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Civil Action2011

HONGKONG CHANGYI REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT LTD v. NEO CHINA (GROUP) INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

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92450-EN-2014-04-08

HONGKONG CHANGYI REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT LTD v. NEO CHINA (GROUP) INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1576/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1576 OF 2011

________________

BETWEEN

 HONGKONG CHANGYI REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 NEO-CHINA (GROUP) INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT LIMITED1st Defendant
 SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT GROUP LIMITED (formerly known as NEO-CHINA GROUP (HOLDINGS) LIMITED2nd Defendant
____________________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Linda Chan SC in Court
Date of Hearing: 26 March 2014
Date of Judgment: 8 April 2014

                  ________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

1.  In this action the plaintiff, HongKong Changyi Real Estate Development Limited, claims against the 1st defendant, Neo‑China (Group) Infrastructure Investment Limited, for unpaid balance of the consideration under an agreement dated 19 September 2007 (“Agreement”) whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell and the 1st defendant agreed to purchase the entire issued share capital of a Hong Kong company, Rich Glory Investments Limited (富譽投資有限公司) (“Rich Glory”), at HK$50,000,000.

2.  The claim against the 2nd defendant was discontinued on 4 November 2011, shortly after commencement of the action.

3.  It is the plaintiff’s case, as pleaded in the amended statement of claim (“ASOC”), that pursuant to the Agreement, the plaintiff transferred the entire issued share capital of Rich Glory (“Sale Share”) to the 1st defendant whereupon the consideration became due and payable.  In breach of the Agreement, the 1st defendant only paid part of the consideration in the total amount of HK$40,000,000, leaving an outstanding balance of HK$10,000,000.

4.  Under the Agreement, the consideration for the sale and purchase of the Sale Share is HK$50,000,000, and clause 5.1(b) provides that the 1st defendant shall pay the consideration to the plaintiff in the following manner:

“(i) a cashier order drawn in favour of the Vendor (or such other person and/or corporation as the Vendor may nominate) in the sum of HK$10 million (HK$10,000,000) shall be delivered to the Vendor at the Vendor’s registered address either on the Business Day immediately following the date of the issuance of the國有土地使用權證 (Land Use Right Certificate) in respect of the Land to the JV Company OR within 60 Business Days after the issuance of a fresh營業執照(Business Registration Licence) by the沈陽市工商行政管理局(Bureau for Administration of Industry and Commerce of Shen Yang City, PRC) showing the change of legal representative in respect of the JV Company, whichever is earlier; and

(ii) a cashier order drawn in favour of the Vendor (or such other person and/or corporation as the Vendor may nominate) for the balance in the sum of HK$40 million (HK$40,000,000) shall be delivered to the Vendor at the Vendor’s registered address on the Business Day immediately following the date of the issuance of the建設工程規劃許可證 (Superstructure Construction Planning Permit) in respect of the Development to the JV Company.”

5.  The “JV Company” referred to in the Agreement is Shenyang Xiangming Changyi Development Limited (沈陽向明長益置業有限公司) (“Shenyang Xiangming”), a sino‑foreign cooperation enterprise with a registered capital of US$63,750,000, which is held by Rich Glory and Beijing Xiangming Investment Management Limited (北京向明投資管理有限公司), a PRC company (“PRC Partner”), as to 50% each.

6.  Until trial, there is no dispute that the Agreement was made. Nor is there any dispute that the sale and purchase of the Sale Shares was completed and that the consideration became payable.  In its Defence filed on 24 May 2012, the 1st defendant refers to a supplemental agreement dated 12 October 2007 (“Supplemental Agreement”) made between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in which the parties agreed to vary “the payment instructions in respect of the consideration of HK$50,000,000” to the following manner:

“(1) On the date of signing this agreement, [the 1st defendant] shall pay the equity transfer price of HK$10,000,000 to [the plaintiff’s] bank account or a bank account designated by [the plaintiff].

(2) On the first day following the obtaining the land use right certificates for the land at Taiyuan South Street, Shenyang City by Shengyang Xianming Changyi Development Limited, or within 60 days of the transfer procedure for Shenyang Xianming at the Industry and Commerce Bureau being completed (whichever is earlier), [the 1st defendant] shall pay the equity transfer price of HK$10,000,000 to [the plaintiff’s] bank account or a bank account designated by [the plaintiff].

(3) On the first day following the obtaining of the construction project planning permit for the project, [the 1st defendant] shall pay the equity transfer price of HK$30,000,000 to [the plaintiff] directly.”

7.  It is the 1st defendant’s pleaded case that it duly paid the consideration in the amount of HK$50,000,000 to the plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement, which comprised of the following five payments:

(1) RMB10,000,000, which the 1st defendant caused to be transferred to the bank account of Shenyang Xiangming on 17 October 2007 pursuant to a payment instruction dated 12 October 2007 and the oral instructions given by Mr Xu Zhong Ping (“Mr Xu”).

(2) HK$10,000,000 transferred by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff’s bank account pursuant to a payment instruction dated 31 December 2007.

(3) HK$10,000,000 transferred by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff’s bank account pursuant to a payment instruction dated 24 November 2008.

(4) HK$5,000,000 transferred by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff’s bank account pursuant to a payment instruction dated 16 February 2009.

(5) HK$5,000,000 transferred by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff’s bank account pursuant to a payment instruction dated 22 July 2009.

8.  The second to fourth payments in the total amount of HK$40,000,000 are not controversial, as the plaintiff all along accepted that they had been paid.  As to the first payment, the 1st defendant’s pleaded case is that:

(1) Mr Xu, who had authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff, had instructed and confirmed to the 1st defendant that RMB10,000,000 should be paid to Shenyang Xiangming, whereupon the 1st defendant caused its subsidiary, Beijing Xinsong Real Estate Investment Consultancy Co Ltd, to transfer RMB10,000,000 to Shenyang Xiangming on 17 October 2007.

(2) At around the time the parties entered into the Agreement, it was agreed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant that the plaintiff would providing funds to Shenyang Xiangming to enable it to repay the RMB250,000,000 loan previously advanced by the PRC Partner to it.  The plaintiff provided such funding through:

(i) Rich Glory remitting US$31,875,000 (equivalent to HK$250,000,000 or RMB238,727,812.50) to Shenyang Xiangming on 21 September 2007; and

(ii) agreeing with the 1st defendant that part of the consideration in the amount of HK$10,000,000 should be paid to Shenyang Xiangming for such purpose (even though the balance of the RMB250,000,000 loan was RMB11,272,187.50 and the amount transferred to Shenyang Xiangming was RMB10,000,000).

9.  In support of its pleaded case, four witness statements were filed on behalf of the 1st defendant.

10.  However, at trial, Mr Ronny Wong SC (leading Ms Wing Kay Po) informs the court that the 1st defendant no longer contends that the RMB10,000,000 paid to Shenyang Xiangming on 17 October 2007 constituted a payment made under the Agreement and the 1st defendant will not call any witness.

11.  Nevertheless, Mr Wong SC submits that the plaintiff has failed to prove its case as pleaded.  His arguments run thus:

(1) The plaintiff’ cause of action as pleaded in the ASOC is based on the Agreement. As Mr Ip Kin Fan (“Mr Ip”), the only witness of the plaintiff, has admitted in his witness statement that the Supplemental Agreement had been signed, which superseded the Agreement, the plaintiff’s cause of action is therefore “defective”.

(2) The plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to prove that the conditions for payment of the consideration under clause 5.1(b) of the Agreement had been complied with. In the correspondence between the parties from 8 June 2011 to 27 June 2011, the plaintiff accepted that payment of the $40 million was conditional upon issuance of the Superstructure Construction Planning Permit but the same had not been issued.

(3) The assignment of the Sale Share is totally irrelevant, as it is “not a condition upon which payments depend”.  There is no proof in support of the plaintiff’s assertion that the consideration has become due and payable in light of the non-compliance with the conditions for payment.

(4) Although the 1st defendant pleaded the Supplemental Agreement in its Defence, and Mr Ip has admitted the same, it is not open to the plaintiff to base its case on the Supplemental Agreement as the same has not been pleaded in the ASOC.  The plaintiff is not entitled to “cherry‑pick parts of the defence case not pleaded by it to make up its own claim”.

(5) Even if the plaintiff is entitled to rely on the Supplemental Agreement, the obligation to pay the 3rd instalment under the Supplemental Agreement, which is predicated on the issuance of the Superstructure Construction Planning Permit, had not been fulfilled.

12.  The arguments set out in paragraph 11(2), (3) and (5) above all boil down to the contention, raised for the first time at trial, that the condition precedent for triggering the payment obligation under the Agreement had not been performed such that the 1st defendant was not obliged to pay the consideration to the plaintiff.

13.  I do not think it is open to the 1st defendant to raise such contention at trial, when the same has never been pleaded in the Defence and, indeed, not mentioned in the 1st defendant’s correspondence or any of the witness statements filed. Mr Wong SC submits that the non‑fulfillment of condition precedent is not a matter which needs to be pleaded by the 1st defendant in its Defence, relying on the following passage in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014, Vol 1, para 18/7/14:

“Cases occur in which, although everything has happened which would appear to be necessary to the case being advanced, there is something further requiring fulfilment, whether by reason of the provisions of some statute, or perhaps because the parties have expressly so agreed; this something more is called a condition precedent. It is not ordinarily of the essence of such a cause of action, but has been made essential by being superimposed. A general averment of the due performance of all such conditions precedent is implied in every pleading and therefore it need not be alleged (Treasure Rock Development Ltd v Splendid Duesseldorf Production Ltd [1986] 1 HKC 86 at para. (4)).

It follows that the onus is on any party contending that some condition precedent has not been duly performed to state with proper particularity what the condition was, and to plead its non-performance (Bond Air Services Ltd v Hill [1955] 2 QB 41); otherwise its due performance will be presumed. Further, if there is an express averment that some such condition precedent has been performed, the onus of proving it falls on the person making such averment. However, if the defendant properly pleads non-performance of a condition precedent, the burden of proving its due performance then shifts to the plaintiff (Bank of New South Wales v Laing [1954] AC 135).” (emphasis added)

14.  It is clear from the above passage in particular those highlighted that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead due performance of the conditions precedent.  The onus is on the 1st defendant to plead non-performance of the conditions precedent with proper particularity.  In the absence of any such plea raised by the 1st defendant, due performance of the condition precedent to trigger the payment obligation will be presumed and I so hold. 

15.  As to the contention that the existence of the Supplemental Agreement would render the plaintiff’s cause of action to become defective, I fail to see why this is would be the case.  As Mr Shum submits, the plaintiff’s case as pleaded in the ASOC is based on the Agreement and the essential terms identified, the essence of the Agreement was the sale of the Sale Share for $50,000,000 and the claim is for the outstanding consideration in the amount of $10,000,000.  The plaintiff does not need to rely on the Supplemental Agreement as it does not affect the essential terms upon which the plaintiff’s claim is founded.  If the 1st defendant wants to rely on the Supplemental Agreement in support of any defence, it should plead the same and identify with particularity the basis for contending that by reason of the terms of the Supplemental Agreement, the obligation for payment of the $10,000,000 claimed by the plaintiff did not arise.  I agree.

16.  I turn to consider the plaintiff’s case.  To succeed in its claim, the plaintiff needs to prove:

(1) the existence of the Agreement and its terms as pleaded in the ASOC;

(2) the Sale Shares were transferred and assigned by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant; and

(3) in respect of the consideration for the Sale Share, only $40,000,000 was paid, leaving an unpaid balance of $10,000,000.

17.  The first and second matters are not in dispute.  I find that the third matter is proved, as the 1st defendant no longer contends that the RMB10,000,000 transferred to Shenyang Xiangming on 17 October 2007 constituted a payment under the Agreement. 

18.  I hold that the 1st defendant has acted in breach of the Agreement by failing to pay $10,000,000, being part of the consideration due and payable under the Agreement.  I make an order that the 1st defendant do pay $10,000,000 to the 1st defendant. 

19.  As for interest, Mr Shum submits that the 1st defendant should pay interest on $10,000,000 from the date of writ to the date of judgment at judgment rate.  Mr Wong SC makes no submission on interest.  I therefore order the 1st defendant to pay interest on $10,000,000 from the date of the writ until payment at judgment rate.  I make an order nisi that the 1st defendant pay the costs of the action to the plaintiff on a party and party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

(Linda Chan, SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Erik Shum, instructed by K L Chan & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Ronny F H Wong SC and Ms Wing Kay Po, instructed by Lam, Lee & Lai, for the 1st defendant

91732-EN-2014-02-25

HONGKONG CHANGYI REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT LTD v. NEO-CHINA (GROUP) INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT LTD AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 1576/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1576 OF 2011

____________

BETWEEN

 HONGKONG CHANGYI REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff
 

and

 
 NEO-CHINA (GROUP) INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT LIMITED1st Defendant
 SHANGHAI INDUSTRIAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT GROUP LIMITED (formerly known as NEO‑CHINA (HOLDINGS) LIMITED)2nd Defendant
(Discontinued)

____________

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 25 February 2014
Date of Decision: 25 February 2014

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

 

1. Nearly 5 years after the implementation of the Civil Justice Reform, parties should be under no doubt by now that the courts will have no hesitation now to reject a late application, made when trial is imminent, for either amendment of pleadings, discovery or the filing of witness statements, which application has the effect of disrupting the preparation for trial with the risk of milestone dates such as a pretrial review or the trial dates themselves being affected. Delay itself is a ground justifying refusal of leave, since delay of a trial is prejudice to a party, who has every right to expect that a trial fixed months ahead with due notice to the parties can proceed without disruption and time and costs being wasted. I can add very little to what has already been summarized and set out in Kinetics Medical Health Group Co Ltd v DrTseIvanCheongYau, HCA 1115/2010, unreported, 8 May 2013 and in the decision of the Court of Appeal in LiXiaoYun v China Gas Holdings Limited, CACV 38/2013, 11 March 2013. The applicant for leave must establish, by affidavit evidence, exceptional circumstances to explain and justify the delay. Change of the legal team has rarely, if ever, been accepted as justification for a last minute change of case or amendment of pleadings, which would result in or necessitate a response from the other side which it cannot in all fairness be expected to do in the availability of time before trial. PD 5.2 makes it clear that change of the legal team will not be treated as exceptional circumstances.

2. The duty of a party making late disclosure of documents for use as evidence in the trial is also clearly set out in Hong Lok School Limited v Chow Sai Yiu, [2003] 2 HKLRD 782.

3. The objectives of the Civil Justice Reform are to encourage early preparation of trial, dealing with cases expeditiously, cost‑effectiveness and proportionality.  Although there is no doubt that the primary aim in exercising the powers of the court is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties, it can hardly be said to be just if a party is required, as a result of late applications made by its opponent at the last minute, in disregard of timetables laid down by the court in good time at case management hearings and pretrial review hearings, to plead to amendments, consider new documents and evidence, and to file supplemental witness statements at the eve of trial.

4. In this case, directions for discovery and filing of witness statements were made as early as 15 August 2012.  On 20 December 2012, the court granted further time to the 1st defendant to take out interlocutory applications within 14 days.  Such time was further extended on 1 February 2013.  On 27 February 2013, the master made an unless order for witness statements to be filed by the 1st defendant by 27 March 2013.  On 29 May 2013, leave was granted to the parties to set the case down for trial.  Trial dates were fixed thereafter, for trial to start on 26 March 2014, with three days reserved.  The pretrial review was scheduled to take place on 8 January 2014, and it was not until 18 and 24 December 2013, that the 1st defendant applied for leave to amend its Defence and to file supplemental witness statements.  The 1st defendant also filed on 24 December 2013 a supplemental list comprising 55 new documents, and on 6 January 2014, a further list comprising 2 new documents.

5. Ms Po says that the amendments to the Defence do not raise any new points: that they only set out the pleaded events in a chronological order and clarify the defendant’s case.  If that was indeed the case, then the amendments are not necessary and should not be allowed.  At this late stage, the parties will have to be content with the original Defence, since it already sets out succinctly the issues in dispute for determination at trial.

6. However, it seems to me that the proposed Amended Defence does raise new matters to which the plaintiff will have to plead as well as file evidence to answer the factual matters raised.  These new facts pleaded in the proposed Amended Defence include, for example, the allegation of the parties’ common intention regarding the Agreement of September 2007 and how payment of the consideration was to be made; and the Agreement being part of a series of other agreements made between the parties which the defendant says have to be considered by the court when construing the Agreement.  I agree with Mr Shum that by contrast, on the original Defence, the defendant has not raised any questions of construction of the Agreement, as the original Defence turns simply on the fact that the defendant had made payment to the joint venture company in accordance with the instructions and directions of the plaintiff’s Mr Xu.

7. The new documents disclosed by the defendant in December 2013 and January 2014 deal with the defendant’s payments of the amounts in dispute and include the other agreements connected with the transaction in dispute, claimed by the defendant to be relevant to the construction of the Agreement relied upon by the plaintiff.  Unless the plaintiff agrees to the late amendments to the Defence and has sufficient time before trial to amend its own pleadings and to prepare supplemental witness statements to deal with both the new allegations in the pleadings and the new documents disclosed, the plaintiff will be prejudiced.

8. At the hearing of arguments on the applications for amendment etc, the trial is 4 weeks away.  At the time when the applications were first made, trial was 15 weeks away.  The whole objection to late applications is that hearings will have to be fixed for argument, these hearings will be delayed, and the parties will be taken nearer and nearer to the dates of trial (as events transpired in this case).

9. At the end of the day, the issue in dispute for determination at trial is whether payment of the consideration for the transfer of shares under the Agreement had been made, whether the payment was made on the instructions of Mr Xu (as the defendant alleges) and what the payment of RMB10 million made in October 2007 was for.  This is something within the knowledge of the defendant as payer, and I fail to understand why the defendant was not able to give the necessary explanation as to the nature of the payments made, by whom the payments were made, how they were made, and produce the documents to explain these payments, at the time when the witness statements were first signed and exchanged, and why it only applied for leave to explain these matters, 16 months after the court first gave directions for the filing of witness statements.  If the defendant had wished to reply to the matters raised in the plaintiff’s witness statements, as it now claims to do by the supplemental statements, the relevant statement of the plaintiff was served in December 2012.  The defendant decided only to file supplemental statements in reply in December 2013, 12 months later.  It only has itself to blame for this delay and its inactivity.

10. The only explanation given by the defendant, apart from the change in the legal team, is that the plaintiff had delayed payment of costs against the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant had decided to withhold action “until it was clear that the plaintiff wishes to seriously proceed with the action”.

11. There should be no doubt that after the Civil Justice Reform, both parties have the duty to proceed with an action.  A defendant is no longer entitled to take a “let sleeping dogs lie” attitude.  The defendant can apply to strike out or stay an action if the plaintiff fails to progress an action or has acted in breach of a court order.  If it does not, and delays its own preparation and conduct of the case, then it has to accept the consequences of its own failure to act.

12. In any event, the plaintiff in this case paid the costs to the 2nd defendant in August 2013, and had applied to set the case down in June 2013. It was not until 6 months after setting down and 4 months after payment of costs to the 2nd defendant, that the defendant applied for leave to amend and to file further statements.  I do not regard any failure to act or delay on the plaintiff’s part as any excuse for the defendant’s own tardiness. 

13. Moreover, having been taken by Mr Shum through the proposed further statements of the defendant, I agree that they appear to be of little probative value.

14. In summary, after balancing all relevant matters, I am not satisfied that the defendant has shown any exceptional circumstances to justify either the late applications for leave to amend its Defence and to file further witness statements, or the late discovery of new documents for use as evidence.  I am not satisfied that the last minute amendments are necessary for the fair resolution of the issues in dispute for determination at trial.

15. Particularly in relation to the 55 new documents sought to be produced by the defendant, it has failed since December 2013 to explain by affidavit how these documents relate to any specific issues in dispute, and how it proposes to use the documents at trial.  At this stage when the defendant seeks the indulgence of the court for the late production of documents, it behoves the defendant to adequately and promptly inform the court and the plaintiff of the reason for the late production, the relevance and the purpose of the documents to be produced.  The onus should not be put on the plaintiff to seek explanation of the documents.

16. If the defendant’s late applications are allowed, there is a real risk that the March trial dates will be disrupted as a result, and the plaintiff will be prejudiced by the delay of a fair trial and the inevitable postponement of the trial to the end of 2014, or 2015.  Time, costs and judicial resources have been wasted as a result of the late applications and all these are against the objectives of the Civil Justice Reform and should not be condoned.

17. The applications are refused with costs to the plaintiff (including the costs reserved at the last hearing on 8 January 2014).

(Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Erik Shum, instructed by KL Chan & Co, for the plaintiff

Ms Po Wing Kay, instructed by Lam, Lee & Lai, for the 1st defendant