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Companies Winding-up Proceedings2010

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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90453-EN-2013-11-28

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO 282 OF 2010

____________

 

IN THE MATTER of Sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 32

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED

____________

BETWEEN

 LU JUN (呂俊)Petitioner
 and
 YU QI (虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPRIETARY LIMITED
(formerly FCP PROPRIETARY LIMITED)
2nd Respondent
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent

____________

Before: Recorder P Fung SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 28 November 2013
Date of Judgment: 28 November 2013

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

1.  This is an application by the petitioner applying for an order that the reserved costs orders made by other judges in the course of the proceedings be allowed as the petitioner’s costs in these proceedings. They included applications for an injunction order and orders for adjournment of those applications. They also included orders for adjourning the hearing of the petition. The summons is issued pursuant to Order 62, Order 20 rule 11 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

2.  By a summons issued by the petitioner on 14February 2013, the petitioner applied for an order that the costs order nisi made by myself dated 31 January 2013 be varied to the effect that the 1st and 3rd respondents do pay the petitioner’s costs in these proceedings on an indemnity basis. 

3.  By another summons issued by the 1st and 3rd respondents on 12 March 2013, the 1st and 3rd respondents asked for an order that my said costs order be varied to an order as follows:

(i) The petitioner do pay to the 1st and 3rd respondents their costs of opposing the petition for winding-up on indemnity basis and

(ii) The 1st and 3rd respondents do pay to the petitioner his costs of the petition for unfair prejudice on a party and party basis.

Secondly, alternatively to paragraph 1 thereof, the said costs order be varied to no order as to cost. 

4.  I heard the parties’ arguments and on 21March 2013 I made an order that the 1st and 3rd respondents do pay to the petitioner the costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis.  The question about the reserved costs orders had never been raised or argued by anybody at that stage. 

5.  Ms Yeung, acting on behalf of the petitioner, refers me to a note in the White Book in relation to “costs reserved” and she also relies on a decision of Master B Kwan handed down on 17 July 2001 in HCB 527/2000, Re Leung Chan Ming and Ex Parte Wong Yee Chow.  These are taxation proceedings in a bankruptcy matter.  In that case, Master B Kwan also relied on a decision of Mr Justice Kekewich in the case of How v Earl Winterton(No 4) (1904). 

6.  In the note on page 1101 of White Book (2013 ed) (Vol 1), under note 62/1/3, “Meaning of related phrases”, in sub-paragraph 5, it is said:

“‘Costs reserved’ means that the costs will be lost and will not be allowed on taxation unless the court makes a specific order dealing with them at the conclusion of the proceedings.”

7.  I take the view that the proceedings have already been concluded on the 21 March 2013 when I made, inter alia, an order dealing with the costs of the proceedings.  I also take the view that Order 20 rule 11 of the Rules of the High Court, which provides “Clerical mistakes in judgments or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected by the court on summons without an appeal” has no application to the present situation.  There has been no accidental slip or omission on the part of the court because the matter had never been raised by anybody when my costs order was made on 21 March 2013.  I also take the view that I am functus officio and that I actually have no jurisdiction to deal with the present summons. 

8.  Furthermore, in the said judgment of Master B Kwan, she distinguished between the costs of “interlocutory applications” and “costs of the action”.  She seemed to have decided that the costs of “interlocutory applications” could not be included under the classification of “costs of the action” in the context of a costs order.

9.  In all the circumstance I dismiss the summons issued by the petitioner. 

10.  The summons is dismissed with costs to the 1st and 3rd respondents.  I put on record the fact that no instructing solicitor from Edward Lau, Wong & Lou has appeared in court to instruct Mr Fung on behalf of the 1st and 3rd respondents.  The costs of the solicitors for the 1st and 3rd respondents should not be allowed on taxation in relation to this morning’s summons. 

  (Patrick Fung SC)

 
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Felicity Yeung, of Deacons, for the petitioner

Mr Danny Fung, instructed by Edward Lau, Wong & Lou, for the 1st and 3rd respondents

Guardian Proprietary Limited (formerly FCP Proprietary Limited), Absent

Astrotec Company Limited (formerly Happy Dragon Technologies Ltd), Absent

Attendance excused for Official Receiver

88441-EN-2013-08-02

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO 282 OF 2010

____________

 

IN THE MATTER of ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of Sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 32

____________

BETWEEN

 LU JUN(呂俊)Petitioner

and

 YU QI(虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPRIETARY LIMITED 2nd Respondent
 (formerly FCP PROPRIETARY LIMITED) 
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent

____________

Before: Hon Chung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 30 July 2013
Date of Decision: 30 July 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 2 August 2013

________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________________

Introduction

1.  At the end of the hearing, I dismissed the petitioner’s application for the appointment of interim receivers of the 4th respondent (“the Company”) pending the determination of this petition or until further order.  I indicated that reasons for the decision would be given later.  They appear below.

Background

2.  The petitioner commenced this petition in June 2010, relying on ss 168A and 177(1)(f), Companies Ordinance (Cap 32).  The gist of his complaints was:

(a) the respondents wrongfully excluded him from the Company’s management;

(b) the respondents wrongfully attempted to dilute his shareholding by increasing the share capital;

(c) the wrongful disposal of the Company’s asset (namely, shares in a Mainland company) at undervalue;

(d) the failure to declare/pay dividends.

3.  After a 4-day trial, the court decided in the petitioner’s favour as regards the 1st and/or 3rd respondents’ liability to buy out the petitioner.  Further, after another hearing, directions were given as to the valuation of the petitioner’s shares in the Company.  These include:

(a) the appointment of an independent valuer whose valuation should be final and conclusive;

(b) the parties are to provide the relevant documents to the appointed valuer for such purpose;

(c) the parties are at liberty to inspect such documents;

(d) the parties are at liberty to make written representations to the appointed valuer.

This application

4.  The petitioner frankly admitted during the hearing:

(a) the valuer has earlier been appointed;

(b) since the appointment:

(1) the valuer has not indicated that any of the parties have failed to provide the documents sought;

(2) the parties are yet to inspect the documents, or to make written representations.

He also accepted that this application is a preemptive step to ensure the valuation for the buy-out could be properly carried out.

5.  In these circumstances, I agree with the 1st and 3rd respondents that this application is misconceived (or at least premature).

6.  First, no doubt has been cast on the appointed valuer’s integrity or competence, nor is there doubt that it otherwise will be unable to perform its duty (whether for want of documents or not).  Hence, there was no need (at least no need yet) for the petitioner to take steps to ensure that the appointed valuer would be able to do so.

7.  Secondly, the obligation to buy out the petitioner falls on the 1st and 3rd respondents, and not the Company.  There is no suggestion they are financially unable to pay for the petitioner’s shares.

8.  Thirdly, the buy-out order has specified the valuation date to be the date of the petition.  Since the time of the buy-out order, the petitioner’s interest should lie more with the sale proceeds of his shares than the affairs of the Company (albeit he is in name still one of the Company’s shareholders).

9.  Fourthly, although there was a hint of dissipation of the Company’s assets, the petitioner (correctly) no longer pursued that ground at the time of the hearing.

10.  Finally, the appointment of a receiver over the assets and business of a company is a draconian remedy.  The discretionary power to do so should not be lightly exercised.

Certificate for two counsel

11.  The 1st and 3rd respondents sought such a certificate.

12.  Without disrespect to senior counsel, I agree with the petitioner that neither the nature of the hearing nor its complexity warranted the attendance of two counsel for the 1st and 3rd respondents.

13.  For this reason, I will decline the 1st and 3rd respondents’ request for such a certificate.

(Andrew Chung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Deacons, for the petitioner

Mr Edward Chan, SC leading Mr Danny Fung, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st & 3rd respondents

2nd & 4th respondents were not represented and did not appear

Official Receiver did not appear

85533-EN-2013-01-31

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO 282 OF 2010

______________________

 

IN THE MATTER of ASTROTEC COMPANYLIMITED

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of Sections 168A and 177(1) (f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 32

_______________________

BETWEEN

 LU JUN (呂俊)Petitioner

and

 YU QI (虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPRIETARY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 (formerly FCP PROPRIETARY LIMTIED) 
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent
______________________
Before: Mr Recorder Patrick Fung SC in Court
Dates of Hearing: 5‑7 September and 4 October 2012
Date of Handing Down Judgment: 31 January 2013

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

 

INTRODUCTION

1. This is the trial of the Re‑Amended Petition (“the Petition”) of the petitioner regarding a Hong Kong company by the name of Astrotec Company Limited (“the Company”).

2. According to the Petition, the present shareholders of the 100 issued shares of $1 each of the Company are as follows:

(i) The petitioner 15 shares
(ii)The 2nd respondent 84 shares
(iii)The 3rd respondent   1 share

I shall say more about the transmission of shares below.

3. Although the 1st respondent (“Yu”) does not appear to be a registered shareholder of the Company, she together with the 3rd respondent are the main protagonists against the petitioner.  They are represented by the same legal team.

4. During the trial, I have only heard two witnesses give evidence. The petitioner gave evidence from a court room on the Mainland by video‑link because he had been held in custody by some law enforcement department and was not able to come to Hong Kong to give evidence.  More about this later.  Yu gave evidence in opposition to the Petition.

5. Although the Petition claims an order that the petitioner’s shares in the Company should be bought by the respondents or one or more of them and, in the alternative, an order that the Company should be wound up, by the time of the trial, the parties were agreed that there should be no winding up order made and that there should be a buy‑out order.  The main dispute remaining is on what terms the buy‑out order should be made and this will depend on the findings of the court on certain issues between the parties.

6. The parties are also agreed that the court will only have jurisdiction to make a buy‑out order if it is satisfied that the Petition is well founded.

7. The claim for the buy‑out order by the petitioner is based on section 168A of the Companies Ordinance.  Section 168A(2) reads as follows:

“168A. Alternative remedy to winding up

in cases of unfair prejudice

(2) If on any petition under subsection (1) the court is of opinion that the specified corporation’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members generally or of some part of the members (including the member who presented the petition), whether or not such conduct consists of an isolated act or a series of acts -

(a) the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of –

(i) make an order restraining the commission of any such act or the continuance of such conduct;

(ii) order that such proceedings as the court may think fit shall be brought in the name of the specified corporation against such person and on such terms as the court may so order;

(iii) appoint a receiver or manager of the whole or a part of a specified corporation’s property or business and may specify the powers and duties of the receiver or manager and fix his remuneration; and

(iv) make such other order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the specified corporation’s affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the specified corporation by other members of the specified corporation or by the specified corporation and, in the case of a purchase by the specified corporation, for the reduction accordingly of the specified corporation’s capital, or otherwise; and

(b)  the court may order payment by any person of such damages and interest on those damages as the court may think fit to any members (including the member who presented the petition) of the specified corporation, whose interests have been unfairly prejudiced by the act or conduct.”

8. In Shareholders’ Rights, Robin Hollington, 6th Ed, it is stated at paras 8‑31 and 8‑33 as follows:

“ As a matter of general law of contract the parties may reach an agreement which includes the term that one side shall purchase the other’s shares at a price to be determined by the court: the settlement agreement need not cover all the issues between the parties. In such a case, the court will make an order for the purchase of the shares in question by the party in question,, with directions for the determination of the price.”

“ Where a respondent is willing to commit himself to buying out the petitioner at a value to be determined by the court, but without making any concession about the unfair prejudice alleged against him, technically the court has to make a finding that the petition is well-founded, before making a share purchase order [referring to Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd., [1986] Ch. 658], but in practice this should not prove an insuperable obstacle, given the elasticity of the concept of unfair prejudice.”

9. In Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1986] Ch 658, Oliver LJ said at 670F‑H:

“ But it is the majority shareholders’ own case, and it was so put to the judge, that no such admission had in fact been made. As I have pointed out, the terms of section 75(3) are perfectly clear. They simply provide that if the Court is satisfied that a petition under this section is well founded, it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of. If of course, it is not so satisfied, then it has no jurisdiction to give the relief which is referred to in section 75(3) of in 75(4). As it seems to me, this only has to be read for it to be seen straight away that the court, in making a valuation of the shares, can only do so if it is satisfied that the petition is well founded.

 The judge therefore had to go into these questions, because it was expressly said that there was no admission of any unfair prejudice, and so the judge had to go into the question of whether there had been unfair prejudice to the petitioners and how it had taken place, in order to see whether he had jurisdiction at all to embark on the inquiry which he was invited to undertake.”

10. Hence, notwithstanding the indication by the petitioner that he is willing to sell his shares and that by Yu that she is willing to buy the same, I will still have to determine the main issues between the parties. In any event, it seems that some guidance will have to be provided to the valuer to be appointed to enable him to value the shares.

11. In the course of the events leading up to the trial, there were interlocutory applications by the parties.  I shall refer to those below as and when appropriate.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

12. The facts of this case are quite complicated.  For the convenience of the readers of this Judgment, I believe that it will be useful for me to reproduce and annex as Appendix 1 to this judgment a corporate structure chart which has been exhibited as exhibit “LJ‑5” to the Affirmation of the petitioner filed on 2 July 2010.  I have adapted the exhibit by adding the abbreviated English names against the respective names of the companies set out therein in Chinese.  I appreciate that Yu may not agree with every detail contained therein, notably the allegation that the 85% shareholding in the Company belongs to “Yu Qi and Associates” and not just to herself.  The chart will however constitute a convenient basis for my recital of the facts as they evolved.

13. The Company (formerly known as Happy Dragon Technologies Limited) was incorporated in Hong Kong on 23 July 2004.  The change of the English name was certified by the Registrar of Companies on 29 October 2004.  The name of the Company in Chinese has always been「恒龍科技有限公司」.

14. It is common ground that the Company is involved in the industrial gas supply business on the Mainland, although there is dispute between the petitioner and Yu as to how it all arose and about the nature and ownership of the beneficial interest of the shares on both sides.  For present purposes, I shall first refer to some of the agreements between various parties which came into existence and set out some of the facts before I deal with the respective allegations by the parties.

15. A co‑operation agreement (“the Baslow Agreement”) dated 10 September 2004 was made between a Baslow Technology Ltd. (a BVI company) (“Baslow”) as “the Appointor” and a 「上海俊瑞投資管理有限公司」(“Shanghai Junrui”) as “the Appointee”.  It is common ground that Baslow was connected with Yu and Shanghai Junrui was connected with the petitioner.  The recital in the Baslow Agreement set out, inter alia, the following facts:

(i)   The Appointor was in possession of know-how for the supply of relevant gases and its process and was looking for a suitable joint-venture partner in China.

(ii)    The Appointee was in possession of experience and social resources regarding investment management and was willing to accept the appointment to look for and negotiate with a suitable joint-venture partner for the Appointor.

(iii)   The Appointor agreed to authorize the Appointee to carry out preliminary negotiations with an intended joint‑venture partner located by the Appointee, namely, a 「湖南郴電國際發展股份有限公司」(“Hunan Chendian”), and to take part in negotiations between the Appointor and Hunan Chendian.

16. The Baslow Agreement went on to provide in effect that the Appointee would act as a go‑between for the Appointor with regard to Hunan Chendian.  If one or more joint-venture companies were to be formed subsequently in China between the Appointor and Hunan Chendian, then the Appointee would be entitled to a 5% shareholding in each of such companies and such 5% shareholding would be paid for by the Appointor in consideration of the service provided by the Appointee.

17. On 8 October 2004, a co‑operation framework agreement (“the Framework Agreement”) was signed between a「湖南匯銀國際投資公司」(“Hunan Huiyin”), a subsidiary of Hunan Chendian, and the Company.  This agreement related to a joint‑venture between the parties in investing in three industrial gas projects and their intention to establish three independent joint‑venture companies for that purpose.

18. As will be seen, two of the three independent joint‑venture companies to be established were in fact Changzhou and Tangshan, although it will also be seen that other companies associated with Hunan Chendian also became involved as investors.  It is common ground that the third joint-venture project contemplated in the Framework Agreement was a project in Hefei and that it was subsequently not proceeded with.

19. On 12 October 2004, a joint‑venture agreement (“the Changzhou Agreement”) was signed between the following parties:

(i)    Hunan Huiyin;

(ii)   a company by the name of「北京金鼎鼎科技發展有限公司」(“Beijing Jin Ding Ding”);

(iii)   the Company;

(iv)   a Brighton Kin International Limited (a company controlled by the petitioner); and

(v)   a company by the name of 「北京今日捷報投資咨詢有限公司」(“Bejing Today”).

20. By the Changzhou Agreement, the parties thereto agreed to establish a joint‑venture company, in effect, Changzhou.  It was further agreed that Hunan Huiyin would contribute capital in the sum of RMB24,924.900 (US$3,003,000) (45.5%), Bejing Jin Ding Ding in the sum of RMB2,739,000 (US$330,000) (5%), the Company in the sum of US$1,287,000 plus technical know‑how worth US$1,320,000 (totalling 39.5%), Brighton Kin in the sum of US$330,000 (5%) and Beijing Today in the sum of RMB2,739,000 (US$330,000) (5%).

21. Changzhou was then incorporated as a joint‑venture company pursuant to the Changzhou Agreement.

22. On 22 October 2004, a co‑operation agreement (“the Hunan Huiyin/Shanghai Junrui Agreement”) was signed between Hunan Huiyin as “the Appointor” and Shanghai Junrui as “the Appointee”.  The third recital refers to the fact that the Appointee had located a joint‑venture partner for the Appointor, namely, the Company.  Significantly, as will be seen later, it also refers to the fact that the people behind Baslow were led by a person called「孫忠國」(Sun Zhongguo) (“Mr Sun”) and the fact that Baslow had another joint-venture enterprise on the Mainland by the name of 「湖南盈德氣體有限公司」 (“Hunan Yingde”).  This agreement provided that the Appointor should pay to the Appointee an agency fee in the sum of RMB3 million.

23. On 30 October 2004, another co‑operation agreement (“the Astrotec/Brighton Kin Agreement”) which was identical or very similar to the Baslow Agreement was signed between the Company as “the Appointor” and Brighton Kin as “the Appointee”.

24. On 12 September 2005, another joint‑venture agreement (“the Tangshan Agreement”) was signed between the following parties:

(i)  Hunan Huiyin;

(ii)  the Company;

(iii)  Brighton Kin; and

(iv)  Beijing Today.

It will be noted that Beijing Jin Ding Ding did not take part.

25. By the Tangshan Agreement, the parties thereto agreed to establish a joint-venture company, in effect, Tangshan.  It was further agreed that Hunan Huiyin would contribute capital in the sum of US$2,777,500 (50.5%), the Company in the sum of US$1,072,500 in cash plus technical know-how worth US$1,100,000 (totalling 39.5%), Brighton Kin in the sum of US$275,000 (5%) and Beijing Today in the sum of US$275,000 (5%).

26. It can be seen that the Changzhou Agreement and the Tangshan Agreement are very similar in nature except that, for the latter, Beijing Jin Ding Ding is not a party and the extra 5% shareholding has been taken up by Hunan Huiyin.

27. The nature of Xinyu is similar to that of Changzhou and Tangshan.  It is not clear as to when Xinyu came into existence but it seems that there is no dispute that Xinyu is owned as to 60% by the Company and as to 40% by a「上海郴電裕旺投資有限公司」(“Shanghai Chendian”) which is a company associated with Hunan Chendian.  It is also not in dispute that a「上海童旺投資有限公司」(“Shanghai Tongwang”), a company belonging to the petitioner, is an investor in Shanghai Chendian to the extent of 17.5%, although Yu complains that she was not aware of this and that this would make the petitioner a secret and indirect investor in Xinyu.

28. It is common ground that Shanghai Hanglong is not an industrial company but acts as a consultant.  It is wholly owned by the Company.

DISPUTE AS TO THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE PETITIONER AND YU AND THE BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SHAREHOLDINGS

29. Against the background of the documents and facts referred to above, I now go into the evidence of the parties which deal with the respective roles of the petitioner and Yu and the beneficial ownership of their respective shareholdings.

(i)    The case of the petitioner

30. I first summarise the account given by the petitioner.

31. He had known Yu since the 1990’s.  At that time, Yu was an employee of the Shanghai International Trust and Investment Co and was responsible for providing registration and consultancy service to foreign investors setting up enterprises in Shanghai.  As far as he knew, Yu had not managed or operated any industrial business.  The petitioner himself had obtained his tertiary qualifications in the areas of investment, finance and management and had acquired considerable experience in such areas.

32. In 2000, the petitioner was employed by a「德隆國際戰略投資有限公司」(“D’Long”) and assisted in the management of various listed companies in which D’Long had an interest.  He had also taken part in numerous mergers and acquisitions of various Mainland companies which he recommended to a「湘火炬汽車集團股份有限公司」(“TAGC”), which company was then listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  In or about October 2001, Mr Sun and TAGC together set up a joint venture in Hunan, namely, Hunan Yingde, in which Baslow had a 20% interest.  It will be noted that the fact of Mr Sun’s leadership in Baslow and the joint‑venture enterprise between Baslow and Hunan Yingde were mentioned in the Hunan Huiyin/Shanghai Junrui Agreement referred to in para 22 above.  That, as I understand the evidence, was how the petitioner first established a business relationship with Mr Sun and Baslow in which Yu also had an interest.

33. Prior to that, Mr Sun and a Mr Trevor Strutt (“Mr Strutt”) formerly worked for a BOC Limited which was the largest provider of industrial, medical and special gases in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  Mr Sun specialized in marketing whereas Mr Strutt had the technical know‑how about industrial gases.

34. In about 2000, Mr Sun and Mr Strutt took steps to set up their own industrial gases business.  They incorporated Baslow in the British Virgin Islands.  Mr Sun had a 60% interest, Mr Strutt a 25% and Yu a 15% interest.  Mr Sun had provided the main source of the investment funds in Baslow.  It was Yu who introduced the petitioner to Mr Sun which introduction led to the TAGC deal referred to in para 32 above.

35. In about 2004, D’Long suffered from financial difficulties and the petitioner left its employment in about June 2004.  Mr Sun instructed Yu to approach the petitioner again for introduction of potential investors for Baslow’s business.  The petitioner introduced Hunan Chendian whose General Manager, Liu Xiaowen, was his friend and former colleague, as a potential investor.

36. At that time, Mr Sun and Baslow had already identified three potential projects, namely, Changzhou, Tangshan and the project in Hefei, as mentioned above.

37. The introduction by the petitioner of Hunan Chendian to Mr Sun and Baslow eventually led to the signing of the Baslow Agreement, which was in fact signed by Mr Sun on behalf of Baslow.  The Baslow Agreement was subsequently replaced by the Astrotec/Brighton Kin Agreement.  The effect of both agreements was to give a 5% interest in the joint-venture projects for his service as a go‑between and causing the parties to come together to carry out the joint‑ventures.

38. The petitioner assisted Mr Sun in his negotiations with Hunan Chendian.  Mr Sun and Baslow eventually decided to use the Company to enter into the joint‑ventures with companies in the Hunan Chendian group.  Mr Sun was so impressed with the performance of the petitioner that he was invited or allowed to make a 15% investment in the joint‑ventures.  Mr Sun was anticipating that he would have no time to manage and operate the joint‑venture companies because he had to concentrate on Hunan Yingde which had plans to become listed in Hong Kong.

39. As is clear from what was said above, the Framework Agreement, the Changzhou Agreement and the Tangshan Agreement were entered into between the Company’s side and the Hunan Chendian’s side.

40. Thus, pursuant to the Baslow Agreement, the petitioner, through his company Brighton Kin, was given an equity interest of 5% in the Changzhou project by virtue of the Changzhou Agreement in October 2004.  Subsequently, pursuant to the Astrotec/Brighton Kin Agreement, the petitioner again through Brighton Kin, was given an equity interest of 5% in the Tangshan project by virtue of the Tangshan Agreement in September 2005.

41. In addition, the petitioner was allowed to become an investor in the Company.  He paid for his 15 shares in the Company in the total sum of RMB3,645,000 to Mr Sun by instalments between July 2005 and February 2006.  Such payments are supported by bank transfer slips in favour of Mr Sun produced by the petitioner.

42. The shares in the Company which were supposed to be issued to Yu and the petitioner were not in fact issued in their respective names.  They were held by the 2nd respondent as nominee under a Nominee Services Indemnity Agreement dated 23 January 2006 as to 85% for Yu and 15% for the petitioner.

43. The understanding of the petitioner was that the initial shareholders of the Company were Mr Sun, Mr Strutt and Yu (through her father Yu Jin Bin (“Mr Yu”)) in the same proportion as in Baslow as set out in paragraph 34 above.  He believed that the 15% shareholding was transferred to him by Mr Sun.

44. Yu was partially responsible for setting up the joint‑venture companies, Changzhou and Tangshan, in the sense that she handled the documentation and formalities for the incorporation and registration of the companies in conjunction with the representatives of Hunan Chendian.

45. In about May 2005, upon the invitation of Mr Sun, the petitioner began to take part in the management and operation of the Company and its business. He established a comprehensive system of management for the Company which included support, communication and monitoring systems in relation to Changzhou, Tangshan and, subsequently, Xinyu.  He was also responsible for the arrangement of financing, development of new projects and human resources matters.  Yu and her father were never involved in the same.  The petitioner was however not involved in the accounts of the Company which were dealt with by Yu.

46. Subsequently when the petitioner sensed that there was something wrong with Yu, he instructed the 2nd respondent to transfer his 15 shares to him.

(ii)   The case of Yu

47. I now deal with the relevant parts of the evidence given by Yu.

48. According to Yu, she knew the petitioner in the 1990’s.  In about 1996 and 1997, she introduced the petitioner to work for a Taiwanese company in Shanghai.  Later the petitioner worked for D’Long as a Vice‑General Manager in its Strategic Development Management Department.

49. Yu says that she had invested in the bulk gas supply industry since 2000. Before setting up the Company in October 2004, she together with other parties operated Baslow for the investment in the bulk gas supply industry. She referred to the contemplated projects in Changzhou, Tangshan and Hefei.  At first, it was intended that Baslow would be used as the investment vehicle. Subsequently, it was decided that the Company would be used instead.  Her father, Mr Yu, was “the initial shareholders and representative of Astrotec”.

50. Yu says that it was the petitioner who first approached her and offered his service of looking for investors.  He then introduced Hunan Chendian to Yu. She says that it was she who negotiated with a Mr Deng of Hunan Chendian. She admitted that Brighton Kin was owned by the petitioner.

51. Yu says that she had promised to reward the petitioner for a successful introduction of investors by giving him a commission.  Although the 5% equity in the joint‑venture companies was much higher than the normal 1%, she was happy to agree to the same.  Hence, the Baslow Agreement and the Astrotec/Brighton Kin Agreement and the subsequent 5% shareholdings of Brighton Kin in Changzhou and Tangshan.

52. She says that the management of Changzhou and Tangshan was vested in the respective boards of directors of them which comprised representatives from Hunan Huiyin and the Company.  Her father was appointed as a director on both boards initially, but he seldom participated in the daily management/operation of those companies.  It was only in late 2005 that the petitioner was invited by her to participate in the operation of the Company which had to monitor the operation of the joint‑venture companies.  She says: “I was not keen to move and travel extensively at the time in monitoring the operation of the joint venture companies so there was a need to ensure the staffs of Astrotec that were at the respective joint ventures would ensure the above objective be maintained.”

53. She then decided to ask the petitioner to assist in the management of the Company first on a part‑time and later on a full‑time basis at a salary of between RMB15,000 and RMB20,000 per month.

54. She says that further in order to provide the petitioner an incentive to work for her, she offered to the petitioner 15 shares in the Company.  On the other hand, she needed some sort of assurance from the petitioner that his performance would be guaranteed.  It was therefore agreed between her and the petitioner that as a condition for the 15 shares of the Company to be transferred to him, he was to repay an amount of RMB3,645,000 on her behalf to Mr Sun being money that she owed to Mr Sun.  She says: “The amount made by the petitioner represented 15% of the injection of the cash capital by Astrotec (by way of my personal loans to Astrotec) to the Changzhou and Tangshan projects.”  She further says that the money paid by the petitioner was much less than the worth of 15 shares in the Company.  It was clearly understood between her and the petitioner that he was only an employee of the Company.  The 15 shares were transferred to the petitioner by her father.

55. The petitioner was appointed as a director of the boards of Changzhou and Tangshan in or about February 2007.  “He was responsible for supervising the staff of Astrotec for the management/ operation of the joint ventures.”

56. She then went on to make an admission that the Company was basically a holding company.

57. The abovementioned evidence is mainly contained in the Affirmation of Yu filed on 19 August 2010.  It is to be noted that, up to that stage, she had hardly mentioned the name of Mr Sun except that she requested the petitioner to pay the “assurance money” in the sum of RMB3,645,000 direct to Mr Sun “being money that I owed the said Sun Zhongguo.”

58. Mr Sun has not been tendered as a witness for the respondents.  In support of her allegations, Yu has produced two pieces of documentary evidence:

(i)   A copy of a “payment instruction” to the petitioner dated 1 August 2005 and exhibited as Exh “YQ-10” to her Affirmation filed on 19 August 2010, a copy whereof I annex to this judgment as Appendix 2.

(ii)    A copy of a Confirmation Letter by Mr Sun dated 21 October 2010 exhibited as Exh “YQ-31” to her 3rd Affirmation filed on 22 October 2010.

59. The position of the petitioner is that he had never received the said payment instruction and that no weight should be attached to the said Confirmation Letter.  I shall deal with them below.

60. Yu went on to say that in or about April 2007 she set up Xinyu for the Xinyu project.  She decided to carry out this project all by herself without any other investor.  She financed it all and the petitioner had no interest in it.

61. Yu further says that in May 2007, she also set up Shanghai Hanglong for the management/operation of the joint‑ventures in China and that the petitioner was instructed to look after the management of Xinyu and Shanghai Hanglong, including their accounts.  Later, it was decided that Hunan Chendian would be asked to join as an investor in Xinyu.  It resulted in Shanghai Chendian having a 40% and the Company a 60% interest in Xinyu.

(iii)   My findings

62. On the whole, I accept the petitioner’s evidence and reject that of Yu regarding how it came about that the petitioner became a 15% shareholder in the Company.  I find the following facts:

(i)    The petitioner did pay the sum of RMB3,645,000 to Mr Sun as consideration for the 15 shares in the Company which were initially transferred to the 2nd respondent who held the same as nominee for the petitioner.

(ii)    The said 15 shares are beneficially held by the petitioner now and not subject to any condition as alleged by Yu.

(iii)   At all material times, the Company had an interest as shareholder in the four companies, namely, Changzhou, Tangzhan, Xinyu and Shanghai Hanglong to the extent as depicted in the corporate structure chart (Appendix 1 hereto) and the petitioner as a 15% shareholder in the Company accordingly had an indirect interest in the four companies.  It is certainly not the case that Xinyu belongs to Yu alone as she seems to have suggested in her evidence.

63. I shall set out the reasons for my abovementioned findings hereinafter.

64. First of all, I find the various agreements between the various parties referred to above to be wholly logical and consistent with the evidence of the petitioner. It is nothing unusual and indeed very reasonable for the petitioner to be promised a 5% shareholding free of charge in any joint‑venture which would result from his introduction of an investor.  He was in fact given a 5% shareholding in both Changzhou and Tangshan through his own company Brighton Kin.  Such reward would not have anything to do with the subsequent service which he provided in managing and operating the joint-venture companies as a representative of the Company.

65. Secondly, I also find that it is logical that the petitioner was invited to be a 15% shareholder in the Company which was used to hold an interest in all the joint‑venture companies, namely, Changzhou, Tangshan and Xinyu, in order to give an incentive to the petitioner to manage and operate the joint‑venture companies.  As Yu has admitted as detailed above, the petitioner was given the task of managing those companies.

66. I find Yu’s allegation about the petitioner being only an employee earning around RMB20,000 per month but being willing to pay the sum of RMB3,645,000 as a refundable security for his good performance wholly incredible.  No employee in his right mind would do such a thing.  Furthermore, why should Yu bother to arrange for the 2nd respondent to hold 15 shares in the Company in trust for the petitioner at all.  According to her, the figure of 15 shares was not even suggested by the petitioner.

67. The so‑called “payment instruction” referred to in para 58(i) above (Appendix 2) hereto is actually entitled “Shareholder Loan 支付指令”.  It is addressed to the petitioner. In the first paragraph, it is recited that Mr Yu intended to transfer a 15% shareholding in the Company to the petitioner for free as an incentive for him to manage the Company.  At the same time, as security for his management of the Company, the petitioner had to be responsible for 15% of the shareholders’ loan which was injected into Changzhou and Tangshan as capital which amounted to US$444,675.  In the second paragraph, it is said that part of the shareholders’ loan would be transferred from under her name to his name and he should therefore pay the sum of US$444,675 (equivalent to RMB3,645,000) on her behalf to Mr Sun.  In case the petitioner were to leave the Company for any reason, that part of the shareholders’ loan could be transferred back to her.

68. I find a few aspects of this document problematic.  First of all, it does not make sense for the declared objects to be achieved in such a roundabout way.  The simplest way of providing an incentive to a staff member is to give him a cash bonus or bonus shares or a share option.  Another way is to let the staff member use his own money to invest in the shares in the Company, perhaps at a discount.  I cannot see any reason for giving the shares to the petitioner free of charge and at the same time requiring him to pay money to take over part of the shareholders’ loan.  Bonus shares are usually given after the staff’s performance has been proved to be satisfactory.  Secondly, why should the petitioner not be asked to make payment to Yu herself and, if Yu really owes Mr Sun money, why she cannot then use the money to repay Mr Sun?  Thirdly, according to Appendix 2, if the petitioner were really to leave the Company, he could transfer his part of the shareholders’ loan back to Yu and, presumably, Yu would then repay him the sum of US$444,675 or RMB3,645,000.  The petitioner would then still end up with the 15 shares which he obtained for free.  Where then is the security for good performance?  Fourthly, one would have expected that Yu would have asked the petitioner to sign on a copy of this document to indicate his acceptance of its terms or some other agreement setting out the terms as alleged by her.  She did not.

69. In all the circumstances, I accept the evidence of the petitioner that no such document was ever given to him.  I find that this document was produced by Yu probably after the event with a view to explaining why the petitioner made payment of the sum of RMB3,645,000 and why he paid the same to Mr Sun and not to her.

70. At this juncture, I should record that I find the petitioner to be a straightforward, spontaneous and honest witness.  On the other hand, I find Yu to be a sophisticated, knowledgeable and experienced businesswoman but an evasive and untruthful witness.  I accept the evidence of the petitioner and reject that of Yu on the material aspects where they differ.

71. I now deal with the Confirmation Letter by Mr Sun.  It is not a witness statement, statutory declaration or affirmation.  Mr Sun of course did not give evidence in court.

72. By the Order of Barma J dated 7 February 2011, it was ordered that the affirmations filed by the parties should stand as evidence‑in‑chief at the trial and that all deponents of the affirmations were to attend trial for cross‑examination failing which their affirmations could not be relied upon.

73. Mr Sun’s Confirmation Letter therefore cannot amount to any testimony by him which can be relied upon by the respondents, it not being an affirmation and he not having been tendered for cross‑examination.

74. The evidence of the petitioner contained in his numerous affirmations contains important allegations about the involvement of Mr Sun.  Yu quite clearly had had access to Mr Sun and should have asked him to make an affirmation and called him as a witness to counter the petitioner’s allegations.  She did not do so.  There is therefore ample room for me to draw the inference that Mr Sun is not in a position to deny the allegations of the petitioner regarding him. I so draw such an inference.

75. I also note the point which was raised by Mr Jonathan Wong in his cross‑examination of Yu, namely, that if Xinyu was entirely Yu’s own baby and had nothing to do with the petitioner, why she did not use a separate corporate entity to hold her interest in Xinyu but had to use the Company to do so.  Furthermore, the petitioner did in fact manage and operate Xinyu in addition to Changzhou and Tangshan.

76. I further take into consideration the third recital in the Hunan Huiyin/Shanghai Junrui Agreement.  It refers to the fact that the people behind Baslow were led by Mr Sun and that Baslow was involved in Hunan Yingde (see para 22 above).  The authenticity of this document has not been challenged by the respondents.  It is a contemporaneous document dated 2004 when there was no possibility of anybody contemplating litigation.  It supports the allegation on the part of the petitioner regarding Mr Sun, Baslow and Hunan Yingde.

77. Finally, I have reviewed the evidence consisting of the recording and transcript of a meeting which took place between Mr Sun, the petitioner and Yu at the Grand Hyatt Hotel, I believe, in Shanghai, in September 2008 produced by the petitioner.  The authenticity and accuracy of the same was not challenged by Yu.  Her only objection to the recording was that it was done without her knowledge or consent.  The petitioner’s answer was that it was done with her knowledge and consent and that on other occasions recordings were also made with her knowledge and consent.  This piece of evidence was adduced by the petitioner for the purpose of showing that, contrary to the allegation of Yu, even in September 2008, Mr Sun was very much in control and involved in the affairs of the Company.  Both on affirmation and in cross‑examination, Yu sought to explain that what was discussed during this meeting was only part of a casual conversation between the three participants.  In my judgment, the recording and transcript show quite clearly the status and involvement of Mr Sun.  The discussion certainly was not a casual conversation.  I reject the evidence of Yu and accept that of the petitioner.  I find that Mr Sun was the real boss in relation to the Company even up to September 2008.

78. In all the circumstances, I make the findings of fact set out in para 62 above.

THE PETITIONER’S COMPLAINTS

79. I now come to deal with the petitioner’s complaints about oppression of him by Yu.

80. They are as follows:

(i)    wrongful exclusion of the petitioner from participating in the management of the Company;

(ii)   wrongful attempts at increasing the share capital of the Company with a view to diluting the petitioner’s shareholding therein;

(iii)   the problematic disposal of Shanghai Hanglong to First Master Investments Limited (“First Master”); and

(iv)   prejudice caused to the petitioner by the surreptitious treatment of a dividend payment from Changzhou to Shanghai Hanglong.

I shall deal with these complaints below.

Wrongful exclusion of the petitioner from the management and wrongful attempts at dilution of share capital

81. It would be convenient for the first two complaints to be dealt with together.

82. According to the petitioner, in or about March or April 2010, Yu began to persuade the petitioner to sell his shares in the Company to Yingde Gases Group Company Limited (“Yingde”) or its associated company on terms that the petitioner would not get cash but shares in Yingde in return and that he would also have to give certain undertakings.  Yingde’s predecessor is Hunan Yingde.  Yingde has been listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and is under the control of Mr Sun. The petitioner informed Yu that he was willing to sell his shares but that the terms offered were unreasonable and unacceptable.  Yu thereafter began to conduct the affairs of the Company in a manner prejudicial to the petitioner.

83. At that time, the petitioner had been an executive director of Changzhou and Tangshan and a director and the general manager of Xinyu.

84. In the late evening of 25 May 2010, Yu caused the office of the Company in Shanghai to be entered and the desks and drawers of all staff under the petitioner to be broken open and all documents removed therefrom.

85. In the early morning of 26 May 2010, Yu sent an email to the petitioner to the effect that the Company had resolved that all duties and functions of the petitioner in the Company would cease with immediate effect and that he was no longer permitted to work in the office of the Company.  Regarding the Astrotec/Brighton Kin Agreement, she would represent the Company in taking over completely the management right of Brighton Kin in Changzhou and Tangshan.  In the Final Submission by Yu, it is said at para 15 thereof: “It is not disputed that Lu was removed from management of the JVs.”

86. On or about 1 June 2010, the petitioner was informed by the company secretary of the Company that Yu intended to transfer one of her 85 shares in the Company to the 3rd respondent.

87. On 7 June 2010, notice was caused by Yu to be issued for holding an EGM of the Company on 24 June 2010 to increase the authorized share capital of the Company from $10,000 to $132,000,000 followed by a rights issue of shares.

88. There then followed correspondence between Deacons, the solicitors acting for the petitioner, and Hastings & Co, the solicitors acting for Yu, in which the former complained about various matters, including the proposed EGM.  By letter dated 14 June 2010, the latter informed Deacons that the proposed EGM would not be proceeded with.

89. On 9 June 2010, the petitioner instructed the 2nd respondent to transfer his 15 shares into his own name which was done.

90. On 15 June 2010, the petitioner was informed that the Company’s sole corporate director would be changed from Exact Administration Limited to Exceedor China Services Ltd (“Exceedor”).

91. It is common ground that both Exceedor and the 3rd respondent are under the control of Yu.  Yu is the director of Exceedor and her father Mr Yu is the director of the 3rd respondent.

92. On 19 June 2010, Yu sent an email to the petitioner claiming that in order to solve the Company’s cash problem, the Company would have to make a second share allotment decision.  It enclosed a copy of a notice of another EGM to be held on 5 July 2010 issued by Exceedor.  This time, the proposal was to increase the authorized share capital to $20,000,000 followed by a rights issue of shares.  It was also proposed to pay a director’s fee of $600,000 payable at $50,000 per month.  This proposal, if passed, would of course benefit the new sole director, Exceedor.

93. On 20 June 2010, Yu sent to the petitioner three Deeds of Assignment and a draft loan agreement, the effect of which was to create a situation whereby the Company became indebted to the 3rd respondent in the sum of $111,680,213.38 as from 1 April 2010.  This was on the basis that the current three creditors of the Company, namely, Yu, Mr Yu and Exceedor, had decided to assign their debts to the 3rd respondent. The terms were to be changed to repayment on demand.  The petitioner was asked to agree to the same.

94. By a letter dated 24 June 2010, Deacons protested on behalf of the petitioner to Hastings & Co about, inter alia, the matters set out in paras 92 and 93 above.  It complained in effect that the emergence of Exceedor as a creditor of the Company was a mystery and that the whole situation was created by Yu in order to justify the proposed fund‑raising exercise.  It also gave notice of issue of legal proceedings and an injunction application.

95. On 28 June 2010, Yu sent an email to the solicitors of Deacons to reply to their said letter of 24 June 2010.

96. The petition in these proceedings in its unamended form was issued on 30 June 2010.  It was followed by an ex parte application for an injunction before Chu J who granted an Order dated 2 July 2010 restraining Yu from holding the EGM to increase the share capital of the Company.

97. The matter was then dealt with inter partes.  It was adjourned a number of times.  Other applications were subsequently made by the respective parties.

98. The long and short of it was that the proposed increase of the authorized share capital of the Company to $20,000,000 was never carried out.  Notwithstanding this, the Company has carried on without any apparent financial difficulty.

99. The audited accounts of the Company for the past few years show that the administration and operating expenses of the Company have been minimal. Further, no director’s fee has ever been paid.  Furthermore, the loans and other payables owing to related parties have always been unsecured, non‑interest bearing and not repayable within one year.

100. Yu has not been able to offer any satisfactory explanation for the sudden need for money by the Company to justify the proposed increases in capital.  It is also admitted by Yu that the petitioner had not been requested to help finance the Company prior to the proposals to increase the capital.

101. In my judgment, the sudden need for money by the Company as alleged by Yu was engineered by her only to justify the said proposals to increase the capital with the object of diluting the shareholding of the petitioner in the Company.

102. Three grounds have been put forward in the Final Submission of Yu to justify the exclusion of the petitioner from the management of the Company and, in turn, the management of Changzhou, Tangshan and Xinyu.  They are as follows:

(i)   Changzhou, Tangshan and Xinyu being companies incorporated on the Mainland, none of them is a “specified corporation” under section 168A(1) of the Companies Ordinance.  The exclusion of the petitioner from their management cannot be taken into account for the purpose of that statutory provision.

(ii)    The Nominee Services Indemnity Agreement referred to in para 42 above provided that Yu’s instructions would prevail over that of the petitioner and therefore she should have control of the Company.

(iii)   The petitioner had in effect embezzled the sum of RMB3.05 million and been arrested by the Xinyu Public Security Bureau.

I shall deal with such grounds below.

103. Regarding the first point put forward by Yu, it is said in Butterworths Hong Kong Company Law Handbook (14th ed) at para 168A.04 as follows:

“The affairs of the company

   There is no definition of what constitutes the ‘affairs’ of the company in the context of s 168A. The phrase in similar provisions has been held to have a ‘wide meaning’. … In R v Board of Trade, ex p St Martins Preserving Co Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 561, [1965] 1 QB 603. … .it was stated to be wide enough to cover a company’s ‘goodwill, its profits or losses, its contracts and assets including its shareholding in and ability to control the affairs of a subsidiary, and perhaps in the latter regard a subsidiary …’  … Conduct of a holding company may constitute conduct in the affairs of its subsidiary.  … Conversely, the way in which the affairs of a subsidiary are conducted can constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct in respect of the parent company’s affairs. …”

In my judgment, at least in a situation where the management and operation of a company and of its subsidiaries or associated companies are closely connected with each other, as in the present case, all of them can be looked at together for the purpose considering whether the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to certain members of the company.  I therefore do not accept the first point.

104. Regarding the second point put forward by Yu, the fact that the instructions by Yu are to prevail over those of the petitioner does not entitle her to treat the Company as her own.  See, eg the case of Chau Hung KauvTexgar Ltd [2002] 2 HKLRD 687, at 697, paras 34–36 per Poon DHCJ (as he then was).  I therefore do not accept the second point.

105. I now deal with the third point advanced by Yu.

106. According to Yu, on 30 April 2010, the Company instructed a firm of Mainland lawyers, Concord and Partners (“Concord”), to carry out due diligence on Changzhou, Tangshan and Xinyu because she was negotiating with Yingde for the sale of the joint‑venture companies and Yingde demanded that a due diligence exercise should be carried out.  According to her, it was in that process that the embezzlement by the etitioner was discovered.

107. It is to be noted that no report of Concord or instruction letter to Concord has been produced.  Strangely, Yu has produced as Exh “YQ‑17” to her Affirmation filed on 19 August 2010 a very brief certificate by Concord dated 3 August 2010 certifying that, on 30 April 2010, it received instruction from the Company to carry out a「法律狀況的盡職調查」on Xinyu, Changzhou and Tangshan.

108. She said that a preliminary check by Concord revealed a lot of wrongdoings by the petitioner. She then confronted him and he was evasive in his answers.

109. As stated above, the petitioner was removed from the management of all the companies on 25and 26 May 2010.

110. In her 6th Affirmation filed on 23 February 2011, in para 4, Yu said that one of the wrongdoings discovered was that the petitioner as the general manager of Xinyu had embezzled the sum of RMB3,051,962.20 by way of falsifying a payment order dated 18 February 2008 on behalf of the Company whereby Xinyu was instructed to remit the said sum of RMB3,051,962.20 to Shanghai Junrui to repay the sum which Xinyu had borrowed from Shanghai Hanglong.  She reported the matter to the Xinyu Public Security Bureau.

111. Yu produced as Exh “YQ‑43” to her 6th Affirmation a copy of her complaint to the said Bureau.  She did that on behalf of Xinyu, not the Company.  It is to be noted that there is some discrepancy between the said para 4, which stated that Xinyu was instructed to remit RMB3,051,962.20 to Shanghai Junrui, and “YQ‑43”, which alleged that in accordance with the payment order dated 18 February provided by the petitioner, the Company remitted to Shanghai Junrui the sum of RMB2,251,692.20 and set off an indebtedness in the sum of RMB800,000 incurred by Shanghai Junrui on 9 January 2008.

112. The petitioner denied that he used any fake chop.  He plainly admitted that the RMB3.05 million did belong to the Company but was in fact paid to him as dividends, wages and bonus in advance.  He explained that the practice between him and Yu was to use Shanghai Junrui as a vehicle to somehow bypass exchange control on the Mainland and eventually remit money to the Company in Hong Kong as well as to pay various expenses.  In relation to the said sum of RMB3.05 million, he said that there were in fact two other payment instructions, one issued by Yu to the effect that the money should be transferred from Shanghai Hanglong to the Company.  The other one was issued by Xinyu to the same effect.

113. He further said that the accounts of the Company were prepared by or under the instruction of Yu.  He was not involved in the compilation of the same and had not regularly received the annual audited accounts of the Company.

114. In support of his allegation, he produced as Exh “LJ‑33” to his 8th Affirmation filed on 12 November 2010 a copy of an email dated 8 April 2010 from Yu to him enclosing the revised management accounts of the Company for March and June 2010 together with copies of Cash Flow Statements of the Company from January 2008 to April 2010 which show the various receipts and outgoings of the Company and the involvements of Yu and the petitioner (through Shanghai Junrui).

115. The petitioner was cross-examined vigorously on the issue of the RMB3.05 million. I do not think that he was shaken.

116. In cross‑examination, Yu admitted that she had full access to the accounts of the Company and the joint‑venture companies.  The said email exhibited as part of “LJ‑33” clearly shows that she was very much involved in the accounts of the Company. I find it difficult to believe that, if the petitioner had embezzled the sum RMB3.05 million in early 2008, she would not have discovered it earlier herself but only discovered it as a result of the due diligence exercise allegedly carried out by Concord after the middle of 2010.

117. The burden being on Yu to prove the alleged embezzlement by the petitioner as the justification for his removal from the management of the Company and of the joint‑venture companies, I find that she has failed to discharge such burden.

118. During the trial, Yu relied heavily on her report to the Xinyu Public Security Bureau and the fact that the petitioner was arrested and placed under custody.  Even after the hearing had ended, the parties’ solicitors still sent letters to my clerk regarding, inter alia, the progress of the criminal proceedings arising out of Yu’s said report to the Xinyu Public Security Bureau.  I believe that recently a copy of a decision by some Mainland court was also supplied to my clerk.

119. I put on record that I have deliberately refrained from looking at the said decision by the Mainland court and I have not paid any attention to the correspondence. They do not form part of the evidence and it is inappropriate for me to take the same into account.

120. Yu also relies on the fact that Shanghai Junrui was subsequently de‑registered.  I do not think that there is anything in the point.

121. It is not seriously disputed that the petitioner had a legitimate expectation to take part in the management of the Company and, as a matter of fact, he had been very much involved in the management of the Company and its subsidiary or associated companies before his removal.  In the result, I find that the petitioner had been wrongfully removed from the management of the Company and its subsidiary or associated companies, the joint‑venture companies.  I further find that Yu had wrongfully attempted to increase the capital of the Company with a view to diluting the shareholding of the petitioner. 

The problematic disposal of Shanghai Hanglong to First Master and the surreptitious treatment of a dividend payment from Changzhou to Shanghai Hanglong

122. It would again be convenient for the last two complaints to be dealt with together.

123. According to the petitioner, on or about 5 August 2010, he received an email from Yu who informed him that the Company’s shares in Shanghai Hanglong had been transferred to others.  Shanghai Hanglong had substantial business operations and provided technical consultancy services, for instance, to Changzhou in return for fees of RMB180,000 per month.

124. The petitioner’s evidence is that he did not know anything about the sale of Shanghai Hanglong.  He immediately asked Deacons to write to Hastings & Co to protest and ask for information.  It was subsequently discovered that an agreement was signed between the Company and First Master on 9 May 2010 for the sale and purchase of all the shares in Shanghai Hanglong for the price of RMB4,500,000 which was payable by instalments within one year.

125. The petitioner had previously asked his accountants Borrelli Walsh to value Shanghai Hanglong and they valued it as at 31 December 2009 at RMB6.9 million. He further said that after his removal from management Hunan Chendian had paid to Shanghai Hanglong the balance of the management fee for 2008 in the sum of about RMB2.4 million.

126. In her 8th Affirmation filed on 22 October 2010, Yu said that Shanghai Hanglong at the time of sale was not worth RMB6.9 million because it had not received any income for five months whilst expenses were continuing.  She alleged that the petitioner had full knowledge of the sale.

127. Yu was cross‑examined by Mr Jonathan Wong on this matter.  She admitted that the person behind First Master was a Mr Kenneth Chung and that it was she who asked him to set it up.  She said that Shanghai Hanglong was only acting as a company for collecting fees and dividends and had no intrinsic value.  As Yingde which was negotiating with the Company to buy the joint-venture companies had another company of its own to perform the functions of Shanghai Hanglong, Shanghai Hanglong would no longer be needed.  She therefore decided to sell it off with the knowledge of the petitioner.  She revealed that First Master never paid the purchase price, on the basis that the petitioner had started winding‑up proceedings.  She admitted that after the selling off, she caused the Company to enter into an agreement with Shanghai Hanglong for the latter to provide the same services as before.  Indeed, the service agreement between the Company and Shanghai Hanglong was signed by her on behalf of both those companies on as early as 20 June 2010. Under it, the Company was to pay to Shanghai Hanglong a service fee of RMB300,000 per month.  She further admitted that she subsequently caused the joint‑venture companies to pay fees to Shanghai Hanglong.

128. Regarding the surreptitious treatment of a dividend from Changzhou to Shanghai Hanglong, the relevant facts are set out below.

129. According to the petitioner, in early March 2011, he discovered that Changzhou should have made a dividend payment of about RMB15 million to the Company.  He instructed Deacons to write to Hastings & Co to inquire about the situation.  Hastings & Co replied by a letter dated 11 March 2011 as follows:

“… we are instructed that the dividend of about RMB15 million was declared by the Changzhou Company but not yet paid to the Company. In other words, as of the date of this letter, the Company has not yet received the said dividend from the Changzhou Company.”

130. Subsequently, the petitioner managed to obtain from Changzhou a copy of a letter of instruction dated 16 February 2011 signed by Yu by which she purportedly on behalf of the Company directed Changzhou to pay the declared dividend in the sum of RMB15,171,501.39 and the interest thereon into the account of Shanghai Hanglong with a bank in Shanghai bearing the account number 076457‑98210155300000811 (“the said account”).  On about 15 March 2011, the petitioner’s private investigator managed to obtain an extract of the statement of account relating to the said account which showed that the exact amount of RMB15,171,501.39 was credited into the said account on 24 February 2011.  In the circumstances, the information given by Hastings & Co as per their client’s instructions referred to in para 129 above is plainly untrue.

131. In Yu’s 7th Affirmation filed on 7 April 2011, she said in para 15 thereof that Shanghai Hanglong had repaid the entire sum of RMB15,171,501.39 back to Changzhou by a remittance on 18 March 2011.  She further says in para 16 thereof as follows:

“I believe that the incident was an administrative and communication mistake and not as what the Petitioner would like this Honourable Court to accept being an act of dissipation.”

132. I am afraid I do not accept Yu’s explanation.  I believe that she did what she did in anticipation of her intended sale of Shanghai Hanglong in the then near future with a view to dissipation of assets from the Company.  The reversal of the dividend took place only as a result of the query raised by the petitioner.

133. In the abovementioned circumstances, I find the alleged sale of Shanghai Hanglong to First Master to be highly suspicious.  I even doubt whether it is genuine.  I also find that the abovementioned acts constitute acts or at least attempts by Yu to dissipate the assets of the Company.

CONCLUSION

134. In all the circumstances, I find that the affairs of the Company have been conducted by Yu, its majority shareholder, in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner.  Accordingly, I propose to make an order that Yu and the 3rd respondent do purchase the 15 shares of the petitioner in Company at a price and on such terms to be determined.

135. I agree with the suggestion by Mr Jonathan Wong that there should be another hearing at which the identity of the valuer and the exact terms of the order to be made by me should be finalized.

136. I make an order nisi that Yu and the 3rd respondent do pay the costs of the petitioner and the official receiver in these proceedings.

137. There are two outstanding matters.

138. First, although there are no pleadings filed, the parties were ordered by the Order of Barma J dated 7 February 2011 to file Lists of Issues.  Yu and the 3rd respondent filed a List of Issues dated 30 May 2012 consisting of 35 paragraphs.  As Mr Jonathan Wong has pointed out, many of the issues set out therein had not been pursued by Yu and the 3rd respondent in their Final Submission dated 14 September 2012.  I agree with Mr Jonathan Wong that such issues listed in the List of Issues and not pursued in their Final Submission must be treated as having been abandoned by Yu and the 3rd respondent and I so hold.

139. There is also outstanding the Summons issued by Yu and the 3rd respondent on 31 August 2012 for the discharge of the undertaking referred to in the Order of Mr Recorder Jat SC dated 16 December 2011.  I prefer to hear what counsel have to say about it in light of my judgment before I finally dispose of it.

140. I direct that a two‑hour hearing be fixed before me in consultation with counsel’s diaries for the purposes referred to in paras 135 and 139 above.  All written submissions should be delivered to the court at least three clear days before the date fixed for the hearing.

141. I also direct that the parties by their legal advisers should use their best endeavours to reach an agreement as much as possible on the identity of the valuer and the terms of the order which I should make before the forthcoming hearing.

142. Finally, it remains for me to thank counsel on both sides for their able assistance in this matter.

 (Patrick Fung SC)
 Recorder of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Deacons, for the petitioner

Mr Brian Wong and Mr Danny Fung, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st and 3rd respondents

Guardian Proprietary Limited (formerly FCP Proprietary Limited), Absent

Astrotec Co. Ltd. (formerly Happy Dragon Technologies Ltd), Absent

Attendance excused for Official Receiver


Appendix 2

 

Please refer to CACV37/2013 & CACV76/2013 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

81371-EN-2012-03-16

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) PROCEEDINGS NO. 282 OF 2010

________________________

 

IN THE MATTER of ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of Sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32

________________________

BETWEEN

 LU JUN (呂俊)Petitioner

and

 YU QI (虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPRIETARY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent

________________________

Before: Hon Barma J, in Chambers
Date of Hearing:  16 March 2012
Date of Judgment:  16 March 2012

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

 

1. This is an application by the 1st and 3rd Respondents to these proceedings seeking further security for costs from the Petitioner.

2. The proceedings are brought under sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance.  Essentially the Petitioner alleges that the affairs of the company had been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to him, or that it is otherwise just and equitable that the company should be wound up.

3. The primary relief that the Petitioner seeks in these proceedings is an order requiring the 1st and 3rd Respondents to buy out his shares in the company, of which he is a 15 per cent shareholder.  The alternative relief sought is a winding-up order in respect of the company.

4. The 1st and 3rd Respondents have indicated in their affirmations filed in opposition to these proceedings that they are, in principle, prepared to buy out the shareholding of the Petitioner in the company, subject to the determination of the price at which that should be done.

5. The issue that arises as between the parties in respect of the price relates to allegations that the 1st and 3rd Respondents have made against the petitioner in respect of certain alleged wrongdoing on the part of the Petitioner in his management of the affairs of the company or its subsidiaries, which, it is said, have given rise to losses to the company which should be taken into account in assessing the price to be paid to the Petitioner for his shareholding in the company.

6. The company is a holding company, holding interests in a number of industrial gas fields on the mainland.  It holds interests in three mainland joint-venture companies that operate gas fields in the PRC and derives its income from two main sources: first, dividends declared by the operators of the gas fields, that is the joint-venture companies in which the company is a shareholder; and secondly, management fees, described as “tax management fees”, that are paid by certain of the joint-venture companies to the company for services provided by the company to those subsidiaries.

7. The amount of the income that is generated from these activities appears to be extremely substantial.  By way of example, by an application made towards the end of last year, a validation order was sought to enable the company to utilise its income for one year of operations (the 2009/2010 financial year) for certain specified purposes: first, to repay to a substantial extent a shareholder’s loan that had been advanced to it by the 1st and 3rd Respondents; and second, to pay its operating expenses that had accrued over the past year and to make provision for the ongoing payment of its operating expenses on a current basis.

8. The amount of income involved for approximately one year’s operation was RMB 112 million.  It is, I think, to be anticipated (and certainly the contrary was not suggested by either of the parties) that that level of income is likely to be achieved on an ongoing basis for at least some time into the future, there being no suggestion that the industrial gas fields in question are going to be depleted or exhausted at any time in the immediate future.

9. The debt that it was proposed to repay by means of the validation order, was a debt of US$15 million-odd advanced to the company by the 1st and 3rd Respondents and the effect of the proposed repayment (amounting to some RMB 88 million, or about HK$100 million), would be to substantially pay off that debt leaving a balance of about HK$20 million, or about US$2.5 million outstanding.

10. Assuming that the company’s income for the following year (2010/2011) was of a similar scale as in 2009/2010, it would seem likely that the shareholder’s loan could readily be fully repaid now or in the near future. 

11. As far as operating expenses are concerned, those appear to run at a rate of about HK$600,000 per month.  On that basis, with an income of approximately RMB 100 million a year and expenses of some HK$7 to 8 million a year, the company would appear to be highly profitable and therefore highly valuable.

12. The history of the proceedings has been rather chequered.  There have been a large number of interlocutory applications and, in fact, at a relatively early stage in the proceedings the 1st and 3rd Respondents did ask for security for costs on the basis that the Petitioner was a person resident outside the jurisdiction.  The Petitioner is, as I understand it, resident in Shanghai.  At that time the Petitioner did not dispute his obligation to provide security and was prepared to do so, which he did in the amount of HK$1 million.

13. At that time the security sought was some HK$1.5 million in respect of costs that had already been incurred in the first month or two of the proceedings and in respect of costs projected up to the trial of these proceedings.  It was against that background that an agreement was reached for HK$1 million in security to be provided.

14. Shortly before the amount of security was agreed, the Petitioner took out an application in about October 2010 seeking the appointment of provisional liquidators in respect of the company. Thereafter, following a consent order made on 2 November 2010 for the provision of security and the payment of $1 million as such security the following day, the proceedings carried on.

15. A large number of affirmations were filed on each side and further applications were taken out.  The first application to be taken out after November 2010 was this application seeking further security for costs, which was taken out in April 2011. 

16. In support of the application a skeleton bill was filed indicating that the further costs had been expended in the period between July 2010, which was the period up to which the previous bill had been prepared in respect of incurred costs, and about April 2011 and the indication was that in that period of some 9 or 10 months a further $1 million had been expended on costs.

17. There was also an update given in respect of the anticipated future costs going forward towards trial with a result that the total amount of costs expected to be expended by the 1st and 3rd Respondents on these proceedings were said to be some HK$2.5 million-odd.  Thus, giving credit for the $1 million that had already been received, this application was made seeking the provision of a further amount of security of about HK$1.5 million.

18. The application, however, did not come on for hearing very quickly.  There were directions which provided for filing of evidence in respect of the application, and the evidence in relation to the application was in fact completed by about August 2011.

19. In the meantime, other applications were made.  First, there was an application by the petitioner for leave to re-amend its petition in these proceedings.  That application was heard in October 2011 before Mr Recorder Fung, SC.  The proposed amendments, although fairly extensive, extending to about eight pages, thereby doubling the length of the petition, were clearly matters that had all been adverted to and canvassed in affirmations already filed in the proceedings.  In those circumstances it is not too surprising that Recorder Fung granted the application for leave to amend.

20. In relation to that application, although he made the usual order for costs in respect of the amendment themselves (that costs of and occasioned by the amendments should be paid by the Petitioner to the 1st and 3rd Respondents) so that costs wasted as a result of the amendment, if any, should be borne by the Petitioner, Mr Recorder Fung ordered that the costs of the application should be the Petitioner’s costs in the cause, reflecting his view that the Petitioner was the substantially successful party in the application, and that 1st and 3rd Respondents’ opposition to the application was not well-founded.  Thus, at the end of the day, the costs of the application will have to be borne by the 1st and 3rd Respondents, and such costs cannot provide a basis for ordering further security.

21. The next application that was taken out was an application by the Petitioner for the appointment of an interim receiver.  That appears to have largely overlapped with the application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator. 

22. The final application that was taken out was one to which I have already adverted, namely the application by the 1st and 3rd Respondents seeking validation orders to enable the income of the company for the year 2009/2010 to be expended to make payments in respect of its ongoing overhead and administrative expenses and such expenses that had been incurred over the past year which have not yet been paid because of the existence of the winding-up relief in these proceedings, and also to enable a substantial repayment to be made to the 1st and 3rd Respondents in respect of the shareholders’ loan advanced by them to the company.

23. For some reason, although the application for security for costs was taken out earlier than the other applications (apart from the application for the appointment of provisional liquidators) it was not brought on as a matter of any urgency, and instead the other applications were allowed to proceed with the result that they were fully argued and orders were made on them before this application was fixed for hearing.  The delay in making the application for security is not one for which any explanation has been provided. 

24. That is the background against which this application came to be made.  At the hearing today, Mr Jonathan Wong, who appeared for the petitioner, took four points in opposition to the application.

25. The first was that, as an application that had been made by the 2nd Respondent for leave to commence derivative proceedings against the Petitioner in respect of the alleged wrongdoing on his part, which had been referred to in the affirmations in opposition to the petition, the position is that the subject matter of the petition is substantially mirrored by the proposed derivative proceedings in which the 2nd Respondent will be in the position of a plaintiff.

26. That being the case, Mr Jonathan Wong suggested that the situation here was similar to one in which a foreign plaintiff was met with a counterclaim which would require all of the matters that were the subject of his claim to be gone into, so that it could not be said that the foreign plaintiff’s claim would of itself give rise to any costs or expenses which would not in any event have been incurred.  In those circumstances, he suggested that the appropriate course to take would be to refuse to order security for costs.  In support of this argument he relied on Success Wise v Dynamic (BVI) Limited [2006] 1 HKC 149 at paragraphs 12 to 14. 

27. However, he fairly acknowledged that in the context of section 168A and 177(1)(f) petitions, there was authority in the form of my judgment in Re All Our Kids Hong Kong Limited (unreported, CFI, HCCW 141 of 2007, 20 June 2011) to the effect that this principle did not apply in the context of section 168A proceedings where the relief sought by the petitioner was of a different nature and included relief that could not be obtained by way of counterclaim in the proceedings that had been brought against him.

28. The second point that Mr Jonathan Wong took was that in this case, given the terms in which the validation order was made, which involved, as a means of protection of the Petitioner’s interest in the company, an undertaking proffered by the 1st and 3rd Respondents that 15 per cent of the amounts sought to be validated would be paid by them into court as a means of providing a measure of protection for the Petitioner’s interests, that there was a substantial fund in the court of some just under HK$15 million which would be available to meet any adverse order for costs that might be made against the Petitioner in these proceedings.

29. As the argument on this matter progressed, Mr Wong extended the submission somewhat and modified it by suggesting that whatever might be the status of the moneys in court, in that it should perhaps more properly be regarded as an asset of the company rather than the Petitioner, it nonetheless demonstrated that the company was a valuable one and that the Petitioner’s shareholding in the company was therefore an asset of the petitioner to which recourse could be had if it should become necessary in order to satisfy any costs award that might be made in favour of the 1st and 3rd Respondents in these proceedings.

30. The third point that Mr Jonathan Wong took was in relation to delay.  He pointed out that although this application had been made in April 2011, and although it is said that the reason for the application is the additional costs that have been incurred as a result of the interlocutory proceedings that have taken place during the course of 2011, all of the interlocutory proceedings in question took place after the application for further security for costs was made.  Yet for reasons best known to the 1st and 3rd Respondents they made no effort to ensure that their application for security for costs was heard first so that they would be able to secure themselves in relation to their costs, rather than allow the applications to go ahead, thereby resulting in costs being incurred and then seeking thereafter to be provided with ex post facto security in relation to those costs.

31. He suggested that in these circumstances, where no good explanation for adopting that course had been put forward, it would not be appropriate to protect the 1st and 3rd Respondents in respect of their position in costs when they could easily have done so themselves by ensuring that their application for security was dealt with in advance of the other applications that were heard.

32. Finally, Mr Jonathan Wong suggested that if one looked at the skeleton bill of costs that had been provided by way of evidence as to the likely level of costs that were concerned, the costs that were claimed were in many respects excessive and that looked at realistically, in respect of the additional applications that were said to have justified the further application for security, a realistic amount of further costs which should be provided for in respect of the two applications was, he said, in the order of around HK$200,000, rather than the HK$1.5 million that is now asked for.

33. Mr Brian Wong, appearing for the 1st and 3rd Respondents, disputed these submissions and sought to persuade me that in all of the circumstances of the case it would be right for the court to grant further security in favour of the 1st and 3rd Respondents, notwithstanding that the application is made a little late in the day.

34. Having considered the submissions on both sides, I have come to the view that in all of the circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate for me to order further security to be paid at this stage.

35. The reasons that I have come to this view are as follows: In relation to the first ground put forward by Mr Jonathan Wong, as I indicated in the course of argument, I am not persuaded by this ground. It seems to me that in these proceedings the petitioner is seeking relief which he would not be able to seek in the context of any other proceedings, namely a buy out of his shares or alternatively the winding-up of the company.

36. Although it is fair to say that the allegations raised by the 1st to 3rd Respondents, which they put forward in support of their argument that the price at which the petitioner should be bought out should be reduced, are matters that are also sought to be raised in the proposed derivative action.  It does not seem to me that that provides a sufficient answer, for the reasons that I gave in paragraphs 27 to 30 of my judgment in the All Our Kids case.  It does seem to me that the nature of the claim that has been made by the petitioner in this case goes well beyond that of simply defending the allegations that are to be made against him in the derivative action (if leave is obtained for that proceeding to be brought).

37. Quite apart from that, it seems to me that bearing in mind that this matter is set down for trial with trial dates fixed for the end of July this year and the proposed derivative action is as yet only at the stage of an application for leave, which is not to be heard until the beginning of May this year, there is no realistic prospect that the derivative action will be able to be heard at the same time as the trial of this petition.

38. That being the case, this petition will have to go ahead in any event and it seems to me that in those circumstances it is also appropriate to treat this as the main proceedings for the purpose of considering whether security ought to be granted.

39. It cannot be said that these matters will have to be canvassed in the derivative action because even if leave is given for those proceedings to be commenced and they eventually make their way to trial, it is quite possible that such findings as the court may make in the course of the trial of these proceedings will simply be relied upon to deal with the question of the appropriate disposition of the derivative action. 

40. Moreover, having regard to the nature of the opposition put forward by the 1st and 3rd Respondents in these proceedings, which is essentially a suggestion that the amount of damage caused to the company by the matters in respect of which the derivative action is sought to be brought should be taken into account and netted off against the price to be paid for the petitioner’s shares, it seems to me that if that argument succeeds and an order for a buy out is made on that basis, the Respondents will have little left to complain of in the proposed derivative action in that such loss as the company might recoup would effectively have been taken into account in the price at which bought out the Petitioner.

41. In those circumstances it may well be that the Petitioner would wish to consider some means of ensuring that if a buy-out order is made on terms along the lines of those proposed by the 1st and 3rd Respondents, that provision should be made to ensure that the Petitioner is not at risk of being penalised twice for the same wrongdoing (assuming he is guilty of any, which has not, of course, as yet been determined).  For all of these reasons I do not think that the first ground put forward by Mr Jonathan Wong in opposition to this application is a good one. 

42. However, it does seem to me that the second ground that is one that has real force.  It is not entirely clear to me why this point was not taken from the outset when an application for security for costs was made.  But, be that as it may, it seems to me that I should consider this application on its merits unaffected by the fact that the petitioner has previously provided security for costs. 

43. The point seems to me to come down to this: while it is undoubtedly the practice of the court to grant an order for security for costs in favour of a person in the position of the defendant in proceedings brought by a foreign plaintiff, the reason for that practice lies in the difficulties that may be faced by a successful defendant in seeking to enforce a costs order against an unsuccessful foreign plaintiff.  However, it is well established that if the foreign plaintiff has assets within the jurisdiction which are sufficient to cover the likely amount of costs of the proceedings, an order for security will generally be refused.

44. In the present case it is quite obvious that the Petitioner does have an asset within the jurisdiction, namely his shareholding in the company.  The company is a Hong Kong company; the shares are therefore assets located in Hong Kong.  Notwithstanding that the Petitioner is a resident of Shanghai, his asset, i.e. his shareholding in the company, is a local asset.

45. On the basis of the material that has been alluded to in the course of this application, it is quite clear that this is an extremely valuable asset.  The income of the company for one year alone was of the order of RMB 100 million.  On that basis, even taking a relatively conservative approach to the likely useful life of the underlying gas fields which form the main source of income of the company, the value of the company is likely to be extremely substantial, and a 15 per cent interest in it, which represents the Petitioner’s shareholding, is likely to be a correspondingly valuable asset. 

46. In those circumstances it seems to me that there is clearly an asset within the jurisdiction that could provide a means for recoupment by the 1st and 3rd Respondents of any costs that they may ultimately be awarded in these proceedings. 

47. Apart from the fact that the shares themselves would appear to be of significant value and that they are assets located in Hong Kong against which enforcement would be possible, it seems to me that it is, in fact, open to the 1st and 3rd Respondents and those running the company to enable themselves to recoup any costs order that they may be awarded at the end of the trial in other ways as well, arising out of the company and the parties’ respective interests in it.

48. As Mr Jonathan Wong pointed out, the fact is that the company is deriving large amounts of income every year, which when compared with its administrative and running expenses suggests that it is extremely profitable.  In those circumstances it would obviously be open to the management of the company, if they were minded to do so, to declare a dividend of which the Petitioner would be entitled to 15 per cent, and from that 15 per cent it would be possible for the 1st and 3rd Respondents to recoup any order for costs that might be made in their favour.

49. That apart, it seems to me that even if that were not done the position would still be that the asset would be located in Hong Kong.  If no dividends were declared, the company would be so much the more valuable having retained its profits, and there would be the ability to obtain a charging order against the Petitioner’s shares in the company to secure any liability for costs that might fall on the Petitioner at the end of the day.

50. But it seems to me that there is a further point which can be taken into account, which is this: in these proceedings the Petitioner seeks to have his shares purchased by the 1st and 3rd Respondents.  The 1st and 3rd Respondents have indicated that they are willing to do so.  The only question is as to whether certain matters should be taken into account by way of reduction of the purchase price of the shares.

51. If the 1st and 3rd Respondents are successful in these proceedings it would seem likely that they will have succeeded on that contention.  But at this stage there is nothing to suggest that even after such appropriate reduction as is made to the value of the shareholding to take account of alleged wrongdoing on the part of the shareholder, the shares would not still be of some real (and probably considerable) value.  There is certainly nothing to suggest that the Petitioner’s shareholding would be thereby rendered valueless, such that the 1st and 3rd Respondents would be able to acquire it for no, or a very small, consideration.

52. In those circumstances it seems to me that the simplest course for the 1st and 3rd Respondents to take would be to offset any costs that are awarded against the purchase price that it may pay at the end of the day to the Petitioner for his shares in the company.

53. In those circumstances it does seem to me that given that there is an asset which is quite likely, at the end of the day, to be realised by a sale of it from the Petitioner to the 1st and 3rd Respondents, the only question being as to the price at which that sale takes place, there is realistically relatively little risk that the 1st and 3rd Respondents will be left in a position of having costs awarded in his favour which it will not be able to satisfy.

54. That in itself, I think, is a sufficient reason to dismiss this application. 

55. However, I would just add very briefly that in relation to the question of delay, it does seem to me that there is some force in the point.  Although Mr Brian Wong suggested that the interlocutory applications that were made were largely at the instigation of the Petitioner and it would therefore be unfair for the 1st and 3rd Respondents to be at risk as to their costs in respect of them if they are successful at the end of the day, since the costs order made in respect of all of those applications (other than the re-amendment application) was costs in the cause, it does seem to me that the remedy for that, or the protection for that, was within the hands of the 1st and 3rd Respondents in that they could have ensured, had they been minded to do so, that their application for security for costs was dealt with first.

56. No very clear explanation was provided as to why this was not done and it seems to me in those circumstances that it would have been appropriate to have, at the very least, substantially reduced the amount of costs to be awarded by way of amount of security to be given to take account of that factor. 

57. Finally, in relation to the question of the quantum of the costs, I would observe that although the amount now sought is some $1.5 million by way of additional security, it should, I think, be borne in mind that when security was originally provided in the amount of $1 million by agreement, that was at a time when the estimated costs of the proceedings as a whole were estimated at $1.5 million. 

58. On that basis, even if one accepts at face value the skeleton bill with an estimated cost of the entire proceedings, including all of the interlocutory applications, at $2.5 million, it seems to me that had the court been minded to make an award for security in respect of the whole of the costs, that amount would have been discounted to some extent.

59. Certainly, the additional costs that have been put forward would not be $1.5 million, since $1.5 million was a figure that was in place from the very beginning.  The additional costs in respect of which security is now sought would appear to be a sum of $1 million being the difference between $2.5 million put forward in the present skeleton bills and the $1.5 million put forward in the original skeleton bills when the consent order was made.

60. Looking at the figures themselves I have to confess that some of the figures in terms of time spent and in terms of the level of fees sought to be charged in respect of various applications seem to me to be somewhat on the high side.  I would therefore accept that there would be some element of discount in respect of that. Taking into account also the fact that some element of discount (at least) should be applied in respect of the delay in the bringing of this application, it seems to me that even if I had been of the view that in principle some further security might be appropriate, , whether or not such security would, in fact, have been ordered after these relevant discounts had been applied is a matter of some uncertainty.  I think it likely that at the end of the day no further security would have been ordered taking the factors of delay and the size of the bills and the appropriate discount to be applied to them into account.

61. However, for the reasons which I have given, the principal reason for which I dismiss this application is on the basis of Mr Jonathan Wong’s second ground as developed in the course of submissions today, namely that although the Petitioner is a person who is resident outside the jurisdiction, he does have within the jurisdiction an asset which would appear on the face of it to be an extremely valuable one from which the 1st and 3rd Respondents should be able to secure that any order for costs in their favour is met at the end of the day.

62. For those reasons I have come to the view that the appropriate course to take would be to dismiss this application.

(Discussion re costs)

63. I make an order that the costs of this application be paid by the 1st and 3rd Respondents to the Petitioner in any event.

 (Aarif Barma)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

  

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Deacons, for the Petitioner
Mr Wong Chao-wai, Brian, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st and 3rd Respondents
2nd Respondent, in person, absent
4th Respondent, in person, absent
The Official Receiver, attendance excused
79621-EN-2011-12-16

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO. 282 OF 2010

------------------------

  IN THE MATTER OF Astrotec Company Limited
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32

------------------------

BETWEEN

 LU JUN(呂俊)Petitioner
and
 YU QI(虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPERIETARY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 (formerly FCP PROPROPRIETARY LIMITED) 
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent

------------------------

Before : Mr Recorder Jat SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 7 December 2011

Date of Ruling : 16 December 2011

------------------

RULING

------------------

 

I. INTRODUCTION

1.  The Petitioner holds 15% of the shares of the 4th Respondent (“Company”).  The 1st to 3rd Respondents together hold the majority 85%.  For convenience, I shall refer to the 1st and 3rd Respondents as “Respondents”.

2.  The Petitioner commenced these proceedings seeking relief under s. 168A of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, primarily for an order that the 1st to 3rd Respondents buy out his shares in the Company at a value to be determined by the Court; alternatively for winding up of the Company under the just and equitable ground.

3.  There are 3 applications for determination:

3.1 The Respondents’ summons dated 31 May 2010 (as amended with leave granted, without opposition, at the hearing on 7 December 2011) seeking a validation order under s. 182 of the Companies Ordinance (“Validation Summons”).

3.2 The Petitioner’s summons dated 12 October 2010 seeking to appoint provisional liquidators (“PL Summons”).

3.3 The Petitioner’s summons dated 7 July 2011 for the appointment of interim receivers pending determination of these proceedings (“IR Summons”). Although the IR Summons does not expressly say so, Mr Jonathan Wong, counsel for the Petitioner, confirms in his Skeleton Submissions that this is in the alternative to the application to appoint provisional liquidators.

4.  These proceedings have had a long and checkered procedural history with many interlocutory skirmishes.  Numerous affidavits have been filed which, together with exhibits, run into well over 2,000 pages.  For the disposition of these summonses, however, it is unnecessary to go into the details of the parties’ respective cases.  Indeed, counsel sensibly agreed that for the purpose of this hearing, the allegations and counter-allegations cannot be determined on the basis of the affidavit evidence.

5.  The trial of the Petition is fixed for July 2012.

II. VALIDATION SUMMONS

6.  The Validation Summons, as amended, seeks the following order:

“1. That notwithstanding the presentation of the Amended Petition dated 19th August 2010:–

(a) Payments made into or out of the bank accounts of the 4th Respondent in the ordinary course of business of the 4th Respondent; and

(b) The following transaction and payments of the 4th Respondent made in the ordinary course of its business for proper value between the date of the presentation of the Amended Petition or further order in the meantime shall not be void by virtue of section 182 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 Laws of Hong Kong in the event of an order for the winding up of the 4th Respondent being made on the said Amended Petition provided that the banks of the 4th Respondent shall [be] under no obligation to verify for themselves whether any transaction through the 4th Respondent’s bank accounts is in the ordinary course of business, or that it represents full market value for the relevant transaction.

Schedule

(1) The acquisition by the 4th Respondent from First Master at the consideration of RMB4.5 million or the net asset value of Shanghai [Hanglong] as the date on which the share transfer is approved by the PRC authority;

(2) The after tax amount of the following dividends declared in favour of the 4th Respondent be released for use in the ordinary course of business of the 4th Respondent after 15% of the respective sum be paid into Court.

Schedule

Changzhou Company RMB33,241,567.69
Tangshan Company MB45,823,215.00
Xinyu Company RMB9,404,069.00

(3) The following management fees received in favour of the 4th Respondent be released for use in the ordinary course of business of the 4th Respondent after 15% of the respective sum be paid into Court.

Schedule

Changzhou Company RMB10,315,502.51
Tangshan Company RMB6,119,654.56

(4) The following amounts be released by the 4th Respondent for the following purpose.

(i) 85% of the after-tax dividends be applied to repay the principal and interests of the loan owned by the 4th Respondent to the 3rd Respondent (the said amount as at 31.3.2011 is HK$9,013,006.59);

(ii) 85% of the after-tax Management Fees shall be paid in RMB into a bank account in the PRC of Shanghai Hanglong which will receive such Management Fees for and on behalf of the Company for paying:

(a) the general expenses and expenditure of the 4th Respondent incurred from April 2010 to March 2011 in the total sum of HK$9,600,868.54;

(b) the general expenses and expenditure of the 4th Respondent to be incurred in the average sum of HK$600,000 per calendar month.”

7.  Mr Jonathan Wong very helpfully indicated in his Skeleton Submissions that the Petitioner would not oppose any application for validation in respect of legitimate ordinary business expenses.  What he takes issue with are the following:

7.1 the propriety of the proposed acquisition (or re-purchase) of Shanghai Hanglong;

7.2 the repayment of the alleged outstanding loans said to be due to the Respondents; and

7.3 the amount of ordinary business expenses the Company is permitted to spend per month.

II.(1) Acquisition of Shanghai Hanglong

8.  Shanghai Hanglong, a PRC registered company, used to be a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company.  It was purportedly sold to First Master pursuant to a share transfer agreement dated 9 May 2010 for RMB4.5 million.  Pursuant to clause 1.1 of that agreement, the consideration was to be paid within 1 year of the completion of the transfer (which took place on or around 2 July 2010, when the PRC authorities approved the transfer).  The consideration has not been paid.

9.  For reasons that I need not go into, it is proposed that the Company should re-purchase Shanghai Hanglong from First Master for the same consideration of RMB4.5 million or its net asset value, whichever is lower.  The proposed re-purchase agreement again provides that the consideration is to be paid within a year of completion.

10.  The Petitioner objects to the acquisition without a due diligence being conducted beforehand.  The parties disagree on the need to conduct a due diligence and the re-purchase agreement has not been signed.

11.  Thus as things stand, First Master owes the Company RMB4.5 million and if the Company enters into the re-purchase agreement, the Company would owe First Master a maximum of RMB4.5 million repayable within a year.  The two sums would set-off against each other.  In any case, the consideration for the re-purchase is not payable until a year later, so there is no “disposition” of the Company’s assets if it should sign the re-purchase agreement to acquire Shanghai Hanglong from Fair Master.

12.  In the circumstances, it would appear that a validation order is not necessary.  When this was pointed out to Mr Brian Wong, counsel for the Respondents, at the hearing, counsel did not suggest otherwise.  Nor is there evidence that First Master would not sell the shares of Shanghai Hanglong back to the Company absent a validation order.  That being the case, I decline to make an order in relation to this acquisition.

II.(2) Repayment of loans

13.  Turning to the repayment of loans, the Company is due to receive various dividends from the operating joint ventures in the PRC, amounting to some RMB 88 million.  Subject to withholding 15% of the dividend payments to safeguard the Petitioner’s interest, the Respondents seek validation to enable the dividends to be applied towards discharging shareholder’s loans owed to the 1st and/or 3rd Respondents, the principal amount of which stood at just over HK$111 million.  I say “and/or” because the 1st Respondent’s shareholder’s loans have been assigned to the 3rd Respondent, although there appears to be some uncertainty as to the documentation and the validity of the assignment is not accepted by the Petitioner.

14.  Mr Brian Wong has drawn my attention to the Petitioner’s own evidence that there was agreement between him and the 1st Respondent that any loans from related parties would be repaid when income (whether dividend or consultancy income) was received by the Company: see Petitioner’s 1st affirmation, paragraph 13.

15.  The dispute has narrowed down considerably in the course of the hearing.  Mr Jonathan Wong fairly accepts that there is no reason why the Company should not repay the “cash parts” of the shareholder’s loans owed to the 1st Respondent (“cash parts” represent the Company’s contribution in cash to the share capital of the 3 PRC joint ventures).

16.  The “cash parts” contributed by the 1st Respondent (by herself or through associated parties) totalled some US$15.36 million. There is no suggestion that the Company is insolvent or unable to make payment of these loans once the dividends are received.

17.  In the circumstances, I do not see any valid reason why the dividends, when received, should not be used to repay the “cash parts” of the shareholder’s loans.  I am therefore in favour of granting a validation order for this purpose.

II.(3) Ordinary business expenses

18.  As stated above, the Petitioner does not oppose an order allowing the payment of ordinary business expenses of the Company.  The dispute centres on the amount allowed to be paid.

19.  Paragraph 1(b)(4)(ii) of the Validation Summons asks for two types of payments:

19.1 payment of general expenses and expenditure of the Company incurred from April 2010 to March 2011 in the sum of HK$9,600,868.54; and

19.2 payment of monthly expenses of not more than HK$600,000 from April 2011 onwards.

20.  It is proposed that these payments be made from the management fees of about RMB16 million which the Company is due to receive from two of the joint ventures.  Again, the Respondents propose to utilise only 85% of the management fees received.

(a) Expenditure for 2010-2011

21.  The Respondents’ case on this issue is that although the direct expenses of the Company in the past years have been relatively small (in the region of approximately HK$200,000 per year), that was because the Company was the holding company.  The operating business of the Company was the PRC joint ventures and Shanghai Hanglong had been managing the Company’s interest in and operating those joint ventures on its behalf.  One must therefore take into account the expenditure incurred by Shanghai Hanglong on behalf of the Company in the operation of the joint ventures.  Mr Jonathan Wong does not dispute that proposition for the purpose of this hearing.

22.  There is no clear evidence of the amount of expenditure on an annual basis.  This is partly due to the unavailability of up to date financial statements.  I think it may also be due to the different reporting periods adopted by the Company (April to March) and PRC companies (January to December).

23.  The audited accounts of Shanghai Hanglong for 2009, which are the latest available ones, indicate that just over RMB7 million in “management fees” had been incurred in each of 2008 and 2009.  Mr Jonathan Wong realistically does not challenge these figures, because his client was in charge of the operation of Shanghai Hanglong and the joint ventures at the material time.

24.  The figure of HK$9,600,868.54 asked for in paragraph 1(b)(4)(ii)(a) of the Validation Summons, however, cannot be found in any of the accounts and cash statements produced.  There is a sum of HK$9,507,668.54 being the “administrative expenses” of the Company for the year ended 31 March 2011 in an income statement prepared by a firm of certified public accountants.  This figure includes a sum of HK$7,340,839.20 in respect of consultancy fees, which roughly corresponds to Shanghai Hanglong’s “management fees” of around RMB7 million a year.

25.  The difference between HK$9,600,868.54 and HK$9,507,668.54 is insignificant.  I am therefore prepared to grant the order sought under paragraph 1(b)(4)(ii)(a).

(b) Future expenses

26.  As to future expenses, the sum of HK$600,000 is roughly based on Shanghai Hanglong’s “management fees” of RMB7 million for 2008 and 2009. 

27.  Mr Jonathan Wong, while not disputing the figures in the audited accounts of Shanghai Hanglong, submitted that HK$600,000 per month, or HK$7.2 million, per year is not justified because in the breakdown given by the 1st Respondent, HK$4.7 million is provided for payment of salaries, out of which HK$1.5 million is provided for the 1st Respondent alone.  This is to be contrasted with the salary that the 1st Respondent had been receiving from the Company in 2006 (RMB15,000 a month) and since 2007 (RMB20,000 per month).

28.  It is not possible for me to come to any definite conclusion on the appropriate amount of monthly business expenditure. Taking into account the objection, I am prepared to make an order permitting the Company to incur up to HK$600,000, or its equivalent, in business expenses per month from April 2011 onwards.  This is, of course, without prejudice to the Petitioner challenging the appropriate amount of any salary payment (or indeed, any payment) which may be made.

(c) Reporting conditions

29.  Mr Brian Wong on behalf of the Respondents stated during the hearing that the Respondents are prepared to have reporting requirements imposed. 

30.  I am inclined to impose a requirement that the Respondents’ solicitors should inform the Petitioner’s solicitors of any item of expenditure incurred by or on behalf of the Company over HK$100,000 within a reasonable time, say 7 business days, of payment, giving particulars of the payment.  I trust that this will not be too burdensome given that the trial is due to take place in July 2012. I will hear counsel on the precise wording.

III. PL SUMMONS

31.  The main submission of the Petitioner as to why provisional liquidators should be appointed is, essentially, that there have been dubious transactions—such as the purported sale of Shanghai Hanglong and buy-back, an alleged attempt by the 1st Respondent to get around an injunction granted by Au J on 17 March 2011, and the purported assignment of loans in favour of the 3rd Respondent—which gave rise to concerns over risks of dissipation of the Company’s assets and a need for investigation.

32.  However, as counsel accepted at the hearing, the merits of the allegations and counter-allegations cannot be resolved at this hearing.  On the basis of the materials before me, I am not satisfied that the Petitioner has made out a prima facie case that a winding-up order will be made, instead of relief under s. 168A, at trial. 

33.  Moreover, there are orders granted by Chu J and Au J which serve to preserve the status quo.  And in view of the fact that the trial is only a few months away, I am not persuade that this is an appropriate case to appoint provisional liquidators.

IV. IR SUMMONS

34.  For substantially the same reasons, I am not satisfied that this is an appropriate case to appoint interim receivers.  The trial is only a few months away and in my view, to appoint interim receivers at this stage is likely to cause far more harm than good to the Company, which is solvent and has an active profitable business through its interests in the joint ventures.

V. CONCLUSION

35.  I have outlined very brief reasons for coming to my decisions on the applications.  They are far from comprehensive, but I think it is in the interest of everyone concerned that the summonses be disposed of as quickly as possible, so that the parties can focus their attention on preparing for the trial.

36.  I will hear counsel on the precise terms of the order to be made and costs.

(Jat Sew Tong, SC)
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Messrs Deacons, for the Petitioner

Mr Brian Wong, instructed by Messrs Hastings & Co., for the 1st and 3rd Respondents

The 2nd Respondent, in person, absent

The 4th Respondent, in person, absent

78730-EN-2011-10-14

LU JUN v. YU QI AND OTHERS

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HCCW 282/2010

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO. 282 OF 2010

____________

  IN THE MATTER of ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED
  and
  IN THE MATTER of Sections 168A and 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32

____________

BETWEEN

 LU JUN (呂俊)Petitioner
and
 YU QI (虞琪)1st Respondent
 GUARDIAN PROPRIETARY LIMITED2nd Respondent
 POTALA MANAGEMENT LIMITED3rd Respondent
 ASTROTEC COMPANY LIMITED4th Respondent

____________

Before: Mr Recorder P Fung, SC in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 13 -14 October 2011

Date of Decision: 14 October 2011

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  This is an application by the Petitioner to re-amend the Amended Petition by Summons issued on 28 September 2011. The application is opposed by the 1st and 3rd Respondents. I have decided to allow the application and I give my brief reasons below.

2.  The Petition was presented on the 30 June 2010.  It was amended on 19 August 2010.  Thereafter at least three Summonses were issued, one by the Petitioner for the appointment of provisional liquidators issued on 12 October 2010.  The next was a Summons by the 1st and 3rd Respondents for a Validation Order which was issued on 31 May 2011.  Then there was a Summons issued by the Petitioner for the appointment of Receivers on 7 July 2011.  These three Summonses led to the filing of many affirmations between the parties.

3.  The Petitioner is a 15% shareholder of the Company.  The 1st Respondent is a shareholder of about 85% in the Company.  The Petition is presented under section 168A of the Companies Ordinance.  It pleads that the 1st Respondent tried to get the Petitioner to sell his shares and such attempt was unsuccessful.  Thereafter there were alleged acts of oppression against the Petitioner.

4.  Originally the major complaint was that the 1st Respondent was trying to pass resolutions at EGMs with a view to diluting the capital of the Company and such alleged acts led to the application for injunctions by the Petitioner which were granted.

5.  There were also alleged dubious debts owed by the Company to others under the control of the 1st Respondent and there were also alleged some acts of depletion of the assets of the Company.  The Petition prays for the remedy of a buyout of the Petitioner’s shares and alternatively for a winding-up order.  The basis for such claim is that the Petitioner had been unfairly prejudiced by the acts of the majority shareholder, the 1st Respondent, and it is just and equitable for such relief to be granted.

6.  The amendments sought to be added are almost as long as the Amended Petition itself.  In the proposed amendment, it is alleged that there are many more blatant acts of dissipation of assets on the part of the 1st Respondent and there has also been acts of exclusion of the Petitioner from the management of the Company.  It is alleged by the Petitioner that such wrongdoings or the seriousness of such wrongdoings were discovered or appreciated only at a late stage.

7.  Mr Brian Wong appearing for the 1st and 3rd Respondents have put forward a number of grounds of opposition to the application and I set out his broad grounds which are not exhaustive.

8.  It is said that the application has come too late because the proceedings have been set down for trial and trial days lasting 4 days have been fixed before Mr Justice Au in July 2012.  It is said that the amendments, if allowed, may possibly involve more witnesses having to give evidence and therefore the milestone date of the commencement of the trial will be upset.  Then it is said that the Petitioner has offered no explanation for the lateness of the application.  Mr Brian Wong also submits that the amendments amount to a changing of the goalpost and also amount to the pleading of new causes of action post-petition and he relies on the case of Eshelby v Federated European Bank [1932] 1 KB 254.  Finally it is said by Mr Wong that since the Petitioner has indicated that the primary relief sought is a buyout rather than a winding up of the Company, therefore the new complaints are really not relevant.

9.  I now deal with Mr Brian Wong’s grounds of objection.  So far as the first two objections are concerned,  I agree with Mr Jonathan Wong, counsel for the Petitioner that the setting down of a case does not amount to any sort of estoppel against the Petitioner so far as subsequent procedural steps are concerned. The most important point to note is all the complaints in the proposed re-amendments have been covered by affirmation evidence on both sides. 

10.  Mr Jonathan Wong confirms that the Petitioner will not be calling Borelli and Walshto give evidence about the financial affairs of the Company. In those circumstances, it is unlikely that any experts will have to be called by the parties.  As regards other possible witnesses, Mr Jonathan Wong has pointed out that the 1st Respondent has produced or referred to unsworn statements and letters from various possible witnesses, but these persons have not been put forward as potential witnesses.  In those circumstances, I do not think that it is likely that there will be any or many additional witnesses, and hence I do not think that the trial will be lengthened to any extent.  Even if the amendments were to necessitate a lengthening of the case, in my view, there is still a lot of time between now and July next year to enable the parties and the court to make arrangements for more days to be reserved for the trial.

11.  As regards the complaint that there is no explanation put forward by the Petitioner for the lateness of the application, as Mr Jonathan Wong has pointed out, there was a flurry of affirmations, in fact something like ten affirmations, filed between the parties during the period from March to October this year.  And I accept the explanation that the amendments really have the effect of consolidating what has come out from those affirmations.  In the circumstances, I do not think that it is unreasonable for the application to have been taken out at the end of September this year.

12.  So far as the complaint about moving the goalpost and the post-Petition new causes of action are concerned, it is to be noted that the Eshelby case was decided a long time ago in 1932 and in fact in subsequent years the principle enunciated in that case had been modified by various courts in England.  In the case of Tilcon Limited v Land and Real Estate Investments Limited [1987] 1 WLR page 46.  The Court of Appeal in England allowed an amendment to the pleadings in a contract case.  At page 30, Lord Justice Dillon after having referred to the Eshelby case, gave some general examples of addition of claims in actions.  Between letters G and H he says:

“It is clear that there are many circumstances in which matters which would ordinarily fall to be pleaded and have happened since the pleading was originally delivered may fall to be put before the court at the trial and may even be dealt with by way of amendment of the pleadings.  One obvious example is in the matter of special damages in an action for damages for personal injuries.  Special damages have to be pleaded, and ordinarily the special damages down to the preparation of the statement of claim would be pleaded in the statement of claim with perhaps some such words as “and continuing,” and further details of the particulars of any additional matters of special damage or changes in the circumstance would have to be disclosed or pleaded – it does not greatly matter which – up to the time of the trial.  Again it would seem that if there was an action against the defendant for breach of contract for failing adequately to repair some article or machinery and further consequential damage was suffered by further defects in the machinery being caused after the issue of the writ and the launching of the claim, it would be possible to amplify the plea by setting out the further damage.”

13.  In the case of Vax Appliances Limited v Hoover Plc [1990] RPC 656, Mummery J. in a patent case also allowed an amendment of pleadings.  At page 661, he dealt with the Eshelby case.  Between lines 25 and 30 he says (having referred to Order 20 r. 5(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court):

“The court’s power to grant leave to amend a pleading is in the most general terms. I do not find in the rules or in the cases any absolute rule against granting leave to amend to introduce a new cause of action which has arisen since the date of the writ or the relevant pleading.”

And slightly later, after having referred to the Eshelby case he says:

“Since Eshelby, Lord Brandon’s comments in the cases which I had mentioned make it clear that the addition of a new cause of action does not relate back to the writ or pleading in question; it dates only from the time the amendment is made. It is also clear from the provisions of Order 18, rule 9, which are in a different form from the equivalent provisions which were in force at the time when the Eshelby case was decided, that there is power to include in a pleading matters which have arisen since the date of the pleading. Further, in my view, the matters sought to be introduced by the reamendments to the counterclaim are not a wholly new cause of action. The amendments are relevant to the scope of the remedy by way of injunction which is claimed by the plaintiffs.”

14.  Then, in a subsequent case in the Court of Appeal Maridive & Oil Services (SAE) v CNA Insurance Company (Europe) Limited [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 9, the Court of Appeal also dealt with the Eshelby case.  At page 15, Lord Justice Mance (as he then was) said:

“Referring to the Vax Appliances case, Mr Justice Mummery allowed the amendment.   He distinguished Roban Jig as a case where the original claim was incurably bad, and pointed out that, since the decision in Eshelby, there had been two changes: first, the doctrine of “relator back” had been disapproved in Liff v Peasley, and Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd., second, O. 18, r.9 of the R.S.C. gave a more general power to amend to include in a pleading matters arising since the date of the pleading.  I interpose to say that that power was however subject to O. 18 r. 15(2) of the R.S.C. precluding a plaintiff from raising in his statement of claim any cause of action which was not mentioned in the writ or did not arise from the same or related facts.  Mr Justice Mummery pointed out that the matters sought to be introduced were not a wholly new cause of action.”

15.  Further on in paragraph 22, the learned Lord Justice goes on:

“Finally, in Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd., [1998] CLC 1382, this Court was concerned with proceedings begun in April, 1994 claiming breach of an agreement for data processing and computer services, entered into with the defendants by a company interface of which the plaintiff was chairman and with his wife owner. The defendants applied to strike out the claim on the ground that the plaintiff was not party to the agreement. The plaintiff maintained that, shortly before the hearing of the application, he had taken an assignment from his company of his claims against the defendants under the agreement. The defendants resisted leave to amend on the ground that it was not appropriate to add a fresh cause of action unless the plaintiff had some valid cause of action at the date of writ or counterclaim. Lord Justice Evans (with whose judgment Lord Justice Henry and Lord Justice Millett agreed) said that scope of the rules had changed since Eshelby, and that –

… in accordance with modern practice generally, the court has a general discretion which should not be restricted by hard-and-fast rules of practice, if not of law, such as that suggested here.

Lord Justice Evans went on to say that the general discretion should be “exercised in accordance with the justice of the case”. He granted leave to amend, saying that the cause of action (breach of contract) remained the same, and that the amendment merely specified the reason why the plaintiff was entitled to pursue it.

23. We are in my view bound by Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd., which appears to me also to reflect the appropriate modern approach.”

16.  In my judgment, the dictum which I have cited above also applies to the present situation.

17.  Moreover, I think that there is some difference between a petition presented under section 168A and a writ of summons or statement of claim in a common law action. 

18.  Mr Brian Wong has also very properly drawn my attention to the case of Geoglobal Partners LLC v PeakTop Technologies USA (Hong Kong) Limited an unreported decision of Madam Justice Kwan (as she then was) which was delivered on 12 December 2007.  In that case Mr Brian Wong unsuccessfully relied on the Eshelby case in resisting an application for amendment of the winding-up petition on just and equitable ground.

19.  In paragraph 10 of the judgment her Ladyship says:

“In respect of the amendment to deal with the removal of Jeffrey and Gregory as directors of the Company, I am inclined to think this is adding a further fact to the existing complaint, which is to secure “the total exclusion of the petitioner from the management of the Company”, already raised in the petition as mentioned earlier.”

And then later she goes on to say:

“I would not regard this amendment as within the rule in Eshelby.”

20.  In paragraph 11, she goes on:

“For the other amendments to deal with the further development in the originating summons which resulted in the withdrawal of the application, again it appears to me that these matters are to give the updated progress of the application which has been mentioned in the petition and are adding further facts to the existing complaint that the petitioner has been denied access to the books and records of the Company. As was said by Megarry J in the context of a winding-up petition on the just and equitable ground in In re Fildes Brothers Limited [1970] 1 WLR 592 at 597E to G, the question whether it is just and equitable to wind up a company is one which must be answered on the facts which exist at the time of the hearing, a winding-up order under this head must be based on subsisting facts and not upon past history.”

21.  I find her Ladyship’s judgment to be particularly pertinent to the present case.

22.  Finally, regarding the submission by Mr Brian Wong that the major relief or the primary relief claimed is a buyout as opposed to winding-up. 

23.  It is to be noted that both reliefs have been claimed, although in the alternative.  At this stage there is no certainty as to whether at the end of the day, the court, if the Petitioner is to be successful, will make an order for buyout or for winding-up.

24.  In any event, in my view, any alleged act of mismanagement or dissipation of assets or oppression of the minority shareholder would be relevant to both kinds of relief. 

25.  For the above reasons, I allow the application in terms of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Petitioner’s Summons. 

26.  I order that the costs of and incidental to the amendment be to the 1st and 3rd Respondents in any event.  And I also order that the costs of the application be the Petitioner’s costs in the cause of the Petition.

27.  I appreciate that the normal order in such a situation would be that the costs of the application should be to the successful party, but in the present case, I do accept Mr Brian Wong’s submission that the application is a bit late although not so late as to warrant my not acceding to it, and also as no sufficient explanation on affirmation regarding the lateness, and this is also in the light of the fact that as early as April, I think, the Respondents were asking for a draft and it was not provided.

(Patrick Fung, SC)
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
of the High Court

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Messrs Deacons, for the Petitioner

Mr Brian C.W. Wong, instructed by Messrs Hastings & Co., for the 1st and 3rd Respondents

The 2nd Respondent, absent

The 4th Respondent, absent