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Land Compulsory Sale Application2011

PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LTD v. MAN YU ON AND OTHERS

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  • LDCS32001/2011TOPBASE INTERNATIONAL LTD t/a NEW KWOK WAH MEAT CO v. PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LTD

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86602-EN-2013-04-12

PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LTD v. MAN YU ON AND OTHERS

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LDCS 32000 / 2011

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

LAND COMPULSORY SALE APPLICATION NO. 32000 OF 2011

__________________

BETWEEN

PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LIMITED
(百冠企業有限公司)
Applicant
And
MAN YU ON (文羽安) and
 YEE YIN YIN (余嫣然)
1st Respondent (discontinued)
CHOW GAVIN DAT YIN and
 CHOW MAXINE GAR YUE
2nd Respondent

___________________

Coram : Mr. W.K. LO, Member of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Hearing : 12 March 2013
Date of Judgment : 12 April 2013

_________________

JUDGMENT

_________________

Background

1.  This is an application for compulsory sale of 2 buildings at No.10 and No.12 of Kimberley Street, Kowloon (“the 1st Building” and “the 2nd Building” respectively).

2.  On 9 September 2011, the Applicant commenced the present proceedings under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (Cap. 545) (“the Ordinance”) against the 2 Respondents for compulsory sale of (a) Kowloon Inland Lot No. 8669 (“the 1st Lot”) and (b) Kowloon Inland Lot No. 8753 (“the 2nd Lot”); (collectively “the Lots”).

3.  The Lots are on the north-western side of Kimberly Street near its junction with Shun Yee Street in the Tsim Sha Tsui District of Kowloon. The building erected on the 1st Lot is No. 10 Kimberley Street, Kowloon (“No. 10”) and is called Cheong Lok Lau and the building erected on the 2nd Lot is No.12 Kimberley Street, Kowloon (“No. 12”). The 2 buildings (collectively “the Building”) are connected by 2 staircases intended for common use by the occupiers of the 2 buildings.

4.  The approved building plans of the Building were dated 8 January 1963 and 1 May 1963. There are separate Deeds of Covenant for No. 10 and No. 12. The occupation permit of the Building is dated 17 December 1965. The prescribed use for G/F is 2 shops, 1/F is 2 offices and 2nd to 7th Floors is 2 European type flats for domestic use. The shop at No. 10 had been sub-divided into Shop Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the shop at No. 12 had been sub-divided into Shop Nos. A, B and C.

5.  A total of 10 undivided shares were allotted for No. 10. Also, a total of 10 undivided shares were allotted for No. 12.

6.  Settlement has been reached between the Applicant and the 1st Respondent. The proceedings against the 1st Respondent have been discontinued on 11 July 2012. The Applicant is the majority owner of the Lots and the 2nd Respondent is the remaining minority owner of the Lots (owner of No. 12, 5th floor).

7.  The 2nd Respondent has on 9 November 2012 obtained leave to amend the Form 33. By the Amended Form 33 dated 12 November 2012, the 2nd Respondent’s position has changed. The 2nd Respondent no longer opposes an order for sale of all the undivided shares of the Lots for the purpose of redevelopment.

8.  Therefore, when the Applicant appeared before this Tribunal at the trial, the application was unopposed.

9.  Section 3(1) of the Ordinance requires the majority owner making the application to own not less than 90% of the undivided shares in the Lots in question. When the application was made on 9 September 2011, the Applicant owned 90% of the Lots. As said, after commencement of the proceedings, the Applicant acquired the 1st Respondent’s property. The Applicant became the owner of 95% of the undivided shares of the Lots. The Applicant was clearly entitled to make the application for the compulsory sale of the Lots.

10.  Under section 3 of the Ordinance, the Applicant has made the application accompanied by a valuation report as specified in Part 1 of Schedule 1, prepared not earlier than 3 months before the date of the application, containing the assessments of the values (of all units which are conveniently termed as the existing use values, the “EUV” of all units) in the Building on the Lots.

11.  Under section 4(1)(a)(i), if there is a dispute between the parties on the EUV of the units in the Building on the Lots, the Tribunal has to determine the values. Section 4(1)(a)(ii) further provides that, in the case of any minority owner of the lot who cannot be found, the majority owner of the lot is required to satisfy the Tribunal that the value of the minority owner’s property as assessed in the application is “(A) not less than fair and reasonable, and (B) not less than fair and reasonable when compared with the value of the majority owner’s property as assessed in the application. However, in the present case, as there is no missing owner in this application, section 4(1)(a)(ii) does not apply.

12.  In the Application Report of 8 September 2011, Mr. Charles Chan (“Mr. Chan”) of Savills Valuation and Professional Services Ltd, the Applicant’s valuation expert, set out the method of valuation and the process of his assessment to arrive at the EUV of each unit of the Building as at 30 August 2011.

13.  In Mr. Chan’s second valuation report, the Supplemental Report of 27 September 2012, he (1) reviewed the EUV of the units as at 30 August 2011, which was prompted by inspection of the internal condition of more units of the Building and the availability of the confirmed property indices for time adjustment since the Application Report; and (2) provided his opinion as to whether redevelopment of the Lots is justified due to the age and/ or state of repair of the Buildings from the economic perspective. In the Supplemental Report, Mr. Chan repeated the exercise he did in the Application Report with the new information and set out the assessments of the EUV of all units, including the 2nd Respondent’s unit:

(1)     The 2nd Respondent’s unit (5/F of No. 12 Kimberley Street) is assessed at $5,870,000 (representing 3.6277% of the total EUV of all units); and

(2)     The total EUV of all units is assessed at $161,810,000.

14.  I accept the EUV valuation of Mr. Chan. I determine that for the purpose of this application, the EUV of all units in the Building as at 30 August 2011 (the Valuation date in the Application Report accompanying the application), including the 2nd Respondent’s unit are as shown above.

Justification for Redevelopment

15.  The second determination under Section 4(1)(b) of the Ordinance is whether the order of compulsory sale should be made. According to Section 4(2) of the Ordinance, this would involve 2 statutory requirements, namely :-

(a)     is the redevelopment justified due to age or state of repair of the Buildings; and

(b)     has the Applicant taken reasonable steps to acquire all the undivided shares in the Lots.

16.  The Applicant has to satisfy the Tribunal that the above statutory requirements were met, otherwise, an order of compulsory sale ought not be granted.

17.  The Applicant submits that with the amendment of Form 33 (Notice of Opposition) on 12 November 2012 by the 2nd Respondent, the latter no longer takes issue as to whether the Applicant has taken reasonable steps to acquire the 2nd Respondent’s unit.

18.  The Applicant submits that, in any event, the evidence is that the Applicant has done so. The details of the evidence were set out in the witness statement of Kwan Po Lam, Phileas, the factual witness and the representative of the Applicant. Two offers have been made by the Applicant. Firstly, before the application was made, the Applicant offered on 24 August 2011 to purchase the 2nd Respondent’s unit at $10,000,000. As stated in the offer letter, the offer price was calculated based on the EUV valuation of Mr. Chan, with an added premium of 18.67%. Secondly, after the commencement of the proceedings, with the assistance of the expert advice from Mr. Chan (based on his estimates of EUV as at 30 August 2011 in his Supplemental Report and his updated RDV report), the Applicant has made a revised offer on 26 February 2013 to purchase the 2nd Respondent’s unit at $10,900,000. The Applicant submits that, the revised offer of $10,900,000 is higher that the 2nd Respondent’s share of the RDV at $10,592,884 (i.e. based on Mr. Chan’s updated RDV estimate of $292,000,000 x EUV ratio for the 2nd Respondent’s unit at $5,870,000/$161,810,000, or 3.6277%).

19.  The Applicant refers to the CFA decision in Capital Well Ltd.V Bond Star Development Ltd (2005) 8 HKCFAR 578 at paras. 33, 34,35 and 36and submits that the Tribunal is not conducting a valuation exercise in deciding whether the offer price was fair and reasonable as the Tribunal only has to be satisfied that the offer fell within the range of what might broadly be regarded as fair and reasonable compensation.

20.  The Applicant also refers to Fully H.K. Investments Ltd and Others v Poon Vai Ching, The Executrix of the Will of Poon Kam Chuen (Deceased) LDCS 3000/2005 at paras. 17 and 18 and submits that the Tribunal can take into account the offer made by the majority owner after the application was made to decide whether section 4(2)(b) of Cap. 545 is fulfilled.

21.  Having considered the evidence aforesaid, I agree with the Applicant and determine that the Applicant has taken steps to acquire the 2nd Respondent’s remaining unacquired undivided shares in the Lots on terms that are fair and reasonable.

22.  Next, as for the requirement under section 4(2) of the Ordinance as to whether the redevelopment is justified due to age or state of repair of the Buildings, The Applicant submits that the tests of “age” and “state of report” are separate tests and that both tests are satisfied in this application. In this regard, I have considered the expert opinion of Mr. Wong Ha, the structural engineer, Mr. Dennis Wong, the building surveyor and Mr. Chan, the valuation surveyor. Their main findings and conclusions are summarized below.

23.  Mr. Wong Ha has the following conclusions in his Structural Survey Report:

 (a) Although the structural elements are in a fair condition, test results show that if no preventive measures are carried out immediately, extensive repair and maintenance will be required in coming years.

 (b) The steel reinforcement is susceptible to corrosion.

 (c) There are cracks and spalling in some structural elements.

 (d) 33% of structural members have concrete cover less than the design cover. The design cover is less than the current design standard.   

 (e) Immediate require works are required.

 (f) The design structural safety of the Building cannot meet the current safety standard in term of wind load, ductility and robustness.

 (g) The provisions for durability and fire resistance of the Building do not meet the current requirement.

 (h) The design life of the Building is less than 50 years and the Building which is now 47 years may have its design life ended. Extensive repair will be required in coming years.

24.  Mr. Dennis Wong has the following conclusions in his Condition Survey Report for the Building:

(a) Due to changes in statutory requirements, advanced technology and higher expectations over the years, the Building has become substandard with many problems affecting the hygiene, safety, convenience and enjoyment of the Building.

(b) The physical and functional hazards have resulted from deficiencies in the planning, design, use of material, facilities and workmanship of the Building when it was first constructed. These are further aggravated due to unauthorized building works and absence of proper building management. This has rendered the Building to be below a habitable standard and fall short of many basic requirements expected in new building.

(c) The Building is obviously below a tenantable standard with its structural frames in fair condition but part of its components and services do not comply with the required standard and some of finishes having deteriorated towards the end of their effective life spans.

(d) The Building have not been maintained and managed up to the required standard with many of its components and services installations showing non-compliance with the current standard.

(e) The costs of essential works estimated at HK$9,149,587 amounts to HK$6,339.58 sq.m. of the existing Gross Floor Area of the Building. This unit cost of essential repairs is about 43.6% of the unit cost of HK$14,532.22/sq.m. for constructing a new building. In short, the essential works costs are disproportionately high as compared with the cost of constructing a new building.

(f) Even after the essential an updating works have been implemented, the Building will remain an old residential cum commercial building with its design and construction outdated and below market expectations and constitute a continuing repair liability to the owners.

25.  It is the conclusion of Mr. Dennis Wong that the redevelopment of the Lots is justified due to the age or state of repair of the Building.

26.  The Applicant submits that although the “economic test” on age or state of repair may be doubted, the test has not been overruled. Hence, the Applicant relies on the age test and state of repair test as set out by Mr. Chan in his Supplemental Report.

27.  On the age test, Mr. Chan opines that the test is whether the redevelopment value of the site less demolition costs exceeds the market value of the building as erected on it in its existing use. Having considered the various issues caused by the age of the Building and assessing the EUV and RDV, Mr. Chan’s conclusion is that the assessed RDV of $265,000,000 as at 27 September 2012 exceeds the EUV of $196,150,000 and hence redevelopment is justified. Indeed, the GDV for the hypothetical redevelopment scheme (which is a hotel with shops at G/F) is much higher than EUV after deducting the development costs and the developer’s profit.

28.  On the state of repair test, Mr. Chan opines that it is to consider the viability of repair by comparing the capital costs of repair with the additional value which the costs will create. If the costs of repair is greater than the additional value created then the repair works are not justified. After having research into the enhancement of value due to repair works in different developments, based on the repair costs estimated by Mr. Dennis Wong, Mr. Chan came to the conclusion that the market value of the office and residential portion of the Building would have an enhancement of 5% while that of the shop would only be marginally enhanced. The total enhanced value is $4,981,500 which is far less than the estimated repair costs of $8,891,329 (after taking away the costs on UBWs). Hence, redevelopment is justified on the state of repair test.

29.  I accept the above items of expert evidence of Mr. Wong Ha, Mr. Dennis Wong and Mr. Chan. I am satisfied that the redevelopment of the Building and the Lots is justified due to the age and/or state of repair of the Building. 

Reserved Price for the Auction

30.  The Applicant submits that the reserve price for the auction of the Lots should be fixed at $292,000,000 based on the assessment by Mr. Chan of the redevelopment value (“RDV”) of the Lots as at 25 February 2013 in his valuation report of the same date. The 2nd Respondent does not oppose this assessment.

31.  I have considered Mr. Chan’s valuation of the RDV of the Lots. I note and agree with him that although there were several land sale transactions in Tsim Sha Tsui area in the past few years and a land sale transactions for hotel development in Wan Chai area, they are all not suitable for direct comparison purpose because of the differences in time and/or location between the Lots and the land sale comparables. I also agree with him that as a last resort, the residual method has to be employed as the method of assessment of the RDV of the Lots.

32.  Mr. Chan opines that the optimum development on the Lots comprised a block of 21-storey hotel with shop units on the ground floor. He estimates the RDV at $292,000,000 as at 20 February 2013. I have gone through his valuation in details. I am satisfied with his valuation, including the valuation assumptions he has adopted, the values and the costs parameters that he has used in his valuation.

33.  Based on the open market value of the Lots reflecting its redevelopment potential, i.e. the RDV of the Lots, of $292 million as at 20 February 2013 as assessed by Mr. Chan, I decide that this should be the reserve price for the auction of the Lots.

Trustees

34.  I find that Mr. Tam Tak Hing Bernard and Mr. Ching Kwok Ho Samuel of Messrs. King & Co., solicitors, nominated by the Applicant, are suitable persons to be appointed as trustees to discharge the duties imposed on trustees under the Ordinance. Their remuneration at the rate of $5000 per hour (subject to the maximum amount of legal fees charged, exclusive of disbursements, of not more than $60,000) as mentioned in the letter dated 8 February 2013 from Messrs. King & Co. to the Applicant’s solicitors is also reasonable and will be allowed accordingly.

Particulars and conditions of sale of the Lots

35.  The particulars and conditions of sale of the Lots by public auction submitted by the Applicant are also reasonable and will be adopted accordingly.

Time for completion of redevelopment

36.  The Applicant submits that as stipulated in Schedule 3 of the Ordinance, and subject to such further period as the Tribunal may allow, the redevelopment of the Lots shall be completed and made fit for occupation within 6 years after the date on which the purchaser of the Lots became the owner of the Lots. I agree.

Costs

37.  Since the 2nd Respondent is absent, and the Applicant does not ask for costs, I will give a costs order nisi that there be no order as to costs.

Conclusion

38.  Upon consideration of all the evidence, authorities and submissions for the Applicant, I am satisfied that the redevelopment of the Lots is justified due to the age and state of repair of the Building. Even though the 2nd Respondent no longer takes issue on this,  I am satisfied that the Applicant has taken steps to acquire the 2nd Respondent’s property on terms that are fair and reasonable as laid down in section 4(2)(b) of the Ordinance. Therefore, I am satisfied that the requirements and conditions as laid down in the Ordinance have been met and an order for compulsory sale sought by the Applicant should be granted.

Orders

39.  I therefore grant the following orders:-

(1) The Tribunal is satisfied that the apportionment ratio in respect of the 2nd Respondent’s property (No. 12 Kimberley Street, 5th floor) under section 10(3) and Part 3 of Schedule 1 of the Ordinance be 3.6277%.

(2) All the undivided shares in the Lots, the subject of the application herein, be sold by public auction for the purposes of the redevelopment of the Lots.

(3) Mr. Tam Tak Hing Bernard and Mr. Ching Kwok Ho Samuel of Messrs. King & Co., solicitors, nominated by the Applicant, be appointed trustees (“the Trustees”) to discharge the duties imposed on trustees under the ordinance in relation to the Lots and the Trustees be authorized to charge such remuneration for their services in accordance with the terms set out in the letter dated 8 February 2013 from Messrs. King & Co. to the Applicant’s solicitors.

(4) For the purposes of a sale of the Lots by public auction under section 5(1)(a) of the Ordinance,

(a) the sale of the Lots be on the particulars and conditions substantially the same as those in the draft Particulars and Conditions of Sale initialled and approved by the Tribunal;

(b) the reserve price be set at $292,000,000; and

(c) subject to further extensions that the Tribunal may subsequently allow upon the application of the purchaser of the Lots or its successor in title, the redevelopment of the Lots shall be completed and made fit for occupation within a period of 6 years after the date on which the purchaser of the Lots became the owner of the Lots.

(5) Liberty to the Applicant, the 2nd Respondent and the Trustees to apply to the Tribunal for further directions as may be required under the Ordinance.

(6) Costs order nisi: there be no order as to costs; the costs order shall become absolute if there is no application made to vary the order within 14 days..

 Mr. W.K. LO
 Member
Lands Tribunal

Mr. C.Y. LI, instructed by M/S Lo & Lo, for the Applicant.

The 2nd Respondent, absent.

84980-EN-2012-12-13

PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LTD v. TOPBASE INTERNATIONAL LTD

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84467-EN-2012-11-20

PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LTD v. MAN YU ON AND OTHERS

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LDCS32000/2011

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

LAND COMPULSORY SALE MAIN APPLICATION NO. 32000 OF 2011

________________

BETWEEN

 PACIFIC CROWN ENTERPRISES LIMITED
(百冠企業有限公司)
Applicant
 and
 MAN YU ON (文羽安) and
YEE YIN YIN (余嫣然)
1st Respondents
 CHOW GAVIN DAT YIN and
CHOW MAXINE GAR YUE
2nd Respondents

________________

Before: His Honour Judge KO, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Hearing: 13 November 2012
Date of Decision: 20 November 2012

_______________

DECISION

_______________

 

1.  This is the application of Topbase International Limited trading as New Kwok Wah Meat Co. (“Topbase”) to join in these proceedings as a respondent.  The application is opposed by Pacific Crown.

Background

2.  Pacific Crown is the majority owner of two lots of land known as Nos 10 and 12 of Kimberly Street (“the Lots”).  It took out an application on 9 September 2011 (“the Main Application”) for the compulsory sale of the Lots under the Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) against the minority owners thereof:

(a)  the 1st respondents, who used to own Shop 3 on G/F of No 10 of Kimberly Street; and

(b)  the 2nd respondents, who own 5/F of No 12 of Kimberly Street.

3.  Pacific Crown has since acquired the 1st respondents’ property and discontinued the proceedings against them.  A pre-trial review has been set for 18 January 2013 for the Tribunal to consider if the case is ready for trial.  Recently, the 2nd respondents have indicated it will no longer oppose the application and the parties have suggested bringing forward the pre-trial review.

4.  Topbase is the tenant at two properties on the Lots, namely, Shops A and B on G/F of No 12 Kimberly Street.  The tenancy for Shop A is for 3 years and will run up to 11 March 2014, whereas the tenancy for Shop B is for 5 years up to 31 July 2015. The original landlord of Topbase has sold the shops to Pacific Crown subject to the tenancies.

5.  By an application dated 30 September 2011 (“the Connected Application”), Topbase applied against Pacific Crown for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of termination of the tenancies under s 8(1)(b) of the Ordinance following the making of an order for sale by the Tribunal.  The parties in the Connected Application have been referred to mediation.

Topbase’s joinder application

6.  According to the affirmation filed by Topbase’s director in support of its joinder application, Topbase is conducting a business of supply and sale of frozen meat, poultry and seafood to restaurants, hotels and retail customers at the shops.  It has been planning to expand its business by opening one more shop dedicated to the sale of high-end meat products and Halal meat.  The uncertainty of the tenancies has caused disturbance in their business and the director complains that:

(a) Topbase has been kept in the dark about the progress of the Main Application.

(b) Topbase should be able to derive some benefits from the compulsory sale of the Lots.

(c) The Ordinance does not provide for compensation to be paid to Topbase in the event of an unsuccessfully application or sale.

7.  Mr Heung, the solicitor appearing for Topbase, submits that Topbase “should not be forced to passively wait for the outcome of the Main Application and be confined to a statutory claim for monetary compensation.  It should be allowed to join in the Main Application to defend its property rights under the tenancies.”  He puts forward three bases for his proactive approach:

(a) Since Topbase is directly affected by the outcome of the Main Application, natural justice demands that it be allowed to participate in the Main Application to defend its property rights under the tenancies.

(b) The Tribunal may give direction in the Main Application under s 4(6)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance relating to the termination of Topbase’s tenancies.

(c) The 2nd respondents’ stance not to oppose the Main Application makes no commercial sense.  He suspects that Pacific Crown has deliberately chosen not to settle with the 2nd respondents so as to invoke s 8(1)(b) of the Ordinance to ensure early termination of Topbase’s tenancies.

Discussion

8.  In my view, Topbase’s joinder application is misconceived having regard to the statutory scheme.

9.  The long title of the Ordinance suggests that it was enacted “to enable persons who own a specified majority of the undivided shares in a lot to make an application to the tribunal for an order for the sale of all of the undivided shares in the lot for the purposes of the redevelopment of the lot; to enable the Tribunal to make such an order if specified criteria are met; and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.”

10.  Riberio PJ has, in Capital Well Ltd v Bond Star Development Ltd [2005] 4 HKLRD 363 at para 10-21, summarised an application for compulsory sale under the Ordinance into four distinct phases: (i) the application; (ii) the Tribunal’s determination; (iii) the sale; and (iv) the apportionment and application of the proceeds of sale. 

11.  In the first phase, an applicant who is eligible under s 3(1) of the Ordinance (called “majority owner”) applies to the Lands Tribunal for an order for the compulsory sale of the lot in question, joining all other persons owning the remaining undivided shares in the lot (called “minority owners”) as respondents (s 2).  Such an application is called a “main application” in Part XIVA of the Lands Tribunal Rules. 

12.  In the second phase, the Tribunal determines any dispute as to the valuation of the properties comprising the lot and decides whether a compulsory sale order should be made (s 4(1)).  The Tribunal is obliged to hear the dispute of any minority owner on the lot (s 4(1)(a)(i)).  In case any minority owner cannot be found, the majority owner will have to satisfy the Tribunal that the value of that minority owner’s property as assessed in the application is fair and reasonable (s 4(1)(a)(ii)).  And the Tribunal shall not make an order for sale unless it is satisfied, after hearing the objections of the minority owners, that the redevelopment of the lot is justified and that the majority owner has taken reasonable steps to acquire all the undivided shares in the lot (s 4(2)). 

13.  The third phase is the sale of the lot.  This is conducted by the trustees appointed by the Tribunal and subject to the directions of the Tribunal (s 4).  The lot is usually sold by public auction to the highest bidder (s 5), subject to a reserve price to be approved by the Tribunal (sch 2). 

14.  The fourth phase is the apportionment and application of the sale proceeds.  The trustees will apportion and distribute the proceeds, after deducting the sale expenses and legal costs, to the majority owner and the minority owners on a pro rata basis in accordance with the value of their respective property as assessed in the s 3(1) report filed with the application subject to any adjustment made by the Tribunal (s 11). 

15.  So, the focus in the first phase is to include all relevant parties in the main application.  A mere tenant who does not own any undivided share in the lot is not normally qualified to be included.  In the second phase, the Tribunal will determine whether the redevelopment of the lot is justified and whether the majority owner’s valuation of the properties comprising the lot should be adjusted.  It is unlikely that a tenant, who only has a limited interest in the leased property (in terms of his right to use the property for the duration of the lease subject to payment of the agreed rent and other terms of the tenancy), will be concerned with the redevelopment of the entire lot.  A tenant, who is not the recipient of any offer from the majority owner for the acquisition of the leased property, will not be in a position to judge whether the majority owner has taken reasonable steps to acquire the lot.  And since he is not the owner, a tenant should not have a say as to the valuation of the leased property.  That is why the Ordinance is silent on the participation of a tenant in the first phase and only obliges the Tribunal to hear the minority owners in the second phase.  A tenant does not feature in the third phase, and the order and manner of application of the proceeds of sale in the fourth phase is statutorily provided.

16.  Mr Heung recalls that he has seen a bank being named as a respondent in a main application.  He is, however, unable to identify the proceedings concerned and he does not know the circumstances under which the bank was joined.  It would be difficult for me to comment on such a general statement except to observe that a mortgagee in possession of any property on the lot the subject of a main application is deemed to be the owner of the undivided shares relating to that property (s 2(3)(a)).

17.  Where the Tribunal makes an order for sale and the lot is sold, all tenancies on the lot will, subject to any direction made under s 4 (6)(a)(ii), be deemed to be terminated immediately upon the day on which the purchaser of the lot becomes the owner of the lot (s 8(1)(b)).  The Tribunal may order compensation to be paid to a tenant for termination of his tenancy under s 8(1)(b) and, for that purpose, the Tribunal will consider the representations, if any, of the tenant (ss 4(6) and 8(3), (4) and (5)).  If a tenant wishes to make representations on the compensation to be paid to him, he should file a “connected application” in accordance with Part XIVA of the Lands Tribunal Rules.  The trustees will automatically retain out of the proceeds to be paid to an owner the amount of compensation directed by the Tribunal to be paid by that owner to his tenant and pay to the tenant directly (s 11(2)(c) and (4) and s 4(6)(a)(iii)).

18.  By the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the legislative scheme does not normally anticipate the participation of a tenant such as Topbase in a main application. 

19.  Mr Heung submits that the court would be in breach of basic principle of natural justice if Topbase is not afforded an opportunity to be heard in the Main Application.  He prays in aid the following judgment of Hoffmann J (as he then was) in Re First Express Ltd [1992] BCLC 824 (at 828e):

“I am firmly of the view that it was wrong for the application to be made ex parte. It is a basic principle of justice that an order should not be made against a party without giving him an opportunity to be heard. The only exception is when two conditions are satisfied. First, that giving him such an opportunity appears likely to cause injustice to the applicant, by reason either of the delay involved or the action which it appears likely that the respondent or others would take before the order can be made. Secondly, when the court is satisfied that any damage which the respondent may suffer through having to comply with the order is compensable under the cross-undertaking or that the risk of uncompensatable loss is clearly outweighed by the risk of injustice to the applicant if the order is not made.”

20.  In my view, Mr Heung’s reliance on that authority is misplaced.  In that case, the company was put into creditor’s voluntary liquidation.  Its bankers exercised their right under a charge to appoint receivers over the assets of the company.  The receivers applied ex parte to the Registrar for and obtained an order requiring the liquidator to hand over the books and records of the company and all moneys held by him on behalf of the company.  The liquidator failed to comply with the order and the receivers applied to commit the liquidator for contempt.  The liquidator, on the other hand, applied for discharge of the Registrar’s order arguing, inter alia, that the original application should not have been made ex parte.  Hoffmann J agreed with the liquidator on that point for the reasons quoted above. 

21.  The present case is very different.  The issues in the Main Application do not concern Topbase. Mr Lee also confirms at the hearing that Pacific Crown is not seeking any order or direction under s 4(6)(a)(ii) or otherwise against Topbase in the Main Application.  So, the proposition discussed in the above quotation is not engaged at all.

22.  In my view, the fallacy in Topbase’s argument is in its overemphasis on its “property rights under the tenancies”.  It seems that Topbase is equating such right with ownership of some undivided shares in the Lots.  That is why its director has suggested that Topbase should be able to derive some benefits from the compulsory sale.  That is not right.  The natural place for a tenant, according to the scheme of the Ordinance, is in a connected application to claim for compensation upon the determination of his tenancy.  That is the extent of their involvement and they may not otherwise share in the windfall from the compulsory sale.

23.  Topbase has already filed the Connected Application against Pacific Crown.  As explained in an earlier ruling dated 19 December 2011 by Deputy Judge Kot in the Connected Application, the Main Application will come on for trial before the Connected Application (see para 12 of the ruling).  Topbase, not being a natural party to the Main Application, will have to justify why it is necessary for it to participate in the Main Application.

24.  On this, Mr Heung has said that the stance adopted by the 2nd respondents in not opposing an order for sale makes no commercial sense to him.  He suspects that Pacific Crown and the 2nd respondents must have elected not to settle but to press on with the Main Application so that Pacific Crown may eventually take advantage of s 8(1)(b) to determine Topbase’s tenancies earlier upon the making of an order for sale.  He submits that Topbase should be given a chance to cross-examine Pacific Crown (or even the 2nd respondents) on their election. He says this is part of the investigation directed under s 4(2)(b).  I do not agree.

25.  The relevant tenancy agreements have not been placed before the court and it is not known if Pacific Crown is entitled to determine Topbase’s tenancies before the expiry of the original terms apart from s 8(1)(b).  So, Mr Heung’s conspiracy theory remains a possibility.  But Mr Lee, counsel for Pacific Crown, has put forward other innocent explanations.  For example, he says the 2nd respondents may wish the Lots to be sold to the highest bidder in a public auction so that the best price according to market force can be obtained (s 5(5)(a)) or the 2nd respondents may even be planning to bid for the Lots themselves in a public auction for redevelopment (s 5(5)(b)).

26.  More importantly, I do not see how an investigation under s 4(2)(b) on the reasonableness of the steps taken by Pacific Crown to acquire all the undivided shares in the Lots can evolve into a consideration of why Pacific Crown did not settle with certain minority owner.  The fact that Pacific Crown has not settled with all the minority owners does not necessarily mean that Pacific Crown has been unreasonable in its attempt to acquire all the undivided shares.

27.  In the course of argument, I asked Mr Heung what Topbase has hoped to achieve by participating in the Main Application.  He says he has no instruction to adduce expert evidence to challenge the justification put forward by Pacific Crown for redevelopment. He merely reiterates his wish to cross-examine Pacific Crown on the steps taken by it in acquiring the Lots.  I do not see how Topbase can have any legitimate basis to cross-examine Pacific Crown in that regard when Topbase, who is not a minority owner, knows nothing about the steps taken by Pacific Crown to acquire the Lots.  I agree with Mr Lee that the proposed course of Topbase is nothing more than a fishing expedition.  Even if Mr Heung is correct in his suspicion, I do not see how Pacific Crown can be criticised for relying on s 8(1)(b) to determine Topbase tenancies.

28.  It is not disputed that a tenant such as Topbase whose tenancy will be statutorily determined upon the making of an order for compulsory sale will suffer some inconvenience.  That will be taken care of separately in the tenant’s connected application.  I do not see how a tenant can guard against its interest in the event of an unsuccessful application or sale by proactively participating in the main application.

29.  Upon closer analysis, it does not appear that the inconvenience to be suffered by Topbase would be as much as that suggested by its director.  The tenancy for Shop A is due to expire in March 2014.  A pre-trial review for the Main Application has been set for January 2013.  There is a pending application to bring forward the pre-trial review.  If that application is acceded to and a trial date is set forthwith, it is likely that the Main Application will come on for trial sometime in about mid-2013.  Assuming there will be a swift determination of the application (as the 2nd respondent no longer opposes the application) and an auction is held within 3 months after the making of the order for sale (s 5(4)(a)), and allowing some time for the purchaser to complete (whereupon Topbase’s tenancies will be determined under s 8(1)(b)(i)) and affording Topbase the full benefit of a 6-month period to vacate the shops (s 8(1)(b)(ii)), the tenancy for Shop A would have expired by the time Topbase is statutorily required to vacate the premises.  That much is accepted by Mr Heung.  By his own estimation, the tenancy for Shop B (which will not expire until July 2015 according to its original term) would be cut short by about 1 to 1½ year.  So, that is the extent of the inconvenience that Topbase will suffer.  There is nothing to suggest that Topbase will not be adequately compensated by a suitable order for compensation in the Connected Application.

30.  Lastly, Pacific Crown has complied with the Ordinance and caused the prescribed notice to be affixed at the main entrance of the buildings in the Lots and to be advertised in newspapers to inform all tenants on the Lots of their application (s 3(3)(c) and Part 2 of Schedule 1).  That was how Topbase was able to commence the Connected Application so soon after the Main Application.  Topbase will be kept informed of the hearings in the Main Application (r 78D of the Lands tribunal Rules).  There is no substance in its complaint that Pacific Crown has kept in the dark about the progress of the Main Application.

Conclusion

31.  For the above reasons, the natural forum for Topbase is in the Connected Application and I see no basis for it to join in the Main Application.  Topbase’s joinder application is therefore dismissed.

32.  I have heard argument on costs.  Both Mr Heung and Mr Lee agree that costs should follow the event.  I make an order that Topbase do pay Pacific Crown the costs of the application to be summarily assessed on the District Court scale if not agreed.  I am satisfied that by reason of the novelty of the point taken by Mr Heung and the relatively infant state of the Ordinance, the engagement of counsel (Mr Lee) to resist the application is justified.  I grant certificate for counsel to Pacific Crown.

33.  I direct Pacific Crown to lodge into the Tribunal and serve on Topbase a statement of costs in the format in Appendix A of Practice Direction 14.3 within 28 days after this decision is handed down, thus allowing some time for the parties to agree on costs.  Topbase is directed to lodge and serve a concise statement of its objections within 14 days thereafter.  The summary assessment will be conducted by me on paper unless otherwise directed, and the parties will be informed of the result in due course.

(Justin Ko)
Presiding Officer
Lands Tribunal

 

Mr Lee Tung-ming, instructed by Messrs Lo & Lo, for the applicant

Mr Matthew Heung, of MessrsLeonard KL Heung & Co, for the intended 3rd respondent

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

Please refer to HCMP2846/2012 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.