HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Construction and Arbitration Proceedings2011

FRESH GAIN LTD v. CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO., LTD AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • HCCT48/2016HZ CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL LTD v. CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO LTD AND OTHERS

Files (2)

80628-EN-2012-03-02

FRESH GAIN LTD v. CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO., LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCCT 45/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO. 45 OF 2011

---------------------

  IN THE MATTER of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap.609

---------------------

BETWEEN

 FRESH GAIN LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
 CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO., LTD1st Defendant
 BEIJING RUNCHANG CO., LTD2nd Defendant
 BEIJING RUI HE LIMITED
(北京瑞和有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 BEIJING WANRUISHENG TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD
(北京萬瑞升科技有限責任公司)
4th Defendant
 LEGEND NEW-TECH INVESTMENT LIMITED5th Defendant

---------------------

Before : Deputy High Court Judge Burrell in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 21 February 2012

Date of Judgment : 2 March 2012

-------------------------

D E C I S I O N

-------------------------

 

1.  This is an inter partes summons brought by the plaintiff for the continuation of an ex parte injunction granted on 7 October 2011 made under section 45 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609 which restrained the defendants from removing any assets from Hong Kong up to the value of US$33.8 million. It is a Mareva injunction made under the Arbitration Ordinance.

2.  In a nutshell the case concerns a lump sum investment of US$33.8 million made by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant. The parties entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) in April 2011. It is the plaintiff’s case that the timing of the SPA and the amount of the investment was, in part, based on financial reports prepared by Price Waterhouse Cooper on instructions from the 1st defendant and other related corporate entities.  The claim is based on the allegation that the financial reports were misleading and false on crucial issues.  The heads of claim are breach of the representations and warranties set out in the SPA, fraudulent inducement and fraudulent concealment.

3.  Had the inter partes summons been fully ventilated and contested it would have been necessary to set out, in much more detail, the complex corporate structure of all the companies involved, the relevant clauses of the SPA, the personalities involved and the accounting details from the financial reports which pre-dated and post-dated the SPA.  The case has already generated a considerable amount of paper and legal costs.  The Tribunal for the arbitration has been appointed but the commencement of the hearing has yet to be scheduled.

4.  After some discussion during the morning of the hearing of this inter partes summons the 1st to 3rd defendants offered an undertaking, which the plaintiff very properly accepted, which rendered a full hearing of the issues relevant to the continuation of the ex parte order, unnecessary.

5.  The undertaking given and accepted was as follows:

“UNDERTAKING FROM THE 1ST TO 3RD DEFENDANTS TO THE COURT

1.   The 1st to 3rd Defendants undertake not to dispose of, deal with or otherwise diminish the sums standing in the following bank accounts:-

Account HolderAccount No.Bank
The 1st Defendant 44706823667
44717827251
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“SCB”)
The 2nd Defendant 44706823713SCB
The 3rd Defendant 44717827308
44706892707
SCB

without the consent of the Plaintiff or order of the arbitrators in the arbitration the reference whereof is HKIAC/A11141.

2.   The 1st to 3rd Defendants undertake to provide to the Plaintiff via email and fax (particulars of which to be provided by the Plaintiff) a copy of the bank statements relating to the bank accounts referred to above within 7 days of receipt of the same by the said Defendants, such undertaking to continue until the final award in the said arbitration, the agreement of the parties or as the arbitrators shall direct.

3.   There be liberty to apply to the arbitrators upon reasonable notice for amendment, modification or withdrawal of the above undertakings.”

6.  The only matter which was not resolved was the question of the appropriate order for costs on the inter partes hearing.

7.  After some discussion it was agreed that the court should order one of three possible alternatives on costs. Mr Benjamin Yu, SC leading Mr Victor Dawes for the plaintiff submitted that the appropriate order was that the costs of and arising from the inter partes summons be to the plaintiff in any event.  Mr John Scott, SC leading Mr Norman Nip for the defendants argued that the order should either be costs reserved to the arbitration or costs reserved to this court not to be decided until after the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.

8.  I propose to dispense with one of those three at the outset.  I do not think that the question of these costs should be determined in the arbitration.  It is uncertain whether the arbitrators would have jurisdiction to do so in any event.  Even if they did, I do not regard it as appropriate for the issue of whether or not the injunction should have been brought or not, to be added to the issues for the arbitrators to resolve.  The injunction proceedings are wholly within this court and this court should exercise its discretion as to the proper costs order.

9.  Had the parties agreed that the costs of this inter partes summons been “costs in the cause of arbitration” that would have been different.  In those circumstances the outcome of the arbitration would have determined the outcome of this costs argument.  It would not have been an additional issue for the arbitrators to consider.

10.  Thus, this court will determine the costs issue.  The question is, when?

Plaintiff’s submission

11.  In the limited time available Mr Yu, SC outlined the key features of his case, as set out in the plaintiff’s skeleton argument, in order to demonstrate the plaintiff’s entitlement to an injunction even though they had accepted, quite rightly, an undertaking from the defendants on the morning of the hearing.

12.  He referred the court to the documents and affirmation evidence in support of his case that the financial figures in two reports (the “February” report and the “April” report) prior to the signing of the SPA were inflated and deliberately so.  In particular, he identified documents which purported to show that a substantial debt (of RMB67 million) to the company was in fact a “bad debt”.  And, in similar vein, that another substantial debt originally said to be owed by an individual to the company turned out to be the reverse, namely a liability to that individual.  He submitted that the plaintiff was easily able to demonstrate that they had a good arguable case and that there was a real risk of assets in Hong Kong being dissipated. 

13.  He submitted that this court is fully equipped to determine the issue of costs now.  No issues will arise in the future, either in the course of the arbitration or otherwise, which will affect the correctness of a costs order in the plaintiff’s favour provided the court is now satisfied that the injunction proceedings have been properly brought.

14.  Had my decision been that costs be to the plaintiff now, it would have been necessary to consider in a little more detail the plaintiff’s submission in this regard — to determine here and now whether all the requirements for making a Mareva injunction have been met.  The fact that, as will be seen hereafter, I have decided to postpone the question of costs is not to be regarded as a poor reflection on the plaintiff’s submission.  It may well be that in due course this court will decide that the Mareva proceedings were properly instituted.  It may well be, in due course, that this court expresses its agreement with the plaintiff’s submissions.  However, there is no hardship or prejudice, in my judgment, in adopting the proposal made by Mr Scott, SC on behalf of the 1st to 3rd defendants.  

15.  Before I move on briefly to outline Mr Scott’s position I should emphasis that the decision to postpone reflects nothing about the merits either way.  A decision to award costs now could not be regarded as an extra trump card in the plaintiff’s hand and, conversely, the decision not to deal with costs now leaves the defendants in exactly the same position as before.  It is neutral.

Defendants’ submission

16.  Mr Scott submits that a determination on costs now would be premature.  The safer course is to wait until after the arbitration.  This is a complex matter and many of the issues which are at the core of the plaintiff’s application are directly relevant to the pre-requisites of granting a Mareva injunction and can only safely be answered at a later date.  Moreover, the complexity of the issues is another reason to exercise caution.  If this were, for example, a simple injunction to keep open a right of way, the costs could and should be dealt with at the time.  If however, as here, the bigger picture is both factually and legally complex and keenly disputed throughout, it is another reason to wait. 

17.  Mr Scott accepts that even if he were to be the successful party in the arbitration, the plaintiff could still be entitled to their costs on this inter partes injunction.  However, if a costs order is made now the risk of it being an unjust one is greater.  There is no prejudice to either party by postponing the costs order.  Even if the arbitration settles, this issue can be still be restored before this court.

Decision

18.  It is of course true that when deciding on costs the court should consider the merits of the application and not the possible outcome of the arbitration.  However, in this case, I cannot exclude the possibility that matters will come to light which will be relevant to the merits of the application.  I do not agree that all relevant matters must already be within the court’s knowledge.

19.  I accordingly defer the court’s decision on costs until after the conclusion of the arbitration.

20.  An issue remains as to how and when this matter should be restored.  In order to assist in the future management of these proceedings I will say two things.

21.  First, it would be preferable but not essential to list the postponed costs issue before the same judge.

22.  Secondly, if, as would be preferable, it is to be relisted before me on some future occasion, I would propose, if the parties consent, to deal with the matter “on paper”.

23.  The majority (may be even all) of the arguments and submissions have already been made.  However, each side may at a later date serve written submissions (of no more than 7‑8 pages) entitled “additional submissions relevant to the merits of the injunction proceedings to be taken into account on the question of the appropriate costs order”.

(M P Burrell)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Benjamin Yu, SC & Mr Victor Dawes, instructed by Messrs Woo, Kwan Lee & Lo, for the plaintiff

Mr John Scott, SC & Mr Norman Nip, instructed by Messrs Dechert, for the 1st to 3rd defendants

79656-EN-2011-12-15

FRESH GAIN LTD v. CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCCT 45/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO. 45 OF 2011

____________

 

IN THE MATTER of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap.609

____________

BETWEEN

 FRESH GAIN LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 CHINA VOCATIONAL EDUCATION CO., LTD1st Defendant
 BEIJING RUNCHANG CO., LTD2nd Defendant
 BEIJING RUI HE LIMITED
(北京瑞和有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 BEIJING WANRUISHENG TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD
(北京萬瑞升科技有限責任公司)
4th Defendant
 LEGEND NEW-TECH INVESTMENT LIMITED5th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge L. Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 14 December 2011

Date of Decision: 15 December 2011

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

 

1.  This is a decision on the 5th defendant’s application to strike out the claim in the originating summons as against the 5th defendant. There were an alternative relief sought by the 5th defendant for discharge of an ex parte Mareva injunction granted by Saunders J on 7 October 2011 and an application by the plaintiff to continue the injunction. The matters in relation to the injunction have been settled.

The plaintiff’s claim for return of US$33.8 million

2.  The plaintiff entered into a Share Purchase Agreement with the 1st defendant and various other persons and entities.  The agreement is dated 22 April 2011.  By this agreement, the plaintiff was to acquire a block of shares in the 1st defendant for US$33.8 million.   This sum was paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant on 31 May 2011.  The 1st defendant was in the education business. 

3.  By the close of the share purchase transaction, the plaintiff alleged that it was induced to enter into the agreement by some false and misleading representations made to it by the 1st defendant’s representatives.

4.  The 1st defendant through a subsidiary was able to exercise control over one Beijing Beike Haoyue Technology Company Limited (“Haoyue”).  Haoyue’s business was in the investment and management of educational institutes in the mainland.  The plaintiff alleged that the misrepresentations made to it were about the financial position of the 1st defendant or its subsidiaries and Haoyue.

5.  The plaintiff then decided to rescind the Share Purchase Agreement and claim the return of the US$33.8 million paid thereunder.  The plaintiff has now started arbitration proceedings against the 1st to 3rd defendants.  The 2nd and 3rd defendants are wholly owned subsidiaries of the 1st defendant. 

Payment of US dollars equivalent to RMB144,276,812.31 to D5

6.  The 5th defendant is an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of Legend Holdings Limited, a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Legend Holdings has another subsidiary, Beijing Legend Star Capital Company Limited (“Beijing Star”). 

7.  Beijing Star entered into a loan agreement dated 7 February 2010 with Haoyue agreeing to advance RMB200 million to Haoyue for 6 months.  In order to comply with or get around the mainland’s financial registrations, the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank was also involved in this loan transaction.  But these proceedings do not concern the bank. 

8.  Haoyue could not repay the loan to Beijing Star on time and a loan extension agreement dated 3 August 2010 was then made to extend the repayment date to 8 November 2010.  Haoyue still failed to repay by that date.  An arrangement was then made to give Haoyue more time to pay. 

9.  The arrangement was put in place by the making of three agreements all dated 8 July 2011, which involved Beijing Star, Haoyue and the 3rd and 5th defendants (“the Three Agreements”).  The scheme required the 3rd defendant to pay the 5th defendant a sum of US dollars equivalent to RMB 144,276,812.31 as security for repayment of the loan by Haoyue or as “Comfort Money”, as the plaintiff prefers to call it.

10.  Of the US$33.8 million paid by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant, a sum of US$25,399,900 was transferred to the 2nd defendant and then to the 3rd defendant on 29 June 2011.  Out of this sum, US$22,297,629.60 (equivalent to RMB144,276,812.31) (“the Sum”) was transferred from the 3rd defendant to the 5th defendant pursuant to the Three Agreements on 12 July 2011. 

11.  This transfer was done with the agreement of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was then fully aware of the terms of the Three Agreements under which the transfer was made. 

12.  The arrangement under the Three Agreements provided for certain waivers of interest and default payments by Beijing Star in favour of Haoyue.  These waivers were conditional upon repayment by Haoyue of the loan to Beijing Star, as provided in the Three Agreements. 

D5’s rights and obligations to the Sum under the Three Agreements

13.  The terms of the Three Agreements also gave the 5th defendant all the powers to use the Sum in investment or business projects as the 5th defendant may deem appropriate during the period when it is kept by the 5th defendant.  This period is referred to as the entrustment period. 

14.  The 5th defendant can keep all the profits to be generated by the use of the Sum, and need not pay any interest for its use. However, when the entrustment period expires, the 5th defendant would have to transfer the Sum to the bank account of the 3rd defendant.  This transfer was guaranteed by Beijing Star in Clause 5.3 of an agreement called the Funds Entrustment Management Agreement, which is one of the Three Agreements.

15.  The 3rd defendant would then have to transfer the Sum to a bank account of another company which had not yet been set up at the time of the Three Agreements.  This company is called Beijing Wanbopeng Technology Company Limited (“Wanbopeng”). 

16.  This bank account of Wanbopeng was to be jointly managed by Wanbopeng and Beijing Star.  Wanbopeng should then pay the Sum together with all outstanding interest into an account of Haoyue.  This account was to be jointly managed by Haoyue and Beijing Star.  There is no dispute on the meaning of the terms of the Three Agreements up to this point. 

The dispute over the meaning of the Three Agreements

17.  The dispute between the plaintiff and 5th defendant is on whether the Sum plus interest received by Haoyue from Wanbopeng should be used to repay the part of the outstanding loan and interest due from Haoyue to Beijing Star.  The 5th defendant says that Haoyue should do so per the terms of Three Agreements, but the plaintiff says that the Sum should remain in the account of the 5th defendant pending repayment of the loan by Haoyue to Beijing Star (see paragraph 38 of the Plaintiff’s skeleton). 

18.  The 5th defendant no doubt has the power to keep and use the Sum pending repayment of the loan by Haoyue to Beijing Star, but this is subject to the 5th defendant’s obligation to transfer the Sum to the 3rd defendant at the end of the entrustment period.  I also agree with leading counsel for the 5th defendant that at the end, Haoyue is obliged to pay the Sum and the interest it received from Wanbopeng to Beijing Star as repayment of the loan. 

19.  However, this dispute between the plaintiff and the 5th defendant is irrelevant to these proceedings as the 5th defendant under the Three Agreements cannot pay the sum to Beijing Star as repayment on behalf of Haoyue.  The 5th defendant can and has to transfer the Sum to the 3rd defendant’s bank account when the entrustment period ends.  Under the Three Agreements, this period will end upon Wanbopeng opening the bank account which would be jointly managed by it and Beijing Star. 

These proceedings and the ex parte Mareva injunctions

20.  The plaintiff, after having decided to rescind the Share Purchase Agreement and resort to arbitration against the 1st to 3rd defendants, then instituted these proceedings against the 1st to 3rd defendants and the 5th defendant.  The relief against the 5th defendant is for an injunction to enjoin the 5th defendant from (1) removing from Hong Kong any of its assets which are within Hong Kong, whether in its own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned by it up to the value of the Sum or (2) in any way disposing of or dealing with or diminishing the value of any of it assets which are within Hong Kong, whether in it own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned up to the value of the Sum.  The relief specifically refers to the Sum in the bank account of the 5th defendant maintained with the Hongkong bank into which the Sum was deposited by the 3rd defendant previously.  The relief is prayed for as an interim measure under section 45 of the current Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. 609. 

21.  The Plaintiff also applied ex parte for Mareva injunctions against the 1st to 3rd defendants and the 5th defendant.  The injunction as against the 1st to 3rd defendants is for the US$33.8 million.  The injunction against the 5th defendant is for the Sum.  The injunction is in the same terms as prayed for in the originating summons, but is subject to further order of this court or until final award in the pending arbitration proceedings. 

22.  The learned judge relied on the explanation of the plaintiff’s counsel on the meaning of the terms of the Three Agreements because the Three Agreements are in Chinese.  Unfortunately, counsel took the view that the 5th defendant was merely a bare trustee in holding the Sum.  This view is obviously incorrect as the 5th defendant can under the terms of the Three Agreements apply the Sum in investment or business projects as it may deem appropriate. It can also keep the profit generated therefrom.  There is also no geographical limitation for the application of the Sum.

D5’s undertaking and the discharge of the Mareva injunction

23.  The Mareva injunction as granted clearly prevented the 5th defendant from exercising such right over the Sum.  Furthermore, the plaintiff was fully aware of the terms of the Three Agreements which required the 5th defendant to pay the Sum to the 3rd defendant at the expiry of the entrustment period.  The Mareva injunction also prevented the 5th defendant from complying with this obligation.    

24.  The plaintiff in agreeing to allow the Sum to be transferred by the 3rd defendant to 5th defendant was fully aware of the terms of the Three Agreements which required the transfer to be made. 

25.  Since the transfer was made, neither the 5th defendant nor Beijing Star nor any company in the Legend Group has committed any conduct which could diminish the 5th defendant’s right over the Sum or qualify its obligation to transfer it to the 3rd defendant at the end of the entrustment period.  The plaintiff has no justification at all to seek the injunction against the 5th defendant. 

26.  At the hearing, the 5th defendant gave an undertaking to the court that it would abide by the terms of the Three Agreements in accordance with the parties’ rights and obligations thereunder until further order.  Leading counsel for the 5th defendant made it clear that the undertaking was made merely to give some comfort to the plaintiff that the 5th defendant would abide by the terms of the Three Agreements in dealing with the Sum.  The undertaking was made without any admission of any wrongdoing. 

27.  The plaintiff then consented to the discharge of the Mareva injunction as against the 5th defendant.  However, the plaintiff insists that its claim for interim relief against the 5th defendant in the originating summons should remain.  

Striking out the plaintiff’s claim against the 5th defendant

28.  The 5th defendant disagrees and says that there is no basis for the interim relief sought.  I agree with the 5th defendant.  On the undisputed facts before the court, there is no reason why the 5th defendant cannot continue to make use of the Sum per the Three Agreements until the end of the entrustment period. There is also no reason why the 5th defendant can refrain from transferring the Sum to the 3rd defendant at the end of the entrustment period.  There is therefore no basis whatsoever for the interim relief as sought against the 5th defendant. 

29.  The plaintiff then tried to rescue the situation by proposing to replace the existing relief with an amended relief in the same terms as the undertaking given by the 5th defendant to the court.  However, the 5th defendant objects to this amendment on the ground of futility as the proposed relief has already been satisfied by the 5th defendant’s undertaking to the court.  I agree with the 5th defendant that there is no basis for the existing or proposed relief against it.  I therefore strike out the plaintiff’s claim against the 5th defendant. 

Costs order nisi

30.  On the question of costs, I think there is no basis for the ex parte application for injunction against the 5th defendant and the injunction should be discharged regardless of the 5th defendant’s undertaking. 

31.  The claim against the 5th defendant has also been struck out without prejudice to the 5th defendant’s undertaking to the court. 

32.  Leading counsel to the plaintiff has referred to some passages in the 5th defendant’s affirmations and skeleton submissions to justify its conduct.  I agree that some statements from the 5th defendant may appear to overstate the 5th defendant’s case.  However, the plaintiff did not apply ex parte because of these statements.  It also cannot create grounds to support its case by referring to misstatement of its opponent.  On the facts of this case, if the plaintiff has no ground to raise and maintain its case, it has no ground. 

33.  I therefore make a costs order nisi that the plaintiff should pay the 5th defendant the costs of the claim including the striking out of the claim, the opposing of the continuation and the setting aside of the Mareva injunction.  I also certify the matter fit for leading and junior counsel.  I, however, do not consider that it is appropriate to order the indemnity scale of costs as I do not think this case would warrant such treatment.  I do not think there was any deliberate abuse of the process of the court. 

(L. Chan)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Rimsky Yuen, SC and Mr Victor Dawes, instructed by Messrs Woo, Kwan, Lee & Lo, for the Plaintiff

Ms Linda Chan SC and Ms Bonnie Cheng, instructed by Messrs Norton Rose Hong Kong, for the 5th Defendant