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Personal Injuries Action2012

MA YONG MEI v. CHENG MUK LAM

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103515-CH-2016-04-11

MA YONG MEI 對 CHENG MUK LAM

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DCPI 631/2012

香港特別行政區

區域法院

傷亡訴訟2012年第631號

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原告人MA YONG MEI 

對

被告人CHENG MUK LAM 

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主審法官: 區域法院暫委法官黃偉權內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊日期: 2016年3月10日
判案書日期: 2016年4月11日

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判案書

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背景

1.  原告人就本席於2015年12月4日所作之判決(下稱“該判決書”)提出上訴許可申請。

2.  原告人並沒有提交申請上訴許可的支持誓章,只在傳票中列出申請上訴許可的理由。

3.  從原告人的上訴理據可看出,她主要是針對本案之事實裁決(即申請人的右眼傷勢是否因為被告人的手擊中而做成)而提出上訴。

上訴法律原則

4.  《區域法院條例》第63(1)條規定:針對區域法院法官在任何民事訴訟中作出的判決的上訴,必須得到原審法官或上訴法庭許可,才可提出上訴。

5.  根據《區域法院條例》第63A(2)條,除非所擬上訴具備合理機會得直的前景或為秉行公義而須上訴法院考慮,否則法庭不可以准許上訴人提出上訴。又上訴庭在闡釋「有合理機會得直」時,指出該機會必須為合理,即不能毫無理據,但毋須達致相當可能(SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125)。

6.  衡量證據及證人的可信納程度主要是原審法官的責任,在上訴的程序中上訴法庭在一般的情況下不會重新聽取證供,所以,上訴法庭要在原審法官有明顯犯錯的情況下才會推翻他按證據評核而作出的事實裁決,見Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen [2002] 3 HKLRD 1。

7.  區域法院在ZYM also known as ZYM v LYK & Ors [2014] HKCU 1638一案中考慮申請人是否可獲上訴許可時亦依賴Tin Kwong InternationalEnterprise Company Limited & ors v San Tung & anor (unreported, CACV1614/2005)一案。

8.  根據Tin Kwong International Enterprise Company Limtied & ors一案,明顯錯誤 (plainly wrong) 是指原審法官所作之事實裁決是完全沒有證據支持或裁定事實和書面或其他無爭議證據有抵觸而原審法官忽視該等抵觸。單憑指出“支持法官裁定之證據薄弱”或“裁定和證據之強弱並非完全脗合”並不足以構成推翻原審法官所作事實裁定的基礎。

9.  上訴法庭只會在確定原審法官的事實裁斷明顯是錯誤時,才會推翻該等裁斷,否則即使對該裁斷是否正確有所懷疑,亦會尊重原審法官的結論。參看Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited v Tsang Sheung Bun (曾尚彬) (CACV7/2013) (未經案例乎彙編報導)一案上訴法庭2013年10月16日判案書中第24段。

被告人的回應

10.  根據上述案件確立的法律原則,被告人認為原告人不能以「原審法官之判決缺乏理據」為申請上訴的理由,原告人所提的理據在法律上均不成立,沒有合理機會得直。被告人指本席於審訊本案時已考慮所有證據,包括證人於證人欄的表現而作出裁決。本席在耳閒目睹的優勢下,作出全盤考慮後作出裁決。被告人認為,本席的事實裁斷是合情理及合邏輯,被告人也看不到有任何其他有利於秉行公正的理由而需要法庭批准可上訴許可,亦看不到任何推翻本席對事實裁決的理由。因此被告人反對原告人的申請。

討論

11.  本案是一宗人身傷亡的訴訟。有關本案的背景,本席於該判決書的第10-13段已說明, 所以不在此覆述。在上訴申請聆訊時,原告人質疑被告人律師有關該案件證供的準確性,因此本席也重新聆聽該部份被質疑的證供。

12.  本案主要的爭議事實是原告人在該意外的關鍵時刻,她的右眼受傷是否給被告人擊打的排球弄傷或因為被告人在擊打排球時,他的手越過中間的欄網擊中原告人的眼睛而引致。

13.  這是事實的爭議。本席在該判決書第30-38段已列明本席對事實裁決的理由。

14.  原告人的上訴理由,除了就該判決書的事實裁斷提出爭議,她亦提交三份新增文件(見附件一至附件三),分別是一封她在沙巴時醫生的診斷醫療報告、一份從網上由美國兒科協會眼科與斜視刊登有關布朗綜合症的下載文章、及一份原告人眼科覆診日期(9/3/2017)的便條。

15.  原告人的上訴理由扼要可分為下列幾類:

(1)  她不懂得法律,對審訊程序不熟悉,也不清楚自己的權利,因此漏交了文件,導致陳詞時才作出披露。

(2)  本席裁斷她的受傷是由排球導致是錯誤的,與附件一的醫療報告、證人張文威的書面供詞、證人尹山紅及林國基的證供不吻合。

(3)  原告人回港後,被告人陪同原告人見被告人相熟的醫生李永康(“李醫生”),李醫生給予她診費折扣優惠,這足以佐證被告人承認用手弄傷原告人的眼睛。

(4)  本席引用的案例及法理的原則並不適合本案的案情。

(5)  原告人指她當時(該意外時)有跳起攔截,因此,被告人的手足以弄傷她的眼睛。

16.  對於原告人此刻提交的新證據(附件一至三),本席不能接納。原因如下:

(1)  這些並非以誓章形式呈交。

(2)  原告人在本案開始到預審時一直都有律師代表,她的申索及證人供詞都由律師預備。她亦獲提醒要呈交所有與案件有關的文件。附件一的醫療報告早於2009年簽發,而並非在審訊後才簽發的。而附件一明顯與本案有關,是訴訟文件的一部份。原告人一直知道此文件的存在, 當然明顯地是在預備審訊文件時,刻意不披露此份文件。這是原告人和她的律師所作的決定。在此情況下,原告人不可能在被裁定申索不成立後,才提出此項新證據。這對被告人構成不公平的情況。附件二是網上的資料。在審訊時原告人沒有提出的話, 現在就沒有任何法理支持她的申請。附件三是在2015年11月簽發的,是新的證供。

17.  原告人在上訴理據中指她不熟悉法律程序,因此才在書面結案陳詞中附上新的資料,而她也不知道可以申請口頭聆訊。對於這點,本席明白原告人審訊時沒有律師代表,她應付審訊程序出現困難是可預料的。但她指有關新資料與申請延遲審訊有關。換句話說,這並不是審訊時本席要考慮的證供,根本對判決沒有影響,所以也不可能是上訴的理據,又倘若原告人所提交的新資料與本案的證供有關,本席於該判決書第5段至9 段已處理此問題。本席經考慮後,仍維持該裁決。

18.  對於事實的裁斷,根據上述的案例,除非本席犯下明顯的錯誤,否則,上訴許可不應發出。

19.  本席裁斷原告人的眼睛並非由被告人的手弄傷。原因是根據原告人自己的證供描述,她當時沒有跳起攔球,只站在水中舉起雙手攔截。這方面的證供是原告人在審訊時確認過的。若是這樣,根據水池深1.4米,又水上有一欄的網分隔原告人和被告人的客觀事實分析及推理,本席再考慮過雙方的高度,又在水中跳起的難度(這一點原告人也同意),在此情況下,若原告人根本沒有跳起,而被告人的身體又沒有壓在網上的情況下,被告人的手又怎可越過中間的欄網而擊中站在網後約1呎遠的原告人眼睛呢?原告人指被告人呈交的兩張相片不能顯示她在該意外受傷時的情形。但在接受盤問時卻同意她及被告人當時的位置和相片所示位置相約。審訊時她也沒有對相片的可信性提出爭議。這是原告人在審訊時宣誓下作出的證供。詳細分析已在該判決書內第30段至38段列明。這包括本席對林國基及尹山紅證供的裁斷。本席不再在此覆述。根據上述原因, 本席不接納原告人這方面的上訴理據。

20.  張文威先生只提供證人陳述書,沒有出庭作證。在審訊當日,本席已再三向原告人作出提醒,而原告人表示清楚明白不傳召張文威先生作供的後果。雖然原告人沒有法律代表,但本席認為她當時清楚明白有關的法律程序。這是她的選擇。

21.  證人沒有出庭作供但存檔了證人陳述書的法律觀點:

(1) 根據香港法例第336H章《區域法院規則》第38號命令第1條規則訂明如下:

“1. 一般規則:證人須予口頭訊問

除本規則及《證據條例》(第8章)的條文及與證據的任何其他成文法律另有規定外,任何規定須在審訊任何藉令狀開展的訴訟時以證人證據證明的事,須在公開法庭藉訊問證人而予以證明。”

  (2) Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015第38/0/3說:

“…The basic rule has always been that evidence should be given by witnesses giving viva voce evidence in open court (r1)…”

(3) 即使雙方在審訊前交換了證人陳述書,如果證人沒有出庭  作供,他的證人陳述書並不是案中的證據。見Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015第38/2A/11段如下:

“Notwithstanding the pre-trial exchange of the other statements of the witnesses between the parties, ...the trial itself remains an oral, public trial. The written statement of a witness is not in itself evidence of the case...

…

Witness statements which have been exchanged under O 38 r 2A are not put in evidence by the fact of exchange, but remain confidential until the witness makes the statement public by verifying it on oath in the witness box...”(底線後加)

(4) 根據《區域法院規則》第38命令第2A條規則第6段,任何一方均不可援引証人沒有出庭的証人陳述書。

22.  根據上述法律原則,鑑於張文威沒有出庭作供,他的證人陳述書不會被視作本案的證據。因此,本席不需亦不應考慮其內容。否則的話,任何證人均可以藉着已存檔的證人陳述書,但卻選擇不出庭作供,以避過被對方盤問的機會。原告人在申請上訴許可時要求本席考慮張文威的供詞毫無法理支持。

23.  原告人上訴理由書多次指出被告人可傳召其他在場的人仕作供,以指出被告人沒有用手弄傷原告人。本席認為原告人錯誤理解舉證責任誰屬的問題。因為是原告人向被告人提出索償,所以舉證的責任在於原告人。若有需要,在審訊時原告人應傳召其他在場的人仕作供,指證被告人用手弄傷她的右眼睛。原告人絕對是有辦法可以這樣做,因為在場目擊人仕也是她的朋友,同屬一個網球會。被告人也披露他(她)們的電話號碼。

24.  原告人指李醫生的報告中曾說:"Her right eye was hit by a hand as she rose to block a volleyball.” 。這一點在審訊時,原告人沒有向被告人作出有關的盤問,更沒有指出這是被告人對李醫生說的。但原告人在上訴理由書中指這是被告人對李醫生說的。這是新的證供、新的論點。本席認為, 明顯地,這是李醫生診症前的問症。在審訊時,李醫生沒有出庭作供,這是雙方(當時原告人仍有律師代表)的審前協議。所以在此情況下,本席不能接納原告人這論點。

25.  對於賓客事件報告紀錄的證供,本席已作出裁斷(見該判決書第33段),原告人在上訴理由書第8項所述也確認是由她自己將意外即時告知了港灣渡假村的護衛員。本席認為這是原告人受傷後最早陳述自己受傷的原因證供, 所以是最可信的。而這也吻合本席根據原告人沒有跳起攔截排球及當時客觀情況下的推理結果。在此方面,本席的裁斷沒有錯誤。

26.  審訊時被告人從沒有承認當時他曾用手指接觸到原告人的眼睛。原告人上訴理由書第7段的陳述,也清楚顯示這只是原告人的一個假設:「相信即使」。這並不是被告人的證供。

27.  原告人指在判決後她看過的眼科權威林順潮眼科中心的李煒業醫生和Dr. A. S. Karthikeyen醫生都指出她右眼所受傷的情況,應是被手弄傷的(見原告人上訴理由書第7點之第一項), 但就這一說法, 原告人在審訊時並沒有作出任何陳詞,也從沒有提供任何文件證明。這只是就上訴許可申請而提出的新論據。

28.  原告人在審訊時,沒有任何陳述指她的右眼是被刮傷的。這也是新的論點。

29.  原告人指被告人當時毋須跳起扣球,這一點在審訊時也從沒有提出。

30.  終審法官常任法官包致金在Flywin Co. Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd. (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356一案的第369頁B-C段清楚指出:

“Where a point is taken at the trial, the facts pertaining to it are open to full investigation at the evidence-taking stage of the litigation. That is as it should be. Therefore where a party has omitted to take a point at the trial and then seeks to raise that point on appeal, the position is as follows. He will be barred from doing so unless there is no reasonable possibility that the state of the evidence relevant to the point would have been materially more favourable to the other side if the point had been taken at the trial.”

31.  根據Flywin Co. Ltd 一案的法理,原告人在上訴理由書提出的所有新論點, 本席一慨不予接納。

32.  就法理而言,本席所引用的案例已清楚指出水上排球並非身體對抗性的球類活動,也確認當時的參與者並非專業球員,只是嬉戲性質。本席在該判決書第45及47-48段已作出相關的說明,並裁定也同意被告人的行為並非罔顧後果地行事。

33.  考慮原告人就疏忽責任提出所有的上訴論點後,本席不同意該判決書有法理上的錯誤。

34.  原告人亦就賠償問題提出上訴。該判決書裁定被告人毋須對原告人的受傷負責,因此,本席根本不用處理賠償事宜。有關數額的計算及法理也詳列於該判決書的第49-79段。為完整起見,本席也同意被告人的陳詞大綱第52及53段的論點。

35.  仔細考慮原告人所有上訴理據後,本席裁定原告人的上訴許可申請沒有合理機會得直,也沒有其他有利於秉行公正的理由。因此,本席拒絕原告人上訴許可的申請。

訟費

36.  本席頒下暫准命令,原告人須支付是次申請的訟費予被告人。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議,則留待法庭評定。如訴訟雙方沒有提出更改暫准命令的申請, 此訟費的暫准命令將於本判決書頒下的14天後成為絕對命令。

( 黃偉權 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人: 無律師代表, 並親自應訟

被告人: 由肯尼狄律師行的譚偉基律師代表

101683-EN-2015-12-04

MA YONG MEI v. CHENG MUK LAM

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DCPI 631/2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 631 OF 2012

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BETWEEN

 MA YONG MEIPlaintiff

and

 CHENG MUK LAMDefendant

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Coram: Deputy District Judge W K Wong in Court
Date of Hearing: 17, 18 and 20 November 2014
Date of Judgment: 4 December 2015

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1. This is a personal injury case. The plaintiff claims loss and damages arising out of the defendant’s negligence in respect of an accident occurred to the plaintiff on 12 April 2009 at the swimming pool of Sutera Harbour Resort, 1 Sutera Harbour Boulevard, Kota Kinabalu, 88100 Sabah, Malaysia (“Harbour Resort”).

2. The plaintiff  is unrepresented during the trial.

3. On 20 November 2014, when I was prepared to hear  both parties’ closing submissions, the plaintiff produced her medical certificate and asked for time to submit her closing submission at a later day.  No objection was from the defendant.  As the plaintiff would go to the USA for about 2 months, both parties agreed to submit and deal with their closing submissions by papers instead of an oral hearing.  In view of the plaintiff’s long holidays in the USA, I accepted this arrangement and directed that they were at liberty to apply for an oral hearing if necessary.

4. Due to the plaintiff’s late submission, I further extended the time for the defendant to make reply, ie not later than 14 January 2015.

5. On 24December, 2014, the defendant in his reply alleged that the plaintiff had introduced many new assertions and documents in her closing submission which the defendant had not previously been made aware of, and so did not consider and cross-examine these new materials at trial. The defendant objected to all the new materials/evidence and had crossed out in red the references to the new assertions and documents in the plaintiff’s closing submission. (Copy is attached in the defendant’s reply.)

6. It is unclear why the plaintiff had failed to disclose all these new materials before when she was legally represented. From the court record, the plaintiff had all along been legally represented until shortly before the trial dates.

7. The plaintiff was informed of the defendant’s objection by the defendant and she was aware that she was at liberty to ask for an oral hearing if needed.

8. Up to 14January, 2015, no such application had ever been made by either party. Therefore, I takeall closing submissions of both parties to be fully done.

9.   Having considered the defendant’s objection and the relevant circumstances in this case, I accept the defendant’s view that the plaintiff, though  unrepresented at trial, does not entitle her to ignore the rules for a fair trial , particularly since both parties have closed their respective cases. I rule that all these new materials including documents attached to the plaintiff’s closing submission are not admitted as evidence in this case.

Undisputed facts

10. The plaintiff was born on 11 January 1965 and was about 44 years of age at the time of the accident.

11. The plaintiff and the defendant were members of a tennis club and they knew each other through the same tennis club. They had been playing  tennis with other members of the tennis club for a few years before the alleged accident. The plaintiff and the defendant together with other members of the tennis club frequently travelled on holidays and had done so for a number of years.

12. On or about 12 April 2009, at about 11:00 am, the plaintiff and the defendant together with about 9 other members of the tennis club and their families (“the Group”) were playing water volleyball at the Harbour Resort which had a tropical swimming pool with facilities for pool volleyball. The plaintiff and the defendant were separated by a net as they were in different teams. The game was intended to be for fun and leisure among friends and other holidaymakers. There were no particular set rules and the number of players on each team was different. The atmosphere of the game was fun and relaxed. Two photos taken at the scene (trial bundle Section B p 119 and 120) submitted by the defendant show the circumstances on that day when the water volleyball was played .

13. The plaintiff got injured on her right eye while playing water volleyball. After returning to Hong Kong, the defendant took the plaintiff to see eye doctor.

Plaintiff’s case

14. At all material times of playing water volleyball, the plaintiff was standing at a distance of about 1 foot from the net and trying to perform a block with both of her hands up without jumping.  At about 11:00 am, the defendant inadvertently extended his hand over the net and spike the volleyball over the net into the plaintiff’s court, the defendant hit the plaintiff’s right eye by hand (“the accident”). The plaintiff lost consciousness for about 2 to 3 seconds and the defendant’s wife helped the plaintiff leave the said swimming pool.  As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries to her right eye and psychological / psychiatric impairment ensued.  The accident was witnessed by the plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Lam Kwok Kei(林國基).  Mr. Lam saw the net swinging after the defendant’s spiking or hitting.

15. Wan Shan Hung( 尹山紅 ) is also a member of the tennis club and has known both the  plaintiff  and the defendant since 2009. She did not go with them to the Harbour Resort. Two days after the accident, she met the defendant at the tennis club. The defendant admitted to her that he had hit the plaintiff’s  eye carelessly by hand.

16. The accident and the plaintiff’s pain, suffering and personal injuries were caused by the negligence on the part of the defendant.

17. As a result of the accident in question, the plaintiff has been suffering from injuries to her right eye and psychological / psychiatric impairment ensured.  Permanent disability is now left with her.  After the  accident, the plaintiff had received various medical treatments at Sabah Medical Centre Sdn Bhd, Hong Kong Eye Hospital, Dr Michael Y T Hung’s clinic, Dr Leo P W Chiu’s clinic, Hong Kong Eye Consultants, 深圳市中醫院, Dr Ng Fung Shing’s clinic and Tak Yan Dispensary Co Ltd.  The various medical treatments she had received included but not limited to X-ray, MRI examination, acupuncture and medicine.  Nonetheless, her injuries to her right eye and psychological / psychiatric injuries have been unrelieved.

18. According to the joint ophthalmic expert report prepared by Dr Tsui Chung Wan and Dr Ng Wing Ho Kenneth dated 3 December 2013, the plaintiff now still suffers from decreased elevation of the right eye in addition and also 2.5% impairment of the whole person as a result of the accident.

19. The plaintiff has since the accident suffered from:-

(i)   pain and discomfort in her right eye;

(ii)  double image;

(iii)  dizziness and nausea;

(iv)  limitation of right eye in elevation and depression eye movements;

(v)  limited field of vision;

(vi)  sleeping problem;

(vii)  anxiety disorder;

(viii)  concentration difficulty;

(ix)  negative emotions;

(x)  depression; and

(xi)  impaired memory.

20. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had perfectly healthy eyes with normal vision.  For the 6 months immediately after the accident, the plaintiff had to cover up her right eye and conduct daily activities in only one eye in order to avoid diplopia and dizziness.

21. Whilst the plaintiff can now still participate in usual sporting activities, she is forced to avoid sports that are more intense due to her eye injury.  As such, the plaintiff can no longer participate in surfing and skiing which she enjoyed prior to the accident.  Further, the plaintiff can no longer join sports competitions as she is now afraid of playing sports with strangers.

22. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff also enjoyed travelling around, visiting tourist spots and meeting new people.  As a result of her eye injuries, however, the plaintiff can no longer enjoy her trips as she would suffer from diplopia without warning.

23. Because of the eye injury, the plaintiff has difficulties in cooking, dining, driving, watching TV, reading books, etc. Her daily life is deeply affected.

24. The plaintiff’s earning capacity has been as a result thereof and will continue to be impaired and affected by the said injuries and therefore suffers and will continue to suffer a handicap in the labour market. She could not find a job until she set up her company in  October 2010.

25. In summary, the plaintiff claims for:-

(1)Pain, suffering and loss of amenities HK$450,000.00
(2)Loss of earnings   HK$196,800.00
(3)Loss of earning capacity/handicap
 in the market HK$200,000.00
(4)Medical expenses   HK$23,015.95
(5)Travelling expensesHK$10,000.00
(6)Tonic food HK$5,000.00
(7)Loss of pension/mandatory provident 
 Fund HK$9,840.00
(8 InterestTo be assessed
 
 Total: HK$894,655.95
  plus interest

Defendant’s case

26. The defendant did not call any witness other than himself to give evidence.

27. In gist, the defendant alleged that:-

(a)    The water depth at the area of the pool for playing water volleyball was shallow enough for standing and both the plaintiff and the defendant were standing in the pool while they were playing water volleyball.

(b)   The incident happened in the middle of the water volleyball game, when the plaintiff and the defendant together with the other members of the Group and other holidaymakers who had been playing the game for sometime.  Both sides had been striking and blocking the ball for a while.

(c)    At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was standing quite close to the net with both her hands raised up.  The defendant was standing opposite her, which was on the other side of the net.

(d)   Just before the incident, the ball came near the defendant and he jumped and reached up to hit the ball.Subsequently, the plaintiff got injury on her right eye.  The defendant denied that his hand had extended over the net and inadvertently hit the plaintiff’s right eye.

(e)    Jumping to reach the ball and attempting to hit it over the net is part and parcel of the game of volleyball and is a natural and instinctive reaction to the ball coming close to the defendant.  The plaintiff had experienced such actions many times during the game in question.

(f)    The defendant was playing the game in a friendly and relaxed manner and did not know and could not have reasonably known that his actions might cause injury to the plaintiff, if it did.

(g)    The participants of the water volleyball game were high-spirited and having fun and the defendant had no intention to cause any harm or injury to anyone.

28. Regarding to the damages issues, the defendant avers that the plaintiff’s injury is extremely minor. He, if found liable to pay damages, agrees to pay the following damages but subject to the plaintiff’s strict proof:

PSLA     HK$50,000
Loss of earning  HK$24,000
Loss of earnig capacity Nil
Medical expenses    HK$5,000
Travelling expenses HK$3,000
Tonic food  HK$1,500
Loss of pension/MPF HK$1,200
InterestNil

 
 Total: HK$84,700

29. The defendant also claims for damages to be reduced because of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence and tax issues.

Facts finding

30. The main facts in dispute in this case is whether the defendant had extended his hand over the net and hit the plaintiff’s right eye with hand while he was jumping to spike the volleyball.

31. From the photos produced by the defendant which are not in dispute, I am satisfied that the plaintiff was always standing quite close to the net (about  one foot away). The depth of pool was 1.4 meters. The net was relatively tall and the the top of the plaintiff’s head was significantly below the top of the net. The photos also show the water extended to about the defendant’s chest level and it was unlikely that the defendant could have jumped very high. The net was not fastened very tightly on either side. I accept the defendant’s estimation that the net was about 7 feet high. During the game, players who were close to the net might jump and spike or block the volleyball.

32. The plaintiff alleged that at the material time of the accident occurred, she was standing at a distance of about 1 foot from the net and trying to perform a block with both of her hands up without jumping. If that was the  case, considering the defendant’s height and the water resistance force, if the defendant did jump to spike or hit the ball which was on his side of the net, he would not have needed to extend his arm across to the other side. Even if his hand had crossed over , it is unlikely the defendant’s hand would have struck the plaintiff’s eye if at the material time she was not jumping and just standing there. Besides, it would be very difficult for the defendant to  extend his hand over the net and hit the plaintiff’s eye without pressing down the net low. If the defendant really hit the plaintiff’s eye by extending his hand over the net, the defendant must inevitably lost his balance after spiking the ball, which must be seen by everyone in the pool.

33. Right after the accident, the plaintiff was taken to the treatment room in the hotel. According to the record of guest incident report dated 12.4.2009, the plaintiff told the hotel guard that her right eye was hit by the ball. The plaintiff during the cross–examination tried to explain that away by saying her ability to use English is not good and she had expressed herself wrongly. This is unacceptable because the words “ball” and “hand” are both commonly used terms and someone having a secondary education level could not possibly mix them up. I do not accept her explanation.

34. Both witnesses of the plaintiff  do not help the plaintiff’s case much.

35. Mr Lam while giving evidence in court admitted that he could not see how the accident occurred clearly as he did not pay full attention to the plaintiff. Mr Lam later also saw the shaking of the net and therefore drew the inference that when the defendant was spiking the ball, the defendant’s hand went beyond over the net and hit the eye of the plaintiff. The inference drawn by Mr Lam is at odds with the circumstantial evidence at the time. It is common knowledge that when the depth of water reaches one’s chest, jumping up from the water will meet with the water’s resistance. It is  difficult to jump up even about 0.5 metre from the water. In other words, even though the defendant is someone who exercises regularly, in the circumstances, at most he would have touched the top of the net when he jumped up to spike the ball. It is impossible that his hand would have gone beyond over the net and hit the eye of the plaintiff who was standing about one foot from the net and without jumping up. The reason is very simple. The eye of the plaintiff was about one metre from the top of the net (see photos). The plaintiff’s evidence is that at the moment of the accident, she did not jump up but only raised her arms to intercept the ball. In the circumstances, the defendant’s hand could not possibly have come into contact with the eye of the plaintiff. If there were contact, then the better part of the defendant’s body must have pressed on the net, causing him to lose his balance. And Mr Lam would certainly have seen the defendant’s body pressed on the net. All Mr Lam saw was the shaking of the net. Such shaking could be caused by the contact between the net and the ball or the defendant’s hand after he spiked the ball. Furthermore, Mr Lam admitted that he had talked about the case with the plaintiff before writing his witness statement. I have reason to believe that Mr Lam’s evidence is partial and cannot be believed entirely.

36. The plaintiff’s witness, Madam Fong, was not present at the scene at the time when the accident occurred. She said firmly that after the defendant returned to Hong Kong, the defendant admitted to her in person that the hand of the defendant had injured the eye of the plaintiff. The defendant denied that and said he was only expressing regret for having injured the plaintiff. The defendant’s version is credible because as analysed above, in the circumstances of what happened at the time, the defendant’s hand could not possibly have come into contact with the eye of the plaintiff.

37. All in all, I find the plaintiff’s case is illogical and against common sense. I reject her version.

38. Having considered all evidence before me, I accept the defendant’s version and  find that at the material time when the plaintiff got hurt,  her right eye was hit by the  water volleyball spiked by the defendant.

Liability

39. The law is very clear. The  standard of care in sporting context is different than a non-sporting context.

40. In BlakevGalloway[2004] 1 WLR 2844, Dyson LJ said , at para 8-11:

“ that participants in sport games generally owe each other a duty of care and that the standard of care depends on all the circumstances of the case, and that the threshold for liability is high (see para 11)”

“there will be no liability for errors of judgement, oversights or lapses of which any participant might be guilty in the context of a fast-moving contest. Something more serious is required”

41. Diplocks LJ (as he then was) had said in WoolridgevSummer & another [1963] 2 QB 43:

“ a person attending a game or competition takes the risk of any damage caused to him by any act of a participant done in the course of and for the purposes of the game or competition notwithstanding that such acts may involve an error of judgement or lapse of skill, unless the participant’s conduct is such as to evince a reckless disregard of the spectator’s safety”

42. The above principle was also applied in Hong Kong in Chan Kin BunvWong Sze Ming & another (HCPI1549/2014), Deputy Judge Saunderss (as he then was) followed the same English cases and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim  who was hurt during a mock sword flight using T-square rulers.

43. Under normal circumstances, the participants who willingly engaged in a vigorous sport must have impliedly consented to assuming certain risk of injury [see Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, 10th ed., paras. 3-76a to 3-77, p.209].

44. The standard of care owed by a professional player in a contest might be high. In CondonvBasi [1985] 2 ALL ER 453, Sir John Donaldson M.R. said ,“Thus there will of course be a higher degree of care required of a player in a First Division football match than of a player in a local league football match.”

45. I notice that the scenario in this case is partly different to the above quoted cases. Firstly the defendant was not the organizer of the game and he was one of the players only. Secondly, there was a net to separate these two teams players. However, by willingly taking part in the game, the plaintiff impliedly consented to any contact which could reasonably be expected to occur in the course of it (Woolridge v Summer & Another [1963] 2 QB 43, Mullin v Richards & Another [1998] 1 All ER 920).

46. As to what are reasonable precautions, Mason J (as he then was) in Wyong Shire County Council v Shirt and others(1980) 29 ALR 217 saidat page 221:

"In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man's response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other  conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant's position. The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable. But, as we have seen, the existence of a foreseeable risk of injury does not in itself dispose of the question of breach of duty. The magnitude of the risk and its degree of probability remain to be considered with other relevant factors."

47. It is normal and foreseeable  while playing water volleyball in the pool, a player who is close to the net  jumps and reaches up to hit the ball to the opponents’ court . In fact, jumping to reach the ball and attempting to hit the ball over the net is part and parcel of the game of water volleyball and is  natural and instinctive reaction to the ball  coming close to the defendant.  The plaintiff should have experienced such actions many times during the game in question. All these actions were foreseeable by the plaintiff.

48. Having further considered the game was intended to be for fun and leisure among friends and other holidaymakers and no particular rules were set for the game, I find that the defendant was not acting recklessly when he spiked the ball and the ball inadvertently hit the plaintiff’s right eye.  In such circumstances, according to the above legal principle, I find that taking to the highest, it is an error of judgement or lapse of skill on the defendant’s part, hence, the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff’s injury of her right eye.

Quantum

49. Having found against the plaintiff on liability, her claim stands to be dismissed and it is strictly unnecessary to deal with the issue of contributory negligence and the quantum of the claim.  However, in case I am wrong on the issue of liability, I briefly set out below my views on contributory negligence and the various heads of damages claimed.

50. If I had accepted the plaintiff’s case, I would not have found that there was any contributory negligence on her part.

51. The plaintiff was born in 1965 and at the time the accident occurred she was 44 years old.

PSLA

52. The plaintiff claims that because of her eye injury, she could no longer participate in surfing and skiing and join sports competitions as she is now afraid of playing sports with strangers. Furthermore, prior to the accident, she always travelled around, visiting tourist spots and meeting new people, but now she gives up her trips as she would suffer from diplopia without warning. Her daily life is deeply affexted by blurred image.

53. The plaintiff asks for the award under this head is HK$450,000.00.

54. The defendant objects to the plaintiff’s claim as he alleged that the injury suffered by the plaintiff is extremely minor and any damages payable under this head would not be more than HK$50,000.00.

55. The defendant mainly relies on the joint ophthalmic expert report of 3 December 2013(“the joint expert report”). Both experts agree that the plaintiff has exaggerated her alleged visual impact. They also opine that the allegation that the plaintiff has to raise books and newspapers when reading is inconsistent with her injury as she should experience more double vision when looking upward. Besides, both experts also agree that the plaintiff should be able to carry out her activities of daily living with no restriction.

56. Both experts in paragraph 7 of the joint expert report  clearly states that the plaintiff could have exaggerated her symptoms of diplopia. Both experts admit that according to the joint assessment conducted on 21 August 2013, the plaintiff was found to suffer from decreased elevation of the right eye in adduction . The clinical findings and progress of the plaintiff are consistent with the clinical diagnosis.  Both experts estimate that the plaintiff has suffered around 10% loss of ocular motility as a result of the accident.

57. I accept the findings of the joint medical report.

58. In any events, the plaintiff admitted that she could now still participate in usual sporting activities. The plaintiff was fond of sports , but she was not an amateur athlete . In view of her diplopia problem, I believe it will affect her performance in joining sports competitions and  participate in surfing and skiing.

59. In the absence of a head injury evidence, I do not accept that the plaintiff had lost consciousness.

60. In Leung Moon SingvYu Hon Kuen [2006] HKLRD (Yrbk) 374, the plaintiff suffered eye injury (spray paint exploded into eyes, eyes padded after saline irritation, epithelial effect healed with no scar, impairment of tear secretion resulting in dry eyes), Deputy Judge Wong awarded a sum of HK$65,000 to the plaintiff under PSLA.

61. In Chan YimvShing Cheong Construction Ltd [2007] HKLRD (Yrbk) 411 , the plaintiff got bruises over medial corner of right upper eyelid, mild diplopia, mild right hypertropia. Deputy District Judge Longley  awarded  the plaintiff a sum of HK$230,000 under PSLA

62. Having taken the above cases into consideration, I consider that an appropriate award for PSLA would have been HK$150,000.

Loss of earning

63. The plaintiff claims that prior to the accident, she secured a job with a company to work as a clerk and the monthly salary was about HK$12,000. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff was unable to work and had to turn down the aforesaid job offer. The plaintiff had been unable to return to work until 26October 2010 when she set up a limited company in Hong Kong.

64. The plaintiff’s loss of earnings from 12April to 25October 2010 would be HK$196,800. ( HK$12,000 x 16.4 month)

65. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but under this head, the plaintiff did not produce any proof neither written documents nor witness statements from the offeror to prove that at the material time a job was offered to her. According to the joint expert report, sick leave of two months given to the plaintiff  is reasonable.  In other words, the plaintiff is entitled to have two months’ loss of earnings. However, the plaintiff fails to prove that during the sick leave period she had earning capacity. The plaintiff claims that she is a freelance worker  in advertising field, but  the letters from Inland Revenue Department dated 12 September 2013 clearly stated that there is no record of the plaintiff’s income from 2007  to 2013. In such circumstances, I do not believe that the plaintiff had secured any employment at the time of the accident and has suffered any loss of earnings during the sick leave period. No award would have been granted under this head.

Loss of earning capacity/ handicap in the market

66. The plaintiff alleges that both experts estimate she suffers 5% loss of earning capacity. She further claims that  by reason of the permanent disability suffered by her, a sum of HK$200,000 should be awarded to her under this head.

67. The plaintiff does not give a full account how this figure arrives at .

68. Having carefully studied the joint expert report,  I note that both experts clearly say that the 5% loss of earning capacity is purely for the parties’ reference. In their conclusion , the plaintiff was found to have depressed ocular motility of the right eye and now still suffers from decreased elevation of the right eye in adduction. The plaintiff suffered 2.5% impairment of the whole person as a result of the said accident. Regarding to the loss of earning capacity, the experts’ view is that the plaintiff has been suffering from diplopia only on extreme upgaze, and she should be able to work as a clerk since reading and writing involve mainly downgaze, her diplopia in extreme upgaze should impose little restriction or limitation on her working capacity as a clerk.

69. The plaintiff claims that she had worked in the field of advertising  and had also worked at the sales department of Sing Tao Daily before the accident occurred. In 2010, she started her own trading business. Other than Mr Lam’s evidence that the plaintiff had been his colleague when he was with Sing Tao Daily, the plaintiff fails to produce any proof regarding to her occupation and income. It is a bare allegation only.

70. The burden of proving damages is on the plaintiff ( see Chan Siu YounvNg Kam Man & others HCPI533/1999).  The plaintiff is not entitled to put figures before the Court and seek them without proper evidence (see Yim Fat FongvWong Kim Hung & another HCPI1173/1996).

71. The plaintiff admitted she did not try to return work after the reasonable period of sick leave.

72. Having considered all the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff  has suffered any loss of earning capacity.

Medical expenses

73. I find the medical expenses sated in the plaintiff’s revised statement of damages are necessary and reasonable. The plaintiff would have been awarded HK$23,015.95 for medical expenses.

Travelling expenses

74. The plaintiff claims for a sum of about HK$10,000 without any documentary proof, I notice that the plaintiff went to Shenzhen, China 11 times for medical treatment, and the rest of consultation places were all  in Hong Kong.

75. Having considered that there may be difficulties for the plaintiff to produce documentary proof for taking public transport by using Octopus card, in any events, the necessity of travelling expenses is not in doubt. However, I do not believe that the plaintiff did spend  a sum of HK$10,000 as travelling expenses. I consider that an award of HK$5,000 would have been appropriate.

Tonic Food

76. No documentary proof  has been produced by the plaintiff as to the necessity and reasonableness of buying tonic food. I decline to grant any sum  to the plaintiff under this head.

Loss of pension/mandatory provident fund

77. The plaintiff totally fails to prove that she has been a member of any pension scheme and / or mandatory provident fund. I find that she has suffered no loss under this head.  Her claim under this head  must fail.

Summary on quantum

78. The total award, excluding interest, would have been HK$178,015.95   as tabulated below:

PSLAHK$150,000.00
Medical expenses   HK$23,015.95
Travelling expensesHK$5,000.00

Total:HK$178,015.95

Interest

79. The interest should be awarded on the PSLA award at 2% p.a. from the date of writ to the date of judgment and that interest on all pre-trial loss of earnings should be awarded at half of the judgment rate from the date of accident to the date of judgment.

Conclusion

80. As I have determined the issue of liability against the plaintiff, the action is dismissed.

81. I make an order nisi that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the action, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

( W K Wong )
Deputy District Judge

The plaintiff appeared in person

Mr Ashok Sakhrani instructed by Kennedys, for the defendant

95567-EN-2014-11-04

MA YONG MEI v. CHENG MUK LAM

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DCPI 631/2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 631 OF 2012

----------------------

BETWEEN

 MA YONG MEIPlaintiff

and

 CHENG MUK LAMDefendant
----------------------
Before:  HH Judge Levy in Chambers
Date of Hearing and Decision:  28 October 2014
Date of Handing Down of Reasons for Decision:  4 November 2014

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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A. The Application

1. The plaintiff, Ms Ma, in this action claims against the defendant, for damages for an injury to her right eye she allegedly sustained while she was playing water volleyball with her friends and the defendant in a resort in Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia in April 2009.

2. Ms Ma engaged solicitors to commence this action in March 2012 and was represented throughout until 14 October 2014 when a “Notice of Intention to Act in Person” (which should have been a “Notice to Act”) was filed.  On the same day, Ms Ma also took out a summons (“the Summons”) to adjourn the trial of this action which had been fixed to commence on 17 November 2014 in the fixture list with 5 days reserved by the order of a master on 18 June 2014 (“June 2014 Order”).

3. The Summons was in English but Ms Ma’s supporting affirmation (“the Affirmation”) was handwritten in Chinese. At the hearing, Ms Ma was still unrepresented while the defendant was represented by Mr Tam. As Ms Ma opted to speak in Cantonese and Mr Tam was also conversant in Cantonese, I directed the hearing to be conducted in Cantonese.

4. The Summons was opposed.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed the Summons. Here are the reasons for my decision for the dismissal.  Notwithstanding the hearing having been conducted in Cantonese, I am disinclined to give my reasons in Chinese as all the filed documents were in English.  An interpreter will be arranged to interpret this Reasons for Decision to Ms Ma in Cantonese at the time of the handing down of this Reasons for Decision.

B.  Reasons for adjourning the trial

5. The reasons for vacating the trial dates, according to the Affirmation, which reasons were further elaborated at the hearing, were mainly due to the following alleged medical complaints which Ms Ma said that she has been suffering from:

(1) Depression

It was averred that since the date of accident, she has been suffering from depression.

(2) Traction Bronchiectasis (支氣管擴張)

Ms Ma complained that since 2013 she has been suffering from this symptom and coughing a lot, and that the doctor had told her that she might be suffering from lung cancer.

(3) Menopause

Ms Ma said she was suffering from menopausal symptoms to the extent that she had poor sleep as well as urinary incontinence.  She further said at the hearing that she had a tumor in her uterus.

(4) Mental disturbance due to the recent “Occupy Central” movement in Hong Kong

Ms Ma submitted that due to the recent demonstrations and the occupation of the streets in Hong Kong, she had been suffering mentally and physically.

6. As a result of the above alleged health problems; Ms Ma said that she had accepted her sister’s advice to leave Hong Kong for the USA to seek medical treatment.  She had therefore bought a ticket for that purpose and could not attend the trial in November.

C.  Defendant’s objection

7. At the hearing, Mr Tam vigorously opposed an adjournment on the grounds that the application was not only made late but that the reasons given were tenuous.

8. The alleged medical complaints, Mr Tam contended, were supported by very little medical evidence.  In relation to the alleged depression, Mr Tam submitted that throughout the proceedings, Ms Ma’s former solicitors had in fact agreed that no psychiatric assessment was required and thus no such reports or evidence had been adduced in support of Ms Ma’s claim for the various heads of damages.

9. As for the bronchiectasis Ms Ma allegedly had been suffering from, Mr Tam referred to “Exh 1” to the Affirmation, which consisted of copies of four treatment cards in one single copy of paper issued by the South Kwai Chung Chest and Lung Clinic; and a report on the adrenal gland and a CT Scan report of the thorax both of which were dated 10 October 2013 from a Dr Simon Wong of Central Medical Diagnostic Centre addressed to Yan Chai Hospital.  Mr Tam suggested that the said treatment card records did not show that Ms Ma was not fit to attend trial. Neither had the reports from Dr Simon Wong helped Ms Ma when the reports were already one year old (October 2013). It was therefore argued that had Ms Ma’s medical complaints been genuine, her former solicitors would not have signed the consent summons of 10 June 2014 to apply for leave to set this action down for trial, and subsequently filed on 23 July 2014 an “Application to Set a Case Down for Trial” as well as a “Notice to Setting Down”.

10. In respect of the alleged symptoms brought about by menopause and the recent “ Occupy Central ” demonstrations, Mr Tam argued that there was absolutely nothing showing that Ms Ma was not medically fit to attend trial, and a fortiori, the alleged need for leaving Hong Kong for the USA to allegedly seek medical treatment.

11. In support of his objection, Mr Tam further submitted that the trial dates are mile-stone dates within the context of Practice Direction 5.2, which are mandated to be immovable save in the most exceptional circumstances (Practice Direction 5.2, §42; Sidepec International Limited v Cheung Hing, HCA829/2010 (unrep) (24 July 2013) at §§11 & 12).  These reasons for vacating the trial, Mr Tam contended, did not show any exceptional circumstances.

D.  The Relevant Principles

12. Under O.25 r.3, Rules of the District Court, the court will not grant an application by a party to vary a ‘milestone date’ which includes a trial date unless there are exceptional circumstances. Practice Direction 5.2 at § 42 emphasizes that milestone dates are immovable save in the most exceptional circumstances (Arko Ship Leasing Ltd v Winsmart International Shipping Ltd [2013] 2 HKLRD 121 at § 13, cited in Sidepec).

13. In view of the fact that the reasons Ms Ma had provided for applying to vacate the trial dates are medical ones, I’d be inclined to echo what the Court of Appeal has stated in Lam Yin Pok Bosco v Dr Chan Yee Shing & Anor, HCMP 2256/2012 (unrep) (2 November 2012) (cited in Sidepec) as follows:

“9. In the ordinary course of events, milestone dates such as the dates fixed for the trial of an action must, on occasion, yield to the vicissitudes of life. The illness of a party or a necessary and important witness may, depending on the circumstances of the case, justify vacating and re-fixing the trial dates. This is simply a manifestation of the principle recognised in Dick v Piller [1943] 1 KB 497, the headnote of which reads:

  “When a witness in, or a fortiori a party to, an action in a county court is alleged to be prevented by illness from attending the court for a hearing of the case and the judge is satisfied of the fact of his illness and of the materiality and importance of his evidence and that the granting of an adjournment will not cause an injustice to the other party which cannot be reduced by costs, it is the duty of the judge to grant an adjournment, it may be on terms, and failure on his part to do so constitutes a miscarriage of justice which necessarily involves an error of law on which an appeal may be founded.”

10. By way of example of the operation of the principle: see, as regards a material witness of fact, Fairwing Investment Limited v China and Canton (Properties) Company Limited & Anor, unrep., HCA 2137/2004, 16 June 2009; as regards an expert witness, Joyce & Anor v King, unrep., Times Law Reports, 13 July 1987; and, as regards a litigant, Teinaz v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2002] ICR 1471.

11. However, in order for an adjournment to be granted on this basis, the court is entitled to be satisfied that the inability of the litigant to be present is genuine and the onus is on the applicant for an adjournment to prove the need for such an adjournment: Teinaz v Wandsworth London Borough Council at §21.”

(Per Hon Fok JA (as he then was).

14. In this application, the Summons to adjourn the date fixed for trial was made just less than 4 weeks before the trial, and on the date of the hearing of the Summons, there were only about two weeks to go. Thus, not only was the Summons an application to vary a milestone date, it was also a very late application.  Ms Ma would therefore be required, according to the principles discussed above, to show not only exceptional circumstances, but also - given the lateness of the application, and the grounds Ms Ma relied on being medical ones - to satisfy me that her alleged medical complaints must be genuine and an adjournment would have been needed before discretion could be exercised in her favour.

E.  Analysis

15. When a medical disability is being relied on as a ground of adjournment, I think it is of vital importance for the court – apart from taking into account all relevant circumstances including matters such as the nature of the claim and the antecedents of the litigation - to examine the medical evidence the applying party has adduced for the purpose of considering the genuineness of the complaints; and if they were found to be genuine, their nature and the seriousness of the conditions.

16. The medical evidence Ms Ma relied on in this application consisted of two exhibits- “Exh 1” and “Exh 2”.  “Exh 1”, as previously discussed § 9 above, did not, in my view, support Ms Ma’s complaints of suspected lung cancer. Neither did it show that she was suffering from a condition rendering her unfit to attend the trial.  The attendance cards from South Kwai Chung Chest and Lung Clinic showed that the last and the next appointment dates were respectively  14 July 2014 and 14 January 2015.  There was, however, no evidence as to her condition.  Further, the trial dates would not be clashing with the date of the next appointment which had been scheduled to take place on 14 January 2015.  Thus, I could not be satisfied that the treatments from the government clinic would prevent her from attending the forthcoming trial.

17. As regards the reports from the Diagnostic Centre, I was in respectful agreement with Mr Tam that they did not support Ms Ma’s complaints.  The reports had been prepared about a year ago, and further they did not reveal any conditions Ms Ma was alleging to have been suffering from.  The findings according to the reports were negative and within normal limits.

18. As a result, Ms Ma, according to my analysis of the evidence as disclosed in “Exh 1”, failed to satisfy me that she had been suffering from a debilitating condition relating to any chest/lung problems that would have prevented her from attending the trial.

19. “Exh 2”, which was a record in Chinese dated 9 October 2014 issued by a registered Chinese medicine practitioner of “香港佛教聯同會–香港大學中醫臨床教研中心”. The diagnosis was stated to be “絕經前後諸病”, which I understood to be relating to pre-menopausal symptoms.  Apart from the said stated diagnosis , the said document also failed to specify the  symptoms such as  urinary incontinence, poor sleep or uterine tumor Ms Ma alleged she had been suffering from the alleged pre-menopausal condition.  In the circumstances, I could not be satisfied that Ms Ma had been suffering from a pre-menopausal condition of such a nature that would have the effect of affecting her ability to attend trial.

20. Apart from the said exhibits, there was no other medical evidence to support Ms Ma’s complaints of her various ailments. I noted that her complaint of depression, being one of the major medical complaints, was not supported by any medical evidence.  It is significant perhaps to observe, as Mr Tam also pointed out, that Ms Ma’s former solicitors had agreed that no psychiatric evidence was to be adduced for the damages Ms Ma was claiming in this action.  I was not persuaded that Ms Ma’s mental condition was of such a nature that it would disable her from attending the forthcoming trial.

21. Ms Ma’s complaint of the worsening of her mental condition caused by the recent so-called “Occupy Central” movement – in the light of the matters I discussed in the preceding paragraph – was, in my view, one that she had conveniently trumped up to perhaps to bolster the said complaint, which she knew full well that she had not been able to find any convincing evidence for.

22. Neither did the last exhibit, “Exh 3” to the Affirmation, help Ms Ma’s application. “Exh 3” was a faxed record of Ms Ma’s flight booking confirmation bearing a fax date of 18 August 2014.  According to the itinerary shown in the booking confirmation, Ms Ma was to depart from Hong Kong for Los Angeles on 30 October 2014, returning to Hong Kong on 21 January 2015. Quite apart from the fact that I had not found the said booking record helpful to the application, I in fact took the view that the said information revealed therein had the effect of undermining the application because:

(a1) First, Ms Ma, according to the date (18 August 2014) of the flight booking confirmation, would have likely made the travel booking after the trial dates had been fixed by the June 2014 Order. It therefore begged an explanation as to why Ms Ma had chosen the said travel dates to clash with the trial period. 

(a2) At the hearing, Ms Ma had indeed attempted to offer a reason. It was submitted that her former solicitors only informed her of the trial dates after the said booking had been made.

(a3) I was not impressed by this empty allegation.  Were the allegation true, Ms Ma would have either (as one would have reasonably been expected to have done) instructed her former solicitors to make or made the application in person (as she had subsequently chosen to do so since 14 October 2014) to vacate the trial date at once (around August 2014). No explanation had been provided as to why the Summons was only issued some two months after the said booking had been made.

(b1) Secondly, I was unable to accept Ms Ma’s given reason for having chosen to leave Hong Kong for the alleged purpose during the trial period.  As Mr Tam correctly suggested, Ms Ma had failed to specify the kind of treatment she wanted to receive in the USA, let alone having fixed any medical consultation.  I found that Ms Ma’s explanation at the hearing that she would only decide on the type of medical treatment to be received when she got to the USA rang hollow. 

(b2) It was, in my view, rather contradictory for Ms Ma to ask the court to vacate the trial dates in order that she could seek the right medical treatment for the host of her alleged medical ailments, when the return date to Hong Kong (21 January 2015) that she had chosen would clearly have prevented her from attending the appointment at the government chest/lung clinic, which was scheduled for 14 January 2015.

(b3) In the circumstances, I was inclined to the view that the reasons Ms Ma put forward in vacating the trial dates were not genuine, and I was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances for acceding to her application.

23. For these reasons, the Summons was dismissed.

F.  Costs

24. Since Ms Ma had failed in her application, I did not see any reason why costs should not follow the event, and I thus awarded costs to the defendant at the conclusion of the hearing with costs to be assessed summarily. Mr Tam submitted a costs statement in the sum of $12,000. Having had regard to the nature of the application, I was of the view that the amount claimed was excessive.  I had  disallowed the one-hour  Mr Tam claimed for doing legal research, and only allowed his claim for 30 minutes, 1 hour, 15 minutes and 1 hour respectively claimed for perusal of papers, preparation for the hearing, taking instructions from client and attending the hearing, which were all claimed at the hourly rate of $2,000.  The total amount I allowed was $5,500, and Ms Ma was given 14 days to pay the said amount of the assessed costs.

G.  Further Case Management Directions for Trial

25. Since Ms Ma would likely be attending the trial unrepresented, I considered it necessary to hold a Pre-trial Review (“PTR”) before the trial, and to give further case management directions to facilitate the conduct of the forthcoming trial. In order to enable Ms Ma to follow the following case management directions that I gave at the end of the hearing, Chinese copies of the relevant passages of the Practice Direction 18.1 and the “E-submission Platform – Quick User Guide” had also been provided to her.

(1) The parties are to attend a PTR on 4 November 2014, 2:30 pm with ½ hour reserved.

(2) §§128 (lodging of Appendix G) to 135 (lodging of the PTR bundle) of Practice Direction 18.1 are to be followed.  The stipulated period of 7 days specified in §§128 and 129 is to be abridged and substituted by 31 October 2014.

(3) The defendant’s solicitors (instead of the plaintiff) are to be responsible for the preparation of the PTR bundle, and to follow §§ 165 to 181 of Practice Direction 18.1.  If there are any documents that the defendant’s solicitors take the view that the plaintiff cannot or is not in a position to agree to, they should be filed in a separate bundle and so marked clearly.

(4) The parties at the PTR are required to confirm whether the time estimates previously given still hold good and further to confirm the matters stated in §§141 (giving of time estimates) and 142 (any change of circumstances that may impact on the time estimates) of Practice Direction 18.1.

(5) The parties are required to deal with the direction on E-submission in §3(b) of the June 2014 Order.

(6) If any of the English documents need to be translated into Chinese, the plaintiff should inform the defendant’s solicitors by 30 October 2014 and specify the document(s) that require Chinese translation, failing which, it is deemed that no translation is required.

(7) This order is to be drawn up by the defendant’s solicitors in Chinese within 2 days.

(Katina Levy)
District Judge

The plaintiff appeared in person

Mr Tam Wai-kay Wilson of Kennedys, for the defendant