HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2010

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAO HONG AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV190/2014MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAO HONG AND OTHERS
  • CACV193/2011MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

Files (10)

[2019] HKCFI 2535-CH-2019-10-16

澳門第一環球國際有限公司 對 丁小紅及另二人

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

[2019] HKCFI 2535

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2010年第992號

____________

BETWEEN  
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 DING XIAOHONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
____________

(By Original Action)

AND BETWEEN  
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff

and

 DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
2nd Defendant
____________

(By Counterclaim)

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如內庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2019年10月8日
判決日期 :2019年10月16日

判決書

引言

1.  本訴訟於2014年8月20日以書面判決結束。原告人澳門第一環球及反申索的原告人丁育先生被判敗訴。丁育先生不服,提出上訴,由於他沒法提供上訴保證金,因此他的上訴申請於2017年被上訴法庭撤銷。從此,本案正式畫上句號。丁育先生發出本傳票,日期爲2019年7月19日,申請取回他所呈堂的證物(全是文件),以便他在上海進行訴訟。

法律原則

2.  根據《高等法院規則》第35號命令第12規則,司法常務官須將所有已妥為標識及標記的證物保留,加以保管,直至上訴獲得最終處理為止。除非法庭另有指示,否則保留證物時限一經屆滿,曾提交任何證物的訴訟每一方,均有責任向司法常務官申請退回該等證物,並領回該等證物。

反對理由

3.  受託人和丁鋼先生均反對申請,因爲丁育先生於2016年9月21日被判令破產,破產管理署署長成爲他的受託人。反對理由可以歸納爲4點:

(1) 丁育先生沒有得到受託人的授權作出此申請;

(2) 丁育先生的財產屬於受託人;

(3) 丁育先生沒有得到受託人的授權在上海進行訴訟;

(4) 某些文件的擁有權看來不屬於丁育先生,因此,在未有確定該些文件的擁有權時,法庭不應輕易把證物清單上的文件給回丁育先生。

第一個反對理由

4.  根據《香港法例》第6章《破產條例》第58條,在破產令發出後,丁育先生的據法產權或訴訟權利即歸屬受託人。

5.  又根據同一條例的第12(1) 條,破產人不得進行或開始任何訴訟或其他法律程序。

6.  丁育先生原於2018年致函法庭,提出要求取回證物。梁陳彭律師行覆函提出反對。在得悉丁育先生已於2016年9月21日被判令破產後,本席於2018年10月14日發函雙方,請丁育先生和受託人商議,然後於42天內發出傳票,處置證物(「法庭函件」)。同時,本席質疑丁育先生的財產究竟是否應該歸受託人?因為不是所有文件均有「財產」的價值,即屬可分配給債權人的財產。

7.  在發出破産令後,丁育先生從沒有聯絡過受託人,也沒有回應受託人兩次着他往辦事處會面的邀請。在本席發函後約9個月,丁育先生發出本傳票。該傳票並沒有送達受託人或任何與訟方。丁育先生藉着他沒有權利委託的段和段律師事務所去信法庭,要求法庭對某些事情作答。如此明顯地違反法庭函件所作出的指示,亦繞過了受託人的監察。結果法庭須指示丁育先生送達該傳票,但丁育先生至今仍沒有交代有沒有送達給丁小紅。

8.  既然丁育先生沒有得到受託人的同意,他是沒有權利提出本傳票的。

第二個反對理由

9.  根據《破產條例》第2及第43條,破產人的產業包括其財產、貨品。「貨品」在第2條的定義包括一切非土地實產 (chattels personal)。除非該些物品屬於《破產條例》第43(2)條中所說的「破產人在其受僱工作、業務或職業中為供其本人使用而必需有的工具、簿冊、車輛及其他設備項目」或「為滿足破產人及其家庭的基本家庭需要而必需有的衣物、寢具、家具、家居設備及供應品」,才不屬破產人「產業」的定義。

10.  本案的證物均符合「產業」的定義,無論那些證物是否能化作金錢來抵償欠債,也歸屬受託人,丁育先生無權處置。

第三個反對理由

11.  相關的訴訟為(2019)滬民終196號(「2019案件」)。受託人指出,該案件似乎是就早前一宗上海的案件而提出的,案號為(2015)滬一中民四(商)初字第S22-2號(「2015案件」)。根據梁陳彭律師行於2017年11月23日致法院的信件,2015案件實際上已因本案而終止,而2015案件的事實基礎與本案相同。無論如何,受託人並沒有同意進行訴訟,因此丁育先生無權提出或進行該2019案件,亦無權取回本庭的證物以進行訴訟。

第四個反對理由

12.  代表丁鋼先生的羅大律師指出,證物清單中不難發現文件有多份合約、分約、賬戶卡、房產證等多份財產轉移或證明文件。該些財產轉移或證明文件擁有價值,應歸屬破產受託人,受託人可變賣該些財產,償還丁育先生的債務,或是進一步調查丁育先生是否有財產可歸還債務。

13.  本席不認為該些文件是可變買的,因為在審訊時,本席收取過作爲證物的正本產權文件, 都涉及已出售的物業和物品。然而,它們仍屬《破產條例》第2條所定義的財產。

14.  再者,羅大律師又指出,證物清單中有許多文件並不屬於丁育先生,而是:

(i) 屬於丁鋼先生的: 證物編號D-5, D-30, D-50, D-54, D-59, D-70, D‑81, D-91, D-102, D-108, D-117, D-119, D-149, D-164, D-165, D-168 (「丁鋼的文件」); 及

(ii) 屬於香港第一大陸有限公司的: 證物編號D-43. D-44. D-47, D-58, D-61, D‑76, D-78, D-112, D-125, D-126, D-146 (「香港第一大陸的文件」)。

15.  丁育先生未有在其誓章中指出上一段的文件屬於他(丁育)或解釋爲何不應歸還丁鋼先生或香港第一大陸。然而,羅大律師並不反對把文件全部交給受託人處理。

16.  由於文件是由丁育先生呈交的,但受託人未有機會審視或考慮文件在管理破產產業中的效用。因此把證物交給受託人是正確的做法。

17.  此外,雖然丁育先生沒有出席聆訊,但本席讀過他的誓章和書面陳詞,他不過是提出不服本席2014年判決的理由,及解釋爲甚麽在上海提起訴訟,他的陳詞對他的申請毫無幫助。

結論

18.  綜合而言,丁育先生並沒有權利或理據提出本傳票,四個反對理由也成立。原則上,該傳票應予撤銷。

19.  不過,本案的訴訟已完結多年,證物必須退回相關的訴訟方。本席指示如下:

(1) 撤銷丁育先生的申請;

(2) 受託人於本命令發出14天內領回丁育一方所呈交的證物;

(3) 在其後的42天或法庭給予的延期內,除非受託人有合理的理由繼續保管,否則受託人必須把丁鋼的文件、香港第一大陸的文件及丁育的文件退回相關的一方;及

(4) 暫令訟費由丁育的產業支付。

19.  本席感謝羅大律師及受託人的協助。

(歐陽桂如)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

  

原訴案件的原告人及反申索的第一及二被告人:由梁陳彭律師行轉聘羅德謙大律師代表

原訴案件的第二被告人及反申索的原告人:無律師代表,缺席聆訊

[2019] HKCFI 2099-CH-2019-08-07

澳門第一環球國際有限公司 對 丁小紅及另二人

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

[2019] HKCFI 2099

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2010年第992號

____________

BETWEEN  
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED(澳門第一環球國際有限公司) Plaintiff
 and 
 DING XIAOHONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED(香港第一大陸有限公司) 3rd Defendant

____________

(By Original Action)

AND BETWEEN  
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff
 and 
 DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED(澳門第一環球國際有限公司) 2nd Defendant

____________

(By Counterclaim)

主審法官 :高等法院原訟法庭法官歐陽桂如
聆訊日期 :2019年8月7日
判決日期 :2019年8月7日

判決書

1.  本席清楚丁育先生今次的傳票申請是想取回案件的證物,好使他的上海訴訟能夠使用這些文件。

2.  澳門第一環球有限公司 (「澳門第一」) 反對丁先生的申請,陳亨利代表律師第十五份非宗教式誓詞列出原因。而根據澳門第一的代表羅大律師的扼要陳詞,主要理由是雖然上訴已無法進行,但證物中可能包括丁育先生的個人財產,而丁育先生目前在破產期間,未得破產受託人同意情況下不能動用財產,亦不能在任何地方進行訴訟。

3.  本席無須在今天決定澳門第一的反對理由是否成立,原因是本席同意羅大律師所指,在程序上丁育先生所提出的傳票有一些欠缺,而同時因為丁育先生方在今天才將傳票及誓章的副本送達給破產管理署,破產管理署沒有足夠的時間考慮及提出支持或反對的理由。因此,案件為公平起見,必須押後處理。

4.  羅大律師亦向法庭指出,證物除了可能包含丁育先生資產的文件外,亦有可能有文件屬於澳門第一,甚或是其他訴訟方,例如丁小紅女士的,因此,正確的程序是丁育先生應該通知其他訴訟方有關今次的傳票申請,讓與訟人有機會向法庭提出反對因由。因此,法庭會將今天的申請押後。

5.  此外,丁育先生今天沒有出席,並且要求由周睿先生代表。本席看過丁育先生所交來的文件,雖然文件顯示他身體有不適的情況,但他所提交的證據並不符合法庭所要求的,即是證據未能顯示他身體的不適與不良於行、甚至不能出席法庭有關。因此之故,本席不批准周睿先生代表丁育先生。

6.  話雖如此,丁育先生若不出席以後的聆訊,他仍然有機會可以用書面方式向法庭作出陳詞。但除了律師之外,他不可以找其他人代表。

7.  本席作出如下指示:

(1)  不批准周睿先生代表丁育先生;

(2)  丁育先生於七天之內,將以下文件送達給丁小紅女士、香港第一大陸有限公司 (「香港第一」)、丁鋼先生及破產管理署:

(a)  2019年7月19日的申請傳票;

(b)  2019年7月19日丁育先生存檔的誓章;

(c)  丁育先生及/或段和段律師事務所從2018年10月5日至今與法庭之間的信件;

(d)  陳亨利的第十五份非宗教式誓詞;

(e)  澳門第一代表大律師羅德謙日期為2019年8月6日的書面陳詞。

(3)  破產管理署、丁小紅、香港第一及丁鋼可於獲丁育送達傳票及誓章後的21天內存檔及送達反對誓章,說明任何反對理由;

(4)  丁育可於其後14天內存檔及送達回覆誓章;

(5)  所有就本傳票而存檔的文件或呈遞給法庭的文件,亦必須送達破產管理署及與訟各方;

(6)  未得法庭准許,任何一方不能夠存檔任何進一步的誓章;

(7)  押後至10月8日上午9時30分,預留一小時;

(8)  任何一方可隨時向法庭作出申請;及

(9)  訟費保留。

  
 

 (歐陽桂如)
 高等法院原訟法庭法官

原審案件的原告人及反申索的第二被告人:由梁陳彭律師行轉聘 羅德謙大律師代表

原審案件的第二被告人及反申索的原告人:無律師代表,缺席聆訊

  

105756-EN-2016-06-21

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

NO 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff
and
 DING XIAOHONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 (By Original Action) 
____________
AND BETWEEN  
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff
and
 DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 17 June 2016
Date of Decision: 21 June 2016

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________


1.  This is an application by DG and MF (“DG’s Camp”) to enforce an undertaking as to damages (“the undertaking”) given when the court granted a receivership order. DY and DXH have been served at their last known address but did not appear. DXH was detained in Mainland China and the application did not really concern her. I thus proceeded in their absence. Subsequent to the hearing, LCP confirmed that HKF would take a neutral stance in the application.

2.  The receivership order was made on 10 March 2011 upon DY’s undertaking:

“to abide by any order this Court may make as to damages if the Court later finds that this Order has caused loss to Ding Gang personally and/or Macau First Universal International Limited … (ie the Plaintiff by original action and the 2nd Defendant by counterclaim) and/or Hong Kong First Mainland Company Limited … (the 3rd Defendant by original action) … and decides that it or they should be compensated for that loss…”

3.  Pursuant to my order to fortify that undertaking, DY paid the first tranche of $6.4 million into court.  The Court of Appeal discharged the receivership order, so the 2nd tranche of $3.6m was not paid in by DY.

4.  After trial, DG’s camp got judgment in their favour on 20 August 2014 (“the Judgment”).

5.  The receivers’ costs have been taxed and allowed by Master J Wong in the sum of $14,721,513.  The $6.4 million was paid out on 19 April 2016 to partially satisfy the costs due to the receivers.  The balance of $8,321,513 will be paid, by order, by MF and HKF to the receivers, as to $4,150,000 on 19 June 2016 and as to $4,171,513 on 19 August 2016 respectively.

6.  DG’s camp seeks an order for DY to make up the difference between the Receivers’ taxed costs and the sum paid into court by DY.

7.  DY has not put forth any ground in opposition to the present application.  Although he has launched an appeal against the Judgment, the appeal has not proceeded in the last 21 months.  The application is justly taken out.  The costs to the receivers represented the damage suffered by DG’s camp and HKF as a result of the Receivership Order and DG’s camp should be compensated for that loss.

8.  I therefore order DY to indemnify DG’s camp pursuant to the undertaking given by DY under the receivership order dated 10 March 2011 by paying to the plaintiff:

(i)   $4,150,000 on or before 19 June 2016;

(ii)   $4,171,513 on or before 19 August 2016.

9.  Costs shall follow the event and be to the plaintiff, summarily assessed and allowed at $40,000.

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by LCP, for the plaintiff (by original action) and defendants (by counterclaim)

The 2nd defendant (by original action) and the plaintiff (by counterclaim) was not represented and did not appear

The 3rd defendant (by original action) was not represented and did not appear

96241-EN-2014-11-11

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAO HONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 DING XIAO HONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
____________
 (By Original Action) 
AND BETWEEN  
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff

and

DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
2nd Defendant
____________
 (by Counterclaim) 
Before:  Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Dates of Hearing: 11 November 2014
Date of Decision:  11 November 2014

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1. This is an application by Ding Gang/Macau First for inquiry as to damages pursuant to an undertaking as to damages given by the defendant DY. DG/Macau First also applies for interim payment in the suggested sum of $14.75 million.

2. The undertaking as to damages arose as a result of DY’s application for receivership pending the trial of this action.  The receivership order provided for remuneration of the receivers to be paid out of the assets of Macau First in the first instance.

3. DG/Macau First now seeks interim payment, being about 50 percent of the receivers’ bill of costs, reduced to about $24.69 million.  DG/Macau First accepts that they cannot seek interim payment in relation to legal costs of instructing Herbert Smith to appeal against that receivership order.

4. The facts before me is that the receivers’ bill has not yet been taxed or paid by DG/Macau First.  That, of course, does not prevent them from taking out the present application.  This is because pursuant to the undertaking as to damages, DY may be held liable to pay to DG/Macau First what they have repaid the receivers (see Order 29, rule 9).  Mr Henry Chan’s affirmation that the bills should be paid by DY merely stated the net result without referring to the proper channel is wrong, but that does not affect the right of the applicants to take out this application.

5. I have to decide whether or not to give directions for inquiry into damages and also the interim payment. 

6. Insofar as the inquiry is concerned, I agree with Mr Law that it is premature.  The bill of the receivers has not yet been taxed; neither DG nor DY has had the opportunity to question the quantum or substance of those bills; it is not clear how much of those bills will be taxed down.  Therefore, giving directions on inquiry as to damages is, in my view, not appropriate at this stage.

7. The next question is the amount of the interim payment.  DY objects to the figure $24.69 million as excessive, representing an average of 1.5 million per month.  I reiterate my observation in the decision of 7 March 2012 that using monthly estimates are not appropriate.  Some items of cost and expenses cannot be assessed on a monthly basis.  Estimates in my decision dated 7 March 2012 are not appropriate either because they are overtaken by the receivers’ bill which are not before the court today, I only have a lump-sum breakdown by letter from the receivers.

8. There is, of course, no doubt that DG/Macau First will recover substantial sums from DY.  However, Mr Law has rightly referred me to my judgment of 7 March 2012.  At that time, faced with estimated costs of $12.5 million on the part of the receivers, I had only asked DY to provide fortification in the sum of $6.4 million which was to cover the period from making of the receivership order up to and including 31 May 2012.  Two months beyond that date the Court of Appeal has already set aside the receivership order. 

9. I share Mr Law’s concern as to why between the dates of hearing, January 2012 to July 2012, the bills of the receivers would have doubled and, secondly, whether or not the $6.4 million would have been enough “security” for the potential liabilities under the receivership order.  Without the receivers’ bill before me, I am unable to pluck a figure from thin air and increase the amount of $6.4 million as security for DG/Macau First.

10. I do not consider it appropriate to order interim payment at this stage.  Accordingly the appropriate thing for me to do is to adjourn the whole summons which should be restored once the taxation on the receivers’ bills comes into existence.

11. As I have indicated in the course of the arguments, knowing the amount claimed by the receivers, knowing the points in issue raised by DG or DY are important to enable me to decide on what interim payment DY should pay.  It is also an important consideration for this court because DG/Macau First are out the jurisdiction of Hong Kong and at this stage I do not feel safe that monies now placed in court for future security to be provided by DY should leave the jurisdiction of Hong Kong pending any taxation of the receivers’ bills.

12. So I adjourn the summons with liberty to restore.  The court should be updated on progress as to taxation of the receivers’ bills in three months’ time by a joint letter from the parties’ solicitors.

(Discussion between court and counsel)

13. A substantial part of today’s argument really turns on the interim payment.  DG/Macau First has asked for a substantial sum, but despite the opportunity to reply they still insist on something in the region of $10 million.  I am of the view that the costs of this hearing ought to be to DY to be assessed on the papers summarily.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Jeevan Hingorani and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by LCP, for the plaintiff by original action and for the 1st and 2nd defendants by counterclaim

Mr M C Law, instructed by Dexter Lam & Co, for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants by original action and for the plaintiff by counterclaim

94530-EN-2014-08-20

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAO HONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

NO 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 DING XIAO HONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 (By Original Action) 
____________
AND BETWEEN  
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff

and

 DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 
____________
Before:  Hon Au-Yeung J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 1, 4-8, 11-15, 18, 19, 21, 22 & 25-28 March,8-10, 15‑18, 22-26, 29 & 30 April, 2, 3, 6-10, 13 & 14 May and 19-21 June 2014

Date of Judgment:  20 August 2014

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

ContentsPara
A.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......1-31
B.  THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASE...32-41
C.  THE BURDEN OF PROOF.......42-47
D.  PRINCIPLES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN EVIDENCE.......48-65
E.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.......66-79
F.  EFFECT OF NOT PUTTING ONE’S CASE TO THE OPPOSING PARTY’S WITNESSES.....80-87
G.  THE CLAIM IN TRUST............88-119
H.  THE CLAIM IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP.........120-125
I.  1980s TO EARLY 1993: EARLY ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH OF DG AND DY ......126-193
J.  1993: THE SETTING UP OF PURAO.........194-277
K.  1993: THE PROPERTY DIVISION AGREEMENT AND THE GIFT AGREEMENT......278-312
L.  1993-1997: DINGTAI......313-377
M.  1997: ACQUISITION OF THE LAND..........378-417
N.  1997: SETTING UP OF BADING........418-435
O.  1998: RAILWAY REDEVELOPMENT AND RAILWAY COMMERCIAL.......436-463
P.  2000: PRIVATISATION OF DINGTAI AND INCREASE IN SHARE CAPITAL FROM RMB 10M TO RMB 100M....464-485
Q.  2000: OBTAINING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDING AND CONTROL OVER BADING ......486-492
R.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOWER.........493-529
S.  ARRANGING FINANCE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOWER.......530-548
T.  2003: THE BAI INCIDENT (白曉江事件)......549-564
U.  HOLDING OF SHARES IN BADING ACQUIRED FROM FOREIGN INVESTORS .....565-586
V.  2003: BUYING OUT OF THE LAST FOREIGN INVESTOR........587-594
W.  2004: THE DXH GIFT AGREEMENT AND SXP GIFT AGREEMENT........595-618
X.  2004-2006: HONG KONG FIRST AND MACAU FIRST........619-634
Y.  2005-2007: DG AND DY’S APPLICATION FOR EMIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA ....635-641
Z.  DY’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL OVER BADING AND HONG KONG FIRST ....642-645
AA.  2010: THE DISPUTE THAT LED TO THIS ACTION.........646-655
AB.  2010: THE IMPUGNED TRANSFERS IN MAY.........656-659
AC.  SUMMARY OF OVERALL FINDINGS OF FACTS..........660-698
AD.  FINDINGS ON THE CLAIM IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP.......699-713
AE.  FINDINGS ON THE CLAIM AGAINST DXH AND DY........714-717
AF.  CONCLUSION.........718-725
AG  ORDERS........726-729

  

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. It is the dream of any businessman: to own a valuable piece of land with a prestigious tower erected on it at the centre of Shanghai. The dream became a nightmare when he had to fight bitterly with his brother over the issue of who really owned the land and tower, causing a complete destruction of brotherhood.  To decide the case, this court has to consider evidence from liars (principally siblings) on both sides.

2. The Ding family started off in poor circumstances in Shangrao city.  Ding Xiao Hong (“DXH”), Ding Wei (“DW”) (not a party to this case), Ding Yu (“DY”) and Ding Gang (“DG”) are siblings.  Their parents are the late Ding Mian (“the Father”) and Fang Mei Hua (“the Mother”). DG was a favoured child of the family born in 1968.  His former wife was Su Xiao Ping (“SXP”).  DY’s wife is Jiang Wen.

3. The main protagonists are DG and DY, whose cases are diametrically opposite.  There is a dispute as to which of them earned the first pot of gold in the 1980s and gradually built up a business empire. 

4. 1993 was a critical year in which 2 guakao companies (explained in Section I5 below) were set up –上海浦饒物產工貿公司 (“Purao”) and上海鼎泰物產國際貿易有限公司(“Dingtai”). 

5. Purao was set up in April 1993.  There is a dispute as to whether DG or DY provided the initial capital of RMB 1m for setting it up and the additional capital of RMB 10m in October that year.  DG claimed to have accumulated wealth from his sole-proprietorship to pay for the capital.  DY claimed to have wealth of about RMB 150m by 1993, including 3 companies he and DW set up in Hainan (“the Hainan Companies”) and other assets.  He said he provided the capital.

6. On 6/6/1993, a 財產分約 (“Property Division Agreement”) and a 贈送書 (“Gift Agreement”) were executed at the direction of the Father.  The former divided up assets between DY and DW.  The latter was for DY and DW to make a gift worth about RMB 2m to DG who did not have much earning capacity.  DG disputed the authenticity of the 2 Agreements and denied ever receiving the gift.

7. In November 1993, to take advantage of the tax benefits provided by the Waigaoqiao Tax Region (“the WGQ Tax Region”), Dingtai was set up.  Again, each of DG and DY claimed to be the owner who had provided the initial capital of RMB 10m.

8. By 1996/1997, DY has lost millions through speculation in futures.  DG claimed that as a result, DY had lost all his wealth and Dingtai was brought into serious financial difficulties.  DG claimed to have retrieved control over Dingtai and paid off its debts.  DY disputed these.  He claimed to still have RMB 50-60m even after losing in futures.

9. In 1997, the land at No. 33, Hua Yuan Shiqiao Road, Puding New District, Shanghai, PRC (“the Land”) was purchased in the name of Dingtai.  The price was US$27,720,000 (about RMB 230,000,000 at that time).  The Land remained undeveloped until about 2001.  Funds had to be borrowed.

10. Dingtai entered into a joint venture with one Balin (HK) Company Limited (“Balin”). They incorporated Shanghai Bading Property Development Co Ltd (“Bading”), which held the Land and eventually the Citicorp Tower (“the Tower”) built over it.  Dingtai initially held 40% shares of Bading, whereas foreign investors (“the Foreign Investors”) held 60%.

11. There is dispute as to who negotiated for the purchase of the Land, raised the Land premium and brought in the Foreign Investors.

12. In 1998, funds were injected into Bading by 2 Railway Companies, ie Railway Redevelopment Co Ltd (“Railway Redevelopment”) and Railway Commercial Co Ltd (“Railway Commercial”) which DG and DY each claimed to be his. 

13. In 2000, Dingtai was privatized as a result of national policy.  The shares were transferred into the names of DY, SXP and a Shangrao company.  There is dispute as to why the shareholding was like that and who raised the money for the privatisation.

14. The Land premium was fully paid by June 2002.

15. The Asian financial crisis occurred soon after the Land was purchased.  The Foreign Investors gradually withdrew.  In 2000, the Shanghai Holding Companies (上海申鑫Shanghai Shenxin and 上海鼎興Shanghai Dingxing) and the Shangrao Companies (上饒三鑫Shangrao Sanxin, 上饒三清Shangrao Sanqing and 上饒鼎興Shangrao Dingxin) were set up.  They directly or indirectly held Bading shares took over from the Foreign Investors. 

16. By 2003, the last Foreign Investor, Lee Tung, was bought out at a consideration of RMB 150m (being RMB 149,990,000 advance dividends and MOP 10,000).  By then, all the shares in Bading became wholly owned by persons or companies which DG and DY each claimed to be his nominees or corporate vehicles.

17. In 2003, DY was removed as legal representative of Dingtai.  In the same year, DY transferred all his shares in Dingtai to DXH.  Notwithstanding that DY claimed to be in control of Bading internally and externally, he claimed that the handover of control to DG was because of a 白曉江事件(“the Bai Incident”) in 2003.

18. The Tower built over the Land was completed on 27/9/2004. Each of DG and DY claimed that the construction of the Tower (“the Project”) was carried out with him as the fund raiser and decision maker.

19. On 7/2/2004, DXH and SXP executed notarized deeds of gift (“the DXH Gift Agreement” and “SXP Gift Agreement” respectively) to acknowledge DG’s ownership in various assets and companies, including all those which held interests in Bading.

20. On 1/9/2004, the 3rd defendant (“Hong Kong First”) was set up.  DXH held 95,000 shares (95%) and DY 5,000 (5%).  Up to 25/7/2006, they had been the only 2 shareholders and directors. 

21. By a series of transfers and use of corporate vehicles, the shares in Bading have been ultimately owned, since July 2006, by Hong Kong First.

22. On 23/1/2006, the plaintiff (“Macau First”) was set up.  The shareholders were DG (85%), DY (5%), DXH (5%) and SXP (5%).

23. On 22/2/2006, Hong Kong First allotted 4,900,000 new shares to Macau First (“the HKF Allotment”). Hence Macau First became a 98% shareholder of Hong Kong First. 

24. On 3/7/2006, DXH and DY transferred their respective 95,000 and 5,000 shares in Hong Kong First to Macau First (“the 2006 Transfers”).  Macau First thus became 100% owner of Hong Kong First.  DG and DXH were the only 2 directors of Macau First before the Impugned Transfers of shares referred to below. 

25. On12/7/2006, DY, DXH and SXP respectively transferred 5%, 4% and 5% shares in Macau First to DG. Hence DG became 99% and DXH 1% shareholder of Macau First.

26. Shortly after the 2006 Transfers, on 25/7/2006, DY resigned as director of Hong Kong First.  He was reappointed as director on 20/5/2010, and since then, he and DXH were the only 2 directors of Hong Kong First.

27. For about 4 years since July 2006 until the Impugned Transfers, Macau First had been the sole registered owner of all the shares in Hong Kong First.  Hong Kong First held all the shares of Bading.  Bading held the Land and the Tower.  Each of DG and DY claimed that the shares in Hong Kong First and Macau First were held by nominees on his behalf.

28. In 2005 and 2007 respectively, DG and DY applied for immigration to Australia under the category for entrepreneurs and senior staff respectively.

29. The direct events that led to this litigation were as follows: according to DY, dispute between him and DG arose in about March and April 2010 when DG refused to release profits and loan proceeds of Bading to DY for him to invest in new projects.  DG also allegedly refused to let DY inspect the books and accounts of Bading.  With a view to protecting his own investments and regain control over Bading, DY, together with DXH, carried out the Impugned Transfers.

30. On 19/5/2010, DXH caused Macau First to transfer all its shares in Hong Kong First to DY (95%) and herself (5%) (“the Impugned Transfers”).  There is no dispute that there was no resolution of the board (comprising DG and DXH) of Macau First and the purported consideration of HK$5m had never been received by Macau First.  In any event, HK$5m was a gross undervalue because the underlying assets (including the Land and Tower) were worth billions of RMB as at the date of the writ.

31. After the Impugned Transfers, DY and DXH removed Yu Xia An (“YXA”), the then legal representative of Bading and nephew of DY and DG, and appointed DY in his place.  They also tried to remove Bading’s seals and business certificates in June 2010 by force.  The staff of Bading reported to the Mainland police and DG.  It was then that DG discovered the Impugned Transfers, so he commenced the present action. 

B. THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASE

32. The substance of this dispute is who, DG or DY, owned the beneficial interest in the shares of Hong Kong First and Macau First.  DXH was a nominee of either DG or DY.

33. The case of Macau First is simple.  The Impugned Transfers were wrongful.  They should be rescinded, or there should be a declaration that the shares in Hong Kong First currently registered in the names of DY and DXH are held by them on trust for Macau First.

34. As against DXH, Macau First claims for damages or equitable compensation for her breach of fiduciary duties in stripping Macau First of its sole asset at effectively no consideration.  It is said that she breached the self-dealing rule which prohibits a trustee from selling trust property to herself and the transaction is voidable by the beneficiary.

35. Macau First also claims against DXH and DY for damages for conspiracy.  It avers that the Impugned Transfers are liable to be set aside on the basis of the "fair-dealing rule" unless DXH and DY can discharge the burden of demonstrating that the Impugned Transfers represented a fair dealing of assets of Macau First.

36. DY’s pleaded case is that there was an agreement or trust arrangement under which DG, DXH and SXP held the shares in Macau First (“the MF Trust”) and Hong Kong First (“the HKF Trust”) on his behalf (“the claim in trust”). 

37. DY’s original claim that he was the real beneficial owner of the Land and the Tower was abandoned.  Instead, he rests his case on being beneficial owner of the shares in companies starting from Purao and all intervening companies up to Hong Kong First and Macau First, set up allegedly with his money or at his direction (“the claim in beneficial ownership”). 

38. DY seeks a declaration that he is the sole beneficial shareholder of Macau First and Hong Kong First; that the shares held by DG in Macau First is and has been held by him as nominee and/or trustee for DY; and that prior to the Impugned Transfers, Macau First held the shares in Hong Kong First as nominee and on trust for DY.  He seeks an order for DG to transfer the Macau First shares to him (prayer nos.1-3)

39. DY seeks consequential relief including his replacement of YXA as legal representative of Bading; and accounts and enquiries to ascertain monies which have been paid to DG by virtue of his being the registered shareholder of Macau First (prayer nos. 4-5).

40. DY no longer seeks damages and/or equitable compensation or accounts or tracing of assets obtained by DG as a result of DG’s alleged wrongful acts (prayer no. 6-6A).

41. In considering the veracity of each party’s case, I bear in mind (1) the burden of proof; (2) the principles for resolving conflicts in evidence; (3) the overview of the credibility of witnesses in this case; and (4) the effect of not putting one’s case to the opposing party’s witnesses.

C. THE BURDEN OF PROOF

42. The case of Macau First is one built on its legal ownership.  Legal title carries with it all rights.  Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and equitable estates, there is no separate equitable title: see WestdeutscheLandesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 699 at 706F (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  

43. The legal title will be the starting point.  The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts.  See Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432, at §4-5 (per Lord Hope) and §68 (per Baroness Hale).  

44. The legal ownership in this case is supported by registered shareholding. The starting point must be that DG is entitled to judgment unless DY can establish the so called beneficial ownership. 

45. Mr Chan SC, counsel for DY, submits that the burden of proof lies upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue: Phipson on Evidence (17th ed) at §6-06; Big Island Construction (HK) Ltd v Wu Yi Development Co Ltd & Anr (unrep) HCA 1957/2005 & Ors, 28 July 2011, Poon J at §16.

46. With respect, this may well be true in respect of individual issues of fact, but this does not detract from the overall burden of proof in this case that it is for DY to establish sufficient bases to show that the beneficial ownership is different from the legal ownership.

47. DY has an uphill fight in the face of corporate documents of Hong Kong First and Macau First.  On top of these are the DXH Gift Agreement, SXP Gift Agreement and written acknowledgements of nominees produced by DG, whereas DY has nothing comparable.

D. PRINCIPLES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN EVIDENCE

48. In resolving disputes of facts happening years ago, one should give heavy regard to contemporaneous documents and inherent probabilities rather than demeanour of witnesses.

49. In Esquire (Electronics) Ltd v Hong Kong And Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd [2007] 3 HKLRD 439, events took place 17 years before trial.  It was held that:

“In such circumstances contemporaneous documentation is usually of the highest importance.” (at §446D-E, per Rogers VP)

“… the truth ... can best be tested by reference to contemporaneous documentation where it exists, or to its absence where one would expect it to have been created, as well as to inherent probabilities (though bearing in mind that there may be occasions where the truth may run against that particular grain) having regard to all the facts that are known. This is particularly so in a case such as the present, where events have taken place so long before trial and where there exists a mountain of contemporaneous documentation that can be used to point the way.” (at §135, per Stock JA (as he then was))

50. See also Big Island Construction (HK) Ltd v Wu Yi Development Co Ltd & Anr (unrep) HCA 1957/2005 & Ors, 28 July 2011, Poon J, at §12-21; Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George (unrep) HCA 2576/2005, 5 May 2011, Chu J (as she then was) and R v Ng Wing Ming [1995] 1 HKCLR 64 at 65.25 and 67.20, Litton JA (as he then was).

51. The proper approach is to start from the undisputed facts.  Then add to them such other facts as seem very likely to be true, as for example, those recorded in contemporary documents or spoken to by an independent witness.  A witness may be found to be unreliable if his evidence is, in any serious respect, inconsistent with these undisputed or indisputable facts, or if he contradicts himself on important points.  There should be as little reliance as possible on such deceptive matters as his demeanour.  Having separated the true from the false by these more or less objective tests, the court will find whether the plaintiff or the defendant’s story seems to be the more probable.  See Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George, §40.

52. It is essential to have regard to the entirety of a witness’ evidence.  Witnesses can make mistakes, but the mistakes do not necessarily affect other parts of their evidence.  Likewise, witnesses can regularly lie. However, lies themselves do not mean necessarily that the entirety of that witness’ evidence is to be rejected.  A witness may lie in a stupid attempt to bolster his case, but the actual case nevertheless remains good irrespective of the lie.  See Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George, §41.

53. The documentary evidence was not complete or conclusive in the present case since many documents could not be found or even destroyed legitimately (eg upon closing down of a company or sale of shares) at a time when litigation was not in sight.  Banking documents were only kept for 15 years in the Mainland.  The authenticity of some documents was questioned.  The context in which the documents emerged had to be explained by witnesses, some of whose credibility was in doubt.  The court has to do its best to weigh the evidence.

54. DG and DY accused each other of late or non-disclosure of material documents. 

55. DY explained that he has lost his status as legal representative of Dingtai, and resigned as a director of Hong Kong First in 2006.  He had no access to documents of these and the intervening companies.  A lot of documents in the possession, custody or power of DG that might prove eg the source of capital injected by DY into various companies, or on his operation of the businesses have allegedly not been disclosed by DG.

56. DY claimed that a lot of documents had been stolen from his office at Zhongyu Building since this litigation has commenced.  He also claimed that his former solicitors, Messrs King & Wood, held his papers by virtue of a solicitor’s lien.  He therefore allegedly lost a lot of documents relevant to the litigation, eg his invitation on behalf of Bading for the tender of the design, choice of materials and suppliers and price, lifts and air-conditioning. 

57. Despite this court’s order that all interlocutory applications had to be taken out on or before 15/12/2012, neither party had applied for specific discovery.  Therefore, unless otherwise specified, the allegation of late or non-discovery shall not be held against any party.  In fact, even without the undisclosed documents, there are sufficient materials before me to safely assess the strength or weakness of each party’s case.

58. One special category of documents which DY was said to have refused to but eventually disclosed was from what could be termed as “the Jiang Wei proceedings”.  Those proceedings were commenced in Shanghai by Jiang Wei (DY’s brother-in-law) on 29/5/2012, to recover RMB 198,000 from DXH (as a member of the winding-up committee of Dingtai) and DY.  That was 17 years after the cause of action first arose.  See the judgment of the Shanghai City Putuo District People’s Court. 

59. The Jiang Wei proceedings were strange.  DY was made a party instead of a witness for no logical reason.  If someone needed to handle the litigation, it should have been劉竹英 (DG’s ex-mother-in-law) the legal representative of Dingtai.  Instead, DXH was brought in and she claimed to be a nominee of DY, the real shareholder and person in control of Dingtai.  The history relating to setting up to Purao and Dingtai and the injection of capital was referred to in those proceedings.

60. DY admitted owing Jiang Wei the sum sued upon.  He did not pay.  It could not have been due to interests, as DXH suggested, in view of DY’s admission.  It could not have been due to Jiang Wei’s refusal to settle, as Jiang Wei had given an affirmation to support DY and must have been on good terms with DY.

61. DY claimed that he was advised by his Mainland lawyers that he could make use of the Jiang Wei proceedings to obtain documents. See search order dated 24/7/2012 listing documents that DY had wanted to obtain, although the banks could not produce those beyond 15 years.  That could not be the sole reason because, having obtained the documents before trial, DY and DXH chose to continue and dropped the defence in limitation despite prompting from the Shanghai Court.

62. Then DXH appealed on behalf of Dingtai for no valid reason.  She was evasive and confused when explaining why she appealed.  Both DXH and DY would not admit that the purpose of the Jiang Wei proceedings was to prove that DY was the owner of Dingtai and to avoid the present litigation. 

63. Mr Chan SC pointed out that DG was not a party to the Jiang Wei proceedings and any judgment obtained could not bind him.  DY had all along maintained that papers in the Jiang Wei proceedings were irrelevant and hence never produced them.  DG’s solicitors only demanded for production of the papers for the Jiang Wei proceedings on 14/2/2013.  DY’s solicitors asked for relevance.  Before an answer came, DG had taken out a summons.  To avoid unnecessary arguments, DY disclosed the documents.  DY had never refused to provide those documents.

64. I accept that DY had never refused to provide those documents.  However, the purpose of the inspection order was stated to be “to further prove that DY was the actual investor of the subject company”.  DY’s Mainland lawyers had put forth a lot of evidence to the Shanghai Court to show that Dingtai belonged to DY, when ownership was not in dispute.  DY sought to distance himself from “his lawyer’s decision” as if the lawyer had acted without instructions.  Even the Shanghai Court stated that the statements and conduct of all parties aroused suspicions of conspiracy (通謀的嫌疑).  Jiang Wei had agreed to be DY’s witness in December 2010 but has not attended the trial.

65. I am not satisfied that the Jiang Wei proceedings were maintained or appealed against for genuine debt recovery purpose.  Apart from obtaining documents, the irresistible inference is that DY had wanted to rely on findings in the Jiang Wei proceedings as to ownership of Dingtai to try to influence the outcome of this litigation.

E. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

66. I have kept detailed notes of the witnesses’ demeanour which I will refer to if necessary in this judgment.  But in fact there is ample evidence for me to test the truthfulness of the witnesses’ evidence. 

67. The witnesses have been heavily cross-examined on their prior affirmations.  (All references to “affirmations” in this judgment are to those filed in the receivership proceedings launched by DY but failed.)  I bear in mind that inconsistencies in the affirmations and witnesses’ evidence at this trial might be inevitable due to preparation of affirmations under great pressure of time and incomplete discovery. 

68. I am mindful of the stress that a witness had to undergo inside the witness box.  Witnesses can be forgiven if sometimes they do not answer questions directly, or give unnecessary answers for fear that a point would be missed by the court.  This court would not exclude the possibility that witnesses, even in an attempt to honestly recount and explain events, might have made genuine mistakes and, upon discovery of documents, refreshed their memory and hence “corrected” or “reconstructed” their version. However, that was very different from making up stories as one went along.

69. The chief protagonists from the Ding family who gave evidence were in 2 camps.  DG himself was in one camp.  Other family members, namely, the Mother, DXH, DW and DY were in the other.  There were other witnesses for each camp.

70. Regrettably, I find all the 4 siblings in the Ding family to be liars.  This case was flooded with lies, concoction, half truth, exaggeration, inconsistent evidence, false documents produced by DG and DY and collusion of witnesses.  There was conduct that put into question commercial integrity, eg signing in another’s name or applying another’s personal chop, injecting capital into a company for a short time just to meet the capital verification requirement in the Mainland and then withdrawing the capital immediately; and misstatements to the banks of the purposes of loans. 

71. Whilst a witness might have forgotten about minor details due to the lapse of time, he/she would hardly forget major events and what governed his/her own conduct.  As will be demonstrated, DY and DG respectively exposed their ignorance of certain major events, thus casting doubt on their credibility.  Both of them have made up part of their case as the evidence went along, which could not be explained away by faulty memory, lack of access to documents and extreme time pressure. 

72. DG was an unreliable witness.  He knew the details of his case well, but there were numerous occasions when he was evasive. That could not be explained by the fact that he had never been involved in litigation before and this was his first time as a witness.  He tried to mislead the Court in various ways.  This was most obvious in relation to his case on the first pot of gold, and ownership of Purao and Dingtai.  He produced admittedly false evidence in relation to the Railway Companies.  Unless otherwise specified, I reject his evidence for the period before 1995/96 but largely accept his evidence for the period thereafter.

73. DY was a shrewd businessman and smart in giving evidence. He was very familiar with the details in evidence and his response was quick.  However, he has been wholly shaken in cross-examination in relation to events after 1995/96.  Without details, he gave bold assertions in his affirmations and witness statements without qualification, only to have to resile from them in the witness box.  Though I accept that a witness might not in the urgent circumstances of receivership proceedings have full memory, he would not have missed a fact as important as how eg the deposit for the Land was funded, how the last Foreign Investor of Bading was bought out, and yet DY just got the primary facts wrong.  There were numerous examples of his evidence being self-contradictory and inconsistent with documentary evidence.  He has put in forged documents (eg the statement in proof of his business with one Baosteel Company).  He used the Jiang Wei proceedings for ulterior purpose.  He made unfounded allegations of DG’s witnesses receiving benefits from DG’s side (eg Sun Huiding’s wife and Guy McComb).  He colluded with his witnesses.  He was an unreliable witness.  Save where expressly specified, I reject his evidence concerning the period after 1995/96.

74. DW has lied to the authorities when he applied to become a person in charge of an enterprise.  He stated that he had worked at 上饒水動力厰when in fact he was imprisoned for 2 years from1988 to July 1990.  I accept that it was because he felt aggrieved and did not want to disclose his criminal record.  I also accept that since his release from prison in 1990, he had been working with DY in the steel business.  From 1996 to 2007 when he retired, he had been a civil servant at Shangrao Foreign Trade Office 外貿部.  He was not an eloquent witness and in fact could be quite rough at times with answers.  He would give an answer even though he was not sure, only to be immediately contradicted by himself.  On issues such as the Property Division Agreement, the Gift Agreement, and why 3 Hainan Companies were incorporated, he gave numerous inconsistent answers.  He got confused with the chronology of events, eg when he talked about what assets he had before entering into the Property Division Agreement and his subsequent discussion with DY on division of assets.  He clearly felt antagonized by what he perceived to be an improper way DG treated DY in this litigation.  DW was obviously a partisan witness, keen to stand for DY.  He was not a reliable witness.  Save where expressly specified, I reject DW's evidence.

75. DXH was wholly shaken in cross-examination.  She heavily contradicted herself, eg in relation to whether DY knew about the HKF Allotment and 2006 Transfers, why she executed the DXH Gift Agreement and transferred 6 properties under her name to DG.  She was clearly a partisan witness who would just say anything to advance DY’s case. Her siding with DY might have been motivated by the fear of being sued by DG for misappropriation of funds.  Save where expressly specified, I reject her evidence.

76. The Mother was aged 81 at the time of the trial. She was born in 1933.  She has misstated her age in her witness statement/affirmation but that did not affect her overall credibility.  She was calm, careful, and not hurried.  She spent 30 minutes in the box reading her witness statement and 10 minutes reading the original Property Division Agreement and Gift Agreement before answering questions.  She could distinguish between hearsay (eg that DY was more successful because DY told her that business was good and gave the Father pocket money when he went home) and first-hand knowledge, eg the job of DW.  She did not pretend to know eg the reasons for this litigation.  She had made a sweeping comment in her affirmation about DG distorting the truth[1]. I disregard that comment as being her perception without sufficient basis, as she could not have read DG’s reply document which was in English.  I remind myself not to rely too much on her perception of the success of each son and his ownership of companies.  There were matters governing beneficial ownership which she clearly was unable to understand. I find the Mother to be an honest and reliable witness and I accept her evidence, save where otherwise specified.  There might have been some inconsistencies between her written and oral evidence, probably due to the use of English in the written version.  Where there was conflict, I accept her oral evidence. 

77. Specific examples to illustrate my view of the Dings’ evidence and credibility of other witnesses would be given when I analyze their evidence under various issues.  Many of the witnesses (or their relatives) from DG’s side have ended up with a post in Bading (eg 幸霓爾, son of 鮑栽萍).  I do not find such witnesses to be unreliable solely because of their connection with Bading.  It was the substance of their evidence that mattered.

78. Statements of witnesses who have not given evidence shall be disregarded save where agreed to by the parties.

79. There was one document which featured prominently in DG’s case – a letter to the High Court of Hong Kong signed by all the staff of Bading (except DXH and her son 朱嘉) (“the staff letter”).  Not all the staff members who appended their signatures to it had first-hand knowledge of the contents or the full contents.  For example, 鮑栽萍only knew that DY had a “little girl” and his lifestyle was lax; yet she subscribed to a sweeping remark that DY “早年間丁育曾經賺了些錢,可是很快這些財富就因爲丁育沉緬于酒色,揮霍無度而所剩無幾, ……”  Some of the content was false, eg the reference to DG sending DY on overseas business visits.  At best, the staff letter showed the staff’s perception of who the CEO of Bading was.  The affirmative statement that ownership of Bading was in DG was opinion evidence without evidential basis.  Therefore, regardless of some staff having confirmed the contents in the witness box, I attach very little weight to the staff letter in assessing their credibility or in deciding the question of beneficial ownership.  

F.  EFFECT OF NOT PUTTING ONE’S CASE TO THE OPPOSING PARTY’S WITNESSES

80. It is a well-settled proposition endorsed by the Court of Final Appeal that “fairness requires that the adverse findings which the judge will be invited to make should have been put squarely to the witness in cross-examination, so that he can have the opportunity of offering an explanation”: see Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers & Others (2000) 3 HKCFAR 70 at 91J-92A, Lord Hoffmann NPJ.

81. If a party has decided not to cross-examine on a particular important point, he will be in difficulty in submitting that the evidence should be rejected: see Phipson on Evidence (17th ed) §12-12.

82. In Rahme v Smith & Williamson Trust Corporation Ltd [2009] EWHC 911 (Ch), Morgan J observed (at §90) that:-

“… Every counsel should know the general rule that it is not open to counsel to invite the court to reject the evidence of a witness as deliberately untrue when the witness was not challenged in that way… The need for cross-examination which specifically challenges the truthfulness of the witness’ account is clearly established … Whilst this approach may be open to some very limited exceptions, there is no possible exception relevant in the present case. In view of the failure to put to Mr Haddad that his evidence was a concoction, it is not open to me to consider that possibility. It would be completely unfair to Mr Haddad to make such a finding against him. Similarly, it would be completely unfair to him even to hint at what I might have thought if my hands had not been tied in this respect by the failure to challenge his evidence in this respect. I will therefore proceed on the basis that Mr Haddad’s evidence was honestly given.”

83. Where an allegation of grave or even criminal conduct is made in civil case, it is all the more important that such allegation is put squarely to the relevant witnesses.  This is different from just putting one’s case to the witness generally.  Whilst the burden of proof on all issues at a civil trial remains the same, the more serious the act alleged, the more inherently improbable must it be regarded; and the more inherently improbable it was to be regarded, the more compelling would be the evidence needed to prove it on a preponderance of probability: see Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers, above,at 78F-G; Solicitors (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117 at §§72-84 (per Bokhary PJ).  It is against the notion of fairness for the court to make any finding of grave or even criminal conduct when the person who was accused of such conduct was not given a fair opportunity to answer such accusation.

84. This court has indicated to the parties at the pre-trial review on 24/1/2013 that it would not be necessary for the parties to put the respective cases to the witnesses (“the deemed put procedure”).  I agree with Mr Tong SC, counsel for DG, that such indication was only given on the basis that this was a civil case where the parties have already set out their respective cases clearly in their witness statements. That basis did not cover (a) witnesses who have not filed any evidence which was responsive to the evidence of either side; (b) new allegations which have not been previously raised in the parties’ witness statements; and (c) serious allegations of grave or even criminal conduct. 

85. In any event, even when the deemed put procedure was adopted for the purpose of saving time, it would still be preferable for important aspects of a party’s case to be specifically put to the witnesses on whose evidence they may impact, so as to afford such witnesses a full and fair opportunity to comment on, or respond to, those matters: Aspial Investment Ltd & another v Mayer CorporationDevelopment International Ltd CACV 162/ 2012, 24 May 2013, per Barma JA, at §59.

86. I bear in mind that many aspects of what DG’s witnesses said have not been challenged.  Of course that would not prevent me from assessing their reliability when weighed against other evidence.  However, as I will demonstrate, new allegations have emerged whilst DY, DW and DXH gave evidence, which were never put to DG or his witnesses.

87. I now proceed to analyze the claims in trust and beneficial ownership.  I will largely follow the sequence of events in the Executive Summary.  A summary of my findings and conclusion can be found in Sections AD to AG below.

G. THE CLAIM IN TRUST

G1. DY’s pleaded case

88. Put simply, DY grew his business empire since 1980s.  Gradually, he required the assistance of people whom he could trust and rely on.  Amongst them were DG, DXH (both on good terms with him) and SXP, who were made his nominees at different stages for the purpose of holding or managing assets on his behalf through various corporate vehicles including Macau First, Hong Kong First and Bading (§§5, 18(4), 18(5) of the re-amended defence). 

89. Re Macau First, it is DY’s case that DG, DXH and SXP had, whilst being registered owners, been holding the shares in Macau First as nominees of or on trust for DY pursuant to or as a result of the MF Trust.  DG, DXH and SXP had never contributed to the issued capital or provided consideration for the Macau First shares.  It was DY who nominated DG and DXH as his nominee directors.  See §11 of the re-amended defence and counterclaim.

90. Re Hong Kong First, it is DY’s case that the shares in it were held in the names of Macau First and DXH as nominees of or on trust for DY under the HKF Trust.  It was DY who initiated the incorporation of Hong Kong First to hold his interests in Bading, which in turn held the Land and the Tower. 

91. Gradually, as DY’s focus of investment shifted from Hong Kong and Mainland China to other countries and due to the Bai Incident, he allegedly maintained a low profile and entrusted his Mainland business (especially the daily operations of the Tower) to DG.  When agreeing to assist DY, DG allegedly requested to be made the nominee owner so that he, ostensibly as the boss to outsiders, could be more assertive in front of other people and it would be more effective for managing the Land, the Tower and Bading.  DY allegedly agreed. 

92. DY claimed that prior to the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers, it was orally agreed amongst him, DXH and DG that Macau First would only be a nominee shareholder of Hong Kong First and would hold the shares in Hong Kong First on DY’s behalf.  (See §18 of the re-amended defence.)

93. The ultimate issues are whether the 2 Trusts existed as a matter of fact and whether they could exist as a matter of law.

G2. Whether the Trusts existed as a matter of fact

94. There was absolutely no evidence of express trusts and their terms.  There was no evidence that DY had disclosed to the alleged nominees his intention of entering into any trust arrangements, or that there was mutual/tacit understanding between DY and the alleged trustees. 

95. For 4 to 6 years since the HKF Trust or MF Trust could have arisen in 2004 or 2006 respectively until issue of the writ on 3/7/2010, there had been no acknowledgement of any kind from DG, DXH and SXP as to DY’s interests in Macau First or Hong Kong First.  There was no distribution to DY of benefits accrued to those 2 companies. Rather, Hong Kong First had given its dividend income to DG.  There had been no account of assets and income from the alleged nominees/trustees to DY.  Nor had DY demanded for the same before action.

G3. The HKF Allotment, the 2006 Transfers and DY’s resignation as director in 2006

96. The HKF Allotment, the 2006 Transfers and DY’s resignation as a director of Hong Kong First effectively excluded all possibilities of the existence of the HKF Trust and MF Trust.

97. DY had given 4 inconsistent versions as regards the HKF Allotment.

98. The 1st version was in DY’s 1st affirmation (§§113 & 115) and §49 of DXH’s 2nd affirmation. The HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers were said to be done on DY’s express instructions to DXH, acceding to DG’s request to be a nominee shareholder:  It was DY’s deliberate decision to make Macau First 100% shareholder of Hong Kong First since Macau First had no business operation.  Hence, DY was not denying that he had signed some documents and he did sign for a purpose.

99. Until August 2011, the defence (verified by a statement of truth from DXH) has maintained this part of DY’s case.  DXH said she thought the HKF Allotment was “nominal” as no consideration was provided. She did not think it important that after the 2006 Transfers, Macau First would own the Tower.  DY gave the incomprehensible explanation in his oral evidence that DXH had a pre-conceived notion (先入爲主).

100. The 2nd version was in DY’s witness statement (§19.6), wherein he refuted the 1st: “因爲年代久遠, 當時又無確切資料可以查證, 以上的説法應該不準確。”DY and DXH claimed that DY did not know about the HKF Allotment or the 2006 Transfers until the start of this litigation in 2010.  Under cross-examination, DY very loudly asserted that DXH had not informed him that DG had told her to do the HKF Allotment.  In my view, if DY did not know, there could not have been any agreement for the alleged trustees to hold on trust for DY. 

101. DXH admitted under cross-examination that she knew that between 2004 and 2005, DY put all entities that held Bading shares under Hong Kong First.  It was most incredible, in my view, that DXH would have taken such a draconian step of transferring the entire ownership of Hong Kong First to Macau First behind DY’s back.  All the more so given her understanding that DY had previously rejected DG’s request to become Hong Kong First’s shareholder.  DG made several requests to her.  In the end, she persuaded DY to transfer shares to DG.  See her statement to the Prosecution of Macau dated about 17/9/2011.

102. DY’s alleged ignorance of the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers was of course contradicted by the minutes of EGM and board resolution of Hong Kong First which bore his and DXH’s signatures.  In his oral evidence, DY denied having signed the minutes and board resolution but admitted having signed the instrument of transfer.

103. Under cross-examination, DY explained that he saw some documents after filing his 1st affirmation and realized that he had no knowledge of the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers.  He and DXH were told by their previous solicitors, King & Wood, that they could not change their case unless they had proof, otherwise they would be criticized for lying. So DY left out the “true” version from his 3rd affirmation. 

104. Mr Chan SC refers me to the history of these proceedings when DY changed his solicitors to Orrick due to a dispute with King & Wood over fees.  DY was thus deprived of access to documents due to the solicitors’ lien and had to face many interlocutory applications.  It was when the parties exchanged their witness statements in August 2012 that DY was told by Orrick to tell the truth and so he corrected the errors made in his affirmation and defence.

105. I reject these explanations.  DY carried out the Impugned Transfers in May 2010 before commencement of this action.  If he had not known about the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers, he must have been very surprised to find that all the shares in Hong Kong First previously held by DXH and himself had gone into the hands of Macau First.  It was impossible for DY not to raise alarm until he prepared the 3rd affirmation.  In any case, who was holding the Hong Kong First shares was an all too important matter that DY would not require documents to jog his memory.  He could not point to any specific document anyway.

106. DY had made a very serious allegation against King & Wood who was never given the opportunity to answer it.  In any event, it was inconceivable for King & Wood to have advised him not to change his case until there was proof.  What proof could there be for a negative averment of absence of knowledge? 

107. Further, DY’s serious accusation against King & Wood was contradicted by his own conduct after engaging Orrick in August 2011.  According to DY, he had immediately told Orrick about the 2nd version.  Despite that, DY (accompanied by Orrick) maintained in his report to the Commercial Crime Bureau on 27/10/2011 that he was aware of the transfer of all shares in Hong Kong First to Macau First.  When asked why DY did not tell Orrick something to the effect that he had not got documents to confirm if he had signed the documents instead of stating affirmatively a wrong version, DY simply said he maintained the original version (沿用原來的話).  He then changed his evidence and said that he only discussed the mistake with Orrick when they prepared his witness statement, about 2 months after he instructed Orrick.

108. I find no truth in the 2nd version.  The allegation against King & Wood was most unkind against a firm who had done well for DY in the receivership proceedings.

109. The third version appeared in DXH’s 3rd affirmation dated 8/3/2013, namely, a bare allegation that she signed for DY on the relevant resolutions.  Under cross-examination, DXH even said that it was DG who told her to sign for DY.  That was clearly a recent invention.  DXH had not pointed to any other instance when DG had dared to ask her to sign on behalf of DY.

110. The fourth version emerged only during cross-examination of DY, namely, that 徐民良(“Xu”) (法務督導副總裁 of Bading) had given the transfer documents for him to sign without the chop of Macau First and DXH was not present then. DY did not know what he had signed until his Hong Kong solicitor showed it to him.  This eleventh-hour version has never been put to Xu.

111. Notwithstanding the unchallenged evidence of Tam Kwan Yip (accountant and secretary to Hong Kong First) that copies had been taken by DXH in June 2010, the board resolutions concerning the HKF Allotment were only produced during the trial.  None of the reasons given by DXH could explain the late production.  In my view, her conduct reflected an intention to hide material evidence and that DY and DXH took time to make up their stories. 

112. These inconsistent versions made DY totally unreliable.  I place the greatest weight on documents and find that DY did know about the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers when they were executed.  He signed the board resolutions and transfer documents without protest or reservation.  He resigned as a director of Hong Kong First, relinquishing all control, just after Macau First became 100% owner of Hong Kong First.  All in 2006.

113. I find that the MF Trust or HKF Trust did not exist.

G4. Whether the 2 Trusts are sustainable as a matter of law

114. The “reflective loss” principle is such that a shareholder has no legal or equitable interest in a company’s property: Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619, at 626-627; Good Profit Development Ltd v Leung Hoi [1993] 2 HKLR 176, at 179-181; Luo Xing Juan v Estate of Hui Shui See (2009) 12 HKCFAR 1, at §34.

115. In Oriental Peer Co Ltd v Terrian Ltd [1987] 2 HKC 61 (CA), at 72D-G:

“… Terrian, as a shareholder of Polly Jack, has no legal or equitable interest whatsoever in the property (if any) of that company.

This is trite law but it is too often overlooked and, as Lord Russell of Killowen observed in EBM Co Ltd v Dominion Bank [1937] 3 All ER 555 (PC) at p 564 it is ‘of supreme importance that the distinction should be clearly marked, observed and maintained between an incorporated company's legal entity and its actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the one hand, and the individual shareholders and their actions, assets, rights and liabilities on the other hand.’

As the English Court of Appeal emphasized in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No 2) Ltd(9), 223A-B, shares are merely a right of participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association. The same point was made by Lord Buckmaster in Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd(10), 626 where he indicated that the shareholder has no right to any item of the company's property, but is entitled to a share in the profits while the company continues to carry on business and a share in the distribution of the surplus assets when the company is wound up.” (emphasis added)

116. If a shareholder who has provided the capital were to be able to acquire direct beneficial ownership to the underlying assets, it would be wholly unfair to the creditors of the relevant company.

117. In Hui Yin Sang v Tsoi Ping Kwan [2010] 1 HKC 585, the plaintiffs sought to assert a trust claim in respect of some underlying assets held through some intervening companies based on the alleged common understanding between the ultimate shareholders.  The claim was struck out.  Au J stated (at 594E-G) that:-

“(5) Secondly, under the principle against recovery of reflective loss, a shareholder is not entitled to recover a reflective loss, being a loss that can be made good if the company enforces its rights against the defendant. The underlying rationale is that if a shareholder is permitted to recover such a loss, then either there will be double recovery at the expense of the defendant, or that the shareholder will recover at the expense of the company and its creditors: Landune International Ltd v Cheung Chung Leung [2006] 1 HKC 517, [2006] 1 HKLRD 39 (CA) at 47B-D.

(6)  The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs’ claim that they still acquired the direct beneficial ownership in the New Plaza Project despite the intervening companies simply because of their common understanding and dealings that they were partners of the project is against the underlying rationale of the principle against recovery of reflective loss.  The trust claims as pleaded as such are also bound to fail.”

118. DY’s counterclaim is brought in his personal capacity.  Even if the initial capital in Hong Kong First or Macau First could be traceable to the various companies that DY set up in the 1990s, the Land and the Tower would still belong to those companies that hold them and not DY in his personal capacity.  He is not entitled to seek loss suffered by the intervening companies, Hong Kong First or Macau First as a direct or indirect shareholder because of the reflective loss principle.

119. There is simply no answer to this legal issue in Mr Chan SC’s final submission.  The claim in trust must fail.  This is sufficient to dispose of the case and entitle DG to judgment.

H. THE CLAIM IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

120. Assuming I am wrong in my conclusion in para 118, I have proceeded to consider DY’s claim in beneficial ownership.  This is on the premise that if he can prove his case on the facts, directions will be given to enable shares in the relevant companies to be retransferred to him. 

121. The Land was acquired in the name of Dingtai at a time when Dingtai did not have funds of its own.  All the funds for acquisition of the Land, the Project and buying out the Foreign Investors of Bading were borrowed.  As the ownership of Dingtai was disputed, on DY’s case, it was necessary to trace the source of capital of Dingtai and Purao and subsequent funding arrangements.  This part of the case involved examination of DY and DG’s conduct from 1980s to 2010. 

122. In his opening submission, Mr Chan SC submitted that the answers to 3 questions (“the 3 Questions”) would be determinative of this case:

(1)  Who paid the RMB 1m to set up Purao in March 1993?

(2)  Who paid the RMB 10m for increase of Purao’s capital in October 1993?

(3)  Who paid the RMB 10m capital of Dingtai in November 1993?

He submits that the answers to the 3 Questions were “DY”. 

123. In his closing submission, Mr Chan SC sought to show that the companies set up subsequent to Dingtai belonged to DY beneficially and that at each stage, for each change of nominees, there had been no consideration. 

124. DG denies DY’s case.  Mr Tong SC submits that the acquisition of the Land and the setting up of Bading to hold all the interest in the Land represented “the fresh start of a new project” in which only DG (but not DY) had direct and indirect personal financial contributions. The objective evidence showed that DG was in control of Bading.  Throughout the years, DXH had acted upon DG’s instructions without reference to DY and executed the DXH Gift Agreement to acknowledge DG’s ownership.  Even after learning of the brothers’ conflict, DXH had continued to act upon DG’s instructions and transferred funds to DG without DY’s consent.

125. In the following analyses, a reader should note the period from 1980s to early 1993 (when there was early accumulation of wealth).  Thereafter the most significant events happened in 13 years between 1993 and 2006.  The relevant year will be highlighted in each section heading.

I.  1980s TO EARLY 1993: EARLY ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH OF DG AND DY

126. How DG or DY accumulated his first pot of gold was highly relevant in proving, on a balance of probabilities, which of them had the financial strength to set up Purao and later Dingtai.  DG’s version was that he accumulated wealth as a sole proprietor through various businesses.  DY said that he accumulated wealth through the steel business.  He said that DG could not even finish apprenticeship and was financially dependent on DY.

I1.  DG’s version on his first pot of gold

127. There is not much dispute that DG’s early businesses were in transportation, logistics, sale of vehicle components and household electrical appliances: Exhibit P2, DG’s original licenses for transportation.

128. DG claimed that in delivering goods, he had established connections with various people who invited him to participate in their trades.  Hence he also (i) sold cigarettes; (ii) sold down jackets and duvets; and (iii) engaged in certain business ventures with DY. 

129. DG had no business licences, no business address, no telephone numbers, and did not pay tax.  He claimed to have accumulated about RMB 2-3m in 4 years by early 1993 and he kept the money at home without a bank account.  He spent RMB 500,000 to 600,000 to purchase a Santana vehicle, a matrimonial property and a property in Shanghai.  He invested his money allegedly in shares in Luyin (魯銀股), from which he generated the capital to invest in Purao.

130. As a sole proprietor and not expecting this litigation, the lack of contemporaneous documents in the 60 trial bundles to show DG’s business was not surprising and should not be counted against him. 

131. DG might have seized on every opportunity to trade on ad hoc basis, as Mr Tong SC submits in closing.  I also bear in mind that doing business by cash without a bank account might well sound strange to Hong Kong people but that in itself was not sufficient for me to disbelieve DG.  He has explained that sole proprietors were not permitted to open a cheque account.  Likewise, the failure to obtain a business license and to pay tax might have been in breach of Mainland law, but it was not sufficient to dissuade me from finding that DG had operated some business(es) beyond transportation.

132. There was a resume of legal representative (法人履歷表) dated 12/12/1998 setting out DG’s credentials when he set up Railway Redevelopment.  Although the contents were said to have been filled in by Su Jian (SXP’s brother, a cheeky and unreliable witness who pretended to be precise), DG did confirm the same by signing.  The resume filled in the “working unit/department” of DG from September 1986 to November 1998 but made no mention of his various businesses. I do not find that surprising.  After all, his sole proprietorship could hardly fit into the description of “working unit/department” on the resume.  And even if he were to fill in “sole proprietor”, one could hardly expect him to put down such details as “trading in down products and cigarettes”.

133. What worked against DG, rather, was the way in which he presented the evidence, the inherent improbabilities in his version and the lack of corroboration by his own witnesses.  Even the Mother did not support his version.

134. Firstly, the most lucrative business of sale of down jackets and duvets (making several hundred thousands of RMB in one deal) was first mentioned only 2 weeks before trial in DG’s 2nd supplemental witness statement.  His explanation was that he could not raise it until he could secure documentary evidence in the form of a statement dated 16/2/2013 from one 王建峰(“Wang”) of Shangrao Down Products Factory to support him.  That was a most ridiculous explanation.  DG had never felt inhibited from describing on affirmation his other businesses that was not supported by documentary evidence either. 

135. Secondly, Wang has given a witness statement in the first round of exchange of witness statements in August 2012.  He never mentioned such lucrative business of DG.  

136. Thirdly, Wang’s evidence contradicted DG’s evidence.  Whilst DG’s oral evidence in chief was that DG started his transportation business together with Wang in 1988, Wang’s evidence was that he worked in logistics and transportation only since 1995. There was no mention of any joint business venture with DG.  

137. Fourthly, Wang’s statement dated 16/2/2013 was not a contemporaneous document. Wang never appeared for cross-examination.

138. Fifthly, DG was evasive when cross-examined on his business in down products.  He evaded the question of whether he had entered into any written contracts in respect of such goods or whether there was a single sheet of paper in proof. 

139. Sixthly, there was no mention in any other witness statements (eg SXP) of DG’s business in cigarettes or down products. 

140. Seventhly, according to DG, he did not have to find suppliers or purchasers.  The suppliers would directly invoice his end-purchasers for the price commanded by DG.  DG did not even have to be troubled with payment of tax because “he thought” the suppliers would have done it for him.  DG simply could not explain why the suppliers would have invoiced customers for a higher price commanded by him, which meant the need for the suppliers to pay more tax.  He dodged the issue by saying he had “agreed” with the suppliers.  Such easy way of making profits that ran into hundreds of thousands of RMB at the cost and trouble of the suppliers was inherently improbable.

141. Eighthly, as admitted by DY, the sale of cigarettes was monopolized by the Mainland government.  It was improbable for DG to have run that business.  In any case, DG was not even able to estimate his costs and gains in that business.

142. The more improbable the act in question, the more compelling the evidence needed: Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers (2000) 3 HKCFAR 70 at 78.  I place no weight on Wang’s statement.  DG simply dared not go into details.  He has concocted the story about the business in cigarettes, down jackets and duvets to boost his weak case on accumulation of wealth.  His income from business (para 127 above), which I accept, was low – about a few ten thousand RMB per year of “hard earned money”, in his own words.

143. As for DG’s business with DY, DG has changed his story as the case progressed.

(i)  DG denied that DY operated a business as金山五交化物資供應站 (金山五交化) and insisted that DY was only an employee there. DG never mentioned in his pleadings, affirmations or witness statements that he participated in that business.  However, in his oral evidence, he accepted that DY ran and subcontracted金山五交化.   

(ii)  DG put DY to strict proof that the latter had run a business of selling steel through上饒茅家嶺供銷公司 (“Maojialing company”).  In his oral evidence, DG changed his stance and asserted that he took part in that business of DY.

(iii)  DG admitted that he had not injected capital into the businesses of DY and the 2 brothers never discussed how to distribute the profits.

144. I reject DG’s version that he had done business with DY.

I2.  DG’s trading in Luyin shares

145. It follows that I do not accept that DG had money to invest in Luyin shares.  In any case, I disbelieve his story on the Luyin shares. 

146. The lack of documentary proof of trading in Luyin shares was not surprising so many years after the alleged trading.  What was incredible about DG’s case was reflected in his 3 different versions: 

(1)  In his 3rd affirmation, DG said that in about 1992, he purchased around 1,000,000 original Luyin shares at RMB 1 per share.  In 1997, he sold them at around RMB 20 per share and earned a handsome profit of over RMB 10m (not RMB 19m).  Such profit would have eroded all difficulty in raising the RMB 2m deposit for purchasing the Land but, as one shall see, it did not.  In my view, it was not that DG had made an arithmetical error by “understating the profit” by RMB 9m, but that he had made up the story.  He even admitted under cross-examination that RMB 10m was only “gross” return without taking into account “deductions”.  What deductions could have run into millions of RMB?

(2)  In his witness statement, DG stated that he used RMB 1m to purchase an unknown quantity of staff shares (職工原始股).  He allegedly sold part of them in about April/May 1997 at RMB 26 to RMB 34 per share.  He sold another lot in about late 1999 at around RMB 13 to RMB 14.  He was able to recall such details of 16 years ago in the absence of documents but was unable to state the profit.

(3)  The 魯銀實業集團股份有限公司董事會魯銀實業集團股份有限公司股票上市公告書dated 21/12/1996 stated that the 5th largest shareholder held 1.21m shares only.  When that was shown to DG in cross-examination, DG changed his version to say that he bought about 200,000 to 300,000 shares for a total sum of RMB 1 million.  He said that the face value was RMB 1 per share but with premium up to a maximum of RMB 3 per share.  He suggested for the very first time that the shares were registered in the name of several ten employees of Luyin.  His friend in Shandong (who sold fruits) was the middleman. He got the profits in several tranches.  In 1997, DG allegedly got back the original RMB 1 million he paid, with certain sums being deducted by the middleman as his remuneration.  Another lot of shares was sold in about 2000 and DG said that he got profits of about “5-6 million”.  The trading was in cash.

147. DG said he earned profits of RMB 400,000 out of the Luyin shares which he might have injected into Dingtai or paid directly to Fortune World for the Land premium in 1997.  In my view, there was no reason why he just invested RMB 400,000 when RMB 230m was needed.

148. He gave a suspicious account as to how he treated the money from the Luyin shares, ie he might have deposited the same with DXH or SXP or other nominees although he had bank accounts.  He explained that it was to maintain a “low key” and “avoid publicity”.  One wondered what publicity could be attracted from selling shares.

149. DG’s version was inconsistent and another concoction.  Mr Tong SC simply avoided any comment on the investment in Luyin shares in his closing submission.  I reject DG’s version on the Luyin shares entirely. 

150. On the other hand, DY claimed that DG first started off as an apprentice, filling the vacancy left by the Mother from her retirement.  Later, DG left the factory and learnt to drive.  DY gave him a truck to enable him to run a sole proprietorship in transportation.  DG was financially dependent on him.  DY relied on the company records of Haikou Materials and employment contracts signed by DG and SXP with Haikou Nanzhou, both being DY’s companies.  DG simply was not in a position to accumulate wealth.

151. It might well be true that DY had put in names of the Ding family members as employees to make his companies appear stronger than they really were.  It might also be true that the employment records wrongly stated DXH’s husband as holding the position of a driver when he was an officer (業務員).  However, these would not undermine the fact that DY, who was in a stronger financial position and in good relationship with DG, supported DG financially and employed him.

152. I accept DY’s case on DG’s financial position in the 1980s to early 1993 and reject DG’s version.  DG had blatantly lied to boost his case on early accumulation of wealth.  His case on setting up of Purao and Dingtai with his own funds naturally could not stand.

I3.  DY’s version on his first pot of gold

153. DY claimed that he had worked at 金山五交化, underwrote at 物資調劑站 and the Maojialing company.  He was corroborated by the Mother.  His trading covered metals, chemicals and electrical appliances.

154. Mr Tong SC does not dispute that DY obtained profits in metals trading but submits that he had exaggerated the profitability of his trades, made bare assertions without documentary proof or was contradicted by available documents.

155. The documentary proof for DY’s early businesses was limited.  I place no weight on the witness statements of 李初興 and 蔣淑芳 who did not give evidence. 

156. With regard to the Maojialing company, there was an underwriting contract dated 26/9/1989 entered into between DY and the legal representative 饒賢林for 3 years from December 1989 to December 1992.  DY said that the company earned profits of RMB 1m in 1989 and RMB 2-3m in 1990.  Mr Tong SC submits, however that the 企業法人分支機構年檢報告書 dated 6/3/1991 showed the tax to be RMB 500, the total annual sales to be only RMB 61,000 and profits RMB 300.  With respect to Mr Tong SC, that annual report was related to a different company called 上饒市茅家嶺物資供應站.

157. With regard to other businesses, the working notes of DY (which I find to be a reliable record) gave a glimpse of the scale of DY’s metal business.  Back in 1987, a single deal of DY involved 102.7 metric tons of round nails, worth more than RMB 150,000.  In respect of other businesses, however, the working notes showed the turnover to be small, as not exceeding a few hundred or thousand dollars.

158. To boost his case, DY had produced an admittedly forged letter from上海寶山鋼鐵股份有限公司 (“Baosteel”) to prove that in 1991, he and DW traded in steel supplied by that company and earned sales income of RMB 60m.  DY accepted that part of this letter relating to the transactions in 1997 to 2000 in which Dingtai ordered about 10,000 tons of product was wrong.  I attach no weight to the forged letter. 

159. Anyway, the undisputed evidence was that in 1990-1991, DY had rented a small flat of around 20 square metres at the Shanghai Luwan Cinema as residence and business premises for DW, DG, YXA and himself.  They slept on the floor and had to use the washroom in the cinema. Such modest standard of living was inconsistent with the alleged huge sales income. 

160. In summary, I find that DY did have his own business in Shangrao and Maojialing although the scale was not as large as he wanted this court to believe.  The significance, rather, was that he had started the steel business which built up his financial strength.

I4.  From Shangrao to Hainan

161. Hainan was a special economic region in the Mainland. DY set up 3 companies there: 海口市物資總公司業務部 (“Haikou Materials”), 海口南州工貿有限公司(“Haikou Nanzhou”) and 南海(海南)物業發展總公司(“Nanhai Properties”).  He continued his steel business from Maojialing whilst the work was done in Shanghai. 

162. DY was challenged in cross-examination as to why he set up companies there instead of in Shanghai.  The answer was obvious and which I accept – for tax benefits.  See Exhibit P30 《企業所得稅 – 國務院關於鼓勵投資開發海南島的規定》.  A Hainan enterprise had only to pay 15% profits tax (Art. 12 of Exhibit P30 and Art. 3 and 4(5) of 《海南省人民政府 - 關於鼓勵投資的稅收優惠辦》). Contrast a state enterprise which had to pay 55% tax (Art. 4 of《中華人民共和國國營企業所得條稅草案》) and a private enterprise 35% (Art. 3 of 中華人民共和國國務院令).

I5.  Haikou Materials

163. Haikou Materials was set up in February 1992, pursuant to a guakao arrangement (掛靠).  DW was the legal representative of Haikou Materials.  It had registered capital of RMB 1m.

164. Under the guakao arrangement (a common mode of doing business in the Mainland at that time), a company would be established ostensibly as a state-owned enterprise with a supervising bureau (主管部門) as its shareholder.  In this case, the supervising bureau was 海南省海口市物資總公司.  The capital would be contributed wholly by the private entity although, on paper, the capital would appear to have been injected by the state-owned supervising bureau.  The guakao company was to be responsible for its own finance without any assistance from the supervising bureau, and operate with independent accounts.

165. DG contended that the capital of RMB 1m was never paid, relying upon the corporate information of Haikou Materials.  However, the corporate documents relied on by DG showed the status of the company as at 30 December 2010.  The company’s legal representative was 李虎章, who was wholly unrelated to DY. 

166. DG’s contention overlooked the contemporaneous documents attached to the search record page, showing the position at incorporation in 1992.  The Capital Verification Report (海口會計師事務所驗資報告書), bank certificate (銀行資訊証明), and credit guarantee certificate (資信擔保証), all dated February 1992, and item no. 78 in the accounts for the year ended 1993, confirmed that Haikou Materials had registered capital of RMB 1m injected in cash. Those were weighty evidence and I accept the same to be true.

167. According to DY, the RMB 1m capital came from profits of Maojialing, which I find to be likely true, having regard to his business in the 1980s.

168. The major business of Haikou Materials was trading of steel and non-ferrous metals.  This was consistent with DY’s trading in steel before establishment of Purao, whereas DG did not have such experience prior to setting up of Purao.

169. DY has produced some contemporaneous documents to support his business deals in 1993.  He purchased 10,000 tons of hot rolled steel coil (熱軋卷板) for RMB 16m, which he on sold to 中國第二汽車製造廠 (later known as 中國東風汽車公司) for RMB 32m.

170. To have a glimpse of the business scale of Haikou Materials:

(i)  The receipt dated 11 May 1992 for tax for the 2nd quarter of 1992 showed that the business tax payable (10%) by Haikou Materials was RMB 94,827.94.

(ii)  According to the 資金平衡表 as of the end of 1992, the total assets in 1992 were of the value of RMB 1,309,727.81.

(iii)  As shown in its 資產負債表, up to 31 December 1993, its total assets were of the value of RMB 1,357,482.30.

171. It was suggested to DY in cross-examination that there was no record of income from sale of goods or stock.  Further, the生產經營和財務狀況appeared to relate to the loss of around RMB 3,750 in 1993; it stated that the loss was due to “經營不善”. 

172. DY said that he did not know accounting and did not understand the financial statements.  He insisted that Haikou Materials had sales of about RMB 50m in 1992.  I cannot accept this explanation.  DY was sensitive to figures, as demonstrated by his reference to transactions and calculations of income from his steel business in his oral evidence.  He could not have failed to understand the financial statements.  His evasive evidence showed that he might have been exaggerating the income and level of stocks of Haikou Materials. 

173. There also appeared to be some contradiction in the documentary evidence.  DY alleged that he and DW had ceased underwriting the business of Haikou Materials since 1993.  The corporate record showed that since about 21 April 1993, one譚傳顏 (who had nothing to do with DY) had replaced DW as legal representative.  On the other hand, after April 1993, DY and DW continued to hold property and bank accounts in the name of Haikou Materials.  DW confirmed his interest in Haikou Materials had not changed after the Property Division Agreement dated 6/6/1993, implying that Haikou Materials had not ceased operation.  On 10 May 1993, RMB 700,000 was even remitted from Purao’s account to Haikou Materials’ bank account.

174. I find that although DY had exaggerated the income and level of sales of Haikou Materials, this company did have assets to the value of RMB 1.3m as stated in the financial statements of 1993.  I also find that Haikou Materials had operated beyond June 1993.

I6.  Haikou Nanzhou

175. By a written agreement dated 8/9/1992, DY and DW set up Haikou Nanzhou.  It was a private company incorporated on 20/11/1992 without any guakao arrangement.  The business was trading of steel.  DW was the legal representative.  The office was inside premises at 海口市大英村bought in the name of DW back in June 1992.  DG and SXP were employees of Haikou Nanzhou.

176. The registered capital was RMB 5m, of which RMB 3m was from DW and RMB 2m from DY.  It came in the form of cash or bank deposit.  This was supported by a payment slip showing that 市物資總公司業務部 paid to Haikou Nanzhou a total sum of RMB 5m and the Capital Verification Report of Haikou Nanzhou dated 19/10/1992.  The company was deregistered on 28/8/1996.  In his closing submission, DG’s counsel have avoided the question of where the registered capital had come from.  I accept DY’s version on the source of capital.

177. There was no dispute that there was a joint venture between Haikou Nanzhou and 江蘇省昆山市物資局下屬金屬材料總公司 (“Kunshan”) to trade in 40,000 metric tons of steel, worth US$1.36m or RMB 118.3m.  The agreement between Haikou Nanzhou and Kunshan was to “共同出資,共同銷售 …… 利益均等分配” (“the Kunshan deal”).  The dispute was on how and to what extent that agreement was implemented.

178. In his 1st supplement witness statement, DG claimed that all those payments marked for Kunshan [eg D1/120, 149, 150, 159] were in fact Purao’s own business.  This version was clearly unbelievable, as there was nothing pointing to Purao having steel trading before this deal. 

179. In the witness box, DG claimed for the first time that, rather than 共同出資, the entire sum of US$8.73m was to be paid by Kunshan, representing the entire cost of 30,000 metric tons in the agency agreement among Haikou Nanzhou, Kunshan and one 中國五礦產進出口總公司(“China Five Metals”).  He said he was told by DY that Haikou Nanzhou only acted as intermediary in the Kunshan deal, collecting and paying funds on behalf of Kunshan (代收代付).  He had no idea about the profits brought in, the substantial part of which went to Kunshan.  

180. This version never appeared in DG’s witness statements or opening submission and was his recent invention.  If, as DG claimed, Purao was his company and he had invested RMB 700,000 (representing about 1/3 of his then alleged wealth) in it in April 1993, it was incredible that he had so little idea about the Kunshan deal.  I reject his evidence.

181. On the other hand, DY’s version appeared in his very first witness statement (§§2.5 and 2.6).  It included details like the supplier of steel, problem with foreign exchange, mode of payment, arrival of the steel in 2 lots, name of the ocean liners and difficulty in unloading.  He also produced some documents of an account of Purao controlled by him to show payments totalling RMB 6m made to Kunshan [D2/149, 150 and 159] in July 2003.  According to DY, Kunshan provided US$8.73m capital.  The balance was borne by him from profits earned by Haikou Materials, Haikou Nanzhou and the Maojialing company.  DY was responsible for customs, loading, transportation and storage.

182. I have taken into account Mr Tong SC’s closing submission that DY’s supporting documents did not show transactions involving the full quantity of 40,000 metric tons. Further, the agreement between Haikou Nanzhou and Kunshan showing the terms of cooperation was not produced.  DY’s oral evidence that profits distribution with Kunshan was done after the sale of the steel and the preparation of a table was not supported by documentary evidence.  There were no documents evidencing sale by Haikou Nanzhou to end-customers, or accounts of Haikou Nanzhou.  The bank records showing payments of Kunshan were for the period between May and December 1993, long before what DY claimed to be completion of the sales in February 1994. Further, despite giving a long narrative under cross-examination, DY was unable to state where his profits from the Kunshan deal had gone.

183. One could not expect DY’s documentation to be complete after so many years but from the piecemeal evidence something was clear:

(i)  On the face of the 代理進口協議(“the Import Agency Agreement”), China Five Metals was Party A.  Both Kunshan and Haikou Nanzhou were Party B, liable to pay 3% agency fee to China Five Metals.  This refuted DG’s case that Haikou Nanzhou was just an agent as against Kunshan.

(ii)  There were vouchers evidencing payments by Purao to Kunshan from an account operated by DY (“the Purao-DY- 339-account”), disclosed by DG in the course of the trial.  They showed payments totalling about RMB 6.8m in the first 2 months of 1994. None of the documents were marked as 代收代付but stated to be 貨款.

(iii)  There were bank documents showing that the Purao-DY-339-account paid a total of RMB 40m to Kunshan from May to July 1993 and another RMB 1m in October.  They supported DY’s case on distribution of profits to Kunshan.

(iv)  Such flow of huge funds between Haikou Nanzhou/Purao and Kunshan was consistent with a business relationship as described by DY.  Otherwise, there was no reason why Kunshan should trust Haikou Nanzhou or Purao to collect such huge sums and no reason why Haikou Nanzhou would have 代收代付without apparent benefit to itself.

184. I accept DY’s version on Haikou Nanzhou and the Kunshan deal.  The setting up of Haikou Nanzhou with RMB 5m initial capital was consistent with the scale of the Kunshan deal expected and actually done.  I also accept DY’s evidence that Purao did not have steel trading before this; its role was to collect proceeds of sale for Haikou Nanzhou.   

I7.  Hainan Properties 南海(海南)物業發展總公司

185. This was established by DY and DW under a guakao arrangement on 12/4/1993.  It was registered on 6/5/1993 and deregistered on 19/9/2003.  DW was the legal representative. 

186. The registered capital of RMB 10m was provided by DY in one go on 12/6/1993 as stated in the Capital Verification Report.  Having regard to his steel business, I am satisfied that DY did have the financial resources and reason to set up such a substantial company.

187. Apart from submitting that DY had grossly exaggerated the size and profitability of Hainan Properties, DG was unable to refute the evidence as to the capital injection from DY’s side.  The fact that Nanhai Properties was running at a loss of RMB 953,000 in 1993 and RMB 550,000 in 1994 was irrelevant as it was not DY’s case that he relied upon any profit of Nanhai Properties to set up Purao.  In any case, Purao was set up earlier than Nanhai Properties.

I8.  Weighing each party’s case on his first pot of gold

188. DY’s financial history was corroborated by the evidence of the Mother, DXH and DW.  I cannot see why the Mother, who is respected by all the children and has nothing to gain from this case, should lie.  I do not expect her to have a detailed knowledge of her sons’ respective wealth but her view of the general financial strength of each son could not be doubted.  I accept her evidence that Haikou Materials was DY’s company and that the business grew quickly.  The Mother’s evidence was that it was DY and DW who brought about the improvement in standard of living of the Ding family in Shangrao.  She confirmed that it was DY who brought her to Shanghai. 

189. There was ample evidence to show that DY had been doing business in Shangrao, moved to Hainan to set up 3 Hainan Companies with DW by injecting RMB 16m capital and engaged in multi-million RMB steel business including the Kunshan deal.  There was no suggestion that DY needed to raise a mortgage or bank loan then.  Although DW claimed to have an undefined share in the Hainan Companies, probably due to his contribution of efforts and capital, DW had not asserted contribution to the capital of Purao.

190. DG’s challenge to DY’s setting up of the 3 Hainan Companies was clearly a desperate attempt to deny DY’s early accumulation of wealth before 1993. 

191. DY and DW had also been busy buying vehicles and landed properties (including 4 units in Zhongyou Building (中友大廈) to house the Ding family and DY’s office) in the early 1990s.

192. If DG had accumulated savings of RMB 2-3m and had bought his own matrimonial property, why would he have lived at Zhongyou Building?

193. DG might have accumulated some wealth but the more probable scenario was that he was then only carrying on a sole proprietorship of transportation and relying on DY’s financial support.  I am not satisfied that he had enough capital to set up Purao.  I have no hesitation in finding that DY accumulated the first pot of gold much earlier and heavier than DG’s to be able to set up Purao.

J.  1993: THE SETTING UP OF PURAO

J1.  Undisputed facts

194. Purao was set up in April1993 under a guakao arrangement with 上饒市糧油貿易公司 (“Shangrao Cereal”) as the state-owned supervising bureau.  (It was in the same month as when Hainan Properties was set up.)  田仕雲 (“Tian”) was the general manager.  DG was the deputy general manager and legal representative.

195. A business contract dated 12/5/1993 was signed by DG andTian on behalf of Shangrao Cereal for 6 years.  It contained a personal obligation for DG to pay management fees to Shangrao Cereal. 

196. Purao had registered capital of RMB 1m at its incorporation.  It was a lot of money in those days, having regard to the fact that the average yearly income of an average person was only RMB 3,000.  The Capital Verification Report dated 19/4/1993 stated that the source of the RMB 1m was 上級撥款 but there was no dispute that the supervising bureau had not provided the capital.

197. In October 1993, Purao increased its capital by RMB 10m, of which RMB 5m was injected in the form of stock-in-trade.

198. Purao had 2 accounts at the Agricultural Bank of China (“ABC”), one operated by DG and another by DY.

199. The issue on ownership of Purao centred on who provided the RMB 1m and RMB 10m capital.

J2.  DG’s case on the setting up of Purao and provision of capital

200. According to DG, he transferred his employment dossier to Shangrao Cereal in 1992.  He then entered into the guakao arrangement[2], which was made with employees.  Tian, the then legal representative of Shangrao Cereal, said he only communicated with DG but not DY.  Purao was allegedly DG’s 1st company which had nothing to do with the Hainan Companies.  DG provided the capital from his previous businesses and his investments in the stock market: §17(5) of the reply.

201. DG’s case on Purao was a half truth. All that he mentioned in his 1st witness statement about Purao could be ascertained from public documents. The true part was that he took the administrative steps of setting up Purao.

202. The untrue part was his assertion that he provided the capital. DG claimed to have paid the RMB 1m in cash to Shangrao Cereal.  He produced a receipt concerning the RMB 1m which did not state the source of the money.  He referred to Shangrao Cereal’s 記帳憑證 dated 31/3/1993 which recorded that RMB 1m 自籌資金was paid into Shangrao Cereal’s bank account before transferring to the auditor.

203. I have already found against DG on his version of the early accumulation of wealth.  Despite calling Tian as a witness, DG has not seen fit to ask him to verify how the RMB 1m initial capital was injected. In any case, Tian was not a reliable witness as he had previously acceded to DW’s request to provide a statement but subsequently turned round to say that the statement he signed did not represent the truth.

204. According to DG’s evidence in chief, he was at the material time living in Shanghai at the Luwan District Theatre (盧灣區電影院).  It was incredible that he would have brought such a large amount of cash all the way to Shangrao instead of using a cheque or bank transfer.  The documents produced by DG himself showed that even for the annual management fee of RMB 20,000 paid to Shangrao Cereal in 1993 and 1994, the payments were effected through bank transfer.

205. DG referred to the record of interview of the auditor 嚴家慶 (“Auditor Yan”) dated 25/1/2012 disclosed by DY to support his case that DG paid in cash.  It stated that “這100萬鈔票進來後,我們收到以後 … 鈔票進來後,我們就要開收據給丁鋼,對吧?”

206. Without disrespect, Auditor Yan’s narration was difficult to follow.  At one stage he mentioned bank notes; at another, he mentioned a cheque which needed to be presented for payment.  I am unable to place much reliance on the record of interview.  But even if RMB 1m cash had been deposited into Shangrao Cereal, the fact was that the Shanghai auditor had verified the capital. 

207. Moreover, DG’s evidence, if accepted, could not explain why he needed to set up Purao when he was running a cash business, was not paying tax and was not expecting any business expansion.  As confirmed by Tian, DG was only doing transportation business whereas the main business of Purao was steel, which was hardly his trade. 

208. I reject DG’s case.

J3.  DY’s case on Purao

209. As regards purpose of setting up, DY said that Purao did not have business of its own but was incorporated in Shanghai to take over the business of Haikou Nanzhou, thereby averting the problem of “異地經營” (ie companies incorporated in Hainan running business in Shanghai).  Part of the steel imported by Haikou Nanzhou was applied to provide the RMB 1m and RMB 10m capital.  Moreover, DY had also wanted to obtain tax benefits available to Shanghai companies during the first East Asian Games (以捐代稅). 

210. According to DY, it was DW who had good relationship with Shanghai Cereal.  He discussed with Tian to establish a platform in Shanghai to operate the business of the Hainan Companies.  It was easier to obtain approval for the guakao arrangement if a staff member was appointed as the legal representative of Purao.  Hence, DG had his dossier transferred to Shanghai Cereal, without having worked there.

211. Mr Tong SC submits that there was simply no point for DY/DW to set up a guakao company in Shanghai.  DY and DW had allegedly been told by one Mr Yu of the risk that assets of a guakao company could be confiscated by the state, so they set up Haikou Nanzhou as a private company.  If so, it would have been unlikely for them to set up Purao as a guakao company.  Mr Tong SC further submits:

(i)  DY already had Haikou Materials which was an underwriting company (承包公司); Haikou Nanzhou which was a private company; and Hainan Properties which was a guakao company. DY could have set up a private company in Shanghai instead of resorting to a guakao arrangement with a modest capital of RMB 1m.  Even if he needed a guakao company in Shanghai, he could have arranged for a Hainan state-owned enterprise to establish one, which was accepted by DY as feasible.  There was no evidence of any requirement that only employees of a state-owned company could establish a guakao company with it.  In fact, neither DY nor DW were employees of the relevant state-owned company with whom they guakao the Hainan Properties.

(ii)  To address the concerns of 異地經營 and 以捐代稅, DY and DW could have caused the Hainan Companies to set up a branch office in Shanghai.  In fact, there was a branch in Shanghai established on 3/6/1993.

(iii)  If DY’s sole purpose of setting up Purao was to receive the sale proceeds of steel, there was no need to include trading in “agricultural products and electrical components” in the corporate documents.  I place little weight on this, as neither would DG need to put in “agricultural products”, which was not his past business.  

212. It is not for the court to examine with hindsight the business wisdom of DY in using guakao arrangement or other modes.  The use of the guakao arrangement did not make DG’s case more credible. What was important was that, on balance, DY had stronger reasons for setting up Purao than DG.  I see no illogicality in DY starting his first company in Shanghai with a “modest” initial capital.  As will be demonstrated below, the evidence showed that the DY’s purposes for setting up Purao were met. 

213. As regards capital injection, DY’s case was that he caused Haikou Materials to remit RMB 1m to the auditors directly in March 1993.  Seven months later, he provided another RMB 10m.

214. At one stage, DY pointed to a document dated 1/4/1993 retrieved from the Pudong New District Industrial and Commercial Bureau 浦東新區工商局 (“thePudongICB”) and alleged that he had intended Purao’s initial capital to be RMB 10m.  That new story never appeared in his pleadings, affirmations or witness statements.  DY never explained why he needed a RMB 10m company to receive the proceeds for his steel business, why he had the means to provide RMB 10m  and why he eventually settled with RMB 1m. It was more probable, as Mr Tong SC submits, that the RMB 10m stated in the document was a clerical mistake of the staff of the Pudong ICB when preparing the record.  I reject DY’s new story as an opportunistic move to bolster his case but that did not undermine his overall credibility on why Purao was set up.

215. DY’s financial strength could be seen from the 3 Hainan Companies that he had set up with a total capital of RMB 16m, and the various properties that he and DW bought back in 1992 and 1993. 

216. I place little reliance on the 進帳單which showed the transfer of RMB 1m from one account of the auditor to that of another as it did not show the source of the money.

217. Considering the evidence in its totality, I find that the source of RMB 1m was from DY.  The auditor verified the existence of this sum.

J4.  Refund of the RMB 1m initial capital

218. After verification of capital, RMB 700,000 was returned by the auditor to DG and the rest to DY.  According to a 劃還驗資貸款申請書dated 3/5/1993 (disclosed by DG after commencement of trial), it was DG who applied to the auditor for refund. The money first went into an ABC bank account operated by DG (“the Purao-DG-333-account” [3]). Immediately on the same day, RMB 700,000 was transferred to Haikou Materials as “price of goods” (貨款). 

219. DG said that he wanted to contribute to the “Kunshan deal”, so he paid Haikou Materials RMB700,000.  When it was pointed out to him that the RMB700,000 were proceeds of sale of goods, DG said he could not recall due to the long lapse of time. 

220. DG’s explanation was, in my view, a fabrication.  In his 1st witness statement, DG stated that Purao had nothing to do with the Hainan Companies. If Purao/Haikou Nanzhou was to 代收代付, why would it require DG’s “contribution”?  It was a huge sum, being about 25% of his then alleged wealth of RMB 2-3m and 70% of the initial capital of Purao.  How could DG fail to know how it was spent?

221. On the other hand, DY’s explanation was equally difficult to understand.  Why did he not ask for return of the full amount to his own account?  His explanation was that the account which he controlled (the Purao-DY-339-account [4]) was only set up on 14/5/1993.  In any event, he had directed the return of the RMB 1m back to Haikou Materials or Haikou Nanzhou.

222. That explanation raised more questions than it answered.  Why did he set up a bank account under DG’s control earlier than the one under his control?  Since there did not appear to be any urgent need for the RMB 1m, and Purao was his company, why would DY not keep the money in the Purao-DG-333-account? Why was the money described as “price of goods” instead of “repayment” to DY?

223. Moreover, there was no credible evidence to show that the RMB 1m was returned to Haikou Materials or any of DY’s personal accounts or companies.  On DY’s own case (mentioned for the first time at the trial), he and DW had ceased the underwriting business of Haikou Materials since April 1993 but had kept the bank account.  This was incomprehensible. 

224. The half truth in each of DG and DY’s case made it difficult to decide where the RMB 1m had ultimately gone.  However, it did not undermine DY’s case that he had provided the initial capital.

J5.  The business carried on by Purao

225. The evidence showed that DY and DG were each ignorant of what the other was doing in Purao.

226. DY claimed that Purao was established as a “shell” for the sole purpose of collecting proceeds of the Kunshan deal on behalf of Haikou Nanzhou.  He also said that all the deposits into the Purao-DG-333-account came from the Purao-DY-339-account.

227. Contrary to DY’s assertions, apart from steel, Purao had traded in various commodities like construction materials, foodstuff and metal products.  This was borne out by the invoices during 1993-1999 and the credit vouchers (進帳單) in 1993. 

228. On the other hand, the Kunshan deal was for very substantial amounts and DG seemed not to be bothered. The accounts of Purao had not reflected this deal.  He did not know if Haikou Nanzhou had given the RMB700,000 to Kunshan.  No goods were sent to Purao in relation to this amount. DG did not know the terms of the Kunshan deal.  In answer to a simple question repeated by Mr Tong SC at least 4 times, DG admitted that DY had told him that there would be profit-splitting with Kunshan but did not tell him how. 

229. Likewise, Mr Chan SC has asked at least 8 times whether DY told DG what the expected profit was, to which DG could only say that the profits were “considerable”.  After 10 minutes’ questioning by Mr Chan SC, DG said he knew that the RMB700,000 had no return, and that was in September/October 1993.  The principal of RMB 700,000 was repaid to Purao.  When pointed out that the Purao accounts did not show such repayment, DG claimed that repayment was through other companies but he did not know through which company or in which year he was repaid.  He did not know if the Kunshan deal was profitable or not, which meant he had paid out ¼ of his wealth for unknown return. 

230. I find it unbelievable that DG would have entered into a deal like this for his 1st company.  The truth, I find, was that it was DY who was handling the Kunshan deal without the need for DG’s knowledge or consent.

231. Further, contrary to DG’s assertion, Purao was closely related to the Hainan Companies.  Purao used the same telephone number (216-2256) of Haikou Nanzhou and the same property in Zhongyou Building bought by DY.  See the letterhead of Haikou Nanzhou. The Mother confirmed that the office of Purao was at Zhongyou Building.

232. The inference is that the 2 brothers each used Purao as his company without accounting to the other.

J6.  The 2 bank accounts of Purao

233. The Purao-DG-333-account was a basic account (基本賬戶) held at the Yangpu branch of the ABC.  It was operated by DG with his personal chop and Purao’s finance chop.  It existed for 10 years since 4/5/1993 until Purao ceased business in 2003.  The deposits were connected with the business in foodstuff, cement and commodities that DY was not involved in.  The annual management fees to Shangrao Cereal were paid out of this account.  It used to be common ground that this account was controlled by DG until DY gave oral evidence.

234. The Purao-DY-339-account was a general account (一般賬戶) held at the Putuo branch of the ABC.  It was set up on 14/5/1993, 10 days after the Purao-DG-333-account.  It was closed around 1½ years later in September 1994.  DY could not operate this account solely with his own chop since DG was in control of the finance chop.

235. DG said that he “allowed” DY to use the Purao-DY-339-account. I do not accept it.  If DY had wanted to use someone else’ account, he could have used the Hainan Companies’ in Shanghai.  To the contrary, it was more like DY allowing DG, the legal representative, to open and use the first bank account for Purao.

236. DY explained in his 3rd affirmation that: “為保證我的這批鋼材銷售匯款的安全,控制資金風險,在浦饒已有基本賬戶的情況下”, he opened the Purao-DY-339-account as his exclusive account (專用帳戶).

237. The questions were: if the Purao-DG-333-account was his anyway, why would DY need another bank account?  Why would placing money in the general account be more risk-free than placing it in the other account? If he did not trust DG, why let DG operate the basic account in the first place?  Even for the Purao-DY-339-account, there was evidence to show that some of the money therein represented proceeds of DG’s business: seepayment slips showing remittances from 西北金屬材料in July and August 1993. 

238. The Purao-DY-339-account was short-lived.  It was closed about 7 months after completion of the Kunshan deal.  The balance was deposited into the Purao-DG-333-account.  DY did not say that he had carried out any business through Purao after September 1994.  He accepted that Purao continued to conduct business through the Purao-DG-333-account but was unable to explain why.  All that he could tell was that DG traded in securities and an employee閻曉新 traded in steel. 

239. Contrary to DY’s assertion in his 3rd affirmation, the Purao-DG-333-account was active.  Upon discovery of the frequent transactions in that account, DY changed his evidence on day 35 of the trial.  He claimed for the first time that he was in control of the Purao-DG-333-account; that he had the personal chop of DG but it was returned to DG in 1995 when Purao’s business was largely wound down[5].  On day 37, DY even said that DG subsequently changed the operating chop without his knowledge.  Such new allegations were never put to DG in cross-examination.  In any case, DY could not explain the business (which was not his usual business) purportedly coming through this account. 

240. How could DY fail to remember that all the accounts of Purao were controlled by him (if that was the case) and that some business was done through the Purao-DG-333-account?

241. The above strange features in respect of the bank accounts strengthen my view that the 2 brothers each used Purao as his company without accounting to the other.  Purao continued to be used by DG after DY virtually abandoned it upon closure of the Purao-DY-339-account.

242. It was not either party’s case that there was a kind of partnership between them but that he solely owned Purao.  Taking all circumstances into account and on balance of probabilities, I am of the view that Purao was set up as DY’s company with the initial capital paid by him to operate the steel business from Haikou Nanzhou. However, he permitted DG to trade through Purao and operate Purao-DG-333-account for DG’s sole benefit.

243. I agree with Mr Tong SC that if in all the circumstances the court finds that a party did pay the RMB 1m initial capital, the increase in capital would not change the nature of the ownership as it was neither party’s case that there had been such change.  However, for completeness sake, I also deal with the circumstances leading to the increase in capital, as they were compelling in showing that DG could not be the owner.

J7.  The increase in Purao’s capital by RMB 10m

244. There was no dispute that on 8/10/1993, ie 6 months after its set up, Purao increased its capital to RMB 11m.  DY had reason to increase the capital, because of the anticipated increase in volume of steel trading.  In contrast, DG never suggested any.  In fact, the loss of RMB2.5m that Purao suffered just before October (see bank statements) would not have justified DG’s decision (if at all) to increase the capital.

245. In his pleaded case, 3rd affirmation and 1st witness statement, DG stated that it was he who provided the sum of RMB 10m from his previous business in logistics, etc and stock investments. However, his only proof was simply 2 pages of the Capital Verification Report obtained from the ICB without any attachments [H93-94]. 

246. In about February 2013, shortly before the trial commenced, the Capital Verification Report with attachments[H130-139 or F4974 to 4981]were obtained by DY from Auditor Yan.  They showed that the following assets were provided to the auditor for verification of capital:

(i)  RMB 5m by cheque from the Purao-DY-339-account; and

(ii)  RMB 5m worth of stock-in-trade, being the subject matter of the Kunshan deal. 

247. The attachments to that Capital Verification Report included:

(i)  An agency agreement (代理進口協議書) executed on 14/2/1993 among China Five Metals, Haikou Nanzhou and Kunshan.  It was for the import of 20,000 tonnes of hot rolled steel coils and 10,000 tonnes of hot rolled flat open steel (熱軋平板).

(ii)  An invoice dated 15/6/1993 issued by RIMACO to China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corp.  About 10.3 metric tonnes of hot rolled steel worth US$2.97m were to be shipped by the vessel泰華海.

(iii)  A 存根聯issued by China Five Metals to Haikou Nanzhou dated 1/7/1993 bearing the details on the invoice.

(iv)  A 發票聯 issued by 五礦國際貨運上海公司 to Purao dated 23/7/1993, containing all the details on the invoice.  The 發票聯 related to certain handling charges or transaction fees. It stated that Purao had to pay 自提定額費 in the sum of RMB 30,930.69.

(v)  3 copies of 物資入庫儲存憑証 issued to Purao – all dated 24/7/1993 – showing part of the shipment being stored at certain places.

248. DG explained that Purao ceased business in 2003. When he obtained Purao’s Capital Verification Report from the ICB, he was not told that there was another version.  His further efforts in speaking to the auditor had not brought him the attachments to the Report either.

249. I do not believe that the ICB did not have the attachments to the Capital Verification Report.  Even giving DG the benefit of doubt that he has not deliberately withheld the attachments from disclosure, his complete change of version in his 2nd supplemental witness statement after DY’s disclosure cast grave doubt on his credibility.  DG alleged that part of the RMB 10m was “borrowed” from the stock in trade of Haikou Nanzhou but the stock was not injected into and hence did not belong to Purao; as the verification process was less regulated then, the auditor did not inspect the stock. 

250. It might be true that, as confirmed by Auditor Yan, there was no physical inspection of the stock-in-trade.  I would be surprised if the converse had happened.  However, what was important was that there were documents to satisfy Auditor Yan that the cash and stock did exist.

251. The evidence of DY was weighty.  Firstly, RMB 5m came from the Purao-DY-339-account, as evidenced by 2 cheques dated 19/9/1993 and 7/10/1993.

252. DG admitted in the witness box that it was difficult to raise the RMB 10m with his or Purao’s means.  He alleged that he was advised by the auditor that the money temporarily deposited for the Kunshan deal in the Purao-DY-339-account belonged to Purao from the angle of auditing, and could be used for capital verification.  He said, for the first time in the witness box, that RMB 5m was taken out of the cash that was supposed to be received and disbursed on behalf of Kunshan, which wholly contradicted his original version that the money all came from him.  See also his completely evasive version in his supplemental witness statement that Purao was in fact not doing 代收代付.

253. Mr Tong SC submits that funds derived from the Kunshan deal could not be said to be Haikou Nanzhou’s since Kunshan had an interest in them.  Nor could they be regarded as DY’s personal assets as they were Haikou Nanzhou’s (belonging to DY and DW).

254. With respect, this desperate argument hit DG with the same force, as he had to rely on exactly the same funds to substantiate his case on increase in capital.  The argument dodges the real effect of the evidence: that those funds were wholly connected with DY and not DG.  The cash capital injection came from DY’s side. 

255. Secondly, physical existence of the stock-in-trade was proved by the photos of the ship Taihuahai and the steel showing the contract number, the name of RIMACO and the destination Shanghai, all in accordance with the invoice in the attachments. 

256. Thirdly, the attachments to the Capital Verification Report  showed that DY had appropriated the stock-in-trade of RMB 5m to Purao:

(i)  The 3 sets of 物資入庫儲存憑証 in respect of 2,562 mt of rolled steel coils were all issued to Purao and not Haikou Nanzhou.

(ii)  Adopting the unit price of US$288 per mt, the total value of such stock-in-trade (without taking into account the resale value) was: US$288 x 2,562 = US$737,856.00.  At a conversion rate of US$1 to RMB9, that was equivalent to RMB 6.64 million.

257. Fourthly, Purao’s balance sheets supported DY’s case:

(i)  The balance sheet as at 31/7/1993 showed that Purao’s capital was of RMB 1m.

(ii)  After the increase in capital in October 1993, the balance sheet as at 31/12/1993 recorded實收資本as RMB 11m, clearly appropriating the RMB 5 million stock-in-trade.

(iii)  Purao’s 1994 annual report dated 16/1/1995 also showed the increase in registered capital from RMB 1m to RMB 11m.

258. Fifthly, the profit and loss accounts for the months of October and November 1993 relied on by Mr Tong SC did not show substantial stock or income from sales.  However, the following financial statements of Purao did show that stock-in-trade in the sum of RMB 5m were appropriated to Purao, as opposed to Haikou Nanzhou:

(1) The profit and loss account in December 1993 showed that Purao derived income from sale of goods in an aggregate sum of RMB 3,409,981.20.

(2) The balance sheet as at 31/12/1993 showed the stock-in-trade to be of RMB 3,193,686.26. 

(3) Such significant amount of stock or sale was only explicable by reference to the appropriation of the stock-in-trade injected into Purao.  DG has not suggested any other source of stock-in-trade or provided rebuttal evidence.

259. If the stock was “borrowed” as DG alleged, there was no evidence of “return” of the borrowed stock to the real owner.  (Compare this to the return of the RMB 1m capital after the capital verification process.) Mr Tong SC’s submission that all the proceeds of sale were booked in Haikou Nanzhou’s accounts and that there was no evidence of Haikou Nanzhou passing title of the steel in the Kunshan deal to Purao could not be substantiated.

260. Sixthly, there were 2½ bundles of documents showing substantial deposits into the Purao-DY-339-account soon after Purao’s incorporation in May 1993.

(i)  In the first 2 weeks, the balance in that account rose from RMB 10,000 to RMB 7,769,542.

(ii)  Between 15 and 31 May 1993, there were substantial deposits in the region of RMB 13,318,000.

DG had never explained the source of these deposits.  On balance of probabilities, they clearly came from DY’s steel business.

261. As one will see in the analyses below, in 1 month’s time, Dingtai was also set up with initial capital of RMB 10m.  The capital of Dingtai was injected partly in the form of cash and partly in stock-in-trade in a similar manner as for Purao.  DG could not have forgotten how capital injection had happened if Purao (and Dingtai) were his company.

262. I find that the Capital Verification Report with attachments correctly recorded the increase of Purao’s capital by RMB 10m in the manner as described by DY. DY would not have increased the capital so significantly if Purao was not his company.  DG was making up the story as he went along.  He had clearly lied to boost his case on the increase in capital of Purao, which I reject in its entirety.

J8.  Disposal of the RMB 10m capital

263. Subsequent to the capital verification, the RMB 5m cash was disposed of as follows:

(i)  RMB 1.5m was returned by the auditors to the Purao-DG-333-account;

(ii)  RMB 3.5 million was (contrary to DG’s request to the auditors) returned by the auditors to the Purao-DY-339-account. DG offered the answer that Kunshan was in urgent need of money and so he and 閻曉新 asked the auditor for such return.  However, this only accounted for, at most, the return of RMB 1.1m and RMB 400,000.

(iii)  Subsequently, when cash was required for Dingtai’s capital injection, a sum of RMB 3.8 million was paid by a cheque drawn from Purao-DY-339-account.

(iv)  Notwithstanding that the money was drawn from the Purao-DY-339-account, after the capital verification process of Dingtai, a substantial part (in the aggregate amount of RMB 1.3 million) was returned to the Purao-DG-333-account.

(v)  There is no evidence of the final destination of the balance.

264. Mr Tong SC submits that this flow of RMB 5m was consistent with the case that the cash used for the purpose of capital increase either belonged to or was borrowed by DG. 

265. I reject this submission.  DG has failed to answer the question posed by Mr Tong SC 3 times: why were there 3 cheques for the return of the capital?  Neither could he explain why the bulk of the money was returned to DY’s account.  He was totally evasive. In any case, the destination of the RMB 5m could not undermine the fact that it had originated from DY. 

J9.  Other evidence showing ownership of Purao

266. There was a certificate of provision of capital (出資證明)dated 28/10/1993 purportedly issued and chopped by Purao to Haikou Nanzhou produced by DY [Exh D-128A].  There was also evidence of third parties treating DY as the boss. 

267. The certificate of provision of capital certified that:

(i)  The RMB 1m for setting up Purao was wholly provided by Haikou Nanzhou.

(ii)  DY decided to set up a company at the WGQ Tax Region which would guakao Purao.  DY was the only capital provider owning 100% of Dingtai.

(iii)  Out of the capital of RMB 10m, RMB 6.2m worth of steel unloaded from the vessel泰華海was taken as injection of capital; another RMB 3.8m cash came from a bank account at Putuo branch of the ABC, being a designated account to receive proceeds of sale of steel of Haikou Nanzhou.  (Note: this part of the contents was, I find, independently proved to be true.  See under Section L on Dingtai below.)

(iv)  The 2 injections of capital did not come from the state-owned Purao but DY himself.

268. In §2.3 of his 2nd supplemental witness statement, DY explained that he was anticipating setting up Dingtai which would require a lot of capital and steel of Haikou Nanzhou.  He was concerned that with a change in personnel, disputes about who funded the capital would arise. Hence this certificate was made.  He produced Exhibit D-128A, which was a colour copy, allegedly found from Huagao No.1 Estate (華高一村). 

269. DG challenged the certificate as fake.

270. Although DY first mentioned this certificate in his witness statement filed in November 2012, the late discovery spoke volumes.  He could not explain why he did not produce the original allegedly kept at the Zhongyou Building in the receivership proceedings in July 2010, well before an alleged burglary occurred in October 2012[6] there.  In fact, he never mentioned about the burglary in the receivership proceedings. 

271. There were other doubts.  DY could not identify the writer of the certificate.  Nor could he explain why a colour copy was necessary in those days and why this was the only colour copy amongst all documents in the 60 trial bundles.  By October 1993, there were already Purao documents bearing serial numbers of 018 or 020[7] and yet the certificate dated 28/10/1993 bore an earlier serial number of 93/015.

272. DY’s explanation as to why the certificate came into existence was illogical:

(i) There were no similar certificates for Haikou Materials and Nanhai Property which were also guakao companies and had contracts with the supervising bureau.

(ii) The certificate was not binding on Shangrao Cereal at all.

(iii) It would have been simpler to ask Tian, whom DW was very familiar with, to give a certificate to a similar effect for DY’s protection. In fact, Shangrao Cereal had issued one on 17/9/1998 concerning the status of Purao.

(iv) DY did not ask DG (legal representative of Purao) to sign this certificate. 

273. Considering all circumstances, I am not satisfied as to the genuineness of the certificate.  Even if it was genuine, I place no reliance on it as a self-serving statement.

274. As for evidence from third parties, I accept the authenticity of the 調查筆錄 [H185-192] of the People’s Procuratorate obtained in the Jiang Wei Proceedings.  Those documents came about because a person called 邵毅 was prosecuted for the offence of職務侵佔罪.  The 調查筆錄dated 24/9/1997, ie 16 years ago, was made of 周德林as a witness who gave information concerning 邵毅 who had made illegal gains from a tax scheme known as 以捐代稅.  DY was also a witness.  I agree with Mr Tong SC that 周德林was mistaken in saying that Purao was a subsidiary of Haikou Nanzhou (instead of Shangrao Cereal) and that DY was Purao’s legal representative. 

275. I do not read these documents from third parties as proof of DY’s ownership of Purao.  In my view, the proper interpretation of the third parties’ documents is that DY (through Haikou Nanzhou) had experience in trading of steel and his scale of business was great, as evidenced by the quantity of 20,000 mt ship plates and the tax of over RMB 10m.  DY (through Purao incorporated in Shanghai) took advantage of the 以捐代稅for the East Asian Games.  Clearly Haikou Nanzhou was related to Purao, which supported DY’s evidence.

J10. The truth lay somewhere in between

276. The truth probably lay somewhere in between DG and DY’s versions.  Whilst DG’s evidence was evasive and full of inconsistencies, there were ample indisputable contemporaneous documents to show that DY engaged in multi-million business.  The tax was over RMB 100,000 for one month and donation in millions.  DY could explain the tax advantage and purpose in setting up a company in Shanghai and where Purao’s substantial steel business had come from. He had the financial strength to afford the RMB 1m and RMB 10m capital.  These contrasted starkly with DG’s hollow assertion of provision of capital and lack of reason for the substantial increase in capital.  DG only did the administrative work for incorporation, opened the basic account and paid the annual management fee.

277. Each of the 2 brothers apparently treated Purao as his company to trade individually with his own bank account under the name of Purao. As will be demonstrated in Section L on Dingtai, when the purpose of Purao had been served and a new company Dingtai was set up, DY moved on to deal with Dingtai. That could explain why Purao “lived on” but was “controlled” by DG.  It did not bother DY, who at that time was in good relationship with DG.  It was neither party’s case that there was a partnership.  I find that DY was the real owner of Purao.

K. 1993: THE PROPERTY DIVISION AGREEMENT AND THE GIFT AGREEMENT

K1.  DY’s case

278. The Father was an authoritative figure in the family.  According to the Mother, on 6/6/1993, after dinner at home, the Father directed DW and DY to stay and divide up their assets.  The Father’s principle was that “even blood brothers ought to have clear accounts” (親兄弟,明算帳).  For fear that DW would renege, the father required something in writing and DXH drafted the Property Division Agreement. It recited the business relationship between DY and DW since July 1991 and divided the fixed assets and profits between them.  DW and DY put their fingerprints and signed the Agreement in triplicate, which were kept by DY, DW and the Mother.  DG was present at that time.

279. Again, according to the Mother, after DW and DY divided their assets, the Father said that DY and DW brought DG to Shanghai at the end of 1992 but DG had no source of income and yet had a family.  The Father suggested that they should each make a gift of RMB 1m to DG. DW was not happy about it but did as his Father wished.  DXH drafted the Gift Agreement which recited as follows:

“玆有丁蔚,丁育合作經商后, 因需用人,92年將三弟丁鋼帶在身邊,協助經商。現因丁鋼自立門戶,獨立經商,需要資本,兄弟倆經協商后 ……”

280. DY and DW made gifts to DG, being the sum of RMB 1.3m as capital, a property at Room 505 Yinpu Building (including interior furniture and fittings) worth RMB 500,000, a Sontana car worth RMB 180,000, a property in Shangrao worth RMB 20,000 and credit card value of RMB 50,000.  The total was stated to be RMB 2.05m.  These gifts were confirmed by the Mother to have been given by DY to DG.

281. DG challenged the authenticity of the Property Division Agreement and the Gift Agreement (collectively “the 2 Agreements”).  He asserted that the car was bought by him.  He challenged the value of the furniture and fittings of the Yinpu Property as too high. 

282. In his closing submission, Mr Tong SC, challenges the 2 Agreements from 4 angles:

(1) Last-minute disclosure of just one set of the original;

(2) The peculiar way of drafting the 2 Agreements;

(3) The information wrongly stated in or curiously omitted from the 2 Agreements; and

(4) The alleged performance of the 2 Agreements.

K2. Last minute disclosure of one set of the originals

283. Exhibits D-2and D-3 are the original of the 2 Agreements produced from the Mother’s custody.  Mr Tong SC questions whether 3 sets of originals were indeed executed on 6/6/1993 or only one set was created by DY’s camp for the purpose of these proceedings.

284. According to the Mother, she has kept Exhibits D-2 and D-3 inside a locked drawer at the instigation of the Father for fear that DW might renege from what was agreed. She produced Exhibits D-2 and D-3 to DW/DXH when the litigation first began and she had not seen it again until she attended trial.  This contradicted:

(i) DY’s 9th affirmation wherein he said that he obtained the Mother’s set in September 2012 and kept them in a safe in Shanghai; and that due to certain investigations he was prevented from going to Shanghai to get it back.

(ii) DXH’s version that she and DW did not take the originals when the Mother showed them to her in 2010.  The originals were obtained from the Mother subsequently when documents were submitted to the court.

285. I cannot see how the late production should cast doubt on the Mother’s version of evidence.  She produced the originals on her own initiative, clearly with a view to assisting the court in resolving any dispute.  She had not taken sides.  She did not even know the details of the litigation. She has identified Exhibits D-2 and D-3 as genuine and could give details of the circumstances surrounding their making.

286. DG was the favoured child of the family.  In particular, DXH (13 years older than DG) had all along been on very good terms with DG since his childhood.  When the dispute first arose, DG asked DXH to fly back from Hong Kong to Shanghai to mediate the matter.

287. Yet all the family members, except DG, spoke with one voice as regards the authenticity of Exhibits D-2 and D-3. It is inconceivable that if they conspired to prepare 2 false documents, they dragged in the Mother and went to the extent of forging even the signature of the Father. To borrow the same logic relied on by DG, the more serious the act alleged, the more inherently improbable must it be regarded and the more compelling would the evidence be to prove on balance of probabilities: Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers (para 83 above).

288. DG attacked the credibility of his own Mother by cruelly referring to her bitter personal history which I do not see the necessity to repeat here.  I have no hesitation in accepting the Mother’s denial of DG’s allegation.  In his closing submission, Mr Tong SC cannot offer any reason for the Mother to lie. 

289. In my view, the Mother’s evidence should be accorded the greatest weight.  I find the 2 Agreements to be genuine. 

290. The other 3 challenges by Mr Tong SC become unimportant but I will deal with them briefly.

K3. Peculiar way of drafting the 2 Agreements

291. Mr Tong SC questions why there were blanks in the Property Division Agreement where the value of assets was supposed to be inserted.  DY and DW explained that it was the Father’s idea to avoid revealing their true wealth.  DXH also said that the steel transaction under clause 2 of the Property Division Agreement was yet to complete and the value could not be computed; this was not corroborated by DW or DY.

292. Mr Tong SC submits that the drafting would not conceal DY and DW’s wealth as the assets had already been identified in the Property Division Agreement itself.  Even if the value was uncertain then, the value of fixed assets could be calculated and stated in the Property Division Agreement. He invites the court to compare that Agreement with the Gift Agreement in which the value of the gifts to DG was mentioned.

293. With respect, the 2 Agreements were drafted by a non-lawyer inside her home.  The Father’s directions were to be abided by, regardless of whether they appeared logical to outsiders.  Litigation was not anticipated.  I do not find it surprising that there was no mention of the value in one Agreement but express mention in another.

294. Mr Tong SC also questions why DG was not asked to sign on the Gift Agreement.  Unlike the Property Division Agreement, the Gift Agreement did not bear the fingerprints of DY and DW.  It was not signed by DXH as the draftsman, nor the parents who were present.  The Mother could not recall why DXH did not sign the Gift Agreement.

295. Again, I see no difficulty with these.  As the 2 Agreements affected the business and assets of DW and DY, it was important for them to sign and apply their fingerprints to bind them.  On the other hand, as the Mother said (twice), DG was the donee and it was not his assets that were divided; that was why he need not sign the Gift Agreement.

K4.  Information wrongly stated in or curiously omitted from the 2 Agreements

296. A property at 寳鋼九村bought with funds of Haikou Materials or Haikou Nanzhou was omitted from the Property Division Agreement.  DW’s explanation as to the 寳鋼九村was inconsistent and unbelievable.

297. As to the Yinpu Property mentioned in the Gift Agreement, DY gave inconsistent versions:

(i)  That the Yinpu Property was purchased in 1992 and he had made a gift to DG prior to the Gift Agreement.  It was contradicted by contemporaneous documents which showed that the Yinpu Property was purchased at about RMB 346,000, earliest, in March 1993 by DG and SXP through SXP’s maternal uncle, 劉勇軍 (“Liu”). See代理購房協議書 dated 23/3/1993, 商品房交付通知書dated 9/5/1993 and the payment slips relating to the purchase issued to Liu.

(ii)  In his supplemental witness statement, DY purported to explain that Liu was appointed to handle the purchase as it was a regulation that only persons with Shanghai native registration could purchase a property in Shanghai.  This explanation was unsustainable because (a) DY could have purchased the Yinpu Property in the name of one of his Hainan Companies (e.g. the Zhongyou Building units were purchased in the name of Haikou Materials); or (b) DY could have signed the代理購房協議書 with Liu in his own name; or (c) DY could have asked someone closer to him who had Shanghai homeland registration (such as his wife or Jiang Wei) to act as his agent to purchase the property.

(iii)  During cross-examination, DY said, for the first time, the idea came from his Father after signing of the Property Division Agreement.  He claimed that he allowed DG to make arrangement with Liu as he had already decided to give the Yinpu property to DG in February 1993, prior to the execution of the Gift Agreement. DY said that the parents and DG knew about it but DW did not.  It was also contradictory to DXH’s evidence (that DY and DW funded the purchase in 1993 and gave it to DG under the Gift Agreement) and the Mother’s evidence in her witness statement that the decision to give the Yinpu Property to DG was only made after the signing of the Property Division Agreement.

298. I find that DY was making up evidence to bolster his case.  The truth probably lay somewhere in between his and DG’s case.  I prefer the Mother’s evidence.  But regardless of who had bought the Yinpu Property, the intention of the Gift Agreement was to attribute a value to it. Regardless of the fact that the decoration was completed only in 1994, the intention of the Gift Agreement was for DY to provide the costs of furniture and fittings.  I accept that such costs were incredibly high for a residential unit worth RMB 346,000.  However, the wish of the Father was to be met. Given the good relationship of DY with DG and DY’s wealth, I am not surprised at the generosity in such costs.

299. With regard to the steel transaction, DW and DY might have failed to give a satisfactory explanation of how the 50,000 mt steel came about.  I note that the Property Division Agreement was talking about imported steel from July 1991 until the stock-in-trade was to be sold out.  I am not convinced that 50,000 mt was made up having regard to the steel business of Purao and Dingtai.

300. Mr Tong SC also challenged if DW had anything to divide in between him and DY.  Although he claimed to have set up the Hainan Companies with DY, DW was most unclear as to what capital he had provided, his share in DY’s business and the bases thereof.  DY was in charge of finance and there had been no distribution of profits. DW admitted receiving money from DY to purchase properties in the names of DW and Haikou Material in 1992 [H/12, 13, 14].  He agreed the properties were not his but were used as office for the business and residences for him and DY.

301. DW might have contributed in some form.  DY never denied that DW had a share in DY’s business.  Given their good relationship, DY and DW might not have defined their interests in business and assets clearly. It is not for outsiders to comment on their business relationship. Suffice to say that they did consider themselves as having joint assets and that those should be divided in accordance with the Father’s wish.

K5.  Alleged performance of the 2 Agreements

302. DW reluctantly disclosed in court that he received RMB 25m under the Property Division Agreement.  He confirmed that after the division, his interests in Hainan Properties had not changed.

303. The documentary evidence produced by DY in support of part of the payment to DW was hard to accept.  Some showed payment out of the Purao-DY-339-account to various entities that seemed to be government bureaus like 上饒衞生局, or were on dates in 1995 and 1996, well beyond completion of the Kunshan deal in February 1994.

304. There was also no evidence of the joint account intended to be opened by DY and DW pursuant to the last paragraph of the Property Division Agreement. 

305. I am unable to rely on DW’s evidence as to performance.  His evidence was illogical and inconsistent.  According to him, 1-2 days following the Property Division Agreement, he had a further discussion with DY at DW’s home at Leshan Road as to how to divide their assets.  It was decided that the properties bought in DW’s sole name (though using company funds) should be given to him, ie 2 properties in Haikou and a villa in Huizhou[8]. DW also got 7 vehicles and RMB 25m.  Those landed properties were worth about RMB 1m.  Yet, in the same witness statement, DW claimed that he received landed properties to the value of RMB 4m, when some properties were not yet in existence[9] at or about the time of the Property Division Agreement.  DW later changed his evidence to say that the discussion took place some time later.

306. There was insufficient evidence as to how the Property Division Agreement was performed and DW and DY had given inconsistent and unbelievable evidence in this aspect. They might have varied the terms but that was not really the issue before the court and it did not affect the authenticity of the 2 Agreements. 

307. As to the Gift Agreement, according to the Mother, DY asked his wife Jiang Wen to issue a cheque of RMB2m to DG on the following day.  Together with the properties it was RMB2.7m.  DW also confirmed that it was DY who paid DG.

308. The cheque relied on by DY appeared to be one for 貨款 issued out of the Purao-DY-339-account to a 上饒市鴻宇工貿物資供應站.  There was no reason why the payment to DG had to be in this convoluted mode and there was no proof of the connection between DG and上饒市鴻宇工貿物資供應站.   

309. DY has failed to satisfy the court as to how the RMB 2m was paid to DG pursuant to the Gift Agreement.  This was not surprising after such long lapse of time.  DY might have, yet again, tried to bolster his case by producing unrelated documents. However, on balance, I am satisfied from the Mother’s evidence that DY did make the gift to DG.

K6.  Findings with regard to the 2 Agreements

310. The impressive efforts of Mr Tong SC to challenge the 2 Agreements go nowhere near casting doubt on the evidence of the Mother.  If anything, his challenges go towards showing the spontaneous creation of the 2 Agreements and the informality one often finds in home-made documents.  The cross-examination might have thrown the credibility of DY and DW in doubt as to what assets they revealed to their Father on 6/6/1993 and how they performed the 2 Agreements but these did not undermine the authenticity of the 2 Agreements.

311. The 2 Agreements were made just 2 months after Purao was set up.  If Purao were DG’s company, the Father would not have missed it.  The Gift Agreement would not have recited that DG wanted to 自立門戶or that DG needed anymore capital in the future tense. 

312. I find that DG’s version was not a failure of memory.  It was a complete lie and shameless denial of the favours done to him by DY.  The 2 Agreements showed that DY was much wealthier than DG and that he financially assisted DG.  DG knew full well that they would have supported DY’s case on the first pot of gold and ownership of Purao.

L.  1993-1997: DINGTAI

L1.  Undisputed facts

313. In early 1993, WGQ Tax Region was set up in Shanghai.  It gave tax benefits to companies set up in that region, Dingtai was set up there in November 1993, using a guakao arrangement with Purao.  DY was the legal representative of Dingtai until he resigned in 2003.  The office was at Zhongyou Building with the same telephone number as Purao. 

314. Dingtai had registered capital of RMB 10m and its balance sheet for 1993 showed 實收資本 as RMB 10m.  For capital injection purpose, a cheque for RMB 3.8m was drawn from the Purao-DY-339-account; and there was injection in terms of stock-in-trade to the value of RMB 6.2m. 

L2.  The issues

315. The issues were who provided the capital and hence was the real beneficial owner of Dingtai.  There were other issues on whether DY was in control of Dingtai’s business and whether DG had completely “retrieved” control of Dingtai. 

L3.  Who provided the capital for setting up Dingtai?

316. Originally, as with the case of increase in RMB 10m capital of Purao, DG had not provided proof of his capital injection into Dingtai.  Then DY produced the Capital Verification Report of Dingtai obtained from the auditors with attachments on 25/1/2013. DG changed his evidence completely even after seeking leave (at the pre-trial review in January 2013) to serve his draft 2nd supplemental witness statement.

317. In the latest version, DG no longer maintained his plea in para 18(2) of the amended reply that the capital injection came from Purao’s assets and profits.  He accepted that RMB 3m came from the Purao-DY-339-account account but asserted that the contract (between Haikou Nanzhou and others regarding imported steel) was borrowed from DY and the goods did not belong to Purao.  He claimed that the capital verification of Dingtai was “hollow” (只是虛的驗資). 

318. Before reaching the undisputed version in para 314, DY’s version on the cash injection had undergone some changes:

(i)  In his 1st affirmation, DY stated that RMB 4m was borrowed from an outsider and he even gave the cheque number of the outsider.

(ii)  In his 3rd affirmation, he said that the RMB 4m came from his personal funds from the Kunshan deal.  He refuted the version of borrowing without giving an explanation.

(iii)  His witness statement stated that the money came from funds of Haikou Nanzhou received by Purao and the goods used for injection came from the steel imported by Haikou Nanzhou.

319. Version (i) was indisputably wrong.  With his wealth, DY simply did not need to borrow.  He said he saw a cheque number on the ICB form and relied on it to say that the funds were borrowed.  It reflected his desperate attempt to bolster his case in order to obtain the receivership order.  The court has to be cautious with his explanation of the contemporaneous documents.

320. Versions (ii) and (iii) were all along part cash-part goods injection although details were missing.

321. The final undisputed version was firmly supported by documents.  On cash injection, DY was cross-examined as to the availability of funds at the end of October and in early November 1993.  He said that his original intention was to inject RMB 4m.  However, he feared that a cheque he received at the end of October for RMB 975,000 would bounce.  Relying on the handwritten accounts in hand (instead of only bank statements which he would only receive once a month), he decided to inject what he could afford, ie RMB 3.8m. 

322. Working on handwritten accounts was in accordance with commercial sense.  DY could mention the name of the issuer of the cheque, the date and amount, in the witness box without a document in hand.  The cheque did bounce and he was able to refer to the chain of documents in proof.  I find the final version of DY as to the source of the cash capital from his Purao-DY-339-account to be genuine. 

323. As for the injection by stock-in-trade, the mode was similar to that for Purao.  The attachments to the contemporaneous Capital Verification Report of Dingtai showed that:

(1)  The 代理進口協議書 dated 14/2/1993 entered into among China Five Metals, Haikou Nanzhou, and Kunshan, together with a contract between China Five Metals and RIMCAO for the import of:-

(a)  20,000 mt of hot rolled steel coils; and

(b)  10,000 mt of hot rolled flat open steel.

(2)  A contract dated 8/3/1993 (with Maison F. Mathieu being the seller) for 20,000 mt of “hot rolled ship building plate” (“the Maison Contract”). Haikou Nanzhou was stated to be the accounting unit (結算單位) and receiving unit (收貨單位).  At US$337 per mt, the total value of the goods was US$6.76m x RMB 9 = RMB 60.84m.

324. The Maison Contract showed that:

(1)  The auditors had asked for evidence of additional stock for the purpose of verification of Dingtai’s capital.  The steel building plates, worth about RMB 60.84 million, was well beyond the capital requirement of RMB 6.2m for Dingtai.  The Maison Contract, refuted Mr Tong SC’s submission that the same assets had been used for the capital injection of both Purao and Dingtai.

(2)  The Maison Contract demonstrated yet again the link between Haikou Nanzhou on the one hand and Purao or Dingtai on the other.  The stock of Haikou Nanzhou was injected into Dingtai as its capital. 

325. Further, contrary to DG’s arguments, Dingtai’s books and records were all consistent with RMB 10m being injected.  In Dingtai’s audited account for the year ended 1994:-

(1) When Dingtai was just set up and had not started operation, there was lack of stock-in-trade in the 1993 balance sheet and no record of sales in the profit and loss accounts.  However, as at 31/12/1994, its balance sheet showed that the paid-up capital (實收資本) was RMB 10m.  Thus, contrary to DG’s argument, the stock-in-trade was injected into Dingtai. 

(2) As shown in its profit and loss account (損益及利潤分配表), Dingtai derived an enormous sum of RMB 158m from the sale of its stock (商品銷售收入淨額).  Such income within a year of incorporation was only possible because of the injection of stock-in-trade.

(3) DG could not provide any explanation as to why there was so significant stock being sold in just a year (especially when he thenceforth did not have much experience in steel trade).

326. I find DY to be mistaken initially but his case was eventually firmly established by contemporaneous documents.  The capital verification of Dingtai was not a hollow paper exercise as DG described.

327. Moreover, bank statements of the Purao-DG-333-account showed that DG’s business did not perform well.  In about September 1993, the bank balance of RMB 282,000 was not even enough to settle a loan of RMB 4m.  DG/Purao could not even afford to fund the increase of RMB 10m capital of Purao in October. There was simply no cause for DG to incorporate Dingtai.  DG has deliberately lied in order to bolster his case, as Dingtai was the entity which purchased the Land.

328. I have no hesitation in holding that it was DY who injected the capital and owned Dingtai. 

L4.  Why was DY the legal representative?

329. DG’s oral evidence was that Tian advised him of a policy[10] that an individual could not act as a legal representative for 2 or more state-owned companies, including those established pursuant to a guakao arrangement. Tian never corroborated DG.  Anyhow, DG’s evidence was contradicted by certificates of corporations which showed that陳志強 did act as legal representatives of 3 state enterprises in about the same period, ie (i) 上饒市商業儲運公司 on 4/3/1993; (ii) 江西特種汽車總廠上饒分廠 on 13/5/1993; and (iii)上鐃市輕型車輛廠 on 22/5/1993.  I reject DG’s evidence.

330. It was natural for DY, the owner, to be the legal representative. 

L5.  The business of Dingtai

331. Dingtai effectively took over Purao’s trade of steel.  DY had produced some steel contracts for the period covering 1996 and 2000, showing that hundreds of thousands of tons of steel were involved, running into millions of RMB. 

332. DG said very little about Dingtai’s business. He never explained where he could have sourced such volume of steel and why DY had to assist him when DY had his own Hainan Companies to run. In the closing submission, Mr Tong SC has not identified Dingtai’s business. 

L6.  Who controlled Dingtai?

333. It was DY, rather than DG, who was in control of Dingtai’s business initially.  DY was the “administrative leader” (行政領導) or person in charge (負責人) and his wife Jiang Wen was the person in charge of accounts (會計主管人員/財務主管) as evidenced by various auditors’ reports, financial statements and tax returns submitted to the Shanghai government between 1995 and December 1997. 

334. DG claimed that DY could not be managing Dingtai during June to late 1994 when DY was detained for an offence for up to 12 months. This was a half truth.  Although DY had violated the law, DW had, I accept, signed an undertaking which caused DY to be released after one month and to receive non-custodial training for one year.  DG had exaggerated the length of DY’s detention.  I find that DY was able to manage Dingtai in 1994.

335. There was other evidence to show that DY was in control of Dingtai:

(i)  There was a 代開百萬元增值稅專用發票申請書 dated 24/7/1996, indicating a single transaction of Dingtai for more than RMB 5m signed by DY.

(ii)  There was a 蘆潮港協議 dated 23/5/1995 signed by DW on behalf of Dingtai to purchase land rights worth RMB 9m. It was impossible for DG to have authorized DW to sign because, on DG’s own admission, he was on bad terms with DW who had tried to prevent him from incorporating Purao under the guakao arrangement with Shangrao Cereal.

336. The analyses in this Section up to this point are sufficient to enable me to find that DY was the true owner of Dingtai.  DG’s submission that the steel business was insignificant compared to the acquisition and development of the Land dodges the issue. 

L7.  DY’s loss in wealth in futures speculation

337. DY accepted that in 1995/1996 he suffered loss of RMB 9m from speculating in futures (apparently treating Dingtai’s money as his).  He accepted that the statements of the futures trading accounts in his or Dingtai’s name were genuine. He denied causing Dingtai financial difficulty as a result and claimed to still possess RMB 50-60m.

338. DG’s case was that DY had lost all his wealth to the extent of pledging the Zhongyou Building units and went into hiding.  This was corroborated by 奕印敏 who assisted Dingtai in the trading of futures.

339. The loss from speculation in futures was clearly reflected in the financial statements of Dingtai:

(i)  In 1995, despite having sales of over RMB 46m, Dingtai suffered loss of about RMB 75,000.  It was specifically pointed out by the auditors that “有一筆膠合板期貨虧損數額較大直接影響當期利潤”;

(ii)  In 1998, part of the account receivables related to loss of over RMB 3m in trading through Hainan Futures;

(iii)  In 1999, the loss from trading through Hainan Futures increased to over RMB 8.47m.

The loss was also corroborated by 鮑栽萍 (accountant of Dingtai since July 1994; financial consultant of Bading since 2012), whose evidence I accept.  She confirmed that Dingtai was in a better financial shape when it engaged in steel business.  Where DY has taken out money for speculation, she would record it in Dingtai’s accounts as “amount receivable” or prepaid amount”.  Those amounts were never repaid.

340. Mr Tong SC relies on DY’s selective disclosure of personal financial documents for the period of 1995/6 to show that DY had lost all his wealth in 1995/6.  I place little weight on the limited disclosure after so many years.  Rather, I place more emphasis on circumstantial evidence:

341. Firstly, what was undisputed was that DY left the Zhongyou Building and resided in a rented flat at the junction of 東方路and 張楊路.  DY’s explanation was that he wanted to avoid being reported for breaching the one child policy, his wife then bearing a second child.  His version was supported by the Mother.

342. In this respect, I reject the Mother’s evidence. Moving could hardly prevent exposure of DY having a second child.  Moreover, having a second child would only expose DY to financial penalty, which he could undoubtedly afford with his alleged wealth of RMB 50 to 60m.

343. Secondly, DY had failed to pay the management fees of RMB 37,872.60 for Zhongyou Building for 3 years between January 1998 and February 2001: see demand note dated 20/2/2001. The Mother confirmed the non-payment. Ironically, DY denied knowledge of it, despite his alleged use of Zhongyou Building as his office. 

344. Thirdly, DY had moved to live at 華高一村in 1999, a cheap estate located at the outskirt of Shanghai. According to DY, the Father used his savings/pension of RMB 280,000 to purchase 4 units there and gave one to DY.  DY claimed to have moved there with his family as the Father was very ill.  This was incredible.  There was no reason why a wealthy man like DY should have allowed his Father to pay for such a modest unit for him, than to house his Father in better accommodation with carers.

345. I find it that DY had lost all his wealth through speculation in futures.  He pledged Zhongyou Building and went into hiding.  He did not have the RMB 50-60m wealth as he claimed.

L8.  Debts of Dingtai

346. Dingtai owed money to (a) 上海保稅商品交易市場第二市場有限公司(“theNo.2 Market”) and (b)上海秦浦物產開發公司 (“Qinpu”). 

L8(a) Money owed to the No.2 Market

347. Bank documents [D30/6824-6829] showed that as of August 1996, Dingtai owed the No.2 Market a principal sum of RMB 8.5m. 

348. Post-1997 (ie after acquisition of the Land), Dingtai still owed No.2 Market:

(i) In 2000, as shown in the financial statements, over RMB 3m;

(ii) In 2001, as recorded in Dingtai’s Letter of Undertaking dated 8/1/2001, over RMB 1.2 million.

349. It was only in 2002 that Dingtai finally settled all the debts owed to No.2 Market.  See收款說明dated 20/11/2001 and 19/11/2002.

350. DG has called an independent witness 孫惠定 (“Sun”), former President of No.2 Market to give evidence on Dingtai’s loans.  Sun’s evidence was supported by very limited documents.  I accept that he did not personally possess any material document except the agreement signed between No.2 Market and Dingtai appointing him as deputy managing director. He confirmed that Dingtai had fully repaid the debt.  But for this case, Sun would have no connection with this matter.  There was no way for him to go back to No.2 Market to get documents.  I make no findings of non-disclosure against him.  

351. Sun was not familiar with some documents as some transactions were done by his subordinates.  Under cross-examination, he gave different figures as the amount owed by Dingtai to No.2 Market, eg RMB 10m by the end of 1996 (§6 of his witness statement) and over RMB 5m (record of conversation between Sun and DG’s lawyer dated 11/11/2010).  He could hardly be blamed for mistake over figures after so many years.  I prefer to rely on the objective bank documents.

352. Mr Chan SC cross-examined Sun as to whether or not No.2 Market had a business of lending; how the No.2 Market, with registered capital of only RMB 58m, could have lent so much to Dingtai.  He also pointed out that the balance sheet of Dingtai for the year ending 31/12/1996 showed the total debt owed by Dingtai to all creditors was just RMB 11m. 

353. Despite such challenge, I accept Sun’s evidence that Dingtai  obtained substantial funds from No.2 Market through the use of the purchase and sale agreements (ie Dingtai would buy steel and sell to No.2 Market)  [eg D2/323].  It was Dingtai which failed to abide by the arrangement in issuing very few invoices for sale of goods through No.2 Market.  Moreover, DY did not apply the funds received from steel trading as promised but, speculated in futures. 

354. I also accept Sun’s evidence that Dingtai’s debts increased but DY was untraceable.  Sun contacted DG, the legal representative of Purao (Dingtai’s parent company).  DG acknowledged his obligation to repay Dingtai’s debts. 

355. DY claimed that the loans from No.2 Market had been applied in obtaining steel to the value of RMB 20-30m for sale, but Dingtai was unable to collect a large part of the proceeds of sale from the customers.  This version was not supported by the financial statements of 1996 and 1997, which did not record any stock or sale of steel worth RMB 20-30m but huge receivables to the tune of RMB 9.9m. 

356. DY claimed to have sued defaulting customers. However, the only Mainland judgment dated 20/6/1996 which he referred to concerned a transaction in 1994, totally unconnected to the alleged unpaid transactions since 1996.

357. I find that Dingtai did owe No.2 Market about RMB 8.5m by 1996 as a result of DY’s speculation in futures.  DY was untraceable.  It was through DG’s effort that the debt was fully repaid by 2002. 

L8(b) Money owed to Qinpu

358. It is DG’s case that DY also caused Dingtai to borrow funds from Qinpu for speculation in futures: see貼現憑證 dated 26/12/1996 showing part of the loans. 

359. When Qinpu was put into liquidation, the official List of Outstanding Debts Payable to Qinpu as of 31/7/2000 showed that Dingtai still owed it around RMB 670,000.

360. DG called紀步連 (“Ji”) (Qinpu’s accountant between 1994 and 2001), and劉玉春 (“Liuyuchun”) to give evidence on the loans and that許建平(“Xujianping”) found DG, who promised to repay by instalments.  See also the statement (情況説明) signed by Xujianping.

361. Mr Chan SC managed to show, under cross-examination, that the debt was owed by Dingtai instead of DY personally.  Mr Chan SC was also able to show that Ji did not have personal knowledge of the matter and he had to rely on what his colleagues, Xujianping and Liuyuchun, told him.  I also find that when Liuyuchun said that DG had, through Dingtai “and other companies controlled by him” repaid the debts owed by Dingtai to Qinpu, there was no proof that the debt was repaid by other companies.  In any case, DG never mentioned that the debt was repaid by any company other than Dingtai.  

362. I find that Dingtai did owe Qinpu RMB 670,000.  Despite what Mr Chan SC established in cross-examination, the true picture remained that DY’s major company, Dingtai, fell into heavy debts.  There was no evidence that, despite his alleged wealth, DY settled those debts.  The inference was clear – DY and Dingtai were in financial difficulties, latest by 1996.  It was DG who settled those debts.

L9. DG’s repayment of the debts of Dingtai

363. One may wonder why DG was willing to repay substantial debts if he was not the true owner of Dingtai.  I find that quite apart from DG’s good relationship with DY, it was because as legal representative of Purao, DG regarded himself as liable in law for Dingtai’s debts. 

L10. Taking over control of Dingtai

364. Three incidents showed DG to have taken over control of Dingtai:

(a)  Obtaining of a letter of authorization from DY;

(b)  Gaining possession of Dingtai’s finance chop and DY’s personal chop; and

(c)  Gaining possession of Jiang Wen’s personal chop.

L10(a)  Obtaining of a letter of authorization from DY

365. DY executed an undated letter of authorization authorizing DG to exercise all his powers as Dingtai’s legal representative (“DY/Dingtai LoA”).  The dispute was whether he did so in late 1996 or early 1997 as a result of his mismanagement of Dingtai (DG’s version), or only in May 2003 (DY’s version). 

366. DG’s version has supported by circumstantial evidence.  Though DY was the legal representative of Dingtai between 1996 and 2003, DG had executed many agreements on behalf of Dingtai as legal representative or authorized representative.  The most important documents were the Land Transfer Agreement dated 25/3/1997 executed between Fortune World and Dingtai (“the SPA"), and related agreements such as the Memorandum dated 26/3/1997 for Dingtai to postpone payment of the Land premium, and Memorandum dated 25/7/1997 for Bading to replace Dingtai as the purchaser under the SPA.  To protect its interest, Fortune World and the notary public required DG to show the requisite authority to sign the SPA on behalf of Dingtai.  The DY/Dingtai LoA was the only letter of authorization produced by DY in the present action. DY could not point to any other letter of authorization.

367. On the other hand, DY’s version had been wholly discredited under cross-examination.  DXH had replaced DY as a legal representative, latest by March 2003: see Dingtai’s shareholders’ resolution dated 31/1/2003 and approval of change in company information dated 21/3/2003.  DY had to admit under cross-examination that he had no authority and no reason to sign the DY/Dingtai LoA in May 2003, ie half a month before he transferred his shares in Dingtai to DXH on 5/6/2003.

368. DY vividly described signing the DY/Dingtai LoA as “like giving away his own baby”.  He had struggled for half a month before doing so.  After all, he had grown the enterprise and there was no reason to give it over to DG.  (That was of course contradictory to DY’s prior version on affirmation that he had no firm recollection as to when the DY/Dingtai LoA was given to DG.) 

369. I find DY’s vivid description to be the true intent and effect of his signing the DY/Dingtai LoA.  He had knowingly accepted the consequences of leading Dingtai into the dire financial situation, acknowledged the fact of DG’s help to clear its debts and hence surrendered control in Dingtai to DG. I find that the DY/Dingtai LoA was executed in late 1996/1997 as DG alleged.

L10(b)  Gaining possession of DY’s personal chop

370. There was no dispute that as its legal representative, DY had, since the incorporation of Dingtai, been operating the basic account at ICBC with his personal chop.  Some of Dingtai’s general accounts at the ABC were also operated with that chop.

371. It was DG’s case that when he took over control of Dingtai, DY handed over DY’s personal chop for Dingtai’s bank accounts to him.  DY denied in his witness statement that the chops had ever been with DG.

372. DG produced the finance chops and DY’s personal chops at the trial as Exhibit P31.  DY accepted Exhibit 31 as genuine. He explained that he had given those chops to DXH in 2003. 

373. That explanation was not plausible.  As a legal representative, all that DXH needed would be the finance chop but not DY’s personal chop.  DY had clearly lied to conceal the fact that he had handed over control of Dingtai to DG.  I accept DG’s version.

L10(c)  Gaining possession of Jiang Wen’s personal chop

374. It was not in dispute that Jiang Wen’s personal chop has been in DG’s personal possession before trial.  DY said that he gave it to DG for him to handle Dingtai’s liquidation in 2006.  If that was the reason, DY should have handed it over to DXH, who was a member of the liquidation committee whilst DG was not.  Further, DY should have got back Jiang Wen’s chop after completion of the liquidation process.  DY’s version was incredible.

375. DG’s version was that Jiang Wen possessed an accountant’s certificate.  Her chop was kept by 鮑栽萍, who would affix it on Dingtai’s financial statements prepared by鮑栽萍 [eg H/167, 169, 176-178, 211, 214, 219-221]. Where the names of DY appeared, they were written (not signed) to show that he was the legal representative.  His signature was different from the written form of his name.

376. 鮑栽萍was a very careful witness whose evidence was not really challenged. Her evidence corroborated DG’s.  Viewed against the backdrop that the personal chops of both DY and Jiang Wen fell into the hands of DG and that DG was in control of Dingtai, 鮑栽萍and DG were credible and I accept their evidence.

L11.  Findings re Dingtai

377. I find that Dingtai was set up as DY’s company. DY had remained in control until about 1996 when Dingtai ran into financial difficulties as a result of his speculation on futures.  DG repaid the debts of Dingtai. There had been no change in ownership of Dingtai but the real control had gone into the hands of DG through obtaining the DY/Dingtai LoA executed at the end of 1996/early 1997, and the personal chops of DY and his wife. DG would not admit the lack of ownership because the Land was purchased in the name of Dingtai.  On the other hand, DY had understated the impact of the speculation on his financial state.  He would not admit the loss of control because he wanted to retain the chance of claiming beneficial ownership of the Land (his original case) or the subsequent companies.  It was also to conceal the fact that he had no means to acquire or exercise control over development of the Land. 

M. 1997: ACQUISITION OF THE LAND

378. In 1997, the Land was purchased for US$27,720,000 (equivalent to about RMB 230,000,000 at that time), to be paid in instalments.  The vendor was Fortune World.

379. If matters had stopped here, the Land would undoubtedly have belonged to Dingtai, owned by DY.  It mattered not who had sought the funding or given instructions for development.  However, because of DY’s loss of control in Dingtai, examination of events thereafter were important in showing why the shares in companies subsequently set up to hold interests in the Land and Tower were in the names of DG and his nominees, and where the beneficial ownership of those companies ultimately rested with.

380. I will first deal with the period between 1997 and 2001 when the Land remained undeveloped.  The most important things to do were (1) to negotiate for acquisition, (2) raise 30% of the Land premium; and (3) find investors. Each of DG and DY claimed to have a leading role in these 3 aspects. 

M1. Negotiation for the acquisition of the Land

381. All the agreements with Fortune World were signed by DG.  They included:

(i)  The SPA dated 25/3/1997;

(ii)  The Memoranda respectively dated 26/3/1997, 25/7/1997, 26/3/1998, 25/8/1998 and 29/10/2001; and

(iii)  The Supplemental SPA dated 17/6/2002.

382. DG’s assertion that he did the negotiation was corroborated by witnesses from Fortune World who gave evidence that they only negotiated with DG. 

(i)  崔冰, an officer of Fortune World’s Sales Department,  stated that she only met DY many years after the Land was acquired by DG.  She explained why she had a vivid memory of the negotiation of the terms of sale and purchase for one month with DG, by reference to the age of her child and her being prevented from going home after the usual office hours because of the need to collate the terms of discussion for the supervisor’s approval on each morning.  Her evidence was well-particularized and her witness statement was admitted without challenge.  I accept the same to be true.

(ii)  幸霓爾, vice manager of Fortune World’s Sales Department also gave unchallenged evidence as to DG’s keenness in buying the Land and negotiated the details for a month.  He is now an employee of Bading but that in no way compromised his credibility.  His evidence was also well-particularized and I accept his evidence in full.

383. On the other hand, DY had only his own word. In his closing submission, Mr Chan SC has not identified evidence showing DY’s participation in the negotiation for the acquisition of the Land or authorization to DG to do so.  What was incredible was that DY (if he had remained in control of Dingtai at that stage), would have left DG (his alleged driver with no experience in grand business) to do such important things as negotiation and signing of the SPA and related Memoranda.  DY was not even present at the signing ceremony of the SPA.

384. I find that it was DG who negotiated for the purchase of the Land and signed the SPA and related Memoranda without the need for DY’s authorization.

M2. Payment of the deposit of RMB 2m for the Land

385. Fortune World required an initial deposit of RMB 2m (“the Deposit”) before it would sign the SPA.  This formed part of the 30% Land premium.  It was clear that Dingtai had no money of its own.  All the funds for purchase, including the Deposit, were thus borrowed.  

386. DG’s case was that the RMB 2m came in the form of a cheque directly delivered by the No.2 Market to Fortune World.  In fact, Sun of the No.2 Market had approached Fortune World directly for information as to the Land.  There was trust between the No.2 Market and Fortune World, which were both government entities.  It was agreed that if the purchase would not proceed, the money had to be repaid to No.2 Market and not Dingtai.

387. DG’s case was firmly supported by a cheque dated 10/3/1997, a receipt, a payment slip and a confirmation dated 10/3/1997.  His case has never changed from the outset since he filed his 3rd affirmation.  He was corroborated by Sun.

388. I am satisfied from Sun’s evidence that DG had provided his own car and landed property worth RMB500,000 as guarantee for repayment of all debts due from Dingtai.  I am also satisfied that, by a written agreement signed by the supervising bureau of No.2 Market dated 16/12/1997, Sun was appointed as an enterprise consultant and director of Bading to supervise repayment by Bading.  Such appointment ceased after repayment of a major portion (not all, as mistakenly stated in Sun’s oral evidence) of Dingtai’s debt.  Sun confirmed that Dingtai and Bading had repaid all debts in full. 

389. On the other hand, DY’s case had changed several times.

(i) In his 1st affirmation dated 14/10/2010, DY stated that he directed Dingtai to pay the Deposit.

(ii) Both DY and DW categorically denied that the Deposit came from the No.2 Market.  They claimed that it was陳躍進 (“Chen”) who paid it.  See DY’s 3rd affirmation adopting the version in DW’s affirmation.

(iii) In his witness statement dated 7/8/2012, DY admitted that, from further information obtained through his instructions, the RMB 2m was paid by the No.2 Market.

(iv) Even with this admission, DY denied that it was an additional loan.  He claimed that it had come from the unused credit line granted by the No.2 Market under a sale and purchase agreement with Dingtai dated 4/3/1996.  However, it was clear on the face of that sale and purchase agreement that it only concerned funding in 1996 and had nothing to do with the Deposit in 1997.  Dingtai already owed a principal sum of RMB 8.5m as of August 1996.  There was no unused credit which it could have utilized.  Sun also confirmed that it was a separate loan.

(v) In the witness box, DY explained that he decided to borrow the Deposit for fear of forfeiture.  It was completely illogical.  If DY failed to honour the SPA, the Deposit would be forfeited and he would have to repay the loan in any event. 

390. Mr Chan SC submits that DY and DW’s errors were due to lapse of 16 years since the event and then made without the benefit of contemporaneous documents.  It was entirely innocent. 

391. With respect, I cannot agree.  DY knew how his own conduct had brought about the financial difficulties of Dingtai.  He could not have forgotten that the Deposit had come from borrowing, all the more so since DG had already given a version in his 3rd affirmation which would have jogged DY’s memory.  Yet DY simply made up the story (with DW) as he went along. 

392. Further, the need to borrow a mere RMB 2m was incredible in the light of DY’s claimed wealth of RMB 50-60m.  It was also incredible that he had not borrowed from DW (who possessed personal wealth of RMB 60-70m), with whom DY was on good terms.  Clearly, it was because the Land was purchased at the instigation of DG who was not DW’s favoured brother.

393. DW’s evidence was equally incredible.  He claimed in the witness box to have found Chen only after the Deposit was paid, which contradicted his affirmation evidence that he asked Chen to pay the Deposit.  The truth, in my view, could be inferred from DW’s answer given under cross-examination – that he personally did not think the Land had development potential and was told that nobody would have wanted a piece of land like this.  That explained why he would not assist even if he had the money.

394. I find that the Deposit was arranged by DG seeking an additional loan from the No.2 Market.

M3. Raising 30% of the Land premium

395. 30% of the Land premium amounted to about RMB 70m: see confirmation from Fortune World dated 28/1/1998.  Once that was paid, the Land title certificate would be issued (see clause (二) 2 of the Memorandum to the SPA).  The Land title certificate could then be used as security to raise further bank loans to complete the acquisition and the construction.  The Land title certificate was actually issued on 12/2/1998 and the loan agreements of Dingtai thereafter were secured by Bading (eg the ICBC loan agreement dated 10/11/1998).

396. Out of the 30% Land premium, the Foreign Investors paid RMB 56m: see confirmation from Fortune World dated 7/7/2000.  Dingtai paid the remaining RMB 14m.  

397. On DG’s case, apart from the Deposit, he raised funds exceeding RMB 14m:

(a)  RMB 400,000 under the 特種轉賬貸方傳票 dated 5/6/1997;

(b)  A loan of RMB 3m from Chen dated 20/9/1997;

(c)  A loan of RMB 1.5m from Chen dated 3/1/1998;

(d)  A loan from 上海大華裝飾工程公司 for the sum of RMB 10m on 15/8/1997; and

(e)  Revolving loans of RMB 2m from ABC. 

The documents in support of (a)-(c) were produced belatedly by DG on 26/2/2013, about a week before trial.  They were never referred to in his affirmations, witness statements or even counsel’s opening submission.

M3(a)  RMB 400,000 under the 特種轉賬貸方傳票

398. The sum was transferred from DG to Dingtai.  DY accepted the injection of this money but questioned the source and its purpose.

399. DG asserted in his evidence-in-chief that however little he could raise, he had injected as the Land premium.  Under cross-examination, he could not confirm if the RMB 400,000 came from the sale of his Luyin shares.  He was not clear what a特種轉賬貸方傳票was but said that the money was transferred from his credit card account. He could not tell what his credit card limit was.  He was also unable to confirm that this RMB 400,000 fell within any of the sources of funds[11] referred to in para 60(9) of the amended reply.  On such evasive answers, I am unable to place any weight on the 特種轉賬貸方傳票, which appeared from nowhere for an unknown purpose. 

M3(b)  Two loans of RMB 1.5m and 3m from Chen

400. DY admitted that the 2 sums were paid into Dingtai’s account, as evidenced by the pay-in slips.  The borrowing thus came as a result of DG’s effort, whether it was on behalf of himself or Dingtai.

401. DG did not have the borrowing slips in his own record.  The copies were allegedly given by Chen to DG in early 2013.  Both DG and Chen had confirmed their signatures on the 2 borrowing slips and Chen had not been challenged in cross-examination. 

402. DY disputed the authenticity.  Given DY’s admission, it should not be necessary to rely on the 2 borrowing slips.  However the challenge over authenticity illustrated DG’s use of dubious documents. 

403. The 2 loans were made at a time shortly after the emergence of the Asian Financial Crisis.  Chen knew that DG was in lack of funds and yet no security was asked for.  The loans were recorded on informal slips of paper that did not specify the date of repayment and interest rate.  DG was completely evasive about the date of repayment.  He left Chen to answer the question.  The answers of Chen were firstly, that they had not talked about the repayment date; secondly, that they had discussed but not with details; thirdly, repayment would have been after operation of the Project.  Such wavering answers were unreliable.

404. Mr Chan SC further points out that DG’s signature on the borrowing slips more resembled the style found exclusively in documents from 2010 to 2013 (Exhibit D1).  Similarly, Chen’s signatures on the borrowing slips more resembled that appearing on his witness statement, which was very different from those in 1997 (eg the Articles of Bading dated June 1997, the Joint Venture Agreement between Dingtai and Balin and the list of board members and senior management of Bading). 

405. The late production of the copy borrowing slips gave DY no opportunity to verify their authenticity.  Exhibit D1 was, of course, not conclusive as to DG or Chen’s styles of signing.  However, Mr Chan SC’s comments were justified.  DG was a liar and, as demonstrated in Section O below on the Railway Companies, DG had produced false documentary evidence.  I am unable to accept that the 2 borrowing slips were made on the stated dates as genuine loan agreements.

M3(c)  A loan from 上海大華裝飾工程公司to Dingtai for the sum of RMB 10m

406. It was not disputed that DG arranged this loan, which was evidenced by the payment slips and letter of confirmation he produced.

M3(d)  Loans from ABC

407. From March 1997 to January 1998, Dingtai borrowed a loan of RMB 2m from ABC on revolving basis (借舊還新).  They were arranged through Dingtai’s account, which was operated by DG’s personal chop: see借款借據 dated 28/3/1997; 21/8/1997; 23/1/1998.  DY admitted being aware of this account only after litigation started.  So he could not have instructed DG to borrow from ABC.  If it was DY who had arranged the loans, he would not have deposited them into DG’s account.  The irresistible inference was that DG arranged those loans.

M3(e)  Business income of Dingtai

408. DY claimed to have contribution in the form of business income of Dingtai.  Dingtai had had steel contracts up to 2000, signed after DG had taken over control.  However, DG was unable to confirm if he had signed any of them.  It was probable, in my view, that though he had lost control, DY still did some business for Dingtai. 

409. However, the audited statements of Dingtai for 1997-1999 showed that Dingtai was trading at a loss.  DG said the WGQ Tax Region required companies within it to have a certain level of trading.  It was upon his instructions that DY carried on the loss-making steel trade in the name of Dingtai to satisfy this requirement.  I find this to be probably true.

M4  Bringing in investors

410. To show that he had looked for potential investors to develop the Land, DY produced:

(a)  An agreement between Dingtai and 上海申虹貿易實業公司 dated 10/3/1997 (“the Shenhong Agreement”); and

(b)  A Letter of Intent between Dingtai and 廣發投資控股公司dated 21/4/1997 (“the Kwong Fat Letter of Intent”). 

411. DG disputes the authenticity of those 2 documents.

412. The Shenhong Agreement was described as a “初步協議”.  It was in extremely vague terms.  Shenhong only had registered capital of RMB 500,000, far below the scale required to acquire and develop the Land.  According to the company registration documents, its business was trading in electrical appliances, vehicle component, daily metal and goods but not real estate development. 

413. In the witness box, DY came up with a new story that Shenhong had the ability to invest in the Land because of its connection with the military forces and possessed army vehicles.

414. Shenhong never participated in the acquisition and development of the Land and DY never explained why he had ceased cooperation with them.

415. The Kwong Fat Letter of Intent was also in very brief terms.  It was not sealed by either Dingtai or Kwong Fat.  There was no explanation why DY needed Kwong Fat after entering into cooperation with Shenhong, or why the Letter of Intent did not proceed further.

416. I am not satisfied as to the authenticity of these 2 documents, or that Shenhong and Kwong Fat were ever potential investors.

417. In summary, I find that DG had raised funds for over 30% of the Land premium (being RMB 2m for the Deposit + RMB 4.5m from Chen + RMB 10m from 上海大華裝飾工程公司 + RMB 2m from ABC + RMB 56m from Foreign Investors), totalling RMB 74.5m.  DY had not put in a single cent of his alleged wealth of RMB 50-60m or arranged funds.  Dingtai was trading at a loss and so the business income from DY’s trading in steel did not contribute to the purchase price.  I am not satisfied that DY had ever found potential investors.  As for DG’s contribution in bringing in investors, see Section N next.

N. 1997: SETTING UP OF BADING

N1.  Undisputed facts

418. It was common ground that after signing of the SPA, attempts were made to find business partners to invest in the Land jointly with Dingtai and to provide the necessary funding.  Bading was set up on 14/7/1997 as a joint venture formed by Balin (HK) (as 60% foreign investor) and Dingtai (as 40% local shareholder).  Bading had initial capital of US$20m, of which US$8m was arranged for by Dingtai and US$12m by Balin.

419. Chen was appointed by Balin as the first legal representative, managing director and general manager of Bading.  DG and DW were appointed by Dingtai to the same position as deputy managing director.  DY was one of 2 deputy general managers.

N2.  Parties’ respective cases

420. DG claimed to have set up Bading.  He relied on the evidence of Chen. 

421. DY claimed that the connection with Chen was made through DW.  DY also claimed that as it was he who set up Purao and Dingtai, it followed that it was he who set up Bading through Dingtai.

422. In deciding this question, I have considered the documents signed by DG and DY’s side and the role of Chen.

N3.  Documents signed by DG and DY’s side respectively

423. Various agreements were signed between Dingtai and the Foreign Investors to confirm the current shareholding, the capital contribution of each party to the joint venture and to authorize the raising of capital.  All of these agreements were signed by DG on behalf of Dingtai and Chen on behalf of the Foreign Investors: see 早期合同 between Dingtai, Balin and 香港悅銘有限公司 (“Nicemate”) dated 1/12/1997; and the Supplemental Agreements between Dingtai and 香港新河(集團)有限公司(“Good Way”) dated 9/9/1999 and 13/8/2000 respectively. 

424. The following documents were signed by DY/DW:

16/5/97  DY signed the Bye-laws of 上海巴林鼎泰 (the name was subsequently changed to Bading)

16/6/97  DW executed Bading’s Articles of Association

16/6/97  DW executed the joint venture agreement with Balin

425. DW’s involvement was telling.  DG was admittedly on bad terms with him since about 1993.  He described DW as “his (DY’s) brother”.  Yet DG admitted that he had invited DY and DW to join the discussions with Chen and 黃騰 (“Huangteng”) of Balin.  DG explained in his oral evidence that he wanted to take the opportunity to mend the relationship with DW and that DW was older and appeared more mature. 

426. I find DG’s explanations to be odd, to say the least.  There was nothing to show that anyone from Balin found DG too young and immature.  Or that having DY (also older than DG) was not enough.  It was inherently improbable for DG to have invited DW to participate in a company with registered capital of US$20m.  Although DW had accepted the invitation, nothing seemed to have happened to further mend the relationship.  DW and DG had not seen each other since 1997 except at the Father’s funeral. 

427. On the other hand, if DY was the true decision maker, it would have made perfect sense for DY to have appointed DW having regard to their previous cooperation in the Hainan Companies.  I find this unlikely since DY had not taken back control of Dingtai and it was DG who negotiated the acquisition of the Land.

428. DW was a government official at the 上饒市外貿局.  He claimed to have enlisted the assistance of Chen.  According to DW, since Chen was from Shangrao and might not have understood the Shanghai situation, DW did not disclose that the Land had no potential but lied that the Land which was alongside Huangpujiang was good.  However, if he did find Chen, it was odd that DW was not further involved in the Land or Project.  I find his version to be unlikely.

429. I do not think that DG, DY or DW had told the whole truth.  Their signing of documents of Bading could not assist in deciding who the real decision maker was over the Land or Bading.

N4.  The involvement of Chen

430. Chen was the representative of all the Foreign Investors who invested in Bading from time to time.  He was personally involved from 1997 until the complete withdrawal of the Foreign Investors in 2003.

431. Chen confirmed that he cooperated with DG in the development of the Land through Bading. He had never discussed with DY about the shareholding of Bading. Chen also confirmed that while DG might have assigned DY and DW to execute some documents on behalf of Dingtai, it was Chen and DG who finalized the terms in those documents.  Neither DY nor DW had authority to change those terms.

432. The evidence of Chen was consistent with the letter of authorization dated 10/5/1997 issued by Huangteng to DG for DG personally to handle all the matters relating to the establishment of the joint venture company to develop the Land (“the Balin LoA”). It was also wholly consistent with the fact that DG was then in control of Dingtai. Mr Chan SC did not deal with the evidence of Chen in this respect in his closing submission.

433. DY never disputed the Balin LoA as false but his versions on the Balin LoA were devoid of common sense. 

(i) In his 3rd affirmation (§107), DY said that he was not aware of the existence of the Balin LoA at the time.

(ii) In the same affirmation, DY claimed that DG only met Huangteng in May 1997 and had not participated in any negotiation with Chen or Huangteng.  If so, Huangteng would hardly have issued the Balin LoA to DG, a stranger.

(iii) Under cross-examination, DY said that he had asked Chen to draft the Balin LoA to facilitate DG’s negotiation with Fortune World.  The Balin LoA was just for DG to handle clerical matters relating to the setting up of the joint venture.  This version was contrary to the express terms of the Balin LoA, which had nothing to do with Fortune World and did not just authorize DG to handle clerical but all matters.

434. I reject DY’s version.  I find that it was likely to have been DG who found Chen.  I accept the version of Chen.

435. In summary, DG found Chen and entered into discussions with Chen who acted on behalf of the Foreign Investors.  At no stage had DY taken back control of Dingtai.  While DW and DY might have signed on some of the documents, it was DG and Chen who could have finalized the terms.  I find that it was DG who set up Bading.

O. 1998: RAILWAY REDEVELOPMENT AND RAILWAY COMMERCIAL

O1. Undisputed facts

436. The 2 RailwayCompanies set up in about 1998 were:

(i)  上饒市鐵路站前舊街改造發展有限公司(“Railway Redevelopment”); and

(ii)  上饒市鐵聯站前商務有限公司 (“Railway Commercial”). 

437. They were involved in a railway redevelopment and hotel construction project in Shangrao.

438. Railway Redevelopment was set up in December 1998.  It had registered capital of RMB 2m.  On paper, it was injected through DG’s personal account as evidenced by a payment slip.  DG was 85% shareholder. In June 1999, he became 90% shareholder.  The other shareholders from time to time were 陳志強,王火根,王桂玲, 徐志良 and 徐梅花.

439. Railway Commercial had registered capital of RMB 300,000.  There was no evidence from either side as to how it was paid.  The shareholders were SXP and her mother, 劉竹英, who was also Railway Commercial’s legal representative.

440. DG signed all the important documents relating to the redevelopment project, including the 聯合改造上饒新客站解放路鐵路區域合同 (“the Joint Redevelopment Agreement”) with the Railway Bureau dated 8/1/1999and the supplemental agreement 10 days later.

441. There was documentary evidence of remittances of funds from the Railway Companies to Dingtai, Bading and DG’s personal accounts, respectively, during the period of May 1999 to November 2000. They added up to over RMB 12.75m.

O2. Parties’ respective case

442. According to his 3rd affirmation, DG had applied most of the profits derived from pre-sale of the properties of Railway Redevelopment and profits of Railway Commercial into the Land or the Project. 

443. On the other hand, DY’s case is that he had funded Railway Redevelopment and beneficially owned it. There had been substantial financial injections by DY through Dingtai between December 1998 and August 2000.  He had arranged DG to manage that business.  However, Railway Commercial was not profitable at all.  In October 1999, DY had asked for the Mother’s ID card, for her to replace DG as the legal representative of Railway Redevelopment.

O3. Analyses of DG’s case

444. DG had indisputably relied on false documents. In §103 of his 3rd affirmation, he claimed that upon full payment of the land premium for the land in the vicinity of the railway station for redevelopment (“the railway land”),  Railway Redevelopment obtained the land use permits of the railway land.  He exhibited 3 Receipts in respect of its land premium for the total sum of RMB 46.6m [D15/3415-3418, at 3417]. The proper interpretation of such evidence was that the RMB 46.6m was paid by Railway Redevelopment to the Shangrao Railway Bureau in respect of the railway land premium.  It was intended to create the impression that the redevelopment project was very significant and the profits obtained as a result was substantial.

445. Through the efforts of DY and DW, the 3 Receipts were subsequently established to have been false, which DG never disputed. 

446. To try and explain away his use of false documents, DG did not say that he was so angry that he confronted whoever was responsible for giving him the false receipts.  Instead, when the time for filing witness statements and interlocutory applications had all gone past, DG filed the 4th list of documents and produced the records of investigation 調查筆錄 (all dated 19/1/2013) prepared by his Mainland lawyers on his instructions.  Those lawyers investigated :

(i)  汪涵芬, retired engineer [D31/7077 to 7085];

(ii)  王火根, 上饒車務段駕駛員 and staff of Railway Redevelopment [D31/7086 to 7100]; and

(iii)  黃有根, retired 上饒車務段段長 [D31/7101-7115].

447. The relevant parts of the調查筆錄were as follows:

(i)  王火根 was asked by 黃有根 to obtain quotation for the Nanchang Railway Bureau on the expenses to be incurred for the redevelopment project [D31/7089]. 

(ii)  He was told by 汪涵芬 (ie the engineer) that the total investment would cost RMB 40 million [D31/7089].

(iii)  Then, for the purpose of giving such quotation, 王火根obtained 3 receipts and put in various figures which added up to a total of RMB 46 million odd and put in the land premium. He got a 羅喜根 to sign those receipts.  Having made copies, he then gave those false receipts to 黃有根.  黃有根did not find the receipts useful, so he returned them to 王火根.  王火根casually threw them to one side.

(iv)  Later, DG asked for copies of documents relating to the railway redevelopment project for the purpose of the litigation. What 王火根 sent to DG included copies of those 3 false receipts.

(v)  王火根stated that DG did not know about (i) and (iii) and had never used the 3 receipts.

448. I find such explanations to be totally incredible. There was a great discrepancy between the amount for the railway land premium (RMB 12.6m) and the amount stated in the 3 Receipts.  DG had the audacity to say that he was not aware of the circumstances under which the receipts were produced and he simply produced without relying on them.  This did not happen to any other piece of evidence in the present case.  This was a clear example of DG being a liar and deliberately producing false documents by way of affirmation to mislead the court.

449. Reliance on false documents aside, DG never produced the profit and loss accounts of Railway Redevelopment, which he admitted under cross-examination to exist.  He purportedly disclosed a set of statistics known as舊街改造合同統計in respect of sale of residential and shop premises but the statistics could not show whether the 2 Railway Companies made a profit or loss. 

450. DG only first mentioned the amount of profit made from the 2 Railway Companies on day 8 of the trial as an astounding RMB 30m.  He could not have forgotten such substantial profits.  It could not be explained away by Mr Tong’s reply submission that the 2 Railway Companies were only intermediaries for transfer of funds and so their profits were not reflected in the financial statements.

451. Appendix 3 to Mr Tong SC’s closing submission purports to show profits of about RMB 30m.  With respect, computation of profit was not just about subtracting a few heads of expenses (eg land premium, construction cost, removal cost) from the income (eg contract price, sale price).  Such unaudited computation could not take the place of the profit and loss accounts.  I reject Appendix 3.

452. The alleged profits were contradicted by the annual examination reports of Railway Commercial produced by DY, whichshowed profits to be about several thousand to just over RMB 10,000 per year.  This low level of profits explained, in my view, why DG did not dare to mention the amount of profits in his written evidence and made up the figure of RMB 30m in his oral evidence to bolster his case.

453. DG changed his story upon discovery of documents of Railway Commercial.  He suggested in his 1st witness statement that Railway Commercial was a “conduit” for transferring the profits from Railway Redevelopment to the construction of the Tower.

454. Again, with a view to bolstering his case, DG brought in 陳志強 who said that the railway redevelopment project was very profitable and he saw DG carry a suitcase claimed to have held cash.  陳志強 estimated it to contain at least RMB 2.5m, based on his own experience in putting cash into a similar suitcase.  Although Mr Chan SC did not challenge some parts of the witness statement of陳志強, that could not preclude this court from assessing the evidence of 陳志強 in the light of other relevant evidence.  I find his evidence described in this paragraph, premised on hearsay and speculation, to be unreliable.  The Railway Companies had bank accounts, which had been used for transfers in and out.  There was no reason why the estimated RMB 2.5m was not done by bank transfer. 

455. I reject DG’s case that the 2 Railway Companies had ever made substantial profits for injection into Dingtai or Bading. 

O4. Analyses of DY’s case

456. DY’s case was equally hard to believe. He said he had injected RMB 11m through Dingtai into the Railway project.  To explain why DG signed all the important documents relating to the redevelopment, DY said that he authorised DG to operate the redevelopment project and DG reported to him regularly: §10.2 of DY’s witness statement.  However, evidence showed that DY had little knowledge of fundamental matters relating to the Railway project:

(i) DY seemed not to know that Railway Redevelopment had to pay about RMB 12.6m to the Railway Bureau as consideration for the land, notwithstanding that such payment was prescribed in the Joint Redevelopment Agreement: clause (三); and the computation of the land value was decided by a valuation report.  In his witness statement, he said only RMB 630,000 was required.

(ii) DY got the plot numbers that were developed wrong.  He claimed that all 9 plots of the land were acquired but only plot nos. 2 and 3 were developed. In fact, although 9 plots with a total area of 11,517.1 sq m were available for sale, only plot nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 were acquired and Railway Redevelopment was only required to pay the consideration for these 6 plots as valued in the valuation report: Clauses (二) 1.2 and (三).  To suggest that plot nos. 3, 5 and 6 were also within the scope of the redevelopment but would not be assigned after the completion of the redevelopment was devoid of commercial sense.  The Joint Redevelopment Agreement was silent as to how those 3 plots would be dealt with after redevelopment.  Compare this to clause (二) 1.3 which dealt with the Railway Redevelopment’s rights and liabilities over plot no. 7 specifically.

(iii) DY got the construction costs (RMB 350 per sq ft instead of RMB 380) and sale price per unit (RMB 500+ to 700+ instead of RMB 520 to 600 per sq ft) wrong.  However, I place little weight on such errors.  One could not expect DY to be exact about unit prices after so many years.

O5. Which liar to prefer?

457. This was an unpleasant instance where the court has to making findings based on evidence of 2 camps of liars.  I place little weight on the fact that the registered capital came from DG’s personal account.  As with other companies, the source of the capital was more important.

458. DY’s assertion that the registered capital came from the RMB 11m that he caused Dingtai to invest into the redevelopment project was not supported by evidence.  Those bank documents he produced related to fund transfers in 1999 to 2000, which had nothing to do with the RMB 2m capital injected in 1998.  In any case, DY had no wealth to inject.

459. Neither DG nor DY could produce evidence of tax payments.  DG said that he could not recall the exact amount but it was done through the Railway Bureau.  I would not rely on the bare words of this liar.

460. All the shareholders of Railway Redevelopment and Railway Commercial had acknowledged that they were holding their shares in the respective Railway Company on behalf of DG.  They had closer connection to DG than to DY.

461. Some of the income from the Railway project was deposited into bank accounts opened in the name of DXH. Her passbooks,the authenticity of which was not denied by DXH, were in the possession of DG.  DY seemed not to have any idea about these.  DXH only alleged that DG had possession of those passbooks because he was operating certain Shangrao company, a totally illogical explanation.

462. The Mother stated in her witness statement that the Railway Companies belonged to DY.  She confirmed that she was DY’s nominee and had never heard of DG saying that he had set up Railway Redevelopment.  She said that all of the money was sent to Shanghai by DY.  Not only did DG fail to make profits but he took money away.  I do not place weight on this part of her evidence as not being borne out by the objective evidence.  Her giving the ID card to DY was not conclusive as to DY’s ownership of the 2 Railway Companies.

463. DY could not discharge the burden of showing that the 2 Railway Companies belonged to him.  The flow of funds among DG, Dingtai, the Railway Companies and Bading appeared circular and it was difficult to find the true source of capital injection.  Based on paras 460 and 461, and his control of Dingtai, I find that they belonged to DG.  I find that the Railway Companies had not been profitable as DG claimed nor had they contributed in any substantial way to the Land premium or the Project. Once again, DG has deliberately presented false evidence to bolster his case. 

P.  2000: PRIVATISATION OF DINGTAI AND INCREASE IN SHARE CAPITAL FROM RMB 10M TO RMB 100M

P1.  Undisputed facts

464. In 2000, due to reform in the Mainland, companies under the guakao arrangement had to dissociate themselves from state-owned enterprises.  Hence, on 22/6/2000, Dingtai underwent restructuring so that shares held by Purao were transferred to上饒三鑫 (51%), SXP (24%) and DY (25%): see e.g. share transfer agreement dated 11/5/2000, 投資協議 dated 10 June 2000 amongst 上饒三鑫, SXP and DY and 產權轉讓合同 dated 22 June 2000.  DY remained legal representative of Dingtai.

465. About 6 days later, on 28/6/2000, Dingtai increased its registered capital from RMB 10m to RMB 100m without any change to the shareholding: see Capital Verification Report dated 30/6/2000.  DY remained the legal representative, chairman and general manager.

466. The increase in capital was provided through 浦鼎 Shanghai Puding Property Consultants Co Ltd (“Puding”).  This was a company set up on 26/12/1997.  DG was a 60% shareholder and its legal representative.  One 姚玲玉 who held 40% has given a notarized declaration dated 11/10/2011 confirming that she was holding her shares for DG and that all capital was put up by DG. 

467. As to the RMB 90m needed for the increase in capital, (a) RMB 20m was paid through Puding as evidenced bypayment slips; and (b) RMB 70m came from a loan from Zhongfu中福.  There was no fresh injection of money from either DY or DG personally.

468. The issues were (1) who funded the increase in capital; and (2) on whose behalf were the shares in Dingtai held?

P2.  Who funded the increase in capital?

469. In his 3rd affirmation, DG claimed that he had instructed 上饒三鑫, SXP and DY to inject RMB 90m in direct proportion to their respective shareholding into Dingtai.  He even referred to the Capital Verification Report and 5 pay-in slips, to show that Puding injected capital into Dingtai.

470. DG’s description of Puding’s business was to provide supporting facilities to Bading. Under cross-examination, he was clearly evasive in saying that he could not remember what independent business Puding did which would have earned the very substantial profits to fund even part of the increase in capital.  I find that Puding had no independent business.

471. On the other hand, DY said that it was through his connection with one 白曉江 (Bai) that Zhongfu injected substantial funds of nearly RMB 250m into the Project.  DG admitted under cross-examination that the capital increase of Dingtai would not have been possible without the funding of Zhongfu.  This admission once again showed the evasiveness of DG in his 3rd affirmation in failing to mention Zhongfu.  This was also an example of DG pointing to an immediate source of fund from a company, but when traced further, the ultimate source came from DY or his efforts.

472. Mr Tong SC submits that within a week after the capital increase, Bading had fully repaid the RMB 70m to Zhongfu.  In 2000 to 2001, Zhongfu had provided short-term loans, which were fully repaid by Dingtai, Bading and/or 上海鼎興 within months, sometimes with commission. Such short term funding could not have contributed to the acquisition or development of the Land. 

473. We have seen previous instances where capital injected into eg Purao was transferred out within days after the capital verification was done. Therefore, with respect, Mr Tong SC’s submission cannot undermine the fact that the funds which made capital increase possible had come from the effort of DY and that DG had concealed the truth from the court.

474. I find that RMB 70m for the increase in capital had come from DY.  The true source of the rest of the RMB 20m that came through Puding was hard to trace but it probably would have come from DG’s side through borrowings.

P3. The role of Puding

475. At some stage Puding transferred substantial funds for the establishment of上饒三鑫, 上海鼎興 and 上海申鑫; and for the increase in capital of上海鼎興.  The fund flow tables prepared by DG or DY were not very helpful in determining ownership of companies as the funds largely came from borrowings and the flow was hard to keep track. 

476. DY claimed in his witness statement (§11.6) that he “borrowed” Puding as his “channel” to move funds around.  Under cross-examination, he confirmed he was not saying that Puding was his but that RMB500,000 capital was from his company.

477. DY’s assertion that Puding was his channel was unbelievable.  Why would he need to use DG’s company when he had other companies allegedly belonging to himself? Under cross-examination, DY put forward some unintelligible answers, e.g. “[浦鼎]這是一個諮詢功能 …… 按理說,錢資金從他那裡過來,從他的經營範圍,可能他含有這種經營範圍。” “這個當時沒有意識的……因為我是出資者……哎,我叫他按照這個意思辦就行了。”

478. What was important, however, was thatDY admitted Puding to be controlled by DG and SXP.  DY simply failed to give a valid explanation for the establishment of Puding, the Shangrao Companies and the Shanghai Holding Companies.  As shall be seen, DG could explain why all those companies were set up and how they were used.

P4.  On whose behalf were the shares in Dingtai held?

479. DG agreed, under cross-examination, that he still harboured fear towards DY’s conduct (心有餘悸) in causing serious financial loss to Dingtai. However, after the restructuring, he still allowed DY to hold 45% of the equity in Dingtai (25% directly and the rest through 上饒三鑫 of which he held 40%), worth about RMB 4.5m.

480. DG explained that, as legal representative of Purao, it was not convenient for Dingtai’s shares to be transferred by him into his personal name: §104 of DG’s witness statement.  I fail to see what the inconvenience was.  DG has not pointed to any state policy which prevented the shares held by a guakao unit from being transferred to the real owner of a privatized company. 

481. DG further explained under cross-examination that (a) in 2000, Dingtai still had a lot of debts; (b) it was necessary for DY to continue being there, “所以我一個需要他還在裏面作為一個,這個所有清結債務不可預見性的存在的延續.”  I fail to see how DY’s continued presence in Dingtai would have any impact on the existing debts if it was DG repaying them anyway.

482. A person could not be made a nominee without his knowledge.  There was no evidence of a consensus between DG or DY as to who should own the shares of Dingtai.  Neither party alleged a change in ownership of Dingtai.  I would not rely on the bare assertion of a liar, without contemporaneous document, that he had told DY that the shares in Dingtai were to be held on trust/nomineeship for DG.

483. DY had ceased using Purao for trading.  Dingtai was then under the control of DG.  SXP was first introduced as a nominee shareholder in Purao and Dingtai.  DY had continued to seek substantial funding from Zhongfu for the increase in capital.  I cannot exclude the possibility that DY and DG recognized each other’s contribution to Dingtai, in terms of  privatisation or repayment of Dingtai’s debts, hence the shareholders included both camps. 

484. DG did not have a firm intention to remove DY altogether.  This was borne out by the fact that DY remained as the legal representative in name until 2003. 

485. If matters had stopped there, I would find that the beneficial ownership followed the legal ownership.  To the extent shares were not in the name of DY, the shareholders were DG’s nominees.

Q. 2000: OBTAINING MAJORITY SHAREHOLDING AND CONTROL OVER BADING

486. To recap, when Bading was first set up, Dingtai held 40% shareholding in Bading and Foreign Investors 60%.  Thereafter, the shareholding of Bading had undergone changes:

DateLocal InterestForeign Investors
14/7/1997Dingtai (40%)Balin (60%)
10/7/1998Dingtai (40%)Balin (10%)
Nicemate (50%)
9/10/1999
Dingtai (40%)Good Way (60%)
23/8/2000Dingtai (40%)
上海申鑫 (20%)
Good Way (40%)
20/3/2001Dingtai (40%),
上海申鑫 (20%),
上海鼎興 (15%)
Good Way (25%)
8/7/2001Dingtai (40%),
上海申鑫 (20%),
上海鼎興 (15%)
Lee Tung (25%)

487. On 23 August 2000, Dingtai and上海申鑫together held the majority shareholding of Bading.  From that point onwards, DG replaced Chen as Bading’s legal representative and obtained full control of Bading’s company seal until DG was replaced by YXA.  All applications for use of the seal had to state the purpose, signed by DG before the seal could be applied on a document.

488. DY alleged that he appointed DG as Bading’s legal representative.  He accepted that that appointment had nothing to do with the Bai Incident, which only took place 3 years later in 2003.  However, he was unable to come up with a logical reason as to DG’s appointment. 

489. Under cross-examination, DY claimed that he had to use Dingtai to obtain finance for the Project.  If so, in my view, appointing DY himself as Bading’s legal representative would have enhanced the opportunity to obtain finance for the Project, since both Dingtai and Bading were allegedly his companies.

490. Further, there was no reason why DY permitted DG to hold Bading’s company seal unreservedly.  DY said under cross-examination that he believed that DG could not sell the assets of Bading because DG was not the investor.  This could not be true.  DY clearly knew the effect of being a legal representative and holding a company’s seal.

491. The fact that DG had full control over Bading (by being its legal representative and possessing its company seal) without any protest from DY was, in my view, compelling evidence that DG has always had interest in Bading or was majority beneficial owner of Dingtai.

492. I will come back to the acquisition of Foreign Investors’ interests in Section V.

R. CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOWER

493. There was a sharp contrast between DY and DG in terms of involvement in the Project.  In his closing submission, Mr Chan SC summarized DY’s limited involvement with frugal comments:

(a) Liaison with Citibank;

(b) Change of town planning conditions of the Land;

(c) Obtaining RMB 80m loan from the Huaxia Bank; and

(d) Involvement from September 2002 to October 2003.

494. I shall consider and compare these to the involvement of DG in almost every aspect from 7 angles in this Section and in Section S.

R1.  Signing of important documents

495. Some of the important documents that DG had signed were (i) the letter of intent dated 24/1/2002 with Citigroup as prospective tenant; (ii) various letters of extension from March 2002 to July 2002 between Citibank NA PRC Office and Bading; (iii) Development Agreement (開發協議) between Bading and Citibank Shanghai Branch on 16/12/2002; (iv) the main contract for construction dated 9/9/2002; (v) the application with Citigroup dated 17/3/2003 for naming the Tower.

R2.  Attendance of ceremonies and meetings

496. As President of Bading, DG attended the (i) meeting of experts on 21/6/2001 for the architectural design and assessment of tender; (ii) signing ceremony of the engineering contract on 28/11/2001; (iii) signing ceremony of the Development Agreement on 16/12/2002; (iv) topping out ceremony of the Tower on 27/9/2004; and (v) grand opening of the Tower on 12/9/2005.

497. Mr Chan SC submits that the photos of DG at various ceremonies concerning the Land and the Tower were reported in the media.  It was contrary to DG’s alleged wish to keep a low profile.  With respect, those media reports were few and far between.  On corporate records, DG did manage to keep his ownership out of the picture.

498. Those ceremonies were attended by government officials and Citibank personnel, all of whom required the real boss to be present.  And yet DY was conspicuously absent from all of them,  notwithstanding that they all took place before or long after the alleged Bai Incident (described in Section T below).  From the photos, even though the venue for the ceremony was spacious, DY was not there.

499. There were some meetings attended by DY.  For example, 汪新野 (Director of the Town Planning Department of Pudong) said that DY chaired the experts meeting held at 西郊賓館 and DY represented the developer to extend a vote of thanks to the participants. There were meetings attended by DY with金茂 held on 1/8/2001 and CB Richards Ellis held on 17/1/2003.  At the meeting held on 12/3/2002, DY was assigned to take charge of matters relating to the contract for the main contractor.  At the meeting conducted by DG on 22/3/2002, DY was assigned tasks by DG.  I find that all those meetings were for preliminary discussions of which DY did not show a leading role.

500. DY was also virtually absent from all overseas inspection tours.

R3.  Selection of architectural design of the Tower

501. DG was part of the tender assessment committee for the architectural design but DY was not: see member list.  The assertions of DY and 汪新野in their witness statements that DY had participated in the tender exercise were not corroborated by any of the relevant documents.  DY even said that he had no knowledge that he was not in the tender assessment committee, which was unbelievable.  I reject both the evidence of DY and 汪新野.

502. No architectural design was chosen at the tendering process.  On behalf of Bading, DG entered into the Construction Engineering and Design Agreement 建設工程設計合同 with Nikken (as architect) on 28/11/2001.

503. DY could not satisfactorily explain how Nikken came to be chosen.  If it was he who had chosen Nikken, he could not explain why the letter of gratitude from Nikken was addressed to DG but not DY.  DY made up a story during cross-examination that he had taken the letter of gratitude to Nikken’s office and obtained confirmation from Nikken’s representative that the letter should not have been issued.  This story was directly contradicted by DY’s own evidence in his supplemental witness statement that the letter of gratitude was issued to DG as he represented Bading to sign the 建築設計協定.

504. I accept DG’s evidence and find that it was he who made the important decision of choosing the architect and the design of the Tower.

R4.  Entering into the main contract for construction

505. Regarding Bading’s meeting held on 1/3/2002 and conducted by DY, only the mode of sub-contracting承包模式 was discussed (see minutes of meeting). It did not concern the selection of the main contractor.  It was DG who signed the main contract dated 9/9/2002 with the main contractor上海建工(集團) 總公司, with a contract sum of RMB 162m.  I find that DG had probably concluded the main contract.  That was why the letter of gratitude dated 29/10/2009 from上海建工was addressed to DG as President but not DY. 

506. DG also signed the建築工料測量顧問服務合同.

507. On the other hand, in 2002, DY procured an undertaking (承諾書) from 上海建工, the main contractor, to complete the Tower works up to 30/F for RMB 80m without asking for further funds.  The undertaking was not signed by DY.  Given DG’s control over Bading’s finance, I find it unlikely that DY had authority to obtain the undertaking on such terms without DG’s approval.

508. DY also did some liaison work in 2003 concerning aluminium, air-conditioning, glass and paints.  In my view, such was relatively minor work compared to what DG did.

R5.  Negotiation of terms of cooperation with Citigroup

509. As President of Bading, DG liaised with the Citigroup over construction and tenancy matters.

510. DY claimed that it was he who brought about Citigroup’s agreement to cooperate with Bading through negotiation with 鍾敏敏 (Chief of Staff of Citibank China Region).  This was evidenced by the set of minutes of 9/6/2000, which was not challenged by DG.  鍾敏敏 also confirmed DY’s contribution at the initial stage. 

511. However, the contents of the minutes of 9/6/2000 showed that the discussion back then was at a preliminary stage.  At that meeting, Dingtai/Bading only agreed to give priority to Citigroup when selecting its partner. Citigroup was yet to submit its letter of intent before 30/6/2000.  

512. The letter of intent (for Citibank to lease some floors of the Tower) that marked the beginning of the cooperation between Bading and Citigroup was only executed 19 months later on 24/1/2002 by DG and Richard Stanley respectively. This was supported by the minutes of Bading’s internal meeting held on 4/1/2002 (which was not challenged by DY), which recorded that formal negotiation with Citigroup would only commence in January 2002.  DY was not even present at the meeting.  

513. 鍾敏敏 had already left Citigroup in 2001.  He accepted that Richard Stanley was his senior to whom he had to report.  鍾敏敏could not give any useful evidence on Bading’s cooperation with Citigroup although he accepted that Guy McComb and Jun Nepomuceno were the representatives assigned by Citigroup to handle the Project.

514. Guy McComb was the former Executive Vice President and Director of Citigroup’s Global Real Estate Capital Transactions Division from 2000 until he retired in October 2006.  After he retired, he continued to provide consulting services to Citigroup concerning major real estate matters through the end of 2011.  He gave evidence that the Project was considered one of the major real estate projects for Citigroup. He and Jun Nepomuceno were the 2 most senior management staff of Citigroup who were involved in it.  Throughout the Project, Citigroup would only discuss with the ultimate decision maker or owner from the other side and that was DG.  Guy McComb had never negotiated with DY.  This was never challenged by DY in cross-examination.

515. In trying to prove his case on cooperation with Citigroup, DY produced 2 Chinese letters dated 3/1/2002to support alleged correspondence between him, and Guy McComb and Jun Nepomuceno.  Guy McComb has expressly questioned the authenticity of such documents in his witness statement.  He said that he and Jun Nepomuceno were illiterate in Chinese and would only send out letters in English in international real estate projects.  Any proposed lease terms by Citigroup would have been drafted and sent by its solicitors from Citigroup directly in English only. 

516. Guy McComb was not challenged in cross-examination. DY has not even begun to rebut his evidence or confirmed if the Chinese letters were translation of the English originals. 

517. DY’s assertions that Guy McComb was employed by or had received fees from DG or Bading were denied by Guy McComb.  I accept that Guy McComb had nothing to gain out of this litigation.  He was an independent witness.  I accept his evidence and find that the 2 Chinese letters had not come from Guy McComb or Jun Nepomuceno.  This was an example of DY using false evidence.

518. I accept the evidence of DG.  DY’s negotiation with鍾敏敏at the initial stage did not alter the fact that it was DG who decided the terms of cooperation with Citigroup.

R6.  Change to town planning conditions of the Land

519. Citigroup wanted the Land to be moved closer to the river bank so that the Tower could stand out and there were also to be changes in construction limit (“the changes”).  These were achieved in the end.  The building area was increased from 60,000 to 89,000 square metres; and the height from 130 to 180 metres, but with the Land premium and town planning authority’s fees increased by RMB 162.76m. 

520. 鍾敏敏 confirmed that without the changes Citigroup was not even prepared to cooperate with Bading.  DY claimed that in 2000, he and 鍾敏敏 applied to the city government for changes in land use.  汪新野also confirmed that DY visited his office from time to time to follow up the matter.  DY said that once government approval was obtained, payment of the Land premium could be deferred.

521. On the other hand, DG said he was the one who issued Bading’s application document dated 29/12/2000 for the changes.  Even 汪新野accepted that the application must be formally made in writing.

522. Such a huge planning exercise had to be subject to the overall planning of the central Liujiazui area and policies of both the city and district government.  汪新野 accepted that he could not make the decision as he was in 規劃處and not 規劃局.

523. DG also pointed out that DY had confused the private rights of Fortune World and the government rights in granting approval.  Payment of the Land premium could not simply be deferred.  To deal with private rights of Fortune World, Bading entered into an agreement with it dated 17/6/2002 to increase the Land premium.  DG signed on behalf of Bading.

524. Whilst I accept that DY had done something in relation to the changes, I am not satisfied that it was so overwhelming as to show him to be a true decision maker.  I accept DG’s evidence.

R7.  Approval of expenses

525. DY was the department head (分管領導) verifying the applications for reimbursement from 2000 to 2005.  Final approval had to be given by DG, the general manager.  Expenses of DY for as small as bottles of water, 3 books and entertainment expenses had to be approved by DG.  I note that this position of DY had been held even before the Bai Incident. 

526. In his closing submission, all that Mr Chan SC can say is that the approval procedure was made to enable the company expenditure to be used for tax reduction purpose.  It is not, in my view, an explanation for why DG had the final say in terms of expenses.

527. Likewise, signing of construction contracts ((工程項目)合同簽發箋), had to be approved by DG as General Manager before those contracts could be signed with outsiders.

528. DY’s lack of management power over Bading’s finance was confirmed by 鮑栽萍 whose evidence I accept. 

529. The evidence in this Section was overwhelming to show DG to be in true control of Bading.  DY could not have possibly entrusted or delegated so much substantial work to DG if the latter was just his driver. Clearly DY was in a subordinate status.

S.  ARRANGING FINANCE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE TOWER

S1.  Loans stamped with the chops of DG and DY

530. There were short-term loans from ICBC to Dingtai stamped with DY’s chop between 10/11/1998 and 28/6/1999, for amounts ranging from RMB 2m to 5m. 

531. The rest of the loans to Dingtai, Bading and the Shanghai Holding Companies were stamped with DG’s chop or his nominees, including: 

(i)  Loans agreement with ICBC for RMB 70m, RMB 80m, RMB 70m loan and a security agreement. 

(ii)  The cooperation agreement with ABC dated 10/7/2001 whereby ABC would act as the main bank (主辦銀行) and undertook to advance a maximum of RMB 580m.  It was signed by DG on behalf of Bading.

(iii)  A loan for RMB 680m from ABC secured by the Project. Pursuant to DG’s instruction, 奕印敏 signed the guarantee agreement for the ABC loan as Shanghai Shenxin’s legal representative. 

(iv)  ABC allowed a 2nd mortgage.  SXP signed the RMB 230m Loan Agreement and Security Agreement with Bank of Communications (“BOC”) on behalf of Bading.  The evidence of 林健良was that this loan was negotiated by DY.  SXP, while stated to be the legal representative, admitted that she was the Chief Finance Officer.  It was the understanding of 林健良that DY sent her to sign the loan agreement.  I find this to be unlikely as SXP had always been DG’s nominee.

532. Mr Chan SC made little comment on those loans in his closing submission.  However, the loans from ICBC and a loan from Huaxia Bank were worthy of consideration.

S2.  Loans from ICBC

533. The short-term loan agreements in para 530 were signed by DY for Dingtai and Qin Wei (欽瑋, ICBC支行行長) from 1998 to 1999.  The purpose was stated to be for “purchase of materials” or “cash flow”.

534. It is DG’s case that the ICBC loan agreements were concluded by him on behalf of Dingtai.  This was supported by the evidence of 張國民 (Deputy Branch Manager of the ICBC WGQ Tax Zone Branch) and 張杰 (Credit Officer of ICBC).  In fact 張國民participated in loans to Dingtai, Bading, 上海鼎興,上海申鑫.  DY and DXH allegedly just did liaison work like delivering documents required by the bank.

535. DY denied DG’s version.  DY claimed that he played a pivotal role in all the loan transactions with ICBC.  However, 張國民decided to be DG’s witness, despite a similar invitation from DY.  Despite attempts of DY to smear the credibility of 張國民by referring to his previous conviction for the first time under cross-examination, I place little weight on the conviction and draw no inference against 張國民.

536. DY then produced Qin Wei as a witness under the most dubious circumstances:

(i)  When DY made his 1st affirmation on 14/10/2010, he never mentioned anything about obtaining loans from ICBC under the topic of “arranging finance for the construction of Citigroup Tower”.

(ii)  In response to DG’s evidence that the ICBC loans were handled by 張杰, DY only challenged the position of 張杰but did not mention Qin Wei in his 3rd affirmation.

(iii)  DY actively sought out 張國民to be his witness as early as November 2010.  However, despite the fact that Qin Wei’s office was only a few blocks away from the Tower, DY made no attempt to ask Qin Wei to be his witness, until DY accidentally ran into him at a restaurant on 17/6/2011.

(v)  DY’s explanation was that he had to find evidence for Qin Wei to comment on.  This was illogical, for if Qin Wei agreed to be his witness, Qin Wei would have provided the evidence for DY. 

537. The inference I draw is that Qin Wei and DY did not play the sort of significant role as DY wanted the court to believe and that 張國民 and 張杰 were the ones who handled the ICBC loans. 

538. There were 2 specific loans involving Qin Wei, one for RMB 19 million to 上海鼎興and another RMB 29 million to 上海申鑫respectively. The 2 loan agreements which DG managed to obtain shortly before the trial showed conclusively that the 2 loans were expressly guaranteed by Dingtai.  However, both the witness statements of DY and Qin Wei never referred to the Dingtai guarantee but DY had lied in stating that the guarantee was provided by one 北大科技資源股份公司(Beida), a listed company controlled by DY’s personal friend, 成清波. 

539. The Beida guarantee was never produced.  成清波 who gave a witness statement did not turn up at trial.  It remained a mystery as to why Beida would have provided a guarantee for two private companies in which it had no equity or commercial interest and had not asked for security.

540. Qin Wei confirmed under cross-examination that those 2 loan agreements were shown to him before he made his witness statement.  DY had concealed them from the court.

541. Qin Wei suggested in his oral evidence that the Beida guarantee was only used for obtaining the credit line, but was not used to secure the 上海鼎興 and上海申鑫 loans.  This begged 2 questions: (a) why did DY and Qin Wei mention the Beida guarantee when it was not used at all? (b) Why did they know that it was not used?  I find Qin Wei’s evidence unbelievable.

542. I find that DY had concealed crucial documents to mislead the court as to his involvement in seeking the 2 loans for上海鼎興 and上海申鑫.  He had even gone so far as to collude with his other witnesses to give false evidence on his efforts in acquiring funding for developing the Land.  I reject DY’s evidence and accept that the 2 loans from ICBC were obtained as a result of DG’s efforts.  I also accept that it was DG who arranged the ICBC loans stamped with DY’s chop.

S3.  Loan of RMB 80m from Huaxia Bank

543. DG asserted that it was he who had instructed DY to apply for this loan.

544. However, 陸全侃 (Lu, President of Huaxia Bank) gave evidence for DY stating that he knew DY back in 2000.  Through enquiries, he realized that DY controlled Dingtai.  Lu said he negotiated with DY in respect of this loan and he had never met DG in the course of business. 

545. It was DY’s evidence that he managed to locate李安保of 上海市區電力投資發展總公司 (“Shanghai Electricity”) to gave a signed letter of undertaking to DY (acting on behalf of Bading) in respect of the purchase of 2 floors of the Tower for a consideration of RMB 128,267,700 (at US$3,300 per square metre). Lu said that he had contacted李安保and confirmed that he had given the undertaking as per DY’s request.  The RMB 80m loan from Huaxia Bank was released only upon receipt of that letter of undertaking.

546. However, 李安保had signed a statement suggesting that that letter of undertaking had nothing to do with Bading but did not explain why.  李安保never attended trial.  I reject his statement and place weight on the contemporaneous undertaking.

547. I reject DG’s assertion and accept DY’s evidence.

548. In summary, the conflicting evidence of DG and DY as to who liaised with the banks shed little light on the question of beneficial ownership of the Land and the Tower.  Suffice it to say that DY did make efforts in procuring the Huaxia Bank loan of RMB 80m but he had obviously lied in relation to the ICBC loans.  The RMB 80m was relatively small compared to other loans obtained through DG.

T.  2003: THE BAI INCIDENT (白曉江事件)

549. Sections R and S showed that DG was in full control of Bading.  DY sought to explain away his own conspicuous lack of control in Bading by what he called “the Bai Incident”.

550. According to DY, he actively participated in Bading prior to August 2003.  In about early 2003, DG told him about rumours that Bai of Zhongfu was subject to investigation by authorities in the Mainland for suspected misappropriation of state-owned assets (“the Bai Incident”).  DG allegedly said that DY might be investigated and jailed, which would affect the Tower. DY himself was interviewed by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Procuratorate in July 2003 concerning his cooperation with Bai.  Although the PRC police confirmed to him after investigation that the Zhongfu loans related to Bai were legal, DY became concerned about legality of the short term loans which Dingtai obtained from ICBC. DY decided to maintain a low profile to outsiders, but remained in active management of Bading behind the scene.  He allegedly entrusted DG to deal with the daily operation of Bading as his nominee.  He gave a letter of authorization to DG and the shares in Bading to DXH.  He turned his attention to business outside PRC.

551. I pause here to note that in 2003 the Tower was in a critical state of construction.  The foundation work had been done and contractors were looking for contracts.  It was incredible for DY to have spent allegedly 2/3 of his time between 2003 and 2009 out of Shanghai to attend to new businesses abroad, which was of no comparison to the scale of the Project.

552. DY’s story about the Bai Incident was completely illogical.

553. Firstly, DY’s worries were irrational. There was no evidence that the ICBC loans (totally unrelated to the Zhongfu loans) were the subject of investigation.  

554. Secondly, despite his concerns as to illegality of the loans, DY could not explain why he had not sought legal advice for 7 years.

555. Thirdly, changing the legal representative would not change the fact that the loans obtained by DY for one purpose had been unlawfully applied for another.  The Bai Incident could not explain how resigning and going into hiding would have absolved DY or Bading from criminal liability or saved the Tower from alleged confiscation if illegality was established. 

556. Fourthly, DXH replaced DY as the legal representative of Dingtai in January 2003 when DY’s positions as legal representative, general manager and director were wholly removed.  (See the shareholders’ resolution dated 31/1/2003.)  DY transferred his 25% shares in Dingtai to DXH in June 2003.  (See theshare transfer agreement dated 5/6/2003).  Both events happened before DY was investigated for the Bai Incident in July 2003. 

557. Fifthly, the Bai Incident could not explain why DY was absent from all the important ceremonies in relation to the Land referred to in Section R2 above, all of which occurred before the Bai Incident.

558. Sixthly, whilst DY might have wished to maintain a low profile as against outsiders, that should not have prevented him from exercising full control over Bading internally.  And yet, both before and after the Bai Incident, DG maintained full control and possessed the company seal.  Sections R and S above clearly show DY’s participation prior to August 2003 as subordinate to DG’s.  As to why DG became the legal representative, DY said that DXH had no experience and DW was in Shangrao.  In my view, DY had no reason to prefer a driver to DXH and DW who at least had experience in managing the Hainan Companies.

559. Seventhly, despite his alleged fear which lasted until 2010, DY acted as registered shareholder of Hong Kong First and Macau First during 2004 to 2006, thus allowing himself (on record) to be traceable as an owner of the Land and the Tower.  Neither could DXH explain how the HKF Allotment to Macau First could have spared DY from investigation in relation to the Bai Incident.

560. Eighthly, despite his extreme concern about the Bai Incident, DY took no steps to follow up its development.  Had he done so, he would have discovered that Bai had been acquitted and released since 2005, in which event, DY could have (if so minded) regained control of Bading.  DY claimed that he had no channel to contact Bai, which was unbelievable.

561. Ninthly, if DY had entrusted Bading to DG due to the Bai Incident, there was no reason why he should not revoke DG’s authority when (i) he learnt that DG and Chen were wanted for bribery offences in August 2003; and (ii) DG went into hiding for half a year.  After all, DY himself had never been wanted.

562. Tenthly, the question of who should be Bading’s legal representative arose in 2000 when Foreign Investors’ interests were reduced to 40% (see Section Q above).  DY could not explain why he let DG be the legal representative 3 years before the Bai Incident. 

563. Bai had made a witness statement but he had not turned up at the trial to support DY’s case.  I find the Bai Incident to be a pack of lies.  I find DG’s version more likely to be true.  DG’s appointment as legal representative of Bading clearly had nothing to do with the Bai Incident.  I do not accept that it was DY who appointed DG as legal representative.  Rather, DG’s appointment was the natural consequence of his being in real control of Bading and Dingtai.

564. As stated in para 556, also in 2003, DY lost all his hollow positions (虛職) in Bading.  He also lost his status as legal representative and direct shareholding of Dingtai.  His indirect interest in Dingtai was lost in 2002 when he transferred his interest in 上饒三鑫 to 劉竹英.  According to DG, which I accept, it was because DY had pocketed RMB millions of secret commissions from the Zhongfu loans.  These events together with DY’s lack of control over Bading could not be coincidental.

U. HOLDING OF SHARES IN BADING ACQUIRED FROM FOREIGN INVESTORS

U1. Holding of 35% shares acquired from Foreign Investors

565. In 2000, 上饒三清, 上饒三鑫 and上饒鼎鑫 (collectively, “the Shangrao Companies”); and上海鼎興, 上海申鑫 (collectively, “the Shanghai Holding Companies”).  These companies did not have any independent business which would have enabled them to earn substantial profit and contribute to the Land premium, the Project costs or the acquisition of the interests in Bading.  DG said he merely injected what he earned from Railway Redevelopment into them.  Again, their capital came from borrowing and it was impossible to trace the genuine source from DG or DY’s fund flow tables.

566. As depicted in Section Q above, Dingtai initially held 40% shares in Bading.  Gradually, between 2000 and 2001, 35% shares of Bading were transferred from Foreign Investors to the Shanghai Holding Companies.  The rest of 25% was held by the Foreign Investor Lee Tung. 

567. The shareholding of the Shanghai Holding Companies was, at different stages, held by (a) DG himself; (b) individuals acting as DG’s nominees; or (c)the Shangrao Companies.  In turn, the shareholding of the Shangrao Companies was held by individuals acting as DG’s nominees.

568. Between 2010 and 2011, those individuals have executed notarized declarations confirming their nomineeship (SXP, YXA, 余霞英, 劉竹英, 高翠珍 who is the grandmother of DG’s 3rd son, 王建鋒, 王火根, 奕印敏).  Some of them (eg SXP, 陳志強, 王建鋒) have attended trial to give evidence in favour of DG.  All of these individuals had/have a closer connection to DG than to DY.  In contrast, there was no evidence of DY instructing any of these individuals to hold shares on his behalf, or instructing anyone close to him to act as nominees.

569. In explaining this phenomenon, DY claimed that DG had changed the nominees to DY’s companies behind DY’s back.  DY claimed to have set up the Shangrao Companies as “bridging companies”.  Their mission was to set up the Shanghai Holding Companies, also bridging companies, to receive the shares of the outgoing Foreign Investors (接盤).

570. According to DY’s witness statement, the funds flowed from Dingtai into the 2 Railway Companies and then to the Shangrao Companies and the Shanghai Holding Companies.  In his oral evidence, DY said that the shares of the bridging companies were “lacking in commercial value”.  He did not pay attention to them after they had “completed their historical mission in March 2001”.

571. Under cross-examination, DY changed his evidence and said that the Shanghai Holding Companies were not bridging companies; they only completed their mission in 2005 and 2006, when they transferred their respective shares in Bading to Hong Kong First. 

572. These explanations were most astonishing.  It was the evidence of 鍾敏敏that he advised DY to take over the shareholding of the Foreign Investors. The “historical mission” of the bridging companies was to hold the shares in Bading.  It was impossible for their mission to be completed within a year of their set up in 2000.  DY could not have failed to pay attention to who the nominees were when the mission was not yet over.  It was also incredible that DY would have regarded their shares as lacking in commercial value.

573. With regard to上海鼎興, DY’s latest stance was that it was not a bridging company.  If so, there was no reason why DY would be unaware that DXH was replaced by朱嘉(Zhujia), and Zhujia was replaced by王建鋒, as its legal representative in 2003 and 2004 respectively.

574. Further, DY’s own evidence was that after the Bai Incident in 2003, he reconsidered his choice of nominees.  Presumably, that should include nominees for the Shangrao Companies and the Shanghai Holding Companies. Strangely, he used nominee shareholders with closer relationship to DG than to himself without apparent good reasons. 

575. DY’s version was totally illogical and unbelievable.  Mr Chan SC did not deal with the situation of the bridging companies in his closing submission.  I find that the Shangrao Companies and the Shanghai Holding Companies were formed by DG to take over Foreign Investors’ interests in Bading.  They beneficially belonged to DG and that was why the nominees were closer to him than DY and DY was not aware of their becoming nominees.

576. Further evidence of DG’s beneficial ownership in the Shanghai Holding Companies could be found from notarized letters of authorization issued by DXH and her son Zhujia to DG.

U2. Notarized letters of authorization executed by DXH in respect of 上海申鑫 and Dingtai

577. DG had from time to time instructed his nominees (SXP, YXA, Zhujia, 王建鋒) to execute notarized letters of authorization in his favour to enable him to manage various companies.  Amongst those were 2 notarized letters of authorization executed by DXH in favour of DG, both dated 15/6/2004.  Each authorized DG to exercise all her powers as shareholder and director of上海申鑫and Dingtai (“DXH’s Shenxin LoA” and “DXH’s Dingtai LoA” respectively, and “the 2 LoAs” collectively). 

578. DXH’s evidence on the 2 LoAs has materially changed: 

(i)  In her 2nd affirmation (§29), she said that she had no impression of signing the DXH’s Dingtai LoA but believed that she signed it without reading the contents out of her trust on DG.  As to the DXH’s Shenxin LoA, she admitted that she had signed it but only did so as she thought that it was authorised by DY (§36). The implication was that she did so without reference to DY.

(ii)  In her witness statement (§§20.1-20.2), DXH disowned her previous evidence.  She said that she was not aware of signing the 2 LoAs.  She alleged that she went to the notary public陳加友 in November 2010, who told her that 徐民良(Xu) prepared some documents. She did not know what she signed because she signed a lot of documents without reading them.  This assertion never appeared in her 2nd affirmation filed on 24/1/2011, just 2 months after the alleged conversation with 陳加友.

(iii)  In her oral evidence, DXH said that the signatures thereon looked like hers. She was most evasive in repeating, “我沒有單獨簽過這種授權委託書”. 

579. Not only was DXH inconsistent, but her version was also illogical.  As her witness statement showed (§20.1), she was told by DG to go from Hong Kong to Shanghai for the special purpose of executing a notarized document. The purpose was, amongst others, to authorize SXP to represent DXH to buy, sell and lease properties of DXH in Shanghai. 

580. There was no reason why 陳加友did not explain the contents of the 2 LoAs to DXH or ask her to read them.  In any case, the 2 LoAs were one-page documents.  It would not have taken DXH more than a few seconds to discover the names of Dingtai and 上海申鑫respectively in the first line of the main text and that those companies had nothing to do with her properties in Shanghai.

581. Further, in about June 2004, there was no transaction concerning properties in DXH’s name, whether in Shanghai, Zhuhai, Hong Kong or Macau: Exhibit P28 (agreed table of DXH’s properties).  As DXH accepted, she did not participate in the management of the Shanghai Holding Companies or the Shangrao Companies.  Therefore, on the occasion when she executed the 2 LoAs, there were unlikely to have been many documents presented to her for signing.

582. I find that DXH executed the 2 LoAs on the instructions of DG, without reference to DY.  She well knew the contents of them.  She knew and treated DG as the beneficial owner of Dingtai and 上海申鑫.

U3. Notarized letter of authorization executed by Zhujia in respect of 上海鼎興

583. It had always been Zhujia’s evidence in his affirmation and witness statement that he provided the original and copy of his ID card to DG and SXP when he was working in Bading. This indicated that Zhujia was DG’s nominee, allowing DG to make use of his ID card.

584. Zhujia purportedly executed a notarized letter of authorization, which was dated 19/12/2003, authorizing DG to exercise his power as the director and general manager of 上海鼎興.

585. Zhujia claimed that it was forged.  This was unbelievable as there was no motive for the notary to notarize a forged document.  Nor could Zhujia explain why someone needed to forge his signature in 2003.  I find the letter of authorization to have been executed by Zhujia.

586. Mr Chan SC has not dealt with the notarized letters of authorization of either DXH or Zhujia in his closing submission.

V.  2003: BUYING OUT OF THE LAST FOREIGN INVESTOR

V1.  Undisputed facts

587. By an agreement dated 12/12/2003, Macau First Investment (not Macau First) bought out the last Foreign Investor, Lee Tung (“the Lee Tung Acquisition”).  DY signed the agreement on behalf of Macau First Investment.  The event marked the complete withdrawal of the Foreign Investors from Bading.

588. The consideration for the Lee Tung Acquisition was RMB 150m, being (a) RMB 149.99m for the value of 25% Bading shares held by Lee Tung; and (b) MOP 10,000 for the value of Lee Tung as a corporate vehicle.

589. The then directors of Bading (Chen, SXP, YXA, 劉竹英and奕印敏) passed a resolution on 3/12/2003 to approve the advance payment of RMB 149.99m dividends to Lee Tung.  All of these individuals confirmed that they acted pursuant to DG’s instructions.

590. MOP 10,000 was paid to施能船, sole owner of Lee Tung, on about 12/12/2003.

V2.  The parties’ case

591. According to DG, the Asian financial crisis had gradually gone past but Lee Tung faced cash flow problem.  Having heard that Lee Tung might mortgage the shares in Bading, DG brought up the idea of buying out Lee Tung at a price higher than that proposed by Chen.  The Lee Tung Acquisition was negotiated and concluded by him and Chen.  DY was not involved.  It was upon DG’s instructions that DY signed the agreement with Lee Tung.  It was also DG’s idea to set up a company outside the Mainland to hold the Lee Tung shares and hence Macau First Investment (99% held by DXH and 1% by YXA) was set up.  Xu confirmed that he paid 施能船 MOP 10,000 upon DG’s instructions.

592. DY’s case need only be briefly mentioned to demonstrate its hollowness.  In his 1st affirmation, DY completely omitted to mention the consideration of RMB 149.99m but only referred to the MOP 10,000 which appeared on the face of the Lee Tung Agreement.  There were no details about the steps he allegedly took to set up Macau First Investment and he did not mention Chen.  It was only after DG has set out the details of the Lee Tung Acquisition in his 3rd affirmation dated 10/12/2010 that DY revised his story in his 3rd affirmation dated 24/1/2011.  In his witness statement dated 7/8/2012, DY described how Chen allegedly shifted financial responsibilities to DY and pressed DY to return to him the capital investment as banks were hotly demanding for repayment.

593. The way DY presented his case on the Lee Tung Acquisition could not have been a slip of memory.  The substantial consideration of RMB 149.99m was unusual when the Tower was uncompleted and Bading was not then making profits.  Getting to hold the final 25% shareholding of Bading was too exciting an event for a true owner to forget the path.  Mr Chan SC’s closing submission simply avoided any comment on how the Lee Tung acquisition came about.

594. I find that DY has simply played no part in deciding on the Lee Tung Acquisition. It was all DG’s decision.  DY’s signing of the Lee Tung Agreement was clearly upon the instructions of DG.

W. 2004: THE DXH GIFT AGREEMENT AND SXP GIFT AGREEMENT

W1. Undisputed facts

595. The 2 most important nominees, DXH and SXP, have executed the DXH Gift Agreement and SXP Gift Agreement on 7/2/2004 (collectively “the 2 Gift Agreements”) acknowledging DG’s ownership of (i) all those companies through which shares in Bading was held, and (ii) 100% shareholding in Macau First Investment and its interest in Lee Tung.  They acknowledged that those assets were obtained by DG lawfully and that they were DG’s nominees in holding those shares registered in their names.  They agreed to return those assets to DG by way of gift without reservation.  Both Gift Agreements were notarized by 陳加友.

596. The discussion among DXH, DG and陳加友at the time of execution of the DXH Gift Agreement was recorded in a set of 談話筆錄signed by the 3 of them, the authenticity of which was not disputed. 

597. Further, it was recorded in a court document retrieved from the Jiang Wei Proceedings that DXH had confirmed to the Mainland Prosecutorial Bureau that she had executed the DXH Gift Agreement and had not disowned it.

W2.  DXH’s evidence

598. In her 2nd affirmation dated 24/1/2011, DXH said that DG asked her to sign the DXH Gift Agreement, which she did without reading, out of her trust for DG.  She never mentioned the presence of Xu. 

599. In her witness statement dated 8/8/2012 (§19.1), DXH said that she had no impression of signing the DXH Gift Agreement and she believed that Xu included it in a pile of documents for her to sign at Xu’s dimly-lit office with no windows, and not before any notary public. DXH’s witness statement was simultaneously exchanged with Xu’s and Xu had no opportunity to reply by witness statement. 

600. Such evidence could not, of course, establish non est factum.  From the contents of the 談話筆錄, DXH clearly knew the nature of the document she was asked to sign and the subject matter; she had confirmed her voluntariness in making the gift to DG.

W3. DG’s case

601. DG, SXP and Xu gave evidence that DXH, SXP and DG had verified the contents of the 2 Gift Agreements before the notary public prior to the execution.

602. Xu was the top man in charge of legal matters in Bading.  He had no interest in the outcome of this case.  He had no motive to lie to this court.  He was not even seriously cross-examined on his evidence about the 2 Gift Agreements. Notwithstanding the deemed put procedure, allegations akin to a conspiracy among Xu, DG, SXP and 陳加友 to perjure was not put to Xu.

603. Xu testified that he had known DY before DG.  In fact it was DY who introduced him to DG but it was DG who invited Xu to join Bading.  He had come to know DY’s character over a long period.  Before joining Bading, he already knew that DY had lost everything because of speculation.

604. According to Xu, he was the contact person in respect of registration matters concerning Dingtai, the Shanghai Holding Companies and Puding.  All the nominee shareholders, directors and legal representatives were decided by DG. 

605. According to Xu, in 2004, DG wanted to let others know he was the boss insofar as shareholding was concerned.  He wanted to do this to facilitate borrowing.  At that time, the Tower rights were owned by Bading (1st tier).  Bading had 4 shareholders (Dingtai, Lee Tung and the Shanghai Holding Companies) (2nd tier).  Those companies had their own shareholders which were the Shangrao Companies (3rd tier). Then there were shareholders who were natural persons (4th tier).

606. Based on his legal knowledge and social experience, Xu reminded DG of the risk of having interests held by nominee shareholders. He suggested that DG should ask for acknowledgement of nomineeship from his nominees, to which DG agreed.  Thereupon, Xu drafted the 2 Gift Agreements and got DG, DXH and SXP to confirm the contents first before he made the appointment with 陳加友.

607. I place greatest weight on the evidence of Xu.  He was firm and detailed in his testimony.  He described himself as a cautious person, which I agree having regard to his evidence.

W4. DY’s case

608. DY denied knowledge of or consent to the signing of those 2 Gift Agreements. 

609. Mr Chan SC submits that it was quite surprising that DG had not asked DY to sign a similar document like the DXH Gift Agreement and SXP Gift Agreement in respect of DY’s 5% shares in Hong Kong First and Macau First. In fact, Xu admitted not reminding DG of the risk of placing shares in DY’s name. 

610. Mr Chan SC suggests that DG might not want to alert DY of his plan to usurp DY’s interests in the Land. This was denied by Xu who said that it was his boss’ decision to decide whom to get to sign or not.

611. With respect to Mr Chan SC, DG was already in control of all the companies.  Should he have any plot against DY, he would not have asked DXH to sign the Gift Agreement, since DXH might read it before signing and expose his plot to DY.

612. The allegation of DY and DXH was that since 2001, DG had kept changing the nominees behind DY’s back, likely by forging signatures. If, on DY’s case, DG had abused the trust DXH had in him by persuading her to carry out the HKF Allotment without DY’s knowledge,  DG could equally have achieved his theft of DY’s kingdom without having to ask DXH to sign the DXH Gift Agreement. 

613. DY also questioned the notarization.  It was not disputed that 陳加友 had notarized DG’s false graduation certificate.  Mr Tong SC glossed it over to say that陳加友might have been careless on that particular occasion and could not constitute any cogent evidence to support a serious but unpleaded case of conspiracy against陳加友(presumably with DG) on this occasion. 

614. With respect to Mr Tong SC, it is hardly acceptable to suggest that a notary was “careless” when his role was to ensure the genuineness of a document before notarization.  The past incident of notarizing a false document could cast doubt on the credibility of the notary in a subsequent occasion.

615. There was no reason why DG should involve陳加友, thereby increasing the risk of exposure of his plot.  Having taken into account the cogent evidence of Xu and the 談話筆錄, I find that DXH had knowingly and voluntarily executed the DXH Gift Agreement.  The 2 Gift Agreements had been properly notarized before陳加友.

W5. Effect of the DXH Gift Agreement and SXP Gift Agreement

616. The DXH Gift Agreement was executed at a time when the Tower was only a few months away from completion.  DXH could not have overlooked the value of the Tower.  The fact that DG invited DXH to sign the Gift Agreement was compelling evidence confirming his ownership of Bading at a time when litigation was not contemplated by anyone. The fact that DXH signed it was evidence of her acknowledgement of DG’s ownership.

617. The execution of the SXP Gift Agreement at the same time as the DXH Gift Agreement was not a matter of coincidence.  SXP had always been on good terms with DG.  There was no suggestion that she ever denied his interests.  He could have simply asked SXP to transfer back everything to him without the need to execute a Gift Agreement.  Clearly the presence of SXP provided an additional witness to the notarization of the DXH Gift Agreement.

618. For 6 years after execution of the 2 Gift Agreements until the start of this action, DY had done nothing to assert his ownership over Bading or other companies holding interests in Bading.

X. 2004-2006: HONG KONG FIRST AND MACAU FIRST

X1.  Payment of the registered capital of Hong Kong First

619. There was no direct evidence as to the source of the initial capital of HK$100,000.  DXH’s evidence was that it came from the rental income of 皇朝寫字樓 which DY allegedly purchased in her name using “company’s funds”.

620. DG’s evidence was that the HK$100,000 came from funds which he paid to DXH for use in the Hong Kong and Macau companies: DG’s 2nd supplemental witness statement, §120-121.  The payments were evidenced by various receipts admittedly signed by DXH. DXH also accepted that she had received funds from Bading from time to time.

621. Such evidence was not weighty enough for me to find one way or another as to the source of capital although given DG’s overwhelming control of the companies, the capital was likely to have come from him.  Resolution of this issue would not have affected the outcome of this case anyway, since that was not how the parties rested their case.

X2.  DY’s shareholding in Hong Kong First

622. Hong Kong First was set up on 1/9/2004 with 95% shares held by DXH and 5% by DY.  DY earned secret commission from the Zhongfu loans and caused loss to Dingtai.  He was removed as legal representative of Dingtai.  In such circumstances, it was surprising that DG would have still trusted DY with 5% shares and directorship of Hong Kong First, without any acknowledgement of nomineeship signed by DY.  DY’s Dingtai LoA to DG was not enough to cover DG’s rights over those shares.  DG was not in lack of nominees.  There was also no reliable evidence of any agreement of DY to act as DG’s nominee.  But note what happened subsequently.

X3.  Hong Kong First becoming sole owner of Bading

623. To recap, since buying out of the last Foreign Investors in 2003, Bading had had 4 registered shareholders: Dingtai (40%), 上海申鑫 (20%), 上海鼎興(15%) and Lee Tung (wholly owned by Macau First Investment) (25%). 

624. By a series of transfer agreements, Hong Kong First became the sole owner of Bading:


Date

Transferor

Person signing on behalf of the transferor

Person signing on behalf of Hong Kong First
1/6/2005Lee TungDXHDXH
5/9/2005Dingtai
上海鼎興
SXP’ mother
奕印敏
DXH
DXH
6/6/2005上海申鑫奕印敏DXH

625. All of the signatories (including DXH) have acknowledged in writing that they were nominees of DG.

X4.  DY’s shareholding in Macau First

626. Again, DY held 5% shares in Macau First.  According to her witness statement, DXH set up Macau First on 23/1/2006 on the instructions of DY. The registered capital was MOP 20m (which was never paid up).  DG held 85% shares, DY 5%, SXP 5% and DXH 5%.  Xu also confirmed that it was DG’s idea to put in a few nominee shareholders.

627. Within 6 months, in July 2006, the other 3 shareholders transferred their shares to DG, making him 99% shareholder and DXH 1%.  This was inexplicable if DY were the real owner of Macau First.

628. DG’s explanation, which I accept, was that if DG had become the sole owner, Macau First would have to add the words “One Man Ltd” to the name of Macau First.  He did not regard it as good for trading purpose. Since DXH had not handled many of his companies, so DG kept 1% share in her name.

629. In the document known as 設立公司合同 for Macau First, clause 5 stated that DG (and not DY) had a first pre-emptive right of the shares.  The significantly greater shareholding of DG coupled with this pre-emptive right was more consistent with DG being the real owner of Macau First.

630. In the same document, there was a phrase which referred to DY being married and his spouse was Jiang Wen and there was a “分別財產制”.  On DG’s case, this clause was to avoid Jiang Wen asserting a right in the Macau First shares in case she was to divorce DY and hence create an “incumbrance” on DY’s shares.  I consider that this clause would apply whether DG or DY was the real owner of Macau First.  I place little reliance on it.

X5. Resignation of DY as a director of Hong Kong First

631. It would be too much of a coincidence for DG to have picked such time to dishonestly (on DY’s case) persuade DXH to do the HKF Allotment in 2006 which had the effect of making Macau First the ultimate owner of interests in Bading, only to meet with the resignation of DY from Hong Kong First soon afterwards on 25/7/2006.  There was no explanation in DY’s affirmation or witness statements for this phenomenon.

632. At the trial, DY explained that the resignation came about because he found it troublesome to fly to Hong Kong to sign documents, eg for opening bank accounts.  That was a ridiculous explanation.  Opening bank accounts would not have been a frequent occurrence to become troublesome, however busy DY was.  Such trouble could not justify his stripping himself of all ownership and decision making power without reservation.  Mr Chan SC did not deal with it in his closing submission.

X6.  DG’s case

633. It is DG’s case that the incorporation of Hong Kong First, the HKF Allotment, the 2006 Transfers and DY’s resignation from directorship of Hong Kong First were carried out in an organized manner for the purpose of using Macau First as the ultimate holding company to hold his interest in Bading and to show his investors his ultimate ownership in the Land and the Tower.

634. I repeat my analyses on the HKF Trust and MF Trust in Section G above.  Viewed against the backdrop of events since 2003 – setting up the Shanghai Holding Companies and Shangrao Companies, removal of DY as legal representative of Dingtai, obtaining written acknowledgements of nomineeship and execution of the 2 Gift Agreements, DG’s version was logical and credible. It was probable that DY and DXH all along knew that DG was the rightful owner of Bading and Hong Kong First and so they did all acts in accordance with DG’s directions.  I accept DG’s version.

Y.  2005-2007: DG AND DY’S APPLICATION FOR EMIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA

Y1.  Undisputed facts

635. DG obtained his residency in Australia by applying under Class 132 (for entrepreneurs) whereas DY did so through Class 164 (for senior staff).  There was no residence requirement for the former but 4 years’ residence was required for the latter. In his application form, DY stated that he was managerial staff of Dingtai and Bading and personally held 2 properties only.

Y2.  Analyses

636. The issue was why DY did not apply through the more prestigious class 132.  The financial requirement was to show ownership of at least 30% shares of value over A$400,000 in a substantial company for 2 years within the past 4 years. DY could have easily met this by asking his alleged nominee (DXH) to transfer Bading back to him or to sign various declarations to acknowledge his ownership. 

637. Alternatively, DY allegedly had shares in Global International (Australia) Property Ltd (“GIAPL”).  He allegedly gave 51% to DG and, with a letter from DY’s friend, DG got immigrant status.  Why didn’t DY do the same with his own 49% (well above the requisite 30% shareholding)?  He has been asked the question 3 times but all that he could say was that Xu got an immigration agent instead of a foreign company to make the application.  It was illogical, in my view, that Xu would have taken upon himself to apply under a different, yet more cumbersome class, for a real boss.  There was also no reason why the immigration agent would have told DY, as alleged, that mentioning 2 properties was sufficient and disallowed him from mentioning others.

638. DY was shown a letter of GIAPL dated 15/8/2008 in which it was certified that the company received A$3.15m and that the money belonged to DG.  DY claimed that the contents were not true as it was DY who had provided the money.  According to DY, what happened was that after DG got his green card in 29/4/2005, DG had to undergo a process within 2 years to verify that he had over A$3m, or else he would have lost his immigrant status. 

639. There was no apparent reason why the immigration department would have wanted a letter (which stated the historical instead of current capital position of a company) 2 years after DG had got the green card.  I do not accept DY’s evidence.  The more probable reason was that DY needed to show this letter to the immigration officer to prove that DG (his guarantor) had money in Australia. 

640. Further, DY kept saying that his immigration was for the sake of his children’s education and he did not want the application to be too complicated.  The irony was that he did it the more complicated way that required residence and a guarantee from DG.  It took DY 2 years.

641. I find that the manner in which DY and DG applied for emigration to Australia reflected that DG was the real owner of Bading and that was also how DY viewed it.

Z.  DY’S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL OVER BADING AND HONG KONG FIRST

642. DY did not know that Bading had declared substantial dividends and Hong Kong First had received dividends of HK$48m in 2008 and HK$47.5m in 2010, as borne out by the financial statements of Hong Kong First.

643. Hong Kong First had paid substantial funds to DG personally (eg HK$44.5m in 2010) but no such to DY.

644. In contrast, DY and his wife, received RMB 30,000 and RMB 20,000 respectively as employees of Bading. There was no explanation as to why DY, if he was the true owner of Bading or Hong Kong First, would have permitted this state of affairs to exist and had never requested for payment of dividends to himself.

645. Mr Chan SC submits that since DY spent 1/3 of his time in Shanghai after 2003 and the rest in development business out of China, he might not be interested in asking for dividends.  With respect, that might explain DY’s stance, but not DXH’s conduct in distributing dividends to DG without DY’s knowing.

AA. 2010: THE DISPUTE THAT LED TO THIS ACTION

646. It is DY’s case that his dispute with DG started in September/ October 2009 when DG allegedly refused to cause Bading to release funds to DY to invest in a new project.  DG allegedly suggested that DY should retire and take a rest.  DXH was told about the dispute round about that time.

647. There was no evidence that DY persisted in his request for inspection of Bading’s accounts or rebuked DG for his disobedience.  DXH, as director of Hong Kong First and alleged nominee of DY, never demanded Bading to release accounts for DY’s inspection or release funds to DY.

648. DXH’s version on when she first came to know about the breakdown in relationship between DY and DG had changed in the course of evidence.  In the defence, she said that their argument started from early 2007 but this was denied in the witness box.  Under cross-examination she said that it started in the first half of 2010. 

649. DXH even claimed in her witness statement (§26.2) that in March or April 2010, DG told her that  “his gang” had deliberated for 2 years and however hard DY tried, DY would not be able to turn the tide.  DG also allegedly suggested a settlement under which DXH was to give him all her properties in Shanghai to DG.

“2010年3-4 月份,一次在花旗大樓三樓的會議室,我告訴丁鋼,丁育辛苦了幾十年的心血是不會白白讓給你的。我很清楚記得丁鋼這樣和我說:沒有用的,我一幫人研究了2 年,丁育怎麽也翻不了盤的!丁鋼還說他要丁育搬出大樓。 … … 過了一會兒丁鋼對我說,要他和丁育和解是可以的,但條件是要我把我在上海名下的物業送給他。”

650. DXH simply could not point to any objective evidence to show what DG had done in 2 years to usurp DY’s assets.  The best she could point to was the 2006 Transfers of Hong Kong First shares to Macau First 4 years before.  When challenged on this aspect, DXH was so hesitant that she could not give a logical answer.

651. What was more incredible was that, despite knowing her brothers’ dispute, DXH disposed of properties in favour of DG without DY’s knowledge or approval:

(i)  DXH transferred, at DG’s request in late March 2010, HK$30m and US$3m to DG’s personal account for investment purpose. 

(ii)  For the year ending 31/3/2010, DXH had paid DG HK$44.5m out of HK$47.5m dividends received by Hong Kong First, in the hope of settling the brothers’ dispute.  This was inconsistent with DY’s pleading and prior evidence that DXH was deceived by DG in causing Hong Kong First to pay DG HK$3m (being part of the HK$44.5m) on 4/3/2010.  When challenged during cross-examination, DY claimed that he had confused the payment of money to DG with the transfer of 6 landed properties by DXH to DG, which was an entirely different category of assets.

(iii)  DXH alleged that there were USA and Canadian companies in which DY had interests.  She claimed to have remitted RMB 2m and another RMB 40m to DG’s personal account for those companies.  This contradicted DY’s case, who did not know there were dividends received by Hong Kong First which he could have used.

(iv)  DXH knew that DY had asked DG for money for a land project but DG said that Bading had no money.  DXH knew that Hong Kong First had profits of HK$47m and yet she did not inform DY.

(v)  On 29/4/2010, she transferred to DG 6 properties worth over RMB 70-100m allegedly held by her on behalf of DY, in the alleged hope that the brothers would settle their dispute.  She said it was at the instigation of DG.  She said that since DY bought them in her name, she believed they were hers.

652. DXH’s conduct was totally inconsistent with her alleged role as DY’s nominee.  When cross-examined on why she transferred properties under her name to DG, she was very evasive.  After a few indirect answers, she admitted that DY realized that he was completely out of control.  She said that after March 2010, DY and DG fell out.  She tried to mediate in vain.  Despite that, DXH still transferred US$3m and HK$30m to DG’s personal account, claiming that she trusted DG.  This was completely illogical.

653. Her notion of settlement was naive to the extreme.  She had never sat the brothers together, nor requested for a note from DG to prove the settlement.  She had seen the need for something in writing when the Father divided the assets of DY and DW, and when DY made a gift to DG in 1993.  If her evidence was to be believed, the ungrateful DG was stealing an empire from DY.  It was impossible that neither DXH nor DY mentioned in any of their witness statement or affirmation this important “settlement” that might have barred DG from instituting this action.  DXH’s settlement without the approval of DY could not be explained by her slogan “親情大於錢情”. 

654. I find DXH’s transfers of substantial funds and 6 properties to DG without DY’s approval to be reflective of her recognition of DG’s ownership and her role as DG’s nominee. There was no settlement as she alleged.  Nor could the alleged plot by DG’s gang be believed.

655. The more likely scenario, which I accept, was that DG found DXH to be getting greedy.  She had been warned by Tam Kwan Yip in 2006 and 2007 against transfer of funds from Bading, Citigroup Property Management Company or unused credit funds of Hong Kong First and unrelated companies into her personal account but she said she would account to the big boss, DG.  Therefore DG gradually got back all his assets, including the 6 properties.

AB. 2010: THE IMPUGNED TRANSFERS IN MAY

656. The shares of Hong Kong First were secretly transferred out of Macau First into the names of DY and DXH in May 2010.  DXH and DY deposited HK$5m cash into Macau First to create a charade that consideration had been provided, but retrieved the cash immediately. 

657. DXH did not instruct Tam Kwan Yip to deal with transfer of shares.  She claimed, twice, that he did not have such power, which was untrue.  She claimed that her solicitor had not explained to her and DY that the consideration must be commensurate with the value of the shares.  Her solicitor did not even tell her to sue DG. 

658. If DY was the true owner, there was no reason why he dared not seek return of his assets by legal action.  There was not even a demand letter before action.  There was also no reason why he needed to provide money consideration.  The alleged advice by the Hong Kong solicitor was incredible.

659. I reject DY and DXH’s evidence.  The irresistible inference is that DY and DXH did not want DG to know about the transfer.  Secrecy was a badge of fraud.

AC. SUMMARY OF OVERALL FINDINGS OF FACTS

660. In the early 1990s when the per capita income of Shanghai was RMB 3,000 per annum.  DY had already prospered in his steel business.  The first pot of gold was clearly earned by DY.

661. The wealth of DG was much, much lower.  He was a sole proprietor in the transportation business. His sole proprietorship had no physical presence, no license, no office, no staff, no bank account and did not have to pay tax.  He had not accumulated wealth in the early 1990s to be able to set up Purao, increase its capital or set up Dingtai.  Nor did he have reason to set up Purao.  His case on the Luyin shares was a pack of lies.  He had blatantly lied to boost his case on early accumulation of wealth.

662. DY set up 3 Hainan Companies (2 with DW) to obtain tax benefits in Hainan.  The total capital injection for these 3 companies was RMB 16m.

663. In 1992/1993,DY and DW were buying vehicles and properties, whether in their own names or in the name of Haikou Materials.  Zhongyou building in Shanghai was bought in this period which was used as residence of the Ding family and office of Haikou Nanzhou.  DG and SXP were employees of Haikou Nanzhou.

664. In April 1993, DY paid RMB 1m to set up Purao. He was the real owner of Purao.

665. By then, the wealth of DY and DW was such as to prompt the Father to suggest dividing up assets between them and make a gift to the youngest brother DG.  The Property Division Agreement and Gift Agreement, both dated 6/6/1993, were genuine documents made at the direction of the Father. DY did make a gift of RMB 2m to DG.  DG was most shameless in denying DY’s financial assistance to him in the early 1990s and claiming to be the real owner of Purao.

666. In October, 1993, DY put up RMB 10m (RMB 5m cash and RMB 5m stock-in-trade) to increase the capital of Purao. 

667. One month later, in November 1993, DY put up RMB 10m (RMB 3.8m cash and another RMB 6.2m stock-in-trade) for setting up Dingtai.  DY was the real owner of this company.   Just the stock-in-trade of Dingtai for 1993 was over RMB 150m.

668. By 1996/97 DY lost all his wealth through speculation in futures.  He brought substantial losses to Dingtai.  Dingtai owed No.2 Market about RMB 8.5m by 1996 and Qinpu about RMB 670,000. DY was untraceable. He abandoned Zhongyou Building in 1998.  He had to live in very modest accommodation at 華高一村in 1999 purchased by the Father.  He did not have the RMB 50-60m wealth as he claimed.

669. It was through DG’s effort that the debts of Dingtai were fully repaid to the No.2 Market and Qinpu by 2002.

670. As a result of DY’s mismanagement of Dingtai, he executed the undated DY/Dingtai LoA in late 1996/1997 to surrender control of Dingtai to DG, although DY remained trading in steel in Dingtai.  DG also obtained possession of the personal chops of DY and Jiang Wen.

671. In 1997, it was DG who negotiated for acquisition of the Land, signed the SPA and related Memoranda dated 26/3/1997 and 25/7/1997 with the undated DY/Dingtai LoA and raised 30% of the Land premium all without the need for authorization of DY.  He pledged his car and property worth RMB 500,000 as guarantee for repayment to borrow the Deposit from No.2 Market.

672. DY had done some steel business through Dingtai but it was trading at a loss and unlikely to have contributed to the Land premium.

673. DG set up Bading to hold and develop the Land. He found Chen and, through him, the Foreign Investors.  I am not satisfied that the Shenhong Agreement or Kwong Fat Letter of Intent produced by DY were genuine or that Shenhong or Kwong Fat were ever potential investors found by DY.

674. While DW and DY might have signed on some of the documents of Bading, it was DG and Chen who could have finalized the terms of those documents.  Huangteng of Balin gave the Balin LoA to DG which was then in control of Dingtai to handle all the matters relating to the establishment of the joint venture company to develop the Land.

675. The Railway Companies belonged to DG but they had not been profitable, nor had they contributed in any substantial way to the purchase of the Land or funding of the Project.  DG had deliberately presented false evidence to bolster his case.

676. In 2000, when Dingtai was privatized, it increased its capital to RMB 100m.  DY had contributed to the increase by obtaining short-term loans of RMB 70m for Dingtai from Zhongfu, through his connection with Bai. The source of the rest of the 20% was probably from borrowings through DG.  DY’s equity was reduced to 45% (being 25% in his own name and another 20% through his shareholding in Shangrao Sanxin).  He remained, on the surface, the legal representative, chairman and general manager of Dingtai until 2003.  DG was the majority beneficial owner of Dingtai.

677. In 1997, Puding was set up.  With funds flowing through Puding, in 2000, the Shangrao Companies and Shanghai Holding Companies were companies set up.  These were all DG’s companies.  They did not have independent business to earn profits so as to fund their own capital or the Land premium and acquisition of Foreign Investors’ interests.

678. In 2000, when 上海申鑫 acquired 20% shareholding of Bading from Goodway, DG obtained full control over Bading by being its legal representative in place of Chen and possessing its company seal without any protest from DY.  The compelling inference was that DG has always been and regarded by DY as the real boss of Dingtai that held interest in Bading.

679. In the construction of the Tower, DG signed the important documents, attended all the ceremonies and important meetings, selected the architect and design of the Tower, decided the main contractor, negotiated and decided the terms of cooperation with Citigroup, dealt with changes to town planning conditions, and approved expenses of Bading.  DG also raised loans from ICBC, ABC and BOC.  What DY did was preliminary, relatively minor and subordinate to DG.

680. DY and 鍾敏敏 were involved in the initial stage of the changes to town planning matters but it was DG who issued Bading’s application for the changes to construction limit.

681. DY raised the loan of RMB 80m from Huaxia Bank, having first obtained the undertaking from Shanghai Electricity.  However, DY had lied and collaborated with his witnesses in claiming that he had arranged the loans of RMB 19m and RMB 29m for the Shanghai Holding Companies through Qin Wei.

682. DY had no control over Bading.  The Bai Incident was a pack of lies.  DG’s appointment as legal representative of Bading clearly had nothing to do with the Bai Incident, and was not the result of DY’s decision.  It was the natural consequence of DG being in real control of Bading.

683. Bading underwent restructuring in between 2000 and 2003.  After buying out the last Foreign Investors on 12/12/2003, the Bading shares were held by Dingtai (40%), 上海申鑫(20%), 上海鼎興 (15%) and Macau First Investment holding Lee Tung (25%). 

684. By then, with regard to Dingtai, DG had removed DY’s title as legal representative of Dingtai on 31/1/2003 because DY earned secret commission of RMB millions from the Zhongfu loans and caused loss to Dingtai.  DY was replaced by DXH and later YXA as legal representative.  DY’s shares were transferred to DXH.  DG’s control of Dingtai was evidenced by the notarized DXH’s Dingtai LoA executed in his favour on 15/6/2004 subsequently.  DXH executed it without reference to DY and she knew the contents.

685. The Shanghai Holding Companies were at different stages held by DG, individuals acting as DG’s nominees or the Shangrao Companies.  In turn, the shareholding of the Shangrao Companies was held by individuals acting as DG’s nominees without DY’s knowing.  The nominees were closer to DG than DY.  They had confirmed their nomineeship in writing.  DY’s description of the Shangrao Companies and Shanghai Holding Companies as bridging companies whose historical mission was completed and that their shares lacked commercial value was untrue.

686. DG’s control of the Shanghai Holding Companies was evidenced respectively by the notarized DXH’s Shenxin LoA dated 15/6/2004, and Zhujia’s LoA concerning上海鼎興dated 19/12/2003 executed in DG’s favour.  DXH’s LoAs were executed without reference to DY.  She well knew the contents of them.  Zhujia’s LoA was genuine and not forged.

687. With regard to Lee Tung, the consideration for the Lee Tung Acquisition was RMB 150m, being (a) RMB 149.99m for the value of 25% Bading shares held by Lee Tung; and (b) MOP 10,000 for the value of Lee Tung as a corporate vehicle.

688. The Lee Tung Acquisition was negotiated and concluded by DG and Chen.  DY had simply no power to make the decision on acquisition.  He had no knowledge as to how the consideration for the Lee Tung Acquisition was decided.  He had not taken part in it except to execute the Lee Tung Agreement on behalf of Macau First on the instructions of DG.

689. On 7/2/2004, at a time when the Tower was only a few months away from completion, DXH knowingly and voluntarily executed the DXH Gift Agreement.  The DXH and SXP Gift Agreements were notarized by 陳加友.  DXH and SXP did so to acknowledge DG’s ownership of the assets stated therein and their nominee status.

690. For 6 years after execution of the 2 Gift Agreements, DY had done nothing to assert his ownership over Bading or other companies holding interests in Bading.

691. The initial capital of Hong Kong First had likely come from DG.  The capital of Macau First was not paid up.  DY held 5% shares in Hong Kong First and Macau First respectively when they were first set up, without any acknowledgement of nomineeship signed by DY.

692. By a series of transfers, Hong Kong First became sole owner of Bading.

693. The HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers took place in 2006 which had the effect of making Macau First the ultimate owner of Bading.  DY knew about the HKF Allotment and the 2006 Transfers when they were executed.  He signed the resolutions and transfer documents without protest or reservation because he knew that DG was the true beneficial owner of shares in Bading, Hong Kong First and Macau First.

694. DY transferred all of his Macau First shares to DG on 12/7/2006.  On 25/7/2006, DY resigned as a director of Hong Kong First just after Macau First had become the ultimate beneficial owner of Bading.

695. All of these events were carried out in an organized manner for the purpose of using Macau First as the ultimate holding company to hold his interest in Bading and to show his investors his ultimate ownership in the Land and the Tower.  DY and DXH all along knew that DG was the rightful owner of Bading and Hong Kong First and so they did all acts in accordance with DG’s directions.

696. DXH transferred substantial funds in Hong Kong First and properties under her name to DG without DY’s approval.  Viewed together with her voluntary execution of the DXH Gift Agreement, the transfer was highly indicative of her recognition of DG’s ownership and her role as his nominee. There was no settlement as she alleged.

697. The manner in which DY and DG applied for immigration to Australia reflected that DG was the real owner of Bading whereas DY was merely managerial staff, and that was also how DY viewed it.

698. The Impugned Transfers of shares of Hong Kong First out of Macau First into the names of DY and DXH in May 2010 were done secretly to avoid letting DG know.  No consideration was provided.

AD.  FINDINGS ON THE CLAIM IN BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

699. In his final submission, having abandoned his case on beneficial ownership in the Land and the Tower, Mr Chan SC submits that DY has had full beneficial ownership in shares of various companies, which I tabulate as follows:


Stage

Event

Nominee Owner

Beneficial Owner
1.Apr 1993: Setting up of PuraoShangrao CerealDY
2.Oct 1993: Increase in capital of PuraoShangrao CerealDY
3.Nov 1993: Setting up of DingtaiPuraoDY
4.July 1997: Dingtai held 40% of BadingDingtai/PuraoDY
5.June 2000: privatization of DingtaiFrom Purao to DY, SXP, 上饒三鑫DY
6.June 2000: increase in capital to RMB 100mDY, SXP, 上饒三鑫DY
7.Aug 2000: 2 Shanghai Holding Companies set up to acquire 35% of BadingDG, 上海申鑫, 上海鼎興DY
8.March 2003:
Bai Incident
Change from DY to DXHDY
9.Sept 2004: Hong Kong First set up to hold 100% BadingDY (5%) and DXH (95%)DY
10.June 2005: Hong Kong First acquired 25% of Bading from Lee TungNo changeNo change
11.Sept 2005: Hong Kong First acquired 55% shareholding in Bading, making a total of 80%No changeNo change
12.Jan 2006: Macau First establishedDG (85%), SXP (5%), DY (5%), DXH (5%)DY
13.February 2006: the HKF AllotmentMacau FirstDY
14.June 2006: Hong Kong First acquired 20% in Bading, making a total of 100%No changeNo change
15.July 2006: transfer of shares in Hong Kong First to Macau FirstMacau FirstDY

700. With respect to the 3 Questions in para 122 above, I find the answers to all of them to be “DY”,  However, contrary to Mr Chan SC’s submission, this is not dispositive of the whole action.  In any case, that is not DY’s pleaded case.

701. There might have been strange conduct on the part of DG, eg despite DY’s mismanagement of Dingtai, DG allowed DY to remain as a legal representative of Dingtai but only obtained the undated DY/Dingtai LoA from him.  He even allowed DY to become a director of Bading. When Dingtai was restructured, he permitted DY to hold about 45% equity (25% shares in DY’s name and 51% in the name of Shangrao Sanxin of which DY held 40%), worth about RMB 45m.  He only removed DY as a legal representative of Dingtai and his “hollow position” (虛職) in Bading in 2003 for earning secret commission.  However, DG still trusted DY and asked him to be his nominee in holding the 5% shares in Hong Kong First and Macau First in 2004 and 2006 respectively.  Throughout the whole period, DG never asked DY to sign something to acknowledge DG’s beneficial ownership. 

702. However, from the findings in Section AD above, one can see that DY’s case broke down in between stages 3 and 4 of the table in para 699 when DG had taken control of Dingtai. DY could not show that Dingtai was holding the Bading shares on trust for him.  DY was not able to show that every company set up thereafter up to stage 15 were beneficially owned by him.  I judged this from the angles of corporate ownership, nomineeship, control, timing and contribution.

703. In terms of corporate ownership,

(i) DY’s shareholding in Dingtai was cut down to at most 45% after its privatisation.  He could not explain why DG’s started to use his nominees.

(ii) DY had no idea as to how Puding, the Shangrao Companies and Shanghai Holding Companies came about and how they came to hold the shares in Bading.

(iii) There was no evidence that DY had personally paid up the registered capital of any of the Shanghai Holding Companies, Shangrao Companies and Macau First Investment.  Even on DY and DXH’s own evidence, the funds for setting up Hong Kong First were not paid by DY personally.  DY certainly did not pay for the HKF Allotment since he did not even know about it.  On DY’s case, the initial capital of Macau First was not even paid up.

(iv) DY gave over the shareholding in Dingtai to DXH for no valid explanation; the Bai Incident was disbelieved.

(v) DY never objected to the meagre 5% shareholding in Hong Kong First and Macau First, and the surrender of them to DG.

(vi) DY/DXH could not explain the HKF Allotment.  DY could not explain why he gave up Macau First at the point when it became full beneficial owner of Bading.

704. In terms of nomineeship, DG had consistently brought in nominees from his side since privatisation of Dingtai. All the nominees were closer to him than to DY. All his nominees acknowledged his ownership in writing. 

705. On the other hand, DY did not have similar nominees.  His alleged nominees, DXH and Zhujia, were disbelieved.  DXH acted more consistently with her being DG’s nominee, without the need to inform DY.  There was nothing in Mr Chan SC’s closing submission to explain away the DXH Gift Agreement or why DXH should not be held to it.  The Mother’s nomineeship was not decisive.  She was as close to DG as to DY.  DY never asked any of his nominees to return assets to him.

706. In terms of control, DY never resumed control of Dingtai.  Unlike DG, he never had control over Bading.  In 2003, he gave up both his status as legal representative of Dingtai and directorship in Bading without reservation.  In relation to Hong Kong First, he did not even know about receipts of dividends from Bading, let alone control.  He resigned as a director of Hong Kong First shortly after Macau First became 100% shareholder of Hong Kong First for no valid explanation.  For 6 years since the HKF Allotment and up to the commencement of this action, DG (himself and through DXH) had been controlling Hong Kong First and Macau First and was receiving the dividends without account to DY. 

707. In terms of timing, 2003-2006 were critical years when DG took careful steps to remove all traces of DY’s control and shareholding in Dingtai and Bading.  DG bought out the last Foreign Investor in 2003, unifying all interests in Bading under his camp.  By 2004, DG got written acknowledgement from his nominees, specifically requiring DXH and SXP to sign Gift Agreements.  When the Tower was soon to complete, he set up Hong Kong First.  After the topping up ceremony of the Tower on 12/9/2005, he set up Macau First on 23/1/2006 to ensure that beneficial interests in Bading could be traceable to him.  He removed all traces of DY’s shareholding and directorship in Hong Kong First and Macau First in 2006.  All of these took place when litigation was not contemplated by anyone.

708. At least between 2006 and 2010, there had been ample opportunity for DY to assert his interests over Bading or other intervening companies, but he had not.

709. In terms of contribution, it was true that the Land was purchased in the name of Dingtai when the legal ownership of Dingtai was with DY.  What Bading had taken over was the Land but not Dingtai. The Land was not fully paid by then.  Dingtai or DY could not have afforded the purchase price of the Land.  DG’s case on how he funded the purchase price as pleaded in para 60(9)(d) of his Amended Reply had changed.  He put in minimal personal wealth as guarantee to borrow the Deposit.  The Railway Companies, Shangrao Companies and Shanghai Holding Companies did not have any or any substantial contribution to the Land premium. All the acquisition funds came from borrowing.  DG raised 30% of the purchase price without DY’s assistance.  He raised many substantial loans for Dingtai/Bading from many banks. 

710. Whilst DY had also raised funds and did something for the Project, DY’s conduct was not consistent with a real owner having had the first opportunity in his life to develop such an important piece of land.  The conduct of DG was not just that of an over zealous “driver” or even management staff looking after his brother’s interest.  The involvement of DG in the Project internally and externally was overwhelming whilst DY’s involvement was subject to the control of DG. 

711. DY was simply unable to rationalize his conduct from since 1996/7.  The irresistible inference from matters occurring thereafter could only be explained by the fact that both DG and DY held the common perception that DG instead of DY was the true owner of Bading and all subsequent companies. 

712. I am aware that a change in beneficial ownership of Dingtai is not the pleaded case of any party.  I remind myself that this case is not a contest between DY and DG as to who had raised loans for the Land or who had done more work in relation to the Project. Nor is it either party’s wish for this court to apportion the interests in any company.  The counterclaim is for DY to establish his 100% beneficial ownership in Hong Kong First and Macau First.  I find that even if Mr Chan SC’s proposition in para 699 above is legally viable, DY simply failed as a matter of fact to show that at every stage he has retained beneficial ownership in all the companies listed in the table.

713. Both DG and DY have lied.  However, the lies themselves did not mean necessarily that the entirety of their evidence was to be rejected: Lam Rogerio Sou Fung v Tan Soon Gin George, HCA 2576/2005, at §41.  DG has lied to bolster part of his case, especially for the period before the purchase of the Land. That was a wrong attempt but his actual case on ownership of Hong Kong First and Macau First remains good irrespective of his lies. 

AE. FINDINGS ON THE CLAIM AGAINST DXH AND dy

714. In making the Impugned Transfers, DXH had acted without authority of the board of directors or consent of DG, and breached her fiduciary duties as director of Macau First.  Effectively that stripped Macau First of its rights, amongst others, over the Land and the Tower in favour of DY and DXH.  No genuine consideration had ever been provided for the Impugned Transfers. 

715. Further, she has breached the self-dealing rule, ie that “if a trustee sells the trust property to himself, the sale is voidable by any beneficiary ex debito justitiae, however fair the transaction”, and that this rule applies to not only trustee but also other persons of fiduciary character: Lewin on Trust (18th ed.) §§ 20-63, 20-84.

716. Likewise, the transfer to DY was also liable to be set aside on the basis of the “fair-dealing rule” as DY could not show that the transfer was at arm’s length and a fair dealing of Macau First’s assets,: Lewin on Trust (18th ed.) §20-62; Newgate v Penfold [2004] EWHC 2993 at §§242-244.

717. I find that DY knew that the Impugned Transfer in favour of himself was made without his being entitled to the shares in Hong Kong First.  DY clearly knew that that Impugned Transfer to him was in breach of DXH’s duties as directors of Macau First and nominee of DG.  No consideration was provided.  He and DXH were holding the Hong Kong First shares on constructive trust for Macau First.  See J.J. Harrison (Properties) Limited v Harrison [2001] EWCA Civ 1467, at §§25-26; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 699 at 705C-G, 707B-F, 716C‑D.

AF.  CONCLUSION

718. There was other evidence in this case.  It is impractical to set out in detail all the evidence from the 60 trial bundles.  Suffice to say that I have considered all the evidence.  What has not been set out here, however decided, would not have affected the big picture.

719. DY fails to establish the existence of the HKF Trust and MF Trust for lack of proof of an agreement/trust arrangement.  The HKF Allotment, the 2006 Transfers and his resignation as director of Hong Kong First also excludes any possibility of trusts.  The trust claim also fails as a matter of law for violating the reflective loss principle.

720. DY’s claim in beneficial ownership fails as a matter of fact.  He has failed to discharge the burden of proof that he was 100% beneficial owner of Hong Kong First and Macau First and all intervening companies since he handed over control of Dingtai to DG.  DG was the real ultimate beneficial owner of Macau First. 

721. Accordingly, the counterclaim is dismissed. Judgment should be entered for Macau First.

722. Costs should follow the event and be to the plaintiff.  However, there had been 2 days on which DG sought, belatedly to adduce further witness statements but his applications were rejected.  Costs of the hearing on those 2 days should be borne by DG, to be set off against costs in his favour.  I make an order nisi on costs accordingly.

723. This is a complex case of facts that justified the use of 2 solicitors for the trial.  Ms Chiang of LCP should be allowed a rate of $4,500 and a more junior solicitor at the rate of $3,000.

724. The case justifies certificates for 3 counsel only – Mr Tong SC, Mr Anson Wong (now SC), and Ms Ho. This is entirely without disrespect to Mr Lawrence Cheung who has shown admirable efforts throughout all interlocutory applications and at the trial.

725. For costs reserved at the PTR, I make an order for the grant of certificates for only one junior counsel as those PTRs were in the nature of checklist hearings and counsel had not advanced the case in the sense of assisting the court in narrowing down issues.

AG  ORDERS

726. I grant declarations as follows:

(1) That the purported transfers of the shares in the 3rd defendant from the plaintiff to the 1st and 2nd defendants made on 19 May 2010 are null and void and are hereby set aside.

(2) That the shares in the 3rd defendant registered in the names of the 1st and/or 2nd defendants are respectively held by each of them on constructive trust for the plaintiff.

I further order that:

(3) The 1st and 2nd defendants do forthwith take all necessary steps and execute all necessary documents to transfer all the shares in the 3rd defendant registered in their respective names to the plaintiff or such nominee duly appointed by the plaintiff.

(4) There be an account and inquiry to ascertain all such monies or benefits which have been paid or accrued to the 1st and 2nd defendants by virtue of their being the registered holders of the shares in the 3rd defendant.

(5) That the 1st and 2nd defendants do pay to the plaintiff such sums found due from them upon the taking of such account and/or making of such inquiry.

(6) Damages and/or equitable compensation in respect of the 1st defendant’s breach of fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.

(7) Interests are to be paid by the 1st and 2nd defendants to the plaintiff at judgment rate on such sums found due from them

(8) The counterclaim is dismissed.

(9) I make an order nisi that costs should follow the event and be to the plaintiff, except that the plaintiff should bear 2 days’ costs of the defendants to be set off against costs awarded to the plaintiff.

(10) On a nisi basis, there shall be certificates for Mr Tong SC, Mr Anson Wong and Ms Sabrina Ho.

(11) I make an order nisi that there be costs to 2 of the plaintiff’s solicitors for the trial.  

(12) Costs reserved at the PTRs should, on a nisi basis, be to the plaintiff, with certificate for one junior counsel and one solicitor at each hearing.

(13) On a nisi basis, the applicable rate for Ms Chiang of LCP should be allowed at $4,500 and a more junior solicitor at the rate of $3,000.

727. I deeply thank both teams of counsel for their able assistance.  I thank them for thinking at every step along the trial of how best to assist the court by preparing core bundles of only relevant documents for their opening and closing submissions.  It saved me a lot of trouble from ploughing through 60 trial bundles. 

728. A special note of thanks to all the junior counsel who, though not having made much oral address, have throughout the trial rendered able and active assistance not only to their leaders but also the court. 

729. I also thank the solicitors for having prepared bundles in a comprehensible way.  My thanks are extended to Messrs King & Wood (specially Ms Ritz Yeung) and Messrs Orrick (specially Mr Samuel Ngo), former solicitors for the defendants who have spent great efforts in preparation of affirmations in the receivership proceedings and some of the witness statements in this case.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Ronny Tong, SC leading Mr Anson Wong, Mr Lawrence Cheung and Ms Sabrina Ho, instructed by LCP, for the plaintiff (by original action) and defendants (by counterclaim)

Mr Warren Chan, SC leading Mr MC Law, instructed by Dexter Lam & Co, for the defendants (by original action) and plaintiff (by counterclaim)



[1] [C3/602 2nd affirmation §8]

(9) [1982] Ch 204

(10) [1925] AC 619

[2] “自籌資金,自立項目在上海設立獨立的上海浦饒物產工貿公司”,“屬全民所有制性質,實行獨立核算,自負盈虧”,“在滬的所有資產和分支機構及再生公司的一切情況及債權債務均與[上饒糧油]無關”

[3] See further under Section J6 on this bank account.

[4] See further under Section J6.

[5] In 1995, the capital of Purao was reduced to RMB 2m.  Business shrank.  In 1998, Shangrao Cereal was terminated.  In 1999, tax liabilities were cleared. In 2003, DY used 華林鋼材公司to terminate Purao, using his father in law as a guarantor. 

[6] He said at the trial that the date of the burglary was not 9/12/2010 as stated in §7.3 of his 2nd supplemental witness statement.

[7] [D2/tab71/201, 227]

[8] [B2/tab44/617]  These were the properties listed in §3.1.1 and the first property in §3.1.2 of the witness statement of DW.

[9] [B2/tab44/618] These were properties set out in §§3.1.3 and 3.1.5 of the witness statement of DW.

[10] Such policy was later codified in Art.70 of the Company Law of the Mainland. 

[11] ie, his personal savings, borrowings, revenue from the railway redevelopment project and profits of 3 Shangrao companies and Shanghai Puding.

Please refer to CACV190/2014 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

82151-EN-2012-04-25

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAO HONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)Plaintiff
 

and

 
 DING XIAO HONG(丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU(丁育)2nd Defendant
HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 (by original action)
 
 DING YU(丁育)Plaintiff

and

 DING GANG(丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED(澳門第一環球國際有限公司) 2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 25 April 2012
Date of Decision: 25 April 2012

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

 

1. The central dispute concerns the reasonableness of the date of expiry in the bank guarantee.

2. Having heard the arguments, I am of the view that the date of 31 December 2014 is wholly unrealistic.  Even taking judgment to be handed down at the end of 2013 and Ding Gang (“DG”) wins, the enforcement of the undertaking as to damages may take time and may be in the form of another trial.  To allow a mere one year for DG to do so is unrealistic and could be oppressive.  

3. In my view, a more realistic estimation will be 6 years after the date of judgment, assuming that to be the end of 2013.  This will cater for the need for trial on the issue of damages under the Receivership Order and possible taxation proceedings arising thereafter.  I do not think having heard Mr Tong, SC, that the period of an appeal to the Court of Appeal or Court of Final Appeal should be taken into account, because if Ding Yu (“DY”) is the appellant, and he wants to keep the Receivership Order pending appeal, certainly he has to make the necessary application, renew his undertaking as to damages and provide an even greater amount in fortification.  But if DG is the appellant and it is he who wants to have an interim Receivership Order, he may be the person giving the undertaking as to damages pending the appeal.  I regard it as wrong in principle for DY as the winning party to provide security under a Receivership Order that will be discharged by then pending DG’s appeal.

4. I have considered the further question of whether or not to order DY to pay cash into court or extend the validity of his bank guarantee.  In so doing, I have taken into account the fact that I have initially given DY an option in my Fortification Order. There appears to be no problem about the terms of guarantee save as to the expiry date.

5. On the other hand, in my view, DY has not properly exercised his option in the sense that he had not discussed with DG before exercising the option thereby generating the present hearing.

6. The parties are already plagued with interlocutory applications thus far.  To avoid unnecessary arguments, I therefore order DY to pay the 2 tranches of security by cash into court, the first tranch to be paid within 14 days.  Pending the payment, the current bank guarantee shall not be revoked.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Receivership Order shall subsist.  There shall be liberty to apply.

(Discussion on costs)

7. There will be a short hearing on 27 April 2012 on summary assessment.  Costs of the application be to DG, with certificate for two counsel.  Costs of the Receivers also to be borne by DY.  All the receiving parties are to give their costs statement to DY within today.  And the grounds of objection are to be lodged by tomorrow.

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Ronny Tong, SC leading Mr Anson Wong and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by LCP, for the plaintiff (by original action) and defendants (by counterclaim)

Mr Rimsky Yuen, SC leading Mr M C Law, instructed by Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, for the defendants (by original action) and plaintiff (by counterclaim)

Mr Calvin Chow of P C Woo & Co, for the Receivers

80736-EN-2012-03-07

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 992 OF 2010

_______________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDPlaintiff
 

and

 
 DING XIAOHONG1st Defendant
 DING YU2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED3rd Defendant
 (by original action)

 
 DING YUPlaintiff

and

 DING GANG1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

_______________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 3 and 4 January 2012

Date of Decision: 7 March 2012

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

1.  There are 5 summonses before me:

A.  By DG and Macau First for an order that the Receivership Order be discharged or replaced by less intrusive and more economical means to preserve the status quo, or that the Receivers be replaced by someone else (“the Discharge Summons”); (Paras 27 to 120 below)

B.  By DG and Macau First for an order to stay the execution of the Receivership Order pending appeal (“the Stay Summons”); (Paras 121 to 140 below)

C.  By DG and Macau First for an order that DY fortifies his undertaking as to damages, failing which the Receivership Order be discharged and replaced by less intrusive and more economical means to preserve the status quo (“the Fortification Summons”); (Paras 141 to 160 below)

D.  By the Receivers for directions and sale of properties (“the Receivers’ Summons”); (Paras 161 to 202 below)

E.  By DG and Macau First prohibiting the Receivers from bringing legal proceedings against DG (“the Prohibition Summons”)(Paras 203 to 215 below)

All abbreviations (unless otherwise defined) follow those in my previous decisions in this case.  A deponent’s affirmation is described by a number in brackets after his name.  All references to Reports are to those filed by the Receivers.

BACKGROUND

2.  Before analyzing each of the summons, it will be useful to outline the important events in the development of these proceedings and analyze a central theme in DG’s applications. 

2.7.2010 Ex parte injunction by Au J against DXH, DY and Hong Kong First, restraining them from, amongst others, dealing with shares of Hong Kong First and restraining Hong Kong First from taking steps to replace Yu Xiaan (“YXA”) as legal representative of Shanghai Bading.
9.7.2010 Order of Suffiad J, by consent, whereby Hong Kong First shall not remove or replace YXA as legal representative of Shanghai Bading (“the Consent Order”)
8-10.2.2011 Hearing of DY’s summons for appointment of receivers and managers (“the February hearing”).
10.3.2011 Decision appointing the Receivers (“the March Decision”).
10.3.2011 Receivership Order to preserve the assets of Hong Kong First and Macau First pending trial.
7.4.2011 Decision dismissing DG’s summons for interim stay pending substantive hearing of an application for (i) interim stay, and (ii) variation and clarification of the Receivership Order (“the April Decision”).
19.5.2011 Decision dismissing DG’s applications for adjournment, stay pending appeal, variation and clarification of the Receivership Order and leave to appeal (“the May Decision”).  The issue of whether the Receivership Order superceded the Consent Order and whether the Receivership Order should be expressly clarified to be so (“the Issue”) was reserved for argument.
26.7.2011 The Issue was argued. Court considered itself functus and declined to vary the Receivership Order (“the July Decision”).
20.9.2011 Receivers’ 4th Report setting out DG’s non-compliance of the Receivership Order.
23.9.2011 The Court of Appeal granted DG leave to appeal against the Receivership Order.
28.9.2011 The Court of Appeal’s reasons for granting leave to appeal (“the CA’s Decision”).
28.9.2011 DG’s notice of appeal filed.
30.9.2011 Receivers’ Summons.
10.10.2011 CMC.  Trial dates fixed for March to May 2013.
11.10.2011 DG’s Stay Summons.
12.10.2011 DG’s Discharge Summons.
12.10.2011 DG’s Fortification Summons.
13.10.2011 Call over hearing of the 4 Summonses.
23.12.2011 DG’s Prohibition Summons.
3-4.1.2012 Hearing.

3.  DG is not resident in Hong Kong but submitted to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Court.  He gave a personal undertaking not to dispose of the assets of Hong Kong First and Shanghai Bading, including Citigroup Tower on the basis that he was the real and only beneficial owner.  It was upon his undertaking and that of DY that the Consent Order was made.  

4.  At the time of the February hearing, DG was aware that appointment of receivers would necessarily lead to a change in legal representative and management of Shanghai Bading (para 84 of the March Decision). However, his then legal team did not take the point that the Consent Order prevented the removal of YXA as legal representative upon making of a Receivership Order.  The arguments that a Hong Kong court had no jurisdiction to make receivership order over a Mainland entity or that a receivership order was not recognized in the Mainland were not raised either.

5.  After the Receivership Order was made, DG changed his solicitors (to Herbert Smith) and senior counsel (Mr Manzoni QC).  He sought leave to appeal, applied for interim stay of execution and variation and clarification of the Receivership Order.  It was raised for the first time that the Consent Order was binding on the parties and YXA could not be removed.  The interim stay application failed.

6.  At the main hearing for stay of execution and the variation and clarification, DG changed yet to another firm of solicitors (the current firm, LCP) and senior counsel (Mr Tong SC) on the ground that the previous solicitors have charged exorbitant fees.  Mr Ronny Tong SC, then appearing for DG, applied for adjournment and orally advanced different grounds of appeal.  The applications failed. 

7.  Upon hearing arguments on the Issue, I have declined to expressly hold that the Consent Order was superseded by the Receivership Order, because I considered myself functus and the matter should be left for argument on appeal (paras 4 , 11 and 12 of the July Decision).  The net position is that both the Consent Order and the Receivership Order remained in force pending the appeal.

8.  DG then applied to Court of Appeal for leave to appeal and was granted leave.  He then took out the present series of summonses.

9.  In the meantime, DG openly flouted the Receivership Order.  Not only DG but the Macanese lawyer acting for Macau First, YXA and Chen Zhi-Quang (“CZQ”) the legal representative of the Management Company also refused to recognize the effect of the Receivership Order and would not cooperate with the Receivers.  DG did everything he could to obstruct the implementation of the Receivership Order.  (There will be more concrete examples when I discuss the Receivers’ Summons below.)

10.  Because of DG’s obstructive stance over the past 9 months the Receivers had to take a circuitous approach (Yen (6) and 4th Report) to try and implement the Receivership Order.  They could only have one meeting with DG and one with YXA and CZQ.  They are still unable to gain control of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company. They are able to achieve very little in terms of collection of books and assets or ascertain the true financial position, other than what DG and YXA chose to reveal to the Receivers in their affirmations.

11.  The central theme to the behaviour of DG and his Summonses has been that the Consent Order was binding on the parties so that YXA could not be removed as a legal representative and the Receivers who purported to do so acted in breach of the Consent Order (“the central theme”).  In reliance on this, DG claims that the Court of Appeal “accepted” that he had strong grounds of appeal.

The central theme

12.  This central theme reflected a shift in DG’s stance as regards YXA from time to time.  Before the Receivership Order was made, he claimed that he was the sole beneficial owner and that YXA was a trusted nominee appointed by him (DG (11)).  YXA has even previously granted a letter of authorization in favour of DG.  YXA obviously saw no problem in “delegating” “his” responsibilities and his alleged duty as legal representative to DG.  DG was the person who exercised the powers as the legal representative and had de facto control over Shanghai Bading (DG (1), (3), (6)).  Retention of YXA as a legal representative was clearly inseparable from DG’s claimed beneficial ownership of Shanghai Bading.

13.  After the Receivership Order and the April Decision, on 20.4.2011, Herbert Smith claimed that DG had lost control over YXA.  The PRC lawyers asked about the letter of authorization.  To that simple question, Herbert Smith had no answer (meeting memo dated 20.4.2011).  On 27.4.2011, Herbert Smith informed the Receivers that DG was willing to remove YXA as legal representative.  DG was even willing to facilitate the Receivers’ visit to the office, inspect books and arrange an interview with YXA.

14.  DG later reneged in July 2011 after instructing the present team of lawyers (although one junior counsel has remained unchanged ever). 

15.  During submission at this hearing, Mr Tong SC would not commit himself when I asked him whether YXA was “neutral”.  He said YXA was acting in the interests of the company, not taking sides with DG or DY. 

16.  However, the undeniable fact is that since the commencement of the receivership, DG has been the only one who could get in touch with YXA.  He was able to procure YXA to file affirmations in support and disclose information which YXA claims it would be against PRC law to disclose to the Receivers.  DG offered to give the undertakings in DG (10) to provide monthly management reports of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company (collectively “the PRC Companies”) in place of receivership.  Apparently, DG has the backup of YXA and CZQ to meet that undertaking. YXA was anything but “neutral” or “not taking sides”. 

17.  Whatever emphasis DG wants to put on the Consent Order to his liking, the Consent Order, at best, affects only one power of the Receivers under para 4(7) of the Receivership Order to prevent the removal of YXA as a legal representative of only Shanghai Bading, but not CZQ as legal representative of the Management Company.

18.  DG has also overlooked an important paragraph in the Receivership Order:

“6. Each of the Defendants by counterclaim [i.e. DG and Hong Kong First] do within 14 days from the date hereof give the Receivers all such information and/or documents concerning the Companies and/or Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company, their promotion, formation, businesses, dealings, affairs or properties to the Receivers.”

Paragraph 6 of the Receivership Order imposes personal obligations on DG and Hong Kong First, whether or not YXA remains as a legal representative.  Apart from handing over title deeds of Citigroup Tower, DG has not done much in furtherance of these obligations.  Any arguments on the Consent Order, if successful, would exempt DG from compliance with one part of para 4(7), but not the other parts of the Receivership Order.

Strong grounds of appeal?

19.  Mr Tong SC submits that in granting leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal “accepted” (para 31 of CA’s Decision) that the Consent Order represented a true contract between the parties such that it may not be set aside unless one of the grounds for invalidating or varying a contract was established.  The Court of Appeal was further of the view that the concept of receivership was not recognized in Mainland China (para 33 of CA’s Decision).  It may exercise the discretion afresh.

20.  With respect to Mr Tong SC, all that the Court of Appeal did was to express preliminary views as the test was only one of reasonable prospect of success (para 29 of CA’s Decision).  DG merely satisfied the minimum requirement for leave to appeal.  It was far from saying that the CA has accepted his views on the merits.

21.  Given the background set out in paras 3 to 18 above, I doubt if the appeal based on the central theme was on strong grounds.  I agree with Ms Sit that the Consent Order was not a “true contract” and not intended to be so.  It would only last till trial or further order.  It did not determine the action one way or another.  Whether DG or DY wins after trial, it can never be suggested that the winner cannot ever remove YXA as a legal representative and if he does so, the loser could sue him for breach of “contract”. The Consent Order contained a provision for “liberty to apply” and that must have been attached to the removal or non-removal of YXA.  Being interlocutory in nature, the court’s jurisdiction over the Consent Order cannot be ousted by the consent of the parties: Yuk Wah Ho v Gao Jiaren, [1999] 3 HKLRD 862; Zuckerman on Civil Procedure : Principles of Practice, 2nd ed, 22.50 to 22.52.  DG and his first team of lawyers contemplated the need to remove YXA.  Their stance was consistent with the lack of reliance on the Consent Order to resist the receivership application at the February hearing.

22.  As for the Court of Appeal’s preliminary view that the concept of receivership was not recognized in Mainland China, para 33 of CA’s decision must be understood in the proper context.  Mr Chan SC draws to my attention that the point was not raised in the arguments at the hearing before the Court of Appeal and DG did not even rely on it in his notice of appeal.  It was raised for the first time in the CA’s Decision itself.  In any case, at the February hearing, the court was not asked to impose a receivership order directly against Shanghai Bading or the Management Company (collectively “the PRC Companies”) but to exercise a personam jurisdiction over DG and the Companies which have submitted to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong, directing them to comply with a receivership order : McDonald v Golden Dynasty Enterprises Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 569.

23.  Viewed in the light of paras 19-22, I am unable to agree that DG has strong grounds of appeal.

A preliminary point on contempt

24.  At this stage, I will add that Mr Chan SC for DY takes a preliminary point that DG, having failed indisputably to comply with the Receivership Order, is in contempt of court and should not be heard on his summonses.  He relies on a decision of mine in K& L Gates v Navin Kumar Aggarwal, unrep, HCA 1061/2011, 18.8.2011.

25.  With respect to Mr Chan SC, I do not think the circumstances in K&L Gates v Navin Humar Aggarwal are comparable to the present case.  There, the defendant had admitted stealing the plaintiff’s money and he has not begun to demonstrate that he had an arguable defence.  The same comment cannot be made of DG where he seeks to put forth defences to alleged non-compliance with the Receivership Order and applies to have it overturned.  The court should not refuse to hear a person when the purpose of his application is to appeal against the very order disobedience to which has put him in contempt.  This is necessary to satisfy considerations of fairness.  See Motorola Credit Corporation v Uzan (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 113, at para 48-53.  Accordingly I have proceeded to hear full arguments from DG.

26.  Against the above backdrop, I consider the applications now before me.  I have considered all the evidence, the background materials and Receivers’ Reports.  In the following analyses, I follow the heads of complaint of DG and the Receivers for ease of reference.

A. THE DISCHARGE SUMMONS

27.  DG relies on the following grounds:

A1. The original appointment should not have been made since DY has fabricated evidence in support of his application.

A2. The Receivers are guilty of actual or apparent bias.

A3. The Receivers are guilty of misconduct in that they have failed to act lawfully or honourably;

A4. The Receivers are guilty of incurring exorbitant costs and thereby prejudice the interests of the parties.

If the Receivers are not discharged, DG asks that they be replaced or that there be alternative accounting duties.

Ground A1: DY’s fabrication of evidence

28.  There is no dispute as to principles.  The court will refuse to grant interlocutory relief, or set it aside if granted, if the applicant has not come to the court with clean hands.  It is no answer for the applicant to say that the court eventually did not accept or rely on that particular piece of evidence to make its decision.  This is because the applicant had tendered that piece of evidence with the expectation that the court would rely on it.

29.  One of the grounds on which the Receivership Order was granted was the evidence of attempted sale of 5/F of Citigroup Tower (para 47-55 of the March Decision).  Two pieces of evidence relied on by DY, (a) information from one Ms Chow (or Ms Zhou); and (b) investigator’s conversation with one Ms Shen, were allegedly fabricated.

30.  At the February hearing, Ms Zhou’s evidence was that she had seen an advertisement for sale of 5/F Citigroup Tower on the internet.  That triggered a recorded conversation between Ms Zhou and DY’s solicitor.

31.  As recorded in para 47 of the March Decision, Ms Zhou’s evidence emerged less than 2 weeks before the hearing.  The intervening Chinese New Year holidays left DG without a reasonable time to respond. Accordingly, DG was deprived of the chance to file evidence to contest the case put forth by DY in that aspect.  I had eventually held that Ms Zhou’s evidence alone was not sufficient to find attempted sale (para 49 of the March Decision).

32.  On 3.3.11, Ms Zhou was said to have given a statement completely refuting what she had told DY’s side but she refused to give evidence for DG.

33.  In September 2011, Ms Zhou changed her mind and affirmed effectively that she had been couched by DY; she never had any interest in the business and operation of the Citigroup Tower.  DG sought to adduce her evidence before the Court of Appeal but the Court of Appeal would not deal with it. 

34.  DY challenges the credibility of Ms Zhou, pointing out that she could not tell the truth since her father was working at Shanghai Bading.  For present purposes, I prefer YXA and CZQ’s direct evidence that Ms Zhou’s father did not work for the PRC Companies to DY’s hearsay evidence.

35.  Ms Zhou’s information given for the February hearing was in the form of question and answer between DY’s solicitor and her and not in narrative form.  I expressly took note of the fact that there had been no leading questions from the solicitor.  (para 49 of the March Decision)

36.  Even accepting that Ms Zhou was not willing to give a statement back in March, I find it hard to believe that she had just said anything that Uncle DY had told her to say to someone whom she was told was a lawyer without asking why.  It was especially astonishing when she “suspected” that the conversation was taped.  Without her evidence tested in the box, it is simply impossible to say that her latest version was true: San Want Media Holdings Ltd v Cha Mou Shing, unrep, HCA 317/2010, 30.4.2010,at para 142(3), per Barma J.  DG fails to discharge his burden of proof of fabrication of evidence.

37.  With regard to Ms Shen’s evidence, DG’s case is even weaker.  It is said that DY misled the court by omitting to transcribe some important words (underlined) towards the end of the recorded conversation between Ms Shen and the investigator: “关键是我们老板不想卖”.

38.  Well before the February hearing, the recording of the conversation between Ms Shen and the investigator was given to DG.  Shen’s statement was available within DG’s legal team.  His lawyers could have counterchecked the transcript against the recording. 

39.  During the course of the hearing, DG (4) was filed, emphasising the omitted words.

“17. … I have been informed by my legal advisers that while the conversations recorded in the audio recording produced by Ding Yu in support of this allegation are quite difficult to follow, it is nevertheless audibly clear from the video recording that our Ms Shen expressly told the investigator that Shanghai Bading had no intention to sell and that her boss (that is, me) had no intention to sell the remaining floors of the Citigroup Tower.”

40.  I do not think the omitted words were material. In any case the court was not misled because para 52 of the March Decision stated that Ms Shen made it clear that the boss was not keen to sell.  The omitted words would have strengthened my view but would not have altered it. 

41.  What is more important is that DG had not taken timely action to re-open the February hearing on the ground of fabrication or apply for discharge of the Receivership Order.  Mr Tong SC explains that when he first appeared before me in May 2011, he expressly told me that he did not have the papers so he was not able to make the application.  That might well be true.  But one must not forget that, prior to his involvement, Messrs Iu, Lai & Li already saw the importance of the new evidence.

42.  The statements of Ms Zhou and Ms Shen were available before handing down of the March Decision.  On 9.3.2011 (the day before handing down), Messrs Iu, Lai & Li, wrote to my clerk, enclosing, amongst others, those statements.  Messrs Iu, Lai & Li stated that they would take out an application very soon to re-open the hearing because of the false evidence presented by DY.  This court was asked to defer the handing down of the decision until after 14 March.  At that stage, I had declined reading that letter and the enclosures.  The March Decision was handed down on the following day.  What followed was a discussion on the terms of the draft receivership order.  DG missed the opportunity to re-open the arguments once, before the Receivership Order was perfected. 

43.  DG’s explanation was that the 1st of Shen’s statements had been delivered to Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li before the February hearing.  The 2nd Shen’s statement was only made on the last day of the hearing and hence there was no opportunity to submit it to the court for consideration.  DG was not told by Messrs Iu, Lai & Li why the 1st Shen’s statement was not used at the hearing.  His present legal team considers both Shen’s statements highly important in discrediting DY’s case and the allegations against DG repeatedly raised by the Receivers in their Reports.  Messrs Iu, Lai & Li has never been invited to comment on these. 

44.  Moreover, Messrs Herbert Smith and Mr Manzoni QC had no difficulty in laying hands on the papers before launching the applications for leave to appeal, stay, and variation and clarification.  They were “robust and fearless” in seeking to protect DG’s interest (para 7 of the May Decision).  So DG missed the opportunity to re-open the arguments a second time. 

45.  Litigation will have no end when a party can rely on change of legal representation to re-litigate issues or defer raising issues. 

46.  I am not satisfied that DY has fabricated evidence or omitted material evidence to justify discharge of the Receivership Order.  Nor should the Court allow DG to re-open arguments after he has missed 2 opportunities.  Ground A1 fails.

Ground A2 : Receivers’ actual or apparent bias

The legal principles on discharge of a receiver

47.  A receiver appointed by the court is an officer of the court who has to observe high standards of conduct:

A receiver appointed by the court is an officer of the court, and his powers and authority are derived from the court’s order.  A receiver, as an officer of the court, is subject to the general supervisory jurisdiction of the court.  He is not in any sense an agent or trustee of the party at whose instance the appointment is made.  An exacting standard of fair conduct and         high-mindedness is to be expected from a receiver as an officer of the court under the rule in Ex p James.  They are obliged not only to act lawfully but fairly and honourably.  The court is sensitive about the conduct of its officers and requires of them strict standards of conduct.  It requires any receiver appointed by the court to observe a high degree of equitable conduct.

Kwan: Company Law in Hong Kong (Insolvency), 2007,para 11.008.

48.  A receiver must act in accordance with principles of justice: Lightman and Moss on the Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies, 4th ed, para 29-011.

49.  A receiver has a fiduciary duty to protect and get in assets of the company: Kwan on Company Law in Hong Kong (Insolvency), 2007, para 11.11.

50.  Where he is appointed to manage the business, he should enable the business of the companies to be carried on in a way that enabled both parties to the dispute to be reasonably confident that neither was benefiting at the other’s expense, and that payments and receipts were in order and properly monitored.  Beatrice Tsang Sau Hing & anor v Yeung Man Loong Maxly & ors, HCCW49-52/2006, 7.1.2009, Brama J at para 69.

51.  A receiver is expected to act with commercial judgment:  Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell [1998] 1 BCC 324;Kwan on Company Law in Hong Kong (Insolvency), 2007, para 11.11.

52.  The court may discharge a receiver if it is just to do so, e.g. if the original appointment should not have been made or if default, misconduct or other ground for unfitness is shown: Lightman and Moss on the Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies, 4th ed, para 29-016. For instance, a receiver may be discharged if his conduct has been such as to impede the impartial course of justice as to amount to a gross dereliction of duty.  He may also be discharged for any default or misconduct of such a degree as will forfeit the confidence of the court or which is liable to prejudice the interests of the parties: Kwan on Company Law in Hong Kong (Insolvency), 2007, para 11.015; Picarda on The Law Relating to Receivers, Managers & Administrators, 4th ed, at 533-534; Mitchell v Condy [1873] WN 232.

53.  Assessment of default has to be justified and reasonable: Re Legend International Resorts Limited, HCCW1139/2004, 7.3.2011 at paras 32, 35, Fok JA (sitting as additional judge).  Where the receiver has honestly done his best but failed to discharge his duties by reason of their onerous and irksome nature, the court will be slow to condemn or discharge him: Re St George’ Estate (1887) 19 LRIr 566, at 567.

54.  If misconduct of a receiver is caused by the conduct of a party, that should not be visited upon the receiver: Kerr and Hunter on Receivers and Administrators, 19th ed, para 12-6.

55.  The court does not lightly remove its own officer and will, amongst other considerations, pay due regard to the impact of a removal on his professional standing and reputation: ReLegend International Resorts Limited, HCCW1139/2004, 7.3.2011, Fok JA (sitting as additional judge) at para 33.

56.  The onus of proof on an applicant will not be easy to discharge where the liquidator has become well acquainted with the business and affairs of the company.  Even if grounds for removal are made out, it is also necessary to take into account the disadvantages that would arise from the removal of the liquidator in terms of costs and delay: ReLegend International Resorts Limited, HCCW1139/2004, 7.3.2011, Fok JA (sitting as additional judge), at para 34.

57.  Mr Tong SC relies on the case of Beatrice Tsang Sau Hing & anor v Yueng Man Loong Maxly & ors, HCCW49-52/2006, 7.1.2009, Barma J, as an illustration of how the above principles applied to the removal of the provisional liquidators.  There, the learned judge expressly noted the difficult position in which the provisional liquidators found themselves, namely a complete breakdown in the relationship between the parties – the Tsangs and the Yeungs. The animosity and hostility between the 2 camps was such that it could be expected that almost any decision which had the appearance of taking the part of, or giving credence to the views of, one side rather than the other could be expected to provoke complaints from the other which felt that its interests had been neglected (para 28 of the judgment.)  The provisional liquidators sought funding from the Yeungs’ camp and operated the business through Yeung Senior’s personal accounts, and later through a company on terms involving commission to the Yeungs, without informing the Tsangs or seeking the sanction of the court. 

58.  Barma J recognized the need for prompt resolution by the provisional liquidators in the circumstances (para 63).  The decision to give the Yeungs a commission could have been commercially justified on the basis that some such arrangements would eventually have to be entered into.  There was no suggestion that the course adopted has necessarily caused loss to the companies.  It may be that all funds passing through the personal accounts of Yeung Senior and later through Yeung’s company, have been accounted for.  It may prove to be the case that the amount of additional expense was insignificant.  Still the Court considered that the provisional liquidators had acted in a way that compromised their function and caused one party to lose confidence in them (para 69). The provisional liquidators had forgone the monitor they would otherwise have over the receipts and payments.  They benefited the Yeungs at the expense of the Tsangs.

59.  The learned judge also weighed the removal of the provisional liquidators from office against the disadvantages that might arise as a result of the removal.  Such disadvantages included the additional cost and expense that would arise as the result of the introduction of new liquidators, and any other disadvantages that might arise to the orderly conduct of the liquidation.  Barma J did not consider the perceived disadvantages as sufficient to tip the balance in favour of retention of the provisional liquidators as liquidators.  The main task for the liquidators would be to conclude the sale of the business of the companies on the best terms achievable.  He did not see why new liquidators could not carry out that task (para 87).  He therefore discharged the provisional liquidators and replaced them by new ones.

The complaints

60.  DG complains that ever since the making of the Receivership Order, the Receivers had been conducting themselves in a way which was, or reasonably perceived to be, unfair and biased against DG.  Mr Tong SC relies on the following matters:

A2.1  Close collaboration with DY’s camp instead of maintaining a neutral position.

A2.2  Abuse of position to oppress DG for the benefit of DY by bringing action against DG to recover sums which form the subject matters of DY’s counterclaim.

A2.3  Unfair exclusion of DG from participation in the management of the companies but allowing DY and DHX to participate in the same.

A2.1 Close collaboration with DY’s camp instead of maintaining a neutral position

61.  It is said that the timing and contents of the Receivers’ Reports gave rise to perception of collaborating with and support of DY when the Receivers should have maintained a neutral stance.

62.  Mr Tong SC submits that the contents of the Reports tilted in favour of DY and was relied on heavily by DY at the April, May and Court of Appeal hearings.  The Receivers also misled the Court in stating that Shanghai Bading had defaulted in making payment to the designated account of the Huaxia Bank and in failing to bring to the Court’s attention in its 4th Report the existence of a Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement dated 7.9.2011 (“the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement”) which was given to the Receivers on 9 September. That Supplemental Agreement would have clearly shown that nothing was outstanding to the Huaxia Bank, and that there was no risk of penalty or foreclosure of the Citigroup Tower as the Receivers wanted the court to believe.

63.  The Receivers have to provide periodic reports to update the court and the parties on the progress of the receivership.  They were supported by documentary evidence whenever available.  The Receivers have filed 4 Reports so far.  The frequency of first 3 Reports was at the request of DG.  After seeing the first 3 Reports and with a view to saving costs, I then directed the Receivers to file reports on a 6-month basis.  Notwithstanding that direction, the Receivers filed their 4th Report on 20 September 2011 about 5 months after the 3rd, shortly before the hearing before the Court of Appeal.  The 4th Report was prepared because the Receivers wanted to seek the Court’s directions.  It expressly stated that it dealt with matters up to 31 August 2011 and therefore did not cover the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement.  Filing of the 4th Report was followed by a draft summons for directions to the parties.  The Receivers were not required to attend the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was no reason for them to draw to that court’s attention any matters in the 4th Report. The Court of Appeal also had its own rules on adducing evidence.  It declined to deal with matters in the 4th Report.  The complaint as regards timing of the Reports was unjustified.

64.  Further, the Receivers had not misstated the position in the 4th Report. The statement that Shanghai Bading had defaulted in meeting the requirement to pay no less than RMB 8,000,000 into the designated account in Huaxia Bank each month was based on letters from the Huaxia Bank and its lawyers and it was recorded in the preamble to the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement.  The Receivers needed to investigate that Supplemental Agreement and, as can be seen below under the Receivers’ Summons, it raised more questions than it answered. There was no basis to say that the Receivers omitted to mention it in the 4th Report or that they misled the court on the true financial position.

65.  Collaboration with DY’s camp is a serious allegation and DG (13) relies on such matters as the Receivers’ discussion with DY before they filed their respective affirmations and the Receivers filed their Reports.  It is alleged that Yen (6) shared a common theme and similar complaints as DY (7).

66.  There is nothing to show that the Receivers had shown the drafts of their Reports or affirmations to DY.  DG was in possession of the bulk of the information and the Receivership Order was directed against him and the Companies.  Any party could use the information in the Receivers’ Reports. That DY relied on information that came to light as a result of the Receivers’ investigation and sharing a similar view with the Receivers did not, per se, point to collaboration.  Anyone reading the Reports would have come to the view that DG was in breach of the Receivership Order.

67.  Reliance by DG on case management matters (e.g. the Receivers’ refusal to vacate hearing dates, DY being heavily involved in preparation of bundles, re-using of hearing bundles) to show collaboration reveals how hollow and desperate the allegation is.

68.  DG even alleges that the Receivers were eager to attend hearings.  This is totally unfounded.  Their first attendance at the hearing in April was uninvited but I was eventually satisfied that it was due to allegations of breach of the Consent Order by the Receivers.  That allegation triggered the directions that the Receivers should attend the May and July hearings.  In the end, I made no findings on misconduct against the Receivers after hearing the parties on the Issue.

69.  DG also relies on the Receivers’ conduct in the application for anti-suit injunction.  Mr Tong SC submits that notwithstanding Hong Kong First was never a party to any foreign proceedings, it was named as one of the applicants.  The application was doomed to failure and was abandoned one week before the hearing.  The Receivers had chosen to do nothing to stop Hong Kong First from participating in it, apart from asking DY and DXH why.  In not stopping the proceedings, the Receivers have thereby exposed Hong Kong First to unnecessary costs.  Mr Tong SC submits that it was also an attempt to pressurize DG when he was appealing to the Court of Appeal.  Even if there were good reasons behind their move, there was still a perception of bias and partiality.

70.  I accept the Receivers’ explanation that para 4(5) of the Receivership Order precluded them from intervening in the conduct of any proceedings between DY and DG of which the anti-suit injunction application formed one.  I cannot see how there can be an inference that the Receivers’ abiding by the Receivership Order can give rise to an inference of pressurizing DG.

71.  DG then complains that whilst turning a blind eye to DY’s wrongful act of causing Hong Kong First to engage in unnecessary court proceedings, the Receivers never failed to challenge everything DG did in relation to Macau First.  He relies on the challenge to appointment of Macanese lawyers as an example.

72.  However, the Receivers’ enquiries in relation to Macau First were not over court proceedings but over the application for change of legal representative, when DG purported to exercise his power as a director which had ceased.  It was a legitimate enquiry under the Receivership Order.  The Receivers did not interfere in Macau proceedings.

73.  This complaint fails.

A2.2 Abuse of position to oppress DG for the benefit of DY by bringing action against DG to recover sums which form the subject matters of DY’s counterclaim

74.  DG says that the Receivers have abused their position by issuing the writ in HCA 1933/2011 (“the writ”) and the statutory demand against him in respect of 2 sums, HK$30,000,000 and US$3,000,000 (“the 2 Sums”) which form the subject matter of DY’s counterclaim in this action.  DG submits that the Receivers have no power to do so and acted for the benefit of DY.

75.  Further, notwithstanding that DG has continuously provided funding each month to HKFUIGL repay the mortgage, the Receivers caused another demand to be issued by HKFUIGL for DG to return HK$1.29 million.

76.  Mr Tong SC has shown me a small bundle of correspondence between the Receivers and DG on the one hand and the Receivers and DY and/or DXH on the other between 21 October 2011 and 23 December 2011.  There was an apparent discrepancy in treatment towards DG and DY.  In respect of the former, the Receivers went to the full extent of issuing a writ and statutory demand despite LCP’s request to withhold proceedings.  In respect of the latter, the Receivers merely corresponded with DY.  No action was commenced by the Receivers on behalf of Hong Kong First against DY to seek recovery of HK$13 million from DY notwithstanding the Receivers had once demanded for the same.  Nor had the Receivers demanded HK$5 million from DY and DXH.  The Receivers have not demanded DY or DXH to produce documentary proof of what the Companies owed to each of them in set off against amounts which the Receivers said were owing from DY or DXH.  The Receivers issued a demand letter dated 23 December 2011 to DY allegedly only after seeing DG’s skeleton submission for the present hearing. DG complains of this leniency in treatment towards DY.

77.  As will be analyzed under the Prohibition Summons, I am not satisfied that the Receivers had acted outside their powers in making those claims.  They were merely discharging their duty to collect in assets.  Any money recovered would not be for the benefit of DY but the relevant company.

78.  As for the statutory demand, it appeared to have been issued erroneously since DG is not a resident of Hong Kong.  The fact that the Receivers (or solicitors) wrongly issued a set of proceedings for want of jurisdiction or failed to take into account a potential defence of set off may be an error of law but does not necessarily evidence misconduct or bias on the part of the Receivers.  This error can be corrected by an appropriate order for costs against the Receivers after hearing representation from them.

79.  The Receivers have explained that DY and DXH have provided substantive replies and explanations as opposed to DG who refused to provide any explanation.  That the Receivers took time (about 2 months) to consider should not form a cause for DG’s complaint, I do not think the evidence is sufficient to establish bias in the Receivers.

A2.3 Unfair exclusion of DG from participation in the management of the companies but allowing DY and DXH to participate in the same

80.  DG points to 4 examples:

(i) DXH was appointed as an additional director of two subsidiaries HKFUIGL and FUIL.  On the other hand, DG was not appointed as a director of Hong Kong First with the effect that Hong Kong First, being the sole shareholder of Shanghai Bading, was under the exclusive control of the Receivers, DY and DXH. 

(ii) Appointment of DXH to execute important documents for HKFUIGL such as a new account and contracts on behalf of Shanghai Bading.

(iii) Notwithstanding that DG remains a director HKFUIGL and FUIL, the Receivers failed each time to give DG notice of board meetings in a timely manner (for example, only one working day before the meeting).

(iv) Despite the Consent Order and my view that DG should not be ousted from the management of Shanghai Bading, the Receivers together with DY and DXH signed a board resolution on behalf of Hong Kong First seeking the removal of YXA as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading. 

81.  The allegations of exclusion from management could not, in my view, be further from the truth.  The Receivers did not act stealthily.  All along, they have wanted to obtain control of the Companies. All along they have been willing to involve DG in the management, in accordance with the letter and spirit of paragraph 87 of the March Decision.  Such willingness was met with an uncooperative attitude from DG in refusing to hand over control.  Mr Tong SC accepts that his client was not free from blame.

82.  Receivers are to exercise commercial judgment.  Although it would have been better had they come to court to seek directions (see McDonald v Golden Dynasty Enterprises Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 569), it was not erroneous for them to seek Hong Kong and PRC legal advice on how to implement the Receivership Order.  The legal advice received was for the Receivers to become the shareholders of Hong Kong First and pass a board resolution to remove YXA as the legal representative (which was subsequently proved to be correct and in accordance with the requirements of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, “AIC”, the PRC authority). The advice was also that the Consent Order was not binding on the Receivers and was an interlocutory order that had been superseded by a further order, the Receivership Order.  (2nd Report)

83.  In relation to Hong Kong First, DG was not a director.  He could not be contacted (1st Report).  The Receivers tried to “reconstruct” its board of directors to maintain the status quo at the commencement of this action and to ensure that the Receivers gained control.  DY and DHX were then engaged to sign the board resolutions dated 18 March 2011 to permit the Receivers to gain control.  Messrs Herbert Smith made no comment on the proposal for restructuring despite notice from the Receivers.  At one stage, DG and Messrs Herbert Smith even agreed to the change of YXA.  The Receivers had in April and June 2011 made clear their willingness to consider appointing DG as director of Hong Kong First if he would cooperate with the Receivers to facilitate their taking control of the assets, but cooperation was not forthcoming.

84.  The Receivers acted honestly in accordance with legal advice and acted under the notion that the Consent Order had been superseded.  The views of Ms Sit as stated in paragraph 21 above was consistently held by the Receivers and Ms Linda Chan SC acting for them at the July hearing.  The Receivers, of course, had no say on the validity of the Receivership Order.  Their views were, however, relevant to explain why they passed the resolution to remove YXA and purported to implement that resolution.  Their acts should not be treated as excluding DG from management. The Receivers’ views were sustainable, at least up to the July Decision.

85.  After the resolution to remove YXA, DG remained uncooperative.  Notwithstanding that DG has never been removed as a director of any of the boards he sat on, he has failed to render assistance to the Receivers.  He ignored notices of board meetings when he could have given proxies, engaged in telephone conferencing or suggested alternative arrangements, and despite the Receivers’ willingness to provide further documents on request of his solicitors.  

86.  Insofar as DXH has been asked to execute documents, it was because she was the only non-receiver director present. Before the meeting, the Receivers had given notice to DG about the intended opening of the bank account and that 2-3 directors of HKFUIGL would be authorized signatories.

87.  Permeating DG’s case on bias was the assertion that the Receivers did the acts complained of to pressurize him and to give advantage to DY.

88.  The parties (not just DG) have to face 2 fronts – one under the action and the other under the Receivership Order.  The Receivers have a duty to implement the Receivership Order.  They cannot sit back because an appeal, the present summonses, and the action are ongoing.   In discharging their duties, it was legitimate for them to approach the parties for assistance and take actions necessary to preserve assets of the Companies. Such approaches, one can expect, will exist alongside DG’s preparation of this case and “pressure” on DG in terms of time and energy will be inevitable. However, that is far from saying that the Receivers acted with the ulterior purpose of pressurizing DG.

89.  The result of the steps taken by the Receivers was to gain control.  I cannot see control surrendered by the Receivers or any benefit falling into the hands of DY or DXH.

90.  I am not satisfied that the complaint of actual or apparent bias was made out.

Ground A3 : Misconduct of the Receivers

91.  Mr Tong SC relies on 6 matters to show that the misconduct of the Receivers is of such a degree that wholly forfeits the confidence of the court and fully justifies their immediate discharge :

A3.1  Acting in breach of the Consent Order to remove YXA from his position as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading;

A3.2  Making false representations to third parties that David Yen of the Receivers had already replaced YXA as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading when his application for replacement was in fact rejected by the relevant authority in the PRC;

A3.3  Acting in breach of the Receivership Order by commencing new actions;

A3.4  Acting in blatant disregard of PRC court order;

A3.5  Acting in unlawful and disreputable manner by criminally assaulting Mr Tang, a PRC lawyer retained by Shanghai Bading;

A3.6  Charging exorbitant fees.

A3.1 Acting in breach of the Consent Order to remove YXA from his position as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading;

92.  Mr Tong SC’s view is that a truly independent and impartial receiver should have respected the Consent Order, the July Decision and that under the Mainland law the Receivership Order has no effect. Yet they have pressed on removing YXA especially in the last 6 months before this hearing.  They applied to the Mainland authorities to seek administrative review of their refusal to replace YXA.  It gave rise to an impression of pressurizing DG and to give advantage to DY.  Shanghai Bading is doing well under YXA’s control and the Receivers should not intervene.

93.  The views taken by the Receivers were, in my view, sustainable up to the time of the July Decision.  I had not then made adverse findings on misconduct against the Receivers.  The Receivers had even been given costs of their assistance on the Issue.

94.  Three days after the July Decision, AIC has rejected the application for change of legal representative.  Despite that, the Receivers still held the view that they could pursue the change in legal representative.

95.  In their solicitor’s letter to DG’s solicitor dated 11.8.2011 (E2/880), the Receivers relied on my “intention” in the July Decision for YXA to be replaced as a legal representative; that I did not state whether the Consent Order was still in force; and that I simply said I had no jurisdiction to decide the matter.  They clearly overlooked my ruling that superseding the Consent Order should be done expressly rather than by implication; and the Consent Order was not expressly superseded by me.  The effect of the July Decision was to confirm the existence of both the Consent Order and the Receivership Order pending the appeal.  The Receivers have breached the Consent Order after the July Decision.

A3.2 Making false representations to third parties that David Yen of the Receivers had already replaced YXA as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading when his application for replacement was in fact rejected by the relevant authority in the PRC

96.  YXA was removed as a legal representative by virtue of a board resolution.  However the legal formalities in the PRC have not been completed. After the July Decision and notwithstanding that AIC has rejected the application for change of legal representative, the Receivers still represented themselves to be legal representatives of Shanghai Bading.  This head of complaint is sustainable.

A3.3            The Receivers acted in breach of the Receivership Order by commencing new actions

97.  This is similar to the complaint under A2.2 above.  This complaint is unsustainable, in the light of the analyses under the Prohibition Summons.

A3.4 Acting in blatant disregard of PRC court order

98.  DG’s complaint is that notwithstanding the Receivers’ representatives were told to comply with the PRC court order (that the chops stolen by DY were to be returned to the PRC court for custody), the Receivers have chosen to ignore that order.

99.  The Receivers have explained to the PRC court the situation and the officers involved confirmed that the PRC court would not request the surrender of the chops of Shanghai Bading as the new legal representative was not bound by the civil judgment.  The PRC court would consider taking action against DY who had not communicated with them effectively: 3rd Report, at para 2.7.7.

100.  This complaint is unsustainable.

A3.5 Acting in unlawful and despicable manner by criminally assaulting Mr Tang, a PRC lawyer retained by Shanghai Bading

101.  According to YXA, 4 persons appearing to be triad members turned up at the office of Mr Tang on 3.5.2011.  They claimed to have come by order of DY, the boss of Shanghai Bading.  They claimed that their people were assaulted by Mr Tang’s people.  (我們的人在4 月 30 日的時候被你們的人打了。)  Mr Tang asked if they meant people of Ernst & Young (the Receivers).  The reply was in the affirmative.  Mr Tang says that the police was handling matters concerning Ernst & Young.  When Mr Tang said he was not prepared to talk further with them, the 4 persons verbally abused and threatened him.  One of them even assaulted Mr Tang.

102.  The Receivers have chosen to avoid answering this serious allegation in their affirmation in opposition but in their 4th Report referred to “defamatory articles” on websites which they have successfully demanded removal of.

103.  This piece of evidence shows that the 4 persons did not come by order of the Receivers.  That the former regarded the latter as “their people” (我們的人) should not be treated as the fault of the Receivers.  There did not seem to have been any follow up actions by the police against the Receivers.

104.  I am not satisfied that this head of misconduct is established. 

A3.6 Charging exorbitant fees

105.  This complaint will be discussed under Ground 4.

106.  On Ground 3, I am of the view that the complaints of breach of the Consent Order after the July Decision and, related thereto, the false representation that Yen had replaced YXA as legal representative are made out.

Ground A4: Charging exorbitant costs

107.  The Receivers are said to be guilty of misconduct in charging exorbitant fees and in irresponsibly incurring costs outside the ambit of their powers under the Receivership Order or the Consent Order.

108.  There is no dispute that up to 31 July 2011 (around 4½ months after the making the Receivership Order), the Receivers have already billed HK$7.3 million which is exclusive of the disbursements paid by the Receivers to the lawyers in Hong Kong and the PRC.

109.  To Mr Tong SC, that was an astounding figure having regard to the fact that Shanghai Bading was not a trading company but was only involved in the collection of rent; and the Receivers have not yet taken over the management and control of Shanghai Bading.  They have not shown the exorbitant costs were incurred or were necessary for the purpose of preserving the assets of Shanghai Bading which was their primary responsibility.  The Receivers have refused to provide the court with a detailed breakdown of their costs. 

110.  Mr Tong SC also submits that the Receivers have no hesitation in unnecessarily or unreasonably blowing up the cost of the receivership.  For example, they deliberately instructed a separate firm of solicitors to bring action and issue statutory demands against DG to recover sums against him. They have taken a lot of steps with a view to removing YXA in contravention of the clear terms of the Consent Order.  They have also incurred substantial costs in perusing documents and preparing for hearings in which they should have minimal involvements. 

111.  Mr Tong SC also submits that the irony lies in the fact that whilst the Receivership Order is supposed to serve the purpose of preserving assets, it turns out that it leads to the depletion of assets, to the extent that the Receivers are even proposing to sell Lippo Centre to foot their own exorbitant bill.  The continued existence of the receivership will not only lead to duplicity of proceedings, but will also cause irreparable harm to the parties. 

112.  Costs can hardly be used as a ground for discharging the Receivers as costs are subject to approval of the court: para 7 of the Receivership Order.  Any costs unnecessarily incurred or those incurred in breach of duties will be disallowed and the assets will not be adversely affected: Re Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd, [1998] 2 HKLRD 670 at 679A-680D.  The proper forum for considering these matters is the taxation hearing: Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell, [1998] BCC 324 at 342F.  The court can require notice of taxation to be given to DG (and DY) who can then challenge the incidence or quantum of costs.  Of course, where the Receivers have to attend court hearings, the court may also assess and allow only reasonable costs, as was done in previous hearings.  Engagement of a second firm of solicitors is permissible under para 18(a) of the Receivership Order, and their costs are equally subject to control of the court.

113.  DG’s obstruction has caused the Receivers to adopt a more circuitous approach to implement the Receivership Order, eg liaising with banks and authorities, performing physical checks on regular basis to monitor transfer of properties, forensic analyses of the financial position, contacting lawyers for YXA, CZQ and Macau First and did a lot more work.  The increase in costs was partly self-induced.

114.  This ground of complaint is unsustainable.

Discharge on the ground of bias and misconduct

115.  Of all the complaints, the ones I find established was the Receivers’ continued efforts in pressing for removal of YXA after the July Decision and the false representation that Yen had replaced YXA as legal representative.

116.  Discharging a receiver on the ground of misconduct is discretionary.  In deciding whether to exercise this power, I have considered the difficult circumstances in which the Receivers were placed.    Their task was onerous and irksome, effectively having to implement a receivership order beyond the jurisdiction.  The Receivership Order was made against DG’s wish, so it was not surprising that every step taken by the Receivers would be viewed by DG with scepticism and resistance.  The Receivers’ conduct may not be ideal in the eyes of anyone.  A finding that they have breached the Consent Order pending appeal is already a blemish on their reputation.  They have nevertheless kept DG and the Court informed of the steps taken as can be seen from the various Reports.  Attempts to gain control were aimed at the benefit of the Companies and not DY.  Although the Receivers have not done much in terms of gaining control, the information they have obtained has given them a degree of acquaintance with the affairs of Shanghai Bading. They have brought to light problems in the management of Shanghai Bading’s assets by DG/YXA.  Overall, the situation reflected more of the Receivers’ zealous attitude in obtaining control in the face of the continued risk of dissipation of assets, than deliberate flouting the Consent Order.  The situation was not such as to wholly forfeit the confidence of the court in the Receivers.  Instead of discharging them, I consider a firm direction that they should not pursue the removal of YXA as a legal representative pending the appeal shall suffice. Failure to comply with this direction may result in their discharge and wasted costs order against them personally.  I stress that this direction is not a stay pending appeal but to recognize the co-existence of the Consent Order and the Receivership Order.

Replacement of the Receivers

117.  It is true that the Receivers have not been able to do much in terms of taking over management of the companies but that was due to the hindrance of DG.  At this stage, with an appeal to be heard in 3 months’ time and thereafter a trial in 9 months’ time, changing to another firm of receivers will just cause chaos and generate more costs.  This is particularly so where there is no indication that DG and YXA will be ready to cooperate with a new firm of receivers.  I therefore decline to replace the Receivers.

Alternative accounting duties

118.  The alternative accounting duties as set out in the Discharge Summons (“the accounting duties”) to replace the Receivership Order are to procure the management of the PRC Companies:

(i) To provide monthly reports to DY in respect of their finance, operation, management, with all up-to-date bank statements from time to time.

(ii) To give not less than 14 days’ prior written notice to DY in the event either Company shall enter into any transaction involving an amount of over RMB 500,000 together with all relevant commercial documents relating thereto.

These will be more economical and less intrusive to preserve the status quo.  DG also claims that YXA has been playing the role of the Receivers well in accordance with Mainland law.                  

119.  These accounting duties have in fact been proposed by DY at the February hearing.  In the end, I chose to impose the Receivership Order.  Since I decline to discharge the Receivership Order, it is not necessary to consider the accounting duties again.  In any case, I cannot trust DG to provide reliable accounts pending trial.  Disclosure by DG and YXA has been selective.  There was rental income that DG has hidden or otherwise failed to account for and risk of dissipation continued -the very cause for the imposition of the Receivership Order.  His attitude oscillated with change in legal representation.  Support of YXA (or CZQ) also provides no comfort to the court as he is not subject to the Hong Kong court’s jurisdiction.

Summary on the Discharge Summons

120.  On costs, the bulk of the complaints have not been made out.  I dismiss the Discharge Summons with a direction that the Receivers should not pursue the change of YXA as legal representative pending appeal.  I order, nisi that DY and the Receivers’ costs should be borne by DG.

B. THE STAY summons

121.  DG has applied for stay of execution of the Receivership Order but failed on 2 occasions (the April Decision and the May Decision).   When he successfully obtained leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal in September, he had not renewed his application for stay or appealed against the refusal of stay there and then.  It is an abuse of process for him now to seek a stay for the third time.  On this ground alone, the Stay Summons can be dismissed.

122.  The only change of circumstances, which Mr Chan SC accepts, is that the Court of Appeal has now granted leave to appeal.  Mr Tong SC, relies on 3 matters in support of the stay application:

B1. Strong grounds of appeal;

B2. That the appeal will be rendered nugatory if a stay is refused and loss will be suffered by DG and Macau First that cannot be compensated for by damages;

B3.    That the Court of Appeal granted costs in favour of DG in the leave application.

DG offers undertakings to assure DY and the court that there will be no dissipation of assets in relation to the PRC companies.

Ground B1: Strong grounds of appeal

123.  An applicant for stay has to demonstrate good reason as to why the court has to do so.  The existence of a strong ground of appeal or strong likelihood of success of appeal is by itself a good reason for stay. 

124.  I have, in paras 19-23 above, expressed my doubts as to the strength of the appeal.  The appeal remains only arguable. 

Ground B2: Appeal will be rendered nugatory in absence of stay

125.  Where there exists only an arguable appeal, the appellant would need to provide the court with additional reasons as to why a stay is justified, which include the fact that an appeal will be rendered nugatory if no stay is granted.

“An appeal being rendered nugatory does not mean in all cases that without a stay, the appellant faces financial ruin or the loss of all his property. Demonstrating that the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect is enough.” Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co. Ltd., [2007] 5 HKC 84 at para 9(4), per Ma J (as he then was).

126.  There is nothing to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory or that anything is irreversible if the appeal is allowed (para 34 of the April Decision).  If DG is successful before the Court of Appeal, the Receivership Order can be discharged.  All loss incurred can be recovered from DY.  All company chops, seals, title deeds, etc. can be returned to DG.  Legal representatives, if removed, can be reinstated.

127.  DG seeks to persuade me that the following events may render the appeal nugatory:

(i) The Receivers are seeking to dispose of the unique Lippo properties, contrary to their goal of appointment - to preserve assets of the Companies.  They have not resorted to a less drastic option of raising loans than selling the Lippo properties.  Since the Receivership Order, DG alone has been shouldering all mortgage repayments for the Lippo properties whereas DXH and DY will no longer be financially capable of funding the Receivers’ operations.

(ii) The Receivers are attempting to serve a statutory demand on DG for the 2 Sums.  In the absence of a stay, substantial costs and time will have to be spent by DG to resist it.  It would be unfair and unjust if a bankruptcy order is obtained before conclusion of this action.

(iii) YXA and CZQ have indicated that they will seek other business endeavours unrelated to the Citigroup Tower and will not return even if the PRC Companies wish to reinstate them in future.  Other senior employees will resign if the PRC Companies are taken over by the Receivers.

(iv) Some of the tenants of Citigroup Tower may hesitate in renewing their leases if the building were to be taken over by the Receivers.  Many of the tenants have indicated that they had been greatly confused by the various notices issued by the Receivers so far.

(v) The astronomical costs of the Receivers without fortification of DY’s undertaking as to damages may cause loss to DG.

128.  The events occurring after the Receivership Order shows that DG did all in his power to make sure that the Receivers could not lay their hands on the cash-rich PRC Companies.  He did not even hand over any residue rental income (after payment of expenses) to the Receivers.  He put the Receivers into the financial strait.  If he were allowed to continue, he may take further steps to dissipate assets of Shanghai Bading.  Therefore, with regard to (i), it was DG who created the situation whereby the Receivers have to propose a sale of the Companies’ assets. Raising loans is impracticable because the Companies lack the means to repay. It is no answer for DG to say that he alone (without assistance of DY and DXH) has been shouldering all the mortgage repayments to the Lippo properties because he alone controlled the finance of Shanghai Bading despite the Receivership Order.

129.  With regard to (ii), DG can, on good grounds shown, apply to stay the Receivers’ steps in relation to the statutory demand.  However, he cannot have the whole Receivership Order stayed.

130.  With regard to (iii), if there is any truth in it, DG would not have waited until this 3rd application for stay to raise it.  The Receivership Order contained a provision for change of legal representative which DG’s lawyers had not commented on before sealing.

131.  With regard to (iv), Citigroup Tower is fully leased out.  The only loss of rent on the evidence was wavier of a month’s rent of UBS and that is something that may be compensated for by DY’s undertaking as to damages.  Confusion to tenants was, again, caused by DG’s refusal to comply with the Receivership Order.  He cannot rely on his own fault.

132.  With regard to (v), DG cannot rely on the costs of the receivership in support of his application for stay.  The expensive nature of a receivership was anticipated when the March Decision was made.  Reasonable loss may be covered by an order for fortification (see under the Fortification Summons).  Any further loss caused by DG being uncooperative was self-induced by DG.

133.  In summary, I am not satisfied that refusal of a stay will render the appeal nugatory.

Ground B3: Grant of costs by the Court of Appeal in favour of DG in the leave application

134.  Mr Tong SC submits that the strength of DG’s appeal was further evidenced by the fact that the Court of Appeal saw fit to depart from the usual order of “costs in the cause of the appeal” and awarded DG costs in his application for leave to appeal.

135.  In my view, this is a desperate argument.  The Court of Appeal did not give reasons for the costs order.  The costs order was nothing more than an indication that DY should not have resisted the application for leave.  It was not an indication of the strength of the appeal.

Undertakings offered by DG

136.  Apart from the accounting duties in para 118 above, DG also undertakes in paragraph 27 of DG (10):

(i) Not to cause sale or disposition of any part of the Citigroup Tower.

(ii) To procure the management of Shanghai Bading to make timely repayments to Huaxia Bank to avoid breach of loan agreements.

137.  It was partly because this court found risk of dissipation of Citicorp Tower that the Receivership Order was made.  Undertaking (i) is not helpful.

138.  Undertaking (ii) sounds reasonable but it does not get over the problem now surfaced - where DG has put the rental income from tenants; and where the surplus over expenses has gone.

139.  I decline to accept the undertakings even if a stay is granted.

Summary on the Stay Summons

140.  The grounds of appeal are not so strong as to merit a stay.  There is nothing to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if no stay is granted.  The undertakings proposed by DG are not acceptable.  If a stay is granted, the risk of dissipation of assets will continue.  The balance of convenience lies in refusing the Stay Summons.  Costs should follow the event and be to DY.

C. FORTIFICATION SUMMONS

141.  DG seeks fortification in the amount of HK$54,000,000 and premises his application on 2 grounds:

(i) The costs of the Receivers incurred/to be incurred;

(ii) The loss of rentals from Citigroup Tower.

The principles

142.  The court has a general power to order fortification where it appears just and proper to protect the defendant by making such an order: Chow Chor Leung v Rafaella Sportswear Inc [1990] 1 HKLR 449 at page 453H.

143.  The burden of showing need for fortification and the appropriate quantum falls on the party seeking fortification, in this case, DG. Whilst there is no obligation on the plaintiff (in this case, DY) to give full and frank disclosure of his own financial means, circumstances might arise where the absence of financial disclosure by a plaintiff might entitle the drawing of an adverse inference as to his ability to meet his cross-undertaking in damages: Hui Chi Ming v Koon Wing Yee [2011] 1 HKLRD 260, at para 45.

144.  I will add that, unlike many types of interim orders (e.g. injunctions where the loss in value of a property or business is not immediately apparent), monetary “loss” to a company subject to receivership is almost a certainty when receivers are paid out of company assets.  The “loss” grows with the time taken for litigation. Therefore, although fortification was not ordered when the receivership order was first made, the court can always do so subsequently when the applicant puts forth sufficient evidence in support. 

145.  Even where an application for fortification is subsequently made, the same test applies: Hui Chi Ming v Koon Wing Yee [2011] 1 HKLRD 260, at para 35. 

Just and proper to order fortification?

146.  Mr Chan SC submits that at the February hearing, DG had, through his leading counsel, already asked for fortification but failed.  DG can only re-litigate this if there is a significant change of circumstances.  Mr Chan SC, however, agrees with me that the Court has power to order fortification at any time. 

147.  Fortification was not ordered in the March Decision as there was no evidence of potential loss or its extent.  The point raised by Mr Edward Chan SC that DY might not have the means to meet his undertaking as to damages was in the context of persuading the court not to make a receivership order.  That was met with DY’s suggestion of paying HK$15,000,000 into court. No order was made at that time.  The arguments then could not be taken as an application for fortification.  The present summons was therefore the first application by DG. 

148.  DG claims that there was loss of rental. However, at best he could only show loss of one month’s rent of an unknown amount payable by UBS.  Citicorp Tower is fully leased out.

149.  At the February hearing, the scale of potential costs of the receivership was everyone’s guess until the Receivers gave their estimation of HK$300,000 per month in the 1st Report.  To date, costs of HK$12.5m have been incurred on the Receivers, about RMB 1.13m on PRC lawyers and about HK$3m on Hong Kong lawyers.   All such costs do not include additional costs that the Receivers will incur in the event of their taking over the management and operation of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company.

150.  The trial has been set down to start in March 2013.  This means the Receivership Order should last for 27 months from its first making up to end of trial.  On the basis that DG is cooperative, that should have cost HK$8,100,000.

151.  Mr Tong SC submits that despite DY’s claim that he is the ultimate owner of Shanghai Bading, only DG but not DY has agreed to fund the operation of the Companies upon the Receivers’ request. The absence of funding from DY clearly demonstrates that he must either be in a precarious financial position or be disingenuous in claiming himself to be the ultimate owner of the Companies.  

152.  With respect to Mr Tong SC, I am unable to agree.  Inability of DY to honour his undertaking has not been accepted in the March Decision.  The Receivership Order contemplates that costs should in the first place be borne by the Companies.  Had it not been for the non-cooperative attitude of DG in handing over the finance of the Companies to the Receivers, there is no question of DG or DY having to fund the operation of the Companies.

153.  What I agree with Mr Tong SC, however, is that DY had placed reliance on two properties in Hong Kong owned by himself and DXH respectively, which are said to be worth HK$16,000,000.  Only DY (and not DXH) has given a cross-undertaking in damages.  In addition, DY has already spent HK$12 million on his lawyers.  Therefore, even if he was able to come up with HK$15,000,000 in February 2011, one questions whether the same can be said of him today.

154.  The only other asset of DY disclosed is his property in Australia.  DG claims that DY has been trying to sell this property.  This has been denied by DY with documentary proof that he is still the registered owner of the Australian property.  However, the fact that DY has property outside the Hong Kong of unknown value gives no assurance that he will be able to fortify his undertaking.  There are always difficulties and inconvenience in enforcement against a foreign property. 

155.  In my view, the costs incurred so far, the anticipated costs, the costs already incurred by DY and the disclosure of only one Hong Kong and one Australian property of his make it just and proper to order fortification.

Quantum for fortification

156.  In determining the quantum to be put up by way of fortification, the court has to take a broad view without resolving all the arguments and counter-arguments on the amount to be fortified: Chow Chor Leung v Rafaella Sportswear Inc [1990] 1 HKLR 449 at page 453I.  However, the loss will not qualify for compensation under the cross-undertaking unless it has been caused by the grant of the receivership. Though normally that is an issue decided on an enquiry as to damages at the end of the day, the causation issue must also be examined in forming an intelligent estimate of likely loss at the fortification stage: Sectrack NV v Satamatics Limited [2007] EWHC 3003 (Comm) at para 99.

157.  DG claims that DY and the Receivers have only themselves to blame for incurring all those costs when the points that they have no power to remove YXA was raised by DG as early as April 2011.  Based on billings of the Receivers (HK$7.3m about 4½ months after the making of the Receivership Order), he estimates the receivership cost to be at least HK$2 million per month.  He asks for fortification in the sum of HK$54 million.

158.  It is unrealistic to adopt $2m as multiplicand. More costs would have been incurred at the initial than later stage.  It will be an affront to justice to allow DG to rely on his own failure to cooperate with the Receivers to jag up the amount to be fortified.  I take into account the hearing dates of the appeal and the trial.  I also bear in mind that the Receivers have been awarded costs for certain hearings already against DG.

Summary on the Fortification Summons

159.  I order DY to fortify his undertaking as to damages by paying HK$10m into court or providing security in like amount as follows:-

(i) Paying HK$6,400,000 into court [in the absence of agreement between the parties as to time, within 28 days] to cover the period from making of the Receivership Order up to and including 31 May 2012; and

(ii) If the Court of Appeal is to uphold the Receivership Order, paying an additional HK$3,600,000 [in the absence of agreement between the parties as to time, within 28 days of the Court of Appeal’s decision on the appeal] to cover the period thereafter up to and including completion of the trial in May 2013.

160.  Failure to fortify the undertaking will cause the Receivership Order to be discharged.  There will be liberty to apply.  Costs should follow the event and be to DG.

D. The Receivers’ Summons

161.  By their summons, the Receivers seek an order:

(i) Against DG for production of books and records, to execute declarations for the purpose of appointment of the Receivers in place of YXA and CZQ as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company respectively and to consent to the commencement of legal proceedings against YXA.

(ii) To sell Unit 3509 of Lippo Centre and to apply the proceeds of sale in reduction of bank loans, and to repay Hong Kong First and that payments received by Hong Kong First from HKFUIGL shall be applied for payment of monthly deficit of Hong Kong First and payment of costs and expenses incurred by the Receivers under the Receivership Order.

(iii) Alternatively, to sell Unit 3705 of Lippo Centre and apply the proceeds in payment of mortgage loans and to meet the costs and expenses of the Receivers under the Receivership Order.

(iv) Subject to the sanction of the court, to be granted powers to dispose of the assets of Macau First and Hong Kong First as the Receivers think fit to raise funds to repay all bank loans due to the mortgagees in respect of the properties currently owned by and registered in the names of Hong Kong First and HKFUIGL and to meet the costs of the Receivers.

162.  The Receivers base their application on:

D1. Substantial and repeated non-compliance with the Receivership Order;

D2. Continuing risk of dissipation of assets; and

D3. Inability to raise the funds otherwise to service the outstanding mortgages.

Ground D1: Substantial and repeated non-compliance with the Receivership Order

163.  Ms Sit has set out in her skeleton submission the non-compliance and obstruction on DG’s part to impede the proper discharge of the Receivers’ duties.  Examples are,

(i) DG (as director) purported to appoint Macanese lawyers as attorney of Macau First; the Receivers have been unable to obtain Macau First's books and records due to objection from the Macanese lawyers.

(ii) The Receivers have not been provided with documents.

(iii) The Receivers have not been given access to office. Their attendance at the office was under heavy surveillance.

(iv) The Receivers have not been able to take control of bank accounts, rental collection for Citigroup Tower and the car parks.

(v) The Receivers have been unable to obtain financial, letting and staff information of Shanghai Bading and relevant documents.

(vi) DG obstructed the change of legal representatives and resiled from his agreement to facilitate change of legal representatives of Shanghai Bading.

(vii) The Receivers have been unable to obtain the business registration documents of Shanghai Bading.  They have to issue proceedings in the PRC which have since been suspended by the court due to unresolved ownership issue of Shanghai Bading.

(viii) DG refused to provide information as to Fushan Lu premises even though some units were registered in his name.

(ix) DG refused to attend interviews but one.

(x) Shanghai Bading’s auditors first declined to provide information, and later provided limited information as regards 2009 financial statements (4th Report).

(xi) Only a few chops are with the Receivers.  It transpired from YXA’s affirmation that there are other chops with other banks and YXA has been using them. He uses his signature to bypass the need for some chops.

164.  The clear stance of DG, YXA and CZQ is that they do not recognise the effect of the Receivership Order outside Hong Kong and will not cooperate with the Receivers. This went well beyond the ambit of the Consent Order.

165.  Even respecting that YXA must act in accordance with PRC law, and even assuming that receivership is not recognised in PRC law, there is nothing to show that his enabling DG to comply with the Receivership Order will be in conflict with his role in acting in the best interest of the real beneficial owner (DG who is subject to the Receivership Order, or DY who does not oppose the assistance of YXA).

166.  It matters not that YXA asserts that Shanghai Bading has been doing well under his control and there is no need for receivers. A party should not be permitted to flout the court’s order.

“It is not competent for anyone to interfere with the possession of a receiver on the ground that the order appointing him ought not to have been made: for persons who feel aggrieved by an order of the court may question its validity in proper proceedings, but while it lasts it must be obeyed.” Russell v East Anglian Railway (1850) 3 Mac & G 104 at 117

167.  DG has also breached his personal obligations under para 6 of the Receivership Order.

Ground D2: Continuing risk of dissipation of assets

168.  For present purposes, there is low risk of dissipation of Citicorp Tower since the title deeds have been deposited with the court.  However, the liquid assets including cash, rental income of Shanghai Bading and loan facilities are at risk of dissipation.  Examples of such risk are:

(i) Unaccounted for shortfall in rental income from the Citigroup Tower since December 2010;

(ii) Unaccounted for rental income from car parks of Citigroup Tower;

(iii) Unaccounted for cash outflow from Shanghai Bading’s accounts at Bank of Shanghai (“BOS”);

(iv) Unaccounted for rental income not subject to the rental collection agreement;

(v) Unaccounted for funds in Agricultural Bank of China (“ABC”).

169.  According to the 4th Report, the dissipation is in the region of RMB 14.5 million within a period of 4 months from March to July 2011.

170.  Shanghai Bading has also failed to cause monthly rental income (RMB 8,000,000) to be deposited into the Huaxia Bank account.  There were demand letters from Huaxia Bank and its lawyers dated 2.6.2011 and 4.8.2011 respectively.  As a result of these demands, Shanghai Bading entered into the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement on 7.9.2011.  This supplemental agreement was signed by CZQ using the contract seal. This was a clear indication that YXA was able to authorize someone to act on his behalf and that by producing the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement in the present proceedings, DG was clearly adopting what his nominee YXA had done.

171.  The Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement raised a lot of issues:

(i) It has never accounted for the default stated in the preamble;

(ii) It did not account for the whereabouts of the rental payments which ought to have been but were not deposited into the Huaxia Bank;

(iii) The consideration for this Agreement, an upfront payment of RMB 140 million by Shanghai Bading, was from an unknown source;

(iv) The monthly payment into the designated account was reduced from RMB 8,000,000 to RMB 5,000,000.  The difference of RMB 3,000,000 can now be channelled into other bank accounts not known to the Receivers.

172.  According to the latest information available to with the Receivers from Mr Zhu of the Huaxia Bank, Shanghai Bading has defaulted in its deposit obligation under the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement: Yen (7).

173.  According to the financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2010, Shanghai Bading had cash or its equivalent of about RMB 163,000,000.  Net profit for 2009 was over RMB 40,000,000 according to the profit and loss account.  The loan facility available at BOS stood at RMB 309,250,000 as at 2.9.2011.  The unaudited statement for the period up to 14.6.2011 shows liquid assets of RMB 185,000,000.  However, YXA(4) claims that Shanghai Bading just managed to make ends meet and there was not much liquid cash.

174.  Mr Tong SC submits that the Receivers have not been fair by alleging that DG had a huge mountain of cash which he sought to hide from the reach of the Receivers and the problem would disappear if YXA were removed.  He sought to demonstrate from the audited reports on the balance sheet dated 31.12.2010, profits table for 2010, cash flow statement and financial report that the surplus of trading income less trading costs and repayments to Huaxia Bank and BOS was less than RMB 1,000,000 per month.  There were no huge figures that could be siphoned away.  As for the cash of RMB 153,000,000, there had been repayments of RMB 140,000,000 under the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement and substantial payment to BOS.

175.  The problem with this line of submission is that the Receivers were simply in no position to verify for lack of documents.

176.  Initially, DG (11) asserted that there was no risk of dissipation:

“… the Receivers tried to mislead the court at page 48 of the 4th Receivers' Report, by saying that Shanghai Bading can possibly utilise the cash at banks by other channels even [though] the company chop and the finance chop are physically with the Receivers. The allegations are naïve and wholly inaccurate, and none of the 5 channels [one of which was to draw money with the authorized chops of various bank accounts] would work for the purpose of dissipating the cash of Shanghai Bading as suggested by the Receivers. In any event, the Receivers have produced no evidence to show that the management of Shanghai Bading have resorted to or even attempted to resort to the said 5 channels.”

DG (11) simply dodged the Receivers’ assertion that they were unable to ascertain the whereabouts of most of the monthly rental.

177.  That statement in DG (11) proves to be false.  The evidence shows that YXA has been manipulating the flow of rental income.  According to YXA, he has been using the finance chops Shanghai Bading has with various banks to withdraw money.  The only finance chop which is not in his possession is that for the account of Huaxia Bank.  To bypass the difficulty, YXA has directed tenants to deposit rental to ABC and BOS instead of Huaxia Bank so as to maintain control over the rental income.  He also used his signature for day to day running of Shanghai Bading.  However, the Receivers are unable to identify any rental deposit in the BOS bank statements and YXA has instructed ABC not to release any information to the Receivers (4th Report).  YXA’s explanation was that he feared that surplus after repayment of the Huaxia Bank’ loan could not be applied for salaries, insurance premiums, operating expenses and other liabilities.  He also explained in YXA(3) that because the company chop (公章) of Shanghai Bading and the finance chop at the Huaxia Bank had been stolen, he was afraid that their rental income deposited by tenants would also be stolen by DY.  He wanted to try his best to maintain the proper running of the companies.

178.  These explanations are unacceptable, for the Receivers would have been obliged to honour those obligations had they obtained control.  There was no room for DY to steal the rental income.

179.  YXA also affirmed to the fact that Shanghai Bading was concerned that the rental to be deposited into the Huaxia Bank account for the month of September would not be sufficient to comply with the Huaxia Bank Supplemental Agreement, so a sum of RMB 1,000,000 was remitted from the SOC to the Huaxia Bank account.  This was a clear withdrawal of funds belonging to Shanghai Bading without the approval of the Receivers.

180.  Further, YXA has actively make use of his effective control over Shanghai Bading’s funds to put them out of reach of the Receivers. He admitted he had not distributed RMB 9,720,000 dividends of Shanghai Bading to Hong Kong First: DG (13). He confirmed that the sum is still in the accounts of Shanghai Bading and that it was because he saw the astronomical costs incurred by the Receivers that he made the decision to retain those dividends.

181.  It is of importance to remember that some of the reasons I relied on for the making of the Receivership Order were, (a) failure to comply with the terms of the loan agreement with Huaxia Bank in not depositing the rental income into the Huaxia Bank account (paragraph 57 of the March Decision); (b) the genuine doubt as to the integrity and propriety of the accounts (paragraph 74 of the March Decision).  Money is easier to dissipate than landed properties and the risk could not be underestimated given DG’s past conduct (paragraph 15 of the May Decision).  The current state of evidence points undoubtedly to persistent dissipation after the making of the Receivership Order.

Power of the court to give further directions

182.  If the powers given under the Receivership Order turned out to be inadequate, the court will equip the Receivers with additional power to ensure that they can discharge their duties effectively under the order for appointment: McDonald v Golden DynastyEnterprise Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 569, at paras 43-45. 

183.  However the court should not make an idle and ineffectual order: Snell’s Equity, 32nd ed at para 18-038.  It will also not make an order requiring a party to do something which is beyond his power to do: Spry on Equitable Remedies, 8th edpages 493-494.

The proposed directions

184.  I have tabulated the proposed directions and DG’s grounds in opposition:

Paragraph in Receivers’ summonsDirections sought against DGDG’s grounds in opposition
1.1 Provide access to books and records of Macau First, Shanghai Bading, Management Company and HKFUIGL’s Shanghai representative office DG does not have possession or control; contravene Consent Order; no control over YXA and CZQ who acts in accordance with PRC laws
1.2 Provide letters of authorization for release of documents

1.3
Provide list of current offices and accompany Receivers on inspection
1.4 Deliver all seals and chops of Macau First, Shanghai Bading, Management Company and HKFUIGL’s Shanghai representative office
1.5 Provide current contact details of DG and staff of Macau First Shanghai Bading and Management Company Receivers able to communicate with DG through his solicitors; not shown how this will assist Receivers in carrying out their duties; aggressive conduct of Receivers’ representatives makes it prudent not to provide DG’s contact details
DG does not have contact details of staff
1.6 Set up meetings with staff of the above companies Shanghai Bading and Management Company are under control of YXA and CZQ who managed them in accordance with PRC laws; DG has no official position;
Macau First does not have staff
1.7 Convene and attend board meetings of Management Company CZQ is only prepared to operate the Management Company in accordance with PRC laws
1.8 Attend meetings including those with banks, tenants and AIC as requested Term of order vague and oppressive; puts DG at risk of contempt simply because he is unable to attend meeting requested by Receivers; past notices of meetings given at eleventh hour
Purpose of meeting to enable removal of YXA in breach of Consent Order
1.9 Execute 4 declarations to give consent to:- 
  (a) &
(b)
remove YXA as legal representative of Shanghai Bading and to register the change with AIC Will assist Receivers to breach Consent Order. Amount to pre-determination of some live issues before the CA
  (c) remove CZQ as legal representative of the Management Company Decision to remove CZQ to be made by 2 shareholders, FUIL (90%) & Shanghai Bading (10%) in control of YXA.  Can’t make order without flouting the Consent Order and pre-determining live issues before the CA
  (d) commence proceedings against YXA so that the stayed PRC proceedings for return of business licence could be resumed 
  (e) co-operate with the Receivers and comply with his undertakings given 
1.10 Execute documents as may be required to enable the Receivers to obtain control and management of subsidiaries Same as for 1.9; oppressive, too broad and too vague
1.11 Provide list of advisers, agents and representatives of Macau First, Shanghai Bading and Management Company Shanghai Bading and Management Company under control of YXA; no evidence DG has knowledge of the advisers, etc.
Macau First’s advisers known to the Receivers; they refused to cooperate with the Receivers because they did not acknowledge the effect of the Receivership Order in Macau

185.  As I have stated in the Background section above, at this stage, one has to live with the existence of the Consent Order. The Consent Order was directed at Hong Kong First, of which the Receivers are receivers.  To avoid its breach, the directions concerning removal of YXA as a legal representative will not be given pending the appeal.

186.  In my view, however, this Court in exercising its personam jurisdiction over DG has no difficulty in requiring him to procure YXA to do certain acts.  This has nothing to do with removal of the title of YXA but is based on DG’s own case as to beneficial ownership and nomineeship.  The Consent Order existed to preserve that status quo pending trial.  That DG does not have physical possession of books and accounts, seals, chops, staff lists etc is irrelevant.  He clearly is in control of those items through YXA (and indeed CZQ).  DG’s excuse of not having official position in Shanghai Bading and Management Company and cannot set up meetings is unacceptable.  DG has no difficulty issuing a statement in April 2011 to the staff of the PRC Companies giving directions to the staff to comply with the Receivership Order in accordance with the laws of PRC and the truth. 

187.  I fully recognize that a legal representative is to discharge his duties owed to the 2 PRC companies in accordance with PRC laws.  I cannot see how a legal representative can be said to be in breach of PRC laws to be required to disclose to the person whom he regards as the beneficial owner (DG) to prevent him from acting in breach of the Receivership Order.

188.  I will not insist on having DG provide his contact details for as long as he has solicitors on record.  He has a right to engage lawyers although he may have to suffer the risk as to delay and increased costs if he does not provide direct contact details.  However he has to provide the contact details of the staff as the Receivers may wish to obtain information on the running of the PRC Companies from them.  YXA has already volunteered the names and positions of various staff in YXA(2).  

189.  Meetings can be arranged at reasonable, mutually convenient times and through telephone conferencing.  These meetings are necessary for gathering of information and collecting assets of the Companies.

190.  Item 1.9 is not too oppressive, vague or broad as it is similar to para 5(4) of the Receivership Order.

191.  In respect of item 1.11, other than the Macanese attorneys there is also a secretarial company holding some of the books of Macau First.  It is not known whether there are such other agents.  Since the Macanese attorneys were appointed by DG, he can certainly procure them to supply such information.  Although there are ongoing proceedings in Macau and documents are filed with the Macau court, there is no evidence to show that DG cannot produce copy documents to the Receivers.

192.  The directions sought are not idle or ineffectual.  They are within DG’s power to comply.

Ground D3: Inability to raise funds otherwise to service the outstanding mortgages

193.  The mortgages in Hong Kong are over HK$50 million. The Receivers are completely cut off from assets and income of the PRC Companies.  YXA deliberately withheld RMB 9,720,000 dividends belonging to Hong Kong First.  Rental income in Hong Kong and limited bank balances are not sufficient to cover the mortgage repayment and running expenses.  It is also unlikely for the Receivers to obtain a second charge on the Lippo properties and DG objects to borrowing.  Even if the Receivers are to accept DG’s offer of a monthly sum of HK$60,000, that is still insufficient to cover the monthly deficit of about HK$100,000.  The Receivers are not able to cut the leases which are due to expire in September 2012.  The employees are kept because they are useful to the Receivers and cheaper to hire than the Receiver’s own staff.  The Receivers propose selling unit 3509 so as to preserve the connected units at 3705 and 3706.

194.  DG opposes the application on the ground that it is beyond the scope of the Receivership Order and contrary to its underlying spirit.  Mr Tong SC points out that I had expressly refused to give the Receivers a power of sale (which was proposed in para 4(10) of DY’s summons for receivership; see paragraph 104 of the March Decision).  The Lippo properties are unique, sale of which will cause irreparable damage.  He suggests that the likely reason for the proposed sale is to foot the Receivers’ bills. 

195.  The power of sale was not granted because Mr Edward Chan SC submitted at the February hearing that it was the same as the power in para 4(9), although it was not.  It does not matter, though, because the court retains power to give directions in the course of receivership.  Since there is no viable funding option because of the conduct of DG and YXA, there is reason for sale of the Lippo properties.  To foot the bill of the Receivers as provided for under the Receivership Order is justified.

196.  It is no answer for DG to ask why DY has not contributed to the mortgage repayments when DG is the person in de facto control of the finance of the PRC Companies and they have failed to render the proper assistance to the Receivers.

197.  I am of the view that the application for sale of the Lippo properties is made out.  At this stage, I will make an order for the sale to proceed only with Unit 3509 upon satisfaction of 2 conditions: (i) DY’s payment of the first of the 2 instalments for fortification of his undertaking; and (ii) lapse of 42 days from the date of this order.  The parties are, of course, at liberty to make proposals to the Receivers in the meantime to avoid the sale, by e.g. providing appropriate undertakings or funding to the Receivers to discharge the expenses of the Companies and HKFUIGL incurred in the ordinary course of business and the cost of the Receivers.

Power to dispose of assets of Macau First and Hong Kong First

198.  The power sought is too general and too wide. At the time of the Receivership Order, it was not anticipated that a power of sale is needed for a cash rich Shanghai Bading.  The Receivers’ should apply to court as and when the circumstances warrant.

Summary on the Receivers’ Summons

199.  I make an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the Receivers’ Summons save that:

(i) under para 1.5: the reference to DG be removed;

(ii) under para 1.9: the reference to the removal of YXA as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading and the appointment of Yen as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading effective from 18 March 2011 be removed;

(iii) under para 1.9: item (b) regarding the application to AIC for change of legal representative from YXA to Yen be removed;

(iv) under para 1.9: item (d) regarding commencement of legal proceedings against YXA be removed;

Parties are at liberty to agree the time for compliance, failing which the time shall be 7 days from the date of handing down of this decision.

200.  I also make an order in terms of paragraph 2 of the Receivers’ Summons subject to (i) DY’s payment of the first of the 2 instalments for fortification of his undertaking; and (ii) lapse of 42 days from the date of this order. 

201.  I make no order under paragraphs 3 and 4.

202.  There will be liberty to apply.  Costs of this summons shall be borne by DG.

E. THE PROHIBITION SUMMONS

203.  DG seeks directions that, without prejudice to the restrictions contained in paragraph 4(5) of the Receivership Order:

E1. The Receivers shall not bring or prosecute any action whether in Hong Kong or in any other jurisdictions to seek recovery of assets from the parties to this action in respect of matters forming the subject matter of this action;

E2. The Receivers shall not, without leave of the Court, exercise its powers given under paragraph 4(5) of the Receivership Order to bring against the parties to this action or any other third parties in respect of transactions, dealings or matters which occurred before the making of the Receivership Order.

Only DG (14) was filed in respect of this Summons.  DY or the Receivers had no opportunity to file any affirmation as this Summons was filed only one working day before the hearing.

204.  DG objects to the Receivers’ taking out of proceedings on the ground of harassment to him, duplicity of proceedings and waste of costs.  The Receivers consider that any “harassment” was due to DG’s own fault in refusing to hand over assets; a fight on two or more fronts is the result of his own making.

E1. Prohibition against legal proceedings for recovery of assets forming subject matter of this action

205.  Paragraph 4(5) of the Receivership Order provides that the Receivers may bring or defend any action in name and on behalf of the Companies provided that such power “shall not be used to intervene in the conduct of this action and any proceedings between [DY] and [DG] in respect of the ownership over the Companies and/or Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company pending in Mainland, including those proceedings set out in paragraph 50 of the Defence and Counterclaim.”  This power, in my view, is clear enough to render item E1 unnecessary.

E2. Receivers not to bring action re transactions occurring before the Receivership Order without leave

206.  The existing proceedings or likely proceedings against DG (collectively “the Receivers’ proceedings”) include the following:

(i) The writ which has been served in relation to the 2 sums;

(ii) The statutory demand issued by Hong Kong First but not yet served;

(iii) A demand from HKFUIGL to recover HK$1,290,685 which was a balance of directors’ loan entered in the ledger before the date of the Receivership Order. 

(iv) Raising issue on dividends declared by Shanghai Bading but not paid to Hong Kong First.

207.  DG is of the view that whether or not he is liable to return those monies to the relevant Company depends on the outcome of this action.  There is no reason why the Receivers should try to steal a march in this action.  Under paragraph 4(5) of the Receivership Order, the Receivers are only given power to bring such legal proceedings which are necessary for the “protection” (as opposed to “recovery”) of the assets.  More importantly, the Receivers are expressly directed that their power to bring legal proceedings shall not be used to intervene in the conduct of this action.  By bringing proceedings covering the subject matter of DY’s counterclaim, the Receivers have blatantly acted against the terms of the receivership.  It is all the more serious in view of the fact that such proceedings were brought and pursued oppressively and unfairly against DG at a time when the discharge application and the appeal against the Receivership Order were pending.

208.  To protect assets, a receiver may be obliged to take out the necessary recovery action.

209.  Only the 2 Sums have been expressly pleaded. There may be sums siphoned away by DG not ascertained before commencement of the action.  DG cannot pray in aid prayer no. 5 and 6A in the counterclaim (for accounts, inquiries and tracing) and say that other claims by the Receivers form the subject matter of the counterclaim. (para 32 of DG (13)).

210.  I agree with Ms Sit that the core issue in the present action is the beneficial ownership of DG or DY over the Companies.  DY’s counterclaim is in the nature of a claim against DG qua trustee for breach of trust, for which DY seeks equitable relief of account. 

211.  On the other hand, the Receivers’ proceedings serve a different purpose.  They are to fulfil the duties of ascertaining, taking possession of and collecting any money and assets of Shanghai Bading including but not limited to demanding all debts due or which may fall due to Hong Kong First and/or Shanghai Bading: para 4(1) of the Receivership Order.  There is no restriction as to time of when the debts fell due or may fall due.  The Receivers’ proceedings do not affect how the issue of beneficial ownership is to be decided, and hence not an intervention in the conduct of this action.  At this stage, the 2 Sums belong to Hong Kong First and indisputably there was no consideration for their diversion to DG.  The sum of HK$1,290,685 belongs to HKFUIGL, a subsidiary.  The declared dividends belong to Hong Kong First.  The Receivers’ proceedings are for the benefit of the relevant company, not DY.  Anything recovered will be handed over to the real beneficial owner as determined by the Court after trial.  The Receivers’ proceedings are therefore justified (subject to the question of jurisdiction on the statutory demand which it is not necessary to resolve here) as a matter of principle.

212.  However, I have taken into account the fact that some transfers (e.g. the 2 Sums and HK$1,290,685) were made pre-action when DG’s beneficial ownership was not under challenge and there was no threat of any legal action from DY.  Taking out Receivers’ proceedings at this stage may be wasteful when one can anticipate the defence to be DG’s beneficial ownership. On the other hand, there may be subject matters of transactions occurring before the making of the Receivership Order that had never fallen into the hands of DG but need to be dealt with by the Receivers immediately, e.g. dividends of RMB 9,720,000 declared before the Receivership Order but withheld from Hong Kong First by YXA in breach of the Receivership Order.  It is thus difficult to generalize.

213.  However, I agree that some kind of control by the court over what action the Receivers may bring will prevent satellite litigation.  Using the date of the writ (as opposed to the making of the Receivership Order) as a watershed is more appropriate because by that date DG should have been aware of DY’s assertion of ownership. I grant the order sought under item E2 subject to this amendment.  The factors in the preceding paragraph, amongst others, will be relevant in the exercise of discretion in granting leave.

Summary of the Prohibition Summons

214.  I direct the Receivers not to proceed with the writ action, the statutory demand and the claim for HK$1,290,685 until further order.

215.  On costs, it should, on a nisi basis, be costs in the cause of this action as this Summons forms part of the management of the receivership.  The Receivers have not erred in principle in taking the Receivers’ proceedings and they should, on a nisi basis, have their costs out of the Companies.

OTHER MATTERS

216.  I have not perused materials given to me by correspondence after the hearing and have not replied to the solicitors concerned.  I have been informed by my clerk that the 2nd affirmation of CZQ filed after the hearing differed in contents from the copy affirmation handed up to me at the hearing.  I make clear that I have only relied on what was placed before me at the hearing, including the copy affirmation.

CONCLUSION

217.  With regard to the Discharge Summons, I am not satisfied that DY has fabricated evidence or omitted to include material parts of transcript to justify discharge of the Receivership Order.  Nor should the court permit DG to re-open arguments after he has missed 2 opportunities.  Of his complaints of bias or misconduct against the Receivers, breach of the Consent Order after the July Decision and false representation as to change of legal representative are made out.  I direct the Receivers not to remove YXA as legal representative of Shanghai Bading pending the appeal instead of discharging the Receivers or replacing them.  The summons is otherwise dismissed.  I order, nisi that DY and the Receivers’ costs should be borne by DG.

218.  With regard to the Stay Summons, the grounds of appeal are not so strong as to merit a stay.  The Court of Appeal’s grant of costs for the leave to appeal was no indication of the strength of DG’s appeal.  There is nothing to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory if no stay is granted.  If a stay is granted, the risk of dissipation of assets will continue.  I therefore refuse a stay, decline DG’s undertakings and make an order nisi that costs should be to DY.

219.  With regard to the Fortification Summons, the loss was not about rental but the need to incur costs of the receivership for about 27 months.  DY has disclosed only one Hong Kong property and one Australian property.  It is just and proper to order fortification but the quantum should not cover costs incurred by DG’s own failure to cooperate.  I order DY to fortify his undertaking as to damages by paying $10m into court (or providing security in like amount) in 2 tranches of (i) $6.4m within 28 days to cover the period up to 31.5.2012 and (ii) $3.6m within 28 days of the Court of Appeal’s decision on appeal (if the Receivership Order is upheld) to cover the period up to completion of the trial.  Failure to fortify the undertaking will cause the Receivership Order to be discharged.  There will be liberty to apply.   I order, nisi, that costs be to DG borne by DY.

220.  With regard to the Receivers’ Summons, there is failure on the part of DG to comply with the Receivership Order.  There is continued risk of dissipation of assets.  I make an order in terms as sought by the Receivers save that any direction concerning disclosure of contact details of DG and removal of YXA as a legal representative are disallowed.  I also make an order for sale of Unit 3509 of the Lippo Centre subject to DY complying with the fortification order in relation to the first tranche of payment in and lapse of 42 days from the date of this order.  No order is made on paragraphs 3 and 4 of this summons.  There shall be liberty to apply.   Costs of this summons shall, on a nisi basis, be borne by DG. 

221.  With regard to the Prohibition Summons, there shall be an order in terms of paragraph 2 so that the Receivers shall not, without leave of the court, exercise its powers given under paragraph 4(5) of the Receivership Order to bring against the parties to this action or any other third parties in relation to transactions, dealings or matter occurring before the date of the writ in this action.  I also direct the Receivers not to pursue the action in HCA 1933 of 2011, the statutory demand and the claim for HK$1,290,685 until further order.  There shall be an order, nisi, that costs be in the cause and that the Receivers’ costs be paid out of the Companies, in the first instance.

222.  There shall be certificates for all counsel on all summonses and in the case of DG and DY, certificates for 2 counsel.

223.  All costs (including those in favour of the Receivers) are to be summarily assessed on 12 April 2012 at 4:30pm on the papers. Parties are at liberty to agree the quantum or set off one sum against another.  Where no agreement can be reached, the receiving parties shall lodge and serve costs statements by 21 March 2012.  The paying parties shall lodge and serve grounds in objection by 10 April 2012.

224.  I thank all counsel for their industry and able assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Ronny Tong SC, leading Mr Anson Wong and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by LCP, for the plaintiff, in the original action and for the 1st and 2nd defendants, by counterclaim

Mr Warren Chan SC, leading Mr MC Law, instructed by Orrick, for the 1st , 2nd and 3rd defendants, by original action and for the plaintiff, by counterclaim

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by P C Woo & Co, for the receivers

76521-EN-2011-05-19

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATION LLIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff
and
 DING XIAOHONG (丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU (丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 (by original action) 
   
 DING YU (丁育)Plaintiff
and
 DING GANG (丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
2nd Defendant
 (by counterclaim) 

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 13 May 2011

Date of Handing Down Decision: 19 May 2011

_____________

DECISION

_____________

 

The Application

1.  By my judgment dated 10 March 2011 (“the Judgment”), I appointed 2 persons as joint and several receivers and managers (“the Receivership Order”).   In this Decision, I shall adopt the same abbreviations as in the Judgment. 

2.  On 24 March 2011, Macau First and DG (I will refer to them as “DG” for ease of reference) took out 2 summonses (collectively “the 2 Summonses”):

(i)   For leave to appeal from the Receivership Order and a stay of execution pending appeal (“the Leave to Appeal and Stay Summons”).

(ii)   For variation and clarification of the Receivership Order (“the Variation and Clarification Summons”).

3.  On 7 April 2011, I dismissed DG’s application for interim stay of execution pending appeal (“the Interim Stay Decision”) and adjourned the 2 Summonses to the present hearing for argument.  DG now seeks an adjournment, having changed to a new team of counsel.  The application to adjourn is opposed by DY.

Grounds for Seeking Adjournment

4.  The Applicants were originally represented by Messrs. Iu, Lai and Li at the hearing of the application for Receivership Order.  By the time the 2 Summonses were issued, they were represented by Messrs. Herbert Smith.  Allegedly due to loss of mutual trust and confidence and what appeared to be exorbitant fees for work incurred just over one month, DG terminated Messrs Herbert Smith.  Messrs. LCP came on record on 4 May 2011.  Messrs Herbert Smith refused to deliver files to Messrs LCP before fees were settled.  Efforts made by the latter to obtain relevant documents from Court files only resulted in limited files being obtained but not correspondence between the parties, including those involving the Receivers.  There was no reasonable opportunity for the present team of lawyers to review the documents to see if the grounds of appeal were arguable.  Mr Ronny Tong SC, leading Mr Lawrence Cheung, are tentatively of the view that substantial additional grounds of appeal, both as to proper exercise of discretion and jurisdiction, should be added.  It is unlikely for the present team to proceed with the Variation and Clarification Summons in its present form.  Mr Tong SC submits that DY will not suffer any prejudice as a result of the adjournment as his interest is now fully preserved and protected by the Receivership Order.  Any difficulty which the Receivers may encounter in the Mainland should not be considered in the question of adjournment.

5.  DG was apparently caught between the dilemma of having to settle exorbitant fees and the inability to get hold of papers if the solicitors’ lien was not discharged.  This is a common phenomenon when a retainer is terminated.  However, this and the resultant change in legal team, in themselves, cannot be a ground for seeking adjournment.   The Court has to see if there are other good grounds for adjournment, whether there are merits in the proposed appeal, variation and clarification application and whether there will be prejudice arising from the adjournment.

6.  The only other ground for adjournment is that DG was not satisfied with the way Messrs Herbert Smith handled the case and doubted “as to whether his interests had been best protected, in particularly (sic) the appeal against the Receivership Order”.  

7.  What meets the Court’s eyes, in terms of the contents of the 2 Summonses was nothing less than robust and fearless on the part of Messrs Herbert Smith (and Mr Manzoni QC).  If can hardly be said that they failed to protect DG’s interest.  Whilst one cannot compel DG to disclose matters involving legal professional privilege, such ground, without more particulars, is unlikely to attract the sympathy of the Court.   

8.  This is particularly so since the present hearing date (about 6 weeks’ from the interim stay hearing) was fixed at DG’s insistence on disposal as soon as possible.  I accommodated it since a Receivership Order could have drastic impact on a business.  This date was fixed so that both parties could use counsel of their choice.  As matters now stand, this hearing date is wholly wasted.  Although Mr Tong SC proposes to adjourn only for 4 weeks, that would mean Mr Yuen SC (whose side is not at fault) would be unlikely to attend because of his other commitments.

9.  Mr Tong SC invites me to adopt a common sense approach and ask why DG would want to adjourn at his own expense.   That is of course a justified approach.   There can be various reasons why DG may want to delay notwithstanding the resultant financial loss – to retain control over the Companies for as long as possible, to buy time for disposal of assets, to gain mileage in the Mainland proceedings. I do not wish to speculate but would rather consider the matter under the prejudice limb.

Merits of the Proposed Appeal

10.  Leave to appeal is ‘not lightly granted’ an ‘reasonable prospects of success’ for the purpose of s.14AA (4) High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 involves the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be more than ‘fanciful’, without having to be ‘probable’.  SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125.

11.  To meet the ‘reasonable prospect of success’ test in section s.14AA (4) (a) High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, ‘an applicant is required to show “more than just an arguable case, but an appeal that has merits and ought to be heard, although he does not have to demonstrate that the appeal will probably succeed’.  In Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA v. Mong Henry [2009] 5 HKC 515, Chu J at para 19.

12.  I stand by my analyses of the merits in paragraphs 18 – 33 of the Interim Stay Decision.  Mr Tong SC has put forth some possible grounds of appeal which I shall briefly deal with. 

13.  Firstly, it is suggested that I have wrongfully exercised my discretion in not taking account of the injunction order granted by consent by Suffiad J (“the Injunction”).  With respect, the grant of an injunction does not bar the Court from making a receivership order: Akai Holdings Ltd (in Compulsory Liquidation) & others v. Ho Wing On Christopher and others, HCCL 37 & 40/2005, 1.9.2009. DG in fact anticipated a change in Yu Xiaan (“Yu”) as a legal representative, the very thing the Injunction sought to prevent: paragraph 84 of the Judgment.

14.  Next, it is said that the Court should not have taken into account events before the Injunction but only those after as evidence of dissipation.  With respect, that was what I did.  An example would be the attempted sale of the 5th and 7th floors of Citigroup Tower, failing to apply rental income to designated bank accounts and failure to properly keep books of account pre- and post-2010.

15.  Thirdly, Mr Tong SC submits that the Court should not have treated sale of property as dissipation, especially if it was above the market price.  A sale is merely transformation of an asset from one form to another.  With respect, money is easier to dissipate than landed property.  This is not something to be under-estimated in this case as there was evidence that DG had been siphoning off funds from Shanghai Bading in the past.  Moreover, Mr Tong’s submission disregards the evidence in DG’s own affirmation in support of the ex parte injunction in which he said that

“… any sale or disposition of the “Citicorp Tower by Shanghai Bading is not something in the ordinary course of business and is therefore prohibited by our undertakings offered to this Court.” (paragraph 54 of the Judgment)

Mr Tong SC submits that this undertaking only applied to sale of the whole building and not units.  I do not think that was how the parties understood it.  Sale of units may gradually lead to sale of the whole Tower.  It was preservation of the building in its present state of ownership that the undertaking and Receivership Order were aimed at.

16.  Fourthly, it is said that non-payment of bank loans was not dissipation as a bank loan was not an asset.  Whilst it may be correct that a bank loan was not an asset, the concern was rather that the rental income had gone to the wrong destination instead of being used for repaying bank loans.  There was thus mismanagement of assets.

17.  DG has had the opportunity of considering the grounds of appeal by Mr Manzoni QC.  Having had a “trial-run” of those grounds at the application for interim stay a month earlier, DG should not be given a 2nd opportunity to adduce new grounds.  In any case, I am not satisfied that the oral additional grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success. 

Merits of the Variation and Clarification Summons

18.  Mr Tong SC submits that the Variation and Clarification Summons cannot be used to vary the Injunction.  Although it is unlikely that he would argue this Summons in its present terms, he cannot at this stage come to a view of abandoning it.

19.  I stand by my reasons in paragraphs 35 – 38 of the Interim Stay Decision.  There is, however, one matter which needs to be dealt with anyway.  From the submissions lodged for the interim stay application on 7 April and for this hearing, one of the issues disclosed is whether or not the Injunction has been superceded by the Receivership Order (“the Issue”) and whether the Receivers acted properly in passing a resolution to remove Yu as legal representative of Shanghai Bading.  Mr Yuen says that it has impliedly been superceded whilst Mr Manzoni QC and Mr Tong SC disagreed.  I have asked the Receivers to attend the present hearing hoping that this matter could be argued and clarified.  (See paragraphs 8 – 11 of the Interim Stay Decision.)   I still consider the clarification to be necessary in any event.  Accordingly, even if I were to refuse to adjourn the 2 Summonses, I will still reserve the Issue for argument.

20.  There is the further application to vary the costs order nisi under the Judgment.  DG applies to vary the order from one giving costs to DY to DY’s costs in the cause.  The Receivership Order arose because of the risk of dissipation by DG despite his undertakings.  For completeness, I will refer to the authorities which show that the Court can order immediate payment of costs in applications for interim injunctions: Midland Business Management Ltd & another v. Lo Man Kui (also known as Howard Lo), HCA 1599/2010, 4.3.2011, per Lam J; Mendlowitz & Associates Inc v. Winner International Group Ltd & anor, HCA 574/2000, at para 28 – 34 per Au J.  I say no more since DG has advanced no arguments at this hearing.

Prejudice Arising out of an Adjournment

21.  Mr Tong SC suggests that the prejudice of any adjournment is with DG as opposed to DY because the assets involved were DG’s.  I do not agree.  The beneficial interest is yet to be adjudicated.

22.  What bothers me most is that there has not been much that the Receivers could achieve since the making of the Receivership Order.  DG has not been cooperative with the Receivers.  He failed to answer their enquiries, to produce updated accounts, or to produce business licences.  Yu could not be contacted.   The situation has deteriorated in the sense that although Yu had allegedly been acting as his nominee, DG says that even he is not able to get in touch with Yu.  Yu is seeking independent legal advice and DG has not been communicating with him as if they were in the same camp.  Just how DG can still maintain that Yu should not be removed as a legal representative is beyond one’s imagination.  Mr Tong SC submits that it is unfair to DG to simply accept the Receivers’ version without question.  I do not think that is unfair because even from the previous Receivers’ report, given to DG when he was represented by Messrs Herbert Smith, it was clear that the Receivers has met with similar difficulties and DG had not been cooperative, offered any solution or answered the Receivers’ allegations for the purpose of this hearing.

23.  There are other matters worth noting:

(i)   Yu may declare loss of title deeds and try to dispose of Citigroup Tower.

(ii)   There has been attempted sale of the Citigroup Tower at RMB 60,000 per square metre.

(iii)   Tenants of Citigroup Tower having been paying rent to Hong Kong First instead of Shanghai Bading.

(iv)   Huaxia Bank expressed concerns over delay and expressed the intention to call in the loan if the receivership is ineffective. 

(v)   There has been drop in income but significant increase in expenses of Shanghai Bading, leading to a deficit in the accounts.

24.  In my view, point (i) is speculative.  Point (ii) has to be investigated, there being no evidence apart from bare allegation.  Points (iii) and (v) do raise concerns.  They arise out of the difficulty in execution of the Receivership Order due to the uncooperative attitude of DG.  The risk of dissipation which was the key factor for the Receivership Order remains.  There are compelling reasons to clarify the position as soon as possible to enable the receivership to proceed. Adjournment will cause prejudice not only to DY but also the well-being of Shanghai Bading and its holding Companies.

Terms of Adjournment

25.  DG has only offered to pay costs arising out of the adjournment on indemnity basis and Mr Tong SC proposes to amend the draft grounds of appeal within 4 weeks.  I am not minded to let a party “buy” an adjournment.  No other conditions have been offered by DG to make the Receivership Order work during the adjournment (e.g. to do certain undone acts under the Receivership Order or to procure Yu to meet the Receivers by a certain date).  I decline to grant an adjournment.

Stay of Execution Pending Appeal

26.  Since the grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospect of success, there should not be a stay. In any case, I adopt the same reasons in paragraphs 17 – 40 of the Interim Stay Decision.

Conclusion

27.  Change of legal team is not a sufficient ground for adjournment.  Insufficient ground for adjournment has been put forward.  The proposed grounds of appeal and oral additional grounds of appeal disclose no merit. Adjournment will give rise to prejudice and DG has not offered any condition to ensure that the Receivership Order can work in the interval.   I decline to adjourn the 2 Summonses.  Since DG has not put forth submissions in respect of the 2 Summonses, I dismiss them accordingly subject to reserving the Issue for argument.  The Receivers should attend the next hearing of the Variation and Clarification Summons to justify the validity of the Resolution.

28.  I order as follows:

(i)   Save and except the issue of whether paragraph 4 of the Order dated 10 March 2011 superseded paragraph 1 of the Order of Mr. Justice Suffiad dated 9 July 2010 and, if so, whether the Order should be varied or clarified by expressly stating that it supersedes paragraph 1 of the Suffiad J Order (collectively “the Issue”), the Summons dated 24 March 2011 (for leave to appeal), the Summons also dated 24 March 2011 (for variation and clarification), the Summons dated 6 May 2011 (for adjournment) and the Summons dated 9 May 2011 (for adjournment), all taken out by the Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim) be dismissed.

(ii)   The hearing concerning the Issue be adjourned to a date to be fixed, with 3 hours reserved, and the Receivers do attend.

(iii)   On a nisi basis, the costs of all Summonses up to and including the hearing on 7 April 2011 be to the Defendants (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim) on party and party basis and thereafter on indemnity basis, with certificate for two counsel.

(iv)   On a nisi basis, the costs of the Receivers for attending this hearing and the hearing on 7 April 2011 be borne by the Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim).

(v)   The costs referred to in paragraphs (iii) and (iv) be dealt with by summary assessment on the papers on 3 June 2011 at 9:30 am.   No attendance is required.

(vi)   The Defendants (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim) and the Receiver respectively to file and serve a statement of costs within 7 days from today.

(vii)   The Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim) to file and serve their grounds of objections (if any), within 7 days thereafter.

28.  I thank counsel and Mr. Tang for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr. Ronny Tong, SC leading Mr Lawrence Cheung instructed by Messrs. LCP for the Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim)

Mr. Rimsky Yuen, SC leading Mr. MC Law instructed by Messrs. King & Wood for the Defendants (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim)

Mr. Simon Tang of Messrs P C Woo & Co. for the Receivers

75991-EN-2011-04-07

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 DING XIAOHONG (丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU (丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY LIMITED
(香港第一大陸有限公司)
(by original action)
3rd Defendant
 DING YU (丁育)Plaintiff

and

 DING GANG (丁鋼)1st Defendant
 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LIMITED
(澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
(by counterclaim)
2nd Defendant
____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 4 April 2011

Date of Handing Down Decision: 7 April 2011

_____________

DECISION

_____________

 

The Application

1.  Pursuant to a 3-day hearing in February 2011 (“the February hearing”), I handed down a judgment on 10 March 2011 (“the Judgment”) whereby I appointed 2 persons as joint and several receivers and managers (“the Receivership Order”).   In this Decision, I shall adopt the same abbreviations as in the Judgment.

2.  Subsequent to the Judgment, Macau First and DG (“the Applicants”) took out 2 summonses (collectively “the 2 Summonses”):

(i) For leave to appeal from the Receivership Order and a stay of execution pending appeal (“the Leave to Appeal and Stay Summons”).

(ii) For variation and clarification of the Receivership Order (“the Variation and Clarification Summons”).

3.  This is an application by the Applicants for an interim stay pending hearing of those 2 summonses on 13 May 2011.  It is the Applicants’ case that given the significance of the issues raised by the proposed appeal and the apparent disregard that the Receivers have shown for the purposes for which they were appointed, it is essential that there now be a stay so that further irreparable damage is avoided.  The Applicants seek an interim stay that is limited in scope and time by asking me to make an order (a) deeming the Receivership Order to have been made in the terms of the draft order attached to the notice of appeal; or (b) by staying paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Receivership Order which require DG to produce title documents and information to the Receivers.

Urgency for Interim Stay

4.  Although there was no apparent delay in taking out this application, the Applicants have failed to demonstrate any urgency in hearing this application, whether in the affirmations filed in support or otherwise.

5.  In addition, the Applicants have sought to rely on the assertion that the Receivership Order is not recognized under Mainland law and expert legal opinion is adduced.  They have failed to give a fair opportunity to DY to answer that assertion.

6.  The Applicants complain that the Receivers:

(i)     have exercised their powers far beyond the purpose for which they were appointed;

(ii)     have interfered with DG’s participation in the management of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company as a result of the court not making the prohibition against his ouster from management express; and

(iii)    have attempted (and continue to attempt) to exert their powers over Shanghai Bading and the Management Company notwithstanding that neither the Court, nor they, have any jurisdiction in respect of those companies.

7.  The Applicants say that the actions of the Receivers are causing prejudice and damage to Shanghai Bading and the Management Company in terms of interference with banking relationships and tenants.

8.  The Receivers have taken action pursuant to the Receivership Order.  In sending out notices e.g. to tenants of Citigroup Tower and banks, they have made clear that they are receivers of Hong Kong First appointed by the Hong Kong Court.  They knew they were not receivers of Shanghai Bading.  They did not meet with much success in obtaining documents and cooperation from DG as he could not be located.  By a resolution executed by the Receivers, DY and DHX, Yu Xiaan was purportedly removed as the legal representative of Shanghai Bading (“the Resolution”).  By that mode the Receivers purportedly gained control over Shanghai Bading

9.  In McDonald v. Golden Dynasty Enterprises Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 569, Kwan J (as she then was) dealt with a similar situation.  Interim receivers were appointed over holding companies in Samoa (Cs).  The appointment orders vested them with the corporate powers of Cs’ board of directors and specifically empowered them to assume control over Cs and to preserve their assets.  The Receivers complained of substantial non-compliance by Cs so that they were unable to identify and secure of Cs’ assets.  They argued that in the absence of Cs’ cooperation, they would find it problematic to act for and on behalf of Cs in the PRC, as it was extremely difficult to obtain recognition there of the authority of liquidators, provisional liquidators and Receivers to so act solely by reference to the orders or documents which appointed them; and this was particularly so for receivers as there was no such concept in Chinese jurisprudence.  The Receivers therefore applied for an order from the Court requiring Cs to pass a board resolution and execute a power of attorney (which were routinely recognized in the PRC) authorizing them to take actions for and on behalf of Cs to identify and preserve Cs’ assets and investigate any dispositions by Cs during the receivership period.  Kwan J granted the order sought.

10.  MacDonald’s case has a similar factual matrix as faced by the Receivers here.  What is distinguishable is that the receivers there sought approval of the Court before passing the board resolution; and that case did not appear to have an injunction similar to the one granted by Suffiad J (“the injunction”).  In the present case, the Receivers took it upon themselves to pass the board resolution which on its face might be in breach of the injunction.  It is arguable that the Receivers had acted outside their powers.

11.  Even so, it seems the proper challenge is not by staying the Receivership Order but by a summons properly served on the Receivers to challenge their acts.  As it stood, the present summons was not served on the Receivers.  Initially, like Mr Manzoni, I was surprised at the presence of the Receivers and their apparent litigious stance. But having considered their evidence and submission, I am satisfied that the Receivers were concerned about the allegation of their breach of the injunction; and their presence (together with their helpful report) was to assist the Court.  Their attendance was justified.

12.  Subject to the potential argument of the Receivers acting in breach of the injunction by passing the Resolution, I do not see, at this stage, that the Receivers have acted beyond the letter and spirit of the Receivership Order.

13.  The Applicants complain that the actions of the Receivers are causing prejudice and damage to Shanghai Bading and the Management Company in the sense of creating negative publicity, raising concerns of lending banks and tenants.  These have been anticipated, argued in the February hearing and analyzed in the Judgment.  The evidence under the present application only shows that DG’s worries at the February hearing have come true.  This complaint cannot constitute the ground for seeking a stay of the Receivership Order.  In fact, if DG has turned up, cooperated with the Receivers to act in the best interests of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and the Management Company, those concerns could be allayed.

14.  Whether or not passing of the Resolution was in breach of the injunction, DG has an existing and continuing personal duty to comply with the Receivership Order.  He has always claimed to be in control and management of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and the Management Company and Yu Xiaan was his nominee.  It would have been within his ability to comply.  Accordingly, his handing over of title deeds to his present firm of solicitors instead of to the Receivers was in breach of the Receivership Order.  Likewise his failure to provide information to the Receivers was a breach of his duty to produce and procure the production of documents/ information.

15.  For these reasons, the interim stay application ought to be dismissed.

16.  For the sake of completeness, I will briefly analyze this application on the assumption that I am wrong on the urgency point.

Stay under the Leave to Appeal and Stay Summons

17.  The starting point is the authority of Star Play Development Ltd. v. Bess Fashion Management Co. Ltd. [2007] 5 HKC 84, para 6-10.  The burden is on the Applicants to show good reasons for stay.  The existence of strong grounds of appeal or likelihood of success is by itself a good reason.  However, in the majority of cases it is undesirable and unnecessary to go deeply into the merits and strength of an appeal.  If the appellant only has an arguable appeal, he will have to provide additional reasons why an appeal is justified, such as that an appeal will be rendered nugatory if no stay is granted.  The cases of SWE Limited v. Chong Lai Fun HCA 1064 of 2004; Re Chime Corporation Ltd HCMP 4146 of 2001are distinguishable as they relate to stay of proceedings rather than stay of execution of an order pending appeal as in the present case.

Merits of the Appeal

18.  The grounds of appeal can broadly be classified into 2 limbs:

(i)   That this Court has no jurisdiction to appoint receivers over a foreign non-party such as Shanghai Bading (“the jurisdiction ground”).

(ii) The terms of the Receivership Order are not clear and adequate and have to be clarified (“the ambit ground”). This limb is the mirror image of the Variation and Clarification Summons.

The Jurisdiction Ground

19.  A jurisdictional issue may be taken at any stage and it can be dealt with on appeal even though it was not argued in the Court below: Norwich Corporation v. Norwich Electric Tramways Co Ltd [1906] 2 KB 119, 125; Westminster Bank Ltd v. Edwards [1942] AC 529, 533-534.

20.  It cannot be disputed that this Court has only a personam jurisdiction over the parties who are before it.  It cannot purport to give an order that binds non-parties outside the Court’s jurisdiction. See Babanaft International Co SA v. Bassatne [1990] Ch 13, 44B.  For present purposes, I also accept that the proviso used by the English Court to protect the position of foreign non-parties is also applicable to Hong Kong: Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (Nos. 3 & 4) [1990] CH 65, 84 C-F; Bank of China v. NBM LLC [2002] 1 WLR 844, para 16-23.

21.  The jurisdiction ground was not raised at the February hearing.  The situation spoke for itself – leading and junior counsel on both sides then before me were clear that there was no jurisdiction issue.  The appointment of receivers and managers was not directly on Shanghai Bading and the Management Company.  The effect of the Receivership Order is that the Receivers are appointed over Macau First and Hong Kong First and through their control of these Companies, control their most valuable underlying assets, Shanghai Bading, the Land and the Citigroup Tower.

22.  In purporting to appeal on the jurisdiction ground, the Applicants have to rely on a PRC legal opinion, which is new evidence.  At the February hearing, the parties have had every opportunity to adduce expert evidence on PRC law.  I cannot see how the present attempt to rely on a new PRC legal opinion can pass any of the Ladd v. Marshall tests and the Applicants have not even begun to show that they could.  On top of it, DY has not been given a reasonable opportunity, as of the date of this hearing, to respond to the legal opinion.

23.  Assuming the new PRC legal opinion relied on by the Applicants is admissible on appeal, it says that the Receivership Order is not recognized under PRC law.  However, that cannot prevent the Hong Kong Court from making and enforcing a receivership order.  For an example, see McDonald v. Golden Dynasty Enterprises Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 569, per Kwan J (as she then was).

24.  I see little merit in the jurisdiction ground.

The Ambit Ground

25.  The Receivership Order is criticized as being unclear and inadequate.   The Variation and Clarification Summons seeks to put that clear.  I am grateful to Mr Yuen SC leading Mr MC Law (acting for DY) for preparing a draft amended Receivership Order which sets out all the proposed terms of variation and clarification suggested by the Applicants or otherwise should be included if the Applicants were successful in the appeal.  In summary the Applicants seek to:

(i)          Add new provisions to state that the purpose of the appointment of the Receivers is to monitor the running and management of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and the Management Company and if the Receivers reasonably believe there threatens to be a breach of the DG undertakings, to take steps necessary to prevent that beach so as to ensure there is no dissipation of assets of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and the Management Company.  The Receivers are not entitled to exercise their powers to restrain DG from participating in the business or interfere with his participation unless the Receivers reasonably believe there to be a breach of DG’s undertaking.

(ii)        Remove the existing paragraph 3 which provides that “the powers of all directors and officers of the Companies shall cease forthwith unless otherwise authorized by the Receivers or by this Court.”

(iii)     Remove the Receivers’ power to take in assets of the subsidiaries of the Companies including Shanghai Bading and the Management Company. 

(iv)     Provide that the Receivers will not have power to distribute dividends out of the profits of the Companies.

(v)        Remove the power of the Receivers to appoint or remove directors and limits its powers to take control of the Companies qua shareholders only.

(vi)     Require the Receivers to specify a date by which DG shall hand over title documents.

(vii)   Limit DG’s obligation to comply with the existing paragraph 5 of the Receivership Order (on provision of title documents and information and compliance with Receivers’ directions) “insofar as DG can lawfully do so in accordance with PRC or other applicable law”.

(viii)   Remove the obligation on DG in paragraph 6 of the Receivership Order to provide information and/or documents concerning the Companies and/or Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company, their promotion, formation, businesses, dealings, affairs or properties to the Receivers.

(ix)     Require the Receivers to file reports every 14 days.

26.  During the February hearing, when leading counsel for DG said that he wished to comment on the terms of the Receivership Order after I had given a decision on whether to make the appointment, I expressly informed counsel that it was my practice to have the terms of the order argued at the same time.  It was precisely with a view to avoiding the situation I am now facing – an attempted re-opening of arguments.  In the end, after discussion with counsel, I adopted the draft minutes of order with certain adjustments.

27.  After handing down of the Judgment, solicitors for both parties had the opportunity to review the terms of the draft order before submission for sealing.  There was an issue over how to reflect paragraph 87 of the Judgment in the draft order, which states,

“What I do not accept, however, is that DG be ousted from management even before determination of the action. There is no strong reason to the contrary. The existence of receiver and manager will be there to safeguard any potential dissipation of assets by DG.”

28.  In the correspondence, only 2 areas of changes were raised.  The first one –to extend DY’s undertaking as to damages to cover not only Hong Kong First but also DG personally – was accepted by DY’s solicitors.  The second one – to add a phrase at the end of paragraph 4(7) to the draft order to provide that the power to appoint or remove directors should not include the power to oust DG from the management of the Companies.

29.  The letter dated 14 March 2011 from Messrs. King & Wood (Solicitors for DY) to this Court largely reflected what happened during the hearing and my views.

30.  Through my clerk’s letter dated 14.3.2011, I have stated my views on the 2 proposed changes as follows:

“Re point no. 1 in [the letter from DG’s former solicitors]: I agree that the undertaking as to damages should extend to loss of DG personally.

Re point no. 2 in the same letter: there should be no change to paragraph 4(7) of the Order. A paragraph between paragraphs 7 and 8 should be added to the Order which refers to the dismissal of paragraph 2 of the summons. This will reflect my view that DG will not be ousted from management.

Paragraph 87 of my judgment is to ensure that there be a proper review of the terms of the draft Minutes before engrossment to ensure that terms relating to ouster of DG be removed.  After reading the 2 solicitors’ letters, it seems the Minutes do not require amendment except to put in the amendments discussed with counsel at the hearing, which I have already done.”

31.  There was then no more issue over the terms and the Receivership Order was sealed.  I cannot see how the Applicants can now say the terms were unclear and seek for variation which is in effect to re-argue the terms of the Receivership Order.

32.  The Applicants should be left to justify the ground for seeking a stay of execution at the next hearing.  Suffice to say that on the evidence now before me, the purpose of the appointment has already been stated in paragraph 1 of the Receivership Order, namely, “until the final determination of this action or further order of this Court”.  I have not just appointed receivers but also managers.  A receiver collects and preserves assets; a manager carries on the trade and not just monitors its running: In re Manchester and Milford Railway Co (1880) 14 Ch.D. 645, at 653.  It is ludicrous to suggest that the Receivers should only act if there is a threatened breach of the DG Undertakings when this Court has already found that there existed a risk of breach of the DG Undertakings, that there was risk of dissipation of assets and mismanagement of Shanghai Bading and that corporate governance was such as to cause genuine doubts as to the integrity and propriety of the accounts to warrant the appointment of the Receivers.

33.  The purported appeal on the ambit ground seeks to remove one of the most important powers of the Receivers to ultimately gain control over Shanghai Bading and the Management Company and defeats the purpose of the appointment.  DG has also failed to show how compliance with his obligations under the Receivership Order will be against any law.  I see little merit in this ground of appeal at this stage.

Appeal Being Rendered Nugatory If No Stay

34.  There is nothing to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory or anything being irreversible if the appeal is allowed and the Applicants have not shown any. The Applicants are also protected by DY’s undertaking as to damages.

 Stay Pending the Variation and Clarification Summons

35.  Paragraph 10 of the Receivership Order gives liberty to the parties to apply generally.  It is pursuant to that paragraph that the Variation and Clarification Summons is taken out.  The terms of variation and clarification and my analyses under the ambit ground are applicable.

36.  In addition, the Court will not entertain an application for variation of a court order unless there is significant change of circumstances: Chanel v. FW Woolworth & Co. Ltd. [1981] 1 WLR 485 at 492-493; Re Prudential Enterprise Ltd, HCCW 594/1999, at para 12-13, per Chu J.

37.  In the present case, there has not been such change.  The stigma created by an appointment of Receivers and the so called significant risk of prejudice and damage to Shanghai Bading and the Management Company cannot be such change.  Neither can the suggestion, through a PRC legal opinion, that a receivership order is not recognized in Mainland China.

38.  I see little merit in the Variation and Clarification Summons at this stage.

Balance of Convenience

39.  Assuming that the principles on stay of proceedings are applicable to the Variation and Clarification Summons, the Court will have to consider the balance of convenience and fairness between the parties: SWE Ltd v. Chong Lai Fun, HCA 1062 of 2004, per Reyes J, at para 27; Re Chime Corporation Ltd, HCMP 4146 of 2001, per Kwan J, at para 14.

40.  The Receivership Order was made despite DG’s undertakings. Any delay in execution of the Receivership Order will be a denial of DY’s “fruits of judgment” in that all the risks of dissipation of assets and mismanagement of companies existing before the February hearing will be revived.  On the other hand, DG’s concerns (except the jurisdiction ground and breach of injunction) have all been rehearsed at the February hearing.  The balance of convenience lies in not staying the Receivership Order.

Conclusion

41.  I find that there is no urgency in the present application.  There do not appear to be merits in the 2 Summonses and there is no question of any stay of the Receivership Order on the terms suggested by the Applicants.  The terms of the proposed variations failed to take into account the stance of the previous team of lawyers for DG and do not reflect the substance of Judgment.

42.  Even if the Applicants can demonstrate an appeal with arguable grounds of appeal, there is nothing to show that the appeal will be rendered nugatory or that there will be irreversible damage. The balance of convenience lies in no interim stay.

43.  The application for interim stay is dismissed.  I direct that the Receivers do attend the hearing on 13 May 2011 as they may have to justify the validity of the Resolution.

44.  On a nisi basis,

(i) costs of this application should be to the respondent DY to be summarily assessed upon disposal of the 2 Summonses on 13 May 2011;

(ii) costs of the Receivers’ preparation and attendance be borne by the Applicants to be summarily assessed upon disposal of the 2 Summonses on 13 May 2011.

45.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr. Charles Manzoni, QC instructed by Messrs. Herbert Smith for the Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim)

Mr. Rimsky Yuen, SC leading Mr. MC Law instructed by Messrs. King & Wood for the Defendants (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim)

Mr. Simon Tang of Messrs P C Woo & Co. for the Receivers

75585-EN-2011-03-10

MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL LTD v. DING XIAOHONG AND OTHERS

HTML content

 

HCA 992/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 992 OF 2010

____________

BETWEEN

 MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONLPlaintiff
 LIMITED (澳門第一環球國際有限公司) 

and

 DING XIAOHONG (丁小紅)1st Defendant
 DING YU (丁育)2nd Defendant
 HONG KONG FIRST MAINLAND COMPANY
LIMITED (香港第一大陸有限公司)
(by original action)
3rd Defendant
 DING YU (丁育)Plaintiff

and

 DING GANG (丁鋼)
MACAU FIRST UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONL
1st Defendant
2nd Defendant
 LIMITED (澳門第一環球國際有限公司)
(by counterclaim)
 
____________

 

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 8 – 10 February 2011

Date of Handing Down Decision: 10 March 2011

 

_____________

DECISION

_____________

 

1.  This case effectively is a dispute between 2 brothers, Ding Gang (“DG") and the 2nd defendant Ding Yu (“DY”). Each claims sole beneficial ownership of shares in companies which own a valuable piece of land and a building erected thereon. This application is by DY for the appointment of a receiver and manager to preserve the assets pending final determination of the dispute.

THE BACKGROUND

2.  DG and Ding Xiao Hong (“DXH”) (1st defendant and sister of DY and DG) were the holders of 99% and 1% shares respectively in the plaintiff, Macau First Universal International Ltd (“Macau First”).  Macau First was the sole shareholder of the 3rd Defendant, Hong Kong First Mainland Co. Ltd. (“Hong Kong First”), which in turn was and still is the sole shareholder of Shanghai Bading Property Development Co. Ltd. (“Shanghai Bading”).  Shanghai Bading was and is the owner of substantial parts of Citigroup Tower, a very valuable commercial complex built over a piece of land at Shanghai Pudong (“the Land”).   The business of Shanghai Bading includes receiving rent from leasing the Citigroup Tower.  The actual management and maintenance of the Citigroup Tower was undertaken by a subsidiary of Shanghai Bading called Shanghai Citigroup Tower Property Management Co. Ltd. (“the Management Company”).

3.  DY claims that he was and is the real beneficial owner of Citigroup Tower and the Land.  DG and DXH were only his nominees acting on his instructions and directions.

4.  In May 2010, on the instructions of DY, DXH purportedly caused Macau First to transfer all its shares in Hong Kong First to themselves (“the Share Transfers”) at a purported consideration of HK$5 million, without notice to DG.

5.  In June 2010, DXH and DY sought to seize control over Shanghai Bading by taking steps to replace its existing legal representative and by obtaining its company seals.   The application to the State Administration of Industry and Commerce to change the legal representative was suspended because Macau First had presented the injunction order below referred to.  The day to day management of Shanghai Bading therefore still rests with DG.

6.  On 2 July 2010, Macau First obtained an ex parte order from Au J restraining DXH, DY and Hong Kong First from, amongst others, disposing of their interest in Shanghai Bading and taking further steps to replace the existing legal representative of Shanghai Bading.

7.  On 3 July 2010 DG procured Macau First to file the writ.

8.  DXH, DY and Hong Kong First did not contest the ex parte order.  Upon their undertakings to the Court not to dispose of their interest in Shanghai Bading and by consent, the ex parte order was continued by Suffiad J on 9 July 2010.  A cross-undertaking was given by DG and Macau First not to procure or cause the disposition or diminution in value of the assets of Hong Kong First and Shanghai Bading other than in the ordinary course of business and for fair market value (“the DG Undertakings”).

9.  On 19 October 2010, DY took out the present summons (“the Application”) for an order, amongst others, that:

(i) Interim receivers and managers be appointed to Macau First and Hong Kong First (“the Companies”);

(ii) DG do hand over all title documents in respect of the Land and Citigroup Tower, the business registration documents, seals or chops of Hong Kong First and Macau First and their subsidiaries, including those of Shanghai Bading and the Management Company and provide information or documents to the receivers;

(iii) DG be restrained from participating in the business of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company (save with the consent and directions of the receivers) pending final determination of this action.

(iv) Alternatively, DG do provide to DY monthly reports and prior notice of substantial transactions of Shanghai Bading.

10.  In substance, the Application was premised on DY’s assertion that he, instead of DG, provided the funding and has been the sole beneficial owner of the Land, Citigroup Tower and the Companies. The Application is necessary to guard against the clear risk of dissipation of assets by DG despite the existence of the DG Undertakings.

DY’s CASE

11.  DY has provided detailed evidence on his background since 1985 leading up to the acquisition of the Land and his establishment of Shanghai Bading and the consequent construction of the Citigroup Tower (started in 2002 and completed in 2005). He has given an account as to his accumulation of funds since the 1980s from his businesses through various companies, the source of funds used for the construction of the Citigroup Tower and each step of his participation therein.  He alleged that DG did not have the financial means to acquire the Land and/or to construct the Citigroup Tower.

12.  DY came from a family with humble background in Shangrao.  DXH is his elder sister, Ding Wei (“DW”) the elder brother and DG his younger brother.

13.  DY described how he started off with a sole proprietorship in about 1985 in Shangrao city and then developed iron and steel business with DW.  Gradually the business expanded and various companies were set up in Hainan and then Shanghai, including in particular, 2 companies called Shanghai Purao and Shanghai Dingtai which were engaged in steel trading business.  DY claims that he provided all the funding for these companies and DG simply had no means to do so.  DG was appointed as legal representative of Shanghai Purao on the instructions of DY and as DY’s nominee.  It was DY and DW who ran the companies. 

14.  In contrast, DG, who was only educated up to secondary school level, had no proper job.  He was supported by DY and DW.  They brought him from Shangrao to Shanghai to assist in running errands.  DG, however, suffered great loss in the trading of futures.  He had to be supported by his brothers in various aspects.  In June 1993, at the instigation of their father, DY and DW executed 2 Deeds of Gift to provide for DG who had no real earning capacity or financial means.  DG denied ever seeing those Deeds.  Since moving to Shanghai in 1993 and up to 1997, DG did not have any job in Shanghai and only acted as DY’s driver and personal assistant.

15.  Shanghai Dingtai was of a substantial scale and generated large amount of profits. Notwithstanding loss of its funds as a result of DY’s trading in stocks and futures, DY still had substantial assets accumulated by early 1990s.   This company marked the beginning of DY’s property development business.

16.  In 1997, DY directed DG to assist him in collecting information about several plots of land for sale.  Initially it was DG who liaised with the vendor in relation to the Land but it was DY who eventually made the decision to purchase.  DY also authorized DG to sign the Land Transfer Agreement on 25 March 1997.  DY allegedly provided the funds for the initial deposit of RMB 2 million.  He and DW made efforts to find potential investors.  Eventually a joint venture enterprise called Shanghai Bading was formed between Shanghai Dingtain and one Balin brought in by DW.   

17.  DY was appointed vice general manager of Shanghai Bading.    Although DW and DG were appointed as vice-chairman, they had no powers in the company and DW ceased to participate in the affairs of Shanghai Bading after its establishment.

18.  Funds were injected by Shanghai Dingtai and Balin into Shanghai Bading.   After signing of the joint venture agreement, DY (representing Shanghai Dingtai) was the one involved in major discussions in relation to the Land.  He was the one involved in discussion with Citibank who eventually decided to purchase some of the office floors of the building with the right to name the building.  He also undertook an active role in the construction of Citigroup Tower, negotiating with government authorities and deciding on selling strategy.  DG did not participate in negotiation or decision making.   DY allowed him to attend meetings, sign some documents to gain some business experience and undertake simple tasks.

19.  Shanghai Bading used to have overseas investors.  Due to onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, overseas investors including Balin were not able to fufil their obligations to inject further funds and wanted to withdraw from their investment. DY established various companies in 2000 to take over the shareholdings in the overseas investors and facilitate capitalization from borrowings from those companies.   Funds for establishing such companies were provided by DY from Shanghai Dingtai or Shanghai Bading and all the shares of those companies were either held by DY or his nominees.  Since September 2000, through various transfers of shares, DY became the sole owner of Shanghai Bading.  By June 2006, Hong Kong First had completed acquisition of all the shareholding of Shanghai Bading. Since July 2006, Macau First became the 100% registered shareholder of Hong Kong First.

20.  A turning point came in around July 2003 (by whence the construction project was well underway) as a result of what was known as the Bai Xiaojiang’s incident.  Mr Bai Xiaojiang of the vendor of the Land was suspected of misappropriating state-owned assets.  In order to avoid negative impact on the sale of the Citigroup Tower and the reputation of Shanghai Bading, DY resigned as director.   So did DG.  As a result, other nominees were appointed as directors in their place in August 2003 but DY entrusted the day-to-day operations and management of Shanghai Bading to DG.  DY absented himself from the opening ceremony of the Citigroup Tower.   He also transferred his shares in Shanghai Dingtai to DXH and she also became its legal representative in his place, later replaced by Yu Xiaan (son of DY’s half-sister) at DY’s directions.  Shanghai Dingtai was deregistered in August 2008.

21.  As DY wanted to shift his focus of investment abroad, Hong Kong First was incorporated in Hong Kong in 2004 with a share capital of HK$100,000.  The initial shareholders were DXH (95%) and DY (5%).  This company does not have any business of its own but is a vehicle used to hold the shares in Shanghai Bading. 

22.  Since about 2005, DY’s focus of investment had been shifted from HK and the Mainland to overseas countries.  DW and DXH were occupied otherwise, so DY entrusted DG to manage the business in the Mainland, especially Shanghai Bading and Citigroup Tower. 

23.  In 2006, DG suggested to DXH that a company should be set up in Macau for social security fund contribution purposes and he wanted to own a company and appear to be the boss.   DY agreed and so Macau First was incorporated in Macau in that year.  At DY’s directions, the shares were allocated as to 85% to DG, 5% to DXH, 5% to DY and 5% to Su although DY was the beneficial owner. 

24.  In March 2006, DG proposed to DY that he should make DG a nominee shareholder of Hong Kong First as he had been entrusted with the operation of the business and needed to appear more assertive in front of outsiders.  DY agreed and arranged for allotment of 4,900,000 shares in Hong Kong First to be subscribed for by Macau First.  DY and DXH’s shares (save for 1% which she retained) in Macau First were also transferred to DG.  Since July 2006, all shares of Hong Kong First have been held by Macau First, as to 99% by DG and 1% by DXH. No consideration was provided for the 4,900,000 shares by Macau First or DG.  DG acted as DY’s nominee.  DXH remained as a director to assist DY in dealing with the company’s affairs.  DXH also obtained a certification that she and DG had equal rights as a director in the company. 

25.  In about March/April 2010, DY instructed DG to apply RMB 600 million from Shanghai Bading to an investment project in Jiangwan.  DG refused, claiming that Shanghai Bading did not have the funds.   He also refused to make available books and records for DY’s inspection.  Suspecting that DY had misappropriated assets of Shanghai Bading and realizing that his relationship with DG had broken down, DY thus instructed DXH to take urgent steps to retain control over Shanghai Bading.  This led to the Share Transfers, consequent upon which shares in Hong Kong First are held by DXH and DY in the proportion of 95% and 5%.

26.  DY’s case was that he had built up all the companies with his own funds.  He had the financial means to acquire the Land and construct Citigroup Tower whereas DG had not.  He denied that DG had any interest in all these assets.  DG and DHX were his nominees who acted on his instructions and directions.  At all material times, shares in Macau First and Hong Kong First were held by nominees on trust for DY.

27.  After the Bai Xiaojiang incident when DY entrusted the operation of Shanghai Bading to DG, the latter abused such position in procuring DHX to sign various documents including those in respect of changes in shareholding and legal representatives of companies, deeds of gifts and authorization letters without DY’s consent. There were allegations that some signatures of DXH were forged.

28.  In addition, DG and his ex-wife Su had caused numerous transfers of shareholdings in connected companies such as Shanghai Puding, Shanghai Dingxing, Shanghai Shenxin, Shangrao Sanxin and Shangrao Sanqing, into the names of DG’s nominees. 

29.  DY counterclaims against DG for, amongst others, a declaration that he was the sole beneficial owner of the Companies, Shanghai Bading, the Land and Citigroup Tower and breach of fiduciary duties.

DG’s CASE

30.  DG’s case is almost the exact opposite of DY’s, i.e. that he was the one who worked to accumulate wealth and whereas DY was the financially poorer one. 

31.  DG started off in the business of transport, logistics and sale of vehicle parts, etc.  He invested in railway projects.  It was he who funded the establishment of Shanghai Purao and later Shanghai Dingtai.  He appointed DY as legal representative of Shanghai Dingtai.  In about 1992 he applied profits to the stock market and earned more than RMB 10 million by 1997 whereas DY lost a lot of money and applied significant sums of Shanghai Dingtai to cover the loss. DG accumulated wealth to enable him to acquire the Land and Citigroup Tower. It was he who did the negotiation, and made the major decisions in respect of the acquisition of the land, construction of Citigroup Tower and its running. He brought in investors to form a joint venture and negotiated with Citibank N.A. over purchase of part of Citigroup Tower.  He signed important documents and attended the topping out and opening ceremonies of Citigroup Tower.  DY’s involvement was limited. 

32.  In 2004, upon the advice of the head of legal department Mr Xu, DG asked his nominees to sign some documents to evidence that they were his nominees.  DXH and Su (his major nominees) signed Gift Agreements (“the DXH Gift Agreement” and “SXP Gift Agreement”).  Although so named, those 2 documents contained an acknowledgement by DXH and Su respectively that the subject assets had been lawfully acquired by DG and that they were holding as his nominees only.  They were willing to return those assets to DG by way of gift.  The DXH Gift Agreement covered her shareholding in, amongst others, Shanghai Dingtai, Macau First and any shares or rights relating to her direct or indirect holding in Shanghai Dingtai.

33.  DG points out that DY has failed to identify overseas investment which he was occupied with. There was no substantial business or investment that needed DY’s attention which would cause him, the alleged beneficial owner, to delegate the important task of managing Shanghai Bading to DG and Su.

34.  DG claims to be the sole beneficial owner of Macau First, Hong Kong First, Shanghai Bading, the Citigroup Tower and the Land.  DXH held shares in Macau First for him but effected the Share Transfers without his authority.  DG seeks to set aside the Share Transfers and for an order that the shares in Hong Kong First be returned to Macau First.  Alternatively, he seeks damages for DXH’s breach of fiduciary duty and damages for conspiracy between her and DY.

GROUNDS FOR DY’S APPLICATION

35.  DY relies on the following heads of risk of dissipation of the assets of Shanghai Bading and/or mismanagement of the Companies or Shanghai Bading in support of his application:

Risk (1):       Attempts to sell the whole of the 5th floor and part of the 7th floor of the Citigroup Tower (not in 1st supporting affirmation of DY);

Risk (2):       Failure to apply rental in repayment of the mortgage due from Shanghai Bading to Huaxia Bank (not in 1st supporting affirmation of DY);

Risk (3):       Recent accounting irregularities in respect of Shanghai Bading based on the evidence of an independent certified tax agent (“Ms Wu”);

Risk (4):       Suspicious accounting practice since 2007 made known to DY recently;

Risk (5):       Recent suspicious transactions;

Risk (6):       Previous suspicious transactions;

Risk (7):       Recent outflow of cash assets

Risk (8):       Unacceptably low standard of commercial morality of DG;

Risk (9):       Irregular treatments of dividends paid by Shanghai Bading to Hong Kong First.

36.  It is not in dispute that DG and his nominees are currently in control of Shanghai Bading without supervision by or any need to account to DY.  In the light of those risks, DY claimed that the DG Undertakings would not be sufficient to protect his interests in the Land, the Citigroup Tower and Shanghai Bading.  It was imperative for there to be an interim receiver to preserve the status quo and to facilitate investigation of suspicious transactions.

GROUNDS IN OPPOSITION

37.  DG opposes the application on the following grounds:

(i)       That he has a much stronger case than DY.

(ii)       That there is no real risk of dissipation of assets.

(iii)       That DY has undue delay in making the application.

(iv)       That irreparable damage will be done if receivers are appointed.

(v)       That no meaningful cross-undertaking as to damages has been given by DY.

PRINCIPLES ON THE APPONTMENT OF INTERIM RECEIVER

38.  The Court has jurisdiction under section 21L(1) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, to appoint a receiver “in all cases in which it appears to the Court of First Instance to be just or convenient to do so”.

39.  The power to appoint receivers on an interlocutory application is a discretionary power to be exercised flexibly on similar principles to grant an interlocutory injunction and the principles in American Cyanamid apply.    Chinese United Establishments Ltd v. Cheung Siu Ki & Anr [1997] 2 HKC 212; Re Niceline Co. Ltd. [2003] 2 HKLRD 725.  In  other words, the court needs to consider the following question:

(i)       Whether there is a serious question to be tried;

(ii)       Whether there is a real risk of dissipation of assets;

(iii)      Whether there is no or no current effective protective regime and some form of interim protection should be given to preserve the status quo;

(iv)      The risk of damage to the company if the appointment is made, and whether it can be adequately compensated by a cross-undertaking in damages.

SERIOUS ISSUE TO BE TRIED

40.  DY suggests that his detailed version supported by contemporaneous documents and affirmations from independent witnesses involved in the early stages of the construction of Citigroup Tower was more credible than the cursory account of DG which merely recited what could be deduced from the documents with no account of the process of negotiation.  DG simply lacked documentary evidence to show his accumulation of wealth.  His witnesses were not independent.  Some of them like the current employees of Shanghai Bading only joined the company in or after 2000 and had no knowledge of crucial matters.

41.  On the other hand, whilst accepting that DY has shown serious issues to be tried, Mr Chan SC for DG submits that DG’s case was clearly stronger than DY’s on the merits to justify dismissal of DY’s application. 

42.  Mr Chan SC queries why DY had to provide consideration of HK$5 million (a clear undervalue) for the Share Transfers if he were the real owner.  He relies on 7 salient features based on undisputed or indisputable evidence that unequivocally pointed to the fact that DG is the ultimate beneficial owner. 

(i) Salient feature 1: The nominees who held interest in the intervening companies that ultimately held Shanghai Bading have close relationship with DG.  They included Su, Su’s mother, mother of DG’s common law wife, DG’s nephew-in-law and DG’s friends.  They had all executed letters of authorization authorizing DG to manage and control the intervening companies.  It was hardly conceivable for DY to appoint individuals with no relationship to himself if he were the sole beneficial owner.  He had offered no explanation for these appointments.

(ii) Salient Feature 2: The DXH Gift Agreement and the SXP Gift Agreement.  The 2 Gift Agreements were executed before a qualified attesting officer in Shanghai.  Su confirmed on oath that the SXP Agreement accurately reflected the fact that DG was the ultimate beneficial owner.  DXH’s explanation was that she signed the DXH Gift Agreement without reading the content, which lacked credibility given that she was not illiterate and was chosen by her brothers to run various companies. Mr Chan SC submits that in the absence of any credible explanation, the 2 Gift Agreements were clear and solemn documentary evidence contradicting DY’s case.

(iii) Salient Feature 3: Clear evidence from officers and employees of Shanghai Bading. All the high ranking officers and employees of Shanghai Bading put in affirmations to confirm that DG (as opposed to DY) is the boss of Shanghai Bading responsible for all major business decisions.  Mr Chan SC asks rhetorically: if DY were the real boss, why would the employees side with DG?  The fact that outsiders having dealings with DY thought that he was the boss is much less probative in showing who owned the company.

(iv) Salient Feature 4: signing of major contracts by DG.  It was DG who signed all the important agreements on behalf of Shanghai Bading in respect of the acquisition of the Land and construction of the Citigroup Tower.  DY barely said that DG was signing on his instructions without explanation.  Mr Chan SC submits that the fact that DY was involved in the pre-contractual negotiations (disputed) and that DG was the person signing formal documents (indisputable) demonstrates that DG was the boss of Shanghai Bading and DY was one of the employees.

(v) Salient Feature 5: DG’s dealings with the Citigroup and his presence in ceremonies. As confirmed by evidence from officers of the Citigroup, DG was the person responsible for the negotiation between Shanghai Bading and the Citigroup.  DY seeks to rely on the evidence of one Mr Zhong to support his allegation that he was involved in the negotiation with the Citigroup when Mr Zhong had left the Citigroup in 2001 and could not possibly be involved in any negotiation on behalf of  Citigroup since then.   DG also participated in all landmark events as President of Shanghai Bading when DY was absent in all of them.  Mr Chan SC submits that DY’s explanation that he wanted to keep a low profile could not be genuine because it failed to explain his absence before the arrest of Mr Bai in 2003 and after his being ruled innocent in 2005.

(vi) Salient Feature 6: DG and DY’s immigration under different schemes.  DG emigrated to Australia under the Class 132 scheme by virtue of his being a high calibre business owner having substantial investment in companies in Australia.  In contrast, DY could only emigrate there under the Class 164 scheme for persons in senior management of large companies but not owning any company.  DY explains that he applied under Class 164 because he wanted to maintain a low profile after the arrest of Mr Bai.  Mr Chan SC submits, however, that there was no reason for DY to believe that the emigration application would make him high profile.  Further, by the time DY made the application in 2007, Mr Bai had already been ruled innocent by the court for 2 years.  It was also noteworthy that in his application for emigration, DY had not declared that he beneficially owned the Citigroup Tower.

(vii) Salient Feature 7: DY and DXH had no knowledge of being appointed as legal representatives or alteration of shareholding.  On DY’s case, there were companies established without his knowledge.  Likewise, he and DXH had been made legal representatives of some of them without his knowledge.  It was difficult to accept that as the real boss he did not have any knowledge in the change of shareholdings and left things to DG.

43.  In deciding whether or not there is any serious question to be tried, the Court will not resolve disputes of fact or even try to form a provisional view on the issues in dispute: Chan Wai Tak v. Chan Mau Ping, HCA 2321 of 2009; Re Full Billion Shipping Ltd [2003] 2 HKLRD 674, per Chu J.   Any view as to the strength of the parties’ cases should be reached only where it is apparent from the affidavit evidence and any exhibited contemporary documents that one party’s case is much stronger than the other’s: Series 5 Software Ltd v. Clarke & ors [1996] 1 All ER 853.   

44.  Both DY and DG did not have direct evidence on injection of capital for the acquisition of the Land and construction of Citigroup Tower.  The initial financial position of the parties was relevant.  With diametrically different cases, it is not surprising that each protagonist went into the long history of his past and hotly disputed the other’s case.  Despite the persuasive arguments of Mr Chan SC, it is not appropriate in my view to pick and choose the 7 Salient Features and rely on them to the exclusion of all other historical and circumstantial evidence.  After all, on DY’s case, documents did not all on their face reveal the true beneficial position and who was in real control.  DY’s version was supported by DXH, DW, his mother and independent witnesses who have no interest in the outcome of this action.  It cannot be lightly brushed aside.

45.  Having considered the evidence on both sides, I decline to hold that DG has an apparently stronger case.  Suffice to say that serious issues to be tried as to true beneficial ownership have been shown.

REAL RISK OF DISSIPATION OF ASSETS

46.  The additional remedy of appointment of a receiver would only be justified if, notwithstanding the considerable protection the DG Undertakings already afforded, there nonetheless was an imminent danger of loss or dissipation of the assets if a receiver was not appointed: Wallace Kevin James v. Merrill  Lynch International Bank Ltd [1998] 1 SLR 785.

Risk (1)       Attempted sale of the whole of the 5th floor and part of the 7th floor of Citigroup Tower

47.  This risk only surfaced in the reply affirmation on DY’s side, less than 2 weeks before the hearing. There was then the intervening Chinese New Year holidays, which left DG with virtually no reasonable time to respond.  Counsel has adopted a very cooperative approach of not objecting to the late inclusion of relevant affirmation evidence. 

48.  The evidence in support comprised:

(i) Evidence of one Ms Chow (daughter of DY’s friend) who claimed to have seen an advertisement for sale of the 5th floor in the google webpage;

(ii) An article on the internet retrieved on 8 November 2010;

(iii) Transcript of a telephone conversation with an estate agent Xu in response to an advertisement; and

(iv) A private investigation report.

49.  The conversation with Ms Chow was made with DY’s solicitor.  I am satisfied that there were no leading questions and Ms Chow freely stated what she saw on the internet.  The contents of the webpage shown in early October simply stated that Citigroup Tower was on sale.  Out of curiosity, Ms Chow called the phone number on the webpage.  She was told that it was the office on the 5th floor that was on sale.  She was also told the price but as she did not really have the intention to buy, she had forgotten it.  The webpage could no longer be located.   I do not consider that this piece of evidence alone is sufficient to show the attempted sale.

50.  The article on the internet retrieved on 8 November 2010 states that the whole of the 5th floor of Citigroup Tower was for sale but  perhaps because the price of RMB 120,000 per square metre was too high, no one had offered to buy.  Part of the 7th floor had also been for sale for half a year.  There was no evidence that this article was published by or on behalf of Shanghai Bading.  Mr Chan SC queries why, if the contents were true, no action had been taken by DY for half a year.  Moreover, it got the ownership wrong.  Again, I do not think this piece of evidence alone is sufficient.

51.  The transcript of a telephone conversation between DY’s solicitor and an estate agent Xu was made by the solicitor in response to an advertisement for sale on the internet. With no leading questions from the solicitor, the agent told the solicitor that 5th floor and part of 7th floor were on sale.  If it were a sale by transfer of shares, it would be RMB 90,000 per square metre; and if by transfer of property, RMB 120,000 per square metre.  Mr Chan SC queries the contents in that Shanghai Bading could not have authorized to sell on terms of transfer of its shares.  The answer is that sale by way of transfer of shares was probably referable to units on the 7th floor in the hands of other owners.

52.  As shown in the private investigator’s report, the investigator was informed by the vice-manager of the Leasing Department (Ms Shen) and Leasing Department Assistant that RMB 120,000 per square metre was their quotation for the 5th floor.  The existing tenant confirmed that the lease for the 5th floor would not be renewed.  The investigator was asked to first consider leasing.  He was told that the cost of development of Citigroup Tower had been wholly recouped.  Shanghai Bading would not tell outsiders it wanted to sell.  The boss was not keen to sell and hence the unit price was basically not negotiable. There were a lot of interested buyers and the boss of Shanghai Bading had instructed employees of the sale and lease department not to supply any documents to outsiders.  Shanghai Bading would not lightly issue documents.  After some persuasion by the investigator, Ms Shen gave an electronic copy of a draft proposal to him.

53.  Although DG claims that since June 2010, he had ever sold or offered to sell any of the remaining floors of Citigroup Tower, the 4 items of evidence show that the internet advertisements were not isolated incidents.  Ms Shen must have known about advertisements for sale because she was not taken by surprise when the investigator mentioned the unit price regarding the 5th floor. However, she did not actively procure a sale.  Rather it was the investigator who actively invited her to give a quotation for sale.  If Ms Shen was sure that the boss would not consider a sale or had instructed her not to sell, she would not have helped the investigator as she did.   The overall inference is that the boss of Shanghai Bading (in this context, DG) was not keen to sell, certainly not openly.  However he may consider an offer to buy if the right price was reached.  The risk of breach of the DG Undertakings exists.

54.  The terms of DG Undertakings are no different from a prohibitory injunction, breach of which may call for the appointment of an interim receiver: Akai Holdings Ltd (in compulsory liq.) v. Ho Wing On Christopher & Ors, HCCL 37 & 40 of 2005, 1.9.2009 per Stone J.

55.  DG clearly knew that a sale would be a breach because when applying for an ex parte injunction against DY, DG stated on affirmation that:

“To protect the interests of both sides, both the Plaintiff and I are also willing to give an undertaking to this Court that we will not procure or cause the disposition of or diminution in value of the assets held directly or indirectly by HK First (including, but not limited to, the “Citigroup Tower”) otherwise than in the ordinary course of business of those companies holding such assets. For the avoidance of doubt, I confirm that any sale or disposition of the “Citigroup Tower” by Shanghai Bading is not something in the ordinary course of business and is therefore prohibited by our undertakings offered to this Court.” (emphasis added)

Risk (2)       Recent Mismanagement of Assets

56.  Where there are doubts on the proper management of the company and its assets are in jeopardy, it is appropriate to appoint an interim receiver: Wilton-Davies v. Kirk [1998] 1 BCLC 274, at 278, per Judge Weeks QC.

57.  The alleged mismanagement was in the form of failure to comply with terms of the loan agreement with Huaxia Bank.  According to 4 letters in January 2011 given by Mr Zhu, Vice-President of the Bank,

(i) Shanghai Bading owed Huaxia Bank a total sum of RMB 500 million.  According to the loan agreement, Shanghai Bading had to deposit into certain designated account of Huaxia Bank a certain portion of the rental income.  However, Shanghai Bading had failed to do so to the extent of about RMB 50 million.  It also failed to repay on the due date of repayment.

(ii) Provided Shanghai Bading repaid the amount owed to Huaxia Bank and provided Citigroup Tower operated as usual, the Bank would not care about the dispute between shareholders of Shanghai Bading, including any order issued by the Hong Kong Court for appoint of a receiver for Citigroup Tower.

(iii) After detailed consideration of all circumstances, Mr Zhu confirmed that the position of Huaxia Bank was to support the making of a receivership order by the Hong Kong Court.  Huaxia Bank had not been able to get in touch with DG for 2 months.  Having considered the current mismanagement of Shanghai Bading, Huaxia Bank considered it more desirable if the management be vested in the hands of independent third parties so that the Bank would stand a better chance of recovering outstanding loans from Shanghai Bading.  It hoped that the Hong Kong Court would take its position into account.

58.  This piece of evidence was hotly disputed by DG. Even on the 3rd day of hearing, evidence from the same Mr Zhu and Huaxia Bank continued to come in.  Effectively, the Huaxia Bank disclaimed responsibility over Mr Zhu’s letters and stated that it was Mr Zhu’s personal views only. (This met with allegations from DY’s side that Mr Zhu had been threatened by DG’s people.) 

59.  Despite Huaxia Bank’s disclaimer, neither it nor Mr Zhu had stated that the evidence of Mr Zhu was not true.  The Huaxia Bank itself confirmed that for 2 quarters, a total of RMB 51 million of rental income was not deposited into the designated account and it had to exercise its right to transfer funds from another account in settlement of the overdue.

60.  DG denied that Shanghai Bading had ever been in default in repayment of loans of Huaxia Bank.  He pointed out that there was no evidence of the Bank issuing a demand letter.  He produced bank statements to show that he had made prepayments totalling RMB 42 million in December 2010, leaving a credit balance of RMB 99 million in one account and another RMB 9 million in another account.

61.  Counsel had put forth different ways to interpret the bank statements.  The terms “餘額” 、“紅字”、“藍字”did not have a clear meaning in context.  I question whether “the balance” was a credit balance in favour of Shanghai Bading or an amount owed to Huaxia Bank.  Even giving the most favourable interpretation that Shanghai Bading has a credit balance in the 2 accounts, the bank statements did not answer the Huaxia Bank’s evidence in paragraph 59.  This risk item exists.

Risk (6)       Previous suspicious transactions

Risk (9)       Irregular treatments of dividends paid by Shanghai Bading to Hong Kong First

62.  In considering risk of dissipation, the Court is concerned with imminent risk of dissipation of assets.  It is not helpful to point to past questionable transactions to press for a receivership order: Jilin Sun & Anor v. Kenneth Chi Shing Cheung, HCA 3544 of 2003, at paras 22 to 23, per Reyes J.  

63.  Individually, the following transactions occurring several years before the Application fell within this principle:

(i) The 4 impugned agreements in 2006 under which dividends of Shanghai Bading were transferred to connected companies beneficially owned by DG in purported settlement of debts due.  A total of RMB 274 million had been so transferred.  Those companies were either deregistered or struck off shortly after receipt of the money.  DY discovered them in late August 2010 from the records of Hong Kong First.

(ii) Unauthorized investments in Huizhou and Shenzhen in around 2007-8.  Funds from Shanghai Bading were injected as capital to 3 companies in Huizhou which were listed as “long term investment” of Shanghai Bading.   Those funds were then transferred out to DG who used them for purchase of properties in Huizhou and Shenzhen in his own name.  Two of the Huizhou companies had been dissolved by deregistration within 2 years of incorporation. 

(iii) Unauthorized transfer in July 2005 of a Shanghai property owned by Shanghai Bading to DG, Su and their son without consideration.

(iv) Transfer by DXH of HK$13.5 million, HK$660,000 and CAD$100,000 to Su’s account upon DG’s request on the ground that they were to be injected into the Canadian companies held in the joint names of DG and DY.

64.  More recent “irregular” transactions happened in 2010.  In March 2010, Hong Kong First received RMB 27 million (about HK$30 million) from Shanghai Bading.  DG requested DHX to transfer it to his personal account for use of a Canadian company registered in the names of DG and DY, which she did under the belief that it was on the instructions of DY. Similarly, a sum of US$3 million was paid by Shanghai Bading  to Hong Kong First.  The sum was never booked into the account of Hong Kong First but was transferred to DG without the knowledge of DY.

65.  DG denied ever representing that the transfers were for use in Canada.  He claimed that as the beneficial owner, he could decide on the transfers without the need to seek DY’s consent.  He even accepted that they were some of the many inter-company transfers upon his directions, some of which involved DXH.

66.  All of these transactions, whether past or more recent, happened before the giving of the DG’s Undertakings.  I accept that DY, having entrusted Shanghai Bading to DG since 2005, was not aware of them until in preparation of this action.  They were not isolated incidents.  Some were, as described by Mr Yuen SC, “surreptitious”, e.g. the 4 impugned agreements, as DG’s companies were de-registered immediately after the agreements without good reason.  The transfers were all for the benefit of DG or his nominees.  One transfer to Hong Kong First was not even booked into its account.  These transactions reflected on corporate governance over a span of years.  The last known one was as recent as March 2010 at about the time when brothers’ relationship broke down.  If the “status quo” were allowed to continue so that transactions similar to the “past transactions” are repeated, there is risk of dissipation of assets of Shanghai Bading pending the litigation. 

Risk (3)       Recent account irregularities in respect of Shanghai Bading

Risk (4)       Suspicious account practice since 2007

Risk (5)       Recent suspicious transactions

Risk (7)       Recent outflow of cash assets

67.  DY relies on evidence of Ms Wu (an independent certified tax agent whose company had been providing tax auditing and tax planning services to Shanghai Bading since April 2007). I shall not rehearse every assertion of DY or the arguments of counsel. Suffice to say that these involve specific items in the accounts, DY’s view on the assets of Shanghai Bading and concerns of unexplained low levels of income and assets.  I will only identify a few that cause me concern.

68.  A specific example was the payment of a total of RMB 1.05 million to one Shanghai Hitech on 10 December 2009.  Ms Wu was of the view that Shanghai Hitech had not offered consultancy or training services as described on the face of the invoices.  This was because that company was known for issuance, management and use of commercial cards which could be used in the PRC and overseas as cash. Such cards could be converted into cash. 

69.  Further, income from the car parking spaces, curtain wall and part of the common area was not fully booked into Shanghai Bading’s account although collection of rentals from car parking spaces has been entrusted to Jones Lang LaSalle ever since the opening of the Citigroup Tower.  The monies that have been booked into Shanghai Bading’s account fell short of the real level of income. 

70.  DY also alleged that there was outflow of cash assets of Shanghai Bading.  He pointed out that the net profit of Shanghai Bading in 2005 was RMB 490 million.  As at 2008, Shanghai Bading had an outstanding loan of RMB 853 million with mortgages.   By May 2010, it had an outstanding indebtedness of RMB 809 million including 2 sums owed to the Shanghai Bank and Huaxia Bank.  There had been no material investment project undertaken by Shanghai Bading since the last financial year of 31 December 2008.  The rental income including cash received from the secured banking facilities totalled RMB 1,700 million.  However, the cash balances of Shanghai Bading as of July 2010 showed only RMB 208 million.  DY was seriously concerned that the discrepancy was caused by misappropriation of assets by DG and his nominees.

71.  Shanghai Bading’s accounts were audited and the accountant at the material times was Ms Wu’s company.  Views of DY had not taken into account the running costs, tax, interest for bank loans, dividends and the difference in revenue (from sale of part of Citigroup Tower in 2005 to leasing out for rent).  DG asserted that on a proper reading of the accounts, Shanghai Bading had been in a healthy financial condition.

72.  The subjects of DY’s concerns require the Court to resolve the differences on how to view the accounts which it will not do in an interlocutory stage.  Suffice to say that Ms Wu had given her views based on her own observation at the time when her company was still handling the accounts of Shanghai Bading.  As Mr Yuen submits, that Shanghai Bading’s accounts had been auditted does not necessarily mean there were no accounting irregularities.  More importantly, the accountants were provided only with documents supplied by Su, who controlled the Finance Department of Shanghai Bading.  Without conducting specific inquiries, the accounts simply would not be able to tell any ingenuity of those transactions. At this stage, DY is simply denied access to the accounts.

73.  If books were not properly kept, transactions not properly recorded, assets have been transferred or dissipated before the action is heard, any damages awarded at the end of the day would be difficult to assess and may well not be an adequate remedy:  Michel Hazan v. HK Sindy Footwears Ltd and others, HCMP 1240 of 2006. 

74.  In addition, viewing the risk items I have analyzed together do show that DG is in control of a whole host of companies and nominees to whom he can transfer funds of Shanghai Bading. Given the corporate governance, there are genuine doubts as to the integrity and propriety of the accounts that warrant appointment of a receiver.

“ 42. As Gee on Commercial Injunctions (5th ed) expresses the position, at paragraph 16.08:

‘If (1) assets are liable to be dissipated or are otherwise in jeopardy and (2) cannot satisfactorily be preserved by injunction, then it may be appropriate to appoint a receiver. This arises where the defendant controls a network of overseas trusts or companies and it appears that he has arranged his affairs in such a complicated way that if the step were not to be taken he might be judgment proof.  The appointment of a receiver would be effective relief when an injunction, on its own, would not be … Other examples of situation calling for the appointment of a receiver are where the defendants are likely to act in disregard of an injunction or have already done so …” 

Akai Holdings Ltd (in compulsory liq.) v. Ho Wing On Christopher & Ors, HCCL 37 & 40 of 2005, 1.9.2009

75.  There are other heads of risk which, however they are viewed, will not affect the overall picture.  I find that DY has shown real risk of dissipation of assets or mismanagement of Shanghai Bading. 

UNDUE DELAY IN MAKING THE APPLICATION

76.  An application of this sort should be made promptly, which has been commonly understood to be a period of six weeks or so of unexplained delay and three months with an explanation given for the delay in making application for an injunction: King Fung Vacuum Ltd v. Toto Toys Ltd [2006] 2 HKLRD 785:

77.  The date from which the period runs is the date on which the person seeking an interlocutory injunction knew or ought to have been aware that interlocutory relief would be required in order to prevent what is said to be irreparable damage: Wong Chung Ming Development Fund Co. Ltd. v. Profit Surplus Ltd [2009] 3 HKLRD 514.

78.  The question of delay is also relevant in considering whether it has caused prejudice to the defendant because it has altered its position in the intervening period: Abbot GmbH & Co KG v. Pharmareg Consulting Co. Ltd. [2009] 3 HKLRD 524, per Sakhrani J at para 83.  What is important is not the length of the delay per se but whether the delay has in some way made it unjust to grant the injunction claimed: Re Wako Giken (HK) Co. Ltd. [2010] 4 HKLRD121, at para 24, per Harris J. 

79.  DY discovered the wrongful acts of DG after several years of trust.  Allegedly, in March 2010 he lost confidence in his brother and amicable discussion failed.  He discovered various acts complained of.  He took out the present application in November. Given the volume of facts that DY has to present to substantiate his case, I am not satisfied that he has unduly delayed his application.  In any case, Mr Chan SC does not suggest that DG has suffered prejudice as a result of any delay.

DAMAGES NOT A SUFFICIENT REMEDY

80.  DG is in control of Shanghai Bading to the exclusion of DY.  Unilateral and wrongful acts on the part of DG would be difficult to discover.  He is so used to using companies and nominees, some of them are out of jurisdiction.  Hence steps unilaterally taken on behalf of  Shanghai Bading without the knowledge of DY can easily cause irreparable damage. 

81.  DY did not allege in his affirmations that DG would not have the means to meet an award of damages.  However, it cannot be denied that the Land and the Citigroup Tower are unique properties.  If units in the Tower are sold, or the bank recovers possession and sells the Tower upon the failure to pay the rental income in discharge of the mortgage,  Shanghai Bading will not be the same.  Damages are clearly not a sufficient remedy.

IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF RECEIVERS ARE APPOINTED

82.  Receivers and managers are expensive.  Their appointment will add to costs of the litigation and running costs of the business.  It will also create a stigma that the company (in this case Shanghai Bading) is in financial difficulty. 

83.  DY asks for receivers and managers of the assets and properties of the Companies to be appointed.  It is proposed that wide powers be given to them to ascertain, take possession of properties of the Companies and their subsidiaries, Shanghai Bading and the Management Company, to carry on business, to bring or defend proceedings (provided that such power shall not be used to intervene in the conduct of this action or any pending proceedings between DY and DG in respect of the ownership over the Companies and/or Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company).  It is also proposed that DG shall be restrained from participating or interfering in whatever ways the business of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and/or the Management Company (save with the consent or at the directions of the Receivers) pending final determination of this action.  The order asked for is thus very intrusive in nature.

84.  DG deposed to the fact that appointment of receivers would necessarily lead to a change in the legal representative and the management of Shanghai Bading.  Such may deter existing and potential tenants and lead to termination of loan agreements by lending banks. 

Deterrence to existing and potential tenants

85.  As an example, one tenant has made clear that whether Shanghai Bading would be controlled by its existing management was a decisive factor in renewing the tenancy. Moreover, termination clauses in some of Shanghai Bading’s tenancy agreements might be triggered by change in management or if the assets of Shanghai Bading were taken over by a receiver.  The ramification is that Shanghai Bading may no longer maintain its status as a first class financial building. 

86.  A receiver (or manager) is aimed at preserving assets and ensuring the proper running of the subject companies pending the litigation.  He has no reason to downgrade the image of Citigroup Tower or to act contrary to the interests of Shanghai Bading.  The existing management and underlying staff can be retained if they are important to the success and smooth operation of the business; so can Jones Lang Lasalle: Michel Hazan v. HK Sindy Footwears Ltd & others, HCMP 1240 of 2006, at para 38.   Even if current tenants were to leave, I fail to see why the receiver will not look for suitable tenants in replacement.   DG has not shown that leasing of Citigroup Tower or managing other business of the Companies and Shanghai Bading will involve complexity that requires special expertise which the receivers will not be able to handle: Re Niceline Co. Ltd., [2003] 2 HKLRD 725.  Given the prime location of Citigroup Tower, any irreparable damage is more of a conjecture than reality and is likely to be financial loss which can be compensated for by money.  Moreover, tenants’ concerns can be addressed by appropriate explanations to them and receivership could be conducted with diplomacy and discretion: Michel Hazan v. HK Sindy Footwears Ltd & others.

87.  What I do not accept, however, is that DG be ousted from the management even before determination of the action.  There is no strong reason to the contrary.  The existence of the receiver and manager will be there to safeguard any potential dissipation of assets by DG.

Termination of loan agreements

88.  DG considers that there is a foreseeable risk that the loans may be called back by the banks upon change of management of Shanghai Bading.  It will cause severe financial blow to Shanghai Bading whose operation relies heavily on loans. 

89.  Clause 14 to the Shanghai bank loan provides:

“第14條 違約情形

14.1 發生下列情形之一的借款人即構成違約

14.1.5 借款人或擔保人捲入或即將捲入重大的訴訟, 仲裁及其他法律糾紛的;

14.1.8      本合同項下… … 抵質押財產發生變化,不足清償貸款本息… …”

90.  The receivers and managers to be appointed are in respect of Hong Kong First and Macau First. Although the beneficial interest over Shanghai Bading will be in issue, Shanghai Bading has not been dragged into these proceedings.   There will be no change to the Citigroup Tower as security nor has it been shown that the value of the security will be so depreciated as to be insufficient for repaying the loan.  In my view, clause 14 does not assist DG’s case.

91.  As for the Huaxia bank loans, the bank can demand immediate repayment where there is change in Shanghai Bading’s mode of operation, corporate structure or legal status (such as receivership).  It can also call back the loan if Shanghai Bading is dragged into substantial litigation or other legal disputes such that the bank’s right as a creditor is being seriously affected.  Once the loan is called back and Citigroup Tower is sold, despite there being enough to repay the loan, Shanghai Bading will never be the same.

92.  Mr Zhu (though not Huaxia Bank) supported the issue of a receivership order by the Hong Kong Court.  The Huaxia Bank is well aware of the “personal views” of Mr Zhu but has not stated otherwise.   The concern of DG is more theoretical than real.

NO MEANINGFUL CROSS-UNDERTAKING AS TO DAMAGES

93.  Mr Chan SC submits that DY is unable to show himself as having sufficient assets to honour the cross-undertaking as to damages under the present application.  His only visible asset is (apart from the subject matter in dispute) a property in Hong Kong and 2 properties in the Mainland (according to his application for emigration to Australia in 2007).  He has not disclosed how much cash or what foreign investment he has.  Such facts must weigh strongly against his application: Lau Tak Wah Andy v. Hang Seng Bank Ltd [2000] 1 HKC 280, at 294.

94.  The proper approach, in my view, has been set out in the case of Hui Chi Ming (Previously known as X) v. Koon Wing Yee & 5 others, HCA 1479 of 2009, per Deputy Judge Coleman SC.

“44. First, the burden of showing the need for fortification and the appropriate quantum of any fortification falls on the defendant seeking that fortification.

45.       Secondly, there is no obligation on a plaintiff to give full and frank disclosure of his own financial circumstances so as to oppose an order for fortification (or to argue for a lesser amount of security than is being sought).  Nevertheless, circumstances might arise where the absence of financial disclosure by a plaintiff might entitle the drawing of an adverse inference as to his ability to meet his cross-undertaking in damages.”

95.  The burden is on DG who asks for fortification to show what amount of loss he is likely to suffer.

96.  As a matter of concession to ensure that matters can proceed, DY has through counsel offered to pay HK$15 million into court or by way of bank guarantee if necessary.  I note this offer but it is not really necessary to decide in this case whether an order should be made since there is no evidence of the potential loss to DG. Suffice to say that at this stage, it appears that the Court should accept and make it a condition that DY should give an undertaking as to damages if an order were made for the appointment of receivers.

BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE

97.  I have taken into account the fact that DG is very familiar with the use of nominees and limited companies.  He does not reside in Hong Kong.  He has companies and nominees in several countries which he can use for inter-company transfer of funds.

98.  On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that he considered himself the real beneficial owner.  He was free to do what he liked with his assets without the need to consult DY. 

99.  If DY succeeds, it means his brother has shamelessly deprived him of his hard earned assets. That is akin to theft.  If no receiver has been appointed in the meantime, DG will be in sole control without supervision and DY might suffer irreparable damage which cannot be compensated for by damages.   If DG wins and a receiver has been appointed, any increased costs and damages are recoverable from DY. The worries that DG may have as regards reputation, retaining tenants and banks calling in loans can be allayed by appropriate explanation by the receivers to the appropriate persons. 

100.  The balance is in favour of appointing a receiver and manager for the present dispute over beneficial ownership: Mardarin Resources Corporation Ltd. v.Daid Cheng Heng Soon & others, CACV146 of 1987.

101.  I have considered the alternative of a less intrusive remedy: Akai Holdings Ltd (in compulsory liq.) v. Ho Wing On Christopher & Ors, HCCL 37 & 40 of 2005.

102.  Given the distrust between DY and DG and the scale of assets involved, a monthly report from DG’s side may not provide as much reliability as management by receivers.

TERMS OF THE APPOINTMENT

103.  Parties do not have any preference over the identity of the receiver and manager although it has been pointed out to me that 2 firms of accountants have had experience as receivers in the Mainland.  I appoint Messrs. Ernst & Young.

104.  I have discussed the amended draft terms handed up by Mr Yuen SC at the hearing with counsel. There will be an order in terms of the draft as amended with the deletion of clauses 4(10) and (16). 

CONCUSION

105.  There are serious questions to be tried as to the real beneficial ownership of the Companies, Shanghai Bading and Citigroup Tower.  There are risks of dissipation in terms of attempted sale of Citigroup Tower, failure to apply rental in repayment of the mortgage due from Shanghai Bading to Huaxia Bank, irregular transactions and  accounting irregularities in Shanghai Bading.  Damages will be a sufficient remedy for DG but not DY.  The balance is in favour of the appointment of receivers and managers. 

106.  DY has given an undertaking as to damages.  He has also undertaken to hand over seals in his possession relating to the subject companies to the receivers and managers. Upon such undertakings, I grant the Application on the following terms.

107.  With regard to paragraph 1 of the summons, there shall be appointment of Stephen Liu Yiu Keung and Mr David Yen Ching Wai of Messrs. Ernst & Young as receivers and managers as per the terms of the draft Minutes of Order Appointing Receivers and Managers as amended at the hearing.  There will be an order in terms of paragraph 2 of the Summons.  Paragraph 3 is dismissed and the draft Minutes should be adjusted  if appropriate.  No order needs to be made re paragraph 4.

108.  There will be an order nisi that costs be to DY with certificate for 2 counsel.

109.  I am most grateful to both legal teams in this case.  Their industry in preparation of the case and sifting through the evidence to present the salient facts have been of great assistance to the Court.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr. Edward Chan, SC leading Mr. Anson Wong and Miss Sabina Ho instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai & Li for the Plaintiff (by original action) and the Defendants (by counterclaim)

Mr. Rimsky Yuen, SC leading Mr. MC Law instructed by Messrs. King & Wood for the Defendants (by original action) and the Plaintiff (by counterclaim)

(I) Please refer to CACV193/2011 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal. (II) Please refer to HCMP1014/2011 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.