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Civil Action2011

LIN MING AND ANOTHER v. CHEN SHU QUAN AND OTHERS

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85640-EN-2013-02-07

LIN MING AND ANOTHER v. CHEN SHU QUAN AND OTHERS

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HCA 1900/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1900 OF 2011

____________

BETWEEN

 LIN MING(林明)1st Plaintiff
 FUJIAN YUANSHENG FOODS INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED
(福建元盛食品工業有限公司)
2nd Plaintiff
 

and

 
 CHEN SHU QUAN(陳樹泉)1st Defendant
 CHAN SIU TAT(陳少達)2nd Defendant
 GUO MIN(郭敏)3rd Defendant
 CHEN YU(陳禹)4th Defendant
 ZHOU GANG(周剛)5th Defendant
 SUPREME WEALTHY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED6th Defendant
 CHINA MINING RESOURCES GROUP LIMITED7th Defendant
 LIN PING(林萍)8th Defendant
 GROUP MOTION SECRETARIAL & CONSULTING LIMITED9th Defendant
 CHAN CHEUK WING(陳焯榮)10th Defendant
 CHEN JIAN HUI(陳建輝)11th Defendant
 MIRANDA TANG KA YEE(鄧嘉儀)12th Defendant
 RICHARD PYVIS13th Defendant
 DAVID CHEUNG WAI SHUN(張為信)14th Defendant
 KUN PENG I LIMITED15th Defendant
 KUN PENG II LIMITED16th Defendant
 CLSA CAPITAL PARTNERS (HK) LTD
(里昂證券亞太恆富資本(香港)有限公司)
17th Defendant
 ARIA INVESTMENT PARTNERS III, L P18th Defendant
 ZHANG ZHI YUAN(張志遠)19th Defendant
 ZHANG ZHI ZHONG(張志忠)20th Defendant
 WANG JI WEI(王吉偉)21st Defendant
 WANG JI PENG(王吉鵬)22nd Defendant
 LI GUANGDE(李德廣)23rd Defendant
 FEI YONG FENG(費勇鋒)24th Defendant
 FABULOUS TURBO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED25th Defendant
 TSUBASA IMAMURA(今村翼)26th Defendant
 SEQUEDGE ASA CAPITAL (CAYMAN) LIMITED27th Defendant
 SEQUEDGE INVESTMENT INC
(formerly known as SEQUEDGE INC)
28th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Suffiad J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 29 February 2012
Date of Decision: 7 February 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  This is an application by summons filed herein on 6 December 2011 by the 26th, 27th and 28th defendants herein (hereinafter referred to as “D26”, “D27” and “D28” respectively) for setting aside the service by the plaintiffs of the following documents upon D26, D27 and D28 on the grounds that service was irregular:

(a)    The Writ of Summons (“the Original Writ”) and Statement of Claim (“the Original SOC”) both dated 4 November 2011; and

(b)    The Amended Writ of Summons (“the Amended Writ”) and Amended Statement of Claim (“the Amended SOC”) both dated 18 November 2011.

PLAINTIFFS’ CASE

2.  For present purposes, it is not necessary to go into any great detail as to the case of the plaintiffs, suffice it to say that in a nutshell, the plaintiffs’ case is that the group of companies of the 1st plaintiff, which includes the 2nd plaintiff (a PRC company), Win Power Investment Ltd, Fame Glory Holding Ltd and Jointa Ltd have been unlawfully taken over by a group of tortfeasors including D26, D27 and D28 and their agents when the 1st plaintiff was detained by the authorities in Mainland China during the period between 22 October 2009 and 22 December 2010.

3.  It is also the plaintiffs’ case that in November 2009, the tortfeasors forged the signature of the 1st plaintiff (while the 1st plaintiff was in detention) and wrongfully caused the relevant Mainland authorities to register a change of the Registered Legal Representative of the 2nd plaintiff from the 1st plaintiff to the 1st defendant.

4.  In December 2009, the tortfeasors forged the signature of the 1st plaintiff and transferred the shares in Win Power Investment Ltd from the 1st plaintiff to the 1st defendant.

5.  In January 2010, the tortfeasors wrongfully caused the Companies Registry to register a change of directorship in Jointa Ltd from the 1st plaintiff to the 1st defendant.

6.  On 8th June 2010, the tortfeasors caused the transfer of the shares in Jointa Ltd to the 15th defendant.

7.  The funds thereby misappropriated by the tortfeasors during the period when the 1st plaintiff was under detention, so far as is known to the 1st plaintiff are US$2,000,000 (escrowed money), RMB45,000,000 (cash in hand), RMB87,000,000 (loss of inventory) and RMB170,000,000 (loss of account receivable).

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN D26, D27 AND D28

8.  D26 is a Japanese national and ordinarily resident in Japan and is also the sole director and managing director of a Hong Kong company known as Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd, a member of the Sequedge Group. Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd has its registered office at Room 1209, Great Eagle Centre, 23 Harbour Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong.

9.  On 8 May 2008, D27, a Cayman Island company, was set up by Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.  The registered office of D27 is at Zephyr House, 122 Mary Street, P O Box 709, Grand Cayman KY1-1107, Cayman Islands.

10.  D28 is a company incorporated under the laws of Japan, with its registered office at 2-18-5, Araki-Cho, Kishiwada City, Osaka, 596‑0004, Japan.  At all material times, D28 holds a Business Registration Certificate in Hong Kong under the Business Registration Ordinance.  The address given in the Business Registration Certificate of D28 is at 1135-1139, Sun Hung Kai Centre, 30 Harbour Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong (“D28’s BR address in Hong Kong”).

SERVICE OF PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

11.  In September 2011, before any Writ was issued by the plaintiffs in this matter, Sequedge Investment Inc (being D28 herein), Sequedge ASA Capital (Cayman) Ltd, (being D27 herein) together with one Gingero Associated SA had commenced arbitration proceedings in Hong Kong, being HKIAC/A11113, in relation to the same subject matter of dispute as in this present case.

12.  On 10 November 2011 the plaintiffs issued the Writ herein and a sealed copy of the Original Writ and Original SOC were purportedly served on D28 by leaving same at the D28’s BR address in Hong Kong.

13.  On 11 November 2011, a sealed copy of the Original Writ and Original SOC were purportedly served on each of D26 and D27 by leaving same at the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

14.  On 22 November 2011, each of D26, D27 and D28 filed Acknowledgments of Service respectively by their solicitors Messrs Sidley Austin.

15.  On 25 November 2011, the solicitors for D26, D27 and D28 wrote to plaintiffs’ solicitors informing plaintiffs’ solicitors that they had “instructions to set aside the alleged service of the Statement of Claim”.

16.  On 29 November 2011 plaintiffs’ solicitors took out a summons restraining D27, D28 and Gingero Associated SA from proceeding with or taking any further steps in the Arbitration Proceedings started by them in September 2011 relating to this matter (“the Stay Arbitration Summons”).

17.  On 30 November 2011, plaintiffs’ solicitors amended the Writ and Statement of Claim herein.  The amendments included the addition of the foreign address of D26, and the addition of the registered offices respectively of D27 and D28.  Despite the additions of the foreign addresses of each of D26, D27 and D28, no applications were made under Order 11 for service out of jurisdiction by the plaintiffs upon D26, D27 and D28

18.  The Amended Writ and Amended SOC were purportedly served on the solicitors for D26, D27 and D28, namely Messrs Sidley Austin, at the office of Messrs Sidley Austin.

19.  On 2 December 2011, directions were given for the filing of affidavit evidence in opposition to the Stay Arbitration Summons and the matter was adjourned for argument scheduled to be heard on 7 February 2012.

20.  On 5 December 2011 solicitors for D26, D27 and D28 indicated to the plaintiffs’ solicitors that the defendants reserved the right to file applications to set aside service and/or application to stay the court proceedings.  The defendants’ solicitors also indicated that those applications should be heard before or together with the Stay Arbitration Summons.

21.  On 16 December 2011, solicitors for D26, D27 and D28 took out the present summons which was scheduled for hearing on 29 February 2012.

22.  On 19 December 2011, solicitors for D27 and D28 took out a summons to stay the present action (of the 1st plaintiff’s claim only) in favour of the Arbitration Proceedings which summons was scheduled to be heard together with the Stay Arbitration Summons on 7 February 2012.

D26, D27 AND D28S’ CONTENTION TO SET ASIDE SERVICE

23.  This being an application by D26, D27 and D28 to set aside the service of the Writ and Amended Writ, I shall deal firstly with the submissions of the defendants.

24.  In a nutshell, the contention by D26, D27 and D28 is that they are either non-residents of Hong Kong (in the case of D26) or companies incorporated outside Hong Kong (in the case of D27 and D28) and therefore the purported service upon them of the Writ on addresses in Hong Kong or the Amended Writ with foreign addresses upon Messrs Sidley Austin but without seeking leave for service out of jurisdiction pursuant to Order 11 of the RSC must be bad, improper and ineffective.

(a)   Service upon D26

25.  Specifically, it was submitted that D26 is a citizen of Japan and ordinarily resident in Japan.  The Writ was purportedly served on him in Hong Kong at Room 1209 Great Eagle Centre, 23 Harbour Road, Wanchai (being the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd) on or about 14 November 2011.  There is no evidence that D26 was in Hong Kong on that date of the alleged service.  That service must therefore be bad and/or defective service.

26.  The Amended Writ added new foreign addresses outside of Hong Kong but no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to seek leave for service out of jurisdiction under Order 11 in the absence of which there can be no proper service.

27.  D26 filed an Acknowledgement of Service pursuant to Order 12 of the RSC on 19 November 2011 to challenge the purported service of the Writ.

28.  Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ solicitors also purported to effect “service” of the Amended Writ and Amended Statement of Claim upon Messrs Sidley Austin, the solicitors acting for D26, by way of letter on 29 November 2011 upon D26.  This was despite the fact that Messrs Sidley Austin had in earlier letters advised the plaintiffs’ solicitors that they had no instructions to accept service for any of the defendants (apart from the 7th defendant) and that they would be taking out an application to set aside service of the Writ and Statement of Claim on behalf of D26.

(b)   Service upon D27

29.  It was submitted by the defendants that D27 is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its registered office at Zephyr House, 122 Mary Street, PO Box 709, Grand Cayman KY1-1107, Cayman Islands and that D27 does not carry on any business activities in Hong Kong nor does it have any place of business in Hong Kong.

30.  Therefore the attempted service of the Writ on D27 by leaving a copy of the Writ and Statement of Claim at 1209 Great Eagle Centre, 23 Harbour Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong, being the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd must be defective service.

31.  It was also submitted that for the Hong Kong courts to have jurisdiction over a foreign corporate entity outside Hong Kong it is fundamental that service out of jurisdiction has to be effected in accordance with Order 11 of the RSC.

(c)   Service on D28

32.  D28 is a company incorporated under the laws of Japan with a registered office in Osaka, Japan.

33.  D28 has a representative office in Hong Kong at 1135-1139 Sun Hung Kai Centre, 30 Harbour Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong.

34.  The Writ was served on D28’s representative office in Hong Kong.

35.  The stance taken by D28 is that service on a foreign corporation at its representative office in Hong Kong is not good service.  Proper service would be for the plaintiffs to seek leave to serve D28 out of jurisdiction and if such leave is granted, then service can be effected at D28’s registered address in Osaka, but the plaintiffs had not even sought leave for service out of jurisdiction pursuant to Order 11 RSC.

36.  D28 accepts that if a foreign corporation is registered in Hong Kong under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance, service may be effected under section 338 of the Companies Ordinance if the foreign corporation has a “place of business” within section 341 of the Companies Ordinance.

37.  However, D28 submits that in the present case, D28 is not registered under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance and it is not open to the plaintiffs to rely on service pursuant to section 338 of the Companies Ordinance.

38.  It was also submitted by D28 that it does not carry on any business in Hong Kong and that its representative office in Hong Kong is only for the purpose of gathering market intelligence in the Asia Pacific region and to explore opportunities in the region for D28 in Japan.  The representative office in Hong Kong does not sign any business contracts or generate any income or profits.  The representative office in Hong Kong has only a single executive who does not sign any contracts on behalf of D28 in Hong Kong.

39.  In the circumstances, the representative office of D28 in Hong Kong is not even a “place of business” under section 341 of the Companies Ordinance.

PLAINTIFFS’ CONTENTION

(a)   Service on D26

40.  The plaintiffs rely on the fact that it is not disputed that D26 is the sole director of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd and submit that as such, the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd could be taken as the last known address of D26.

41.  In so submitting, the plaintiffs seek to rely on a passage in the judgment of Lord Atkin in McMillan v Guest [1942] AC 561 at 565 in which it is said:

“The office of director of an English company, the head seat and directing power of which is admitted to be in the United Kingdom, seems to me of necessity to be located where the company is. It is in fact part of the organic structure of the corporation… I consider it to be clear that the director of an English company which is resident in the United Kingdom, wherever he resides and whether or not he takes any part in directing the affairs of the company, holds an office in the United Kingdom.”

42.  Therefore it was contented by the plaintiffs that service upon D26 at the address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd in Hong Kong was good service.

43.  It was also contended by the plaintiffs that the only matter relied on by D26 in challenging the effectiveness of service is the fact that D26 says that he is a Japanese national, not ordinarily resident in Hong Kong and not within the jurisdiction on the day that the Writ was served.

44.  In so saying, D26 has only produced one page from his passport to show that he is a national of Japan but has failed to produce any other pages from his passport to show that he was not in Hong Kong on the day when the Writ was served on him at the address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

45.  The plaintiffs therefore submit that D26 has not discharged the evidential burden in displacing the presumption that the Writ was duly served on D26.

(b)   Service on D27

46.  The plaintiffs submit that service on D27 at the address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd in Hong Kong is justified for the following reasons.

47.  D27 was established by Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd and, although a Cayman Island company, does not have any establishment in the Cayman Islands.

48.  D26 is a director of D27 and also the managing director of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

49.  When D27 invested in the business of the 1st plaintiff by taking some of the shares purchased by D28 from the 1st plaintiff, this investment was announced by Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd in its official website.  Therefore the fact that D28 has carried on business in Hong Kong by exercising a put option through Messrs Sidley Austin equally applies to D27.  Thus D27 should be taken as carrying on business in Hong Kong.

50.  As such D27 is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts and service out of jurisdiction is not required.

51.  Pursuant to section 338(2) of the Companies Ordinance, service of a document may be effected by leaving it or sending it by post to any place of business established by the company in Hong Kong.

52.  In the present case, the place of business established by D27 in Hong Kong should be taken as the address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

53.  Given that D26 holds an office in Hong Kong by reason of the fact that he is the sole director of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd, it is submitted by the plaintiffs that the central management of D27 is in Hong Kong and therefore D27’s real business is carried on in Hong Kong.

54.  By virtue of section 338(2) of the Companies Ordinance, the plaintiffs say that service on D27 was properly effected by leaving the Writ at the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

55.  As an alternative argument, the plaintiffs also say that D27 (and also D28) has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts by bringing arbitration proceedings in Hong Kong in respect of the same subject matter.  This point is more fully dealt with when I come to D28.

(c)   Service on D28

56.  It is not disputed by the plaintiffs that D28 is a company incorporated under the laws of Japan.

57.  Service of the Writ upon D28 was effected at the address given by D28 in the Business Registration Certificate of D28.

58.  The justification for service on that business address is as follows, as submitted by the plaintiffs.

59.  Since D28 has taken out a Business Registration Certificate under the Business Registration Ordinance, that is as good an admission by D28 that it is carrying on business in Hong Kong since section 5 of the Business Registration Ordinance provides that persons carrying on or commencing to carry on business in Hong Kong shall be registered in the manner prescribed under the ordinance.

60.  Regulation 3 of the Business Registration Regulations Cap 310A provides that in the case of a business carried on by a body corporate, a business registration application must be made to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue in the prescribed Form 1(b) set out under Regulation 9.  An applicant shall provide (inter alia) in Form 1(b) the address of its “place of business”.

61.  Under section 19 of the Business Registration Ordinance, the Commissioner shall certify and issue to any person upon request a copy of a valid business registration certificate and/or extract of any information contained in the register of business kept by the Commissioner.

62.  By virtue of section 19(1A) of the Business Registration Ordinance, an “extract of information” may be issued by the Commissioner by supplying a copy of the Form 1(b) submitted by the relevant body corporate for the purpose of registration.

63.  The purpose of section 19 of the Business Registration Ordinance is to enable any person to ascertain whether a business is registered under the Business Registration Ordinance and the particulars of the business so registered.

64.  The fact that D28 was registered under the Business Registration Ordinance and that it was not a club, is a representation to the public by D28 that it carries on a business in Hong Kong within the meaning of the Business Registration Ordinance and it carries on that business at its registered “place of business”.

65.  D28’s reliance on the decision of case of Deputy High Court Judge Anthony To (as he then was) in the case of Gerald Leon Murdock v Dresser-Rand Services SARL [2001] HKCFI 148 to say that its “representative office” is not a “place of business” within the meaning of the Companies Ordinance is wholly misconceived.

66.  Murdock’s case was decided before section 341 of the Companies Ordinance was amended.  The amendment to section 341 came into operation on 14 December 2007.

67.  Before its amendment, “place of business” is defined in section 341 of the Companies Ordinance to include “a share transfer or share registration office and any place used for the manufacture or warehousing of any goods, but does not include a place not used by the company to transact any business which creates legal obligations.” (my underlining)

68.  After the amendment, “place of business” in section 341 of the Companies Ordinance include “a share transfer or share registration office but does not include an office specified in the 24th Schedule”.

69.  The kind of office specified in the 24th Schedule is a “local representative office established or maintained … under section 46 of the Banking Ordinance”, which is not applicable to the present case.

70.  The plaintiffs rely on the decision of Sakhrani J in the case of Sigamas Management Services Ltd v Axis Intermodal (UK) Ltd trading as Seaaxis (HCA 228/2010) in which Sakhrani J refers to the difference of section 341 before and after the amendment and then said in para 31:

“I agree with the observations of Deputy District Judge Raymond Tsui when he said in Huang Ping Owen v Burswood Ltd and anr (DCCJ 5239 of 2008) 9th September 2009 at paragraph 30 of his judgment that as the wide exclusion in the old version of section 341 has now been replaced by a narrower exclusion this must mean that the legislature intends that “place of business” should bear a wide meaning.”

71.  Based on what is stated in the passage cited above, the plaintiffs submit that the business address given by D28 in its Business Registration ought to be taken as the “place of business” required under the Companies Ordinance as defined by section 341 thereof.

72.  The plaintiffs further submit that section 338(2) of the Companies Ordinance provides that where a non-Hong Kong company has defaulted in delivering to the Companies Registry the name and address of a person authorized to accept service on behalf of the company (as where the company has failed to register its “place of business” under section 333) a document may be served “by leaving it at or sending it by post to any place of business established by the company in Hong Kong”.

73.  For the reasons given above, the plaintiffs submit that the Original Writ should be considered as duly served on D28 at its place of business registered under the Business Registration Ordinance.

74.  Lastly, in the case of D28, it is also the submission of the plaintiffs that since D28 (and also D27), by commencing arbitration in Hong Kong in relation to this dispute, both of them are deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts and that service out of jurisdiction is not required.  In those circumstances, the plaintiffs say that service can be properly effected by serving the Amended Writ at the office of their solicitors, namely, Messrs Sidley Austin, representing them in the arbitration proceedings.

DECISION

(a)   Service on D26

75.  D26 is a Japanese national and an individual and is not ordinarily resident in Hong Kong.  The fact that he is the sole director as well as the managing director of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd does not make the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd the last known address of D26 in Hong Kong.

76.  The plaintiffs’ reliance on the passage cited in the case of McMillan v Guest is misconceived.  That case was not a case on service of process.  That was a tax case and decided that a foreign director (who is resident outside England) of an English company holds an office in the company which is situated in England and therefore is liable to pay tax by reason of his holding an office in a company in England.

77.  That decision is not authority for saying that the last known address of a foreign director of a company is the registered address of the company and that the foreign director, when sued as an individual tortfeasor, can be served with the process at the registered address of the company of which he is a director.

78.  In the circumstances, the service upon D26 at the registered address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd, is not proper service and therefore ineffective.

79.  Moreover, the purported service of the Amended Writ and Amended SOC upon the office of Messrs Sidley Austin is also not good service since there is no endorsement by Messrs Sidley Austin that they had instructions to accept service and more importantly, Messrs Sidley Austin had informed the plaintiffs’ solicitors that they were about to dispute/challenge jurisdiction after acknowledging service.

80.  Indeed at the hearing, the plaintiffs have not pursued this point of service upon Messrs Sidley Austin as being good service against D26.

81.  As for the point that D26, having failed to show any part of his passport to show that he was not in Hong Kong at the material time of service, has failed to discharge the evidential burden on him to rebut the presumption of service, I do not find that to be a good point.  Since there is no presumption of service on the facts, I cannot see that D26 has any evidential burden to rebut.  The onus is squarely on the plaintiffs to show that D26 was present within the jurisdiction when the plaintiffs purported to serve him with the Writ in this matter.  It is not a matter for D26 to disprove.

(b)   D Service on D27

82.  D27 is a Cayman Islands company with its registered office in the Cayman Islands.

83.  D27 is a separate legal entity from D28 and also from Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd.

84.  Once again there can be no justification for serving D27 at the registered office of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd and I do not accept the arguments put forward by the plaintiffs to the effect that service of the Original Writ upon D27 at the registered address of Sequedge ASA Capital Ltd to be good service.

85.  For the same reason as given above in the case of D26, purported service of the Amended Writ upon Messrs Sidley Austin on behalf D27 is neither good nor effective service.

86.  I also do not accept the argument put forward by the plaintiffs that because D27 had, together with D28 and Gingero, began arbitration proceedings in Hong Kong in respect of the same subject matter of dispute as that of the present case, they have thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts.  When the arbitration proceedings were commenced by D27, D28 and Gingero, the Writ in the present case has not even been issued by the plaintiffs and therefore that act on the part of D27 cannot be said to be “a step in the proceedings” whereby D27 would have waived any irregularity as to service.

87.  However, D27 (together with D28) did take out a summons to stay the present action and in so doing did take “a step in the proceedings” whereby D27 has waived the irregularity as to service and has thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts in these proceedings.

88.  Accordingly, the application by D27 to set aside service of the Original Writ and Original SOC upon it as well as to set aside service of the Amended Writ and Amended SOC must be dismissed.

(c)   Service upon D28

89.  Service of process is permitted on a non-Hong Kong company by leaving it at or sending by post to “any place of business established by the company in Hong Kong” even though the company has not registered under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance (see section 338(2) Companies Ordinance, Ho Tai Kwan v Global Innovative Systems Inc [2008] 1 HKLRD 339).

90.  The question to consider therefore is whether the address in the Business Registration Certificate of D28 is a “place of business” established by D28 in Hong Kong for the purposes of the service under section 338(2) of the Companies Ordinance.

91.  Section 341 of the Companies Ordinance defines “place of business” as including “a share transfer or share registration office but does not include an office specified in the Twenty-fourth Schedule.”

92.  The Twenty-fourth Schedule contains an exclusion in the definition of place of business which is:

“A local representative office established or maintained with the approval of the Monetary Authority under section 46 of the Banking Ordinance (Cap 155) by a bank as defined in section 46(9) of that Ordinance.”

93.  That exclusion is not applicable here.

94.  Before section 341 was amended by The Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 which came into effect on 14 December 2007, there was another exclusion to the definition of “place of business” in section 341.  That exclusion was that a place of business “does not include a place not used by the company to transact any business which creates legal obligations”.  Such exclusion was removed by the said amendment to section 341.

95.  In the case of Huang Ping, Owen v Burswood Ltd and anr (DCCJ 5239 of 2008, 9 September 2009), Deputy District Judge Raymond Tsui said in paragraph 30 of his judgment that as the wide exclusion in the old version of section 341 has now been replaced by a narrower exclusion this must mean that the legislature intends that “place of business” should bear a wide meaning.  I agree with that observation of Deputy Judge Raymond Tsui.

96.  When Deputy High Court Judge Anthony To (as he then was) gave his decision in the case of Gerald Leon Murdock v Dresser-Rand Services SARL [2001] HKCFI 148, the amendment to section 341 of the Companies Ordinance had not been made and had not taken effect.  That case was therefore decided on the old version of the exclusion to the definition of “place of business” in section 341 of the Companies Ordinance.  In the light of the amendment, that decision by Deputy Judge To cannot assist D28 in the present case.

97.  Given that D28 has seen fit to apply for a Business Registration Certificate in the present case, I am of the view that the address given by D28 on the Business Registration Certificate to be D28’s “place of business” within the meaning of section 341 of the Companies Ordinance notwithstanding that D28 has not registered itself under Part XI of the Companies Ordinance.

98.  Accordingly, and for the reasons given above, service of the Original Writ and Original SOC upon D28 at the address under its Business Registration Certificate is good service and the present application by D28 ought to be dismissed.

99.  Moreover, if I was wrong in deciding that service upon D28 was good service, or if there was any irregularity with service upon D28, D28, like D27 has also taken out an application to stay the present action in favour of the arbitration proceedings.  In so doing, D28 has taken a step in the present proceedings and must also be taken to have waived any such irregularity with service.

CONCLUSION

100.  Service of the Original Writ and Original SOC as well as the Amended Writ and Amended SOC upon D26 is set aside as being improper and ineffective service.

101.  The applications by D27 and D28 are dismissed.

COSTS

102.  The costs of D26 in making this application and attending the hearing be borne by the plaintiffs in any event.

103.  The plaintiffs’ costs in opposing the applications of D27 and D28 to be paid by D27 and D28 in any event.

(A R Suffiad)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Kelvin Leung, instructed by M C A Lai & Co, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Ing Loong Yang, of Sidley Austin, for the 26th, 27th and 28th defendants

80747-EN-2012-03-08

LIN MING AND ANOTHER v. CHEN SHU QUAN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1900/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1900 OF 2011

------------------------

BETWEEN

 LIN MING (林明)1st Plaintiff
 FUJIAN YUANSHENG FOODS INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 (福建元盛食品工業有限公司) 
and
 CHEN SHU QUAN (陳樹泉)1st Defendant
 CHAN SIU TAT (陳少達)2nd Defendant
 GUO MIN (郭敏)3rd Defendant
 CHEN YU (陳禹)4th Defendant
 ZHOU GANG (周剛)5th Defendant
 SUPREME WEALTHY INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED6th Defendant
 CHINA MINING RESOURCES GROUP LIMITED7th Defendant
 LIN PING (林萍)8thDefendant
 GROUP MOTION SECRETARIAL &
CONSULTING LIMITED
9th Defendant
 CHAN CHEUK WING (陳焯榮)10th Defendant
 CHEN JIAN HUI (陳建輝)11th Defendant
 MIRANDA TANG KA YEE (鄧嘉儀) 12th Defendant
 RICHARD PYVIS13th Defendant
 DAVID CHEUNG WAI SHUN (張為信) 14th Defendant
 KUN PENG I LIMITED15th Defendant
 KUN PENG II LIMITED16th Defendant
 CLSA CAPITAL PARTNERS (HK) LTD17th Defendant
 (里昂證券亞太恆富資本(香港)有限公司) 
 ARIA INVESTMENT PARTNERS III , L.P.18th Defendant
 ZHANG ZHI YUAN (張志遠)19th Defendant
 ZHANG ZHI ZHONG (張志忠)20th Defendant
 WANG JI WEI (王吉偉)21st Defendant
 WANG JI PENG (王吉鵬)22nd Defendant
 LI GUANGDE (李廣德)23rd Defendant
 FEI YONG FENG (費勇鋒)24th Defendant
 FABULOUS TURBO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED25th Defendant
 TSUBASA IMAMURA (今村翼)26th Defendant
 SEQUEDGE ASA CAPITAL (CAYMEN) LIMITED27th Defendant
 SEQUEDGE INVESTMENT INC.28th Defendant
 (formerly known as SEQUEDGE INC.) 

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Before : Deputy High Court Judge P Ng SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 7 February 2012

Date of Judgment : 8 March 2012

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  There are two applications before me.

2.  First, there is a summons dated 29 November 2011 by the 1st plaintiff for an injunction restraining the 27th and 28th defendants, as well as Gingero Associated SA (“Gingero”), from proceeding with and /or taking any further step in the arbitration Case No HKIAC/A11113 (“HKIAC Arbitration”) until the determination of this Action or further order (“Injunction Application”).  Gingero is not a party to this Action.  It is unclear on what basis the 1st plaintiff joins Gingero in the Injunction Application.

3.  Second, there is a summons dated 19 December 2011 by the 27th and 28th defendants for an Order that the 1st plaintiff’s claims against them in this Action be stayed in favour of the HKIAC Arbitration (“Stay Application”).

4.  On 9 September 2011, the HKIAC Arbitration was commenced by the 28th defendant, the 27th defendant and Gingero as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd claimants against the 1st plaintiff as the sole Respondent.  Both parties have filed their pleadings in the HKIAC Arbitration ‑ the 28th defendant, the 27th defendant and Gingero filed their Statement of Claim on 25 November 2011 and the 1st plaintiff filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on 6 January 2012.

5.  On 4 November 2011, the plaintiffs issued the Writ of Summons in the present Action.  The plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim was dated 4 November 2011, and was subsequently amended on 18 November 2011.  The 27th and 28th defendants have not filed their Defence in this Action.

6.  It is common ground between the parties that the facts and matters relied upon by the 1st plaintiff in this Action are substantially the same as those in the HKIAC arbitration.  Indeed, the 1st plaintiff’s case is that precisely because the issues raised by the parties in the two sets of proceedings are the same and the evidence to be adduced is also likely to be the same, it would be oppressive if the 1st plaintiff has to handle two proceedings concurrently.

7.  In support of his client’s case, Counsel for the 1st plaintiff prays in aid two authorities viz. University of Reading v Miller Construction Ltd (1994) 75 BLR 91 and J Jarvis & Sons Ltd v Blue Circle Darford Estates Ltd [2007] EWHC 1262.  I shall come back to them later in this judgment.

8.  The Stay Application is based on section 20 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609, which gives legal effect to Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (“Model Law”) :

“ (1) Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the text of which is set out below, has effect‑

Article 8. Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before Court

(1) A Court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed…

(5) If the Court refers the parties in an action to arbitration, it must make an order staying the legal proceedings in that action.”

Background

9.  The following background facts are taken from the amended Statement of Claim in this Action and the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim in the HKIAC Arbitration.

10.  The 1st plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff, a company incorporated in the PRC, were at all material times engaged in the business of food processing and trading.  The 2nd plaintiff owned a piece of land in Fuzhou, the PRC, with plants and equipments for seafood processing and trading.

11.  The 1st plaintiff was the sole director and shareholder of Win Power Investment Limited (“Win Power”), a company incorporated in the BVI.  He was also the indirect 100% shareholder of the 2nd plaintiff, via Win Power, Fame Glory Holding Limited, another BVI company, and Jointa Limited, a company incorporated in Hong Kong.

12.  On 18 January 2008, the 28th defendant and the 1st plaintiff entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (“Share Purchase Agreement”) whereby the 28th defendant agreed to acquire from the 1st plaintiff 1,000 shares of Win Power, representing 10% of its entire issued share capital (“Sale Shares”).  The consideration for the Sale Shares was RMB 115,000,000. 

(a)   Under Clause 10.6.1 of the Share Purchase Agreement, the 1st plaintiff was to use his best endeavors to procure the occurrence of a “Qualifying IPO” within 24 months from completion.  “Qualifying IPO” meant an initial public offering undertaken by a special purpose vehicle on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited or other internationally recognized stock exchange.

(b)   Clause 12.1 of the Share Purchase Agreement provided that if no Qualifying IPO took place by 29 January 2010 (being two years following the Completion Date of the Share Purchase Agreement), the 28th defendant might at any time exercise a put option by written notice to the 1st plaintiff requiring him to purchase all of the Sale Shares.

(c)   The Share Purchase Agreement contained an arbitration clause at clause 19.2 in the following terms :

“19.2 Arbitration

19.2.1 Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, (each, a “Dispute”) shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Clause 19.2…”

13.  In November 2008, the 27th defendant acquired the beneficial interest in 237 of the 1,000 Sale Shares from the 28th defendant. This was evidenced by, inter alia, a Declaration of Trust dated 12 November 2008 executed by the 1st plaintiff in favour of the 27th defendant. Significantly, on 12 November 2008, the 1st plaintiff issued a confirmation letter (“Confirmation Letter”) to the 27th and 28th defendants who also countersigned it.  The third paragraph of the Confirmation Letter provided as follows :

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement, we hereby irrevocable and unconditionally give our written approval to the Proposed Transfer and waive our right of first refusal and tag-along right for the Proposed Transfer; provided, however, that [the 27th defendant] shall assume and succeed all the rights and obligations of [the 28th defendant] under the [Share Purchase Agreement] for 237 Shares subject to the Proposed Transfer. For the avoidance of doubt, [the 28th defendant] shall remain to be bound by the [Share Purchase Agreement] for the remaining 763 Shares after the Proposed Transfer.”

14.  It is the case of the 27th defendant that it thereby assumed and succeeded all the rights and obligations of the 28th defendant under the Share Purchase Agreement in relation to the 237 Sale Shares, including the arbitration agreement contained in clause 19.2 thereof.

15.  On 30 January 2009, Gingero acquired the beneficial interest in 220 of the remaining Sale Shares from the 28th defendant.  As in the case of the 27th defendant, a similar declaration of trust and a confirmation letter, both dated 30 January 2009, were executed by the 1st plaintiff.

16.  On 26 August 2011, the 27th and 28th defendants and Gingero, through their solicitors, issued a notice under clause 12.1 of the Share Purchase Agreement requiring the 1st plaintiff to purchase the Sale Shares.

17.  The 1st plaintiff having failed to comply with the notice, the 27th and 28th defendants and Gingero commenced the HKIAC Arbitration on 9 September 2011, seeking a sum of US$25,317,032.30 being the purchase price of the Sale Shares calculated in accordance with clause 12.1 from the 1st plaintiff.

18.  On 4 November 2011, the plaintiffs issued the Writ of Summons in the present Action.  The amended Statement of Claim runs to over 100 pages.  But in gist, the complaint is that the 1st plaintiff’s group of companies have been unlawfully taken over by the defendants during his detention in the Mainland sometime in 2009 and 2010.

19.  In order to facilitate a better understanding of the parties’ arguments in the two applications, I shall endeavour to give a very brief summary of the 1st plaintiff’s pleaded case concerning the 27th and 28th defendants :

(a)   At or about the end of 2007, the 28th defendant, an institutional investor, approached the 1st plaintiff and showed interest in investing in his food processing business.  Subsequently, the 1st plaintiff and the 28th defendant entered into the Share Purchase Agreement by which the 1st plaintiff agreed to transfer 1,000 shares in Win Power to the 28th defendant at the consideration of RMB 115,000,000.

(b)   The 1st plaintiff and the 28th defendant contemplated that the 1st plaintiff’s business would be listed in the future.  It was an implied term of the Share Purchase Agreement that the 28th defendant, its agents or servants :

(i)   should not do any act which was harmful to the 1st plaintiff and his group of companies or which hindered, obstructed or frustrated his listing plan ;

(ii)   should exercise reasonable diligence in assisting or cooperating with the 1st plaintiff and his group of companies towards listing his business.

(c)   At the request of the 28th defendant, the 1st plaintiff held the 1,000 shares in Win Power on trust for 3 entities nominated by it viz. the 27th defendant, the 28th defendant and Gingero.  The 1st plaintiff remained the legal owner of the said 1,000 shares in Win Power.

(d)   The 27th defendant was the agent and nominee of the 28th defendant.  They, together with the other defendants in this Action and certain Mainland government officials, had conspired to cause damage to the plaintiffs, with the predominant intent to injure or by unlawful means viz. converting the 1st plaintiff’s shares in his group of companies and unlawfully obtaining ownership and control thereof, as well as converting and /or misappropriating the assets of the plaintiffs and Win Power.

(e)   Prior to 22 October 2009, the 1st, 7th, 17th and /or 28th defendants and /or their agents had unlawfully conspired to take over the management of the 2nd plaintiff (“the Unlawful Scheme”).  Pursuant to the Unlawful Scheme, the 1st, 7th, 17th and/or 28th defendants and /or their agents had wrongfully caused the Mainland government authorities to arrest the 1st plaintiff, his sister and another person.

(f)   By reason of the participation of the 27th and 28th defendants and /or their agents in the Unlawful Scheme and /or by reason of their agreement with the other defendants to misappropriate the funds and assets of the 2nd plaintiff, they had acted in a manner totally inconsistent with and in breach of the implied term of the Share Purchase Agreement and frustrated the 1st plaintiff’s listing plan.

(g)   The Share Purchase Agreement was terminated on the day when the first overt act pursuant to the Unlawful Scheme was carried out.

(h)   In the circumstances, the obligation of the 1st plaintiff under the Share Purchase Agreement was discharged and the 27th and 28th defendants had lost their right to exercise the put option under the Share Purchase Agreement.  Further, since Gingero was controlled by the same group of people as the 27th and 28th defendants, it had also lost the right to exercise the put option under the Share Purchase Agreement.

(i)   In the prayer for relief, the 1st plaintiff sought inter alia a declaration that the 27th and 28th defendants were in fundamental breach of the Share Purchase Agreement and that it had been terminated.

20.  On 29 November 2011, the 1st plaintiff issued the summons for the Injunction Application.  On 19 December 2011, the 27th and 28th defendants issued the summons for the Stay Application.

21.  On 6 January 2012, the 1st plaintiff filed a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim in the HKIAC Arbitration, basically repeating his case in this Action.

22.  To complete the picture, the 1st plaintiff has, prior to 6 January 2012, made a number of attempts to stay the HKIAC Arbitration on the basis that inter alia his proposed Statement of Defence and Counterclaim would be substantively similar to the claims he asserted in this Action.  The 1st plaintiff’s stay applications were made by letters to the HKIAC and the arbitrator Dr Michael Moser.  The applications were rejected by both.

Stay under section 20 Arbitration Ordinance

23.  The HKIAC Arbitration was commenced in Hong Kong on 9 September 2011, after the (new) Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609, had come into effect.

24.  Section 20 of the Arbitration Ordinance gives legal effect to Art 8 of the Model Law.  It sets out the basic principle that a Court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement must refer the parties to arbitration unless it is established that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

25.  Once the conditions of Art 8 are satisfied, a stay of the legal action is mandatory : Astel‑Peiniger Joint Venture v Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries [1995] 1 HKLR 300; William Company v Chu Kong Agency [1995] 2 HKLR 139; Pacific Crown Engineering v Hyundai Engineering Ltd & Construction Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 440; Tommy C.P. Sze & Co v Li & Fung [2003] 1 HKC 418.

26.  The case of the 27th and 28th defendants for a stay is straightforward :

(a)   There is a valid arbitration agreement between the 27th and 28th defendants and the 1st plaintiff in terms of clause 19.2 of the Share Purchase Agreement.

(b)   The claims made by the 1st plaintiff in this Action ie the 27th and 28th defendants had committed a fundamental breach of the Share Purchase Agreement whereby it was terminated and they had lost the right to exercise the put option, arise out of and relate to the Share Purchase Agreement, and fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

(c)   The 27th and 28th defendants have applied for a stay of the 1st plaintiff’s claims against them in this Action before filing their Defence.

(d)   The 1st plaintiff does not challenge the arbitration agreement in question as being null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

(e)   The 1st plaintiff does not contend that the disputes between the 27th and 28th defendants and him fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement ‑ on the contrary, the 1st plaintiff maintains that the issues raised against the 27th and 28th defendants in this Action are substantially similar to those in the HKIAC Arbitration.

(f)   The requirements of Art 8(1) of the Model Law having been met, it is mandatory for the Court to stay the 1st plaintiff’s claims against them.

27.  As far as the existence of the arbitration agreement is concerned, while the 1st plaintiff’s case is that the Share Purchase Agreement has been terminated by the 27th and 28th defendant’s fundamental breach, this would not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement as such. Art 16(1) of the Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement and, for that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.  Art 16(1) of the Model Law is now given legal effect in Hong Kong by virtue of section 34 of the Arbitration Ordinance.

28.  In Fung Sang Trading Limited v Kai Sun Sea Products & Food Company Ltd [1992] 1 HKLR 40 at 50, Kaplan J observed that Art 16(1) of the Model Law enshrined the doctrine of separability which English law had partially recognised since Heyman v Darwins [1942] AC 356. Thus the arbitration clause is separable from the contract containing it so that even if the contract is repudiated and the repudiation is accepted, the arbitration clause survives the repudiation.

29.  Subject to one point, there is nothing in the submissions of the 1st plaintiff which argues against the case of the 27th and 28th defendants for a stay, as such.  Instead, the submissions of the 1st plaintiff focus solely on why the HKIAC Arbitration should be restrained, to which I shall return later in this judgment.

30.  The point is this.  At the hearing, Counsel for the 1st plaintiff disputed the existence of any arbitration agreement between the 1st plaintiff and the 27th defendant. He seemed to be suggesting that the 1st plaintiff and the 27th defendant were parties to the substantive part of the Share Purchase Agreement, in so far as the 237 Sale Shares were concerned, but not the arbitration clause in the Share Purchase Agreement.  He prayed in aid the doctrine of separability, but somewhat turned it the other way round.

31.  I do not agree.  In The Jordan Nicolov [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 11 at 15, Hobhouse J (as he then was) made the following observations concerning the effect of legal assignment of a contract with an arbitration clause :

“But where the assignment is the assignment of the cause of action, it will, in the absence of some agreement to the contrary, include as stated in s136 [of the Law of Property Act 1925]all the remedies in respect of that cause of action. The relevant remedy is the right to arbitrate and obtain an arbitration award in respect of the cause of action. The assignee is bound by the arbitration clause in the sense that he cannot assert the assigned right without also accepting the obligation to arbitrate. Accordingly, it is clear both from the statute and from a consideration of the position of the assignee that the assignee has the benefit of the arbitration clause as well as of the other provisions of the contract.” (emphasis added)

In Hong Kong, section 9 Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance, Cap 23, similarly provides inter alia that such an assignment is effectual in law to pass and transfer the legal right to such chose in action and all legal and other remedies for the same.

32.  If one looks at the express terms of the Confirmation Letter, it seems reasonably clear that the intention of the parties who signed the letter viz. 1st plaintiff, the 27th and 28th defendants, was that the 27th defendant would thereafter assume all the rights and obligations of the 28th defendant under the Share Purchase Agreement, in so far as the 237 Shares were concerned.  Whether one analyses the legal effect of the Confirmation Letter as an assignment of the 28th defendant’s rights under the Share Purchase Agreement to the 27th defendant or as a novation of the Share Purchase Agreement among the three parties is not important.  The important thing is there is nothing to suggest that they intended to leave out the arbitration agreement at clause 19.2 from the assignment or the novation.

33.  In any event, the onus on the 27th defendant is merely to demonstrate to this Court a good prima facie case, or a plainly arguable case, that an arbitration agreement exists between the 27th defendant and the 1st plaintiff, and if so, to refer the matter to the arbitrator for final determination : Pacific Crown Engineering v Hyundai Engineering Ltd & Construction Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 440 at §§6 & 12.  In my view, a good prima facie case has been so established.

34.  In my judgment, the conditions of Art 8 of the Model Law having been satisfied, this Court is bound to give effect to it and grant the Stay Application by the 27th and 28th defendants in favour of the HKIAC Arbitration.

The Injunction Application

35.  It should be immediately apparent that if this Court accedes to the Stay Application in favour of HKIAC Arbitration, it would be self‑defeating for this Court then to grant an injunction restraining the 27th and 28th defendants from proceeding with the HKIAC Arbitration.  Common sense compels this Court to adopt one or the other course, but not both.  Given that a stay under Art 8 of the Model Law is mandatory, the course which this Court has to adopt should be quite obvious.

36.  Further, granting the injunction sought by the 1st plaintiff would tend to undermine the object of the Arbitration Ordinance viz. to facilitate the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense, and the principles upon which the Ordinance is based viz.

“(a) that, subject to the observance of the safeguards that are necessary in the public interest, the parties to a dispute should be free to agree on how the dispute should be resolved ; and

(b) that, the Court should interfere in the arbitration of a dispute only as expressly provided for in this Ordinance.”

See section 3 of the Arbitration Ordinance.

37.  Solicitors for the 27th and 28th defendants go even further.  Their submission is that the Court has no power to restrain the HKIAC Arbitration at all. In this regard, apart from section 20, they also rely on section 12 of the Arbitration Ordinance which gives legal effect to Art 5 of the Model Law as follows :

“In matters governed by this Law, no Court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law.”

38.  In the present case, the Injunction Application is not premised on anything expressly provided for in the Arbitration Ordinance or the Model Law.  Instead, Counsel for the 1st plaintiff relies on the Court’s general jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under section 21L of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, and the principles set out in the two authorities to which I now turn.

39.  In University of Reading v Miller Construction Ltd (1994) 75 BLR 91, the university employed Miller to carry out construction work under two contracts.  The second contract (but not the first) contained an arbitration clause.  The university also employed HLM as architects and RSA as consulting engineers in connection with the building works.  Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the second construction contract, Miller brought arbitration proceedings against the university, claiming £1.8 million. The university then brought proceedings in the Official Referees’ Court, making claims against Miller, RSA and HLM in respect of the building works which had been the subject of both construction contracts.  Miller applied under section 4 of the Arbitration Act 1950 for a discretionary stay of those proceedings insofar as they related to the second construction contract.  Judge Bowsher QC dismissed the application for a stay.

40.  The University then applied to the Official Referees’ Court for an injunction to restrain Miller and the arbitrator from taking further steps in the arbitration until after trial.  Judge Lloyd QC acceded to that application.

41.  At p 111 B‑G, Judge Lloyd QC noted that the Court had the power to restrain the continuance of an arbitration but that power would only be exercised sparingly.  The relevant principles were those stated by Sellers LJ in The ‘Oranie’ and The ‘Tunisi’' [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 477 at 487 viz.

(1)   the stay must not cause injustice to the claimant in the arbitration ;

(2)   the applicant for a stay must satisfy the Court that continuance of the arbitration would be oppressive or vexatious to him or an abuse of the process of the Court : in short, that it would be unjust.

42.  In the circumstances of the case, his Lordship concluded that the proposed injunction would not cause injustice to Miller whereas it would be vexatious and oppressive for the University to be involved in concurrent proceedings before the Court and the arbitrator.  He therefore granted an injunction restraining Miller and the arbitrator from taking further steps in the arbitration until after the trial of the Court proceedings.

43.  Unlike Art 8 of the Model Law, section 4 of the Arbitration Act 1950 conferred a discretion on the Court to grant a stay of legal proceedings where there was a submission to arbitration.  Judge Bowsher QC had earlier refused to exercise the discretion to grant a stay.  Hence, when subsequently Judge Lloyd QC heard the injunction application, there was no question of a stay of the legal proceedings.  His Lordship was only concerned with whether to allow the arbitration to proceed concurrently with the legal proceedings, or to restrain its continuance until after the trial of the legal proceedings.

44.  University of Reading v Miller Construction Ltd was decided prior to the Arbitration Act 1996.  On 31 January 1997, the Arbitration Act 1996 came into force, and the principles upon which the Act was based effected a significant shift in the law of arbitration in England.  Two of the principles set out in section 1 of the Act are respect for party autonomy and self‑restraint by the Courts when intervening in the arbitral process.

45.  In J Jarvis & Sons Ltd v Blue Circle Darford Estates Ltd [2007] EWHC 1262, the question before the Court was whether its jurisdiction to restrain continuance of an arbitration on the grounds identified in The ‘Oranie’ and The ‘Tunisie’ survived the enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996.  Jackson J, after reviewing the authorities, concluded that it did.

46.  At paragraphs [39] and [40], his Lordship observed as follows :

“[39]…It is clear from two decisions of the Commercial Court (with which I respectfully agree) that the jurisdiction does survive, but its exercise will now be even more sparing than before. See Intermet FCZO v Ansol Ltd [2007] EWHC 226 (Comm) and Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm), [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 8 (Comm). In both of those cases the existence of the jurisdiction was acknowledged, but the Court refused to grant an injunction. …. Indeed, despite their industry, neither advocate has been able to find any case since 31 January 1997 in which the Court has granted an injunction to halt an arbitration.

[40] From this review of authority I derive four propositions :

(i) The Court’s power under s37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to grant injunctions includes a power to grant an injunction to restrain an arbitration from proceeding.

(ii) That power may be exercised if two conditions are satisfied, namely :

(a) the injunction does not cause injustice to the Claimant in the arbitration, and

(b) the continuance of the arbitration would be oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process.

(iii) The Court’s discretion to grant such an injunction is now only exercised very sparingly and with due regard to the principles upon which the Arbitration Act 1996 is expressly based.

(iv) Delay by the party applying for an injunction is material to the Court’s exercise of discretion and may in some cases be fatal to the application.”


47.  Counsel for the 1st plaintiff made three points in support of the Injunction Application.

48.  First, if the HKIAC Arbitration is allowed to continue, there will be two different tribunals of facts adjudicating upon the same matter based on the same factual matrix and evidence.  There is a risk that the facts found by the two tribunals will be different.  This is totally undesirable.

49.  Second, there will be no injustice to 27th and 28th defendants and Gingero if they are restrained from proceeding with the HKIAC Arbitration pending the outcome of the present Action.  On the other hand, the continuance of the HKIAC Arbitration will be unjust to the 1st plaintiff in that he has to apply his resources to two identical proceedings while the 27th and 28th defendants would only need to deal with one if the present Action against them is stayed.

50.  Third, even if the 1st plaintiff’s claims against the 27th and 28th defendants in this Action are stayed, the Action against the other defendants will continue.  As these defendants are sued inter alia as their agents, the 27th and the 28th defendants cannot be completely removed from this Action.

51.  On the question of jurisdiction, presently, I am not convinced by the arguments of Mr Yang for the 27th and 28th defendants that sections 12 and 20 of the Arbitration Ordinance have the effect of ousting the Court’s jurisdiction under section 21L High Court Ordinance to grant injunctive relief in a case like the present.  I note that in England, where the concept of respect for party autonomy and self‑restraint by the Courts when intervening in the arbitral process is similarly endorsed, the Courts tend to assume that the wide jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 continues to exist : Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 618, [2005] 1 WLR 355 at paragraph 74; Intermet FCZO v Ansol Ltd [2007] EWHC 226 (Comm) at paragraph 20; Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm), [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 8 (Comm) at paragraph 51; J Jarvis & Sons Ltd v Blue Circle Darford Estates Ltd op cit.

52.  As I have not heard full arguments on the tension, if any, between the Arbitration Ordinance and the Court’s jurisdiction under section 21L of the High Court Ordinance, I shall refrain from expressing any concluded view on it.  The relationship between the two is a matter that requires detailed consideration and is eminently suitable for decision by the higher Courts.

53.  I am content to assume there is jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the continuance of an arbitration to which the Arbitration Ordinance applies, but that such jurisdiction must be exercised very sparingly and with great caution.  With this in mind, I turn to the three points raised by Counsel for the 1st plaintiff.

54.  As far as the first point is concerned, this Court accepts that it is in general undesirable to have parallel proceedings in this jurisdiction involving the same factual disputes, with the concomitant risk of inconsistent factual findings.  However, one should not lose sight of the fact that it was the 1st plaintiff who created this risk by instituting the present Action two months after the commencement of the HKIAC Arbitration.  Where a litigant, like the 1st plaintiff in this Action, chooses to sue multiple defendants, some of which are parties to an arbitration agreement while other are not, the costs and inconvenience of concurrent proceedings and the risk of inconsistent factual findings are almost inevitable.  Nevertheless, it lies ill in the 1st plaintiff’s mouth to complain of oppression when it is his own decision which creates the oppressive situation.

55.  The second and the third points can be dealt with together.

56.  To start with, I am not convinced that there will be no injustice to the 27th and 28th defendants if they are restrained from proceeding with the HKIAC Arbitration until after the determination of this Action.  In the HKIAC Arbitration, they are asserting one claim against one party viz. the 1st plaintiff, for buying back the Sale Shares pursuant to the terms of the Share Purchase Agreement.  On the other hand, in this Action, the plaintiffs are asserting a number of claims against a large number of defendants.  Compared with the HKIAC Arbitration, this Action is likely to take much longer to proceed to trial, and the trial is likely to last much longer.  Further, the progress of this Action will in no small ways depend on inter alia the pace at which the plaintiffs choose to prosecute their claims and the vigor with which the other 26 defendants choose to defend them.  This is something over which the 27th and 28th defendants have little control.  If the 27th and 28th defendants are restrained from proceeding with the HKIAC Arbitration until after the determination of this Action, they could face considerable delay before they can resume the HKIAC Arbitration.

57.  Further, it seems to me a false point to suggest that the 27th and 28th defendants would only need to deal with one set of proceedings whereas the 1st plaintiff will have to deal with two.  The simple reason is that there is no question of staying this Action so far as the 2nd plaintiff is concerned.  The 2nd plaintiff is not said to be a party to the arbitration agreement in question.  Its claims for damages for fraud, conspiracy, conversion and so on against all the defendants, including the 27th and 28th defendants, will remain in this Action, irrespective of the outcome of the applications before me.  Whatever inconvenience, expenses and strain on resources said to be suffered by the 1st plaintiff in having to engage in two concurrent proceedings will likewise be suffered by the 27th and 28th defendants.  Equally, there is no question that the 27th and 28th defendants can be completely removed from this Action.

58.  In the circumstances of this case, the 1st plaintiff has not satisfied me that the continuance of the HKIAC Arbitration would be oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process, or that the injunction sought would not cause injustice to the 27th and 28th defendants. Even if I am wrong on this, in view of the concerns that I express in paragraphs 35 and 36 above, I am in any event not inclined to exercise my discretion to restrain the 27th and 28th defendants from proceeding with the HKIAC Arbitration.

Order

59.  Accordingly, I grant the stay sought by the 27th and 28th defendants and dismiss the 1st plaintiff’s application for an injunction.  I also make a costs order nisi that the 27th and 28th defendants are to have their costs in both applications, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

(Peter Ng SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Kelvin Leung, instructed by MCA Lai & Co, for the 1st plaintiff

Mr Yang Ing Loong of Sidley Austin, for the 27th and 28th defendants

Please refer to HCMP552/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.