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Matrimonial Causes2012

NAV v. JTMW

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108844-EN-2017-02-23

NAV v. JTMW

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FCMC 4191/2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 NAVPetitioner
 and 
 JTMWRespondent

----------------------------

Coram:  His Honour Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not open to Public)
Dates of Hearing:  1, 8, 15, 22 and 29 November 2016
Date of Judgment:  23 February 2017

__________________

J U D G M E N T
(Custody, Care and Control and Access)

__________________

1.  This judgment deals with the arrangement for two children upon the divorce of their parents. 

2.  This case bears all the hallmarks of a high conflict case – a total breakdown of trust and communication between the parties, no reasonable or sensible compromises in regard to the welfare of the children have been possible and all disagreements, big or small, have ended in court. Thus, notwithstanding that the petition for divorce was taken out in March 2012, the parties so far have not obtained their decree nisi.  Instead, they have spent essentially all their times and costs in fighting over their children.  Over the course of nearly 5 years or so, I have given numerous rulings and decisions including 5 written judgments.  This judgment is the 6th one but is certainly not the last one.  Yet to come would be those on the determination of their financial matters.

3.  For convenience, I shall refer the petitioner wife as “P” and the respondent husband “R” in this Judgment.

Background

4.  The petitioner is from Country A and the respondent from Country D.  After having cohabited in Country D since June, 2002, they married in February, 2008 and moved to Hong Kong in June, 2008 when R obtained a job as a pilot here.

5.  There are two children of the family, both boys.  The first, referred to in this Judgment as “L”, was born in April 2007, now aged 9 and the second, “B”, was born in Hong Kong in February 2010.  He is now 7 years old.

6.  It is unfortunate that marital discord developed; that led to their separation in November, 2011.  On 26 March 2012, P petitioned for divorce on the ground of R’s unreasonable behaviour.

7.  At the beginning, the parties were able to come to terms through mediation by entering into an agreement dated 28 April 2012 dealing with all the ancillary relief and children matters.  Apart from the matrimonial assets which are not relevant here, insofar as the two children of the family are concerned, the parties agreed that both of them would have the custody of the children and they would share the care and control on approximately equal basis. The 1st social investigation report (“SIR”) of 20 December 2012 also recommended that the joint custody, care and control were to be granted to the parties.

8.  Conflicts, however, soon developed.  It is fair to say that at that time their conflicts centred much on the care and control arrangement of the children. In brief, P was complaining about the situation where, whether or not R would be able to take care of the children would have to be dependent upon whether he had any flying duties and these in turn were governed by his monthly duties roster issued by his employer.  This arrangement was seen by P to have been dictated by the monthly roster which she found it difficult to cope with. She felt it unfair that even after the dissolution of her marriage with R her lives should continue to have been manipulated by the other side.  Sadly, it turned out that starting from early 2014 the parties’ relationship had deteriorated to a point where they would argue on essentially all issues arising from the present proceedings, be they big or small.

9.  It is necessary to set out the chequered history of the present proceedings in order to understand how the case has come to this stage and the issues that are required to be determined by the court.

10.  To begin with, the first application was taken out by R on 2 July 2013.  He sought the joint custody, care and control of the children and for directions from the court on the working out of the joint care arrangement, including the sharing of overseas trips and holidays. 

11.  As a response, P also took out her own summons on 4 September 2013 for a joint custody order and a shared care arrangement.

12.  The 2nd SIR, which was released on 14 January 2014, continued to recommend joint custody, care and control. 

13.  The trial of the parties’ summonses was originally set down to be held on 2 July 2014.  Up to that point, the major discrepancy between the parties was merely on how the shared care arrangement could be worked out for the benefit of the children.  It appeared that it was merely a “run-of-the mill” case that the Family Court would have to deal with day-in and day-out.

14.  However, the proceedings took a turn when R, fearful that P might remove the children to Country A permanently, took out an ex parte application on 5 May 2014 for an order prohibiting the children from leaving Hong Kong without the leave of the court.  Consequently, an interim stop order was granted on 7 May 2014

15.  It transpired that R’s worry was not without some substance.  A few days later, on 19 May 2014, P took out 4 summonses.

16.  The first was an application for the permanent relocation of the children to Country A, her home-country.  She also sought joint custody with care and control of the children to her and reasonable access to R.

17.  The second was for the interim care and control of the children.

18.  The third was an application for a non-molestation order against R for P and the two children. P alleged that R was spying and stalking her via some spywares installed in her computer.

19.  The fourth was for maintenance pending suit payable by R.

20.  On 20 May 2014, the court gave the following directions.

21.  As regards P’s application for permanent removal, a further SIR and an international social investigation report (“ISIR”) were to be obtained.  Her application for interim care and control was adjourned to be dealt with together with her application for permanent removal.

22.  The interim stop order was to continue until further order of the court.

23.  As for P’s application for a non-molestation order, it was originally set down for argument on 4 July 2014 but the parties were able to compromise on 2 July 2014 as a result of which, upon the undertakings by both parties to each other that they would not hack or spy on the other party’s computer, P’s application was dismissed by way of a consent order.  The consent order also provided that the issue of costs be adjourned for arguments at the trial of permanent removal.  I need to re-visit this application in later part of this Judgment when I come to deal with the issue of costs.

24.  On 2 July 2014, the court set P’s application for permanent removal down for trial in November 2014, with 5 days reserved.  Meanwhile, the court also tried to ease out the parties’ differences by way of a CDR, which was fixed to be heard on 17 September 2014.  

25.  By a Judgment dated 8 July 2014 the court dismissed P’s application for maintenance pending suit, with costs to R.

26.  The SIR on relocation came out on 3 September 2014. In her report, Ms Lo, the Social Welfare Officer (SWO) did not recommend relocation.  She further recommended that the care and control of the children be given to R, with free access and visitations to the children in Hong Kong be given to P.  On the other hand, although usually it is not the responsibility of an ISIR to give any recommendation, the ISIR was favourable to P’s application.

27.  Regrettably, the CDR hearing failed to narrow down any differences.  Shortly after that on 23 September 2014, P took out an application for the appointment of two singe joint experts.  P argued that for the proper disposal of her application for permanent removal, a clinical psychologist, in the capacity as a single joint expert, was required to be retained for the family.  Further, since she was allowed to stay in Hong Kong on the strength of a dependant visa (as the spouse of R) only, the court would be greatly assisted by a single joint expert on Hong Kong immigration law as to whether or not P would continue to be allowed to remain in Hong Kong.

28.  By a judgment handed down on 23 October 2014, P’s application for single joint experts was dismissed with a costs order that P is to bear 2/3 of R’s costs.

29.  It is to be remembered that up to that stage, both P and R were still taking care of the children on essentially an equal-split basis, referred to as “the 5 day/5 day system”. One would have thought that with these preliminaries being cleared, the parties should have been well on their way to have the issues resolved by way of trial but it turned out that the parties never reached there.  Instead, it took them another 2 years before they finally came to trial when by then the issues that the court would have to determine had radically changed. 

30.  The proceedings took another turn when on 27 October 2014, the court received a letter from the children’s school (both were attending the same school) raising serious concerns over suspected abuse that the children were subject to when they were under the care of P.  What followed was an ex parte application by R with notice to P on 29 October 2014 for a non-molestation order.  The background to this application was set out in §§7 to 11 of my subsequent Judgment of 3 December 2014:

7. What triggered the application was that when R collected the children on 14 October 2014 for his care and control, L told him that he did not want to return to P as he was very scared that P would hit him more.  He learned from L that the night before P had hit him 10 times with a closed fist on his head, 5 times on each side of his head around the temple area.  This was the punishment for L writing to his father on his iPad while under P’s care.  At the same time, B also claimed that he had also been hit many times on his throat.  Both children told their father that it was the worst week ever as they were being hit many times.  Both did not want to go back to their mother.  They had to say “yes” to the relocation, otherwise P would hit them more.  When R helped the children shower he noticed bruises and a scratch on L’s right arm.  L said the injury was caused when P grabbed and pinched his right arm after she had hit his head the previous night. 

8. R said the children continued to receive corporal punishment between 19 October 2014 and 23 October 2014 when they were under the care of P.  Two scratches on L’s right lower arm were found, and according to L, the injuries were inflicted when P squeezed his arm with her hand whilst pushing her thumbnail into his skin.  Both children said P hit them again many times during their time with the mother.

9. There was also an allegation that according to B, P told him that she might be killed if she stayed in Hong Kong.  R suggested that it was an attempt on the part of P to try to poison the children’s minds so that she would be able to indoctrinate and sway them so that they would agree to relocate with her. 

10. R also referred to some incidents of abuse back in June 2013.  He said the situation was escalating while P was pressing on her application for relocation.  The situation had come to an alarming one where the children were no longer safe in the care of P without supervision. 

11. R also found out from the children that P had taken them to see a lady whom he believed was a psychologist or a psychiatrist.  This happened before the Ruling on her application for Single Joint Experts were handed down on 23 October 2014.

31.  On the same day (ie 29 October 2014), the court granted the following interim orders:

(1) P be restrained from assaulting or molesting the children and be restrained from taking the children to see any psychologist or psychiatrist or any form of medical consultation without a court order;

(2) the 5 day/5 day system be suspended until further order;

(3) the interim care and control of the children be granted to R;

(4) the interim access to the children twice a week for not more than 3 hours each be granted to P; such access to be supervised by a social worker until further order; and

(5) the children’s passports and all other travelling documents be delivered by P to her solicitors.

32.  At the same time, the court called for a clinical psychologist’s report and an updated SIR.

33.  The interim access did not go well.  Ms Lo, the SWO, took the unusual course of writing a Memo to court on 18 November 2014 seeking directions as to how the interim access was to be arranged.  As a result, the court gave further directions in this regard. 

34.  R’s application was strenuously contested; by a Judgment handed down on 3 December 2014, the non-molestation order, the interim care and control arrangement in favour of R and the supervised access for P remained to be in force until further order.

35.  Meanwhile, R made complaints to the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”) against P about the suspected abuse that the children had suffered.  The Multi-disciplinary Case Conference (“MDCC”) for Suspected Child Abuse Case concluded that there was not an established case of physical abuse.  Rather, the MDCC concluded that it was a high risk of physical and psychological abuse case, which meant there would be risk of occurrence of abusive behaviour on the children and the case required closed monitoring.  The children were put in the “Child Protection Registry” of the SWD.  Significantly, P was charged by the police on 19 March 2015 for the offence of ill treatment or neglect by those in charge of child or young person under section 27(1) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212).  She was granted bail on the condition that she was not allowed to have direct or indirect contact with the children unless under the supervision of the SWD.

36.  At this juncture, I digress to deal with what happened to the criminal proceedings.

37.  According to the Particulars of Offence and the trial magistrate’s Statement of Findings, P was said to have assaulted L on two occasions between September and October 2014.  It is not necessary to refer to these two incidents in any detail.  I only need to point out that these 2 incidents were amongst the various incidents that R relied upon in support of his application for the non-molestation order.  Since P denied the charge, R and L had to give evidence and subject to cross-examination by P’s counsel.  P was convicted of the offence on 24 November 2015 in respect of one of the incidents and was fined $3,000.  Specifically, she was found to have deliberately hit L on the head for several times and as a result the boy cried.  Her appeal to the Court of First Instance against conviction was dismissed on 2 September 2016.

38.  The SIR, which was submitted as a result of the alleged child abuse, reported on 30 April 2015 that during access P asked L to tell the police that he had told lie to the police.  The SIR also made the following observations:

(1) the children had positive development and becoming emotional stable at school and in home;

(2) the caring arrangement of R was satisfactory;

(3) the children had strong views to live continuously with their father and they did not wish to return to the 5-day/5-day system;

(4) the children maintained close bonding, secure and supportive relationship with R while L repeatedly expressed his scare arising from staying with his mother; and

(5) Ms Yau, the government clinical psychologist, also gave her opinion that the caring arrangement seemed to be conducive to meet the best interest and developmental needs of the children.

39.  Ms Lo therefore recommended that R was to be given the sole custody, care and control of the children with supervised access for the first 2 months followed by defined access be given to P, such access to be subject to supervision for a period of 12 months.

40.  On 11 May 2015 leave was granted for P to withdraw her application for relocation and for interim care and control. At the same time, R was given leave to amend his application of 2 July 2013 so that he might be granted the sole custody, care and control of the children, with supervised access to P.

41.  On 26 June 2015 the court received a 2nd letter from the boys’ school.  It was reported in the letter that on any particular access day, L was withdrawn, reluctant to participate in class room activities and began crying as “pick-up” time was drawing near.  L openly stated that he did not want to attend access and complained of stomach ache or of feeling unwell.  The school observed that L did not enjoy access and participated only under duress.

42.  What followed was Ms Lo’s 2nd Memo dated 13 July 2015 reporting to court that the supervised access seemed getting more intense when L expressed in a few sessions that he did not want to continue and wished to leave immediately.  The rejecting attitude of L was observed to have been related to P’s perennial questioning on L about the criminal case.  That irritated the boy greatly.  It was also reported that during the access of 3 July 2015 Ms Lo tried to stop the questioning but in vain. Plainly, Ms Lo encountered difficulties in working with P on how access could be effectively carried out.  In my view, Ms Lo was correct in trying to stop the questioning.  First of all, that should not have been the purpose of access; and secondly, L was a prosecution witness.

43.  As regards B, by and large, his access was still observed to be smooth. 

44.  At about the same time, probably because of what had happened during access, P took out an application on 20 July 2015 for an order that Ms Yau should attend the access sessions or in the alternative, P should be allowed to have a child psychologist to attend the same.  P’s application, insofar as it related to the attendance of Ms Yau, was dismissed on 30 July 2015 for the reason that the court simply had no power to give such an order.  As for the attendance of a child psychologist, it was adjourned to be dealt with in the trial.

45.  In light of L’s reaction during access as reported by Ms Lo, P’s access to L was suspended for one month from 1 August 2015. 

46.  On 11 September 2015 P took out a further summons for the court’s directions for (1) ensuring the children are reliably delivered to supervised access sessions; (2) vesting the control of setting the access sessions on herself to eliminate interference; and (3) requesting the court to address the repeated breaches of the order regarding supervised access.  Clearly, she took the view that R had been manipulating and interfering with her access by not delivering L to access sessions.

47.  On 12 October 2015 the Official Solicitor was appointed to represent the children.

48.  Ms Yau, in her report of 7 December 2015, recommended a family-oriented phased therapy as a way forward.  She pointed out that the first and primary person who needs to undergo therapy is P.  In order to make the therapy work, the first important step is for P to acknowledge her problems and to own up responsibility.  Only when P is willing to commit to therapy and then manages to make genuine and positive changes will it be appropriate for therapy to move on for working with and involving L with a view of rebuilding trust and mending the relationship.  Of particular note is that Ms Yau warned that “the clock is ticking”.  Estrangement is serious in the mother-child relationship and remedial actions need to be carried out fast.

49.  Upon the recommendation of Ms Yau, P started to receive therapy from Dr Poon, another government clinical psychologist.  However, the therapy has proven to be futile.  I will elaborate this in more detail below.

50.  The Official Solicitor’s 1st report, submitted on 14 December 2015, stated that the replies or responses of the children as to the mother-child relationship are spontaneous and natural; and no signs of manipulation or coaching can be observed.

51.  On 21 December 2015, the interim sole custody and sole care and control of the children were granted to R with defined supervised access to P. Upon the recommendation of the Official Solicitor, it was expressly provided in the order that neither of the children should be compelled to attend any access session if either or both of them do not want to attend it on a particular day.  The interim stop order preventing the children from leaving Hong Kong was varied to the extent that there would be no prohibition or restriction for the children to leave Hong Kong with R temporarily for holiday purpose and/or family visit provided that each trip shall not be more than 14 days and there shall not be more than 4 trips per year, commencing from 1 January 2016.  

52.  On 30 March 2016, with a view of trying to improve the relationship between P and the children, FaceTime access for 10 minutes each in the presence of R was granted.

53.  However, it is unfortunate that the FaceTime access too failed to achieve the intended purpose.  The adverse development following the implementation of the FaceTime access prompted the Official Solicitor to investigate into the matter and produced his 2nd report on 21 April 2016.  His enquiry with Ms Lo revealed that P might have put undue pressure on B during the access by:

(1) repeatedly requesting B to bring the i-Pad to L so as to join L in the FaceTime access;

(2) repeatedly asking B questions in a critical manner which B found it difficult to answer; and

(3) repeatedly asking B to hold the i-Pad in a proper position which made B feel impatient and upset.

54.  The Official Solicitors recommended that the children should not be compelled to attend access sessions, either in the form of supervised access or FactTime, against their will and that taking a “non-coercive” and “more space” approach would be more effective and productive to mend the relationship between P and her children.

55.  These events also made Ms Lo saw the need to write her 3rd Memo to court on 8 June, 2016.  The court was informed that B did not want to have FaceTime with P in May and June 2016 while P insisted that this was not acceptable.  B was reported to have shown some signs of being overwhelmed and distress, causing him repeated bedwetting since April 2016.  B was asked by P frequently to get L participating in either the physical or FaceTime access.  The situation further deteriorated.  There were reports of B getting more aggressive, upset and tempered sometimes, both at home and in school.  Ms Lo realised that B was being pressured when he did not want to either attend the physical access or having FaceTime with the mother.

56.  Meanwhile, in response to the court’s concern over whether L would require any counselling arising from his refusal to attend access sessions, the Official Solicitor, after having consulted Ms Yau and Ms Lo, reported on 25 May 2016 (the 3rd report) that:

(1) L does not require any counselling as his refusal to see his mother is not a psychological problem;

(2) L may be encouraged / persuaded to see his mother only when there is cogent evidence showing that P has made genuine and positive changes; and

(3) the current access arrangement (both supervised access and FaceTime access) for B should be closely monitored to ensure that B is free from undue pressure.

57.  Consequently, by an order of 13 June 2016, the FaceTime access was suspended and her interim access could continue only if the children are willing to participate.

The Present Situation of the Parties and their Children

58.  The children have been living with R since October 2014.  When R is having his flying duties, the daily care would have to be given by the domestic helper who has been working for them before the divorce proceedings.  The boys are attending the same school as before.  L is in Year 5 and B is in Year 2.

59.  P is living alone and continues to work as a free-lance face-painter and fitting model.  I was told that she also works as a part-time nanny.  I was not told she has further plan of returning to Country A now. 

60.  The children have gradually shown their resistance to attend access, whether supervised or through FaceTime.  B attended most of the access up to June 2016.  By that time, B was reported to have bedwetting.  Since then, he has refused to attend.  As for L, he has ceased attending access since September 2015.  Both L and B have clearly expressed their wish to stay away from their mother. 

The Reports

61.  As can be seen from the brief narration above, over this period of time the relationship between P and her children have turned from bad to worst.  There were:

(i) 6 Social Investigation Reports;

(ii) 3 substantial memoranda from Ms Lo raising significant issues on access arrangement and seeking court’s directions;

(iii) 1 International Social Investigation Report;

(iv) 2 clinical psychologist reports prepared by Ms Yau;

(v) 1 clinical psychologist report prepared by Dr Poon; and

(vi) 4 Official Solicitor’s Reports.

Ms Lo’s Up-dated (6th) SIR dated 5 October 2016 for the purpose of Trial

62.  It is reported that both L and B unequivocally expressed that they are happy to live with their father and refuse to attend access with P.

63.  L expressed to Ms Lo that he does not want to go to access because he does not want to meet his mother.  He further shared that he refuses to have access in the home vicinity because there would not be anyone watching over P.  He mentioned that P had hit his head for 5 to 10 times and had splashed cold water to him and B. 

64.  B also mentioned to Ms Lo that P had hit and pushed him when the children were under the 5-day/5-day system.  He also mentioned that P had hit him for about 2 times during the supervised access in Ms Lo’s office. P hit him with her fist at the back of the door where it was beyond the reach of the CCTV.

65.  Ms Lo noted that both L and B expressed their consistent negative views towards P.  She considered the children are age appropriate and are consistent in their views regarding access.  As such, their views should be seriously taken into consideration. They should not be compelled to attend access.

66.  Ms Lo saw that P could hardly regain the trust of the children if she continues to externalize her blame and does not address her own difficulties in parenting. Therefore, P’s wishes for immediate care and control and direct access to the children are totally unrealistic and impractical, which would only further increase the resentment of the children towards her. 

67.  Ms Lo also considered that communications in the parental system have broken down; the parties would not be able to make any decisions for the children without going back to court repeatedly, which would only make the children more vulnerable.  She recommended that the sole custody of the children be given to R.  In light of the children’s consistent negative views towards their mother, Ms Lo considered it impractical and infeasible to continue with access if P refuses to acknowledge her problems.  She proposed that no defined access order should be made and access could only be arranged when the children are ready to see their mother.

The Clinical Psychologist’s Reports

68.  Ms Yau has submitted two reports, dated 24 April 2015 and 7 December 2015 respectively.

69.  In her 1st report, she stated:

“...I am also concerned that P seems to have little ability of self-reflection. She is either unaware of or have (sic) very little reflection on the possible impacts of her actions on the children, e.g. her recording of all the access meetings which is quite an intrusion into the children’s personal and psychological boundary, her act of drawing (L) into a conflict she had with Ms Lo which could be better handled just between her and Ms Lo, her telling (L) that she would go to prison and he could help her by telling the police that he lied in the VRI, etc.... It seems to me that P has confused the need of the children for her to love them with her need for the children to love her. The actions she engages in towards her children suggest to me that she is getting her own needs met at the expense of the children’s in particular (L)’s needs.”: §34(j)

70.  Ms Yau urged P to take her observation as a wake-up call and as an opportunity to work for and change for a better self, so that she can have authentically close and loving relationships with her children.  If P does not make any positive changes, Ms Yau had the concern that when the boys grow older, they would very likely rebel, fight back or disengage emotionally to cut the pain.  The relationship would then be really estranged or lost: §36.

71.  In her 2nd report, Ms Yau repeated her advice and recommended a family-oriented phased therapy to be given by her, starting with P being the primary client before involving the children: §26.

72.  The latest report is by Dr Poon, the government clinical psychologist who gave P therapy upon the recommendation of Ms Yau.  Dr Poon reported on 27 September 2016 that P does not have any significant signs and symptoms of emotional disorders which warrant clinical attention.  However, P exhibits personality pattern of anger, resentment, distrustful of people, irritability, sensitive to criticism and projection of blame onto others.  She perceives her attendance for psychological service as a compliance with the court order.  Her goal is to get back her children, rather than to look into her own difficulties in parenting. She does not think she has any personal issues that warrant therapeutic intervention.  She regards her stress was solely caused by R, the court system and other professionals.  Dr Poon further said that without a genuine reflective and honest attitude, she does not think psychotherapy is going to help P and thus, she recommended the discontinuation of the service.

The Official Solicitor’s Stance in his 4th Report for the purpose of Trial

73.  The Official Solicitor has always taken the view that the children should not be compelled to attend the access sessions against their will.  Any coercive element would end up pushing the children farther away.

74.  It is reported that L still does not want to see his mother, whether physical or by FaceTime.  He likes the present living arrangement and does not want any change.  Significantly, L does not think P could improve and be “good” again. He does not want to give her a chance at all.

75.  As for B, he gave similar answers that he does not want to have FaceTime access. He does not want to attend access sessions either because P hit his arms during access.  It happened when Ms Lo was in another room and she did not notice it. B felt painful and hence does not want to go to access anymore.  Like L, B does not think P would be ‘good’ again.  That said, he indicated that perhaps he could see his mother once each year, but there should not be any FaceTime access.

76.  The Official Solicitor is too of the view that the parties can hardly co-operate with each other on matters of importance in the upbringing of the children.  He recommended that the sole custody, care and control of the children be given to R.  As far as access is concerned, the Official Solicitor maintained his stance that the children should not be forced to attend access against their will.  It may take the children considerable time to overcome their fear and resentment. The Official Solicitor urged the mother to demonstrate unconditional love for the children by showing her patience and understanding.  He noted that according to Ms Yau, there are personal issues P needs to work on in order to mend her relationship with the children but unfortunately P is still unable to acknowledge this fact.  Given the children’s strong rejection of their mother, any immediate direct access is unrealistic and infeasible.  It is therefore proposed by the Official Solicitor that P may have indirect email access to the children.  This can be implemented by a designated email account.  The question of direct access can be re-visited when P has shown progress in re-building her relationship with the children and when the children are willing and ready to see their mother.

The Applications that the court has to deal with

77.  The following applications, all concerned with the arrangement of the children, are required to be formally disposed of:

(1) R’s summons dated 2 July 2013 and amended on 11 May 2015 for the sole custody, care and control of the boys with supervised access to P;

(2) P’s summons dated 4 September 2013 for joint custody and shared care arrangement;

(3) R’s summons dated 19 June 2015 insofar as it relates to the delivery up of the boys’ Country A passports and other travel documents.  R seeks to have the documents to be delivered to him for safe custody;

(4) P’s summons dated 20 June 2015 seeking leave to have a child psychologist to attend access; and

(5) P’s summons dated 11 September 2015 seeking directions from the court to ensure that access be carried out without interference.

The Witnesses

78.  In trial, apart from P and R, P’s mother (who flew in from Country A), Ms Lo and Ms Yau also gave evidence in court.

Parties’ Position

79.  At the beginning of the trial, the parties were, in their usual fashion, poles apart.

80.  P asked for the custody of the children to be shared between the parties.  While she agreed that the care and control of the children be remained with R for the time being, she said a clear path towards returning to shared care and control should be implemented.  Before this is realized, in the meantime, she sought regular and defined accesses.  

81.  On the other hand, R sought the sole custody, care and control of the children, with access to be continued upon the willingness of the children.  He also sought (1) to remove all restrictions on removal so that he may take the children out of Hong Kong for holiday purpose or family visit and (2) the possession of the children’s Country A passports which are being held by P’s former solicitors.

82.  After having heard Ms Yau and Ms Lo’s evidence, when it came to the 4th day of the trial it is clear that P did not seek to argue seriously for the custody, care and control of the children.  She was realistic in that she nailed down her focus on access in order to rebuild her relationship with the children.  Specifically, she asked for email and FaceTime accesses and family therapy.

83.  At the same time, R’s position has also soften somewhat.  He agreed to let P to have indirect electronic access, limited to one email per week but the children should not be compelled to read or respond to P’s emails.

Legal Principles

84.  In matters in relation to the custody or upbringing of the child, the court is guided by the principles set out in section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13),

Section 3

(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, or in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property -

(a) in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court –

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to –

(A) the views of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father;

(b) ..., a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other;”  (emphasis added)

85.  In short, the court shall regard the best interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration.  The court shall give due consideration to the views of the child and any material information including any SIRs; and there shall not be any discrimination against the father or vice versa.

Custody, Care and Control

86.  With the concessions from both parties, the issues which call for determination by the court have been simplified.  I have no doubt that P has taken the correct approach by focusing on ways to improve her relationship with the children rather than labouring on custody, care and control issues. 

87.  R has always been commended by all professionals involved in this case as a stable and a secure-base attachment figure for the children.

88.  P asserted that the children have been subject to alienation manipulated by R.  This has not been supported by Ms Lo, Ms Yau and Mr Lee, who appeared for the Official Solicitor.  Quite to the contrary, Ms Yau takes the view it is a case of estrangement rather than parental alienation.  Information from different sources all pointing to P’s own acts which have negatively affected her relationship with the children.  It was reported in the 1st psychologist report that L and B had consistently told different people at different times in different contexts that their mother hit them and yelled at them many times.  According to her professional judgment, Ms Yau believed the children were telling the truth, in light of the ways they disclosed and talked, as well as the complex feelings of fear, hate and wanting to love which L expressed towards his mother.  These were not how children who had been alienated or coached would have responded.  Ms Yau even concluded, in her 1st report, that P is the primary architect of the estranged relationship.

89.  It is significant to note that R arranged 2 meal gatherings for the children to meet P’s mother in April and May 2016 when she visited Hong Kong.  He also invited P’s sisters to have dinner with the children at home.  It is evident that the boys have no resistance to see their maternal grandmother and aunts.

90.  It is extremely fortunate that having undergone all these turmoil, Ms Yau does not think the boys, especially L who was at the centre of the criminal proceedings, have any significant psychological problems that need therapy.  Ms Yau assessed that L is resilient and has risen to the difficulties and the challenges of a family situation that many children may be traumatized.

91.  According to Ms Lo’s enquiry with the children’s teachers, the children have been doing well in school.  L has done very well academically, especially in reading and Mathematics as well as improvement in focus and concentration.  He is well-behaved at school and respectful towards both adults and peers.  He is described as always being gentle and calm and has been able to express his feelings in appropriate way. B is commended to have made good progress in all areas of the curriculum.  He was the ‘Star’ of the week in September 2016 because he was in a group above his year level for Literacy and Numeracy and he worked incredibly hard to produce some impressive work.  He is seemed to be emotionally stable now. 

92.  Of course, I have not lost sight of P’s complaints that under the care of R the children have been displaying traits of arrogance, entitlement and indifference.  She has objections to various decisions made by R such as (1) the children being given unsupervised access to the internet and violent games, (2) B was given a switchblade knife as a gift, (3) the children being driven in R’s car by their maid who, in P’s eyes, is an unsafe driver, and (4) the children being exposed to racist and bigoted opinion from the maid’s husband who had been with the family briefly. 

93.  It seems to me that Ms Lo was aware of these complaints but she did not find them justified.  All the evidence points to the fact that both children have remained under the good care of their father and have been leading a stable live in the past 2 years. It has to be appreciated that R has been juggling between his flying duties and giving care to the children.  I have no doubt that R could have been in an easier position if the caring responsibility could be shared by P, but the reality forbids this to happen.  P said the children could have travelled by public transportation instead of being driven by their maid.  She even added that no driver with less than 5 years’ experience should drive the boys.  I do not know how she came up with the figure of 5 years.  As I see it, regardless of whether she is correct, I wonder whether it is too much a demand on the children if there is an alternative by which they could travel faster and more comfortably.  Again, this may not be an issue at all if their care and control could be shared by their parents.  Anyway, R has agreed to give the undertakings that (1) he will not leave the children or any one of them in the car alone and (2) when the children or any one of them are travelling in his car, he will use the safety device as set out in the Road Users Guide issued by the Transport Department.  It is either a child harness made of a lap strap and two shoulder straps; or a booster together with the ordinary seat belt, which also has an extra strap running behind the child that acts as a guide to change the lie of the diagonal belt.

94.  I will hold R onto these undertakings.  The undertakings will form part of the order made by the court in this Judgment.

95.  I am not saying that R, as a father, is impeccable.  There is some merit for P to have pointed out that R posted a picture of his and the children on a dating website for a brief period of time but that happened quite a while ago.

96.  On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the children have been doing significantly better both at home and in school for the last 2 years under the care of R.  For the above reasons, I grant the sole custody, care and control of the children to R.

Access

97.  It is glaringly apparent that P has not been able to work smoothly with Ms Lo.  To name only just one example, Ms Lo mentioned that she had reminded P for several times since 2016 not to have the partner yoga poses with B during access because the access room was not safe enough to carry out such exercise.  P usually disagreed with her friendly reminders and argued each time in front of B. 

98.  In evidence, P said it was fantastic that when she was having FaceTime access with B on 17 or 24 April 2016, L joined them for a while voluntarily, said “Hi, Ma Ma” and exchanged some nonsense chit-chat. However, P did not mention this incident in the hearing of 27 April 2016 and 13 June 2016 when the FaceTime access was suspended, nor did she mention this in any of her affirmations.  P also testified that she last saw L in the street two months ago before the trial.  L waved at her and she waved back.  I have great doubt over whether these incidents really happened. 

99.  In evidence, both Ms Yau and Ms Lo agreed to the Official Solicitor’s proposal that in the meantime, there should not be any physical access but indirect email access to the children only.  Further, the children should not be felt being compelled to read the emails or to respond to them.  This is also agreed to by R.

100.  Throughout P has been denying what the children said about the hitting and the yelling and what happened during supervised access sessions.  To her, all these are lies engineered by R, told to deceive the world including the court.  However, there is not a hint of evidence from Ms Lo, Ms Yau or the Official Solicitor in support of her contention.  They have not found any sign of coaching on the part of R.

101.  In her very 1st report, Ms Yau observed that P has a strong tendency to blame others for problems and also has little ability of self-reflection.  She would also take actions for getting her needs met at the expense of the children’s needs.  Ms Yau advised that only when P is willing to go for therapy, to acknowledge and face her problems and to work for positive changes, could she then salvage her relationship with the children.  If P does not make positive changes of herself and of the way she relates with the children, the boys would in the future disengage themselves emotionally to cut the pain.  The mother and children relationship would then be really estranged or lost.  As can be seen from the history of the proceedings, it is regrettable that she did not give any heed to the advice; consequently, defined access failed to serve as a catalyst to mend the relationship.  

102.  Dr Poon also assessed that the problem has its root at P.  P has to acknowledge that this is the case. Without a genuine reflective and honest attitude to her problem, any effort would be futile. 

103.  Ms Yau testified that at the beginning L felt sad for not being able to love his mother, but now he has come to terms.  As for B, it is evident that he was willing to see her mother.  He was able to enjoy access though B told her that P had yelled and hit him.  But the situation has gradually deteriorated to a point where B is not willing to see his mother anymore.  She added that she is not surprised to see this happened.  She confirmed her view that P is the major contributing factor.

104.  Ms Yau did not think the boys have any psychological or emotional disturbance that they need to go to therapy.  Unless there are positive signs from P, she is not even sure what she can tell the boys.  This must come from the real experience of the boys.  She agreed with the Official Solicitor that for the present moment, there should only be gentle and indirect contacts by way of emails between the mother and the boys.  The boys should not be under any pressure to respond.

105.  The boys are now physically safe but, as I see it, psychologically speaking, they are still very feeble. They are still harbouring strong resistance to see their mother; especially for L who went through the tormenting experience as a prosecution witness against his mother.  According to Ms Yau, the thought that he may have to see his mother would cause him a lot of anxiety.  It is clear in my mind that one needs to be extremely careful when considering how a step further is to be taken in mending the mother and child relationship.  I agree with Ms Yau that the situation, as it stands, is to give priority to the children’s sense of security and well-being.

106.  All the professionals involved in this case have given their views that the children’s views have to be respected.  Any attempt to ‘force’ them to see their mother would only cause backfire and deteriorate the situation further.

107.  Both Ms Yau and Ms Lo said P has not changed.  In trial, P reiterated that she should be given a chance to show her new skill.  With respect, she has missed the point.  It is not a matter of skill.  The long and short of it is that there must be a change in her attitude.  She has to recognise her problem deep from her heart and seeks therapy.  Regrettably, I have not seen this yet.  P still maintains that she never abused the children, notwithstanding she was convicted of the relevant offence.  She should realize that she is the one who holds the key.  Without any positive sign, it is too risky to give P the opportunity to demonstrate her skill.

108.  The options open to me are extremely limited.  Supervised access and FaceTime access are foiled attempts. I do not think they are appropriate for the time being.  I also accept that the children should not be forced to see their mother.

109.  It is clear to me that the best and the only option, as recommended by all professionals, is indirect access by way of emails from P.  I agree with R that email access is a “slow burner”.  This can be a safe, pressure-free way for the children to maintain contacts with their mother.

110.  P asked for 10 emails over a period of one month rather than one email each week.  This is to even out over a period of time.

111.  Mr Lee, in his closing submissions, agreed to increase the frequency of email access to two emails per week. 

112.  As said, bearing in mind that the children are very feeble psychologically, one has to be very careful in not overburdening the children with too many emails within a short span of time. Thus, I prefer Mr Lee’s suggestion. 

113.  I think P should be informed of the progress of the children so that she may have something to write to or to encourage the children.

114.  I accept the grandmother’s evidence that the boys enjoyed good times with her.  I would like to see this happens again when the grandmother visits Hong Kong.  Even though R’s relationship with P had been extremely poor, he was commended by Ms Lo to have been fully supportive in the previous supervised access.  I believe it is better to leave some flexibly here; so I do not think it is necessary to give an order for this.  I am sure the progress report will keep the court up-dated of this matter if there are aspects in this regard which need to draw my attention to.

Supervision

115.  R repeatedly made the point that he does not want the children to be exposed to psychologist, social worker and solicitor anymore.  They are entitled to have a closure of the matter and should have their ‘childhood’ and normal lives back.

116.  However, Ms Lo agreed that supervision is appropriate given the circumstances of this case.  Mr Lee also considered that supervision is inevitable.

117.  I listened with care and empathy to what R said.  Yet, I feel duty bound that the court has to continue to monitor the situation and to render whatever assistance as may be required for the benefit of the children.  I have taken Ms Yau’s professional view on board.  If the indirect access is going well, and there are signs that P has changed in her attitude, then consideration can be given to get the children and R involved with a view to extend the access as the next phrase.  I will give an order that the access is to be supervised by the SWD for 24 months.

Temporary Removal for Vacation / Family Visits

118.  R seeks to remove all the restrictions on removal so that he may take the children out of Hong Kong for holiday purpose or family visit.  There is already an order given by the court on 21 December 2015 that R may take the children out of Hong Kong temporarily for holiday purpose and/or family visit provided that each trip shall not be more than 14 days and there shall not be more than 4 trips per year.

119.  This arrangement has been in place since January 2016 and no complaint or problem has been heard of.  I have determined that this arrangement should be continued.

Passports

120.  As said, R seeks the custody of the children’s Country A passports and other travel documents.  It seems to me clear that apart from the Country A passports which are being kept by P’s former solicitor pursuant to a previous order of the court, no other travel documents are involved.  The Country D’s passports must always have been with R otherwise he would not have been able to travel with the children.  I was told (and this was not disputed) that the Country A passports have long expired.  It is a matter of commonsense that renewal of the passport must be subject to the consent of the other parent. Thus, on any view, there is little point for R to have the expired passports being placed in his custody.  For this reason, I will give an order that the expired Country A passports of the children be released to P.

Non-molestation Order

121.  The non-molestation order was granted on 29 October 2014.  The 24-month period of validity of such an order has already expired pursuant to section 6 of the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance (Cap 189). On the evidence before me, I do not see any need to give such an order afresh.

Orders

122.  For the reasons aforesaid, I give the following orders:

(1) P may have access to the children of the family by way of emails, limited to 2 emails per week from her.  P may also send an electronic card during Christmas and on the occasion of the children’s birthdays. The children are not obliged to give any reply;

(2) R is to provide a designated email account for each of the children within 7 days;

(3) R is to provide the children’s school hand-books, notices and reports, if any, on a monthly basis; and

(4) The access is to be supervised by the Social Welfare Department for a period of 24 months.  A progress report is to be submitted to court upon the expiry of the first 9 months.

123.  Further, upon the undertakings given by R to the court and contained in the order dated 21 December 2015, I give an order that paragraph 2 of the Order dated 21 December 2015 be continued until further order of the court.  The Country A passports are to be released to P.

124.  The above orders should have disposed all the children’s matters in the present proceedings. Specifically, the orders in paragraph 122 dispose of R’s summons dated 2 July 2013 and amended on 11 May 2015, and P’s summonses dated 4 September 2013, 20 July 2015 and 11 September 2015.  The order in paragraph 123 above disposes of the remaining matters that required to be dealt with in R’s summons dated 19 June 2015.

Costs

125.  R asks for the costs, on indemnity basis, of all the applications on children’s matter.  They include the summonses set out in paragraph 77 above and the following summonses together with all costs reserved:

(1) R’s ex parte summons for non-removal dated 5 May 2014;

(2) P’s application for permanent relocation dated 19 May 2014;

(3) P’s application for interim care and control dated 19 May 2014;

(4) P’s ex parte application for a non-molestation order against R dated 19 May 2014;

(5) Consent summons dated 17 June 2014 for moving the trial dates for relocation;

(6) Consent summons dated 2 July 2014 (on P’s application for a non-molestation order);

(7) R’s summonses for a non-molestation order against P dated 27 October 2014 and 30 October 2014;

(8) Consent summons dated 8 May 2015 (for amendment of R’s summons and P’s withdrawal of application for permanent relocation);

(9) R’s summons for release of funds for litigation and for variation of non-removal order dated 19 June 2015; and

(10) P’s summons dated 19 August 2016 (for extension of time to file her affirmation on children matters).

126.  As I have not had the opportunity to hear any serious arguments on costs, I indicated to the parties that the costs order given in this Judgment would be by way of orders nisi.

P’s Application for Non-molestation Order dated 19 May 2014

127.  As said in paragraph 23 above, at the same time when P took out her application for relocation, she also sought a non-molestation order against R. That application was compromised by way of a mutual undertaking from each other not to hack or spy on the other’s computer.  It was also agreed that the issue of costs be adjourned for arguments at the trial of relocation.  As things turned out, there was no trial on relocation but this does not prevent the court from dealing with the issue of costs at this stage of the proceedings. 

128.  In Famous Marvel Company Limited & Ors v Conversant Group Limited & Ors, (unreported, HCA 2153/2009, 29 October, 2012) Hon Au-Yeung J summarized the relevant principles for determining costs where the dispute has been compromised by the parties:  

“22. There is no dispute that even if a case is settled except as to costs, the Court still has power to determine which party should be liable for costs.  There is no tradition for there to be “no order as to costs” in such a scenario.  I am guided by the following principles in deciding costs:

(i) The Court is to decide if the party seeking costs has substantially obtained the reliefs sought in the litigation: Re Chinese United Establishment Ltd, HCCW 291/1994, 5 October 1995, Rogers J (as he then was), approved in CACV 214/1995; Lai Yuet Chun v Super Deluxe International Limited & ors, HCCW 186/2001, 3 June 2003 Kwan J (as she then was).

(ii) At each end of the spectrum there will be cases where it is obvious which side would have won had the substantive issues been fought to a conclusion.  In between, the position will, in differing degrees, be less clear.  How far the Court will be prepared to look into the previously unresolved substantive issues will depend on the circumstances of the particular case, not least the amount of costs at stake and the conduct of the parties.  Brawley v Marcynski (No.1) [2003] 1 WLR 813.

(iii) The Court will first consider if it is in a position to say what the likely outcome after trial would have been.  If it is not in a position to do so, the order may well be no order as to costs: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1),at para 18, Longmore LJ; followed in BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C Brewer & Sons Ltd [2004] FSR 150.

(iv) The Court may permit parties to adduce evidence on the question of costs: Ta Tung China & Arts Ltd v Fontana Restaurant Ltd [1999] 1 HKLRD 404; Lai Yuet Chun v Super Deluxe International Limited & ors, at para 12.  However, to say that the parties must go to trial in order to resolve any outstanding questions of costs would be contrary to the underlying objectives enshrined in RHC Order 1A rules 1 and 2: Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan & others, HCA 4366/2003, 30 December 2009, Recorder Jat SC.

(v) A broad brush can be taken by referring to all matters already laid before the Court, eg pleadings, correspondence, witness statements, transcripts of evidence and the terms of the settlement order: c.f. BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C Brewer & Sons Ltd, at para 9; Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan & others.

(vi) The objective is to do justice between the parties without incurring unnecessary Court time and consequently additional cost: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1).”

129.  Both parties had exchanged their affirmations but were able to settle the application before the substantive hearing.  The court did not have the opportunity to assess the merits of P’s application.  With the mutual undertaking given in favour of the other party, each has obtained the same reliefs or benefits.  There is an acknowledgment set out in the recital of the consent order that the undertaking by the parties should not be construed as an admission.  R’s affirmation in opposition is more than bare denials. Hence, even if a board brush approach is adopted, the court is not in a position to say what the likely outcome after arguments would have been.  In the circumstances, I consider it is fair that each party is to bear his or her own costs in respect of this application, including the costs of the consent summons dated 2 July 2014 and all costs reserved and I so order.

R’s Application for Non-molestation Order

130.  The events that I have alluded to plainly show that R’s application is fully justified in preventing the children from being physically and psychologically abused.  There is simply no merit for P to have repeatedly said that the MDCC had concluded that there was not an established case of physical abuse.  I think it is fair and just that P is to bear R’s costs of and in the application, including all costs reserved and with counsel certificate and I so order.

The Other Summonses

131.  While costs are in the discretion of the court the general principles as regards costs in children cases are that there should be no order as to costs save when one party has been unreasonable or reprehensible in the conduct of the litigation, as parents should not be deterred from putting cases concerning children before the courts: R v R (Costs and Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95, and Re G (Costs:  Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, H v H, CACV 42/2002 (date of judgment: 6 September 2002).

132.  Behaviour beyond the band of what is reasonable may result in an order for costs against that party.  In Keller v Keller and Legal Aid Board [1995] 1 FLR 259 Wilson J (as he then was) said at 265:

No one suggests that the court's discretion in respect of costs under s 51(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 has become emasculated in children cases. The position is only that in most such cases, indeed in ordinary cases, the proper weighing of the factors in the exercise of the discretion is likely to lead to the choice of no order inter partes. Where, for example, the conduct of a party has been reprehensible or his stance in the litigation has been beyond the band of what is reasonable, an order for costs might well be made against him. Equally a marked disparity in wealth, such that, for example, the wife's costs would bear harshly upon her economy but could be discharged by the husband without significant impact upon his economy, might give rise to an order against him.

133.  When assessing whether a party’s conduct has been unreasonable, what should be considered is unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation.  Hale J (as she then was) made the celebrated remark in R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95 at 98B that parents are expected to be unreasonable:

It is urged on his behalf that he was not totally unreasonable. The judge does indeed point to the good features about him and his relationship with R. He made some complaints about the mother's care of R to which the judge gave some credence, although it is right to say that in comparison with his criticisms of the father these are very limited indeed. It is further argued that it is not right to penalise the father for defects in his character which cause the apparent unreasonableness of his attitude. The fair point is made that in children cases one must not confuse unreasonableness in relation to the child – because one might say that we are all expected to be unreasonable in our attitudes to our children – and unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation. However, it is quite clear that the judge took the view that the father had indeed been unreasonable in relation to the litigation. Of course, the parties should not be deterred, by the prospect of having to pay costs, from putting before the court that which they genuinely think to be in the best interests of the child, but there have to be limits. Children should not be put through the strain of being subject to claims that have very little real prospect of success, still less should they be put through a quite unreasonable involvement in their parents' disputes, to the extent that R was in this case. He was taken to see a psychologist, whom the judge described as totally unqualified to give an opinion on the case. We learn that this was done without the leave of the court. The judge made various criticisms of the psychologist's methods and described him as a 'paid hack'. He was also taken to see a solicitor between the end of the evidence and the judge's giving judgment. In other words, there was conduct in relation to the litigation which goes way beyond the usual sort of attitude which a concerned parent shows in relation to the future of his child. (emphasis added)

134.  There are two recent UK Supreme Court judgments.

135.  In Re T (CareProceedings:Costs) [2012] UKSC 36, [2012] 1 WLR 2281, Lord Phillips PSC restated that “the general practice of not awarding costs against a party, including a local authority, in the absence of reprehensible behaviour or an unreasonable stance, is one that accords with the ends of justice”: §44.

136.  In Re S (A Child) [2015] UKSC 20, [2015] 1 WLR 1631, Lady Hale DPSC explained the rationale for the general practice:

“18  As long ago as Gojkovic v Gojkovic [1992] Fam 40, 57, the Court of Appeal observed that it was unusual to make an order for costs in children's cases. In Keller v Keller and Legal Aid Board [1995] 1 FLR 259, 267–268, Neill LJ went further: “In the last decade, however, it has become the general practice in proceedings relating to the custody and care and control of children to make no order as to the costs of the proceedings except in exceptional circumstances.” He did, however, go on to say that it was “unnecessary and undesirable to try to limit or place into rigid categories the cases which a court might regard as suitable for such an award”.

19  Nevertheless, the cases which might be regarded as suitable may be deduced from the reasons why the courts have adopted the “no costs” approach. The classic explanation is that given by Wilson J in Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994] 1 WLR 1317, 1319:

“Where the debate surrounds the future of a child, the proceedings are partly inquisitorial and the aspiration is that in their outcome the child is the winner and indeed the only winner. The court does not wish the spectre of an order for costs to discourage those with a proper interest in [the welfare of] the child from participating in the debate. Nor does it wish to reduce the chance of their co-operation around the future life of the child by casting one as the successful party entitled to his costs and another as the unsuccessful party obliged to pay them. The proposition applies in its fullest form to proceedings between parents and other relations; but it also applies to proceedings to which a local authority are a party. Thus, even when a local authority's application for a care order is dismissed, it is unusual to order them to pay the costs of the other parties.”

20  Whenever a court has to determine a question relating to the upbringing of a child, the welfare of the child is the court's paramount consideration: section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. This applies just as much to care proceedings brought to protect a child from harm as it does to disputes between parents or other family members about the child's future. Although the proceedings are adversarial in form, they have many inquisitorial features. An application cannot be withdrawn without the court's consent: FPR r 29.4. The court is not bound by the cases put forward by the parties, but may adopt an alternative solution of its own. The court is not bound by the choice of evidence put forward by the parties, but can decide for itself what evidence it wishes to hear. The court is very often assisted by the independent investigations and reports of the family court reporter (in private law cases) or the children's guardian (in care and adoption proceedings) and other experts. Even in care proceedings, there are many possible outcomes available to the court. Thus, for example, in a case such as this, the available outcomes ranged from a closed adoption with no contact (other than letterbox contact) with the birth family to the child going to live with her father with no further intervention by the local authority. In between could be, for example, an open adoption, a special guardianship order, long term fostering under a care order with only limited contact with the birth family, medium term fostering with increasing contact with a view to restoring the child to her birth family in due course, placement with the birth family under a care order, placement with the birth family under a supervision order together with a child arrangements order, a child arrangements order or even no order at all. It can readily be seen, therefore, why in such proceedings there are no adult winners and losers—the only winner should be the child.

21  Furthermore, it can generally be taken for granted that each of the persons appearing before the court has a role to play in helping the court to achieve the best outcome for the child. It would be difficult indeed for a court to decide how to secure that the child has a meaningful relationship with each parent without hearing from them both. It would be difficult indeed for a court to decide the best way of protecting a child from the risk of harm without hearing from her parents and those whose task it is to protect her. That is why parents are compellable witnesses in care proceedings, even when it is alleged that they have committed criminal offences. No one should be deterred by the risk of having to pay the other side's costs from playing their part in helping the court achieve the right solution.”

137.  There are other considerations justifying the “no costs” approach.  Lady Hale pointed out that generally parents are assumed to have been motivated by concern for their child’s welfare and want the best for their child as they see it: §22.  Parents need to be able to co-operate with one another after the case is over.  Stigmatising one party as the loser and adding to that the burden of having to pay the other party’s costs is likely to jeopardise the chances of their co-operating in the future: §23.  There is also the consideration that having to pay the other side’s costs, or even having to bear one’s own costs, will reduce the resources available to look after the children: §24.

138.  That said, Her Ladyship remarked that one consideration that the court could not legitimately take into account was whether a party was, or was not, legally aided: §25.

139.  Her Ladyship concluded in §26 that costs order should only be made in unusual circumstances:

26  ... They lead to the conclusion that costs orders should only be made in unusual circumstances. Two of them were identified by Wilson J in Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994]1 WLR1317, 1319: “where, for example, the conduct of a party has been reprehensible or the party's stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable: Havering London Borough Council v S [1986] 1 FLR 489 and Gojkovic v Gojkovic [1992] Fam 40, 60C–D”. Those were also the two circumstances identified in In re T, at para 44.

140.  Significantly, Lady Hale further said that the exceptional categories recognised in Re T are not closed.  The possible exceptions are not confined to reprehensible behaviour or unreasonable stance.  There may be other reasons why an award of costs might be justified; financial hardship might be one of the other reasons.  Her Ladyship said the following in §33:

“...The object of the exercise is to achieve the best outcome for the child. If the best outcome for the child is to be brought up by her own family, there may be cases where real hardship would be caused if the family had to bear their own costs of achieving that outcome. In other words, the welfare of the child would be put at risk if the family had to bear its own costs. In those circumstances, just as it may be appropriate to order a richer parent who has behaved reasonably in the litigation to pay the costs of the poorer parent with whom the child is to live, ... if otherwise the child's welfare would be put at risk...”

141.  Re S(A Child) is in respect of public law proceedings but the principles enunciated there are equally applicable to private law proceedings. Guided by these authorities, I now deal with R’s application.

P’s Application for Permanent Relocation

142.  P was an expatriate who came to Hong Kong because of her connection with R.  Her application for relocation, put in the proper context at that time, cannot be said to have been an unreasonable or a hopeless application, though the same was overtaken by subsequent events.  There are no unusual features that warrant a departure from the normal costs order.  I consider that the proper costs order should be no order as to costs in respect of this application and also the relating applications including the consent summonses dated 17 June 2014 and 8 May 2015 (insofar as the latter summons relates to the withdrawal of her application for permanent relocation and interim care and control) and all costs reserved.

Parties’ Custody, Care and Control and Access Applications

143.  R argued that P has abused the litigation process and has not been transparent with her financial position.  P should have accepted the objective facts and the recommendations from the reports.  Instead she continues with her unreasonable litigation conduct without regard to the family situation.  As a result, there has been irreparable damage to the children and him emotionally and financially.  He also said that P has financial impunity and this would explain her litigation conduct.

144.  On the other hand, P submitted that there should not be any costs order against her.  Further, her income is far less than that of R who is working as a pilot.

145.  I do not think I need to be lengthy on this issue.  As said, the parties have not advanced any substantive arguments in this regard yet.

146.  The crucial question is whether (1) the conduct of P has been reprehensible or (2) P’s stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable. 

147.  In respect of whether the conduct of P has been reprehensible in the proceedings, she has already met with the adverse costs order in R’s non-molestation order proceedings.  I accept the problems arising from the supervised and FaceTime access have generated some applications but these cannot be regarded as P’s reprehensible conduct in the proceedings.  Rather, these problems were evidently due to P’s failure to reflect upon her own problems and to deal with her relationship with the children. 

148.  As for whether P’ stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable, in my view, in the context of the present case, one has to consider whether P’s case is a hopeless one. 

149.  More than 2 years have gone by since the interim care and control was placed with R and with all the reports produced by different professionals during this time, it is apparent that her case of asking for shared custody and regular and defined accesses were entirely unrealistic and beyond the band of reasonableness.  Yet, her agreement that the care and control be granted to R for the time being, with a clear path towards returning to shared care and control cannot be said to be unreasonable.  Further, as said above, when it came to the 4th day of the trial it is clear that P did not seek to argue seriously for the custody, care and control of the children.  

150.  Speaking of hopeless application, Butler-Sloss LJ in Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250 said at 252G:

If this judge in this case had found that this father had behaved unreasonably in the litigation and had gone beyond what many fathers do, seeking orders which are hopeless, the point will come at which pursuing a hopeless application becomes unreasonable. But hopelessness and unreasonableness are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, particularly where there is a litigant in person, a degree of generosity towards a litigant may be more appropriate than to a litigant who is on legal aid generally advised by counsel and solicitors as to the extent to which they should continue to litigate.

151.  Her Ladyship then added at 253D:

It seems to me that the case of R v R does not change the normal situation that it is unusual to order costs, although it will be appropriate to order costs when a parent, even a litigant in person, goes beyond the limit of what is reasonable to pursue the application before the court. I would not like this judgment to be seen in any way as suggesting that judges do not have the jurisdiction and ought not in the appropriate case to make an order that one parent should pay the costs of the other parent in children cases. But because it is an unusual order, it ought to be clear on the face of the transcript, either in the judgment or preferably in the order for costs, as to why it is that the normal situation is not being followed in this case. It is obvious that the judge did not put his mind to this point as to whether or not this was an unusual case.

(emphasis added)

152.  P has been litigating in person since 30 July 2015.  I consider that she should be given a degree of generosity.

153.  As for R, at the beginning, his case was to suspend all forms of access; that was so even in light of the Official Solicitor’s recommendation of giving indirect email access to P.  Further, R has not been successful on some minor issues such as the temporary removal and the Country A passports.

154.  Considering all in a round, I do not find any unusual circumstances that warrant a departure from the usual no order as to costs.

Costs Orders Nisi

155.  I therefore give an order nisi that there be no order as to costs in respect of the custody, care and control and access of the children, including all costs reserved. For the avoidance of doubt, this order covers (but not limited to) the following summons:

(1) R’s summons dated 2 July 2013 and amended on 11 May 2015 for custody, care and control;

(2) P’s summons dated 4 September 2013 for Joint custody and shared care arrangement;

(3) R’s ex parte summons for non-removal dated 5 May 2014;

(4) P’s application for interim care and control dated 19 May 2014;

(5) R’s summons for release of funds for litigation and for variation of non-removal order dated 19 June 2015;

(6) P’s summons dated 20 June 2015 seeking leave to have a child psychologist to attend access for so long as considered necessary;

(7) P’s summons dated 11 September 2015 seeking directions from the court so as to ensure that access be carried out without interference; and

(8) P’s summons dated 19 August 2016 (for extension of time to file her affirmation on children’s matters).

156.  The Official Solicitor is not seeking costs, so there is an order that there be order as to costs between the Official Solicitor and the parties in the proceedings.  

Case Management

157.  I have no doubt that the parties need to have a closure of their divorce proceedings as soon as possible.   A hearing is fixed to be heard on Tuesday, 21 March 2017 at 10:30 am, at Court no. 9 (with 30 minutes reserved) for the purpose of 1st Appointment and for directions on the main suit.  Both parties do attend the hearing personally.  Penal notice be endorsed on the order.

158.  Finally, I would like to thank Mr Lee of the Official Solicitor for his assistance.

 ( I. Wong )
  District Judge

Ms NAV, the petitioner, appeared in person

Mr JTMW, the respondent, appeared in person

Mr Lee Tak-lei, Ted, solicitor, appeared for the Official Solicitor

99458-EN-2015-06-30

NAV v. JTMW

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FCMC 4191 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 NAVPetitioner
and
 JTMWRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of the Respondent’s Submissions: 3 December 2014
Date of the Petitioner’s Submissions: 27 February 2015
Date of the Respondent’s Reply Submissions: 13 March 2015
Date of Handing Down Ruling: 30 June 2015

__________________

Ruling on Costs
(By Paper Disposal)

__________________

1.  By a judgment dated 23 October 2014, I dismissed the petitioner wife’s application for single joint expert reports and I also gave an order nisi that there be no order as to costs.  The respondent father now challenges the order nisi in accordance with Order 42, rule 5B(6), RHC.  By his summons dated 6 November 2014, he asks for the costs order be varied such that the petitioner is to pay his costs of and incidental to the petitioner’s application.

2.  As a matter of fact, this is already the 2nd application on the part of the respondent for costs to be paid by the petitioner.  The 1st  application was in relation to the respondent’s application for the removal of certain parts of the petitioner’s affidavit and for the return of his personal documents.  By a Ruling dated 10 February 2014, I ruled that the petitioner should bear one-third of the respondent’s costs, to be summarily assessed if not agreed.

3.  Turning back to the original application that sparked the present costs summons, it was an application for leave to adduce the expert evidence of (1) a psychologist and (2) an immigration expert.  As said, I ruled against the petitioner on the reasons that I have set out in the Ruling dated 23 October 2014 (“the said Ruling”).  I would refer to the relevant parts of the said Ruling where appropriate.

The Relevant Legal Principles

4.  Hon Yuen JA set out the relevant principles in L v C, CACV No. 169/2006 (date of judgment: 19 March 2008): 

[23] As a matter of law, it is clear that costs are in the court’s discretion. Pointers as to how that discretion should be exercised include the following:

(1) in family cases, as in others, costs should normally follow the event;

(2) however because of the special dynamics of family litigation (e.g. where the case involved children, or where financial resources were inadequate to meet the needs of both parties, etc.), the discretion may be broader than in civil matters generally (Gojkovic v. Gojkovic [1991] 2 FLR 233, F v F (No. 2) [2003] 3 HKLRD 977); …;

(3) the court also retains a discretion to deprive successful litigants of costs under the Elgindata principles (In re Elgindata Ltd (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207);

(4) where a litigant succeeds on appeal but only on a new point, the court can deprive him of the costs below (Farquharson v Morgan [1894] 1 QB 552) or even order him to pay those costs (Yip Lai Fong v. Sin Tung Hing [2004] 3 HKLRD 230), and the court can deprive him of the costs of appeal (Chard v Jervis (1882) 9 QBD 178).

5.  Notwithstanding the starting point remains to be “costs follow the event”, it is important not to forget that the basic principle is that costs are in the court’s discretion.

6.  For children’s cases, the general practice is that there should be no order as to costs save when one party has been unreasonable or reprehensible in the conduct of litigation, as parents should not be deterred from putting cases concerning children before the courts. 

7.  When assessing whether a party’s conduct has been unreasonable, what should be considered is his or her unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation.  In R v. R (Costs and Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95, Hale J (as she then was) said at 98B as follows:

“The fair point is made that in children cases one must not confuse unreasonableness in relation to the child – because one might say that we are all expected to be unreasonable in our attitudes to our children – and unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation”

8.  In Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, Butler-Sloss LJ had this to say at 252G:

“If this judge in this case had found that this father had behaved unreasonably in the litigation and had gone beyond what many fathers do, seeking orders which are hopeless, the point will come at which pursuing a hopeless application becomes unreasonable. But hopelessness and unreasonableness are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, particularly where there is a litigant in person, a degree of generosity towards a litigant may be more appropriate than to a litigant which is on legal aid generally advised by counsel and solicitors as to the extent to which they should continue to litigate.”

9.  Her Ladyship then added at 253D:

“It seems to me that the case of R v R does not change the normal situation that it is unusual to order costs, although it will be appropriate to order costs when a parent, even a litigant in person, goes beyond the limit of what is reasonable to pursue the application before the court.”

10.  In S v S HCMP 5547/1999 (date of judgment:  22 June 2000) Deputy High Court Judge Gill went through the authorities then available and summarised how the court may determine a contest on costs in a case involving children:

(1) In general circumstances there should be no order for costs.  Parties who have a reasonable case to put forward going to a child’s welfare should not be dissuaded from doing so by threat of an adverse costs order if they do not succeed.  And in a child related case there should be no perceived winner or loser, save that it is the child who is the winner.

(2) If a party has by virtue of improper conduct attracted the proceedings which but for that may have been avoided then that might well warrant an adverse costs order.

(3) If in the course of the proceedings one party behaves unreasonably in his or her conduct of the litigation then that might be recognised in an adverse costs order.

(4) The financial circumstances of the parties and how an order for costs will impact on the parties is a factor for consideration.

(5) The general rule of not ordering costs should not deter a court from exercising its discretion to do so in circumstances it finds to be exceptional not necessarily limited to a particular category of cases.

11.  Having set out the relevant principles, I now turn to the issue.

The Expert Psychologist Report

12.  The respondent’s main bone of contention is on the petitioner’s conduct of the litigation.  Her adamant and unreasonable pursuit of the expert summons at a very late stage was such that it must attract an order for costs.  Her conduct of the litigation has gone well beyond “unreasonableness in relation to the child” and instead is a clear example of “unreasonableness in the attitude of the litigation”.

13.  As regards the psychologist expert, first, the petitioner has been represented by an experienced family law firm, she had ample opportunity to properly consider her relocation application, including whether expert evidence would be required.  Yet she took no action and only intimated her wish to appoint a single joint psychologist at the CDR hearing on 17 September 2014. By that time, it was less than 2 months before the trial.

14.  Secondly, her application for a psychologist expert was baseless and was out of her distaste towards the views of the social welfare officer.

15.  Thirdly, the petitioner failed to demonstrate why a psychologist report would be necessary and/or relevant to her relocation application.  It was clearly a smokescreen put up to deflect from the real issue and to attempt to fish for another report.

16.  In response, the petitioner submits that she should not be deterred from putting legitimate application before the court.  The fact that her application failed does not mean that it was not a legitimated and genuine application. 

17.  The petitioner emphasises that the social welfare report on her relocation dated 3 September 2014 was only received a few days before the CDR hearing, ie on 12 September 2014.  She therefore cannot be criticised for not raising this issue any earlier.  There was no opportunity for her to obtain any direction at any Children’s Appointment prior to the CDR hearing.  In fact, at the conclusion of the failed CDR hearing, Mr Marwah, the petitioner’s counsel, had already informed the court that an expert psychologist report was needed. 

18.  The respondent says he received the report on 8 September 2014.  It is unknown as to why the petitioner got the report a few days late.  He argues that the relocation application was initiated entirely by the mother on 20 May 2014 without any supporting affidavit at the time of its issuance.  Further, she was the one who asked for the trial dates to be set down in late 2014, before the academic year started.  She was well aware that the CDR hearing was fixed on 17 September 2014.  Hence, she knew well that it was totally unrealistic for a psychologist report to be appointed in time between the CDR and the trial.

19.  I do not think when the petitioner received the social welfare report is material. What is material is if the petitioner was genuinely of the view that a psychologist report was necessary to assist the court in the fair and just disposal of the relocation issue whether by way of the CDR hearing or the trial, what she could have done was to have her application made known to the court through her counsel before the CDR hearing so that the court may either give the necessary directions, for instance, to give her more time to consider her position or to proceed with the CDR hearing.  As I said in Para 7 of the said Ruling, prior to the CDR hearing there was no suggestion on the part of the petitioner that any expert was required.  It was at the end of the CDR hearing, after the parties had heard the views of the social welfare officer and the observations of the court, that Mr Marwah indicated that the petitioner would require the expert opinion of a psychologist. Thus, it appeared to me that the petitioner came to the CDR half-hearted, adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude.

20.  As I have observed in Para 21 of the said Ruling, the petitioner was utterly unhappy with the investigations carried out by the social welfare officer and her recommendations.  I have also found that the matters or concerns raised by the petitioner (and set out in Para 16 of the said Ruling) could not be addressed by a psychologist; what the petitioner asked for was effectively for another social investigation report (Para 23 of the said Ruling).  This could be reflected from her asking for a psychologist report “on the family” without reference to any particular or specific purpose (see Para 22 of the said Ruling).  I incline to agree with Ms Sum, who appeared for the respondent at the hearing, that it was a ‘fishing’ expedition. 

21.  Surely, it is not her submission that she did not have sufficient time to consider or prepare her application. In any event, by the time when the petitioner took out her application on 23 September 2014, with the assistance of her solicitors, she should have sufficient time to consider whether or not her application was merited. 

22.  It is true that, as has been pointed out by the petitioner, in the interim between the hearing on her application regarding the expert reports on 10 October 2014 and the handing down of the said Ruling on 24 October 2014 there were new matters arising resulting in the respondent’s ex-parte application for a non-molestation order and the granting of the relevant order by the court together with the calling for an up-dated social welfare report and a psychologist report on 29 October 2014.  The petitioner seems to be saying that these new matters justified her application for a psychologist report.  With respect, I do not agree.  The new matters are in respect of the alleged abusive behaviour of the mother which is in stark difference from the matters relied upon by her in support of her application for a psychologist report.  At the time of the petitioner’s application and the hearing, there was no alarming circumstance which justified the involvement of a psychologist.  I do not think the respondent’s application automatically or retrospectively justify the petitioner’s expert summons.

23.  For the above reasons, I am of the view that the petitioner has behaved unreasonably in her conduct of the litigation by taking out the application for an expert psychologist report. She should be met with an adverse costs order.

The Expert Immigration Report

24.  On the immigration expert, the respondent raises the same point that the petitioner had never raised the issue before the application was taken out.  Her application was clearly a waste of the parties’ time and a hopeless pursuit.  She even instructed a senior counsel to argue for her.  There is no reason why the respondent should be asked to bear his own costs incurred as a result of the petitioner’s unreasonableness in the litigation.

25.  I said the following in Paras 27 and 28 of the said Ruling:

27.  The Mother’s case is that she does not wish to remain in Hong Kong even if she has the ability to do so.  She wishes to return home with the children so that they may have long term stability, in terms of living and education there.  However, if her application for relocation fails, she would try to remain in Hong Kong because she is not leaving without the children.  Therefore, the court should know the likelihood of her ability to stay.  For this reason, an expert opinion is needed.

28.  I accept that the likelihood of her being able to stay is relevant to the extent that if the court is inclined to refuse the relocation application, then the court would need to consider the care and control arrangement of the children in Hong Kong.

26.  Thus, I recognized the relevancy of the immigration issue. However, I conclude in Para 30 of the said Ruling that this is a matter on Hong Kong law and thus expert evidence is inadmissible.  The parties are going to give their evidence in trial and their legal representatives may address the court on this issue by way of submissions. 

27.  It is certainly valid for the respondent to point out that it was a late application.  Her immigration status as a dependant of the respondent at the time must have been at the back of her mind.  However, for nearly 4 months since her application for relocation, the petitioner did not mention even a word about her intended application.  That said, I do not consider that this factor per se is so grave that it would have warranted the petitioner bearing the costs.  It is true that I have rejected her application but I do not think the manner in which the application was made was such that she had behaved unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings.  I agree with the petitioner that it was not wholly wrong for her to bring the application before the court to ensure that the court is properly assisted at the children’s hearing.

The Financial Position of the Petitioner

28.  There are also some brief submissions by the parties on the overall financial impact the costs order will have on the petitioner when she is now without income or maintenance from the respondent. 

29.  On this, I must agree with the respondent that the petitioner’s financial position is not transparent.  In my judgment dated 8 July 2014 on the petitioner’s application for maintenance pending suit, I concluded that the petitioner has other sources of income which are much more substantial than she has chosen to disclose and she has failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial situation.  In this regard, it should be noted that the petitioner had the means to instruct a senior counsel to argue for her in the expert summons.  Apparently, she is financially in a better shape than the respondent who has to support the 2 children.

Conclusion and Order

30.  For the above reasons, I am persuaded that the petitioner should bear the respondent’s costs of and incidental to her application so far as they relate to the expert psychologist report.  Doing the best I can, in terms of the coverage of the evidence and the hearing, I apportion 2/3 of the costs to the expert psychologist report and the remaining 1/3 to the expert immigration report.

31.  The cost order nisi is therefore varied as follows.

32.  I order that the petitioner do bear 2/3 of the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the summons dated 23 September 2014, including the variation of the costs order nisi, with counsel certificate, to be taxed if not agreed.

( I. Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Withers, Solicitors, for the Petitioner

Hampton, Winter & Glynn, Solicitors, for the Respondent

96665-EN-2014-12-03

NAV v. JTMW

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FCMC 4191 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 NAVPetitioner

and

 JTMWRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 12 November, 2014
Date of Handing Down Decision: 3 December, 2014

______________________________

DECISION
(Non-molestation Order and Interim Care and Control and Access)

______________________________

 

1. This is yet another clash between the parties regarding the 2 children of the family.

2. On 29 October 2014, on an ex parte application taken out by the respondent father (“R”) with notice to the petitioner mother (“P”), and after having heard the submissions of the parties’ legal representatives, I granted an order that:

1. The previous care arrangements of the children under a 5-day/5-day care system (“5/5 day system”) be suspended until further order;
2. The interim care and control of the children be granted to R;
3. The interim access to the children twice a week for not more than 3 hours each be granted to P; such access to be supervised by a social worker of the Neighbourhood Advice-Action Council or the Social Welfare Department until further order;
4. A clinical psychologist’s report and an updated social welfare report be submitted within 3 months;
5. P be restrained from assaulting, molesting, harassing, threatening, or in any manner causing physical and/or bodily harm to the children;
6. P be restrained from taking the children to see any psychologist or psychiatrist or any form of medical consultation without a court order or R’s prior written consent, except for any emergency medical treatment;
7. The trial on P’s relocation application be vacated and adjourned to new dates; and
8 That the children’s passports and all other travelling documents be delivered by P to her solicitors until further order;

3. On the return date of the summons on 12 November 2014, P seeks for principally the restoration of the previous 5/5 day system care arrangement for the children and she wishes to retain the children’s passports.  On the other hand, R seeks for the continuation of the orders until the conclusion of the trial on the children’s matters.

Background to the Ex Parte Application

4. As I have been living with this case for nearly 2 years, I am well familiar with the factual background and the previous course of the proceedings.  For the purpose of this application, I do not think I need to rehearse them here.  Suffice for me to say is that this family has two sons, the elder son L is now 7½ years old and the younger son B is now 4 years 8 months.  Before the Order of 29 October 2014, they were under the care and control of their parents on essentially an equal-split basis, referred to as the 5/5 day system in this Decision.

5. Shortly before R’s ex parte application for the non-molestation order, a Ruling was handed down on 23 October 2014 dismissing P’s application for the appointment of 2 single joint experts:  the first a psychologist and the other an immigration expert.  Such application was made in relation to P’s application for permanent relocation to her home country. Her application for permanent relocation was due to be tried on 5 November 2014 (with 5 days reserved).

6. The ex parte application was made just before R was to return the children to P under the 5/5 day system.  The essential ground was that P had committed physical violence towards the children.

7. What triggered the application was that when R collected the children on 14 October 2014 for his care and control, L told him that he did not want to return to P as he was very scared that P would hit him more.  He learned from L that the night before P had hit him 10 times with a closed fist on his head, 5 times on each side of his head around the temple area.  This was the punishment for L writing to his father on his iPad while under P’s care.  At the same time, B also claimed that he had also been hit many times on his throat.  Both children told their father that it was the worst week ever as they were being hit many times.  Both did not want to go back to their mother.  They had to say “yes” to the relocation, otherwise P would hit them more.  When R helped the children shower he noticed bruises and a scratch on L’s right arm.  L said the injury was caused when P grabbed and pinched his right arm after she had hit his head the previous night. 

8. R said the children continued to receive corporal punishment between 19 October 2014 and 23 October 2014 when they were under the care of P.  Two scratches on L’s right lower arm were found, and according to L, the injuries were inflicted when P squeezed his arm with her hand whilst pushing her thumbnail into his skin.  Both children said P hit them again many times during their time with the mother.

9. There was also an allegation that according to B, P told him that she might be killed if she stayed in Hong Kong.  R suggested that it was an attempt on the part of P to try to poison the children’s minds so that she would be able to indoctrinate and sway them so that they would agree to relocate with her. 

10. R also referred to some incidents of abuse back in June 2013.  He said the situation was escalating while P was pressing on her application for relocation.  The situation had come to an alarming one where the children were no longer safe in the care of P without supervision. 

11. R also found out from the children that P had taken them to see a lady whom he believed was a psychologist or a psychiatrist.  This happened before the Ruling on her application for Single Joint Experts were handed down on 23 October 2014.

12. Incidentally, at about the same time the court was approached by the principal of the school where the children were attending.  By a letter of 27 October 2014, the principal took the initiative of expressing the school’s concern about what the children had said about P since the start of the school term in September this year.  The principal also mentioned in the letter that she was “a little fearful that (P) may further hit or threaten the children knowing they have disclosed such”.  Attached to the letter were 6 incident reports prepared by the teaching staff of the school recording what the children had said or behaved.  For instance, it was reported that in the morning of 15 October 2014, B said to his teacher that he did not like to go with his mother “because she always hits me and (L)”.  B was also reported to have told his teacher that “I feel sad when my mummy shouts at me” and drew a picture of himself crying.  Another occasion was on 9 October 2014 when B said “Mommy is very bad because she hits (L) and me.  She puts her hand across our face, (L) and me”.  L was also recorded to have said “I love my dad but I don’t love my mum”.

13. With the evidence before me, in particular the letter and the incident reports from the school, I was of the view that there was a prima facie case that there was an imminent risk to the children’s safety for the reason that they might have been subjected to some form of physical violence.  The children’s best interests were the first and paramount consideration.  I therefore gave the orders as set out in para 2 above.

P’s Response

14. P and her boy-friend T have filed their affirmations in opposition to R’s application for the continuation of the orders. They give an entirely different picture.  

15. P denies that she has been physically abusive to the children. Indeed, all the incidents of physical abuse are denied.  She explains that the bruises on L’s arm were a result of being hit by a friend while playing in the pool on 11 October 2014, playing on the beach on 12 October 2014 or falling off the bike on 13 October 2014.  The marks on L’s arm were the result of T playing an ‘airplane’ game with the children on 19 October 2014.  There is nothing serious as the boys are normal ‘rough and tumble’ boys.  She denies she was angry with L or having yelled at the boy to go to bed on the night when L tried to speak to the father.  During her care and control, the children were happy and affectionate to her as before.  She never talked to the children on the relocation issue; it was R who talked to the children about it.

16. She however admits that the children saw her psychologist on 22 October 2014 but it was a mere coincident.  It just happened that the children were under her care on the date of the appointment.  In any event, the psychologist talked to L on sibling rivalry only.

17. T says over the last few months, he had spent over a week with the children and P.  What he saw was the children were happy and excited while staying with the mother.  There was absolutely no conflict between the mother and the children and he describes the relationship as one of harmonious and affectionate.  He has never seen P using corporal punishment on the children; and there is no suggestion that the children are frightened of their mother.

P’s Submissions

18. Mr Coleman SC, for P, stresses that it is now for the first time that the court hears R’s application on an inter parte basis.  The court should deal with the application from scratch because it is the first time that the court deals with it on an inter-parte basis.  It is fundamentally wrong to say that since the court has given the same orders on an ex parte basis, the same orders should continue unless P is able to convince the court.  The burden remains on R, being the applicant, to satisfy the court that he is entitled to the orders prayed for. 

19. Mr Coleman also emphases that despite the ups and downs, the 5/5 day system had been in place for the last 2 years, what is now being sought by the father is a fundamental change in the arrangement.  P is demoted from a position of an equal full time parent to someone with a few hours of limited access under supervision from the social welfare officer (“the SWO”).  This impacts on the children’s relationship with the mother and this is not beneficial to them.

20. Mr Coleman gives a close scrutiny on R’s evidence which he says reveals repetition, confusion, obfuscation and exaggeration in large measures. The totality of the evidence does not provide a proper basis to change the existing arrangement. 

21. Despite R’s concern regarding the so-called ‘abuse” P allegedly inflicted back in June 2013, as of January 2014, R still conceded that joint care and control would cause the least disruption to the daily routines of the children.  Even in September 2014 when R raised the possibility of having ‘sole custody and care and control’, he did so only as a response to the relocation application and on the basis that the mother would have left Hong Kong on her own.  The events in June 2013 therefore cannot possibly justify the sudden change of the care and control arrangement now being sought by the father.  The recent injuries relied upon by R were not the result of physical abuse.  For instance, the bruises on L’s arm were a result of a minor accident on 13 October 2014 when L fell off his bicycle.  R has exaggerated isolated incidents, amplifying the severity of minor incidents which are a far cry from ‘child abuse’.  Even R in his 15th Affidavit in opposition to P’s application for Single Joint Experts said that the children have shown no abnormality. 

22. In the present case, the court must consider the importance of the mother and child relationship both in general, and specifically in relation to P and the children.  Apart from allegations of abusive behavior of P – which are unfounded – R has never suggested that P is a bad mother.  Due to R’s work, he has to be away from Hong Kong on rotational basis.  He is highly dependent on his domestic helper but it has been observed by the Court of Appeal that hired help can be no substitute for a mother:  R v Y [2010] HKFLR 492 at Para 17 (per Rogers VP).  Granting care and control of the children to the father is in effect granting the majority of care and control to R’s domestic helper, and to the exclusion of the mother.  It is contrary to authority and logic and is unduly oppressive on P, and also not in the children’s best interest.  It may also have a deleterious effect on P’s relationship with the children.

23. Mr Coleman also submits that the children have been excelling at school and are found to be happy and healthy.  These are not descriptions of abused children.  They defy R’s suggestion that the children have been subjected to sustained abuse. 

24. The school incident reports contain indirect expression of views by the children only.  The court must be very careful with the views for the reason that a young child is unlikely to be mature enough.

25. Also, the evidential value of the school materials is very low.  The principal has no personal knowledge on the matters.  All of the incident reports (save for those undated) relate to alleged incidents which occurred when the children were in the father’s care, or on a changeover day when the children would understandably have mixed feelings.  None of the incident reports are contemporaneous documents and at least one of the reports simply cannot be an accurate record.  All of the teachers who submitted the incident reports found that there was no “Action to be Taken” and the court is told nothing of the qualifications of any of the teachers. The reports appear to have been solicited, as though the result of a decision to try to build up a picture. 

26. Further, R chose not to report the matter to the police despite his allegation of the severity and urgency of the situation.

27. Mr Coleman also draws my attention to the evidence showing the intimacy of the mother and sons’ relationship.  He also draws the distinction between child abuse and corporal punishment.  P may appear to be more firm and regimented with the children and this is simply a matter of a difference in parenting styles.

28. Finally, P is willing to seek counselling to assist her in coping with the stress involved in the present situation, but it is wholly disproportionate a reaction to rescind the long-term shared care arrangements.

29. Mr Coleman therefore concludes that it is the best interests of the children to return to the status quo before the orders.

R’s Submissions

30. Ms Irving, for R, submits that the court’s first responsibility is to act to protect the children and not to take risks, until the truth of the matter has been established.  The court has ordered for an up-dated Social Investigation Report and a Clinical Psychologist Report. Pending investigations by these professionals, there is enough to raise concerns that the children were exposed to inappropriate and frightening conduct from P when they were with her.  She stresses that it is not a case where one party has come forward alleging abuse of the children, with the complainant being the only source of any accusation, in what is a litigation tactic.  In the present case there are several sources of information made available to the court.  The first is from the children.  The second is from the SWO who said more than 2 months’ ago that the children were scared of their mother and the third source is from the school.  The school has come forward because the situation is escalating. She accepts that the matter has not been put to the test, but there is sufficient information before the court for the court’s protective functions.  She argues that realistically, in order to provide the necessary protection for the children, the only order that can be made is to continue the orders of 29 October 2014.

31. Further, as has been reported in the previous SWO reports, R all along has preferred to have sole care and control. He should not be criticized to seek for sole care and control now.

32. In reply to Mr Coleman’s criticism that the care and control is in effect given to R’s domestic helper, Ms Irving submits that the issue is whether the care and control should be given to P.  There were also 2 occasions when P chose to go for holidays when R was working and left the children to the care of the helper.

Discussions

33. As in all custody and care and control matters, the welfare and best interest of the children are of paramount importance.

34. It is to be noted that the SWO also recorded that the boys had said to her that they were scared of their mother “because she became angry easily when they had troubles”.  And the mother becoming angry easily and “screamed, yelled and shouted at them for no reason”.

35. R was also concerned about P hitting the children way back in June 2013 when by his summons of 3 July 2013 he asked that P be restrained from physically abusing the children but P refused to give an undertaking not to use corporal punishment, as this was a method of discipline that was sometimes required “as a last resort”.

36. Mr Coleman’s forceful challenge on the school’s incident reports is certainly valid but the accuracies and the reliabilities of the reports would have to be tested and determined at the trial when the court hears the evidence of the witnesses, including possibly the teachers who prepared the reports.

37. As of now, I consider that prima facie at least on the evidence before me, matters have now gone beyond anything that could be interpreted as discipline.  The fact that the school chose to voice out their concerns is alarming.  Normally, schools very seldom become involved in these matters, preferring to remain neutral for the sake of the children. 

38. I am told by Ms Irving (not objected to by Mr Coleman) that the Social Welfare Department has taken the initiative to report the matter to the police and R has just given a statement to the police.  The children will soon be interviewed also.  It is clear that the matter is evolving and the outcome of the investigation is yet to be seen.  At this stage, pending investigations by the social welfare officers, the clinical psychologist and the police, I cannot simply dismiss it as a misunderstanding or something fabricated or a matter of mere imagination.

39. I have no doubt that given the evidence as they are now before me, there are significant issues concerning the way P was conducting herself in relation to the children.  It has to be borne in mind that what are being dealt with are some interim measures pending the final determination of the relocation and the custody and care and control of the children.  When it comes to the trial of these issues, all the allegations in the present application will be heard and determined.  I agree with Ms Irving that what I need to do is to protect the children.  Their welfare is the court’s paramount consideration.

40. It is true that R’s work necessitates his absence from Hong Kong from time to time but the evidence suggests that P also relied on the help of this helper even when she was away from Hong Kong.  It also appears that so far the children have been well taken care of.  Ultimately it is a balancing exercise, and given that what is in place is an interim measure, I am favour of keeping the orders of 29 October 2014.

Orders

41. For the above reasons, I give an order in terms of paragraph (a) of the respondent’s summons dated 29 October 2014.

42. Costs are reserved with certificate for counsel.

( I. Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Russell Coleman SC, instructed by Withers, Solicitors for the petitioner

Ms Frances Irving, instructed by Hampton, Winter & Glynn, Solicitors for the respondent

95897-EN-2014-10-23

V v. W

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FCMC 4191/ 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 VPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 October 2014
Date of Handling Down Ruling: 23 October 2014

__________________

RULING
(Expert Reports)

__________________

 

The Application

1. This is a 30-minute application taken out by the petitioner mother (“the Mother”).

2. This is also the latest combat between the parties arising from the battle on relocation ignited by the Mother by way of her application dated 19 May 2014.  In her application, the Mother, an XXXX, applies to have the two children of the family to be relocated with her back to XXXX.

3. Now what is before the court is the Mother’s application taken out on 23 September 2014, seeking the appointment of two single joint experts.  The first expert is a psychologist.  Paragraph 1 of her summons seeks the following order:-

That there be a single joint expert psychologist appointed to prepare a report on the family pursuant to the Petitioner’s Summons dated 19 May 2014 seeking permanent removal of the two children of the family and matters relating to custody, care and control and access mattes to be filed 14 days prior to the hearing commencing on 5 November 2014.

4. The second expert is an immigration expert.  The Mother asks for the expert’s opinion on her Hong Kong immigration status and the same to be filed 14 days prior to the hearing commencing on 5 November 2014.

The Background

5. The Mother’s application must be seen in the context of her relocation application.  It was taken out after the CDR hearing of 17 September 2014 and just about 1½ months away from the trial of her relocation application scheduled to commence on 5 November 2014, with 5 days reserved.  Prior to the CDR hearing, the Social Welfare Officer (“SWO”) had prepared her report (“SIR”) specifically for the purpose of the relocation application.  The SWO was not in favour of the Mother’s proposal.

6. In addition to this report, there were also two Social Investigation Reports dated 11 January 2013 and 14 January 2014 on the custody and care and control issues.  There is also an International Social Investigation Report dated 11 September 2014 and lodged on 13 October 2014. 

7. I think it is not in dispute that prior to the CDR hearing, there was no suggestion on the part of the Mother that any expert was required.  It was at the end of the CDR hearing that Mr Marwah, counsel then acting for the Mother, indicated to the court that the Mother would require the expert opinion of a psychologist.  Up to then, there was not any formal application nor was there any mention whatsoever of the need for an immigration expert.

8. It is now recognized by the parties that if the Mother’s application is allowed, the trial will have be vacated and re-fixed.

9. For the purpose of the present application, I do not think I need to set out the family background of the parties.  Suffice to say is that the Father is XXXXX and the Mother XXXXX.  The Father has been working as a pilot here since March, 2008 and before April this year, the Mother had been staying in Hong Kong as a dependent of the Father.  I understand she has now obtained a visa to stay for another year on her own.  She came to Hong Kong in June, 2008.  By June, 2015 she will have been staying here for 7 years.  There are 2 children of the family, both boys, the elder son L is now aged 7 and the younger son B is aged 4.

The Applicable Legal Principles

10. I believe the parties have no argument over the applicable principles regarding expert evidence.

11. To start with, in the present case, leave must be obtained from the court for adducing the expert evidence proposed by the Mother:  O 38, r 36(1), RHC. 

12. Leave may be granted when the matters of opinion are on questions on which the court cannot be expected to have the requisite knowledge or experience.  The function of an expert witness is to provide for the court an opinion as to the significance of or interferences to be drawn from proved facts, in a field in which the expert possess special knowledge and experience which is beyond that of the court.  Expert opinion evidence is permitted (when other opinion evidence is usually not) because that opinion will assist the court in reaching the correct and fair conclusion.

13. The Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2014) (Vol 2) has the following commentary at Para J1/58/3:-

Evidence relevant to a matter or issue in the proceedings - Both the common law and Section 58(1) require that the proposed evidence be relevant.  Section 58(3) declares that the concept of “relevant matter” includes an issue in the proceedings in question.  The word “relevant” is used in section in the sense that evidence is relevant if it is helpful to the court in arriving at its decision on one or more of the issues to be resolved: Wong Hoi Fung v American International Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Ltd & Another [2002] 3 HKLRD 507.

14. The party proposing to call a person to give expert evidence must demonstrate that there is a need for such evidence:  see Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2014), (Vol 2) at Para J1/58/8.

A Psychologist Report

The Mother’s Arguments

15. Mr Coleman, senior counsel for the Mother, submitted that the SIRs do not cover the necessary ground as to the psychological evaluation of the family, not least because the SWO is not qualified to cover that ground.  Rather, the reports reveal precisely the need for such independent expert opinion.  The need for the psychologist report arises not as a result of the recommendations of the SIR but as a result of the root towards that result.  He drew my attention to the Mother’s supporting affidavit where she referred to a number of internal inconsistencies, factual inaccuracies and absence of necessary consideration on the part of the SWO, some of these matters are right for psychologist.

16. He accepted that whilst some of these inconsistencies may be put to the SWO in her cross-examination, nevertheless he emphasized that the prevalence of these internal inconsistencies undermines the very factual underpinning of the recommendations.  Mr Coleman helpfully set out the Mother’s concerns as follows:-

(1)   it inaccurately places reliance on the Petitioner’s boyfriend living with her and the children in XXX; when in fact this is not part of her evidence;

(2)   it is clear that the children had heightened knowledge of the proposed removal plans notwithstanding the Petitioner’s undertaking not to discuss the proposed removal with the children; and the fact that the Petitioner has abided by her undertaking;

(3)   it reveals inconsistencies between the findings of the SWO of a loving relationship between the Mother-children and the ‘hostile’ behaviour of the child L during the observation periods;

(4)   it does not take proper account of the different domestic arrangements in the parties homes and that there are more chores and responsibilities in the Petitioner’s home than the Respondent’s and, when taking this into account, whether the children are of an age and maturity to express views on which home is preferred over the other ;

(5)   it inaccurately relies on the Respondent’s assertion that he would move to XXXX (and hence resign from his employment) if the relocation was granted, which is inconsistent with the Respondent’s evidence;

(6)   there is no consideration/assessment of the Respondent’s ability to properly care for the children taking into account that his job by nature takes him out of Hong Kong;

(7)   it places too much weight on the children’s homes and schooling arrangements in Hong Kong when L is 7 and has just started Primary 2 and B is 4½ and still completing kindergarten, and it does not properly consider the future education options for the children in Hong Kong;

(8)   the Respondent cannot be said to have stable accommodation when he lives in a two bedroom home and shares his bed with both growing boys and his domestic helper lives in the second bedroom;

(9)   there is no consideration of the children’s welfare in the event the Petitioner cannot remain in Hong Kong due to loss of visa;

(10)   there is no consideration of the children’s welfare for when they are in the Respondent’s care and taking into account his flying roster; and

(11)   there is no consideration of the Petitioner’s changed living circumstances of loss of maintenance, and how this has impacted her and the stress it has caused her and why her household may be tense compared to the Respondent’s.

17. Mr Coleman submitted that the court will be greatly assisted by the provision of a psychologist report in resolving these various matters and in providing an expert consideration of necessary ground. This is not something the court can or should do unassisted by such an expert.

The Respondent’s Arguments

18. Ms Sum’s main argument is that the court does not require a psychologist to challenge the findings of the SWO as he or she will be subject to cross examination at trial.  The court can then decide whether the recommendations made by the SWO are to be accepted.  If the Mother’s application were to succeed, this would mean in every case where one party does not like the findings of the SWO, which in reality would happen in almost every contested case, an expert would be required to put right the SWO’s errors.  The Mother has not proved any exceptional circumstances which required assessment by a psychologist. 

19. Further, it is obvious that the Mother does not like the conclusion of the SIR and the evidence given by the SWO at the CDR hearing.  Therefore, she is trying to ‘fish’ for another report that she hopes will find favour with her application.  This is a fishing expedition and a costly exercise.  It is unnecessary and it is inimical to the needs of the children that this matter delayed again.  The Mother had had ample opportunity to properly consider her removal application including whether expert evidence would be required.  The delay will cause more uncertainties to the Father and the children and they need finality in the matter as soon as possible.

Discussion

20. Ms Sum is certainly correct in pointing out that the Mother took no action and only intimated her wish to appoint a single joint psychologist at the CDR hearing, having heard the oral evidence of the SWO, which was against her application.  At that time, there was not even any mention of her intention to appoint a single joint immigration expert. 

21. Clearly, the Mother was utterly unhappy with the investigations carried out by the SWO and also her recommendations. 

22. To start with, the application is framed in an overly general term:  to prepare a report “on the family”.  There is no reference of any particular or specific purpose for which the report is to be obtained or any particular aspect or problem that the psychologist is asked to focus on.  Not every relocation case requires a psychologist report.  Thus, the question is whether a psychologist report is required in this case?  To me, the answer lies at whether the facts or the peculiar features of the present case or whether the presence or absence of particular behaviours of the parties or the children call for the opinion of a psychologist in order to assist the court in its deliberation.  In this connection, it is to be noted that no question was ever put to the SWO during the CDR hearing as to whether it had ever crossed her mind that a psychologist report was necessary.

23. The Mother argued that many of the underpinning facts are factually wrong, the SWO failed to give due considerations to this and that and there are contradictory or inconsistent findings.  Despite all the imperfections and pitfalls on the part of the SWO as alleged by the Mother, on which I do not need to come to any conclusion for the purpose of the present application, I fail to see how a psychologist may be able to address the concerns raised by the Mother.  By way of an example, the Mother challenged that there is no consideration or assessment on the part of the SWO of the Father’s ability to properly care for the children taking into account that his job by nature takes him out of Hong Kong.  Even if the SWO has, as a matter of fact, failed to consider this, I wonder how a psychologist would be in a better position than that of a social welfare officer in making the assessment. Ultimately, it is the court’s duty to find whether the SWO has failed to get the facts right or has failed to give due regard or considerations to any of the matters after having heard not only the testimony of the SWO but also the testimonies of the parties and their factual witnesses, if any.  It seems to me that what the Mother is asking for is effectively the obtaining of another SIR.  I do bear in mind that L (the elder son) is said to have shown certain ‘hostile’ behaviour towards the Mother as reported in paragraph 29 of the SIR dated 3 September 2014 in which the SWO observed that L dodged when the Mother planned to give him a kiss and at the beginning L refused to assist in making tofu cake and sausages stick.  After being reminded by the Mother, L offered his assistance.  To me, the SIR must be read as a whole.  In the same paragraph, it was observed that “… The children played continuously at their play corner after making food.  In sum, they were observed to have supporting interaction and the mother-children relationship was impressed to be full of love…”.  I do not find any suggestion of abnormality of behaviour on the part of the children.  There are no alarming circumstances which call for a psychologist expert report. 

24. Mr Coleman mentioned that there are now already conflicting recommendations.  The Hong Kong SIR does not recommend removal whilst the International SIR satisfies with the arrangement proposed by the Mother and gives a contrary recommendation.  Be that as it may, leaving the question of whether the International SIR would be in a position to give a recommendation in the absence of an interview with the Father and an observation of his interaction with the children aside, I do not think a further psychologist report would help.

25. For the above reasons, the Mother’s application for a psychologist report is rejected.

Immigration Expert

26. As regards the immigration expert, the Mother said in her supporting affidavit dated 23 September 2014 that the report would be on her immigration status so that the court can have expert evidence as to what ability she has to remain living in Hong Kong, including her ability to obtain employment and generate an income and conduct her everyday life so that she can provide to the best of her ability and care for the children.  She said she is concerned that the SWO has not fully considered that if her relocation application is not granted then how her immigration status impacts the children if she is removed from the children’s everyday lives. 

27. The Mother’s case is that she does not wish to remain in Hong Kong even if she has the ability to do so.  She wishes to return home with the children so that they may have long term stability, in terms of living, education and up-bringing there.  However, if her application for relocation fails, she would try to remain in Hong Kong because she is not leaving without the children.  Therefore, the court should know the likelihood of her ability to stay.  To be more precise, her ability to obtain some kind of visa to remain in Hong Kong. For this reason, an expert opinion is needed.

28. I accept that the likelihood of her being able to stay is one of the considerations that the court may take into account in its deliberation as to whether or not to allow the children to go, especially when the court is minded not to allow the application.  It is also of some relevancy to the extent that if the court is inclined to refuse the relocation application, then the court may need to consider this matter in the context of the care and control arrangement in Hong Kong.

29. Mr Coleman submitted that the expert is sought on matters involving consideration of specific factual matters (albeit by reference to or in the context of some law) as can identify the likely or potential ability of the Mother to remain in Hong Kong in any given set of circumstances.  They are not matters falling within the ordinary knowledge, experience or competence of the court. 

30. It is common ground that the law gives the Director of Immigration a very wide discretion as to whether or not to permit a person to stay in Hong Kong and if he does, what the conditions are.  The likelihood of the Mother being able to get a permission to stay is a mixed question of law and facts.  The parties are going to give their evidence in trial and their legal representatives may address the court on this issue by way of submissions. To me, the issue is entirely a matter of Hong Kong law.  Expert evidence on matters of Hong Kong law is inadmissible.  As such it is for submission and not for expert opinion:  Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2014), (Vol 2), at para J1/59/3. 

Order

31. For the above reasons, the petitioner’s summons is dismissed.

Costs

32. As it is an application in relation to children’s matters, I give an order nisi that there be no order as to costs.

( I. Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Russell Coleman SC, instructed by Withers, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Ms Sum of Hampton, Winter & Glynn, Solicitors for the Respondent

95130-EN-2014-07-08

NAV v. JTMW

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FCMC 4191 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 NAVPetitioner

and

 JTMWRespondent
------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing : 2 July, 2014

Date of Handing Down Judgment : 8 July, 2014

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JUDGMENT

(Maintenance Pending Suit)

-----------------------

 

1.  This the petitioner wife’s application for maintenance pending suit for her and for interim maintenance for the 2 children of the family.

Background

2.  The petitioner is XXXXX and the respondent XXXX.  After having cohabited since June, 2002, they married in February 2008 in XXXX and they moved to Hong Kong in June, 2008 when the respondent obtained a job as a XXXX here.

3.  There are two children of the family, both boys.  The first was born in April 2007, now aged 7 and the second was born in Hong Kong in February 2010, now 4 years old.

4.  It is unfortunate that marital discord developed.  They separated in November, 2011.   On 26 March 2012 the petitioner petitioned for divorce on the ground of the respondent’s unreasonable behaviour.

5.  At the initial stage, the parties were apparently able to come to terms through mediation by entering into an agreement dated 28 April 2012 dealing with all the ancillary relief and children matters.   However, sadly it turns out that the parties are now arguing on essentially all issues arising from the present proceedings, big or small.

6.  Meanwhile, the matrimonial home was sold in early January, 2013 and the proceeds were placed in escrow with the solicitors for the transaction.    By a consent order dated 4 June, 2013, $500,000 was released to each of the parties.  Currently the balance remains at about $4,465,997, which, I believe, is the only substantial asset available for division in the ancillary relief trial if by then the same has not been eroded by their legal costs.

7.  Since separation the 2 children of the family have been taken care of by the parties on essentially equal-split basis.

8.  During the marriage, the petitioner was a full-time home maker.  She then engaged in some fit modeling work and face-painting business since early 2012 earning, according to her own version, about $4,000 to $10,000 per month.   As from April, 2014 she has been employed as a Business Development Executive by a company.  According to the employment contract that she has produced, it is a full-time job with a salary of $15,000 per month.

9.  As for the respondent, he recently got a promotion to the rank of XXXXXXX.   However, he has been on sick-leave since 7 March, 2014 due to the chronic stress that he has been suffering arising from the protracted divorce proceedings.

10.  Up to about April, 2014 the respondent was paying the petitioner $12,000 per month as the children’s maintenance.  I am told (and this is not disputed) that the respondent has unilaterally reduced this amount to $10,000 and has not paid at all this month, ie July, 2014.

11.  The petitioner’s immigration status was as a dependent of the respondent.  That was the situation until 27 April, 2014 when the respondent withdrew his sponsorship. There is some ambiguity over her current status since from the affirmations filed by the petitioner it is not apparent what her status has been after 27 April, 2014.  At the beginning of the hearing, Mr Marwah, counsel for the petitioner, informed the court that in order for her to continue to stay in Hong Kong, the petitioner has applied for residence on her own merits which, if granted, will allow her to continue to work and live in Hong Kong as before.  Further, she has been given an oral assurance from the Immigration Department that she could continue to work in the meantime pending the final outcome of her application.

12.  Both are now living in their respective rented-flats in the same locality: XXXXXX.

The Law

13.  Under section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 (“MPPO”), the court may order either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of presentation of the petition or the making of the application and ending on the date of the determination of the suit, as the court thinks reasonable.

14.  The court has unfettered discretion to award such sum as it thinks fair and reasonable. There is no hard and fast rule, and no fixed proportion:  each case depends on its own facts.  The court should take a ‘broad brush’ approach.  The means of the parties, the needs of the parties and their previous standard of living are relevant but the overriding consideration is the actual needs of the parties pending suit.

15.  In respect of interim maintenance for the children, the court is guided by the factors set out in section 7(2) of MPPO, ie

a. The financial needs of the child;
b. The income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;
c. Any physical or mental disability of the child;
d. The standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage; and
e. The manner in which the child was being and in which the parties expected him to be educated.

The Petitioner’s Application

16.  Initially, the petitioner was seeking a total sum of $38,300 per month for her and the 2 children.  That was on the basis that she was without a visa to work.   Now given that the petitioner is allowed to continue to work in the meantime, Mr Marwah conceded that a sum of $9,300, being the petitioner’s estimated earnings, should be taken into account and therefore he is seeking, on behalf of the petitioner, a sum of $29,000 only ($38,300 - $9,300), with each of the petitioner and the children given 1/3 of the sum.

17.  Further, since the petitioner is going to take the children back to XXXX for summer vacation (fortunately this been agreed to by the respondent on the date of the substantive hearing on the basis that he can also take the children back to XXXXX for part of the summer), the petitioner is also seeking payment of the costs of flights from Hong Kong to XXXXXXXX for her and the children.  Mr Marwah informed the court that the full-fare tickets would cost $10,400 for the petitioner and $8,300 for each of the children, totalling $27,000. Alternatively, the respondent could provide the petitioner and the children with XXXXXX  / XXX, a benefit provided by the respondent’s employer.  Mr Marwah estimated that this would cost the respondent much less, in the region of $4,500 to $5,000 only.  Though these information are not in any affirmations filed by the parties, since there is no objection from Ms Irving, counsel for the respondent, I take these as unchallenged evidence.

The Petitioner’s Case 

18.  Mr Marwah submitted that the petitioner’s application is on her “needs” basis and she is seeking a reasonable amount only.   She is not seeking to return to the previous high standard of living during the marriage.  She was compelled to bring this application by the respondent’s sudden threat of withdrawal of support of the children and the loss of her visa.

19.  Even before the loss of her visa, the petitioner’s earning capacity was severely limited.  She has no qualifications.  As a full-time mother without a domestic helper, it is impossible for her to commit to working full-time.   Therefore she has only been able to find irregular work as a face-painter and “fit model”.   To cover the shortfall in her income, she has had to rely upon loans and gifts from family and friends.  Her present job that she started sometime in April, 2014 as a Business Development Executive, which is in the nature of telemarketing, is still on probation.  Fortunately, with the understanding of her employer, she has been able to work not on a full-time basis so that she may take care of the children and to return to XXX in the summer.  Hence, she is able to get about $9,300 per month only.  However, it should be noted that there is nothing to show that she was earning $9,300 per month.  As a matter of fact, the latest bank statement shows she received $11,000 for the month of April, 2014.

20.  Mr Marwah further submitted that the petitioner has economized substantially while still prioritizing the children.  Contrary to what the respondent has, she has no car and does not have the help of a domestic helper.  She has moved to a cheaper apartment for a monthly rental of $10,000 only.

21.  He argued that the respondent’s sick-leave is self-inflicted and he should be capable of returning to XXX duties.  He relied on a letter dated 24 April, 2014 by the employer’s psychologist Dr SL where it is stated that the respondent has “not been diagnosed nor has he shown symptoms of any kind of mental illness/disorder”.

22.  The parties’ financial means are dramatically different.  The respondent has a career and an existing salary that is many multiples of that of the petitioner.

23.  The petitioner’s estimate of legal fees as per her Form H is approximately $1,500,000 including fees paid to date of $431,445.   She intends to rely on the funds held in her bank account of $324,857 and any additional borrowings from her family if available to meet her ongoing legal fees.  She reserves her right to apply for contribution to legal fees from the respondent in the event that the parties cannot resolve the matters amicably and when her savings are depleted and she cannot borrow any further funds.

24.  Mr Marwah also ensured that his client would try to earn some extra money by doing modelling and face-painting on part-time basis whenever there is an opportunity presented to her.

The Respondent’s Case

25.  Ms Irving, for the respondent, opposed the application.   First, she submitted that the petitioner has not shown she has a need that she cannot meet herself from her own resources.

26.  Secondly, the petitioner has not been open about her own financial situation.  She has not presented clear and documented evidence of her financial status.  She clearly has income or resources that are not disclosed.   There are numerous transactions in her bank account that are unaccounted for with deposits amounting to more than $14,000 a month over the last 12 months.   Contrary to the respondent who is in deficit, she presently has a bank balance of about $324,857.   In other words, the petitioner has failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial situation.

27.  Thirdly, the petitioner has not shown that the respondent can afford to meet her claim for the reason that the respondent is being placed on sick-leave he has no means to pay.  He has been placed on sick-leave since 7 March, 2014, due to chronic stress.  He was on full pay for the first 126 days, which was up to 2July, 2014 (the date of hearing). Thereafter, he will be on half pay of $36,740 for a further 126 days, if he is not terminated, which is an option available to his employer.   As of now and up to October, 2014 the respondent is still receiving $36,740, housing allowance of $24,000 and the employer’s contribution to education $6,000, being a total of $66,740.   There will be an assessment in mid of July, 2014 by XXXX XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX of the respondent’s employer to determine whether he will be granted extended sick leave and remain in employment, or have his employment terminated.  Quite apart from this, he has to undergo regular assessment, currently by Dr SL, and his general practitioner, and can only resume XXX duties when the doctor certifies that he is fit to XX.   These procedural matters are not disputed by Mr Marwah.

28.  As for his monthly expenses, they come up to $85,390.  This includes the portion of education not covered by the employer’s allowance, his tax, repayment for bank loans and also payment of his legal costs by instalments.  Thus, the respondent is running at a deficit.

29.  Finally, the petitioner has inflated her expenses.

Discussion

30.  I will deal with Ms Irving’s 1st and 2nd grounds in one go.

The Petitioner’s Resources and Non-Disclosure

31.  Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and Family Matters, (18th Edn), Vol 1(1), para. 16.18 says as follows,

“In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non-disclosure.  However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and on inability to pay.  The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties…”

32.  Notwithstanding that the above citations refer to payer, I see no reason why the duty does not equally apply to payee.

33.  Further, as stated in C v F, FCMC 1701/2000 (date of judgment:  20 September, 2004) at para 28,

It is well established that in ancillary relief proceedings, which include maintenance pending suit, there is a duty on both parties to make full and frank disclosure of the relevant materials to enable the Court to exercise its discretion to make the order, and if it is of the view that the evidence disclosed by a party is deficient, inferences may be drawn by the Court from such defective disclosure against that party when making the appropriate order.

34.  I agree with Ms Irving’s submissions that the petitioner has not provided any particulars of her face-painting business and fit modelling work.   Whilst she might have a small business only and thus did not prepare any balance sheet or profit-and-loss account of that sort, I consider that at least she should have kept some work contracts or orders, schedules, list of customers, invoices and receipts and some rough calculations of profit and loss but nothing of that sort has been put forward.   Similarly, there are no work schedules, list of employers or particulars on how much she earned as a model.

35.  Ms Irving pointed out that for the period between 31 May, 2012 and 19 August, 2013 and based on the bank statements disclosed by the petitioner, her monthly income amounts to a monthly sum of $13,596 on average and $14,327 over the last 12 months and these apart, there should also be receipts in cash from her face-painting business.

36.  The petitioner accepted that there were such deposits but she argued in her affirmation dated 17 June, 2014 that the respondent “does not differentiate between ones which constitute ‘earning and income’, versus those which are from selling things I own or receiving money from my mother and grandmother to help me pay my bills/expenses.”    She explained that some of the increases in her overall balance can be attributed to gifts and loans from her family as well as disbursements from her parents’ family trust.    In her affirmation dated 19 May, 2014, the petitioner said that the loans needed to be ultimately repaid so she estimated that her current cash assets once her debts are deducted are $150,000 to $180,000.  She added that she maintains a decent amount of liquid assets in her name for proof of her ability in order to support her visa application.  Finally, she has made some money by ‘up-selling’ items from time to time such as buying a stroller for $200 which she can then sell for $500.

37.  The petitioner also explained in her affirmation that she was not able to renew her business registration for the face-painting business because she did not have a visa.  With respect, this reason is unheard of.   To me, it is a matter of commonsense that anyone should be able to register a business in Hong Kong.

38.  I agree with Ms Irving that the petitioner does not give any information on the sums received from third parties.  She gives no details and identifies no sums of money that are gifts, loans or disbursements of her parents’ family trust.  She has produced no evidence whatsoever of any debts that she alleges exist, and no details at all of her earnings.   She has not referred to a single transaction where she earned some money from ‘up-selling’ as alleged.  The ability to borrow is also a financial resource but there is a dearth of particulars and supporting evidence.  To me, all these explanations are mere say-so on her part.  I agree with Ms Irving’s submissions that the petitioner’s alleged earnings are inconsistent with her financial position.

39.  Faced with the deposits, Mr Marwah accepted that the petitioner’s monthly receipts inclusive of gifts and loans from family and friends are about $14,000.  In my view, it still does not clarify the picture.   A simple calculation illustrates my point.  Of $38,300 monthly expenses, Mr Marwah agreed that $8,000 is prospective expenses.  The actual expenses thus should be about $30,300 per month.  The petitioner has been legally represented in the present proceedings for about 10 months.  So far she has paid legal costs of $431,445, meaning on average $43,145 per month.  Hence, her monthly expenses, on a broad brush basis, should be $73,445 ($30,300 + $43,145) but her alleged monthly receipts were 26,000 only (ie $14,000 + $12,000 maintenance from the respondent).   It follows that on average she should have a deficit of $47,445 per month.

40.  However, the objective facts are that the petitioner has been able to pay all the legal costs to date and she still has about $324,857 in the bank.   I accept that this sum would not be sufficient for her legal costs if the present proceedings continue to drag on to CDR and trial on permanent removal of the 2 children as applied for by the petitioner and ancillary relief but this is beside the point for the present purpose.   

41.  On the evidence before me, I am able to come to a conclusion that the petitioner has other sources of income which are much more substantial than she has chosen to disclose.   She has failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial situation.

The Respondent’s Ability to Pay

42.  Mr Marwah argued that the respondent’s sick leave is self-inflicted.  As oral evidence was not heard in the present application, I am not in a position to make a finding of fact as to whether or not the respondent’s sick leave is self-inflicted.  The petitioner is essentially accusing the respondent of malingering.  This is a very serious allegation and could be a criminal offence.   As Ms Irving rightly pointed out, if he is a malinger, he will get fired immediately.  In any event, I consider that Mr Marwah is reading too much into Dr. SL’s letter.  In the same letter, Dr SL also wrote, “Whether and when (the respondent) will resume to XXX duty will be a decision made by his company based on the strictest industrial standard and internal guidelines.  Understandably, the nature of the job as XXX determined that they are being held at the highest standard.”  In my view, given the high standard and level of skill required of by the nature of his job, the fact that the respondent has not been diagnosed nor has he shown symptoms of any kind of mental illness/disorder does not necessarily mean that he does not need the sick leave that he is having and will be automatically put back to his job.  

43.  Since the respondent is going to have an assessment by the Board in mid of July at which time it will be known whether his sick leave would be continued or his employment would be terminated, I enquired with Mr Marwah whether the petitioner would like to wait for the outcome of the assessment but I was told she was prepared to press on with the application.   In the circumstances, I would have to make a decision on the basis of the materials before me. 

44.  That said, Mr Marwah accepted that the respondent is now on sick-leave and that as from 3rd July, 2014 his salary will be cut by half and he will be getting $66,740 per month only. 

45.  I agree with Ms Irving that it is unhelpful to calculate the respondent’s income excluding his legal fees, taxes, loan repayments and the costs of children’s education from his salary as these are all expenses that have to be paid.  Inclusive of these expenses, his monthly expenses are $85,390 and they are not challenged.

46.  The respondent’s debts are presently $129,515 and $23,249 with HSBC and $132,405 with DBS.  He owes legal fees of $277,222.   These give a total of $561,500.   He has already depleted the $500,000 released from the proceeds of sale.  These are not challenged.  On the other hand, apart from the fees payable to the mediator, it appears that the petitioner does not any outstanding legal fees and she has not depleted her $500,000 yet and still has $324,857 in the bank.

47.  In the circumstances, it seems clear to me that the respondent is in deficit and he is not able to pay the maintenance pending suit.

Inflated Expenses

48.  With the conclusion that I have reached above, it is not necessary for me to consider whether or not the petitioner has inflated her expenses.  Suffice for me to say is that some of the items such as clothing/shoes at $1,200 and entertainment at $2,000 appear to be on the high side.

Travel Tickets

49.  The respondent does not agree to provide the petitioner with XXXXXX / XXX for the trip to XXXXXXX for the reasons that previously she failed to repay the tickets to him for which he is personally liable and further that this type of tickets provides no guarantee on the dates of travel and no guarantee that the petitioner could sit together with the children.  Considering that the time in question is a peak season and that it seems there was at least one occasion when the petitioner was sitting separately with the children that gave rise to grave concern on the part of the respondent, I do find some force in the respondent’s reasons for refusal.  Further, the petitioner clearly has the means to pay.

Order

50.  For the above reasons, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner has other sources of income, that she failed to give a full and frank disclosure of her financial situation and that the respondent does not have the means to pay.  In the circumstances, I have to dismiss the petitioner’s application and I so order.

51.  Before I end I must emphasize that I should not be taken to have ignored the needs of the children in dismissing the application.  I have been living with this case for a great deal of time.  My observation is that both parties are loving and caring parents.  I have no doubt that both of them have been doing their utmost and will be so doing in the future to cater for the needs of the children.

Costs  

52.  I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.  I give an order nisi that the petitioner do pay the respondent costs of this application, including costs reserved and counsel certificate, to be taxed if not agreed.

( I. Wong )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Azan Marmak, instructed by Messrs Withers, solicitors for the petitioner

Ms Frances Irving, instructed by Messrs Hampton, Winter & Glynn, solicitors for the respondent

95131-EN-2014-02-10

NAV v. JTMW

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FCMC 4191 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 4191 OF 2012

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BETWEEN

 NAVPetitioner

and

 JTMWRespondent
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Coram : Deputy District Judge I. Wong in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing : 28 January 2014

Date of Handing Down Ruling : 10 February, 2014

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R U L I N G

on Costs

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1.  I am asked to rule on the costs of an application taken out by the respondent husband (the respondent) for the removal of certain parts of the petitioner wife’s affidavit (“the petitioner’s affidavit”) and for the return of the respondent’s personal documents. 

Background and the Application

2.  The petitioner is an XXXX and the respondent XXXX.  They were married in February 2008 in XXXX and they moved to live in Hong Kong in June, 2008 when the respondent obtained a job as a XXX here. 

3.  There are two children of the family, both are boys.  The first was born in April 2007, now aged 6 and the second was born in February 2010, now nearly 4 years old. 

4.  It is unfortunate that marital discord developed.  On 26 March 2012 the petitioner petitioned for divorce on the ground of the respondent’s unreasonable behaviour. 

5.  At the initial stage, the parties were apparently able to come to terms by entering into an agreement dated 28 April 2012 dealing with all the ancillary relief and children matters. 

6.  Apart from the matrimonial assets which are not relevant here, as far as the two children of the family are concerned, the parties agreed that both of them would have the custody of the children and they would share the care and control on approximately equal basis.  The agreement went well for sometime but conflicts soon developed.  I have to say that as I have been living with this case for some time, my observation is that both parties have now developed deep mistrust against each other, the present application being a live illustration of this situation.  I think it is fair to say that the conflicts between the parties centre much on the care and control arrangement of the children.  In brief, the petitioner is complaining about the situation where whether the respondent would be available to take care of the children depends on whether he has any XXX duties and these in turn depends on his monthly duties roster issued by his employer.  The result is that the arrangement of the children’s care is seen by the petitioner to have been dominated by the monthly roster which she finds it difficult to cope with.  In short, she feels it unfair that her lives should continue to be manipulated by the duties roster. 

7.  It is against this background that the parties sought to resolve their differences before this court. 

8.  On 2 July 2013, on the basis that the parties would have the joint custody and the joint care and control of the children of the family, the respondent took out an application seeking directions from the court regarding the care arrangement of the children.  In support of his application, he also filed his affidavit dated 3 July 2013. 

9.  The petitioner swore an affidavit in reply on 3 July 2013.  In paragraph 8 of the petitioner’s affidavit and at Exhibit “AVN-1”, the petitioner referred to certain correspondences exchanged between the respondent and his former solicitors in Hong Kong and his lawyers in XXXXX.  The respondent took the view that these communications were privileged and confidential and hence inadmissible.  In the absence of a favourable response from the petitioner to remove these materials, he took out the present application asking for :

1. Paragraph 8 of the Affidavit of NAV sworn on 19th July 2013 be removed or redacted from the Court File and/or the hearing bundle for the use in Court and expunged in its entirely.

2. The documents marked exhibit “AVN-1” to the Affidavit of NAV sworn on 19th July 2013 be removed from the Court File and/or the hearing bundle for the use in Court and expunged in its entirety.

3. The Petitioner do return to the Respondent forthwith his personal documents as marked “AVN-1” exhibited to the Affidavit of NAV sworn on 19th July 2013.

4. ...

5. Costs be to the Respondent.

10.  As the parties were unable to come to any sensible solution, the application was fixed to be heard for argument on 28 January 2014. 

11.  Some time before the date due for the argument, on 10 January 2014 the petitioner eventually conceded to the respondent’s application but refused to pay the costs of the present application.  The hearing of 28 January 2014 was therefore on whether the petitioner should bear the respondent’s costs. 

The Respondent’s Arguments

12.  The respondent’s arguments are simple and straight forward.  The petitioner has conceded to the respondent’s application and therefore costs should follow the event. 

13.  Further, the matter could have been dealt with amicably and expeditiously.  However the petitioner chose not to do so and therefore, the respondent has incurred unnecessary costs and should be compensated.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

14.  Ms Todd, for the petitioner, maintained that since this is first and foremost a children’s matter, the proper order should be no order as to costs.   

15.  She relied on the following general principle :-

‘There should be no order as to costs save when one party has been unreasonable in the conduct of the litigation, as parents should not be deterred from putting cases concerning children before the Court.’ Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR 569 and Gojkovic v GojkKovic (No 2) [1992] 1 AER 271

16.  She also referred to S v S HCMP 5547/1999 (unreported) where Deputy High Court Judge Gill went through the authorities then available and summarised how the Court may determine a contest on costs in a case involving children :

(1) In general circumstances there should be no order for costs.  Parties who have a reasonable case to put forward going to a child’s welfare should not be dissuaded from doing so by threat of an adverse costs order if they do not succeed.  And in a child related case there should be no perceived winner or loser, save that it is the child who is the winner.

(2) If a party has by virtue of improper conduct attracted the proceedings which but for that may have been avoided then that might well warrant an adverse costs order.

(3) If in the course of the proceedings one party behaves unreasonably in his or her conduct of the litigation then that might be recognised in an adverse costs order.

(4) The financial circumstances of the parties and how an order for costs will impact on the parties is a factor for consideration.

(5) The general rule of not ordering costs should not deter a court from exercising its discretion to do so in circumstances it finds to be exceptional not necessarily limited to a particular category of cases.

17.  Ms Todd argued that there is no good reason for there to be a costs order when agreement has been reached on the substantive matter and for which has done away the need to proceed with the time, cost and emotion of a hearing.

18.  She submitted that the central issues in dispute in the respondent’s summons are complicated as they are evidence concerning aspects of the respondent’s behaviour that the petitioner was seeking to adduce for the purpose of the Children’s hearing.  As stated in the petitioner’s affidavit, the respondent installed spyware on the home computer so as to obtain unauthorized access to the petitioner’s personal conversation in the computer.  He was successful in unlawfully obtaining communications that he considered were relevant to these proceedings and sent them to his divorce lawyer he had engaged in XXXX without the petitioner’s knowledge or consent.  Subsequently, the petitioner observed this exchange between the respondent and his XXXX Solicitor on the respondent’s I-pad which was left password unlocked and unattended.

19.  The evidence that the petitioner sought to adduce in her affidavit was the respondent’s gross misconduct and unlawful act of installing spyware on her computer.  This is relevant to the day to day relationship the petitioner has with the respondent and their ability to co-parent.  The petitioner absolutely had the right to highlight the dishonest and unlawful character of the respondent, which might affect the court’s decision on the care arrangements issue, when such matters are in issue.

20.  She further added that but for the reprehensible act of the respondent, the petitioner would not have needed to include paragraph 8 and Exhibit AVN-1 in the affidavit, and there would not be a need for the respondent to take out the Summons.

21.  However, in the interest of saving time, costs and emotions, the petitioner did agree with the respondent to remove paragraph 8 and the Exhibit.

22.  It is submitted that for the above reasons the petitioner should not bear the responsibility for both parties’ costs of the Summons when the origins of the matter in issue is traced to that of the respondent.

23.  In the alternative, it is submitted by Ms Todd that the court cannot make a determination on the costs without hearing the substantive argument.  It is submitted that the petitioner does not fall in the category of cases where costs orders have been made as identified by the Court in MAO v NCB, FCMC 14742/2010 (unreported) where costs orders were made in cases which had been fully determined by the Court. There is no way for the court to ascertain the fault of the petitioner without hearing and determining the issues in a substantive way.  In that respect, the petitioner has sensibly conceded the issues and the court is bound to make no order as to costs when there is no finding that a costs order should be made, particularly when it relates to a children’s related matter.

24.  Therefore the reasonable costs order should be no order as to costs.

25.  Further, as per Deputy High Court Judge Gill in S v S, supra, the financial circumstances of the parties and how an order for costs will impact on the parties is a factor.  The petitioner has limited income of about $5,000 per month only.  There is no contribution of legal costs to the petitioner by the respondent.  By comparison, the respondent is a high income earner and has benefits from his employment.  A costs order made against the petitioner in the context of her financial circumstances would not be appropriate.

Discussion

26.  To start with, I accept that for Children’s cases, the general practice is that there should be no order to costs save when one party has been unreasonable or reprehensible in the conduct of litigation, as parents should not be deterred from putting cases concerning children before the courts. 

27.  It has been held that the general practice of no order for costs in children cases applies to interlocutory matters as it does upon the substantive hearing:  Rayden & Jackson on Divorce and Family Matters (18th Edition), at para. 52.21 and C v. FC (Children Proceedings:  Costs) [2004] 1 F.L.R. 326; [2004] Fam. Law 104.

28.  The thrust of the respondent’s case is that these materials, in particular the exhibit are communications between him and his lawyers and hence are privileged and inadmissible.  I have not been assisted by the parties in this respect but I do not think it is in dispute that the contents exhibited are communications between the respondent and his lawyers and as such, they should be subject to the protection of legal professional privilege.  There is no suggestion that the respondent has waived his privilege over these communications.

29.  That said, while these materials may be privileged, whether they are inadmissible is another matter. As has been said by the learned author of Phipson on Evidence (17th Edition) in para 23-16,

“The fact that a document may be privileged does not affect its admissibility, as privilege may be waived. Where one party has obtained privileged materials, even improperly, the evidence remains admissible even though an injunction may be granted in advance of its use to prevent it…”

30.  The learned author quoted Galcraft v Guest [1898] 1 Q.B.D. 759 as the authority for the above commentary.  I do not think I need to go into its details. 

31.  In my view, what the respondent does in the present application is essentially to injunct the petitioner from the use of these privileged materials, and on that basis, I accept that he has justification to take out the application as he did. 

32.  That said, the question remains to be whether the petitioner falls within any of the exceptional circumstances that make her liable for costs. 

33.  In my view, two of the considerations identified by Deputy High Court Judge Gill in S v. S, HCMP 5547/1999 (unreported) referred to in Para. 16 above are relevant here. They are (1) whether the petitioner has by virtue of improper conduct attracted the proceedings; and (2) whether in the course of the proceedings the petitioner has behaved unreasonably in her conduct of the litigation.

Whether the petitioner has by virtue of improper conduct attracted the proceedings

34.  I must say I am persuaded by Ms Todd.  During the hearing, I questioned about the relevance of the materials.  Relevancy must be seen in the context of the disputes between the parties.   Upon reflection, I am prepared to accept that they are relevant, as contended by Ms Todd, as they are relevant to the issue of co-parenting relationship between the parties.  The reason being that while the parties agree on joint custody, the respondent is asking for joint care and control and the petitioner is asking for shared care and control.  Hence, these materials are relevant to the extent that they may cast light on the level of co-operation and trust the parties have on each other.

35.  Thus, the petitioner’s inclusion of these materials in her affidavit cannot be said to be an improper conduct that attracted the present proceedings; and further that, whether these materials are inadmissible are yet to be determined.

Whether in the course of the proceedings the petitioner has behaved unreasonably in her conduct of the litigation

36.  Ms Sum, for the respondent, argued that the matter could have been dealt with amicably and expeditiously but the petitioner chose not to do so and therefore the respondent has incurred unnecessary costs. 

37.  Ms Sum referred me to the correspondences between the parties at the relevant time. 

38.  According to Ms Sum, well before the present application was taken out, the respondent’s solicitors had written to the petitioner, who at that time was acting in person but assisted by a qualified lawyer as a McKenzie friend requesting for the removal of the offended parts but this did not meet with any constructive response.

39.  Shortly thereafter on 15 August, 2013, the petitioner was represented by the present firm of solicitors. On 28 August 2013, the respondent’s solicitors made another attempt to resolve the matter by writing to the petitioner’s solicitors.  In the absence of any response, the respondent took out the present application on 4 September 2013. The next day, ie 5 September 2013, the petitioner’s solicitors responded by stating that the she did not agree to remove the paragraph.

40.  On 18 September 2013, the respondent’s solicitors wrote to the petitioner’s solicitors making another attempt to resolve the issue as there would be no benefit to the parties to further debate over it. 

41.  On 23 September 2013, the petitioner replied and indicated, inter alia, that if the matter was not resolved then she would proceed with her affidavit as it was.

42.  It was against this background that in the hearing of 24 September 2013 that the court set the application down for argument. 

43.  Then after a lapse of nearly 4 months, the respondent took the initiative again to invite the petitioner to resolve the matter and it was not until 10 January 2013 that she eventually acceded to the demands but refused to pay costs.

44.  I do not think the above sequence of events is in dispute.  The petitioner was at the time of the petitioner’s affidavit assisted by a qualified lawyer and before the respondent took out the application, she was already represented by her solicitors.  In my view, the issue of legal professional privilege is real and apparent and must be obvious to the minds of the petitioner and her legal advisers but there was no response from her until the 10 January 2014.  There is simply a dearth of explanation as to why the matter could not be resolved earlier.  

45.  The present proceeding is an interlocutory proceeding relating to children’s matter.  The parties are not dealing with the main subject matter here.  There are ways that the petitioner could have dealt with the matter expeditiously and to save costs if she does not wish to argue on the summons.   For instance, as what Ms Todd has indicated, the petitioner may apply to file another affidavit referring to the incident complained of but without exhibiting the communications.  I wish to make it clear that it does not mean that this alternative has the endorsement of the court.  I only wish to point out that there must be other alternative to resolve the matter much earlier on.  It is high time to sound a warning that the parties should take a more sensible approach to resolve their differences.

46.  Ms Todd argued that it was the respondent’s reprehensible act of spying into the petitioner’s correspondence that led to the present dispute.  This is strenuously denied. Since the petitioner has not proceeded to argue but has conceded to the respondent’s application, this issue is yet to be determined.   

47.  For the above reasons, I consider that the petitioner should be responsible for the costs incurred arising from her procrastination.

The Petitioner’s Financial Situation

48.  Ms Todd also argued that the petitioner is earning merely a meagre sum of $5,000 only and the respondent is in a much better financial position.  Whilst I am prepared to accept that the respondent is earning more than that of the petitioner but I have not been referred to any evidence on the petitioner’s income or how an order for costs would impact on her financial situation.  On the contrary, the objective fact is that the petitioner has the means to instruct her solicitors to argue costs on her behalf.

Conclusion

49.  Considering all the above and taking the matter in a round, I am satisfied that the petitioner should bear part of the respondent’s costs.  In my judgment, the fairest order is for the petitioner to bear one-third of the respondent’s costs.  

50.  To conclude, I give an order in terms of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Summons dated 3 September 2013.  I also give an order that the petitioner do pay one-third of the respondent costs, to be summarily assessed if not agreed. 

( I. Wong )
 Deputy District Judge

Ms A Todd of Messrs Withers, for the petitioner

Ms Sum of Messrs Hampton, Winter & Glynn, for the respondent