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Civil Action2011

BRIGHT GOLD LTD v. MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LTD

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[2023] HKCFI 594-EN-2023-03-03

MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LTD v. CENTALINE PROPERTY AGENCY LTD

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HCA 2194/2011

[2023] HKCFI 594

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2194 OF 2011

_________________

BETWEEN

 Mega Well Development LimitedPlaintiff

and

 Centaline Property Agency Limited
(by Counterclaim)
Defendant

_________________

Before:Hon Ng J in Court
Dates of Hearing:22-26, 29-30 August and 23 September 2022
Date of Judgment:3 March 2023

________________

JUDGMENT

________________


Introduction

1.  This is the re-trial of the Counterclaim in the Action on the issues of liability.

2.  The underlying subject matter is the sale and purchase of a residential property in Shatin ie Duplex B on the 32/F and 33/F of Block 1 (“Duplex B”) of a new development known as “Hill Paramount (名家匯)” (“Development”), together with balcony, utility platform, roof staircase, flat roof and roof thereof and 3 car parking spaces on Level 1 (collectively “Property”). The purchase price was HK$69.8 million.

3.  The Plaintiff was the purchaser under:

(a) a Provisional Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 16 August 2011 (“PSPA”),

(b) a Formal Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 22 August 2011 (“SPA”), and

(c) an Assignment dated 2 December 2011 (“Assignment”).

4.  The Defendant was the estate agent involved in the transaction.

5.  Two other entities were involved in the original trial but not this re-trial viz Bright Gold Limited (“Bright Gold”), a subsidiary of the Henderson Group, which was the developer and vendor of the Property and Messrs Woo Kwan Lee & Lo (“WKLL”), the Plaintiff’s solicitors in the transaction.

6.  The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is for certain oral representations made through its staff Ms Stella Wong (“Stella Wong”) to Ms Cheng Shui Chu Katherine (“Madam Cheng”), the sole director and shareholder of the Plaintiff, during the viewings of the Property and in the office of WKLL. The representations made by Stella Wong (“Representations”) were to the effect that the private roof which formed part of the Property (“Private Roof”) extended from a glass door (“Glass Door”) to 2 pillars (“2 Pillars”) some distance away on the roof of Block 1 (“Block 1 Roof”). For ease of reference, this is what the Plaintiff describes as the yellow area (“Yellow Area”). Since the Yellow Area is in fact much larger than the actual Private Roof, the Plaintiff claims it had been misled by the Defendant. The Yellow Area can be seen on the Roof Plan at Annex 1 of the Statement of Claim dated 5 January 2021. This plan was prepared for the purpose of this litigation.

7.  In the Statement of Claim dated 5 January 2021, the Plaintiff has pleaded a case that the Representations were made negligently and/or recklessly. in Madam Cheng’s 1st witness statement (“Cheng 1”) at para 52, she says she believes Stella Wong knew full well the Representations were incorrect in order to earn commission ie a case of deliberate and fraudulent misrepresentation. This was confirmed by Madam Cheng to this court in the morning of Day 3. As Mr Yan SC points out in his Closing, the Plaintiff’s case has been shifting since the beginning of this Action between fraudulent misrepresentation, in the Plaintiff’s original Defence and Counterclaim dated 17 April 2012, and negligent and/or reckless misrepresentation, in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim dated 5 January 2021, and then back to fraudulent misrepresentation in Madam Cheng’s testimony for this re-trial.

8.  Since the Plaintiff is accusing Stella Wong of fraud, while the standard of proof is still the civil standard, the evidential burden on it has to be commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation so that more compelling and stronger evidence is required to prove its case.

9.  It is not in dispute that the Yellow Area was part of the common area of the Development and not part of the Property. According to the Defendant, the Yellow Area exceeded 45 sq m.

10.  The actual Private Roof included 2 relatively small areas on the Block 1 Roof. For ease of reference, the correct plan identifying the Private Roof is coloured pink (“Rectified Plan”) in Annex 2 of the Statement of Claim.

11.  Physically, the Private Roof was situated on two different levels. First, on the 33/F of the Property, there was an internal staircase which led onto the Block 1 Roof. At the top of the stairwell (“Stairwell”), there was the Glass Door and by opening that outwards, one could enter the Block 1 Roof. Only a narrow strip of the roof area just outside the Stairwell of about 0.5m x 4.7m was part of the Property. Second, the area where the outdoor units of air-conditioners and boilers serving the Property were situated and was only accessible by way of a cat ladder (“B Upper Roof”). According to the Sales Brochure for the Development (“Sales Brochure”), the Property had an “Extra Roof Area” of 199 sq ft (saleable area) which is the total area adding up the narrow strip and the B Upper Roof.

12.  Apart from Duplex B, there were 2 other duplexes in Block 1 – Duplex A, which were on the same floors as the Property ie 32/F and 33/F (“Duplex A”) and Duplex C, which were one floor level lower than Duplex B ie 31/F and 32/F (“Duplex C”).

13.  Duplex A came with a rather larger roof (“A Roof”), located immediately above the 33/F area of Duplex A, as well as a part of the upper roof of Block 1. Duplex C included an area on the Block 1 Roof almost of a square shape (“C Roof”), which was located right above the covered area of Duplex C and importantly was only accessible from Duplex C. It appears from the Sales Brochure that the outdoor air-conditioner units for Duplex C were located there.

14.  Prior to the signing of the PSPA on 16 August 2011, there were two viewings at the Development by the Plaintiff on 14 and 15 August 2011 respectively (“1st Viewing” and “2nd Viewing”). At the time of these viewings, Duplex B was furnished and was used by the developer as a show flat. As for the Private Roof, there was no physical marking on the Block 1 Roof to demarcate the area which was exclusively allocated to the Property.

15.  The PSPA was signed in a temporary sales office (“Sales Office”) on 25/F of Block 1 which was converted from one of the units in the Development. The PSPA was in a printed form prepared by Henderson Real Estate Agency Ltd (“Henderson Agency”) who acted as agent for Bright Gold.

16.  The signing of the SPA by Madam Cheng on behalf of the Plaintiff was at the WKLL Office on 19 August 2011 (“WKLL Meeting”). The draft of the SPA was provided by Bright Gold’s solicitors, Messrs Fairbairn Catley Lo & Kong (“Fairbairn”) with a roof plan annexed to it (“SPA Roof Plan”) which can be found in Annex 3 of the Statement of Claim. The SPA Roof Plan contained a square area in the middle of it ie the C Roof which was wrongly coloured pink as constituting part of the Private Roof. This error does not relate to the Plaintiff’s claim for misrepresentation against the Defendant.

17.  After the signing of the SPA by Madam Cheng on behalf of the Plaintiff, there was another viewing at the Development on 20 August 2011 (“3rd Viewing”).

18.  Completion of the sale and purchase took place on 2 December 2011.

19.  On 3 December 2011, the Plaintiff took possession of the Property when it was informed by the management staff that much, if not all, of the Yellow Area was common area.

20.  On 22 December 2021, Bright Gold commenced this Action against the Plaintiff for rectification of the SPA Roof Plan so that the C Roof would be excluded from the Property. The Plaintiff counterclaimed against inter alia the Defendant for misrepresentation.

21.  On 9 January 2019, the learned trial Judge handed down his Judgment in which he entered judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against Bright Gold and Centaline and found inter alia that Centaline had made the Representations. The Plaintiff was held to be entitled to rescind the PSPA and the SPA. Its claim against WKLL was dismissed.

22.  This re-trial was conducted pursuant to the Order of the Court of Appeal. In their reasons for Judgment dated 17 July 2020 (“CA Judgment”), the Court of Appeal held inter alia that the assessment by the learned trial Judge of the material evidence concerning the alleged misrepresentation by the Defendant and the alleged reliance thereon by the Plaintiff was tainted by misapprehension as to the significance of such evidence in the overall context of the dispute sufficient to set aside his findings on the alleged misrepresentation and reliance: Bright Gold Ltd v. Mega Well Development Ltd [2020] 4 HKLRD 26 at [44] and [45]:

“V. The Oral Misrepresentation and Reliance Issue

44. Mr Yan SC (appearing with Ms Leung for Centaline) submitted that in his assessment of the evidence pertaining to Oral Misrepresentation, the Judge erred in failing to apprehend the significance of several parts of the evidence. For present purposes, it is sufficient to concentrate on two aspects of evidence which are of great significance to the Oral Misrepresentation and Reliance Issue:

(a) The evidence on the Sales Brochure;

(b) The evidence regarding the WKLL Meeting.

45. Whilst this is an appeal against factual findings by the Judge on the Oral Misrepresentation and the reliance by Mega Well on the Oral Misrepresentation, we are persuaded by Mr Yan that the Judge’s assessment of the material evidence was tainted by misapprehension as to the significance of such evidence in the overall context of the dispute.”

The parties’ cases

Plaintiff’s case

23.  Stella Wong had acted as the estate agent for Madam Cheng in a number of prior purchases since around 2004. By reason of these prior purchases, Madam Cheng has developed rapport, trust and reliance upon Stella Wong for property dealings and Stella Wong has gained a sufficient understanding of Madam Cheng’s preference and/or requirement.

24.  At all material times, Madam Cheng’s personal preference and business needs of a spacious private outdoor area for eg BBQ parties was clearly made known to Stella Wong. With full knowledge of such preference, Stella Wong arranged a number of viewings and a meeting at WKLL Office ie the WKLL Meeting which led to the purchase of the Property.

25.  Regarding the 1st Viewing on 14 August 2011, Madam Cheng had an appointment with Stella Wong to view some properties in the New Territories. Madam Cheng was accompanied by her husband Mr Tam Kwok Wa, Ivor (“Tam”) and the company secretary Ms Miranda Cheung (“Miranda”). Stella Wong was accompanied by her colleague Ms Wendy Shum (“Wendy”). Madam Cheng did not find the properties shown to her suitable. As an impromptu response, Stella Wong suggested that Madam Cheng should view a new development and they subsequently went to view the Property.

26.  After viewing the internal area of Duplex B, Madam Cheng, Stella Wong and those accompanying them then went up to the Block 1 Roof via an internal staircase. The roof area right outside the Stairwell was decorated with a round lawn area at which a table, chairs and potted plants were placed. When viewing the roof area, Madam Cheng asked Stella Wong about the area of the roof that formed part of the Property.

27.  First, Stella Wong told Madam Cheng that the Private Roof extended from the Glass Door to the 2 Pillars at a distance away ie the Yellow Area. Stella Wong also said to Madam Cheng that (i) the Private Roof would be sufficient outdoor space for her to hold BBQ parties for her business associates’ and her family’s entertainment, and (ii) when holding BBQ parties, they could move the table, chairs and plants to the two sides of the roof and leave the middle area for BBQ. Second, there were conversations Between Stella Wong and Madam Cheng about delineating the Private Roof with large potted plants as well as emergency fire escape concerns.

28.  On this occasion, Stella Wong had never shown Madam Cheng the 2 areas shaded pink on the Block 1 Roof Plan in her iPad. Madam Cheng also denies having proceeded to the Sales Office after viewing the Property or that Stella Wong has given her a copy of the Sales Brochure.

29.  After the viewing, Madam Cheng and Tam were driven home by Stella Wong. From inside Stella Wong’s car, Madam Cheng obtained a copy of the large size marketing brochure “Hill Paramount (名家滙) A Masterpiece for the Mastermind” (“Marketing Brochure”). After Madam Cheng and Tam had gone home and studied the Marketing Brochure, they noted that the Property was not mentioned in it - rather the floor plans and description of Duplex C and Duplex A of Block 1 were shown at pages 54 and 55. Indeed, the only brochure Madam Cheng has ever obtained prior to signing the PSAP was the Marketing Brochure.

30.  Regarding the 2nd Viewing on 15 August 2011, Madam Cheng went along with Tam. They met Stella Wong and were taken to what appeared to be a living room inside the Sales Office while waiting for Madam Cheng’s brother and his family. After the arrival of Madam Cheng’s brother and his family, Stella Wong showed them 3 special units including the Property. The party, together with Henderson’s staff, later went to the Block 1 Roof.

31.  While on the Block 1 Roof, in response to enquiry from Madam Cheng’s brother, Stella Wong repeated what she had said the previous day ie the Private Roof of the Property extended from the Glass Door to the 2 Pillars. On this occasion, only Stella Wong and Wendy from the Defendant were present. Their supervisor Philip Ng (“Philip”), who was the Senior District Sales Director of the Kowloon Tong Beacon Hill branch, was not. Indeed, Philip was never present during any of the viewings.

32.  For the purpose of comparison, Madam Cheng, Stella Wong and those accompanied them proceeded to view 2 other units. First, they went down to 31/F to view Duplex C of Block 1. They then went over to Block 2 and viewed Duplex B on 32/F and 33/F which could be said to be a mirror unit of the Property but was unfurnished.

33.  Relying on Stella Wong’s Representations during the 2 viewings, Madam Cheng was satisfied with the Property and considered its Private Roof was sufficiently spacious for her purpose. On 16 August 2011, the Plaintiff and Bright Gold entered into the PSPA.

34.  On 19 August 2011, the WKLL Meeting was held in the WKLL Office for the purpose of explaining the terms of the SPA to Madam Cheng and her signing of it in advance. At this meeting, Madam Cheng was accompanied by Tam, Miranda and Stella Wong. They met Ms Lau Lai Sze (“Joey Lau”), the handling partner, in a conference room. Initially, Joey Lau requested Stella Wong to leave but she declined.

35.  During the meeting, after having referred to Schedule 3 of the SPA which set out the saleable area of various parts of the Property, Joey Lau told Madam Cheng that the part coloured pink on the SPA Roof Plan “belonged to” the Property and she should check it carefully. On the other hand, Stella Wong said to Madam Cheng that the Private Roof was so big, it was well sufficient for her use. Joey Lau then said it should not be exaggerated and only the parts coloured pink were part of the Property. At that time, Madam Cheng was confused about the SPA Roof Plan. She did not know how to interpret the floor plans shown to her. However, Stella Wong picked up the document containing the floor plans in front of Madam Cheng, took a look, said there was no error and she could sign on it.

36.  Regarding the 3rd Viewing of the Property on 20 August 2011, Madam Cheng went with Tam, Miranda, her family members as well as a friend Mr Roberto Passador (“Passador”). Only Stella Wong and Wendy of the Defendant were present.

37.  When Madam Cheng, Stella Wong and those accompanied them were viewing the Block 1 Roof, Passador asked Stella Wong to identify the Private Roof which belonged to the Property. In response, Stella Wong repeated the same representations as previously made by her on 14 and 15 August 2011. Stella Wong pointed out the 2 Pillars to Passador while making the representations. Passador also asked Stella Wong whether there would be iron gates for partitioning the Private Roof. Stella Wong replied that the Property was very new and the installation of the partition would be completed soon.

38.  It is the Plaintiff’s case that in reliance on the Representations, it entered into the PSPA and the SPA and completed the purchase.

39.  On 3 December 2011, the Plaintiff obtained the keys and took possession of the Property when it discovered that the Yellow Area was not the Private Roof of and did not “belong to” the Property.

Defendant’s Case

40.  The Defendant’s case is simple.

41.  Primarily, Stella Wong had not made the Representations as alleged and there could be no reliance by the Plaintiff - it had all along been apprised of the true and correct position ie the Yellow Area was not part of the Property. Even if Stella Wong had made the Representations during the 1st and 2nd Viewings, the Plaintiff had been apprised of the true and correct position by Joey Lau at the WKLL Meeting on 19 August 2011.

42.  Alternatively, even if the Representations had been made, the Plaintiff had imputed and/or constructive knowledge of the falsity of the Representations because at the material time, WKLL and in particular Joey Lau were authorized by the Plaintiff to receive on its behalf all relevant information relating to the Property. Hence, WKLL and Joey Lau were under a duty to read and would have read the approved building plans of the Development and the deed of mutual covenant and did read the SPA thereby acquiring knowledge that the Private Roof of the Property did not include the Yellow Area. Neither Madam Cheng nor any servant or agent of the Plaintiff had ever told the Defendant of her alleged intention to purchase the Property with the Yellow Area, and it was entitled to believe that the Plaintiff/Madam Cheng had received notice of the true and correct position so as to correct the Representations.

43.  It is fair to say that, judging from Mr Yan SC’s Closing, he does not really press upon the Defendant’s alternative case. In these circumstances, this court will only concentrate on the Defendant’s primary case.

Deliberation

The issue and the witnesses

44.  The parties are in agreement that the central question is largely a factual one ie whether the Property was purchased by the Plaintiff in reliance on the Representations by the Defendant through its agent Stella Wong.

45.  The Representations are pleaded at:

(a) para 21 of the Statement of Claim as “the Yellow Roof Area formed part and parcel of the area of the roof of Duplex B and the exclusive right to possess belonged to the owner of Duplex B” and

(b) para 22 of the Statement of Claim as “由於該單位的玻璃門(位於天台一層)起到對面的兩條方柱(包括戶外擺設)都是屬於該單位的私人天台範圍,私人天台的位置正是在該單位33樓上面的一部份。該天台範圍足夠[Madam Cheng] 在日後舉行barbecue party,與家人及朋友相聚,及款待客戶。”.

46.  That was a reference to the Representations allegedly made at the 1st Viewing.

47.  At para 24 of the Statement of Claim, in relation to the 2nd Viewing, the gist of the Representations is pleaded as “天台的位置是由單位的玻璃門起到對面的兩條柱位。”

48.  The Representations, if made, are admittedly false. Indeed, it is the Defendant’s position that if Stella Wong had made the Representations and the Plaintiff had reasonably relied upon them, then it would have been in breach of a duty owed to the Plaintiff.

49.  At the re-trial, the Plaintiff called 4 witnesses:

(a) Madam Cheng.

(b) Tam.

(c) Miranda.

(d) Passador.

50.  The Defendant called its 3 staff as witnesses:

(a) Stella Wong.

(b) Wendy.

(c) Philip.

51.  The Defendant also relied on the witness statements of 4 witnesses previously filed in this Action and called the first 3 of them:

(a) Joey Lau.

(b) Ho Mei Wai Wen (“Ho”), secretary of Joey Lau.

(c) Mr Lai Tak Cheung (“Lai”), of Henderson Agency.

(d) Ms Leung Po Chi Cherry (“Leung”), of Henderson Agency[1].

52.  There is no doubt that the 2 main protagonists are Madam Cheng and Stella Wong while the role of the other witnesses is mainly corroborative.

53.  Mr Yan SC submits that Cheng and Tam are not credible witnesses, their testimony contains many inherent inconsistencies and is illogical and/or inherently improbable. Miranda is not an independent witness - at the time of the hearing, she was still under the employ of Madam Cheng and was obviously put forward by her employer to support the Plaintiff’s version of events. This is readily apparent from the almost identical language used in her witness statement when compared to those of Madam Cheng and Tam. Passador is also not an independent witness - he was Madam Cheng’s long time good friend and business partner. His testimony about the 3rd Viewing is also different from the Plaintiff’s original pleaded case at the first trial.

54.  On the other hand, Mr Choy SC has devoted an entire Section D1. of his Closing in challenging Stella Wong as an evasive and incredible witness and inviting this court to reject her testimony as well as the corresponding parts of Wendy’s and Philip’s evidence. As for Joey Lau, Ho and Lai, he invites this court to focus on the inconsistencies between their evidence and the evidence of the Defendant’s own staff, and in case of any such inconsistency, reject their evidence. There is no attack on the truthfulness of Joey Lau, Ho and Lai as such.

55.  The central question of this re-trial is largely a factual one and the witnesses have given competing versions of what happened and what was said at the material events. This court has carefully considered the testimony of all witnesses and assessed it against inter alia the contemporaneous documentary evidence and the known and undisputed circumstances of this case. This court has in particular considered the inherent probabilities or otherwise of the witnesses’ testimony and assessed their credibility accordingly. Further, since this is a re-trial, any unexplained/unjustified departure by any party of the case it previously ran at the original trial will be carefully scrutinized.

The 1st and 2nd Viewings - 14 & 15 August 2011

56.  The undisputed or indisputable facts are as follows.

(a) Between 2004 and 2007, Madam Cheng had purchased 3 increasingly larger and more expensive properties, all in Kowloon Tong, through Stella Wong’s introduction.

(b) The property Madam Cheng purchased in 2004 was in Chermain Heights in Kowloon Tong with a private roof at the price of HK$4,018,000.

(c) The property Madam Cheng purchased in 2006 was in Mount Beacon which was a first-hand property and did not include any outdoor area. It was a 1,500 sq ft unit and priced at HK$18.84 million.

(d) The property Madam Cheng purchased in 2007 was in Kowloon Tong Garden of around 2,000 sq ft with a 1,000 sq ft garden and courtyard. Madam Cheng paid HK$30.8 million for it.

(e) It was Madam Cheng who took the initiative to contact Stella Wong in around mid-2011 when she wanted to move away from her then residence in Kowloon Tong Garden and to purchase another home.

(f) On 13 August 2011, Stella Wong took Madam Cheng, Tam and Miranda to view 2 properties in Tsim Sha Tsui and Kowloon City. On that occasion, Madam Cheng told Stella Wong that if she did manage to buy a new property with her assistance, she would engage the Defendant to help her to sell her Kowloon Tong Garden property.

(g) Madam Cheng was a regular client of Stella Wong and was known to Stella Wong to be interested and experienced in the luxurious property market. Madam Cheng was a successful businesswoman. Miranda, who has known Madam Cheng for over 20 years, describes her as an astute businesswoman who has enjoyed great success in business.

(h) Stella Wong was an experienced estate agent. She started working as an estate agent in 1997 and joined the Defendant in 2002. By 2011, Stella Wong would have had 13 to 14 years of experience in the field.

(i) The Development was a new development and, as such, information about the units for sale, including the Property, would have been and was provided by its developer in inter alia the very detailed Sales Brochure. The Henderson group was a reputable developer in Hong Kong and there is no challenge to the accuracy of the Sales Brochure and its ready availability to potential buyers.

(j) Copies of the Sales Brochure were readily, freely and easily available from the Sales Office at the Development. The Sales Office was located at a unit in Block 1 of the Development.

(k) Stella Wong was well aware that, for any new development, it was more or less common knowledge that there would be a sales office on site and that information about the units for sale, in particular, something similar to the Sales Brochure, would be easily and readily available.

57.  Regarding the 1st Viewing, the Plaintiff’s detailed case has already been summarized above. Mr Choy SC also emphasizes 2 points: (i) the visit to the Property was an impromptu response after several other viewings of properties which Madam Cheng found unsuitable; (ii) the area right outside the Stairwell was decorated with a circular artificial lawn, plants in pots and garden furniture - there was no marking to delineate the Private Roof.

58.  On the other hand, Stella Wong’s and Wendy’s testimony in their witness statements (“Stella Wong 1”, “Stella Wong 2”, “Wendy 1” and “Wendy 2” respectively) is that since the visit on 14 August 2011 was impromptu, neither of them had the Sales Brochure immediately in hand. When they went to the Block 1 Roof, Stella Wong showed Madam Cheng the Block 1 Roof Plan in her iPad in order to explain where the Private Roof was - the only parts which were sold together with the Property were the 2 areas shaded pink and marked “Roof B” and “A/C B” on it. It is obvious from the plan that the area shaded pink and marked “Roof B” (discounting the Stairwell and internal staircase) is only a narrow rectangular strip and clearly not the Yellow Area. Stella Wong told Madam Cheng that she was unsure about the width of the strip or how to access the area marked “A/C B” and she had to enquire with the developer. They then proceeded to the Sales Office where Stella Wong obtained 2 copies of the Sales Brochure, made some enquiries with the staff, gave a copy of the Sales Brochure to Madam Cheng and recounted to her what she had been told by the staff.

59.  As for the 2nd Viewing, the Plaintiff’s detailed case has also been summarized above.

60.  Regarding the Defendant, Stella Wong’s testimony is that on 15 August 2011, Philip, Wendy and her arrived at the Development together and waited for Madam Cheng at the lobby. Madam Cheng, Tam and her relatives also attended this viewing but they did not arrive at the same time. When Madam Cheng and Tam arrived, she said her brother and family would arrive later. Philip, Wendy and Stella Wong then took Madam Cheng and Tam to wait in one of the meeting rooms of the Sales Office on 25/F. In that room, copies of the Sales Brochure were placed on a round table. Since Stella Wong had already given a copy to Madam Cheng the day before, she did not pass another copy to her. Shortly afterwards, Madam Cheng’s brother and family arrived.

61.  The party went to inspect the Property and the Block 1 Roof. Madam Cheng said she considered the Private Roof area was too small and she would not be able to have BBQ there. Madam Cheng indicated she wanted to place a barbeque stove, a table and chairs in the area outside the Private Roof. Stella Wong told Madam Cheng she could not do so as the area outside the Private Roof was common area. Madam Cheng then asked Philip, Stella Wong’s superior, if she could have BBQ in the common area. Philip replied that if she did so discretely, no one would know but she needed to clean up the area afterwards so that the neighbors would not complain.

62.  Afterwards, Madam Cheng still considered the Private Roof too small. Wendy therefore suggested to inspect Duplex A on 32nd and 33rd Floor of Block 2 (“Duplex A Block 2”) and Duplex C on 31st and 32nd Floor of Block 2 (“Duplex C Block 2”). Stella Wong suggested Madam Cheng to consider buying one of them. This was because while the internal area of the 2 duplexes was smaller and without renovation, they had a larger roof area than the Property. Subsequently, Stella Wong, Wendy and Philip accompanied Madam Cheng and her party to inspect the 2 duplexes. Madam Cheng was still not satisfied with the 2 duplexes and asked Stella Wong about the price of the Property. The party then went to the Sales Office. Philip asked the staff for the price of the Property and was told it would be HK$75 million. Madam Cheng said she would consider it and left.

63.  It is not in dispute that on 15 August 2011, Stella Wong had taken Madam Cheng and Tam to a unit in the Development which was (whether or not Madam Cheng realized it at the time) in fact the Sales Office to wait for Madam Cheng’s brother and his family. While there are a number of disputes between the parties as to what happened, the more material ones are: whether Philip was present at the 2nd Viewing, whether Madam Cheng had asked him whether she could have BBQ on the roof and what was his reply, whether Madam Cheng’s brother had asked Stella Wong which part of the Block 1 Roof “belonged to” the Property and whether she had repeated the Representations in response.

64.  In his Closing, Mr Choy SC submits that Stella Wong’s evidence about the 1st Viewing is inherently implausible and contrary to the practice of an experienced estate agent. He highlights the following “absurd” features of her evidence:

(a) Stella Wong admitted that prior to the tour to the roof at the 1st Viewing, she did tell Madam Cheng that the Property would include some roof area.

(b) When viewing the Block 1 Roof, Madam Cheng asked Stella Wong about the location and size of the roof which “belonged to” the Property. At this point in time, an experienced estate agent like Stella Wong must have realised that the client was enquiring about a real private roof for actual use and enjoyment.

(c) Stella Wong’s evidence was that she already noted from the roof plan in her iPad which indicated the narrow strip outside the Stairwell. If this part of her evidence were true:

(i) As an experienced estate agent, she must have realised that the narrow strip would offer no actual use and enjoyment to a client like Madam Cheng.

(ii) A reasonable estate agent in her situation must have pointed out this truth about the narrow strip. Yet, Stella Wong did not respond by simply telling Madam Cheng that this Property had no private roof for Madam Cheng’s actual use and enjoyment (“個物業可以話無私人天台俾你用”or“個天台唔係你嘅”) or words to similar effect.

(d) Instead, according to her evidence, Stella Wong went to obtain an answer from the Sales Office staff that the width of the strip was up to the front of the artificial lawn (“該長方形部份的闊度是到草地前位置”) which was vague and without any precise measurement. It is also unbelievable for Madam Cheng to have asked this question while she was actually standing around the narrow strip and saw that with her own eyes.

(e) During cross-examination, Stella Wong was very cautious and alarmed with this line of questioning.

(f) Assuming arguendo that what Stella Wong alleged were true, she was effectively trying to convince this court that a client checking out the private roof that she was interested in would, upon having already seen the strip outside the Glass Door, still have urged the estate agent to give the size and other information of that effectively unusable area.

65.  With respect, this court does not see how the description of Stella Wong’s evidence as “absurd” is justified.

66.  Even if Madam Cheng wanted a large roof for her exclusive use and Stella Wong realized it, the reality was that the Private Roof of the Property was only a narrow strip. This court is not entirely certain what an experienced and reasonable estate agent would have done or responded in the circumstances, but showing a client the floor plan provided by the developer in her iPad was not off the mark. If a client asked the estate agent to make some enquiries, this court cannot see why the estate agent would refuse to do so. As for the description that Stella Wong was very cautious and alarmed with this line of questioning, in this court’s experience as a trial Judge, it is not unusual for a witness to be cautious, especially when she is being accused of fraud. Importantly, from its observation, this court finds Stella Wong a straightforward witness who gave her testimony calmly and her answers to questions put to her were mostly direct. While she was in the witness box, this court did not detect any signs of embellishment of her testimony. Her credibility has withstood the vigor of Mr Choy SC’s cross examination.

67.  In relation to the 2nd Viewing, Mr Choy SC’s focus of challenge was whether Philip was present and if not he could not have said to Madam Cheng she could have BBQ parties on the roof but “靜靜雞”. What Philip actually said in his first witness statement was “悄悄地進行” and in his supplement statement was “靜靜雞”. In both statements, Philip also said Madam Cheng should clean up the place properly to avoid complaints from neighbours. Whether Philip was present on this occasion will be examined later but if he was present, it does not strike this court that his response was out of line with what an estate agent more experienced than Stella Wong and eager to sell the Property without lying might have said.

68.  This court has taken on board Mr Choy SC’s submissions on the credibility of Stella Wong and the other staff of the Defendant. This court is also mindful of Mr Choy SC’s general submissions that (i) Madam Cheng was not a sophisticated or highly educated person and it was reasonable for her to rely on the Defendant specifically Stella Wong to deal with property transactions and (ii) Madam Cheng’s intention to purchase the Yellow Area. However, for the reasons set out below, this court is satisfied that the testimony of Stella Wong, corroborated by Wendy and Philip, as to what happened on the 1st and 2nd Viewings is truthful and accepts it in preference to the account of Madam Cheng, corroborated by Tam and Miranda.

69.  First, it is inherently improbable that Stella Wong would have deliberately made the Representations in order to mislead Madam Cheng into purchasing the Property.

70.  Madam Cheng has been Stella Wong’s loyal and increasingly important client since 2004. Within a relatively short period of 4 years from 2004 to 2008, Madam Cheng had bought 3 properties in the luxurious neighborhood of Kowloon Tong ie Chermain Heights in Eastbourne Road, Mount Beacon in Cornwall Street and Kowloon Tong Garden in Cambridge Road, through the introduction of Stella Wong. When Madam Cheng wanted to buy a new home in 2011, she contacted Stella Wong. Madam Cheng was a successful and astute businesswoman, with experience in the luxurious property market. Stella Wong obviously knew that from her previous dealings with Madam Cheng.

71.  Stella Wong was an experienced estate agent and had survived in the sector for 13 to 14 years, having gone through the ups and downs of the property market in Hong Kong since 1997. She was well aware that for first-hand developments, it was well known that there would be sales offices on the site staffed by the developers and that information about the properties for sale, in particular in the form of sales brochures, would have been easily and readily available to potential buyers. If so, Stella Wong would know that any glaringly inaccurate information given to Madam Cheng about the Property would soon be found out to be untrue, whether from the staff at the Sales Office or from the Sale Brochure. And if she were found out, Stella Wong would lose not just the commission in relation to the Property, she would also lose her potential engagement to sell Madam Cheng's Kowloon Tong Garden property as well as her long-standing relationship with Madam Cheng.

72.  Second, according to Madam Cheng, Stella Wong’s motive in making the Representations was for the purpose of earning commission on the Property. This is also inherently improbable.

73.  At the material time, there were other properties in the Development which would meet Madam Cheng's preference for a large outdoor space. For instance, Duplex A Block 2 where the gross floor area of 4,300 sq ft is slightly less than that of the Property but it had a larger private roof of 338 sq ft compared with the narrow strip. Stella Wong explained in re-examination that she would have earned more or less the same amount of commission ie around HK$400,000 had Madam Cheng purchased it. Similarly, Duplex C Block 2 which had a smaller gross floor area but a large private flat roof area of over 1,000 sq ft was also available at the time. On Stella Wong’s undisputed testimony, if Madam Cheng had bought Duplex C Block 2, her commission would have been around HK$350,000 to HK$360,000. In other words, there was little incentive for Stella Wong to lie about the area of the Private Roof when she could have earned comparable commission by persuading Madam Cheng to buy other units in the Development.

74.  Third, it is accepted by Madam Cheng that on 15 August 2011, before going up to the Block 1 Roof, Stella Wong had taken her and Tam to a unit in the Development where she saw a model of the building in the living room and some table(s) and chair(s) as well as a photocopy machine in one of the rooms. There is no dispute that the unit was the Sales Office albeit she claims she did not know on that day.

75.  It seems to this court highly improbable that if Stella Wong had made the Representations at the 1st Viewing, she would have taken Madam Cheng to the Sales Office at the 2nd Viewing. As a matter of common sense, Stella Wong would have done her best to keep Madam Cheng away from it where she could and would have obtained accurate information about the Private Roof of the Property. This is really self-evident. Stella Wong knew there would be staff at the Sales Office who were there to answer questions from potential buyers. Stella Wong also knew copies of the Sales Brochure were readily and freely available there. So why would Stella Wong take Madam Cheng to the Sales Office and run the risk of Madam Cheng finding out about the Representations she made the day before were all lies?

76.  Further, Madam Cheng’s claim that she did not know the unit she was taken to was a Sales Office is also less than credible. For why else would there be a model of the building and a photocopy machine in the unit? If she was actually taken to the Sales Office, she would in all probability have seen copies of the Sales Brochure lying around. According to Lai, there were plenty of Sales Brochures as well as large and small Marketing Brochures at the Sales Office for interested buyers to take away for free. Yet in her witness statement, Madam Cheng said she did not pay attention to them.

77.  On the other hand, this court has considerable misgivings about Madam Cheng’s testimony, and in turn Tam’s and Miranda’s corroborative testimony.

78.  First, Madam Cheng’s oral testimony is that she had never asked Stella Wong about the size of the Yellow Area and Stella Wong had never told her about it. Madam Cheng’s explanation in Re-examination for this omission is that she had been onto the Block 1 Roof with Stella Wong who had pointed out to her the 2 Pillars from outside the Glass Door.

79.  In this court’s view, while Madam Cheng had been onto the Block 1 Roof with Stella Wong, that would only give her a rough idea of the size of the Private Roof but in itself would not inform her the actual area of the Yellow Area in terms of sq ft. If being able to hold private BBQ parties at an exclusive area on the Block 1 Roof was so important to Madam Cheng and if Stella Wong had indeed made the Representations, the size of the Yellow Area would be hugely relevant, not just in relation to the preference of Madam Cheng but also in relation to the price that she would consider acceptable. It is common sense and in any event accepted by Madam Cheng in court that the size of the Private Roof, as part of the Property, would affect the unit price of the Property and hence how much she would be willing to pay for it.

80.  Mr Yan SC submits that if Stella Wong had indeed made the Representations, it would not only have been logical, but indeed necessary, for Madam Cheng to have asked her about the actual size of the Yellow Area in terms of sq ft. The Plaintiff’s own pleaded case is that the difference in value between the Property with the Yellow Area and the Property without it is HK$3,050,000. This may not be a huge sum in light of the purchase price of the Property but, to an astute businesswoman like Madam Cheng, it is not a negligible sum either. Yet, Madam Cheng said she had not done so. It seems to this court that Madam Cheng’s omission is a cogent piece of evidence that Stella Wong had indeed given her details of the Property, including the Private Roof, both from the floor plans in her iPad and from the copy of the Sales Brochure given to Madam Cheng at the 1st Viewing. In other words, the reason for her omission to ask was because Madam Cheng already had the information she needed. This court agrees.

81.  Second, Madam Cheng is adamant that Stella Wong had never shown her the floor plans downloaded onto her iPad at the 1st Viewing. However, she also admitted in cross-examination at the first trial that during the 1st Viewing, Stella Wong had told her the gross floor area of the Property but that she could not remember whether it was 4,571 sq ft or 4,517 sq ft. During cross-examination at this trial, Madam Cheng confirmed that this was what had happened. According to the plans in Stella Wong’s iPad and the Sales Brochure, the correct figure is 4,571 sq ft. This is not a figure that one could normally remember by heart. As submitted by Mr Yan SC, since the 1st Viewing was impromptu, Stella Wong would not have prepared for it. Hence, the only probable reason that she was able to tell Madam Cheng the gross floor area of the Property in terms of square footage is that Stella Wong had her iPad with her and had looked at the plans downloaded for reference. If Stella Wong had her iPad with her and had referred to it, there is no reason why she did not show the plans to Madam Cheng. This has consistently been the Defendant’s case since the filing of its Defence to the Plaintiff’s Counterclaim back in June 2012.

82.  Third, it is the Plaintiff’s case that after the 1st Viewing, Madam Cheng and Tam obtained a copy of the Marketing Brochure inside Stella Wong’s car. When they were at home and looked at the Marketing Brochure, they noted that the Property was not mentioned in it - rather the floor plans and descriptions of Duplex A and Duplex C of Block 1 could be found at pages 54 and 55. Madam Cheng also said to Tam she really liked the Property and wanted to purchase it. In fact, Madam Cheng liked it so much that she suggested that her brother and his family should also live in it with her.

83.  Curiously, during cross-examination, Madam Cheng said she was not interested in finding out the relevant information about the Property equivalent to the information about Duplex A and Duplex C of Block 1 as contained in the Marketing Brochure. When Tam was asked about this during his cross-examination, he also said it had not occurred to him that they should look for the equivalent plans of the Property.

84.  When inquired by this court after her re-examination about her previous experience generally of viewing or buying first-hand properties eg the one she bought in Mount Beacon, Madam Cheng reiterated that she did not know there would be sales brochures, did not take notice of them or ask for copies. she even said she did not have a practice of finding out the details of the properties that she had viewed. She said she was very busy - whenever she wanted to buy a property, usually she would just go there and view it physically. It seems to this court quite amazing that it did not occur to either Madam Cheng or Tam that they should find out more about the Property before getting serious about buying it. Here, we are talking about a HK$70m duplex of over 4,000 sq ft, the most expensive residence Madam Cheng had bought up to that point, not a shoe box flat for a few million dollars.

85.  According to Lai, in his experience in promoting properties to potential buyers, if they were interested in a unit of the Development after inspection, they would obtain the Sales Brochures and/or Marketing Brochures at the Sales Office. According to him, the Plaintiff’s case that Madam Cheng had not obtained the Sales Brochure from the Sales Office or through the Defendant’s agents before signing the PSPA defies common sense. This court agrees.

86.  In the CA Judgment at [50], Lam VP (as he then was) observed that given the Plaintiff’s case on the importance placed by Madam Cheng on the Private Roof, it was likely that she and her family members would have checked the information contained in the Sales Brochure about the roof attached to the Property and questioned Stella Wong if she had indeed made the Representations. That is a cogent observation which this court would respectfully adopt.

87.  Fourth, Madam Cheng’s testimony about what happened at the 2nd Viewing is also problematic.

88.  To start with, during cross-examination, Madam Cheng was adamant Philip was not present at the 2nd Viewing.

89.  On the other hand, Philip’s testimony is that not only was he present right from the beginning, he is able to give details of inter alia his conversation with Madam Cheng while on the Block 1 Roof about her desire to hold BBQ parties and the subsequent enquiry about the price of the Property at the Sales Office. This was mentioned as early as Philip’s 1st witness statement dated 15 January 2016 (“Philip 1”) but was not contradicted by Madam Cheng in her supplemental witness statement dated 25 November 2021 (“Cheng 2”) where she specifically dealt with the 2nd Viewing.

90.  It is not in dispute that Philip was Stella Wong’s supervisor and that, prior to the present transaction, Madam Cheng had previously met Philip twice - when she told Stella Wong she wanted to buy a certain property, Philip would show up to negotiate the price for her with the vendor. It is also Madam Cheng’s testimony that on 16 August 2011, it was Philip who negotiated the price for her at the Sales Office. This is consistent with Philip’s and Stella Wong’s testimony that in the case of first hand properties, the usual practice of most developers was to engage in price negotiation only with estate agents who were district managers ie Philip’s grade or higher. Their testimony in this regard is corroborated by Lai in cross-examination who told this court he would only deal with fairly senior staff of estate agencies and not just any licenced agent.

91.  In Mr Choy SC’s brief cross-examination of Philip, he was fairly restrained and concentrated on what happened on 16 August 2011 rather than 15 August 2011. In Mr Choy SC’s Closing, his challenge to Philip’s testimony is that it does not make commercial sense for Philip, being a senior in the Defendant, to attend just another normal property viewing with Madam Cheng on 15 August 2011 when it would have been far more sensible and likely that he would leave the ground work to Stella Wong.

92.  Mr Yan SC, on the other hand, submits that it is inherently probable that Stella Wong would have asked Philip to attend the 2nd Viewing. The reason is that, in case Madam Cheng decided to purchase the Property immediately after the viewing, Philip could promptly start negotiating the price with the developer in the hope that a deal could be closed there and then. For a deal this big, and with a buyer so keen as to have a 2nd Viewing just a day after the 1st Viewing, this court can see why Stella Wong was anxious to close the deal sooner rather than later and for that purpose to ask Philip to go along. If Stella Wong did ask Philip to go along, it is difficult to see why Philip would decline if he was available.

93.  Further, given Madam Cheng’s failure to contradict Philip’s detailed evidence at to what happened on 15 August 2011 in Cheng 2, but only made a bare denial in cross-examination, this court is prepared to accept his evidence and find as a fact that Philip did attend the 2nd Viewing on 15 August 2011 and what he testifies as to what happened on that day.

94.  Next, Madam Cheng’s testimony is very different from the Plaintiff’s case as pleaded in the Plaintiff’s original Defence and Counterclaim dated 17 April 2012. Back in 2012, the Plaintiff’s case was that Madam Cheng’s brother asked which part of the roof belonged exclusively to Duplex B and “Madam Cheng, in the presence of everyone present, showed her brother the Roof Top Area Represented by Stella”. What was then pleaded was that Madam Cheng and her brother discussed her barbecue party plan in the presence of everyone and neither Stella Wong nor the others who were present corrected Madam Cheng. This glaring discrepancy was never explained.

95.  The above reasons are sufficient for this court to come to the conclusion that the testimony of Stella Wong, Wendy and Philip is truthful and should be accepted while that of Madam Cheng, Tam and Miranda should be rejected. But there is more. In the discussion of the subsequent events below, this court shall explain why various aspects of the Plaintiff’s case are also unsatisfactory which of course adversely impacts on the Plaintiff’s case overall.

96.  Taking a holistic approach to the evidence as a whole, this court finds as a fact that Stella Wong had not made the Representations at the 1st or 2nd Viewings as alleged. There is therefore no question of the Plaintiff relying on them in purchasing the Property. Given this court’s finding that Stella Wong had not made the Representations at the 1st or 2nd Viewings which were prior to the signing of the PSPA, it is wholly improbable that she would have made them subsequently.

97.  That is sufficient to dispose of this re-trial.

98.  For completeness, this court will deal briefly with some of the subsequent events.

Signing of the PSPA on 16 August 2011 and the 3rd Viewing on 20 August 2011

99.  While the parties differ on what happened on 16 August 2011 when the PSPA was signed at the Sales Office, there is no suggestion by Madam Cheng in Cheng 1 or Cheng 2 that the Representations were made on that day. It is also fair to say neither Mr Yan SC nor Mr Choy SC, advisedly in this court’s view, places any emphasis in their Closing on the event of 16 August 2011.

100.  As for the 3rd Viewing on 20 August 2011, the Plaintiff’s pleaded case is that Stella Wong negligently and/or recklessly reiterated the Representations to Madam Cheng’s mother, 2 sisters, a number of relatives and Passador. Save for Passador, none of the representees viz Madam Cheng’s mother, 2 sisters and relatives came forward to testify in support of the Plaintiff.

101.  It is true that Passador’s evidence at this re-trial, contradicted by Stella Wong’s, is that he had asked her about the location and size of the Private Roof and she had repeated the Representations. However, as Mr Yan SC points out, that was not how the Plaintiff had pleaded its case back in 2012 at para 8 of its original Defence and Counterclaim as follows:

“(v) A relative of Madam Cheng asked which part of the Roof Floor belonged exclusively to Duplex Flat 32/33B. In the presence of everyone present, Madam Cheng pointed out the Roof Top Area Represented by Stella.

(vi) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Passador asked Madam Cheng in English which part of the Roof Floor belonged exclusively to Duplex Flat 32/33B. In the presence of everyone present, Madam Cheng explained in English and pointed out the Roof Top Area Represented by Stella.

(vii) Neither Stella, nor the Other Staff of Centaline, nor the staffs of Henderson present corrected Madam Cheng by reference to the Sales Brochure, the DMC or the Approved Plans or information contained therein.” (emphasis added)

102.  This court has disbelieved Madam Cheng and found Stella Wong had not made the Representations at the 1st or 2nd Viewings. If so, there was clearly no reason why Stella Wong would suddenly see fit to make the Representations at the 3rd Viewing after the PSPA had already been signed. In addition, Passador testified that Stella Wong could only speak basic English and, for that reason as well as owing to the passage of time, his testimony as to the words used during the conversation he said he had with Stella Wong must be viewed with considerable caution. For these reasons, this court is not prepared to accept Passador’s evidence hence the Plaintiff’s case that the Representations had been repeated by Stella Wong at the 3rd Viewing.

WKLL meeting on 19 August 2011

103.  This is the next material event. What happened on this occasion not only assists this court in deciding whether the Representations had or had not been made previously, it is important also in relation to the issue of reliance ie whether the Plaintiff had relied upon the Representations in executing the SPA.

104.  The Plaintiff’s pleaded case is, on 19 August 2011, Stella Wong negligently and/or recklessly reiterated the Representations to Madam Cheng and in reliance on the Representations, she executed the SPA on its behalf.

105.  The first point to note is the Plaintiff’s pleaded case is not exactly supported by Madam Cheng’s own testimony. The relevant part of Cheng 1 is as follows:

“August 19, 2011 - The signing of the formal sale and purchase agreement

31. On August 19, 2011, Stella took Ivor, Miranda and me to the office of Woo Kwan Lee & Lo. It was Ms. Joey Lau who received us. Ms. Lau required Stella to leave at the beginning, but Stella ignored her. Ms. Lau then explained the agreement for us. But I wasn't sure whether she had gone through all clauses in it. She said that she was never on the site. When she said, ‘The pink areas highlighted is the flat roof that belongs to your unit. You need to look at this carefully’, I took a look at the floor plan.

32. The "schedule B" I present now is the copy of the floor plan attached to the agreement shown by Ms. Lau.

33. The flat roof was the pink area in the middle of schedule B as I saw it, which was the pink area of the bottom half of the roof plan. The area was square, and a "B" was on it. When I was looking at the floor plan, Stella said, ‘The flat roof is large enough for you’. Ms. Lau then said, ‘Don't exaggerate. Not all the areas are yours. Only the areas highlighted in pink belongs to your unit.’

34. I didn't notice that schedule B was made up by two plans, which were the upper half of the roof plan and the bottom half of the part plan of upper roof. Two areas were highlighted in pink on the roof plan, and one area was highlighted in pink on the part plan of upper roof. Yet Ms. Lau never explained these two plans or these three areas in pink to me. I only browsed the plans when she mentioned the flat roof.

35. It was after the plaintiff sued Mega Well that I knew that the pink areas on the upper half of the roof plan included the stairs to the flat roof in the unit on 33/F, the space where the stairs end, and the flat roof.

36. Stella mentioned that part of the flat roof was used to place air conditioning units and other things. During my two visits to the unit, Stella never talked about the location of that flat roof, let alone mentioning that I needed to go there by cat ladder. Although she never explained the issue to me, I had no problems with that since it was used to place air conditioning units.

37. I was a bit confused at that time. Stella (sitting diagonally opposite to me) took over the agreement in front of me suddenly and said after taking a look at it, ‘There were no mistakes. Just sign it’. The time it took for us to discuss the plans and the flat roof was about two to three minutes.” (emphasis added)

106.  In Mr Choy SC’s Closing at para 98, he submits the gist of Madam Cheng’s testimony is that when it came to the part of the plans annexed to the SPA ie the SPA Roof Plan, Madam Cheng was in doubt or confused when they were shown to her by Joey Lau. At this point, Stella Wong said the roof was big enough for her use. Upon hearing this from Stella Wong, Joey Lau told her not to exaggerate and reminded Madam Cheng that only those parts as coloured pink would “belong to” the Property. Later on, Stella Wong took away the SPA from Madam Cheng, looked at it and then told her that it was all right and asked her to sign.

107.  It can be seen from the above that what Stella Wong had allegedly said is not quite the same as the Representations that the Private Roof of the Property extended from the Glass Door to the 2 Pillars. The Block 1 Roof was of course big enough for Madam Cheng’s use and the representation that the roof was large enough for Madam Cheng’s use could mean in practice she would have the use of the Block 1 Roof even though most parts of it did not “belong to” the Property.

108.  The second point to note is that Joey Lau has filed a witness statement independently on behalf of WKLL back in 2016. Neither Mr Choy SC nor Mr Yan SC challenges the independence or the truthfulness of Joey Lau’s testimony. As the Court of Appeal found, Joey Lau’s testimony was corroborative of various aspects of Stella Wong’s evidence and contradicted parts of Madam Cheng’s: paras 69 to 72 of the CA Judgment.

109.  Stella Wong’s account of what happened on that occasion is materially different from Madam Cheng’s. The relevant part of Stella Wong 1 is as follows:

“19 August 2011 – Signing of formal agreement of sale and purchase

...

26. After arriving at WKLL Law Firm, a female staff of the firm arranged us to a meeting room. In the meeting room, the female staff, Madam Cheng, her husband, and her secretary sat on one side of the conference table while I sat on the other side. The female staff explained the contents of the formal agreement of sale and purchase to Madam Cheng, her husband, and her secretary. She also showed and explained the contents of the floor plans.

27. When the female staff explained the floor plan to Madam Cheng and her husband, Madam Cheng once discussed the floor plans with her husband. Madam Cheng then pointed at the air conditioning room area of the floor plans and asked me how to access there. I replied that she could access there by using the cat ladder. Madam Cheng then said that the rooftop was too small. I told Madam Cheng that there was a lot of space on the rooftop for her usage. The female staff immediately told Madam Cheng that she was only buying the pinkish area as shown on the floor plan. The other area did not belong to her. I then told Madam Cheng that although only the pinkish area of the rooftop belonged to the Property, no one would normally go up to the rooftop, therefore, she could in fact use the other area as well. The female staff repeated that Madam Cheng was only purchasing the pinkish area of the floor plan. The other parts did not belong to her.

28. I want to supplement here that, when I said at the law firm that no one would normally go up to the rooftop, it was because apart from the occupants of Property, Duplex Flat 32/33A, Block 1 and Duplex Flat 32/33B, Block 2 could use the internal staircase within the units to access the roof area, Block 1 and Block 2 also respectively have fire-escape stairs reaching up to the rooftop. However, when the fire-proof door of the fire-escape stairs was pushed open, the fire alarm connected to the fire-proof door would go off, therefore, basically no one would use the fire escape stairs to go up to the roof top.” (emphasis added)

110.  This court has carefully considered Joey Lau’s testimony and is satisfied that it is corroborative of material parts of Stella Wong’s evidence, in contradiction to Madam Cheng’s.

111.  First, Madam Cheng says Joey Lau had required Stella Wong to leave right at the beginning but Stella Wong ignored her. This was put to Joey Lau in cross-examination on Day 5 but she categorically denied. Indeed, at an earlier part of her cross-examination in the morning of Day 5, Joey Lau said, for first hand properties, she often saw estate agents accompanying their clients to her office when the sale and purchase agreements were explained to them. She also said she was not surprised that Stella Wong had accompanied Madam Cheng et al to WKLL.

112.  Next and more importantly, at paragraph 32 of Joey Lau’s witness statement (“Lau 1”), she said:

“32. When I heard Stella Wong mentioning that there was a roof of several thousand square feet available for use by Madam Cheng, I interrupted their discussion. I explained to Madam Cheng that she would only have exclusive use and possession of those parts of the roof which are coloured pink on the Roof Plan and Part Plan of Upper Roof; …When I later heard Stella Wong telling Madam Cheng that she could “practically” use other parts of the roof because nobody would go up to the roof, I repeated to Madam Cheng that she was only buying the interest in those parts of the roof that are coloured pink and she would not have exclusive use of any other parts which are not so coloured.” (emphasis added)

113.  In re-examination, Joey Lau confirmed that when Stella Wong mentioned several thousand sq ft of the roof, she understood Stella Wong to mean Madam Cheng could use that area on the roof, not that Madam Cheng had bought it. This is crucially consistent with Stella Wong’s testimony.

114.  In light of the aforesaid, and for all the reasons already explained before as to why this court does not accept the testimony of the Plaintiff’s witnesses, this court finds that Stella Wong had not repeated the Representations to Madam Cheng on 19 August 2011.

115.  The third point to note is that whatever Madam Cheng herself might or might not at first have properly understood what Stella Wong was saying at the WKLL Meeting, Joey Lau has definitely reminded her that only those parts as coloured pink were parts of the Property. Save for 1 part, Joey Lau’s statement is entirely correct. It can be seen that the pink areas in the roof plan annexed to the SPA and reproduced in Cheng 1 clearly did not include the Yellow Area - rather, it depicted inter alia only a narrow strip just outside the Stairwell.

116.  As explained earlier, what the SPA Roof Plan got it wrong is that a square in the middle of it wrongly shaded pink and marked “B” was actually part of Duplex C of Block 1 and not the Property. This is immaterial for the present purpose since there is no suggestion that Stella Wong had made any misrepresentation to that effect and indeed, that square part had nothing to do with the Yellow Area. In this regard, Mr Choy SC, very fairly and properly, indicated to this court on Day 1 that the Plaintiff is not relying on that erroneous part of the SPA Roof Plan for its claim against the Defendant.

Timely complaint or not

117.  The last aspect of this case that this court shall touch upon is the timing of Madam Cheng’s complaint about the Representations. In Mr Choy SC’s Closing at section E7., he refers this court to inter alia Madam Cheng’s evidence as to what happened on 3 December 2011 upon taking possession of the Property in support of the Plaintiff’s case that it has made a timely complaint. The relevant part of her evidence can be found in Cheng 1 as follows:

“December 3, 2011 - Took possession of the property

50. Ivor, Stella, and I went to Hill Paramount to take possession of the property the next morning. When we got to the Management Office of Hill Paramount, two staff members of HLD and two to three staff members of the Management Office accompanied us to the unit and explained how electrical appliances, water, electricity, gas worked, how to operate the keypad door lock of the gate and other things. Then we went to the flat roof together. I told the employees of the Management Office that I planned to build a glass ceiling on the private flat roof, so that my guests didn't need to go indoors for shelter in barbecue parties when it was raining. Then I said that I planned to install a closed-circuit television monitoring system on the flat roof in case someone got into my home through the glass door of the flat roof. The employers of HLD and the Management Office said, ‘The flat roof is not yours’. We had been arguing over this for one to two hours. Stella didn't say anything when we were arguing. She only said to me in a low voice afterwards, ‘You can barbecue secretly. Don't let others know’. I was so angry that I yelled at her, ‘What are you talking about? My unit includes the flat roof’. We questioned Stella that why did something go wrong with the flat roof. And she didn't reply.

51. Ms. Cherry Leung, an employee of HLD, told us that the flat roof didn't belong to the Property and that we could read the Sales Brochure. I indicated that no one had ever offered us the sales brochure. The employees of HLD and the Management Office emphasized, ‘If there is a barbecue, we would drive the people away each time we see it’.

…

53. We asked Cherry to check that whether the flat roof belongs to the Property. I emphasized to the employees of HLD repeatedly that I only bought the Property because I could host barbecue parities [sic] on the flat roof and that if the flat roof was not part of the Property, I would never buy it. I demanded to cancel the deal and took back HKD69.8 million.”

118.  Madam Cheng’s account as to what happened on that day is contradicted by the testimony of Stella Wong as well as the hearsay statement of Leung. Their evidence is that Madam Cheng only enquired about the use of the Block 1 Roof outside the Glass Door for BBQ to which the staff of the management office said no and Leung also showed her the relevant part of the Sales Brochure about the Private Roof. In this court’s view, the gist of their evidence is clear - Madam Cheng was talking about use rather than ownership of the roof area.

119.  Mr Yan SC also refers this court to Tam’s email to Stella Wong dated 7 December 2011. What is instructive is the content of the complaint raised in it. The email reads:

“We are very disappointed with the service provide on buying Hill Paramount Duplex as we were misled with the followings:

1)The usage of the roof area is exclusive to residents of top floor duplex, other residents may only use when there is emergency.

2)Furniture is allowed to put on the roof if they do not cause any obstruction.

3)BBQ is allowed on the roof and is exclusive to residents of the top floor duplex.

The above conditions are the reasons that we bought block 1, 32 B top floor duplex of Hill Paramount. However, when we collect the keys on 3rd of December, the management company mentioned the conditions are not true...”

120.  It seems to this court the email is supportive of the Defendant’s case all along that Stella Wong had only mentioned about the use of the Block 1 Roof, rather than ownership. Indeed, condition 2 in the email that furniture “is allowed to put on the roof if they do not cause any obstruction” strongly suggests that Tam knew he was talking about common area rather than an exclusive Private Roof for the owner of the Property. In response, Mr Choy SC submits that “the contents or wordings of ‘use’ or the usage concept are actually inter-related to the right to possession and ownership to laymen.”

121.  With respect, this court cannot agree. Any lay property owner knows he can use the common area of a property development but no one in his right mind would think he owns any part of it. This transaction is not the first property transaction entered into by Madam Cheng. It is unbelievable that she could not tell the difference between use and ownership. If she could, so could Tam when he wrote the email. Further, the email was meant to be a complaint against Stella Wong about the inaccuracy of the Representations made by her. Yet, nowhere in this email can one see any reference to the Representations that the Private Roof of the Property extended from the Glass Door to the 2 Pillars.

122.  Looking at the evidence as a whole, this court is not prepared to accept Madam Cheng’s testimony that she had complained about the lack of ownership of the Yellow Area on 3 December 2011. More probable than not, this court finds that the gist of her dissatisfaction was about what the management staff told her on that day ie she could not use the Block 1 Roof for BBQ parties.

123.  Be that as it may, whether or not Madam Cheng had made a complaint about ownership of the roof area on 3 December 2021 cannot outweigh the numerous factors outlined earlier in this Judgment which lead to this court’s finding of fact that the Defendant, whether through Stella Wong or others, had not made the alleged Representations to Madam Cheng and that there was no reliance by the Plaintiff on the alleged Representations in purchasing the Property.

Disposition and costs order nisi

124.  The Plaintiff’s claim is hereby dismissed.

125.  There shall be an Order nisi that costs of the retrial of this Action, including all costs reserved, if any, be to the Defendant, to be taxed if not agreed and paid by the Plaintiff forthwith, Certificate for 2 counsel.

126.  Lastly, this court wishes to thank the legal team on both sides for their detailed and helpful assistance.

 (Peter Ng)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Edwin Choy SC, Mr Tommy Cheung and Ms Michelle Chan, instructed by Li, Kwok & Law, for the Plaintiff (by Counterclaim)

Mr John M Y Yan SC and Ms Shannon Leung, instructed by Cheung & Choy, for the Defendant (by Counterclaim)



[1]   Hearsay notice served.

[2019] HKCFI 2175-EN-2019-09-02

BRIGHT GOLD LTD v. MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LTD

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HCA 2194/2011

[2019] HKCFI 2175

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2194 OF 2011

________________________

BETWEEN  
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant

(by Original Action)

BETWEEN  
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 CENTALINE PROPERTY AGENCY LIMITED1st Defendant
 WOO KWAN LEE & LO2nd Defendant
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITED3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

_______________________

Before:Hon Anthony Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:02 September 2019
Date of Decision:02 September 2019

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

1.  These are my succinct reasons for dismissing this application by Bright Gold for a stay of execution pending its cross-appeal against the Judgment of this court dated 9 January 2019.

2.  The applicable principles are not in dispute: see Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84. 

3.  Erring in favour of Bright Gold, I am prepared to proceed on the basis that its cross-appeal is arguable.  However, such an appeal would not justify a stay on its own.  It is necessary for Bright Gold to provide additional reason to support its application.  Bright Gold says that its cross-appeal would be rendered nugatory without the stay.

4.  Before dealing with the nugatory argument, I should say that I am not attracted by Mega Well’s contention that the cross-appeal is bound to fail because it seeks to overturn a consent order.  I am inclined to agree with the analysis of Mr Ho SC, appearing with Mr Lee for Bright Gold, that the consent order in question merely sought to vary the mechanism for the rescission ordered by the court in the Judgment, by which the sale of Duplex B by Bright Gold to Mega Well is to be reversed.  Further, in the negotiation over the variation, Bright Gold had made clear that it was without prejudice to its right to appeal.

5.  However, Mega Well did in good faith adhere to the terms of the consent order.  In accordance therewith, it had, inter alia, redeemed the mortgage against Duplex B and vacated therefrom in preparation for the rescission.  In my view, this must be a matter which should weigh in the exercise of the court’s discretion in this application.  Fundamentally, Mega Well is the winner pursuant to the Judgment.  It has so far been deprived of the fruit of the litigation. 

6.  Turning to the nugatory argument, I see little substance in it apart from the technical point that the rescission will have to be reversed if the cross-appeal succeeds.  In principle, such a reversal is no different to the case where the winner has to repay the judgment sum when the judgment is overturned on appeal.  The fact of the matter is that there is no reason to believe that there will be any impediment to such a reversal. 

7.  Mega Well has demonstrated by its ability to redeem the mortgage that it is a company with financial backing.  I see no reason to doubt that Cheng would very much like to purchase a new home for herself and her family, which was her reason for the purchase of Duplex B on the first place.  The purchase price to be refunded by Bright Gold will be injected into the new home.  The delay in compliance with the Judgment in these circumstances has resulted in real prejudice to Mega Well. 

8.  Equally, there is no reason to doubt that in the event of a reversal of the rescission, Mega Well will be able to repay the purchase price to Bright Gold.  On the evidence, the money will be invested in a new property.

9.  Further, the evidence is that the existing value of Duplex B far exceeds the purchase price paid by Mega Well.  It is therefore very difficult to see why there will be any real impediment to a reversal of rescission.  I accept the submission of Mega Well that upon rescission Bright Gold will be in a secured position concerning the recovery of the purchase price.  In the worse case scenario, it will be able to sell the property to recover the same.

10.  For these reasons, I dismiss the stay application.  I shall hear the parties on costs.

(Anthony Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr Ambrose Ho SC and Mr Lee Tung Ming, instructed by Lo & Lo, for the Plaintiff (by Original Action) and the 3rd Defendant (by Counterclaim)

Mr Anson Wong SC and Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Au, Thong & Tsang, for the Defendant (by Original Action) and the Plaintiff (by Counterclaim)

[2019] HKCFI 1907-EN-2019-07-29

BRIGHT GOLD LTD v. MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LTD

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HCA 2194/2011

[2019] HKCFI 1907

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2194 OF 2011

________________________

BETWEEN
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant

(by Original Action)


BETWEEN
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and  
 CENTALINE PROPERTY AGENCY LIMITED1st Defendant
 WOO KWAN LEE & LO2nd Defendant
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITED3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

_______________________

Before:Hon Anthony Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:29 July 2019
Date of Decision:29 July 2019

_______________________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

_______________________________________

1.  This is WKLL’s application to vary the costs order nisi made in the judgement of this court dated 9 January 2019 (“Judgment”). WKLL say that they are entitled to have their costs on an indemnity basis based on 2 Calderbank offers (“Offers”) dated respectively 4 August 2016 and 14 October 2016.

2.  The issues are relatively straightforward. Firstly, it has to be determined if the Exclusionary Rule under O 62, r 5(1)(d) applies such that the Offers are not to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion on costs by the court.  That turns upon whether the Offers could have been made by way of sanctioned offers pursuant to O 22.  Secondly, if the Exclusionary Rule does not apply, whether in the exercise of discretion it is appropriate for the court to award indemnity costs. 

First issue

3.  Pursuant to the 1st Offer, Mega Well was invited to have its claim against WKLL dismissed with payment of 50% of the latter’s costs.  The letter which contained the Offer set out an analysis of the merits of Mega Well’s case.

4.  Under the 2nd Offer, WKLL suggested that Mega Well’s claim be dismissed with no order as to costs. 

5.  Pursuant to the Judgment, Mega Well’s claim was dismissed with a costs order nisi that WKLL’s costs be paid by Mega Well with a certificate for 2 counsel.  It should be said that the merits analysis set out under the 1st Offer was largely vindicated by the Judgment.

6.  I am of the view that neither of the Offers could have been made by way of a sanctioned offer under O 22 because each one of them contained a costs provision: see Wong Yim Man v Wong Ho Ming [2016] 3 HKLRD 249, §18; and Mitchell v James [2004] 1 WLR 158, §§33-34.

7.  Mr Kok, who appeared for Mega Well relied on Central Management Ltd v Light Field Investments Ltd, CA, [2011] 2 HKLRD 34, §32, Chen Tak Yee v Chan Moon Shing, unrep, HCA 954/2010 (11 June 2015) which followed Central Management and Union Glory Finance Inc v Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd, unrep, HCA 2494/2013 (13 December 2016) to support the proposition that an offer which contained a costs provision could fell within the O 22 regime. 

8.  The first 2 authorities were dealt with in Wong Yim Man.  In particular, I agree with Deputy High Court Judge Yee that there was no ratio in Central Management which might bind this court (see §29).  As identified by the learned Deputy Judge, there was at least an obiter dicta from the CA in Leung Lai Kwan v Lo Kai Ming, unrep, HCMP 1554/2015 (20 August 2015), §7, to the effect that an offer with a costs provision did not fall within O 22. 

9.  As regards Union Glory, I agree with Mr Ho, who appeared for WKLL, that the authority does not assist because the offeror did not argue that they could not have made a sanctioned payment or offer. 

10.  Finally, Mr Kok, drawing supporting from Etratech Asia-Pacific Ltd v Leader Printed Circiut Boards Ltd [2013] 4 HKC 282, argued that WKLL could have made an offer with a clear indication that they would apply to the court to make a different costs order under the power reserved to the court pursuant to O 22, r 20(1) (“unless the Court otherwise orders”). 

11.  With respect, I agree with Mr Ho that such an offer would be rather different to those made by WKLL.  It is common ground that there is a high threshold for invoking the power in question.  In other words, there would be no assurance that WKLL would not be ended up paying Mega Well’s costs, contrary to their intention.  As submitted by Mr Ho, such an offer would be a different creature to the ones envisaged under the O 22 regime.  I am unable to see why it would be justified for the court to construe the rules in a creative manner so as to fit with Mega Well’s case. 

Second issue

12.  It follows that this court’s discretionary power to award indemnity costs can be triggered.  Such a costs order should not be regarded as a penalty but a means of achieving a fairer result for the payee: see Grant Williams v Jeffries Hong Kong Ltd, HCA 320/2011, unrep, 12 July 2013, §5 citing Petrograde Inc v Texaco Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 947, §§63-64; and TPB v Society for Protection of Harbour Ltd (No 2) (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114, §§16-17.

13.  It is reasonably well-established that the failure to beat a favourable settlement offer can attract an award of indemnity costs: see Sam Sien San v Sam Mo Yee[2019] HKCFI 1188, §24; and Euro Search (Hong Kong) Ltd v Snow Lake Capital (HK) Ltd[2018] HKCFI 2292, §10. 

14.  In this case, it would have been advisable for Mega Well to accept certainly the 2nd Offer.  Given the merits analysis set out under the 1st Offer, it was unreasonable for Mega Well to have failed to engage in any negotiation with WKLL to put an end to this part of its case (see Codent Ltd v Lyson Ltd [2007] 2 Costs LR 185, §§29-30; and LCC v LMWA [2019] 2 HKLRD 529, §§51-52).

15.  It is consonant with the underlying objectives enshrined in O 1A, r 1 for the court to encourage dispute settlement, and therefore failure to respond constructively to a reasonable Calderbank offer, coupled with the subsequent failure to beat the offer, should weigh heavily against the offeree on costs.

16.  Last but not least, Mega Well’s case against WKLL was damaging to their professional reputation.  The costs order sought would provide a fairer result to them.

Disposition

17.  For these reasons, I accede to the application and make an order that WKLL’s costs of this action be paid by Mega Well to be taxed if not agreed, with a certificate for 2 counsel.  The taxation be on party and party basis save that the costs incurred after the 4 November 2016 be on indemnity basis. 

18.  WKLL should have the costs of this application. I make an order nisi accordingly.  As discussed during the hearing, the parties should endeavour to agree such costs.  Failing agreement, a succinct joint letter be written to the court identifying the items of disagreement and the respective position of the parties.  Failure to act reasonably may be visited with costs.  The matter may then be determined on paper if the court sees fit.

 
 

 (Anthony Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

   

Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Au, Thong & Tsang, for the Defendant (by Original Action) and the Plaintiff (by Counterclaim)

Mr Martin Ho, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the 2nd Defendant (by Counterclaim)

[2019] HKCFI 54-EN-2019-01-09

BRIGHT GOLD LTD v. MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LTD

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HCA 2194/2011

[2019] HKCFI 54

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2194 OF 2011

________________________

BETWEEN  
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant

(by Original Action)

BETWEEN  
 MEGA WELL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 CENTALINE PROPERTY AGENCY LIMITED1st Defendant
 WOO KWAN LEE & LO2nd Defendant
 BRIGHT GOLD LIMITED3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

________________________

Before: Hon Anthony Chan J in Court

Dates of Hearing:  26 – 30 November, 3 – 4, 11 December 2018

Date of Judgment:  9 January 2019

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

1.  This action concerns disputes arising from the sale and purchase of a landed property known as Duplex Flat B on 32 & 33/F of Block 1 and car parking spaces No 165, 166 and 167 on Level 1 (collectively “Duplex B”) of Hill Paramount (“Development”), Shatin, which was acquired by Mega Well Development Ltd (“Mega Well”) in August 2011 at the price of HK$69.8 million.

2.  Bright Gold Ltd (“Bright Gold”) was the developer of the Development and the vendor of Duplex B.  It was a subsidiary of the Henderson Group.  Centaline Property Agency Ltd (“Centaline”) was the estate agent involved in the sale and purchase of Duplex B.  Messrs Woo Kwan Lee & Lo (“WKLL”) were the solicitors acting for Mega Well for the purchase.  These are the parties involved in this action.

3.  The disputes over the purchase of Duplex B are revolved around the allegation of misrepresentation by Centaline to Mega Well over the roof of Duplex B.

Background

4.  Pursuant to the directions of this court, a Statement of Agreed Facts and a List of Agreed Issues had been filed by the parties.  The background facts below are not in dispute, save where indicated otherwise.

5.  As the price suggests, Duplex B was a property at the higher end of the market.  Apart from the covered area, it included 2 areas on the Roof Floor of Block 1 (“Roof”).  There was an internal staircase on the 33/F of Duplex B which led onto the Roof.  At the top of the stairwell (“Stairwell”), there was a glass door (“Glass Door”) and by opening that outwards one could enter the Roof.  However, only a narrow strip of the roof area just outside the stairwell of about 25 sq ft (about 0.5m x 4.7m)[1] (“Strip”) belonged to Duplex B.  The second area was located on top of the stairwell where the outdoor units of air-conditioners and boilers serving Duplex B were situated (“B Upper Roof”).  It was only accessible by way of a cat ladder.  Evidently, B Upper Roof was not meant to be an area to be enjoyed by the residents of Duplex B as part of the living space.

6.  The focus of this action concerns the roof which was to be sold as part of Duplex B.  According to the Sales Brochure for the Development, Duplex B had an “Extra Roof Area” of 199 sq ft (saleable area).

7.  There was another duplex on the same floors as Duplex B.  I shall refer to it as “Duplex A”.  It came with a significant part of the Roof which located immediately above the 33/F area of Duplex A, as well as part of the Upper Roof.  According to the Sales Brochure, the area of the Extra Roof Area was 483 sq ft.

8.  One floor down from Duplex B, there was another duplex at a different wing of the building, Flat C on 31 & 32/F (“Duplex C”).  Duplex C included an area on the Roof (“C Roof”), almost a square shape, which was located right above the covered area of and was only accessible from Duplex C.  It appears from the Sales Brochure that the outdoor air-conditioner units (probably also the boilers) for Duplex C were located there.  There is no evidence on the area of C Roof[2].

9.  Duplex B was introduced by a staff of Centaline, Ms Stella Wong (“Wong”) to Ms Katherine Cheng (“Cheng”), who was the sole director and shareholder of Mega Well.  What Wong had said to Cheng about the roof area of Duplex B is highly controversial and will be dealt with below. 

10.  The Provisional Agreement for the sale and purchase of Duplex B (“PSPA”) was signed at a temporary sales office (converted from one of the units in the Development) on 16 August 2011.  The Formal Agreement (“SPA”) dated 19 August 2011 was later signed by Cheng at WKLL’s office.  On 29 November 2011, the Assignment was signed by Cheng at WKLL’s office.  The sale and purchase of Duplex B was completed on 2 December 2011.

11.  Upon completion of the purchase, Mega Well mortgaged Duplex B to a bank by an “all moneys” mortgage, to which the property remains subject.  Further, since about 2 December 2011, Mega Well has been in possession of Duplex B.

12.  It is not in dispute that after Mega Well took possession of Duplex B on 3 December 2011, it was discovered that the Roof Plan annexed to the SPA included C Roof erroneously as part of Duplex B.

This action

13.  In this action, Bright Gold seeks reliefs against Mega Well for rectification of the Roof Plan attached to the SPA so that C Roof would be excluded from Duplex B.

14.  By its counterclaim, Mega Well seeks various reliefs against Centaline, WKLL and Bright Gold.  Mega Well says that, prior to its decision to purchase Duplex B, misrepresentations were made by Centaline and Bright Gold to the effect that the roof area of the property included a much larger part of the Roof immediately outside the Stairwell (“Yellow Area[3]”).  That part of the Roof was located right above the covered area of Duplex B.  However, the Yellow Area was part of the common area (fire refuge) of the Development.  Mega Well’s claim against WKLL is based on their alleged breach of duty of care owed to it as solicitors for the purchase. 

Promotional materials

15.  At the sales office, there were available to potential buyers promotional materials, which included the Sales Brochure already mentioned[4] and 2 marking brochures.  I shall refer to them as Marketing Brochure A[5] and B[6].  In both the Sales Brochure and Marketing Brochure A, there was a plan for Block 1 which consisted of the 33/F Plan, Roof Plan and Part Plan of Upper Roof.  Three colours were used to identify the areas of the 3 Duplexes: brown for Duplex B; green for Duplex C and lime green for Duplex A.

16.  On the 33/F Plan, Duplex B was shown in brown with the Flat Roof and Terrace on that floor in light brown or beige.  On the Roof Plan, the Stairwell was in brown and the Strip in light brown and marked “Roof B[7]”. On the Part Plan of Upper Roof, B Upper Roof was also in light brown and marked “A/C B”).  Both Brochures referred to Duplex B having an Extra Roof Area of 199 sq ft. 

17.  The Yellow Area was not identified in the Brochure Plans.  The area where it was located was not coloured, save for the Strip as described above.

18.  In respect of Duplex C, the Brochure Plans showed that C Roof on the Roof Plan was in light green and marked “A/C C”.

The PSPA

19.  The PSPA was contained in a printed form prepared by Henderson Real Estate Agency Ltd (“Henderson Agency”).  It provided for the inclusion of “platform (平台)” and “roof (天台)” as part of Duplex B, but it contained no information on the location or size of those parts.  Instead, Clauses 0.6 and 0.9 of that document provided as follows :

“06. The purchaser has inspected the property and agrees to purchase the same on ‘as is’ basis, including its conditions and area, and the delivery of vacant possession by the vendor will be on the same basis (買方已實地觀察承購之單位並同意根據已建成之實際形狀、情況及面積為賣方交吉交樓之標準).

09. The purchaser has inspected the platform/roof and confirms the installations of pipes and meters within these areas.  The purchaser agrees that the sizes and conditions of the platform/roof as at the time of grant of Occupation Permit would be the basis of delivery of vacant possession by the vendor (買方已實地視察購買之平台/天台並確認該等平台/天台範圍內之水喉、渠管、錶位等裝置,並同意以入伙紙發出時該等平台/天台之實際形狀,大小及情況為賣方交吉交樓之標準).”

20.  A copy of the Occupation Permit was made available.  The document did not contain any information relating to the size or condition of the roof of Duplex B.  Indeed, there was no reference to any roof in the Occupation Permit. 

Declaration

21.  After the PSPA was signed, Cheng was asked by a staff of Centaline, Mr Philip Ng (“Ng”) to sign a document which would enable Centaline to get commission from Henderson.  Cheng thought that it was a reasonable request and she signed it without reading the contents of the document.  This part of Cheng’s evidence was not challenged. 

22.  This Chinese document[8] was headed “買客/地產介紹人聲明 (Purchaser / Estate Agent Declaration)”.  Mega Well was the stated purchaser and Centaline (with Ng identified) was the estate agent.  The following terms can be found in the Declaration :

“介紹人以「恒基兆業地產代理有限公司」 (後稱 “恒代”) 中介人身份,向本人推介上述單位,…

本人 (等) 現應「恒代」要求,確認下列聲明:

(一)  介紹人並無代「恒代」許下任何承諾或存在任何「恒代」須承擔之責任,而「恒代」亦無義務為介紹人履行任何承諾或責任;

(二)  本人 (等) 與介紹人之任何轇轕,概與「恒代」無涉,本人 (等) 不會以此拖延買賣之正常交易。

(三)  買方不反對「恒代」支付佣金予介紹人。”

The SPA

23.  The draft of the SPA was provided by Bright Gold’s solicitors, Messrs Fairbain Catley Low & Kong (“FCLK”).  The details of Duplex B were provided in the draft.  There were 2 plans attached to the document which identified the constituent parts of Duplex B by colouring them pink.  On the 33/F Plan, there were 2 “Flatroofs” coloured pink.  They had an area of approximately 14.74 sq m according to Schedule 3 of the document.

24.  On the Roof Plan, 2 areas were identified and coloured pink, namely, the Stairwell and Strip (marked “(P) B”) and C Roof (marked “(P) A/C B”).  On the same plan and marked Part Plan of Upper Proof, B Upper Roof was likewise coloured pink (marked “A/C (P) B”).  Apart from the “flat roof”, Schedule 3 also provided, inter alia, the approximate sizes for the “roof” and “roof staircase”.  Reading the Roof Plan in conjunction with Schedule 3, the area of about 11.73 sq m for the roof staircase should cover the Stairwell.  It was not made clear whether the roof staircase included the Strip. 

25.  The evidence of Ms Joey Lau of WKLL (“Lau”), the solicitor who handled this transaction for Mega Well, was that she understood that the Strip was not part of the roof staircase.  Instead, the Strip, C Roof and B Upper Roof made up the roof of 18.53 sq ft according to Schedule 3. Whilst these understandings or reading of the Plans are not unreasonable, I do not believe that it would be readily apparent to an untrained reader that, eg, the Strip was not part of the roof staircase and the B Upper Roof was part of the roof.

26.  The area of the roof as per Schedule 3, about 18.53 sq m, was consistent with the information found in the Sales Brochure and Marketing Brochure A (18.53 sq m is equivalent to about 199.46 sq ft[9]).  However, the Roof Plan contained no measurement.  Therefore, the measurement itself would not reveal anything amiss in the Roof Plan, namely, an additional area was included.

27.  There was no indication in the SPA Plans about the Yellow Area.  According to the valuation report of the Joint Expert (“Report”), the size of the Yellow Area would be 486 sq ft (equivalent to about 45.15 sq m).

28.  The draft SPA, including the Plans, was duly approved by WKLL and was subsequently executed on 22 August 2011.  A copy of the Roof Plan on which is marked the Yellow Area (part of which overlaps with the Strip) is attached to this Judgment and marked “Annex I”.

Assignment

29.  It should be mentioned briefly that the draft Assignment provided by FCLK was approved by WKLL, signed by Mega Well and returned to FCLK upon the usual undertaking.  Thereafter, dispute arose over the roof of Duplex B, and FCLK refused to return the executed Assignment with the same plans as attached to the SPA.  In order to preserve the rights of their lay client, WKLL presented the Assignment without the plans for registration, which has been withheld by the Land Registrar due to the deficiency. 

Issues

30.  The central issue in this case is the factual question whether Duplex B was purchased by Mega Well under the misrepresentation by Centaline.  Unless that question is answered in favour of Mega Well, its case will collapse and Bright Gold will be entitled to rectification of the SPA.

31.  If there was such misrepresentation, the court will have to consider whether (a) Bright Gold is liable for the same and (b) whether WKLL were in breach of their duties to Mega Well and that such breach had caused loss to Mega Well.  These broad issues involve a number of sub-issues and they will be addressed below.

Witnesses

32.  On behalf of Mega Well, Mr Roberto Passador (“Passador”), Mr Ivor Tam (“Tam”), Cheng and Ms Miranda Cheung (“Cheung”) had given evidence in this trial.  For Centaline, Wong, Ms Wendy Shum (“Shum”) and Ng were called to give evidence.  Lau and her secretary, Ms Wen Ho (“Ho”) gave evidence for WKLL.  Four witnesses were called by Bright Gold, Mr Eric Lai (“Lai”), Ms Cherry Leung (“Leung”), Mr Yu Wai Yiu, Mr Leung Ka Shing and Ms Luk Siu Fong.

Misrepresentation

33.  The person alleged to have made the misrepresentation is Wong.  All 4 of Mega Well’s witnesses had heard the same misrepresentation.  The important evidence concerns 3 viewings of Duplex B by Cheng and the people who accompanied her; the signing of the PSPA; and the meeting on 19 August 2011 at the office of WKLL during which Lau explained the draft SPA to Cheng.  I shall summarise such evidence below.

1st Viewing

34.  On 14 August 2011, Cheng had an appointment with Wong to look at some properties in the New Territories.  Cheng was accompanied by her husband, Tam and her secretary, Cheung, whilst Wong was accompanied by a colleague, Shum.  Cheng did not find the properties shown to her suitable.  As an impromptu response, Wong suggested that she should look at a new development (the Development).  Cheng was subsequently shown 2 units at the Development, a house and Duplex B.  Cheng was not interested in the former.   

35.  Duplex B was furnished.  It was used as a show flat.  After looking at the covered area, the party of people then went up to the Roof via an internal staircase on the 33/F.  The area right outside the Stairwell was decorated with a circular artificial lawn, plants in pots and garden furniture.  There was no marking on the Roof to demarcate the area which formed part of Duplex B.  Cheng therefore asked Wong about the location of the same.  The foregoing is not in dispute.

36.  Thereupon, according to Mega Well, Wong said that the roof which formed part of Duplex B extended from the Glass Door to 2 pillars at a distance away, ie, the Yellow Area (“Misrepresentation”).  Cheng was excited about what she saw because there was sufficient outdoor space for her to hold barbecue parties for her business associates and to entertain her family, which she frequently did.

37.  Cheng and her husband were driven home by Wong after the viewing.  Inside Wong’s car, Cheng obtained a copy of Marketing Brochure B.  It is common ground that the document did not contain any specific information about Duplex B, in particular, there was no information about the location or size of the roof which formed part of that property.

38.  That evening, Cheng discussed with her husband and her family about Duplex B which she found desirable.  She had in mind living with her brother’s family in that large property.

39.  Centaline’s case on what Wong said about the roof is quite different.  It is alleged that Wong showed Cheng her ipad which contained a Roof Plan of Block 1 (showing also a Part Plan of Upper Roof).  It appears that the Roof Plan was identical to those in the Sales Brochure and Marketing Brochure A.  In other words, the Stairwell, the Strip and B Upper Roof were identified under the colouring scheme (see para 16 above).  With that Plan, Wong identified to Cheng the roof which belonged to Duplex B.  She also said to Cheng that save for the identified parts, the Roof was part of the common areas.

40.  However, Wong was unable to tell from the Roof Plan the size of the roof belonging to Duplex B.  After the viewing, Wong went to the sales office to ask for the size information.  Later, she told Cheng that the Strip only extended to the artificial lawn and gave her a copy of the Sales Brochure.  From the photographs in the Bundles, it can be seen that the artificial lawn was very close to the Stairwell, and therefore it would have been apparent that the Strip was very narrow. 

2nd Viewing

41.  On the next day, Cheng arranged with Wong to look at Duplex B again.  She went with her husband, met Wong and was taken to a room inside the sales office to wait for her brother.  After the arrival of Cheng’s brother and his family, the party of people, including Shum, went to Duplex B.  At the Roof, in response to the brother’s enquiry, Wong repeated what she had said the previous day, ie, the Duplex B roof extended from the Glass Door to 2 pillars.  According to Cheng, they stayed at the Roof for about 30 minutes. 

42.  Wong’s version is that she went to the 2nd viewing with Shum and Ng (Cheng and Tam denied that Ng was there on that day).  When the party of people were looking at the Roof, Cheng said that the roof area (belong to Duplex B) was too small for any barbecue and that she wanted to keep a barbecue grille, table and chairs on the Roof.  Wong immediately said to Cheng that she could not do so because that was common area.  Cheng then asked Ng whether she could have a barbecue outside her area.  Ng said to her that if she did it surreptitiously, no one would know about it but she needed to clean up the place afterwards to avoid complaint by the neighbours. 

43.  Wong said that the viewing at the Roof took about 15 minutes.  Before Cheng left the Development, she was told by Ng that the asking price for Duplex B was HK$75 million.

3rd Viewing

44.  The 3rd visit of Duplex B took place on 20 August 2011, after the PSPA was signed but before the execution of the SPA.  On that day, Cheng went with Tam, Cheung and a large party of her family members as well as a friend, Passador, to look at the property she had just bought.  Wong and Shum were there. 

45.  When the party of people was looking at the Roof, Wong was asked by, inter alia, Passador to identify the roof which belonged to Duplex B.  The same representation as previously made by Wong on 14 and 15 August 2011 was repeated.  According to Tam, that visit lasted half a day with most of the time spent on the Roof.

46.  According to Wong, no such conversation took place.  To the contrary, during the viewing of the Roof, Cheng again expressed the wish to keep furniture at the common area for her barbecue and to enjoy coffee.  Wong again told Cheng that she could not keep anything at the common area, which did not belong to her.  Wong said that the visit lasted 20 to 25 minutes, and that most of the time was spent in the covered area. 

47.  In the course of the 3rd Viewing, one of Cheng’s relatives took a photograph which showed the Yellow Area (“Photograph”).  The area was decorated with plants and outdoor furniture, and might give the impression of a private garden.

Signing of the PSPA

48.  At the time when the PSPA was signed Ng allegedly used the plans contained in a Sales Brochure to explain to Cheng about the various constituents of Duplex B, including the roof which was “coloured pink”.  This is disputed by Mega Well.

Meeting on 19 August 2011

49.  Cheng was accompanied by Tam, Cheung and Wong. They met Lau at a conference room and sat around a long conference table. According to Lau, she was at the head of the table with Cheng to her right and Tam next to his wife.  Cheung and Wong were at the other end of the table. 

50.  According to Cheng, during the course of the meeting, after having referred to Schedule 3, Lau told her that the parts coloured pink on the Roof Plan attached to the draft SPA belonged to her and that she should check it carefully.  Thereupon, Wong said to Cheng that the roof was so big and well sufficient for her use.  Lau then said that it should not be exaggerated and that only the parts highlighted in pink belonged to the unit Cheng had bought.  Wong also said to Cheng that part of the roof was for storing the air-conditioners and the like.  At that time, Cheng was confused about the Plan.  Her evidence is that she did not know how to interpreted plans.  However, Wong, who was sitting opposite her, picked up the document in front of Cheng, took a look and said that there was no error and that Cheng could sign it. 

51.  Wong’s evidence is that when Lau explained the Plans, Cheng discussed them with Tam.  Cheng then pointed at the area where the air-conditioners were located (B Upper Roof) and asked Wong how to get there. To which she replied that it was accessible via a cat ladder.  Cheng then said that the roof was too small.  Wong then told her that the roof available for her use was so big.  After Lau having pointed out that Cheng was only entitled to the parts coloured pink and the rest was common area, Wong explained to Cheng that although Duplex B only came with the parts coloured pink, normally no one would use the Roof and therefore as a matter of fact she could use it as she liked (Wong’s evidence is that, apart from the occupants of Duplexes A and B of Blocks 1 and 2 who could access the Roof via internal staircases, the other occupants could only access the Roof via fire exits and fire doors.  The use of fire door would trigger an alarm.  Hence, normally the other occupants would not access the Roof.).

Analysis

52.  Given the number of parties involved, the evidence in this trial (especially that of Cheng) was subjected to very thorough examination.  I approach the evidence based on inherent probabilities, common sense, whether it had withstood the test of cross-examination and how the witnesses behaved in the witness box. Uncontroversial or uncontroverted documentary evidence will of course be accorded due weight[10]. I agree with the approach set out in Star Glory Investment Ltdv Kai Tuo (HK) Technology Co Ltd, unrep, HCA 3523/2002, 13 August 2005, §12. 

53.  On drawing of inference, I shall be guided by the dicta of Ribeiro PJ in Ming Shiu Chung & Ors v Ming Shui Sum & Ors (2006) 9 HKCFAR 334, §§78 and 79.

54.  Having considered all the evidence, there is no real doubt in my mind that the Misrepresentation was in fact repeatedly made to Cheng and in her presence by Wong. 

The requirement of sufficient outdoor space

55.  Firstly, Cheng’s evidence that she was looking for a property with outdoor space that was sufficiently large for barbecue party and entertaining her guests is certainly credible.  She explained, inter alia, that she found that restaurants were too noisy and preferred her own space.  That would echo the sentiment of many people in Hong Kong.  Cheng’s wish to live with her brother’s family and taking many of her family members to visit the new place she bought reflected the fact that she liked to be with her big family. 

56.  Of the 3 properties purchased by Cheng prior to Duplex B, one had a roof and the one where she was residing in August 2011 had a large garden and light well of about 1,000 sq ft.  Given the price of Duplex B, it would be surprising for a potential buyer not to have an expectation that it came with a decent size roof.

57.  Wong’s evidence agreed with that of Cheng on her requirement[11] for a roof to accommodate her barbecue party, although Wong said that she only knew about it on 15 August 2011 during the 2nd Viewing.  Finally, Leung’s evidence confirmed that on the day when Cheng took possession of Duplex B (3 December 2011), she had a long argument with the building management and was clearly upset[12] that she was told by them that she would not be allowed to have any barbecue on the Roof.  I do not believe that Cheng merely wanted to use the common area.  Cheng must have known that she had no specific right over the common area.  There was no reason for her to be so insistent over the right to barbecue unless she believed that the area belonged to her (see also para 78 below). 

The Viewings

58.  There is no argument that Cheng asked Wong about the location of the roof which belonged to Duplex B on 14 August 2011 (during the 1st Viewing).  Indeed, it was the most natural thing for a potential buyer to ask.  It is unlikely for Cheng to be enthusiastic about the property if she was told that the roof was merely a narrow strip outside the Glass Door (apart from the area for the air-conditioners).  The fact is that Duplex B did not actually have any useable roof.  Lai (a senior sales staff of Henderson Agency at the material times) agreed that it was the case.  Further, Wong and Shum, both very experienced estate agents, agreed that they had never come across a case where the roof was merely a narrow strip. 

59.  If Cheng was shown a plan of the Roof, as alleged by Wong (and Shum), indicating that only a narrow strip of the Roof belonged to Duplex B, one would expect Cheng to be at least surprised and said something about it.  Both Wong and Shum said that Cheng had no reaction after she was told about the Strip and the party of people then left the Development.  Such evidence is not credible.  A normal person, let alone a prospective purchaser, would be quite surprised by the revelation that only the Strip belonged to Duplex B.  Such a person would likely have reacted by, eg, asking what was the point for having an internal staircase going to Roof?  

60.  It was agreed by Wong that at the price of nearly HK$70 million, a purchaser looking for a good amount of outdoor space would have ample choices.  I do not believe that Cheng would have been interested in Duplex B if she knew that it had no useable roof.  She would not have taken her brother and his family to look at the Roof with enthusiasm on 15 August 2011 (2nd Viewing).  She would not have repeated that exercise with more members of her family as well as her friend (Passador) on 20 August 2011 (3rd Viewing). 

61.  Cheng’s evidence that during the 2nd and 3rd Viewings, members of her family asked Wong to identify the roof which belonged to Duplex B is inherently credible.  Passador, a gentleman from Italy, was called to give evidence about what he was told by Wong in answer to his question about the roof which came with Duplex B.  The Misrepresentation was repeated to him.  I take into account that Passador was a long standing friend of Cheng and had become a business partner of hers.  It was a natural question for Passador to ask when there was no marking on the Roof.  I see no reason why he would travel thousands of miles to Hong Kong to give false evidence.  Quite the contrary, he impressed the court as an honest witness.

19 August 2011

62.  Cheng’s evidence about what took place at a conference room inside the office of WKLL is largely consistent with and supported by that of Lau, as well as being consistent with the recorded conversation between Lau and her on 24 December 2011 (“Recorded Conversation”).  The recording was made by Lau without informing Cheng. Although Lau said that it was for the purpose of making a report to the senior partner about the matter, I have little doubt that she was alive to the possibility that the matter might turn into litigation and wanted, at least in part, to preserve some evidence about what took place on the 19 August 2011 for her own protection.

63.  Importantly, Cheng’s evidence that she was unable to read the Plans shown to her by Lau is consistent with what Lau was recorded to have said – Lau saw that Cheng appeared doubtful or confused and asked Wong about the Plans.  Further, Lau’s evidence confirmed that Cheng had relied on Wong to approve the Plans.

64.  Some of the evidence of that meeting militate against the suggestion that Cheng had been shown the Brochure Plan and was told that the Duplex B roof was made up of only the Strip and an area for air-conditioners.

65.  To begin with, she was in doubt or confused when the Roof Plan was shown to her by Lau.  If she had seen the Brochure Plan, she should not be in doubt, and she would have been able to tell easily that there was something wrong about the Roof Plan, because it contained 3 areas coloured pink, whereas the roof in question was only made up of 2 areas. 

66.  Cheng’s evidence that she was labouring under the belief that C Roof as shown on the Plan was the Yellow Area is credible. She also relied upon the fact that C Roof was marked “B” like the other 2 areas.  I accept this evidence despite the heavy criticisms based on the variance between C Roof and the Yellow Area in terms of location and size. Cheng’s evidence is indirectly supported by the evidence of Wong. 

67.  Wong said that she pointed out to Cheng with the Roof Plan where B Upper Roof was.  That document clearly showed 3 areas coloured pink, and C Roof appeared immediately above B Upper Roof.  Despite Wong’s denial, she must have seen that the document showed 3 pink areas.  Her failure to point out the clear error is an important piece of evidence which supports Mega Well’s case.  It suggests that, contrary to the contention that Cheng was shown the Brochure Plan and knew that Duplex B only came with the Strip and an air-conditioners area, Wong had in fact told her that it came with more than those 2 areas, and Wong did not attempt to correct the misunderstanding which Cheng was labouring under as a result of what she was told.

68.  Further, the fact that Wong said to Cheng at the meeting that the roof was big and well sufficient for her use is at odds with the suggestion that Cheng was told from day 1 that the roof was limited to the Strip and the air-conditioners area.  I reject Wong’s suggestion that she was merely explaining that the common area could be used by Cheng.  I see no honest reason why Wong would have said that when Cheng was asked by Mega Well’s solicitors to check the Plans carefully to ensure that they reflected what she was buying.

Wong’s motive

69.  I believe that Wong was keen to be present at the meeting to ensure that the approval of the SPA went smoothly.  She was to be handsomely rewarded from the commission to be earned in the transaction (3% of the purchase price and from which Wong would be entitled to a share in the sum of HK$400,000)[13]. Wong declined to leave the meeting despite Lau’s request to do so.  What Wong said about the roof suggests that she was indeed keen that the SPA be approved by Cheng.

Inspection of Duplex B

70.  Finally, Mega Wells’ case on the Misrepresentation is supported by the fact that when Tam instructed a qualified person (“Jim”) to inspect Duplex B for the purpose of getting approval for the unauthorised alterations there, he provided an estimate of 500 sq ft for the roof.  There is an invoice from Jim’s company to evidence that.  Unless Tam believed that Duplex B came with a sizable roof, it is inconceivable that he would have provided such an estimate. 

Cheng’s credibility

71.  Cheng is a credible witness.  Her evidence was rigorously tested by the cross-examination on behalf of the other 3 parties.  I have not noticed any hesitation in any of her answers.  With the exception of 1 matter (see para 80 below), there is no major inconsistency in her evidence.  There are of course variances in details compared with the evidence of other witnesses, eg, the duration of the discussion with Wong over the Plans at the meeting.  I believe that such differences are matters of recollection or impression, and can be expected with honest witnesses.   

72.  There are some points of credibility made against Mega Well which I would deal with specifically.  Firstly, suggestions had been made that Tam and Cheng did not mention the Yellow Area to Lau until much later, which was Lau’s evidence.  In this regard, I believe that Tam had provided a credible explanation.  He said that it was on the 8 or 9 December 2011, shortly after Jim’s inspection of Duplex B on 7 December 2011and confirmation that the Yellow Area did not form part of it, that he mentioned it to Lau over a telephone conversation.  At that time, there was a meeting with Henderson’s management scheduled on 12 December 2011, Tam wanted to ask Lau for advice as to how the matter might be resolved.  In the course of the conversation, he asked Lau if it was possible to get “our roof” (the Yellow Area).  Lau told him that it would not be possible because it was mostly common area but suggested to him to explore at the meeting whether there was any area which belonged to Henderson. 

73.  WKLL were Mega Well’s only solicitors at the time.  It is inherently credible for Tam to have consulted Lau in anticipation of the meeting.  Tam’s explanation was detailed and coherent.  I see no reason to disbelieve the evidence. 

74.  As to any variance between Tam’s evidence and that of Lau in this regard, it is likely to be matters of recollection and/or confusion over events which took place many years ago.  No doubt those were trying times not only for Cheng and Tam but also Lau.  When Lau was cross-examined about Mega Well’s complaint over the roof, Lau said that Cheng was complaining about how small the roof was, and she agreed with the court that Cheng thought that the roof was bigger, otherwise there was no cause for complaint.  Further, Lau in cross-examination agreed that in complaining about Wong’s misrepresentation over the roof, Cheng had mentioned the exact location and area of the roof that was supposed to be sold to Mega Well.

75.  On this topic, Cheng explained that the discussions with Lau (and Ho) after taking possession of Duplex B were conducted mainly by her husband (on 24 December 2011 Lau actually rang Tam but he passed the phone to his wife because he was driving (see para 62 above)). She believed that there might be misunderstanding or confusion over what Tam had said about Mega Well’s entitlement over the roof. 

76.  I believe that Cheng is probably right about the misunderstanding or confusion.  The term “Yellow Area” was only coined after the filing of Mega Well’s pleading.  Tam would have to describe what he was told about the roof.  Such an exercise, no doubt carried out in circumstances of stress, over the phone and quite likely without the assistance of plan, was liable to result in misunderstanding.  Importantly, I fail to see why Tam should be complaining only about C Roof as suggested by WKLL, Bright Gold and Centaline.  It was inaccessible and not an area of any interest to Mega Well. More likely than not, he was complaining about something else.

77.  Tam’s explanation is supported by the evidence of Ho, who said that, during a period of 2 weeks from 8 December 2011, he had repeatedly complained to her that Wong had made misrepresentation about the roof.  Although Ho said that Tam’s complaint was not specific, it is unlikely that Tam was repeatedly complaining about misrepresentation without mentioning what the misrepresentation was.

78.  There is also support in the evidence of Leung. She had to go to the Roof on 3 December 2011, the day Mega Well took possession of Duplex B.  There was an argument between Cheng and the management about the roof and Leung was asked to deal with it.  Although she was unable to recall what she was told about the argument, she took along a copy of the Sales Brochure believing that it would assist in resolving the argument.  Later in cross-examination, Ms Leung agreed that the argument was about what Mega Well maintained to be the size of the roof which belonged to it.  In re-examination, Leung said that the argument was mainly about “their” wish to barbecue at the Roof. Whilst I had detected an unwillingness on the part of Leung to acknowledge that Cheng did complain about the size of the roof belonging to Mega Well, it is reasonably clear from her evidence that it must be the subject matter of argument on the 3 December 2011. 

79.  Secondly, much criticism had been made about Cheng’s evidence that she did not obtain a copy of the Sales Brochure.  When Cheng was taxed on this topic by Mr Ho SC, who appeared for Bright Gold with Mr Lee, she said that she based her purchase on the physical inspection of Duplex B. Cheng was a business person.  Her success was self-made, having completed only her secondary education and started her own business at a young age.  It is quite plausible that such a person might place reliance on what they see rather than reading up on the details as, eg, lawyers are inclined to do.  Indeed, the terms of the PSPA emphasized the primary importance of inspection of Duplex B (see para 19 above).  The court bears in mind also the fact that Cheng had a long standing relationship with Wong, having purchased 3 properties through her.  Naturally, she would have trusted Wong in what she had said to her.  I do not believe that this is a point which materially damage Cheng’s credibility.

80.  Thirdly, serious criticisms were made about the evidence of Cheng and Tam that they only saw a copy of the Sales Brochure after Mega Well had instructed its solicitors for this action in early 2012.  Such evidence is inconsistent with what Cheng had said in the Recorded Conversation, which may suggest that she had seen the Brochure Plan before that day.  Whilst I agree that this is one of the matters to be taken into account in assessing the credibility of Mega Well’s evidence, I do not see anything sinister in it. Bearing in mind that this was about events after the purchase had been concluded, I am unable to see why Cheng and Tam would deliberate lie about this matter.  It would not materially improve Mega Well’s case.  Cheng and her husband might have been confused or their recollection was flawed.  I have to bear in mind that the circumstances at the material times must have been testing for them.   

81.  Fourth and finally, much had been said that Mega Well’s case on the Misrepresentation is incredible in that the lie could easily have been revealed, eg, if Cheng had taken a look at the Brochure Plan before signing the PSPA.  Experience informs that human behaviour cannot always be explained by logic or common sense, especially with the benefit of hindsight. It might be the case that Wong was misled by the decoration of the Yellow Area and thought that it was part of Duplex B (the visit to the Development was an impromptu event) or she had in mind that, if caught out, she would try to salvage the situation by telling Cheng that the Roof would not be accessible by other owners save in the case of emergency (which was what she said at the meeting on 19 August 2011).  However, trying to look into Wong’s mind would be a matter of speculation. 

82.  Whilst this criticism of Mega Well’s case is to be taken into account in assessing the evidence, the court should also balance the criticism against the fact that Cheng had no motive to lie.  None had been suggested in the lengthy cross-examination of Cheng (or Tam).  Her evidence is that, after many unsuccessful meetings with Henderson to try to resolve the matter, she received a solicitors’ letter threatening legal action against Mega Well.  In due course, she received a copy of the writ and was struck by a feeling of helplessness.  According to Tam, there was difficulty in obtaining the service of solicitors for the litigation, which involved one of the largest developers in Hong Kong.  I do not see why Cheng would have taken on the might of Henderson if the dispute was only about the C Roof over which she had no access. 

83.  In respect of Cheng’s demeanour as a witness, I find it convincing.  The manner in which she answered questions – maintaining eye contact, forthright and spontaneous – suggests that she was telling the truth.  Indeed, there is a distinct impression that Cheng wanted to pour her heart out on the injustice she had suffered and to vent the pressure (no doubt both mental and financial) she had experienced in this litigation.

Mega Well’s other witnesses

84.  As for Tam and Cheung, I am also satisfied that they are truthful witnesses.  Tam’s evidence very much supported that of Cheng, especially on the Misrepresentation due to his presence when it was repeatedly made. He was cross-examined at considerable length.  His evidence was unshaken.  I see no major inconsistency.  I should add that Tam was quite relaxed in the witness box and he came across as a credible witness.

85.  Cheung also heard the Misrepresentation during the 1st and 3rd Viewings.  She was soft-spoken and a careful witness.  In answering questions, she did not hesitate to tell the court that she was unable to recall the matter.  Again, I find no major inconsistency in Cheung’s evidence and I find her to be a credible witness.

Centaline’s witnesses

86.  Turing to Centaline’s witnesses, I have pointed out above an incentive for Wong to have Duplex B sold and analysed some of her evidence.  I do not believe that Wong’s evidence stands scrutiny.  The evidence of both Cheng and Lau that Cheng relied on Wong to confirm that the Roof Plan was correct goes a long way to discredit her evidence. 

87.  Both Shum and Ng participated in the transaction.  They also would have a share in the commission to be earned. Once the transaction had turned into a litigation and what Centaline did was put under the spotlight, one can see the pressure on them to support Wong’s (and Centaline’s) case.

88.  Shum was also an agent of Centaline.  She accompanied Wong at all 3 Viewings, although she said that she did not go to the Roof during the 3rd Viewing.  I do not find Shum to be a credible witness.  I do not believe her evidence that she did not try to promote Duplex B to Cheng but merely left it to her to make a decision.  This is not what one would expect a very experienced estate agent would do with an expensive property the sale of which would result in substantial commission. Shum tried to argue that the Strip was a useful area to have some plants or a shallow cabinet.  Such suggestion was, in my view, disingenuous.  I have already mentioned that, like Wong, Shum said that that Cheng had no reaction when she was told about the Strip (see para 59 above). 

89.  Ng was a branch manager of Centaline.  I do not find him to be a credible witness either.  He was a combative witness, and had the tendency to give long irrelevant answers despite the court’s advice to pay attention to the questions and to answer the same.  When he was asked whether 2011 was a buyer’s market, he suggested that it was difficult to define a buyer’s market due to various factors.  Upon further questions by the court, Ng said that he understood what the term “buyer’s market” meant but he could not recall the state of the market in 2011.  I do not regard this as the hallmark of a credible witness. 

90.  Ng said that he had showed the Brochure Plan to Cheng at the time of the signing of the PSPA and identified the 2 areas coloured pink on the Roof as belonging to Duplex B.  He was then challenged by Mr Chong, who appeared for Mega Well with Mr Poon, that the relevant parts of the Brochure Plan were not in pink.  Ng tried to explain that he regarded the colour as pink.  When he was asked by the court to look at the car park plan in the brochure in which the car parks were coloured pink, Ng said he thought that the car parks were in “dark pink” and the areas he identified to Cheng in “light pink”.  I am in no doubt that Ng had made up his answers. 

91.  For these reasons, I am satisfied that Wong had made the Misrepresentation to Cheng or in her presence during each of the 3 Viewings. 

Reliance on the Misrepresentation

92.  The only argument is that Cheng was disabused of any misrepresentation by what took place on the 19 August 2011 and/or when she obtained a copy of the Sales Brochure.  Given the court’s acceptance of Mega Well’s evidence, in particular, I do not believe that Cheng had seen a copy of the Sales Brochure before signing the SPA, this argument has no leg to stand on. 

93.  I bear in mind the relevant principles of law which had been helpfully set out in a recent judgment in this area: Joytex Development Ltd v Super Homes Ltd, unrep, [2018] HKCFI 2286, 10 October 2018, per DHCJ Stock SC, §77, in particular §77(4) and (5).  In my view, there can be no serious argument that Cheng (and Mega Well) had relied on the Misrepresentation in purchasing Duplex B, and I so find.

Centaline’s liability for the Misrepresentation

94.  Equally, it is not open to serious doubt that Centaline was acting for Mega Well in the purchase of Duplex B notwithstanding that its commission was to be paid by Bright Gold.  Duplex B was introduced by Centaline to Mega Well as a potential buyer; Cheng and the people who accompanied her were taken by Centaline’s staff to Duplex B for 3 Viewings; what Duplex B came with was explained by such staff; and the price was negotiated with Bright Gold by one such staff (Ng) on behalf of Mega Well.  Further, Mega Well was required to sign the Declaration which was necessary to enable Centaline to be paid by Bright Gold[14].  I have no difficulty finding that Centaline was acting for Mega Well in the transaction. 

95.  As Mega Well’s professional agent, Centaline clearly owed a duty of care to the former (see Midland Realty (Comm. & Ind.) Ltd v NCF (HK) Ltd, HCA 1830/2013, unrep, 22 May 2015, §§74 to 79). There is no contrary submission advanced on behalf of Centaline to suggest that it did not owed a duty of care to Mega Well in the purchase of Duplex B. Making the Misrepresentation to Mega Well was a blatant breach of such duty, and I so find.

Bight Gold’s liability over the Misrepresentation

96.  I turn next to consider whether Bright Gold is liable for the Misrepresentation.  This turns on whether Centaline was acting as Bright Gold’s agent for the purpose of providing information about Duplex B’s roof to Mega Well. 

97.  I respectfully adopt the dicta of Deputy High Court Judge To (as he then was) in Hondon Devlopment Ltd & Anr v Powerise Investments Ltd & Ors, HCA 1208/1998, unrep, 1 September 2003, §27 :

“… It is trite law that agency can be created expressly or by implication when it is reasonable to infer that an agency relationship has resulted: Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park [1964] 2 QB 480. It is a question of fact in each case whether an estate agent is an agent authorised by his principal in providing information relating to a property to another party. The authority may be express or implied.”

98.  I also bear in mind the dicta of DHCJ S Kwan (as she then was) in Yili Concepts (HKG) Ltd v Lee Wai Chuen, unrep, HCA 12911/1997, 29 September 2000, pp 21 and 22.

99.  In my view, there is ample evidence to justify the inference that Centaline was acting for Bright Gold as its agent in the sale of Duplex B and in providing information about that property to potential purchasers. 

100.  According to Lai, Henderson Agency would promote the Development with their own clients or potential buyers sourced by them. For buyers introduced by outside estate agents, they would be handled by those agents.  In cross-examination, Lai agreed that Centaline’s role was to promote the Development for Bright Gold, and if it resulted in a sale Centaline would get commission from Bright Gold.  He agreed that Centaline’s role did not change in the negotiations over the purchase price as it was trying to bring the promotion to fruition and earn the commission.  He agreed also that Centaline’s interest aligned with that of Bright Gold in attaining a higher selling price, and that Centaline was looking after the interest both of itself and Bright Gold in the negotiations over the price. 

101.  In re-examination, Lai tried to resile from what was said by emphasising that Centaline did not introduce its clients to only the Development, and he said that in the negotiations of the purchase price Centaline was only representing Mega Well.  Lai also said that Centaline might just be looking after whether the deal could be done and if not, it could take the buyer to other properties.  He further said that Centaline was not looking after Bright Gold’s interest, it was mainly looking after the buyer’s interest. 

102.  I do not believe the fact that Centaline did not only promote the Development detracts from its role vis-a-vis Bright Gold.  It speaks volumes that Centaline was going to be paid 3% of the purchase price for any success in promoting the Development.  What Lai accepted in cross-examination sits with plain common sense.  Critically, there was no one doing the promoting for Bright Gold in respect of the buyers brought along by the estate agents other than those estate agents.  In this case, there was no contact between Mega Well and Bright Gold prior to the signing of the PSPA. Plainly, Centaline must be acting for Bright Gold in the transaction. 

103.  Further, in the course of promoting the Development to potential purchasers, obviously Centaline would, and was expected by Bright Gold to, provide information about the properties, such as the roofs which came with the top floor duplexes. 

104.  The negotiations over the purchase price between Mega Well and Bright Gold were carried out via Centaline.  It was plainly part and parcel of the promotion exercise to bring it to fruition.  The suggestion that Centaline was only representing Mega Well sits poorly with Ng’s evidence that, on one hand, he had discussions with Mega Well with the view to getting Bright Gold to come down on the price with incentives such as a shorter completion period or negotiation over the amount of rebate of stamp duty.  On the other hand, Ng had discussions with Bright Gold to exploring how the Mega Well might be encouraged to improve its offer, eg, with an additional car parking space as sweetener.  Plainly, Centaline (via Ng) was acting for both Mega Well and Bright Gold in the transaction, and I so find.

105.  Finally, the existence of the Declaration (see paras 21 and 22 above and the analysis below) by which Henderson Agency attempted to exclusion its liability for, inter alia, misrepresentation made by Centaline fortifies the fact that it knew and expected that representation would be made by the latter to potential purchasers.  Although it was not a document of Bright Gold, it is part of the evidence on which it endeavoured to rely and it fortifies what can only be a common sense view. 

106.  Bright Gold placed considerable reliance on the CA judgment of Montrio Ltd & Anr v Tse Ping Shun David [2013] 4 HKC 505, §§28-31.  However, the critical distinction is that in Montrio the vendor did not instruct the agent to market its property.  In any case, the finding here is highly facts sensitive.    

107.  In the premises, I find that Centaline was acting for Bright Gold in the sale of Duplex B and that it was impliedly authorised by the latter in providing to Mega Well information about the property.  In the premises, Bright Gold is liable for the Misrepresentation.  

108.  Mega Well also has a claim of implied representation against Bright Gold based on the presentation of the Yellow Area as depicted in the Photograph.  Lai agreed that a potential purchaser who had looked at 32/F and 33/F of Duplex B, walked up the internal stairs onto the Roof, pushed open the Glass Door and entered an area decorated in the manner shown in the Photograph might get the impression that the area was part of the furnished property.  Lai said that nothing was done to prevent potential purchasers from getting that impression.  He also agreed that normally one would expect that the roof which belonged to the property would situate immediately above the covered area. 

109.  The legal test for an implied representation is what a reasonable person would have inferred was being impliedly represented by the representor’s words and conducts in their context: see Joytex Development Ltd, supra, §77(3).

110.  Having considered the matter with care, I am not satisfied that the state of the Yellow Area at the time of the Viewings was sufficient to constitute the Misrepresentation.  At most, it might have contributed to Mega Well’s belief in it.  I believe that a reasonable person would have made enquiry about the roof which formed part of Duplex B, as Cheng did, despite the impression that it might be part of the show flat.  I bear in mind that there was no partition at the Roof. 

Declaration and Clause 10(2) of the SPA

111.  Next, I shall deal with 2 remaining arguments of Bright Gold.  I regret to say that they have no merits. 

112.  Firstly, Bright Gold relied upon the Declaration as constituting a contractual estoppel.  However, the document did not in anywhere suggest that it had anything to do with Mega Well.  Clause 1 of that document (see para 22 above), on which Bright Gold sought to rely to exclude its liability for any misrepresentation made by Centaline was poorly drafted in that it purported to refer to a state of affairs (there was an absence of any responsibility on Henderson Agency’s part (“或存在任何「恒代」須承擔之責任”) but it was not clear how that state of affairs was to be applied.  It was not a matter of the absence of a punctuation in the sentence.  The document was provided by Henderson Agency, and it must be construed contra proferentum and any ambiguity in a document of such nature cannot be resolved against Mega Well.

113.  Both these points were raised by the court with Bright Gold at the beginning of the trial but there was a total failure to address them in Bright Gold’s final submissions.

114.  Secondly, there is a short paragraph in Bright Gold’s final submissions relying on Clause 10(2) of the SPA to limit Mega Well’s right to cancel the agreement or seek compensation for misrepresentation.  Clause 10 was about error, mis-statement or mis-description in the Government Grant.  The point is hopelessly unmeritorious.  It should not have been made, certainly not in the throwaway manner in which it was advanced.      

Case between Mega Well and WKLL

115.  It is not in dispute that WKLL, as Mega Well’s solicitors for the purchase of Duplex B owed a duty of care to it both in contract and in tort: see Hondon Development Ltd & Anr v Powerise Investments Ltd & Ors [2005] 3 HKLRD 605, CA, §48.

116.  As regards the nature and standard of that duty of care, I again respectfully adopt the lucid dicta of DHCJ To in the first instance judgment of Hondon Development[15], §§75 to 77 :

“75. There can hardly be any doubt that a solicitor owes a duty of care towards his client the moment he begins communication with his client or prospective client in his professional capacity as a solicitor in tort or upon being engaged under his retainer in contract. In general, the content of his duty is as follows. His foremost and basic duty is to understand the terms of his retainer and the purpose for which he is retained. If in doubt, he should seek clarification or instruction from his client. He shall act in accordance with his retainer. He shall advise his client on all matters relevant to his retainer, so far as may be reasonably necessary. He shall carry out his instructions by all proper means. He shall consult with his client on all questions of doubts which do not fall within the express or implied discretion given to him under his retainer. He shall keep his client informed to such an extent as may be reasonably necessary. He shall generally protect his client's interest. He is under a duty to exercise the care and skill to be expected from a normally competent and careful practitioner.

76. In the context of a solicitor acting for the purchaser in a conveyancing transaction, the content of a solicitor’s duty includes the following specific duties. Firstly, in order to understand the terms of his retainer and the purpose for which he was retained, a solicitor is under a duty to ascertain what is the subject matter of the sale and purchase in the mind of his client and, if in doubt, to seek clarification or instruction from his client. He has to ensure the parcels clause of the formal agreement or assignment adequately describes the property to be purchased. He has to scrutinise plans closely to ensure that the limits of the property accord with what is supposed to be purchased and conveyed. If there are discrepancies between the plans used in the course of the negotiation, for example, plans annexed to the provisional agreement on the one hand and the plans annexed to the formal agreement or the assignment on the other as to suggest that the latter plans may not adequately reflect the understanding of his client as to the subject matter of the purchase, he should draw that to his client’s attention. In case of doubt, he should consult with his client. Any plan identifying or describing the property to be purchased in the Formal Agreement, the Assignment and the Deed of Mutual Covenant must be shown to the client. Secondly, his duty to protect his client's interest is specifically extended to protect his client’s interest in the transaction and to protect his client against possible future hazards. Thus, a solicitor has to protect his client’s interest by duly registering the provisional sale and purchase agreement so that his client’s interest will not be deferred to any later competing interest over the property. He has to ensure that the vendor can show a good legal title free from adverse interests of the property to be conveyed. For that purpose, he is obliged to make the customary enquiries and searches and to do so with care. He shall not hand over the purchase money unless satisfied that his client will acquire a good title. Also, he has a duty to warn his client of risks which are obvious to the solicitor but which are not so to the lay client. He has a duty to explain the documents which give effect to the transaction and make sure that his client understands their content before appending his signature to the documents.

77. The standard of care in conveyancing is high, but it is not absolute. A solicitor is not expected to be faultless nor is he to be taken as his client’s insurer of any risk which the skill and care of a normally competent and careful practitioner cannot avoid. That a mistake was made by the solicitor is not conclusive of negligence. In determining whether a solicitor is guilty of negligence, the court has to apply what it perceives to be the standard of the normally competent solicitor. This is a finding of fact based on the particular circumstances of the case and authorities are unlikely to be decisive or helpful. Usually a solicitor will not be regarded as negligent if he makes a mistake as a result of acting in accordance with the general practice of the profession: see for example, Simmons v Pennington [1955] 1 WLR 183.

[emphasis added]

117.  I also take into account the following principles which Mr Fung SC, who appeared with Ms Lui for WKLL, had urged upon the court :

(1)  The onus of proving professional negligence over and above errors of judgment is a heavy one: see Foshan Hua Da Industrial Co v Johnson, Stokes & Master (a firm) [1999] 1 HKLRD 418 at 426E-F, per Stock J (as he then was), citing Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191.

(2)  To discharge this onus of proving professional negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct fell short of the standard of “what the reasonably competent practitioner would do having regard to the standard normally adopted in his profession”: see Foshan, supra, at 425C-E, citing Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp(a firm) [1979] 1 Ch 384 at 403B.

(3)  In order to establish its case against WKLL, Mega Well must prove that the latter had committed acts of gross ignorance which could not have been committed by any other ordinarily informed member of the profession: see Simmons v Pennington & Son [1955] 1 WLR 183 at 189 where Hodson LJ cited with approval the following dicta from Cooke v Falconer’s Representatives (1850) 13 D 157, 172:

“It is not enough, in order to recover damages from a professional man, to show that something which was committed to him to do, has not had the effect which was expected from it; he must show an act of gross ignorance, such as could not have been committed by any other ordinarily informed member of the profession.”

(4)  Hindsight is no touchstone of negligence, and the conduct of the professional must be judged and based on events as they occurred at the time: see Simmons v Pennington, supra, 186-187, per Denning LJ:

“The solicitors acted in accordance with the general practice of conveyancers. No ill consequences had ever been known to flow from an answer in this form. Now that the case has gone adversely to the vendor, we can see that it was a mistake, but it is so easy to be wise after the event. One has to try to put oneself in the position of the solicitors at the time and see whether they failed to come up to a reasonable standard of care and skill such as is rightfully required of an ordinary prudent solicitor.”

See also Duchess of Argyll v Beuselinck [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 172 at 185, column 1 (Megarry J).

118.  In Mega Well’s closing submissions, Mr Chong had confirmed that Mega Well’s case against WKLL is essentially based on an alleged failure to ascertain the subject matter of the sale and purchase before Mega Well was asked to sign the SPA.

119.  First of all, I believe that WKLL (via Lau) had acted with diligence and expedition over the preparation of the SPA.  They received a copy of the PSPA on 17 August 2011, which constituted their instructions on the transaction.  On the same day, Wong called WKLL and spoke to Ho requesting that the SPA be signed 2 days later on 19 August 2011.  The draft SPA was provided to WKLL by FCLK on 18 August 2011.  The SPA was signed by Mega Well on 19 August 2011.

120.  Secondly, there is no dispute that Mega Well had never informed WKLL about the Yellow Area prior to signing the SPA.  Cheng’s evidence was that she believed that the plans would have been checked by the solicitors and she relied on them.

121.  Thirdly, there is no evidence before the court that there was a document which Lau should have checked in the course of approving the draft SPA and that document would have shown that the Roof Plan attached to the draft SPA was wrong. 

122.  At the highest, one may say that the SPA plans showed that C Roof was situated at a different wing of the building and not above Duplex B.  Lau was asked by the court about this point.  Her evidence was that she did address her mind to it.  Whilst unusual, she had previously come across such a situation in other cases, and she had in mind that the part of the roof not above Duplex B might be accessible by way of a cat ladder.

123.  I am unable to see anything wrong or any inadequacy in Lau asking Cheng to examine the plans with care to check that they accorded with what she had seen on inspection.  Unless Lau had been to the property (which was not the case) or she was instructed that the property came with any particular feature, I am unable to see a sound basis for Mega Well’s case.

124.  It might have been advisable for Lau to have asked Cheng if she could understand the plans given her observation about Cheng’s doubt over the plans and Cheng’s reliance on Wong to approve them.  In addition, (a) there was an unusual feature in that C Roof was situated at a different wing and (b) the interest of her client did not necessarily align with that of the estate agent.  However, this involves some benefit of hindsight, and is at most an error of judgment rather than an act of negligence.

125.  For these reasons, I am unable to agree with Mega Well’s case against WKLL. 

Rescission

126.  The primary relief sought by Mega Well is rescission of the SPA.  There is no argument that if the Misrepresentation is proven and that Bright Gold is found liable for the same, the SPA is liable to be rescinded.  The only argument, advanced by Bright Gold, is that Mega Well had affirmed the contract and therefore lost the right to rescission and is only entitled to damages. 

127.  Before dealing with Bright Gold’s argument, I should mention that there is a submission by Mega Well that the SPA is void ab initio because of the absence of consensus ad idem between it and Bright Gold over the sale.  The premise of the submission is that Bright Gold intended to sell Duplex B with only the Strip and B Upper Roof, whereas Mega Well intended to purchase that property with the Yellow Area.

128.  I am inclined to agree with Mr Ho that the submission is misconceived.  The authority of Frederick E Rose (London) Ld v William H Pim Jnr & Co Ltd [1953] 2 QB 450, per Denning LJ at 459-461 provides guidance to resolve this issue : 

“… It is quite clear on the evidence that the parties to the second and third contracts (though not to the first) were under a common mistake. …

What is the effect in law of this common mistake on the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants? … I am clearly of the opinion that the contract was not a nullity. It is true that both parties were under a mistake, and that the mistake was of a fundamental character with regard to the subject-matter. The goods contracted for – horsebeans – were essentially different from what they were believed to be – “feveroles”. Nevertheless, the parties to all outward appearances were agreed. They had agreed with quite sufficient certainty on a contract for the sale of goods by description, namely, horsebeans. Once they had done that, nothing in their minds could make the contract a nullity from the beginning, though it might, to be sure, be a ground in some circumstances for setting the contract aside in equity. … Even a common mistake as to the subject-matter does not make it a nullity. Once the contract is outwardly complete, the contract is good unless and until it is set aside for failure of some condition on which the existence of the contract depends, or for fraud, or on some equitable ground … This mistake was induced by the innocent misrepresentation of the defendants made to the buyers and passed on to the sub-buyers. As soon as the buyers and sub-buyers discovered the mistake, they could, I think, have rejected the goods and asked for their money back.”

[emphasis added]

129.  Here, on the face of the SPA, the parties were in agreement.  The issue is whether Mega Well is entitled to have it set aside for misrepresentation.

130.  For completeness, I should mention that had the court rejected the claim of misrepresentation, it would accede to Bight Gold’s claim for rectification on the ground that there was a common mistake over the C Roof: see the judgments of the CA and CFA in Kowloon Development Finance Ltd v Pendex Industries Ltd at respectively [2012] 3 HKC 541, §§25 to 36 and (2013) 16 HKCFAR 336, §19 and 24.

131.  The court is unable to accept Bright Gold’s argument on affirmation of the SPA by Mega Well.  First and foremost, Bright Gold has conveniently overlooked the fact that the SPA is incapable of affirmation even on its own case.  Under that contract, Bright Gold is obliged to transfer C Roof to Mega Well.  It was and is in no position to do so as it formed part of Duplex C.

132.  Secondly, the unchallenged evidence does not support a case of affirmation on the part of Mega Well.  Upon possession of Duplex B, Mega Well strongly disputed with Bright Gold about the roof which formed part of that property.  Ms Cheng asked for the refund of the purchase price on the 13 August 2011.  Although there is no evidence of the many meetings between Mega Well and the management of Henderson to resolve the dispute, it would be foolhardy to believe that Mega Well had given up its claim that the property was purchased under misrepresentation and was content to accept it with no useable roof.  Bright Gold took the initiative to bring proceedings for rectification of the SPA on 22 December 2001. 

133.  I have mentioned in para 82 above the situation presented to Cheng and her husband when the writ was taken out by Bright Gold. Such evidence was not challenged.  I do not believe that the registration of the Assignment (without any plan attached) assists Bright Gold’s argument.  The lack of plan reflected the parties’ dispute over the roof.  Further, the registration was carried out upon WKLL’s advice to preserve Mega Well’s rights.  This was explained in Lau’s evidence, which was not disputed.

134.  As regards the use of Duplex B, Mega Well’s unchallenged evidence was that Cheng refused to move into the property. However, she was advised by Mega Well’s solicitors to do so in mitigation of damage.  She moved into the property on 29 July 2012 and had to return to her Kowloon Tong home in about September 2014 due to many quality issues, like water leakage and the fact that the water heater control was located on B Upper Roof.

135.  In respect of any complaint that Mega Well had used the property, the court has to take into account that Bright Gold has kept and no doubt benefited from the use of purchase price since the 2 December 2011 (there is no claim by Mega Well that the purchase price should be refunded to it with interest upon rescission of contract).  At the meantime, the expenses for the property, eg, management fees, were all paid by Mega Well. 

136.  In the premises, I see no inhibition or unfairness to the grant of the relief of recession, and I do so.

137.  As regards Bright Gold’s argument that there should be, as a consequence of rescission, an account of mesne profit by Mega Well for the use of the property and depreciation, Bright Gold had adduced no evidence of such profit, and there is no order for a split trial. 

138.  As indicated above, Bright Gold has kept the purchase price whilst Mega Well has shouldered the responsibility of paying the mortgage interest.  Any accounting exercise will have to consider the benefit derived by Bright Gold with the use of the purchase price over the years.  By allowing Bright Gold to keep such benefit would, in these circumstances, do practical justice between the parties (see Chitty on Contracts, 33rd edn, Vol 1, [7-125]).  Therefore, this court is not inclined to allow this matter to be dragged on any further. 

139.  Finally, it should not be overlooked that Bright Gold has never agreed to take back the property, and therefore cannot simply blame the situation on Mega Well.

Damages

140.  If this court were to refuse to order rescission of the SPA, Mega Well would be entitled to damages in lieu.  As between Mega Well and Bright Gold there is no issue on the amount of damages, being the difference in value of Duplex B with and without the Yellow Area, in the sum of HK$3,050,000 as assessed in the Report. 

141.  However, WKLL take issue with the damages claim firstly on the basis that Mega Well’s pleaded case was that it had lost the use of the Yellow Area and that such area, being common area, could never be enjoyed by Mega Well exclusively.  With respect, I see no merit in such technical argument.  In any case, the evidence of the joint expert had been in place for a long period of time and Mega Well had made clear in its written opening what its claim for damages was.  WKLL was unable to demonstrate to the court any prejudice it might have suffered by reason of the pleading of Mega Well. 

142.  WKLL also submitted that the amount of damages should be reduced by reason of the fact that the purchase price paid by Mega Well was below what was assessed by the expert as the market price of Duplex B with the Yellow Area.  Damages are not meant to achieve perfect compensation. In any case, the argument overlooked the position that Mega Well is saddled with a property which is worth HK$3.05 million less than what it should be.  I see no merit in this objection either.

143.  In respect of Centaline, it contended in its final submission that Mega Well had suffered no loss because Bright Gold had reimbursed the stamp duty paid by it in the transaction and therefore the net price paid for the property was less than the assessed market value of it with the Yellow Area. 

144.  Such argument should have been raised in a transparent manner in Centaline’s opening submissions, if not before.  Raising it in final submissions is not consonant with modern principle of litigation with cards faced up.  Indeed, the matter should have been raised with the expert because the properties used in his comparison approach were all from the same Development, and it is not clear whether the same “incentive” were given in those sales by Bright Gold.  Further, the argument suffered from the same flaw identified in para 143 above.  In the premises, I reject this argument.

145.  If the court were to award damages in this case, I would have awarded Mega Well the sum of HK$3,050,000.

Disposition

146.  On behalf of Bright Gold, Mr Ho had informed the court that there will be no difficulty in Bright Gold repaying the purchase price upon rescission of the SPA.  Therefore, Mr Chong had accepted that Mega Well would only be entitled to nominal damage against Centaline.

147.  I find for Mega Well and WKLL and order as follows:

(1)  Judgment in favour of Mega Well’s Counterclaim against Bright Gold and Centaline;

(2)  It be declared that Mega Well is entitled to rescind and has rescinded the PSPA and the SPA;

(3)  Bright Gold do pay to Mega Well the sum of HK$69.8 million within 14 days from today, with interest at judgment rate(s) from today until payment;

(4)  Upon payment of the said sum with interest, Mega Well do such necessary acts and execute such necessary documents as to transfer the legal and beneficial title of Duplex B to Bright Gold free from encumbrances with reasonable expedition;

(5)  There be liberty to apply;

(6)  Centaline do pay damages to Mega Well in the sum of HK$100;

(7)  Bright Gold’s action be dismissed;

(8)  Mega Well’s Counterclaim against WKLL be dismissed;

(9)  An order nisi that Mega Well’s costs, excluding the costs of its Counterclaim against WKLL, be paid by Bright Gold and Centaline jointly and severally, with a certificate for 2 counsel;

(10)  An order nisi that WKLL’s costs be paid by Mega Well, with a certificate for 2 counsel.

 (Anthony Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Ambrose Ho SC and Mr Lee Tung Ming, instructed by Lo & Lo, for the Plaintiff (by Original Action) and the 3rd Defendant (by Counterclaim)

Mr K M Chong and Mr Darren Poon, instructed by Au, Thong & Tsang, for the Defendant (by Original Action) and the Plaintiff (by Counterclaim)

Mr John Yan SC and Ms Shannon Leung, instructed by Cheung & Choy, for the 1st Defendant (by Counterclaim)

Mr Eugene Fung SC and Ms Verna Lui, instructed by Reed Smith Richards Butler, for the 2nd Defendant (by Counterclaim)

Annex I



[1] It appears that this rather unusual feature was the result of the limited amount of space available after having dedicated most of the Roof as fire refuge in accordance with the Approved Building Plans.

[2] There was a reference to 1,344 sq ft of “Extra Flat Roof Area” in the Sales Brochure for Duplex C.  Apparently, it covered a large area on the 33/F, and it is not clear whether C Roof fell within that area.

[3] It is identified in the 1st Schedule of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Defence and Re-Re-Amended Counterclaim shaded yellow.

[4] CB1/Tab 1.

[5] CB1/Tab 3.

[6] CB1/ Tab 4.

[7] With B encircled.

[8] No translation was provided.

[9] Using the conversion rate of 1 sq m to 10.764 sq ft suggested by Bright Gold.

[10] Unfortunately, there is little such documentary evidence which may assist the court in resolving the credibility issues.

[11] Wong later questioned whether that should be regarded as a “requirement”.  I do not believe it is important whether the appropriate label was a requirement or a wish. 

[12] Both Leung and Lau had described Cheng as angry.  I have listened to the taped conversation of Lau and Cheng (see para 62), whilst Cheng was clearly upset she remained restrained.  In any case, I see nothing unusual for a purchase to be angry if he/she had purchased a very expensive property under misrepresentation.  A proposition which Lau agreed. 

[13] Mega Well was not required to pay any commission for the transaction.

[14] See Fullwood v Hurley [1928] 1 KB 498.

[15] The judgment on negligence was affirmed by the CA but the finding of contributory negligence was reversed.