to be impressive.

THE AMENDMENTS

15.  Of the statement of claim, the major amendments proposed were those of paragraphs 6 and 7.  The paragraphs concern the alleged orally agreed terms of the sale and purchase of the defendant’s shares during the conversation between Wong as representative of the plaintiff of one part and the defendant of the other.  As Mr Lam SC pointed out, the proposed amendments reflected change of the plaintiff’s pleaded case as to when, where and some of the terms allegedly agreed between Wong and the defendant.

16.  Mr Lam SC submitted that if the proposed amendments were put forward as the correct version, one asked how the existing version came to be verified by the statement of truth.  Miss Tong submitted that that the current pleaded version was verified by statement of truth did not prevent it from being amended.  She submitted that amendments should not be refused solely because they had been made necessary by the honest fault or mistake applying for leave to make them.

17.  As I understood, what Mr Lam SC meant was that any attempt to amend the pleading, which had been verified to be true, should be explained.  That must be right.  In the present case, the evidence that the amendments were necessitated by an honest mistake did not come from the plaintiff or Wong.  It came from Miss Tong in her submission.

18.  Miss Tong submitted that it would be fundamentally unfair to force a party to run a case known to be incorrect simply because the application to amend the pleaded case was refused for being late.  This might sound reasonable from the point of view of the applying party.  However, if the application to amend was indeed made so late that it would be allowed at the expense of substantial justice to the other party or the scheduled trial, then the correct decision might well be one of dismissal of the application; and the applying party might well have to accept that he was the author of his own predicament.  In other words, it all depends on circumstances.

19.  As to the proposed amendments to the reply and defence to counterclaim, Mr Lam SC submitted that most of them were unnecessary.  But I accept that some of them were indeed introduced so as to reflect what was covered by the existing witness statements for the plaintiff.  Then there was also mere pleading of the legal effect or position on the basis of the existing pleaded facts (eg, §6A). The more controversial ones included those (§§3(p); (q); (r)) that were introduced to align this pleading with the proposed amendments to the statement of claim (§§6 and 7).  They fell to be considered together; and I repeat the discussion above.

SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS STATEMENT (AND DISCOVERY)

20.  Mr Lam SC had no objection to part of the supplemental statement of Wong (ie, §§16-28; 32-33; 35-36; 38-39; 59-60; 62-63).  He objected to some (eg §§14-15) which would effectively be evidence consequential upon the amendment of the statement of claim being sought in this application.

21.  Part of the supplemental statement related to the dealings between Chan and Wong before and after the conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant (eg §§4-13; 34; 37; 40; 46-50; 51-57).  They together with the rest, Mr Lam SC submitted, were irrelevant.  Mr Lam SC submitted that the core dispute should be how and what oral terms of the agreement came to be agreed between the parties.

22.  As a matter of pleading, the defendant actually also seeks to rescind the sale and purchase agreement for fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff (through Wong).  The alleged misrepresentation related to whether the plaintiff is genuinely an independent entity or in fact mere nominee or agent of Wong.  Now the plaintiff chose to answer the allegation by leading evidence of the details of the dealings between Chan and Wong leading to and in connection with the sale and purchase agreement.  In the circumstances, I would not rule out the relevance of such evidence.

23.  As to further discovery, I am referring to the documents sought to be introduced by way of annexure to the supplemental witness statement.

PREJUDICE

24.  In view of the above discussion, I thought the consideration boiled down to that of the risk of injustice to the parties respectively as a result of allowing or disallowing the application to amend the pleadings and to adduce the additional evidence.  This inevitably entailed the consideration of the prejudice to the defendant who was at the receiving end of this application.

25.  Essentially, I considered what the defendant would fairly be expected to be entitled to do in response to the amendment of the pleadings and the new evidence; and whether that could fairly be done without jeopardising the commencement of the trial. Considering the nature of the amendments to the pleadings and further evidence of the matters concerning the defendant personally, I expected him to be readily able to respond in accordance with his personal knowledge.  As to the further evidence of the dealings between Chan and Wong, I expected the defendant to be unable to say much in any event.

26.  There was no indication by the defendant that the amendments to the pleadings and the further evidence would entail time-consuming further investigation or discovery of documentary evidence.  Indeed Mr Lam SC put the effect of allowing the application on the trial date as no higher than a mere possibility.  At the pre-trial review, one day was actually added to the original estimated length of the trial.  The timetable proposed by Mr Lam SC (consequential upon allowing the application), as apparent from the order made (below), actually suggested that the time before the scheduled trial date should still suffice.  The prejudice in the form of time and costs to be incurred by the defendant as a result could well be compensated.

27.  It was after the above consideration of the circumstances of the present case that I came to the conclusion that discretion could and should be exercised in allowing the application.

ORDER

28.  For the above reasons, I made the following order at the end of the hearing:

(1)   The plaintiff do have leave to amend the statement of claim as per the draft attached as Annex 1 to the summons; and that the amended pleading shall be filed and served by 4:00 of the following day (i.e., 31 May 2013);

(2)   The defendant do have leave to file and serve amended defence and counterclaim within 21 days from the date hereof;

(3)   The plaintiff do have leave to amend the reply and defence to counterclaim as per the draft attached as Annex 2 to the summons but:

(a)    subject to leave to the plaintiff to make further amendment strictly consequential upon the amendments to the defence and counterclaim pursuant to (2) above; and

(b)   the amended reply and defence to counterclaim incorporating the amendments pursuant to (a) above shall be filed and served within 14 days after service of the amended defence and counterclaim pursuant to (2) above;

(4)   The plaintiff do have leave to file and serve the supplemental witness statement of Wong Chor Cheung (as per the draft attached as Annex 3 to the summons) and to rely on the same at the trial;

(5)   The defendant do have leave to file and serve supplemental witness statement in respect of the contents of the plaintiff’s supplemental witness statement within 21 days from the date hereof.

29.  As to costs, I saw no room for reasonably arguing that the plaintiff should not bear the costs of and occasioned by its application.  The real dispute lies in the costs of the hearing.  As the applying party, it was to begin with the burden of the plaintiff to satisfy the court why discretion ought to be exercised in its favour at this stage.  It was never the burden of the defendant to show why the application should not be allowed.

30.  As discussed above, the plaintiff’s affirmation in support would have caused the defendant to insist on bringing this application before the court for determination.  The hearing was not unnecessarily or unreasonably occasioned by the defendant’s objection in the circumstances.  The court has also pointed out that the applicant in a late application should normally be expected to face an adverse order (and in appropriate circumstances on indemnity basis): see Li Xiao Yun & Anor v China Gas Holdings Ltd, CACV 39/2013 (11 March 2013) at §18.  It was only fair that the defendant ought to have its costs including those of this hearing in any event.  So I ordered.  Being asked, the defendant did not seek summary assessment of his costs.  I therefore ordered those to be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for one counsel.

(Simon Leung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Miss Sara TONG, instructed by Messrs Maurice W M Lee Solicitors, for the plaintiff

Mr Paul LAM SC and Mr Vincent LUNG, instructed by Messrs Cheung Wong & Associates, for the defendant