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Matrimonial Causes2012

TWC v. LKL

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Files (5)

99872-EN-2015-07-20

TWC v. LKL

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FCMC 8460 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8460 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 TWCPetitioner
 and 
 LKLRespondent

------------------------

Coram: Deputy District Judge Pang in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 23 June 2015
Supplemental Submission of the Respondent: 7 July 2015
Date of Judgment: 20 July 2015

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J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance Pending Suit & Legal Costs Provision)

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The Application

1.  This is the hearing of the petitioner wife (hereinafter called “W”)’s application for maintenance pending suit (hereinafter called “MPS”) for the daughter of the family (hereinafter called “K”) and her 3rd application for legal costs provision pursuant to s.3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (hereinafter called “MPPO”).  The court has power to make orders for financial provision for a child of the family under s.5 of the MPPO.

The background

2.  The background of the parties and the history of the present litigation were set out in T v L Judgment (Maintenance Pending Suit) (FCMC 8460/2012, 13 November 2012), T v L Judgment (Maintenance Pending Suit: Legal Costs) (FCMC 8460/2012, 25 June 2013), TWC v LKL Judgment (Care and Control) (FCMC 8460/2012, 12 December 2013), TWC v LKL Judgment (Maintenance Pending Suit: Legal Costs) (FCMC 8460/2012, 19 September 2014) and TWC v LKL Judgment (Ruling on Costs) (FCMC 8460/2012, 5 December 2014).

3.  By the said Judgment of Deputy District Judge A. Yim dated 13 November 2012, it is ordered that the respondent husband (hereinafter called “H”) shall pay W the sum of HKD25,000 per month as maintenance pending suit.  By my Judgment dated 12 December 2013, the care and control of K was granted to H with reasonable access to W.  By two Summons both filed on 29 May 2015 (and an Amended Summons filed on 23 June 2015), W applied for an order that H shall pay her the sum of HKD23,000 per month as MPS for K pending the determination of the question of ancillary relief (hereinafter called “AR”) and the sum of HKD45,000 per month towards her legal costs in respect of her application for AR.  By a Consent Order dated 1 June 2015, the arrangements for K were varied to the effect that the care and control of K was granted to W with reasonable access to H.  In view of W becoming the daily carer of K and upon the fact that H openly offered to pay W an additional sum of HKD13,000 per month for K in settlement of her application for maintenance for K, on the same day I made the order that H shall pay W the sum of HKD13,000 per month for K pending the determination of the present applications. 

The law

4.  The parties do not dispute the applicable legal principles on applications for maintenance and provision for legal costs.  The law in this regard can be found inthe said Judgments dated 13 November 2012, 25 June 2013 and 19 September 2014 respectively.  The overreaching principle is reasonableness: see HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 at p.106. 

The issues

5.  In C v F [2006] HKFLR 41, HHJ Bruno Chan stated at paragraph [45]:-

“Although the sole statutory guideline in considering maintenance pending suit is that the award shall be ‘reasonable’, the court will nevertheless bear in mind all the factors drawn to its attention relating to the marriage and the parties to it and perhaps the two most outstanding matters in every case, as in this one, are the standard of living of the parties, and the ability of the husband to pay.”

6.  In the present applications, H does not gainsay W’s pronouncement of her impecuniosity, her affirmation on K’s current standard of living and monthly expenses or even H’s potential liability to make provision for K, and W’s legal costs.  The parties agreed that in relation to W’s application for MPS to K, there is no dispute on the question of K’s reasonable need and H’s ability to pay is the only issue.  That means I can safely presume K’s reasonable need should not be less than HKD23,000 per month for the purpose of the present application.  About the application for legal costs provision, the parties agree that there are two issues, namely: -

(a) H’s complaint that W did not provide a skeleton bill of costs;

(b) H’s ability/ inability to pay.

Skeleton bill of costs

7.  Obviously, the real question behind the complaint about the lack of W’s skeleton bill of costs is: Even if the court is persuaded that H should pay further legal costs provision to W, what is the reasonable amount?  No doubt a sufficiently detailed breakdown of W’s anticipated costs in future will help the court make a decision on whether the amount sought is reasonable.  In HJFG v KCYsupra at p.122 Hartmann JA expressed similar view that:

“122. The issue of a contribution towards the wife’s ongoing legal costs is more difficult to decide, mainly because of the lack of detail supplied by the wife in support of her claim.”

8.  In another Court of Appeal case, Kv K (CACV 80 of 2010, 31 August 2010),Roger VP said in para 14:

“It seems to me that the appropriate course would be for a court to be told what the foreseeable anticipated costs are likely to be. That can be done in much the same way as the detail in which a court is told when security for costs is asked for. In other words, not an elaborate bill of costs, but a simple back of the envelope type bill of costs itemising out what counsel’s fees are likely to be and what solicitor’s expenses are likely to be. That can be done in a very simple sort of way but not in a complicated sort of way. Then the court should try and make the appropriate order. If it is to be on a monthly basis, the order should come to an end when it is foreseen that the expenses would be fully covered.”

9.  Notwithstanding that W did not lodge with the court a skeleton bill of costs in support of her applications, she provided some information on the amount of costs already incurred and an estimate of the amount of costs to be incurred by her.

10.  With H’s past contribution to her legal costs, W settled HKD528,000 out of the total legal costs that she has already incurred.  She is still owed to Messrs. Chan and Chan, her former solicitors, outstanding legal fees in the sum of HKD300,000 including counsel fee of HKD113,500 of her former counsel.  Since 25 February 2013, she has retained Messrs. T.K. Tsui & Co. at the rate of HKD4,500 per hour for a partner and HKD3000 per hour for an assistant solicitor.  To date, her outstanding legal costs were estimated to be over HKD3M. 

11.  It is W’s contention that because of the allegedly uncooperative attitude of H, vast expenses and time will be required for her to prepare the upcoming FDR or AR trial.  In her Notes lodged with the court for this hearing, W attached a list of orders and directions sought, by which she called for, among other things, the court’s leave to her to file and serve further questionnaire on H’s 7th Affirmation and updated Form E, the court’s leave to the parties to adduce single joint expert evidence on valuation of the landed properties that H’s late parents were interested as well as their shareholdings in a number of companies.  At the same time, W also asked for an order that FDR be dispensed with in case the parties’ further out of court negotiations and/or attempt on mediation fails.  Against the backdrop, her solicitors estimated that the ongoing costs to be incurred from the present stage of the proceedings to the FDR or AR trial should be about HKD500,000 to 600,000, taking account of :- (i) solicitors costs, (ii) counsel fees, (iii) disbursements for forensic accounting expenses and property valuation, however excluding outlay involved in any investigative work that might be carried out.  W requested legal costs provision in the sum of HKD45,000 per month.  In other words, she expected that it will take about 11 to 13 months to conclude the FDR or AR trial.

12.  If the parties can successfully reach a settlement agreement out of court, then of course W will procure a consent summons that contains the terms of the parties’ agreement to be filed for the court’s approval, which should bring the matter to an amicable ending.  If the parties cannot reach a settlement agreement out of court, for my part I hold the view that FDR should be fixed, probably with 1 day reserved, instead of having the case proceeded directly to a pre-trial review.  It is common that FDR can bring about a settlement through the combined effort of the parties’ active participation, the legal representatives’ assistance and the court’s input as a facilitator even though the parties have been previously unsuccessful in reaching a settlement out of court.  Given that H has already shown reluctance to provide full disclosure of his financial position, I accept that it might be necessary for W to take out further questionnaires and/or applications for specific discovery for her to prepare the FDR.  Taking a rough estimate of the work required in the circumstance, I hold that the ballpark figure of W’s anticipated future legal costs from now to FDR should be HKD240,000, 50% of which is solicitors fees and the remaining 50% is counsel fees.  I accept W’s estimate that probably the 1 day FDR can take place in about 12 months.  Subject to H’s ability to pay, an order that H shall pay W HKD20,000 per month up to FDR as provision for her legal costs should be reasonable.  For the sake of clarity, perhaps I should mention that the estimate of HKD240,000 does not cover costs for expert evidence on valuation proposed by W, if any.  If it is necessary to adduce expert evidence on valuation, more likely than not the costs to be incurred will be paid by H initially, with the direction that such costs shall be in the cause of the AR proceedings, in view of W’ limited financial ability and my finding on H’s ability to pay as follows.

H’s ability to pay

13.  I turn to the issue on H’s ability to pay.

W’s case

14.  W contended that H clearly has the ability to meet the proposed amount because:

(1) H retained leading senior and junior counsel at previous hearings;

(2) The spending on his legal fees appeared to have no impact on his lifestyle – he travelled overseas and continued enjoying a ‘party lifestyle’;

(3) H spent over HKD400,000 on private investigators;

(4) The value of the estate of his late parents was estimated at about HKD150M in his From E.  H being the sole beneficiary is going to inherit the whole estate;

(5) H has the ability to access funds/ loans/ advances from the sport goods business company operated by his late parents (hereinafter called the “Company”);

(6) H used to make legal costs provision to her.

H’s case

15.  The gist of H’s case is: -

(1) H provided legal costs provision to W pursuant to the said Judgments dated 25 June 2013 and 19 September 2014 respectively.  At the time of the said Judgments the court indeed held the view that H had the ability to pay the said legal costs provision.  However, H’s financial situation has got worse since then. 

(2) At the same time H is the sole beneficiary of the estate of his late parents’ estate that was valued at HKD 150M, his assets are locked up.  The estate of the deceased consists of nine landed properties, seven of which are registered in the joint/ sole names of his later parents, among which two adjacent shops are rented out for HKD110,000 per month, one car parking space is rented out for HKD3,000 per month, another shop is rented out for HKD17,000 per month, one factory unit, one office unit, and another flat unit are left vacant (see paragraph 12 of his 7th Affirmation).  The rental income from the said two adjacent shops of HKD 110,000 per month is paid to the receiver of the Company (hereinafter called the “Receiver”), who uses the income to cover rates, Government rent and management fees of all nine landed properties, maintenance to H’s grandmother, audit fee and Receiver’s fee, H’s legal costs and H’s credit card expenses, totally at HKD133,715 per month (see paragraph 17 of his 7th Affirmation).  The rental income from the said car parking space of HKD3,000 per month and the said shop of HKD17,000 per month, totally HKD20,000 per month, is paid to the solicitors representing H in the probate and administration matter as retainer fee.  In relation to the said three landed properties left vacant, as those properties are still registered in the name of his late parents, despite previous attempts to let them out, no willing tenant could be found.

(3) The said flat and car parking space that H occupied are registered in the name of a BVI company that has two issued shares, one of which is held by the auditors of his late parents on trust for his deceased father, the other share is held by a gentleman that H has lost contact for three years.  H cannot sell the said flat or car parking space without participation of the said gentleman.

(4) He has been living on debt over the past few years.  His up to-date indebtedness to the Company was in the sum of HKD13,377,311.7.  H received from the Receiver monthly allowance in the sum of HKD60,000 per month from 2010 to November 2014.  Since December 2014, the monthly allowance has been reduced to HKD50,000, for the cash flow of the Company is so tight that the Receiver is unable to pay him HKD60,000 every month.  His current monthly expenses are HKD64,200 (see paragraph 18 of his 7th Affirmation).  To make the ends meet, he used to take drawings from the Company, but from now on the Receiver is very strict in making any advancement to him in light of that the Company has been operating at a loss for the past few years.

(5) Due to the onset of his mental illness, he cannot work.

(6) He was not aware of the financial problem the Company faced when he, through solicitors, offered HKD13,000 to W for K’s maintenance.

(7) It is out of question that he can afford the amount sought by W or to provide any legal costs provision to her.  H’s current offer is to pay HKD10,000 per month for the interim maintenance of K.

My view

16.  The court could adopt a broad brush-stroke approach to deal with MPS applications.  Further affirmation will be filed and witnesses will go to the box and be cross-examined during the trial when a detailed examination of the parties’ financial resources and needs will take place. With the benefit of further evidence and detailed cross-examination, the court will make its conclusion in the AR matter at the trial and any under/ overprovision in the MPS provision may be set off if it is fair and just so to do.

17.  Despite that H receives HKD60,000/50,000 per month from the Receiver, free accommodation and the use of a sports car, H has been living on debts.  He said that due to the liquidity problem of the Company, he might not be able to borrow from the Company in future.  In the premises, he would have to use the rental income from the two adjacent shops of HKD110,000 per month to settle all expenses including those of the estate of the deceased and his expenses.  The expenses of the estate of the deceased comprise outgoings of the nine landed properties owned by the deceased in the sum of HKD58,215 per month (see paragraph 17 of his 7th Affirmation). His monthly expenses are HKD64,200 (including MPS of HKD25,000 to W and HKD13,000 to K: see paragraph 18 of his 7th Affirmation).  H affirmed that the Receive also used the said rental income of HKD110,000 per month to pay other monthly expenses viz maintenance to H’s grandmother in the sum of HKD5,000 per month, audit fee and Receiver’s fee of HKD20,000 per month, H’s legal costs of HKD30,000 per month and H’s credit card expenses of HKD25,000 per month.  For the present applications, I make no comment on H’s grandmother’s maintenance payment.  I regard that the said audit fee and Receiver’s fee should be paid by the Company’s income, nonetheless.  As to H’s credit card expenses, I hold the view that it must be significantly cut down.  H admitted that he spent too much with his credit card (see paragraph 17 of his 7th Affirmation)  He was told by his psychiatrist that due to his mental illness, sometimes he lose control of his credit card spending.  With the assistance of the psychiatrist, he said he would try to control himself in future.  My simple advice to H is that he should immediately close his credit card account.

18.  At any rate, the total of the expenses of the estate of the deceased in the sum of HKD58,215 per month and his monthly expenses of HKD64,200 per month exceeds the rental income of HKD110,000 per month from the said two adjacent shops.  At the first sight of it, he does not have the ability to make any additional payment to W or K.  If what H just said was true, not only he could not make any further legal costs provision to W, but also he would not afford sustaining legal representation.  It seems to me the fact that there is no indication that H will lose legal representation any time soon militates against his self proclamation of financial difficulty.  What makes H’s case more perplexing is that in the Company’s audited accounts for the year ended 31 March 2014, it shows that, besides H, Mr. So (H’s uncle and a witness for H in the care and control trial) was indebted to the Company, in the sum of HKD2,350,817.85.  H has not produced the Company’s audit account for the year ended 31 March 2015 or the current management accounts.  There is no evidence that Mr. So’s indebtedness was paid off.  Has the Company taken any step for the repayment of Mr. So’s debt?  If not, why?  If yes, the repayment of more than HKD2.3M should resolve the Company’s alleged cash flow problem.  Despite that the above rhetorical questions were raised by W through counsel, no answer was given.  It follows that one has to ask this question: Is the Company really facing cash flow problem?

19.  In KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314 at pp.327 328 the Court of Final Appeal held that:-

“34. The width of the wording of s.7(1)(a) of the MPPO will include financial assistance made by third parties to the parties to a marriage. Accordingly, such assistance made by a third party to the husband or wife may be taken into account in the computation of the party’s overall financial resource.

35. As stated in para.2 above, such third party assistance may take various forms. The authorities, to which I shall presently turn, show commonly trust situations or where relatives have provided financial assistance. There are of course other factual situations.

36. In every case where third party assistance is involved, there are two critical evidential questions for the court to consider: (1) What is the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third to the husband or wife? (2) What is the likelihood of such financial assistance continuing in the foreseeable future?

37. It goes without saying that in the fact finding exercise, the court must look at the reality of the situation and have regard to matters of substance and not just form. In looking at reality, the court can take into account not only what a party actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him or her if a request for assistance were to be made.

38. In addition, in looking at what may occur in the foreseeable future, past conduct is often a useful guide.

39. Having ascertained the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party and then finding on the evidence on a balance of probabilities that there is a likelihood of the continuation of such financial assistance in the foreseeable future, the court is then in a position in law first to take this into account in the identification of the financial resources of the parties and secondly, in determining the appropriate ancillary relief to be granted.  This is an approach that is entirely consistent with the court’s duty under s.7(1) of the MPPO”

20.  The headnote to the report of Thomas v Thomas [1996] 2 F.C.R. 544 stated that:-

“The discretionary powers conferred on the court by ss.23 to s.25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to redistribute the assets of spouses were almost limitless. However, the Judges who administered this jurisdiction had accepted the necessity of restraint. The precise boundaries of this judicial self-restraint had never been rigidly defined. But certain principles emerged from the authorities. One was that the court was not obliged to limit its orders to resources of capital or income which were shown actually to exist but might infer from the evidence the availability of unidentified resources. Another was that where a spouse enjoyed access to wealth but no absolute entitlement to it, the court would not act in direct invasion of the rights of a third party nor put a third party under pressure to act in a way which would enhance the means of the maintaining spouse. However, this did not mean that the court acted in total disregard of the potential availability of wealth from sources owned or administered by others. In the present case the court was confronted by a husband with immediate liquidity problems but possessing substantial means. On such a husband a heavy onus lay to satisfy the court that all means of access to liquid funds to support suitable outright provision for his wife had been thoroughly explored and found to be impossible. If he failed to do that he ran the risk of having the inference drawn against him that ways and means could be found of funding suitable provision for the wife’s capital needs.”

21.  As stated by the English Court of Appeal in Thomas v Thomas, in the present case the court was confronted by a husband with alleged immediate liquidity problems but possessing substantial means.  In this connection, it is noteworthy that the estate duty of H’s late parents was recently cleared and instruction was given to solicitors to proceed with the application for the grant of the Letters of Administration from the Probate Registry.  Despite that the administration of the estate of the deceased has been in a state of limbo for over 10 years, in whatever way the Letters of Administration of the estate can possibly be obtained in a few months.  On such a husband a heavy onus is laid to satisfy the court that all means of access to liquid funds to support suitable outright provision for his wife had been thoroughly explored and found to be impossible.  If H failed to do that he ran the risk of having the inference drawn against him that ways and means could be found of funding suitable provision for W’s need.  By reason of the matters stated in the above paragraph 18, I regard H has not discharged the burden to satisfy the court that all means of access to liquid funds to support suitable outright provision for W had been thoroughly explored and found to be impossible.  On top of that, based on the fact that he is the sole beneficiary of the estate of his late parents and that he used to receive substantial monthly maintenance and regular drawings from the Company, if he is ordered by the court to pay further MPS to W and K, despite Mr. Chow’s ability to argue to the contrary, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he will be able to obtain further advancement from the Company to meet his liability under a court order. 

22.  Over and above the probability of H obtaining further advancement from the Company, there are other resources accessible to H.  It is noted that, three out of the nine properties owned by the deceased are left vacant.  Not to mention, H also admitted that the rent for those properties that have been leased out is not up to market value (see paragraph 21 of H’s 7th Affirmation).  H sought an explanation suggesting no new tenancy could be signed since the properties were registered in the deceased’s sole name/ joint names.  Such explanation does not hold water as a matter of law.  The doctrine of tenancy by estoppel can be found in Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd & Others v Associated Electrical Industries Ltd [1977] 1 QB 580.  This is what Lord Denning MR said in rejecting the defence at pp.596 597:-

“If a landlord lets a tenant into possession under a lease, then, so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbed by any adverse claim then the tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title. Suppose the tenant (not having been disturbed) goes out of possession and the landlord sues the tenant on the covenant for rent or for breach of covenant to repair or to yield up in repair. The tenant cannot say to the landlord: ‘you are not the true owner of the property.’ Likewise, if the landlord, on the tenant’s holding over, sues him for possession or for use and occupation or mesne profits, the tenant cannot defend himself by saying: ‘The property does not belong to you, but to another.’”

23.  If H lets a tenant into possession (no doubt something he can do), then so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbed by any adverse claim, he can receive rent from the tenant.  It seems to me the fact that many landed properties of the estate are left vacant and the rent of the leased out landed properties is left not up to date shows that H is not concerned about money and not in financial difficulty as alleged.  There is no evidence adduced on the market rent of the nine landed properties of the estate.  Judging from the fact that the old tenancies were signed ten or more years ago and given the common knowledge that in general rent has gone up a lot since ten years ago, regardless of what H’s true case is, H can still take immediate steps to lease out the vacant landed properties and to renew the stale tenancies of the leased out landed properties so as to significantly increase his income.

24.  For the purpose of the present applications, I am persuaded that H has the ability to pay the monthly sum of HKD23,000 to W for K and the monthly sum of HKD20,000 for 12 months.

Conclusion

25.  The order dated 13 November 2012 is varied to the effect that: -

(a) H shall pay W the sum of HKD48,000 per month as MPS for W and K, the 1st payment to be paid on 12 August 2015 and thereafter on or before the 12th day of each succeeding month until further order of the court;

(b) H shall pay W the sum of HKD20,000 per month as W’s further legal costs provision, the 1st payment to be paid on 12 August 2015 and thereafter on or before the 12th day of each succeeding month until 12 July 2016 or further order of the court, on the condition that the said payments are to be punctually paid by W to her solicitors on account of her legal costs for the AR;

(c) The aforesaid monthly payments will be paid on account of any sum eventually received by W and/or K when the AR is determined;

and it is further directed that

(d) The parties shall lodge with the court a joint proposal of directions for the way forward within the next 14 days.

Costs

26.  Taking the result at face value, W is the successful party.  For the time being, I can see no reason why costs should not follow the event.  It is ordered nisi that H shall pay W’s costs of the present applications, to be taxed if not agreed, in any event. The nisi order becomes absolute after 14 days of the date hereof unless a party has applied to vary the order.

( K.K. Pang )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Giles Surman and Ms Christina Tseng instructed by Messrs T.K. Tsui & Co for the petitioner

Mr. Enzo WH Chow instructed by Messrs Sidney Lee & Co. for the respondent

96640-EN-2014-12-03

TWC v. LKL

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FCMC 8460 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8460 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 TWCPetitioner
and
 LKLRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Before Deputy District Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing : 21 November 2014
Date of Handing Down of this Ruling : 3 December 2014

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RULING ON COSTS

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1.  This is a hearing of a summons taken out by the Husband (“H”), the respondent in the action, to vary the costs order nisi given in a judgment dated 19 September 2014 (the “Judgment”).

2.  By a summons filed on 18 March 2014, the Wife (“W”), the petitioner in the action, sought a sum of HKD100,000 per month as legal costs provision.  On 26 March 2014 W issued another summons for an order to backdate the legal costs provision from the month of the hearing of the children matter i.e. October 2013.  The substantive hearing of the two summons took place on 29 August 2014.  By the Judgment, it is ordered H shall pay W a monthly sum of HKD45,000 as legal costs provision, the 1st payment to be made on 12 October 2014 and thereafter on the 12th day of each succeeding month until 12 January 2014 and on a nisi basis that H shall pay W’s costs of the application, including all reserved costs.  H now applies to vary the costs order nisi.  As stated by H, the appropriate costs order should be that W shall pay H’s costs of her two summons.

3.  The court has a wide discretion as to costs.  For the present application, the relevant provisions in the Rules of the High Court governing the exercise of discretion as to costs are Order 62 rules 3(2A) and 5, which contain amendments introduced as a result of the Civil Justice Reform.

4.  When dealing with costs orders, under Order 62 rule 5(1)(e) the court may take into account the conduct of the parties.  Rule 5(2) provides that conduct for this purpose includes (a) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (b) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue; (c) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and (d) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.

5.  First and foremost, H contended that his Calderbank offer beats the amount awarded by the court.  Under Order 62 rule 5(1)(d), the court may take into account a “without prejudice save as to costs” offer.  By a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter dated 20 February 2014, H offered to W the sum of HKD25,000 per month from 1 March 2014 up till the conclusion of FDR.  The FDR hearing being now fixed to take place on 25 January 2015, the sum awarded by the court i.e. HKD45,000 per months x 4 months = HKD180,000 is less than what H would pay under his Calderbank offer i.e. HKD25,000 x 11 month = HKD275,000.  If the FDR hearing could not take place in January 2015, H would pay even more, which will beat the award made by the court by far.

6.  W’s case is that this cannot be the right approach to evaluate and compare the offer made by H with the order made by the court.  Whilst the court considers the costs of the FDR hearing in a lump sum figure, which includes the preparation work such as exchanging the parties’ Form Es and raising further questionnaires, H offered to pay in a monthly term, which would have only come to a total sum of HKD100,000, considering the original FDR hearing date was 24 June 2014.  As the FDR hearing was originally scheduled on 24 June 2014, if W were to have accepted H’s Calderbank offer, she would have received HKD100,000 in total, which would not be sufficient to cover W’s costs for the FDR hearing.  It is W’s case that therefore, H’s Calderbank offer, which would originally be HKD100,000 in total, does not beat the order made by the court.

7.  In KWC v LYY, FCMC No 14968 of 2006, 17 November 2009 (unrep), the wife in the action, who put forward several Calderbank offers, was criticized by HHJ Bebe Chu in para 26:-

“In my view, both W’s Calderbank Letters clearly fall short of these requirements. Making a Calderbank offer does not simply mean putting forward an amount, albeit a high amount which eventually in this case well exceeded the award, but also setting out the basis of the offer to enable the other side to consider it properly and seriously. At that time, H was saying his proposal of HK$2.67m was only one third of what he said were the Family Assets at the time of the separation, which was about HK$8m. If W disagreed with H’s calculations, she should have made it known, whether in her 2nd Calderbank Letter or otherwise, and explained what she regarded as the value of the Family Assets were and how she arrived at the sum of HK$1m. It was also not clear whether W had arrived at this sum after taking into account her alleged amount of maintenance for the children. By failing to set out the basis of her offer, H might have thought that W was only offering him HK$1m out of the HK$8m, i.e. 13% of the assets. This should also be seen against the background that W’s then disclosed net current assets of about HK$11m and H’s of about HK$14,000. In such circumstances, there being no proper explanation as to the basis of her offer of HK$1m, which was further to be paid over 12 months, it was not unreasonable for H to reject W’s offer in her 2nd Calderbank Letter. I also note that there was no mention by W in her 2nd Calderbank Letter as to what her estimated costs would be if the matter were to proceed to trial. H was under legal aid, but W was not and I would have thought it would be helpful for H to know what her costs might be if the matter were to proceed to trial and that such costs might have to be deducted from his award.”

8.  H did not set out the basis of his Calderbank offer to enable W to consider it properly and seriously.  W might have taken that H thought W’s future legal costs for the FDR was in the sum of only about HKD100,000 in total, as the FDR hearing was originally fixed on 24 June 2014, which said sum of HKD100,000 would not be sufficient to cover W’s costs for the FDR hearing.  Furthermore, after the parties agreed to have the FDR hearing adjourned to a date to be fixed pending for W’s summons for legal costs provisions, the total sum of H’s Calderbank offer became uncertain.  For example, were W to have accepted H’s offer in July 2014 or August 2014, and then the court fixed the FDR hearing in September 2014, she would have received only HKD175,000, which still would not be sufficient to cover W’s costs for the FDR hearing.  It is for the court to fix a date for the adjourned FDR hearing in consideration of, among other things, the court’s diary, which is outside the control of the parties.  In such circumstance, I take the view that it is not unreasonable that W did not accept H’s Calderbank offer.

9.  Second, H blamed W for her reluctance in making an offer for a settlement of the ancillary reliefs matter.  He contended that the court should discourage litigants from refusing to negotiate by considering costs sanctions.  Under Order 62 rules 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(d), the court may take into account parties’ conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.

10.  The chronology relating to the parties’ negotiation is as follows:-

(i)  Upon the Court’s decision in respect of custody, in a letter dated 16 December 2013, H asked W to proceed with the FDR hearing.

(ii)  In a letter dated 17 December 2013, W replied to H’s letter asking H to make a monthly payment of HKD58,000 per month as her legal costs provision in preparation for the FDR hearing.

(iii)  In a letter dated 10 January 2014, W suggested the parties to exchange updated Form E and questionnaires.

(iv)  In a letter dated 22 January 2014, H said he was of the view that there was no need to file updated Form E or further questionnaire.  In a second letter on the same date, H asked W to apply for legal aid for her ancillary relief claim and said he would consider W’s request for legal costs provision if her application for legal aid failed.

(v)  In a letter dated 5 February 2014, W proposed to have a without prejudice conference with H along with their respective legal representatives.

(vi)  In a letter dated 7 February 2014, H asked for a breakdown of W’s anticipated legal costs, agreed to attend a without prejudice conference on the 18 February 2014 as suggested by W and proposed W to withhold issuing a summons for legal costs provision pending to the without prejudice conference.  He also repeated that W should try to apply for legal aid.

(vii)  In a reply letter dated 7 February 2014, W agreed not to take out a summons for legal costs provision pending to the without prejudice conference.  She also revealed that Mr Surman would be present at the proposed without prejudice conference.  As to an estimate of legal costs, she replied that it would depend upon how forthcoming H was with respect to his financial disclosure.

(viii)  In a letter dated 11 February 2014, H said he did not think W should instruct Mr Surman to be present at the without prejudice conference.  He also asked for W’s offer for settlement.

(ix)  In a letter dated 12 February 2014, W reiterated she would like to have Mr Surman’s attendance at the without prejudice conference.

(x)  On 17 February 2014, H called W directly asking her not to instruct counsel but she refused.

(xi)  On 17 February 2014 by fax H informed W that he would not attend the without prejudice conference because it was H’s view that it is a total waste of costs and time to have W’s counsel to be present at the without prejudice conference, and despite W’s repeated requests, W has not provided an offer for settlement.

(xii)  In a letter dated 18 February 2014, W said she would issue a summons for a contribution of HKD100,000 per month and repeated her request for updated Form E.

(xiii)  In an open letter dated 20 February 2014, H repeated his suggestion that W should try legal aid and repeated the request for W’s estimate of her future legal costs.  On the same dated by a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter H offered HKD25,000 per month from 1 March 2014 till the conclusion of FDR.

(xiv)  At the 1st appointment hearing on ancillary reliefs on 17 March 2014, the court fixed the FDR hearing on 24 June 2014 with 1 day reserved.

(xv)  On 18 March 2014, W took out the summons for legal costs provision of HKD100,000 per month, which said summons was returnable for directions on 19 May 2014, with 15 minutes reserved.

(xvi)  On 26 March 2014, W took out her second summons for an order to backdate the legal costs provision.

(xvii)  In a letter dated 12 May 2014, H said he was opposing W’s summons and proposed that the hearing of W’s application be adjourned to 24 June 2014 after the FDR hearing for argument.

(xviii)  In a letter dated 14 May 2014, W agreed with H’s proposal for adjournment, but disagreed to proceed with FDR hearing before the hearing of her summons.  She said she had no means to afford legal representation for FDR hearing.

(xix)  By way of consent summons, the parties disposed of the directions hearing dated 19 May 2014 and also have the substantive hearing of W’s summons for legal costs provisions fixed on 29 August 2014 with 1 day reserved.

11.  Throughout the 10 months between the judgment of the custody trial and the legal costs hearing, W has repeatedly engaged with H by correspondence in relation to the ancillary reliefs matter and the child’s matter.  It seems that both parties has expressed an intention to negotiate with a view to reach settlement of the ancillary reliefs matter, and for that purpose, at one stage the parties agreed to hold a without prejudice conference.  It is unfortunate that: First, rightly or wrongly H considered that an updated Form E was unnecessary; Next, obviously W was unwilling to make an offer before having an opportunity of reviewing H’s updated Form E; Then, H called off the without prejudice conference.  W has agreed to delay taking out a summons pending to the without prejudice conference.  W eventually took out the application on 18 March 2014 when the FDR hearing was fixed to take place in about 3 months and the parties’ negotiation for settlement has not been successful.  It seems that it is reasonable for W to make the application dated 18 March 2014.  Also, I do not regard W should be blamed for her refusal to go ahead with the FDR hearing dated 24 June 2014 without legal representation.  Taking an overview of the evidence, I do not agree with H’s suggestion that W has refused to negotiate.

12.  Third, as the amount eventually awarded by the court is far less than W’s request, H contended that W could not be regarded as the successful party in the application.  Despite that in the Judgment, I consider that W has exaggerated her future costs and W’s reasonable legal costs up to FDR is only in the sum of HKD180,000, at the end of the day W was awarded a substantial sum of money.  It seems that in reality and substantively W has succeeded her claim.  However, it is noted that the “rule” that costs normally follow the event is no longer the usual order in an interlocutory application, though remains an option.  The effect of Order 62 rule 3(2A) was as explained by To J in Melvin Waxman & Another v Li Fei Yu & Another, HCA No 1972 of 2012, 11 September 2013 (unrep) at para 11:-

“The amendment to rule 3(2) and the introduction of rule 3(2A) specifically applicable to costs in interlocutory proceedings makes it clear that the legislative intent was to distinguish between costs in interlocutory proceedings and costs in other proceedings. Under the new rule 3(2), the general rule of costs to follow the event is preserved for costs in proceedings other than interlocutory proceedings. But a difference approach is provided under the new rule 3(2A) for costs in interlocutory proceedings. Under this new rule, the court may order costs to follow the event or make such other order as it sees fit. The court is no longer required to apply the general rule of costs following the event except in special circumstances, though that principle remains as one of the options. The court may make such other order as it sees fit. Rule 3(2A) gives the court even wider discretion than that under rule 3(2) in respect of costs in other proceedings.”

13.  It is worthy of noting that apart from the question of quantum, H vigorously contested W’s application on the issue of liability at trial and lost the argument.  It is also pertinent to take notice that much of the hearing time has spent on the issue of liability. A substantial part of the Judgment is a discussion on the issue of liability. On the other hand, W is responsible for what Deputy High Court Judge Mostyn QC (as he then was) guarded against in TL v ML (Ancillary Relief: Claim Against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263 – forensic exaggeration.  It is clear W has overinflated her future legal costs.  Under rules 5(1)(e) and (2)(c), the court is entitled to consider that W’s conduct that she has exaggerated her claim when deciding costs.  As well, under rule 5(1)(f), the court may take into account whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful.  The court is entitled to consider that after having heard H’s arguments on quantum at trial, the court finally awarded a sum far less than W’s request.

14.  Fourth, H put blame on W’s failure to provide a breakdown as to how the requested amount of HKD100,000 per month was arrived at.  W stated in her Affirmation that her solicitors is charging at the rate of HKD4,500 per hour for a partner and HKD3,000 per hour for an assistant solicitor and she needs about HKD500,000 to HKD700,000 from the time of the filing of the supporting Affirmation on 14 March 2014 to FDR, but she did not give any breakdown of her anticipated legal costs.  I said in the Judgment that without a proper breakdown, I cannot fathom why she needs HKD500,000 to HKD700,000 for the FDR hearing.  The applicant’s duty to provide a breakdown of the anticipated legal costs has been repeatedly emphasized by the courts: see KWTM v NSH, FCMC No 14639 of 2007, 3 September 2008, unrep at para 79; K v K CACV No 80 of 2010, 31 August 2010, unrep at para 14; HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 (CA) at para 90.  I am not persuaded by W’s contestation that she was not in a position to provide a breakdown of her anticipated legal costs because her future costs would depend on how forthcoming H is with respect to his financial disclosure and whether the parties would pursue updated Form E.  W can always provide a breakdown that covers her anticipated application for further discovery, if that is necessary. It might be true that in view of H’s dispute on liability to W’s claim for legal costs provision, it seems unlikely that the parties would have got rid of the hearing supposing W has provided H a breakdown of her anticipated legal costs, but after all a breakdown of the estimate of her legal costs can give the court and H an early opportunity to properly consider the reasonableness of her request and can work to narrow down the dispute between the parties on the issue of quantum, if not liability.

15.  All in all, I remind myself of the provisions of Order 62 rules 3(2A) and 5 of the Rules of the High Court, which set out the factors which the court shall have regard in exercising its discretion as to costs.  I place particular significance on the fact that by and large W is the successful party, at the same time bearing in mind that the court is no longer required to apply the rule of costs following the event except in special circumstances, though the rule remains as one of the options.  I caution myself of the need to consider the overall justice of the situation and examine all the factors and circumstance, taking into account whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful, and the underlying objectives in Order 1A.  I also place particular significance on that W has overinflated her future legal costs, and her failure in providing a breakdown of her anticipated legal costs.  Looking at the matters in the round, I regard it is reasonable and just to make the order that H shall pay W 2/3 of the costs of the summons dated 18 March 2014 and the summons dated 26 March 2014, including all reserved costs, with certificate for counsel’s attendance, to be taxed if not agreed.

16.  For my ruling in the above, there be a costs order nisi that W shall pay H of 1/3 the costs of this application including reserved costs in any event, to be taxed if not agreed. This costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the handing down of this ruling unless a party has applied to the court for varying the order.

( K K PANG )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Giles Surman and Ms Christina Tseng instructed by T K Tsui & Co, solicitors for the petitioner

Mr Alvin Cheng of Alvin Cheng & Rosaline Choy, solicitors for the respondent

95276-EN-2014-09-19

TWC v. LKL

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91201-EN-2013-12-12

TWC v. LKL

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FCMC 8460 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 8460 OF 2012

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BETWEEN

 TWCPetitioner

And

 LKLRespondent

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Coram: Deputy District Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of Hearing : 22-25, 28-31 October 2013, 21 November 2013
Date of Judgment : 12 December 2013

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J U D G M E N T
(Care and control)

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1.  I will refer to the “Petitioner” and the “Respondent” as the “Mother” and the “Father” respectively.

The Application before the court

2.  This is the trial of the Mother’s application for the care and control of her daughter (hereinafter called “K”), a child of the family.  In spite of that the Mother and the Father agree joint custody of K be granted to the parties, the Mother proposes the parties should share the care and control of K while the Father seeks the sole care and control of K.  The core question that requires the Court’s determination is what future care and control arrangements are in the best interests of K.

The Background

3.  The Father was born in 1987 and is now about 26 years of age.  The Father comes from a comfortable background.  He is the only child of his late parents, who used to run a sports equipment business.  After having attended school up to F 3 in Hong Kong, he was sent to a boarding school in England to further his studies. Tragically, his parents died in a traffic accident in September 2004. Following that, he returned to Hong Kong and was taken care of by his maternal uncle (hereinafter called “Mr So”) and his wife (hereinafter called “Ms Tsang”). Under the guidance of Mr So and Ms Tsang, the Father is now working in the sports equipment business of his late parents.

4.  The Mother was born in 1986 and is now about 27 years old.  She is also the only child of her parents, who were separated when she was in primary school.  She was sent to live with her maternal grandparents in Guangzhou and spent her teenage years there while her mother worked in Hong Kong.  She returned to Hong Kong to reunite with her mother when she was 18 years old.  She worked as a beautician before she met the Father and had worked as a beautician for some period of time during the marriage.

5.  The parties got acquainted in early 2008 and were married in early 2009.  K, now aged 4 ½ years old, was born in May 2009 in Hong Kong.

6.  When K was born, the Mother and the Father were respectively 23 and 22 years old. In early 2011, K was sent to live with the Father’s maternal aunt (hereinafter called “Auntie So”) in her place.  According to the Father, it has been a joint decision of the parties with the welfare of K in mind to place K with Auntie So as they have found themselves quite incapable of adequately taking care of K at that time.  The Mother said she agreed to that with great reluctance.

7.  The parties had a big quarrel in late December 2011.  After that event the Mother moved out of the matrimonial home and returned to live with her mother.  The Mother petitioned for divorce on the Father’s behaviour in June 2012.

8.  Since early 2013, K together with Auntie So have moved back to live at the Father’s place i.e. the former matrimonial home. 

9.  After the Child Disputes Resolution hearing dated 18 April 2013, it was arranged that the Mother would pick up K from school every Friday afternoon and have staying access until the following Sunday at 10 a.m.  That has been largely the access arrangement since April 2013.

The evidence

10.  A lot of evidence was adduced.  Both parties filed voluminous affirmation evidence prepared by the parties and the witnesses.  I heard evidence from Mr. Ho, Social Work Officer, who prepared an Updated Social Investigation Report dated 16 September 2013.  The Mother, a domestic helper (hereinafter called “R”) and the maternal grandmother testified for the Mother.  The Father, Ms Tsang, Auntie So and Mr So testified for the Father.  Besides the factual witnesses, Dr. Yu, a specialist in psychiatry, was called by the Father to give opinion on his psychiatric health.  In addition, there are two earlier Social Investigation Reports, respectively dated 29 October 2012 and 14 March 2013, prepared by Ms Lai, Social Work Officer, whose attendance at this trial is not required by the parties.  Furthermore, by consent leave has been granted to the Father to produce and rely on the surveillance evidence as particularized in the letter from his solicitors to the other party dated 16 October 2013, produced and marked exhibit “LKL5-1” to his 5th Affirmation filed on 21 October 2013, without calling the maker of the same to give evidence at the trial.

The Mother’s case

11.  She loves K and has been actively involved in her daily care.  She certainly desires to share the care and control of K so that she can have a significant involvement in the upbringing of K.  The Mother said the Father and his witnesses are malicious and intent on blackening her name with the suggestion that she is in pursuit of the care and control of K not out of her genuine care and concern for K but for the advancement of her claim for ancillary reliefs.

12.  Since K was arranged to be taken care of and live with Auntie So, although she had to work long hours for living and the Father and his relatives have been frustrating her access to K, she has tried to make visits on K as much as she can.

13.  Though she has gone to pubs and bars for birthday party or meeting with friends, she denied she has frequented night discos and bars or practised one night stand.  The Father’s accusation that she has a causal sense of sexual relationship is a vivid demonstration of how far the Father can go to sully her name.

14.  While she was an inexperienced young mother and young wife having no idea on how to nurse K, right from the beginning she is very willing to learn how to take care of K and longs to be actively involved in the care of K.

15.  On the other hand, the Father is not a proper parent to be granted the care and control of K.

16.  The Father used to party with friends several nights and days in a week.  He has not been actively involved in the care of K.

17.  The Father has been diagnosed with depression and required psychiatric treatment for depression.  For his psychiatric problem, doctor has been advising the Father to take medications, obtain regular psychiatric check-up, live a healthy lifestyle and refrain from drinking alcohol.  Not only has the Father failed to follow the doctor’s instructions, but he chooses to party with friends several nights and days a week, take dangerous drugs, drink large amount of alcohol, smoke cannabis, or play video games with friends from dusk till dawn.

18.  The Father has been aggressive in character and has been prone to violent behaviour.

19.  Since the parties were separated, the Father had exposed K to his loud sexual exploits with his new girlfriend.

20.  She being the mother has a natural role in the rearing of K.  K is always afraid of Auntie So, who disciplines K and gives her lectures.  Auntie So is not an appropriate substitute for her.

21.  Bothe her mother and R, who is now working for them, are very close to K and they are prepared to help in her care of K.

The Father’s case

22.  He loves K and genuinely cares and is concerned about K’s welfare and is eager to be actively involved in her upbringing.

23.  He had a wild life when he was young.  At that time, he was seriously depressed by the sudden death of his parents.  He does not have any drug problem anymore. He has changed a lot and become a mature person since the separation of the parties.

24.  The Mother is definitely unsuitable to be K’s carer.  She is still young and enjoys going out and clubbing.  She has a causal sense of sexual relationship.  She always indulges in meeting with men and having sexual relationship with newly acquainted men.  She is so absorbed in her clubbing life that she is too busy to spend any quality time with K.

25.  Since the birth of K, the Mother has indulged in telephone calls with her friends day and night without taking care of K.

26.  She frequently played online games at home without taking care of K.

27.  The Mother seldom took care of K personally. She was busy in playing with her own things or going out with friends.

28.  The Mother seldom visited K after she was placed under the care of Auntie So, which shows the Mother’s disinterest in K.

29.  The foremost reason for the Mother’s quest for the care and control of K is for her to gain ground on her claim for ancillary reliefs.  She is not genuinely interested in taking care and looking after K.

30.  R is a lazy, unfit and incapable helper and is unsuitable to be K’s carer.

31.  The maternal grandmother who works in shift is too busy to be actively involved in the care of K.

32.  Auntie So being a very experienced child minder and is very capable in taking care of K, who is living happily and growing healthily with him and under her care, the present arrangement is the best for K for the time being.

The applicable law

33.  The general principles governing applications relating to children are set out in s. 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (the “GMO”), Cap. 13, which provide that:-

“3. General principles

(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property-

(a) in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court-

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to-

(A) the views of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father;

(b) except where paragraph (c) applies, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other”

34.  The Hong Kong Family Court has on many occasions taken into account of a welfare checklist of factors referred to in the Law Reform commission of Hong Kong’s Report on Child Custody and Access dated 7 March 2005, i.e.:

(a) The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of his age and understanding;

(b) The child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c) The nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

(d) The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

(e) The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

(f) The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;

(g) Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(h) Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

(i) How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(j) The practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

(k) The range of powers available to the court in the proceedings in question; and

(l) Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

I shall refer to some of these factors in so far as they appear to be relevant to the present case.

35.  It is trite that the best interest of the child is the first and paramount consideration.  It is also clear and well-established law which has been reiterated in judgments in Hong Kong that in a matter relating to the custody or upbringing of a child, to make a decision that the Court consider to be in the best interest of the child, the judge has the duty to take into consideration and weigh all relevant factors properly.  The welfare checklist is to be used as guidance.

Discussion

The welfare checklist

a) The views of K

36.  Though K at her young age is hard to understand divorce and the forthcoming issues, Ms Lai mentioned that K has repeatedly said to her that she wanted to go back to Auntie So’s place.  In her 1st report (at para 42), Ms Lai stated:

“從資料顯示,家中各成員在K心中同樣重要。過往一年,K的基本照顧主要由蘇女士提供,而母親與父親則透過探視維繫與女兒感情。… 當問及留宿安排,K重複表示要回姨婆家中,顯示姨婆的家給予K一份安全感。”

(It appears that every family member is the same as important in the heart of [K].  In the past year, [K]’s basic care has been provided by Auntie So, and the mother and the father have been maintaining their relationships with [K] through access.  When being asked about overnight access arrangement, [K] repeatedly said that she wanted to go back to grandaunt’s place, which shows that grandaunt’s place has been providing a sense of security to [K].)

c) The nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with such other persons;

f) The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;

i) How capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs

37.  As the parties tried to show at great length how much quality time they have spent with K and convince the Court how the other party cannot be a proper parent, it was increasingly becoming clear to me that the issues of the present case are likely to focus on the parties’ disputes on the parents and the other related persons’ involvement in the care of K and their respective ability to take care of K, including:-

i) The Mother;

ii) The maternal grandmother;

iii) R;

iv) The father;

v) Auntie So.

The Mother

38.  The Father conducted a year-long spying operation on the Mother.  Videos captured scenes that the Mother went to pubs and bars with her friends.  The Father accepts there is nothing intrinsically wrong that the Mother enjoys going to pubs and bars with friends.  His complaint is that the Mother has a very active nightlife which runs into conflict with her commitment to take care of K.

39.  The videos also captured moments where the Mother was being dropped off to visit K at Auntie So’s place when K had chicken pox, spending time taking K to drawing lessons, carrying K on her shoulder into a double decker bus while K was sleeping, going home to meet up with K after work, and taking K to family gatherings.  From the videos, the Mother did not go to pubs and bars frequently during the last year.  Despite the videos capturing scenes depicting the time between the Mother and K, the Mother is described by the Father as uncaring since she did not always carry K herself but let the maternal grandmother carry K or she did not wait outside when K was taking her drawing lesson and asked R to pick up K instead.  I do not agree that not carrying one’s child at all times or not picking her up from an activity class implies that one is not a caring mother.  Looking at the evidence in the round, I do not regard that the videos can be used to show the Mother has a very active nightlife which runs into conflict with her commitment to take care of K.

40.  According to the Father, the Mother has a promiscuous lifestyle.  Apart from the bare assertion made by him and his witnesses, his ‘evidence’ of this awful accusation is scenes in the videos showing the Mother having dinners or going to discos with various men.  There is no evidence of the Mother having casual sex with these men as suggested by the Father.

41.  From the video it can be seen on one occasion the Mother brought K to a pub at about 10 p.m. and K was so tired that she fell asleep.  The Mother explained that she was taking K to meet a friend who worked at the pub.  For obvious reasons, it is undesirable for the Mother to have taken K to a pub at a time when K should go to bed.

42.  The Mother accepted that she had no idea on how to nurse K.  It was chaotic and the parties needed help but she denies the Father’s allegation that she has been less than willing of taking care of K.  The parties had the help of a confinement lady and R who has been serving the Father for 2 years before K was born, whereas the confinement lady has stayed with them for 2 months.  During that period, the Mother learnt from her on how to take care of K.  The Mother breast-fed K, changed her diapers and nappies and gave her baths.  The Mother breasted K despite that she was suffering from extremely painful sore & cracked nipples.  She continued to breastfeed K until she became quite ill and had to take antibiotics for medical treatment.  At her doctor’s advice, she stopped breastfeeding K as she was taking antibiotics.  After she recovered, she could no longer produce milk to breastfeed K.

43.  About her habit of talking over the phones, she agreed that she has talked regularly to a good friend whom she has known for a long time and has shared her life with her.  She wanted to share her happiness and bitterness with her good friend about being a young mother.

44.  The Mother said as far as she can remember, she visited K 5 to 6 times per month in average and about 15 times in December 2012 after K was placed in the care of Auntie So.  She said she has tried to make visits as much as she can.  According to Auntie So’s records, the Mother visited K only 6 times during January to March 2012 and there was no visit during April to June 2012, prior to the issue of the petition for divorce.  It was pointed out by Mr Surman, Counsel for the Mother, during cross-examination that Auntie So’s records were inaccurate.  It appears that Auntie So has not put all of the Mother’s visits on her records.  As well, the Mother has worked for long hours.  Not only did the long working hours made it impracticable for the Mother to visit K frequently, the fact that K lived in Kwun Tong also made it inconvenient for her go visit her.  Despite it is accepted that the Mother did not visit K as frequent as she wished, I do not regard the pattern of the Mother visiting K since December 2011 shows that the Mother has been disinterested in K.

45.  In view of the importance of parenting and to improve her parenting skills and to learn how to be a better parents, the Mother has enrolled and completed a parenting and child’s growth and development course and a nutrition course.

46.  The Father thinks the Mother being disingenuous.  Taking an overview on the evidence, I accept that the Mother cares and is genuinely concerned about K’s welfare and is willing to be actively involved in the care of K for the welfare of K.  I do not regard that she is questing the care and control of K to advance her claim for ancillary relief.

R

47.  The Father and his witnesses described R as a lazy, unfit and incapable helper who cannot do basic chores correctly or take good care of K.  Yet R had worked for the Father for the period from 2006 until October 2012 when she moved to work at the maternal grandmother’s place.  In my view, was R as lazy and incapable as described by them, the Father would fire her during her employment with him.  I am incredulous to the suggestion that R is basically good for nothing.  I accept that she has been actively involved in the daily care of K as she alleged.

The maternal grandmother

48.  After K’s birth, every Friday she visited the parties’ place to see K and the parties.  After K moved to Auntie So’s place, she continued to visit K and the Mother at the Father’s place at weekend when K would be brought back to home from Auntie So.  Sometimes she would go to Auntie So’s place to visit K.  She plans to retire in which event she can spend more time with K.

49.  Mr Ho observed both the Mother and the maternal grandmother has a good relationship with K (see para 10 of Mr Ho’s report).

50.  I accept that the maternal grandmother loves K and cares and is concerned about her welfare.  She has a good relationship with K but at the same time it is noted she has never been K’s primary carer.

The Father

51.  The Father has been diagnosed with depression since his parents’ sudden and tragic death in 2004 when he was only 17 years old.  He required psychiatric treatment for depression.  He has taken dangerous drugs and alcohol to manage his depression.  In February 2008, the Father overdosed on dangerous drugs by taking 5 to 6 Ecstasy pills in one go.  He admitted himself to hospital and was hospitalised for a month for psychiatric treatment.

52.  At the beginning, the parties were excited with the birth of K.  The Mother said things changed for the worse dramatically in the year of 2011.  Over time the Father began to distant himself from the Mother and K and spent more and more time with his friends on drinking and partying outside, or inviting friends to home to party, playing video games and smoking through the nights and well into the next day.  The Father spent the nights on partying with friends and slept during the day.  When K made noises as she was running around the flat, playing with toys or crying, the Father would become very annoyed and demand K to stay in her room.

53.  The Mother said the Father is a violent person.  She said one day during the marriage, the parties had a heated argument.  The Father completely lost his temper.  He went to the kitchen, pulled out a knife, slammed it on the counter top and threatened to chop up the Mother.  K, being present at the scene, was cuddling the Mother, crying and trembling in fear.

54.  Not long after September 2011, the Mother began to suspect the Father was having an affair.  On 29 December 2011, they had an argument about it.  The Mother said in the heat of the quarrel, the Father lost his temper and slapped her face. He went on to press her down on the bed and throttled her neck.  When she struggled to get away from him, accidentally she picked up a mobile phone and used it in defence to hit him on his head.  The Father reacted by snatching the mobile phone out of her hand and threw it on the floor.  The mobile phone was smashed.  The Father then picked her up from the bed in anger and threw her against the bedroom wall.  As she landed on the floor she banged her head and her back.  The Father’s version of that event is that on 27 December 2013, the parties had an argument at home and the Mother threw her mobile phone directly at him causing his head bleeding seriously.

55.  The Mother suggested the Father’ is not so much asking that he should be the principal carer for K, but that Auntie So should be, and further the Mother should be just a ‘weekend mum’.  The Father denied it.  He stresses that he wants K to live with him.  Since K has been living with him, he has learnt a lot from Auntie So in terms of caring K.  He said he is mainly responsible for playing and reading books with K.  He spends a lot of quality time with her at home on playing with her, reading books with her and teaching her home works and playing piano.  He also reads and checks K’s kindergarten handbook every day and he signs the handbook whenever possible.

56.  He admitted he had a wild life when he was young and at the time when he was seriously affected by the death of his parents and the litigation of his father’s brother fighting for his guardianship in order to get control of his parents’ business.  He was very lost at that time.  With the support from his relatives and professional intervention, he has quitted the abuse of substances and now has good mental health.

57.  In this respect, the Father’s case is support by Dr Yu, who is of the opinion that:-

(a) The Father had had mental ill health and he suffered from grief since the death of his parents in September 2004 when he was a teenager.  Dr Yu believes the Father developed emotional symptoms in response to the bereavement, which was abrupt and tragic.  It has taken time, the support from his relatives, and professional intervention for him to get better.

(b) He was a teenager devoid of the love and guidance of his parents.  He succumbed to the temptation of using alcohol and drugs to counter his sorrows during late 2004 to early 2008.  With the support from his relatives and professional intervention, as well as his willpower, he has succeeded in stopping the abuse of substances.

(c) He has had good mental health since he was discharged from hospital in March 2008.

(d) He does not have a propensity for hostile or aggressive acts.

It is Dr Yu’s prognosis that the Father should enjoy good mental health in the coming years.  The Father enjoys the various aspects of his life, which include parenting, work, a romantic relationship, relationships with relatives and friends, and exercises and leisure activities.  In my view, Dr Yu’s opinion is objective, moderate and reasonable.  I accept Dr Yu’s evidence.

58.  Since K started attending kindergarten, the Father has been positively participating in the school work and extracurricular activities of K (see Ms Lai’s 1st report at para 14; Ms Lai’s 2nd report at paras 6 -9 and Mr Ho’s report at para 6).

59.  The Father has a very good relationship with K.  Mr Ho stated in his report :-

“跟據觀察,K和父親關係親密,她看來很喜歡跟父親玩耍,對父親親她面額感到開心。父親亦能夠透過玩耍教導女兒,合作完成任務。K看來已接納了蘇女士為家人,樂於接受她的教導。”

(From [my] observation, [K] has a close relationship with the father. She appeared to enjoy playing with her father and felt very happy when her father kissed her forehead.  The father could teach [K] through playing with her and finish a task together with [K]. It appears that [K] has accepted Auntie So as part of her family and felt comfortable to take her instructions and advice.)

60.  The Father’s mental health problems and his previous involvement with drugs were brought to the attention of Ms Lai and Mr Ho, who have investigated the case and are both satisfied the Father is a suitable parent to be granted care and control of K.

61.  On an overall assessment of the evidence, I accept that the Father loves K.  He has been actively involved in the care of K and is capable of taking care of K.

Auntie So

62.  Auntie So is the Father’s late mother’s elder sister.  When the Father was young, she was asked by her sister to help to take care of the Father as his child minder.  The Father had been looked after by her since birth until he was about 2 when he returned to live with his parents.  She has also taken care of the two children of Ms Tsang and Mr So and looked after her other nephews.  She is paid for providing child care services.  She is very capable in looking after small children.  She is willing to live with K at the Father’s place and is prepared to continue helping the Father take care of K.

(g) Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

63.  The Mother said after she moved out of the matrimonial home in December 2011, one day K said to her, “Mommy, Daddy is so mean.  He always hit (his new girlfriend) so hard that she screams very loud”.  The Mother has been told that neighbours have made complaints to the management office about the loud sex exploits between the Father and his new girlfriend every day.  R also testified that after making love to his new girlfriend, the Father did not bother to clean after his mess but disgustingly tossed their used condoms on the ground of the master bedroom at times when K was present and running around.  She considered it is unsuitable that the Father has exposed K at her very young age to such adult scenes.  However, Auntie So gave evidence that she has not seen or heard any loud sex exploit between the Father and his new girlfriend since she lived in the Father’s place.  It appears to me such loud sex exploits have been subsided and moderated since Auntie So and K moved back to live in the Father’s place.  I believe the Father and his new girlfriend would behave with general decorum when Auntie So and K are living with them.  I do not consider that K will be at risk of being exposed to loud sex exploit if she lives at the Father’s place.

(e) The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances

64.  The Father contended as K has settled happily to live with him and Auntie So, status quo should be maintained because the disruptions to be caused by requiring her to adapt to a new living environment all over again cannot be underestimated if her care and control is to be changed from him to the Mother.  The Father is to be assisted by Auntie So, who will continue to live at the Father’s place together with K.  There is no doubt that K is very attached to Auntie So as she has been taking care of by Auntie So since early 2011.  Auntie So is experienced in looking after small children and is doing well in taking care of K.  The Father’s place was K’s home when she was born till the age of about 2 years old.  I agree with the Father that whilst this factor alone is not determinative, there are obvious advantages of preserving the status quo in the present case.  K has been in good hands under the care of the Father and Madam So.  K’s performance in school is noted to have been significantly improved since she was returned to the Father’s place.

Overall, what are the arrangements in the best interests of K

Custody

65.  In the present case, the parties agree that joint custody of K should be granted to the parties.  In spite of that the parties have had a lot of mistrust and difficulties over their relationship, the parties are loving parents who should be able to make rational decisions in the interests of the child.  I believe they will be able to cooperate with each other concerning matters of importance in the upbringing of the child.  I agree that there shall be an order for joint custody.

Care and Control

66.  As said in the above, the core of this case is to what extent each parent may be involved in the future day to day care of K as she grows up.  The Court is required to decide whether:-

(a) the parties should share the care and control of K; or

(b) the Father should have the sole care and control of K with reasonable access to the Mother.

67.  In her Open Proposal dated 24 September 2013, the Mother proposes shared care and control by the following two options:-

(1) K is to spend 4 nights with the Mother (from Friday to Tuesday) and 3 nights with the Father (from Tuesday to Friday) on a weekly basis; or

(2) Alternatively, K is to spend 7 days with one parent followed by the next 7 days with the other parent.

68.  By a letter dated 7 October 2013, she has also suggested a schedule for gradually increasing the time K is to spend with her over a period of 1 year.  She is effectively seeking some sort of shared residence.  She suggests that it is for the best interests of K to have shared parenting where K can have both parents involved in her school work and activities during weekdays and have fun time during weekends and holidays, rather than sole parenting with the Father, which means effectively leave the care of K to Auntie So during weekdays and limits K’s time with her mother during weekends only.  In support of the proposal on shared care, Mr Surman mentioned a numbers of shared care cases in his List of Authorities: A v A (Minors: Shared Residence Order) [1994] 1 FLR 669; Re H (a Child: Joint Residence/Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 883; Re D (Children) (Shared Residence Order) [2001] 1 FLR 495; Re P (Children) (Shared Residence Order) [2006] 2 FLR 347; A v A (Children) (Shared Residence Order) [2004] 1 FLR 1195; Re K (a Child) (Shared Residence Order) [2008] 2 FLR 380.

69.  Mr Pang, Senior Counsel for the Father, submitted that the shared care and control arrangements proposed by the Mother is rarely made in this jurisdiction and in the circumstances of this particular case undesirable and not in the best interests of the child, and the authorities relied on by the Mother in relation to “shared residence” need to be examined carefully.  These authorities were decided under a different regime (Residence Orders and Contact Orders instead of custody, care and control).  The authorities do not suggest any principle of ‘equality of time’.  Where in an individual case the court made a Shared Residence Order (equivalent to joint custody) with equal amounts of time spent with each parent, that was in a situation where the children were generally older and giving effect to the status quo which was working well in that particular case.

70.  In SKP v Y,ITT, FCMC 17772/2011, unreported, 12 November 2012, HHJ Melloy said:-

“Joint care and control

21. Consequently joint care and control denotes a situation where the parties are sharing the day to day practicalities of raising a child. It will normally mean that the child is spending significant periods of time with both parents in each of their homes, but not necessarily on a 50:50 basis. However the time shared is likely to be more significant than in a standard custody/access type order and will probably mean that the child is spending at least 35% of his time based with each of his parents. One would expect that both parents are involved in the schooling and extracurricular activity schedule and it normally denotes a high level of co-operation between the parents. Consequently one would normally expect an order for joint custody and joint care and control to be made by consent. However court intervention to that effect is not precluded. In the language of the social scientists an order for joint custody and joint care and control would probably be reflective of a cooperative co parenting scenario.

So how does this compare with the concept of shared care?

22. The concept of shared care as an alternative to joint care and control has developed over time. I referred to this recently in a case that may be going on appeal and is presently unreported namely TAC v VDC nee VDM FCMC 16497of 2010. In that case I referred to H v H (unreported, 6 September 2002, CACV 42 of 2002), where the Court of Appeal first upheld an order for shared care. This judgment has been referred to by counsel for the father in this hearing. What is interesting is that in that case an order was made for sole custody and shared care. This approach was then followed by myself in SEB v ZX (Custody) [2007] HKFLR 165 referred to above and more recently in RWS v KCC, FCMC 9661 of 2010 unreported. In each of these cases and for a variety of different reasons it was felt appropriate for the ultimate decision making power to vest in only one parent. Thus orders were made for sole custody. However the court was anxious to ensure that the child/ren involved should continue to spend significant amounts of time with both parents in a way that was more reminiscent of a joint care and control order. In order to recognise this and the fact that the non custodial parent continues to have a great deal of practical control in the child’s day to day life, the phrase shared care was coined. Again in social science terms this is perhaps more reflective of a parallel parenting regime i.e. where there is a very high level of conflict between the parents which makes cooperative co parenting virtually impossible, but where it is in the child/ren’s best interests to spend significant periods of time with both parents. It would be normal in a situation like that to set out very clearly how the child/ren’s time is to be split between both parents. There is no order for access per se. I made such an order in RWS v KCC, FCMC 9661 of 2010 commenting as I did that:

I have given a great deal of thought to the appropriate order to be made in this case.  As I have said it is not possible for me to make a “parallel parenting” order as such.  However I would like to make an order that supports the concept of parallel parenting.  Consequently it seems to me that it would be more appropriate to make an order for shared care as opposed to a traditional order for care and control and access.  This will make no difference at all to the practical arrangements that I intend to put in place.  They would have been the same in either event.  However the concept of shared care seems to me to echo that of parallel parenting and I would urge the parties to adopt that approach. … … I will therefore make an order for shared care, following the format of the order in H v H i.e. that the care of the children shall be shared between the parents as follows:

Detailed arrangements were then set out accordingly.

23. In TAC v VDC nee VDM FCMC 16497of 2010 I made an order for joint custody and shared care. Again there was a very high level of conflict between the parents necessitating a very detailed order, which was again more reminiscent of a parallel parenting regime. I did not think it appropriate in that case for the important decision making power to vest in one parent only.”

71.  As stated by HHJ Melloy, contrary to Mr Pang SC’s submission that the shared care and control arrangement is rarely made in this jurisdiction, the Hong Kong Family Court is prepared to make an order for shared care and control arrangement reflective of a parallel parenting regime (even in cases where there is very high level of conflict between the parents which makes cooperative co-parenting virtually impossible) where it is in the child’s best interest to spend significant periods of time with both parents.  It would be normal in a situation where there is very high level of conflict that the Court will make detailed arrangements on how the child’s time is to be split between the parents in the hope that this will reduce the opportunity for continuing conflict between the parties.  The real question is whether a shared care and control arrangement is in the best interest of K for the present case.

72.  During the CDR, Ms Lai expressed her opinion on the undesirability of requiring K to shuttle between two homes:-

“MISS LAI: I think for the child is quite young. I think her need include different aspects, the emotional, the health, educational and the personal care needs and also for the young child I think a sense of security is important. And for [K] in her case, because her past pattern is a stable pattern, it’s quite different from some case that, yes, already build up a pattern with half with in mother’s home and then half it in father’s home and if it is the case as a usual pattern I think it can goes on but for [K]’s case I think it’s quite hard for her or it has to take time for her to adjust a new plan and that’s my view”

73.  Ms Lai’s observation in this regard was echoed by Mr Ho in Court.  He is of the opinion that the Mother’s proposal of shared care and control arrangement for K is not a stable arrangement for K and such arrangement will create confusion and unease to K as the Mother and the Father might have different approaches towards matters like parenting and homework.  All in all, he considered that the Mother’s proposal is not suitable bearing in mind the best interests of K.

74.  It is observed by both Ms Lai and Mr Ho that in the particular circumstance of this case, a shared care and control arrangement as proposed by the Mother will cause serious disruption to K’s daily life by requiring her to adapt to, and switch between, different living routines and parent concepts frequently and therefore will not be of the best interest of K.

75.  It is the Mother’s case that she has a natural role in the rearing of K and Auntie So is not an appropriate substitute for her.  The Mother referred to L v C, CACV 144/2003, unreported, 19 March 2004 where Rogers VP said (at para 17)

“The position of a mother in the life of young children cannot be underestimated. If there is to be a substitute for the real mother, then the court must be satisfied that that substitute is appropriate. I consider that this proposition needs no authority, but our attention was drawn to a number of cases in particular S v S [1972] 117 Sol Jo 34, H v H & C [1989] 1 All ER 262 and Re U (Application to free for adoption) [1993] 2 FLR 992, which all make the same point.”

76.  It was said in Brixey v Lynns [1996] 2 FLR that where a very young child has been with its mother since birth and there is no criticism of her ability to care for the child only the strongest competing advantages are likely to prevail.  Be that the advantage of a very young child of being with its mother is a consideration which must be taken into account in deciding where its best interests lay, its importance will vary according to the age of the child and to the other circumstances of each individual case such as whether the child has been living with or apart from the mother and whether she is or is not capable of providing proper care.  As stated by Lord Jauncey in Brixey v Lynns at 505 B-D:

“My Lords, to summarise, the advantage to a very young child of being with its mother is a consideration which must be taken into account in deciding where lie its best interests in custody proceedings in which the mother is involved. It is neither a presumption nor a principle but rather recognition of a widely held belief based on practical experience and the workings of nature. Its importance will vary according to the age of the child and to the other circumstances of each individual case such as whether the child has been living with or apart from the mother and whether she is or is not capable of providing proper care. Circumstances may be such that it has no importance at all. Furthermore it will always yield to other competing advantages which more effectively promote the welfare of the child. However, where a very young child has been with its mother since birth and there is no criticism of her ability to care for the child only the strongest competing advantages are likely to prevail. Such is not this case.”

77.  In the present case, it is noted K has been taken care of by the Father and Auntie So for a long time and she is doing very well under their care.  In the circumstance, it appears that the importance of the natural role of the Mother in the rearing of K is of comparatively minor significance.

78.  The Father has flexible work hours and is normally required to go to work for a few hours a day.  Since his shop opens at 11 am, he is able to spend the morning with K and return home by the time K comes back from school.  On the contrary, it is the Mother’s case that she is planning to enrol in some classes with a view to returning to full-time work in the near future.

79.  At the same time, I take note Ms Lai at her 1st report (at para 14) stated :

“楊老師表示開學初期,她曾嘗試致電與母親聯絡,目的是向她講解學校情況及一般事項,以達致家校溝通;由於母親的電話沒有人接聽,楊老師曾留口訊在留言信箱,至今未能成功取得聯絡。楊老師亦以電話方式與父親聯絡,從而知道K的照顧安排。父親同意學校與姨婆聯絡,跟進女兒日常安排;父親亦曾到學校接K放學,並會向老師了解女兒在校情形。”

(Ms. Yeung said that at the commencement of term, she had attempted to call the mother to explain the situation in school and other general matters in order to achieve communication between home and school; as the mother’s telephone was not answered Ms. Yeung had left messages on voice mail, but up to-date she was not successful in getting in touch with her.  Ms. Yeung also telephoned the father and through that came to know the arrangements for [K]’s care.  The father consented to the school contacting the maternal grandaunt to follow up with his daughter’s daily arrangement. The father had also come to the school to pick up [K] after school and would ask [K]’s teachers about her performance. )

80.  As this Court said in FKYP v KHYF, FCMC No 7952 of 2012, unreported, 28 August 2013 (at para 96), when in all other respects, the ability of either parent to care for a child cannot by themselves be criticised, the ability of one parent to give more time to the child will weigh with the court in determining where the child’s best interests lie: Liu Lau Oi Yuk Shelldy v Liu Chian Hsiong, Civil Appeal Action No. 126 of 1997, 17 October 1997, per Saunders DJ.

81.  Another strength that the Father has is that he is the more educated parent of the two and is in a position to help K on English and other school work.

82.  With regard to the Mother’s allegation that the Father’s new girlfriend does not treat K well and does not have a good relationship with K, it is noted this is contrary to the observation of Mr Ho that K tried to draw a picture to indicate that “her home” consists of the Father, the mother, Auntie So and the Father’s new girlfriend.

83.  Ms Lai observed while both parents have a good relationship with K, she appears to be closer to the Father:-

“從觀察所得,她與父母關係良好,但她似乎與父親比較親密…”

(From [my] observation, her relationship with both parents is good, but she appears to be closer to the father) (para 42 of Ms Lai’s 1st report)

84.  Both Ms Lai and Mr Ho take the view that it is in the best interests of K that her daily care and control be granted to the Father (with the assistance of Auntie So) with reasonable access to the Mother.  It is Mr Ho’s recommendation in his report (at para 22) that:-

“在日常照顧和管束方面,考慮到姨婆蘇女士一直是K的重要照顧者,K看來亦視她為父母以外最重要的親人,況且,父親擁有廣泛的家庭支援,他們亦持續積極參與K的照顧、教育和醫療事務,因此,K的最佳利益而言,由父親擁有照顧和管束權較符合K最佳利益。”

(Regarding everyday care and control, having considered that Madam So has been the primary carer of [K] all along, and [K] also sees her as her most important family member besides her parents, and furthermore, the father has extensive support from his family, and the paternal family members have also actively and continuingly take care of the education and medical affairs, therefore, to the best interests of [K], the father should be granted the care and control of [K])

85.  I remind myself of the provisions of s. 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap. 13 which provide that when a court determines any question with respect to upbringing of a minor, the court shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration, and in having such regard shall give due consideration to the social welfare reports and all relevant factors.  Using the welfare checklist as guidance, I consider the factors that are important in this case are the child’s needs, the parents’ and other relevant persons’ involvement in the care of the child and their ability to take care of the child and the likely effect on the child of any change in her circumstance.  I give particular weight to the fact the Father is able and willing to give more time to the child than the Mother.  I place a particular weight on the status quo, which is working well and is in favour of the Father.  The child was moved from her parents to live with Auntie So when she was 1 year old.  Not long thereafter when she was about only 1 ½ year old, the Mother and the Father were separated.  She was moved again together with Auntie So from her place back to the Father’s place when she was about 3 years and 9 months old.  She was passed around to and from the Father’s place and Auntie So’s place at very young age.  I agree with Ms Lai and Mr Ho that in the particular circumstance of this case, the child needs a sense of security and a stable environment for her to grow up and develop.

86.  Having carefully considered all of the relevant factors and having given due consideration to the Social Investigation Reports, despite the ability with which Mr Surman argued to the contrary, it seems to me on balance it would be in the best interests of the child to grant the care and control of the child to the Father with reasonable access to the Mother.

Access

87.  The Mother should continue to have weekend staying access.  In addition, the Mother would have alternate weekday access on either Tuesday or Wednesday after school to 8 pm and further access including staying access during long school holidays and special occasions.  This is to ensure the child has proper and meaningful contact and can spend time with both parents.  The access arrangements shall be as follows:-

(a) Staying access from every Friday after school to Sunday at 10 am;

(b) Alternate weekday access on either Tuesday or Wednesday after school to 8 pm;

(c) Staying access during long school holidays including Summer, Christmas, Chinese New Year and Easter and half terms be split equally with one parent having the first half and the other parent having the second half;

(d) Extra day access on the child’s birthday, the Mother’s birthday and the Mother’s Day.

Surveillance Evidence

88.  The Father conducted a year-long spying operation on the Mother with costs racking up to some HK$410,000.  As stated by the Father, the Mother was followed on 33 separate occasions spreading over the period from July 2012 to 31 July 2013. Understandably, the Mother has felt very bitter about the spying operation undertaken by the Father against her.  It is emphatically submitted on her behalf that:-

(a) The large sum of money spent on such a destructive exercise, funded by the Father’s company, could well have been used on a co-parenting course, which would have been beneficial to all parties in the long run.  Yet this was not the decision the Father made, instead he chose to damage whatever little was left of a broken marriage.

(b) The Father, his relatives and legal team have edited and trawled through all the video material and they have found absolutely nothing at all.

(c) The spying operation demonstrates enormous insensitivity, a crass disregard for another individual’s personal privacy; and further demonstrates on the part of the Father and his cohort of relatives a willingness to stoop to every conceivable device (however disreputable) to get their own way – totally disregarding the best interests of K as they trampled across her privacy as well as that of her mother’s.

(d) Such underhand, intrusive and abusive use of covert surveillance or more accurately ‘spying’ should not be encouraged in the use of custody proceedings unless the party can show that the spouse is a danger to the child in question such as causing physical harm to a child.

89.  A research on the case law in England and Hong Kong shows that the issue regarding the use of covert video surveillance in children’s cases was discussed only once in Re DH (A Minor) (Child Abuse) [1994] 1 FLR 679. Like the present case, no point was taken on the admissibility of the covert video surveillance in that case, so what Wall J (as he then was) said in the judgment on that topic was obiter.  In that case, a 2-year-old child was found to have stopped breathing while he was alone with his mother in a cubicle in a local hospital.  He was staying at the hospital because of upper respiratory tract infection while the mother was admitted to the hospital because she suffered from mood swings.  Similar incidents occurred when they were transferred together to another hospital.  The mother was found to suffer from Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy.  It was suspected that the child might have been assaulted or harmed by her mother.  The mother and the child were then arranged to be transferred to a specialist unit where covert video surveillance was used without the consent of the mother or her husband.  The mother was seen in the video to have placed something over the child’s face. She was arrested.  She initially denied the involvement but having been shown the video she admitted one incident.  A care proceedings by the local authority subsequently ensued.

90.  Wall J explained at 709 how the issue regarding the use of covert video surveillance (which was abbreviated as “CVS” in the judgment) arose:-

“A discussion of the issues raised by CVS is not directly necessary to my decision in the instant case since there was no point taken on the admissibility of the evidence …

Although I was impressed by the evidence given by both Mrs M and the father on the effect on them of the use of CVS, I wish to make it quite clear that I accept a submission made by Mr Swift that it is not for me to express a view about the medical ethics of CVS. That is for the doctors. I do, however, feel that it is appropriate that I should say something about the legal and forensic application of CVS to proceedings relating to children whose mothers are suspected of suffering from MSBP and in particular where the syndrome manifests itself by attempted suffocation of the child.

The first point to be made is, of course, that there was in this case and there can be generally no objection to the admissibility of evidence produced by means of CVS. Counsel were agreed that even if the evidence were unlawfully or improperly obtained, it would still be admissible in civil proceedings and a fortiori in proceedings relating to a child where the welfare of the child plainly requires that the truth of the manner in which he was abused should be ascertained. The case relied on by Mr Jubb was ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 436 at pp 440C-441B in which the law on the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in civil proceedings is helpfully summarized.

It appears from ITC Film Distributors v Video Exchange Ltd that it is only in cases where the manner in which the evidence is obtained plainly affects the interests of the proper administration of justice (for example, evidence obtained consequent upon a contempt of court) that the court in civil proceedings has the power to intervene and rule evidence inadmissible. Whether the court would in fact exercise that power in a child case is another question.

…

Notwithstanding its admissibility in evidence, however, the court would not wish as a matter of practice to continue to sanction conduct which is in fact unlawful.  The question thus become: given that CVS involved a baby unable to give consent to treatment (1) was it necessary in this case to obtain the father’s consent to CVS, and (2) without it, was CVS in fact unlawful in this case? ”

91.  Wall J then referred to the submissions made on behalf of the local authority in favour of the use of CVS at 712:-

“Mr Jubb, for the local authority, in submitting that the CVS in the instant case was lawful without the consent of the father, developed his argument along similar lines as follows:

(1) In the present case the intention of the consultant paediatrician was to establish whether the mother was responsible for bringing about the symptoms akin to apnoea when no other cause had been found after careful observation of the child.

(2) In order that the observation could take place, the mother and the child had to come into the specialist unit. By its very nature, it was necessary for this observation to be covert, that is, that the mother had no knowledge of the nature of the means of observation. If the mother was to know of the likelihood of observation then she would be unlikely to behave in a way that caused danger to the child. Observation by nurses in a ward would therefore be unlikely to produce any meaningful results. Likewise, it was necessary to leave the mother on her own with the child for long periods, during which she was covertly observed.

(3) There are two possible criticisms of such observation: one is that such a course might amount to the paediatrician acting as an agent provocateur and the child might be said to be placed at unnecessary risk. A further criticism of his form of observation is that it infringes medical ethics.

(4) As to risk to the child the point can be overcome by the provision of a careful programme of observation of the mother and the child by properly trained staff who can intervene within a very short time.

(5) The conflict is thus between the civil rights of the parent and the rights of the child to be brought up without being subjected to significant harm of a physical or psychological nature.

(6) The mother came to the hospital voluntarily bringing her child with her in the full knowledge that the placement there was to see if the child’s breathing problems could be diagnosed. There was therefore no trick involved, although the mother was not informed, but as instructed, she did not tell the mother. The video-recording was carried out within the confines of the hospital where the paediatrician worked, and presumably was carried out with the consent of the area health authority (AHA) – assuming that the AHA is the employer and the owner of the hospital. No issue of trespass therefore arises.

(7) There is no right to privacy at common law, and consequently if the mother, was to claim that her privacy had been invaded then that would not be actionable. If it was otherwise then video-recordings made by security cameras would be inadmissible in either civil or criminal proceedings.

(8) Furthermore, the use of security cameras must as a matter of public policy be permitted, provided that they do not in their operation either cause a trespass to land or constitute an actionable nuisance. They act to enable persons to go to the aid of those in danger in cases of emergency and also to provide the means for tracing criminals and the evidence of their actions.

(9) The method used to obtain this evidence was not unfair. The use of these aids (i.e. the video-recording equipment) is passive – that is, the camera merely records what it ‘sees’ (and the microphone correspondingly ‘hears’) and takes no other part in the activities. Similarly the nursing staff at the hospital were acting in a neutral manner.

(10) Moreover, the paediatrician was not acting as an agent provocateur. The essence of an agent provocateur is to induce the suspect to behave in a criminal manner. In this sense there is an element of trick involved. Even If, however, the paediatrician was acting as an agent provocateur his actions would not of themselves be unlawful: R v Smurthwaite; R v Gill (above).

(11) In general there is no tort of invasion of privacy, and the concept of invasion of privacy is unknown to English domestic law (save perhaps in respect of telephones but these are covered by specific legislation) …”

92.  At 714, Wall J accepted the above submissions and found the use of CVS in that case to be lawful:-

“I have come to the conclusions that the submissions of Mr Swift and Mr Jubb, which are broadly in unison, are correct and that CVS as practised on this occasion in the specialist unit and in relation to upper airways obstruction was lawful and did not require the consent of the father.

…

I have also to say from a purely forensic point of view the nature of the evidence provided is invaluable for a number of reasons.  First, it puts the issue of the cause of the child’s injuries beyond doubt; secondly it affords an opportunity to observe what the mother did in some detail, and may assist in some case(s) (a) in providing a basis for the assessment of her motivation, and (b) (by gauging her current reaction to it) in helping to assess the stage in the rehabilitative process the mother has reached; thirdly, by rendering denial impossible it obviates the need to spend substantial time in court hearing and evaluating circumstantial lay evidence and what is often inconclusive medical evidence relating to the assaults.”

93.  Wall J’s observation on the permissibility of surveillance evidence has not been further considered in any subsequent case in England and Hong Kong.

94.  There are a number of family law decisions (whether before or after Re DH) where surveillance evidence was used.  In the context of family law, some allegations (e.g adultery, cohabitation with another or one’s lifestyle etc) are by nature difficult to be proved and easy to be concealed.  Needless to say, no issue was taken in those cases in relation to the admissibility of the surveillance evidence.

95.  CYLR v CYSA, CACV No 282 of 2005, 18 November 2005, unreported was an appeal concerning the interim care and control of a minor.  Yeung JA referred to the father’s use of surveillance evidence in the judgment:-

“6. It was the father’s contention, based mainly on the evidence of a Filipina domestic helper, Miss S, who has been taking care of H since he was born, that the mother had attempted suicide in March 2005, and had frequent fight with her boyfriend who had moved in to live with her on 1 April 2005.

7. There were also allegations that the mother was frequently out late at night, sometimes not returning home until early hours of the next morning; and that she smoked marijuana.

8. Surveillance on the mother on 26th to 27th May and 1st to 2nd June, 2005 showed that the mother left home at 5:30 p.m. and 3:50 p.m. and did not return home until 4:18 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. the next morning, having visited bars and restaurants.

9. The judge granted an order for interim care and control of H in favour of the father, and adjourned the interim custody hearing to the 6th July 2005 for an inter parte hearing pending a Social Investigation report.

10. On 30 June 2005, the mother took out an inter parte summons returnable also on 6 July 2005 seeking to discharge the ex parte order made on 10 June 2005, and for an order that care an control of H be returned to her.

11. The mother denied the allegation of marijuana smoking.  She said she had to be out at night sometimes because she had an interest in a bar or karaoke that she was observed to be visiting …”

96.  In A Local Authority v J [2008] 2 FLR 1389, the local authority commenced care proceedings in relation to 3 children as their father was considered to be a man who presented risk to the children.  The mother had found it difficult to accept that the father might represent a threat to the children.  One of the issues at trial was whether the mother had lived away from the father.  Hogg J said in 1397:-

“[46] The local authority was not satisfied that the parents had separated, and this on the weekend of 11-13 April 2008 instructed a private investigator to carry out a surveillance of the mother.

[47] On the evening of 11 April the surveillance team lost sight of her and could not find her. She did not return home until after 12:30 am on 12 April. Later on 12 April she was seen visiting the father’s brothers home on at least two occasions, and on Sunday she is recorded as visiting the father’s own mother’s home where she spent the whole of the afternoon and evening and was still present when the investigator left at midnight. The mother gave an account that she did visit the brother’s home on Saturday as his daughter was celebrating her 16th birthday, and she was invited to the party and asked to help prepare for it. She said the father was not there, that she did not see him at all over that weekend.

[48] From the party late at night she says she took the father’s mother back home because she had been taken ill.  She stayed with his mother to see she was alright and stayed with her until late Sunday evening…”

97.  In Grey v Grey [2010] 1 FLR 1764, the English Court of Appeal (comprising Thorpe, Wall and Patten LJJ) was faced with a claim from the wife for financial provision, and an issue arose as to the wife was cohabiting with another man who might be financial contributing to the wife’s expenses.  Thorpe LJ referred to the use of surveillance evidence at 1767:-

“[9] The development of a relationship between the wife and Mr Thompson was inevitably revealed to the husband by the fact that the wife’s house was in the same street as that of her parents-in-law. The issue was raised by the husband’s solicitors in January, June and December 2007. In responding on 26 June 2007, the wife’s solicitors wrote ‘Lara instructs me that Liam is not her boyfriend, he is a friend. He does not live with her.’ About 6 weeks before the trial her solicitors wrote again: ‘my client is not cohabiting with Liam. He is making no financial contribution to the household.’

[10] On 22 December 2007, the husband’s father agreed to keep observation and to maintain a record of Mr Thompson’s use of the wife’s home. The detailed diary between 22 December and 28 January 2008 demonstrated that Mr Thompson was clearly living with the wife throughout that 5-week period. Mr Grey’s detailed evidence was the subject of an affidavit sworn on 29 January 2008. He was not required to attend the trial for cross-examination.

[11]  Similarly an inquiry agent, Mrs Dorman, carried out surveillance between 12 and 27 January 2008.  Her report dated 28 January confirmed the observation of Mr Grey senior.  She too was not required to attend the trial for cross examination…”

98.  It is noted that Wall LJ (who decided Re DH) did not make any comment on the use of surveillance in his judgment.

99.  In Re K (special guardianship order) [2012] 1 FLR 1265 (CA), the local authority instituted care proceedings in relation to a child who was born out of wedlock amid fear of domestic violence.  One of the issues was the whether the father and the mother had deceived the local authority as to the on-going nature of their relationship.  The use of covert surveillance by the local authority was referred to in paragraph [19] of Black LJ’s judgment:-

“A fact-finding hearing was scheduled for mid-September 2009. Both parents’ case was that they had separated. LA did not trust this information and arranged for covert surveillance which showed that very shortly before the fact-finding hearing the parents were spending time together. In the light of this evidence the parents, who at that point had the benefit of legal representation, submitted to various findings of fact which were record in an order of 17 September 2009…”

100.  Most recently, in IDC v SSA [2013] 5 HKC 482, the Court had to determine an unmarried mother’s claim for financial provision for the benefit of a child against the father.  Acting Principal Family Judge Bruno Chan mentioned about the surveillance evidence produced by the father at paragraph 53 of his judgment:-

“The Father does not dispute when it comes to accommodation, the court will take into account of the fact that the Mother has another child, N, even though he is not her father, but it also needs to take account of the fact that there is someone in addition to the Mother who is legally responsible for the maintenance of N, namely her own father, Mr W who is said to have come from a wealthy, prominent family in Bangkok and that himself a prominent film director, and that contrary to the Mother’s evidence, Mr W had indeed made financial provisions for N including her school fees and cash payments to the Mother for her maintenance, as evidenced respectively by his emails (PB7:2582) and the surveillance report produced by the Father (PB6:1886).”

101.  It is noted that in all the above cases, no criticism was made by the Courts (including English Court of Appeal, our Court of Appeal and also Wall LJ in Grey v Grey who has had the benefit of considering the issue in Re DH) in relation to the use of surveillance evidence.

102.  Re DH was, of course, a very different case from all the other cases above (including the present one) in that the issue of the permissibility of covert surveillance video only arose as it involved patient’s rights, parental consent, the use of covert surveillance video within a specialist ward in a hospital by a medical doctor against patients, the argument of the paediatrician acting as an agent provoeateur as well as the possibility of placing the child at unnecessary risk in the process.

103.  Mr Pang SC submitted that the use of the surveillance evidence in the present case and also the manner in which it was obtained are proper and legitimate and like all the decisions referred to in the above, there can be no issue about its admissibility.

104.  Having regard to all the above matters, I accept that the use of covert surveillance evidence in proceedings in relation to children is permissible in appropriate cases.  As to whether it is appropriate to use covert surveillance evidence in any case, in my view it depends on a consideration of the special circumstance of individual case with the best interest of the child as the guiding principle. Where there is clear evidence showing that the spouse is a danger to the child in question, presumably the use of covert surveillance can be justified.  In other cases, for my part, probably it is wise to exercise caution.  It is because to spy on the other party’s private life is intrusive and is often frown upon and taken as prying and underhand by the other party when he or she finally finds out that his or her privacy has been under covert surveillance.  It is going to do a lot to undermine trust between the parties.  It increases the costs and expenses of the litigation.  It curtails the communication between the parties.  It harms their continuing relationship as parents.  It increases the tension, bitterness and conflict that the parties may encounter in an adversarial litigation system.  The parties may be discouraged from co-operatively working together as parents in the long run, and eventually the best interest of the child will be inevitably threatened.

105.  In the present case, the Father said that the surveillance evidence is valuable in that it has revealed, contrary to the Mother’s case:-

(1) The Mother has had a very active nightlife which runs into conflict with her commitment to take care of K;

(2) Her disinterest and lack of interaction during access time with K; and

(3) The Mother failed to inform Ms Lai and Mr Ho that there were (or are) males who would individually take care of K alone living at her place in Shatin.

106.  It has been my finding that :-

(1) I do not regard the videos can show the Mother has a very active nightlife which runs into conflict with her commitment to take care of K ; (see para 39 above)

(2) In the videos, there is no evidence of the Mother indulges in having casual sex with newly acquainted men etc. as suggested; (see para 40 above)

107.  With respect to the alleged failure on the part of the Mother to disclose that the maternal grandmother’s two long time male friends would stay at her place and would sometimes help in the care of K, when being asked about her relationship with these two men, the maternal grandmother identified each one of them. There is no evidence whatsoever about these two men are unsuitable to offer occasional help in the care of K.  Nor is it alleged that they should not stay in the same flat with the child.  Apparently, it is a matter that can be adequately dealt with by way of cross examination without any videos evidence.

108.  As submitted by Mr Surman, the Father and his legal team have edited and trawled through all the video material and they have found little from it.  Still, Mr Ho and the Mother were asked to watch the covert surveillance videos.  And they were cross examined on the material.  Very roughly I estimate that Mr Ho and the parties have spent about 2 days on the videos at the trial.  On top of it, not less than ½ day has been spent on Counsel submission about its admissibility, relevancy and weight.  It is lamentable so much time has been spent thereon so little assistance that it has offered to this Court.

109.  The general principle in children’s matters is that there should be no order as to costs, but the Court has unfettered discretion to do what is just in the circumstance of the case: E v E (Financial Provision) [1990] 2 FLR 233. In view of the above matter, I have seriously considered whether I should make an adverse costs order against the Father to reflect this Court’s disapproval of the manner that the surveillance evidence was used by the Father in his conduct of the litigation.  After having carefully considered, I accept that the Father’s use of covert surveillance evidence is not designed to manipulate and harass the Mother.  He tried to use it to advance his case, which is an unwise move, in my view, and plainly without much success.  Despite that, I do not regard that the Father’s conduct in the proceedings had come within the category of unreasonable litigation conduct such as to have enabled the Court to exercise its discretion as to costs.  In particular, I take into account of the fact that there has been counter allegations during the course of the proceedings.

Costs                                                              

110.  The general approach of no order as to costs in children proceedings was summarised by Neill, LJ in K v K (legal aid: costs) [1995] 2 FCR 189:

‘… it has become the general practice in proceedings relating to the custody and care and control of children to make no order as to the costs of the proceedings except in exceptional circumstances. In Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994] 2 FCR 1199 at p 1202D Wilson, J threw some useful light on the reasons for this present practice, the existence of which was recognised in this court by Butler-Sloss, LJ in Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1991] FCR 913 at p 916H. The court of course retains the jurisdiction and a discretion to award costs in suitable cases. It is unnecessary and undesirable to try to limit or place into rigid categories the cases which a court might regard as suitable for such an award, but examples would be likely to include cases where one of the parties had been guilty of unreasonable conduct or where there was such a disparity between the means of the parties that a special order was justified.’

111.  In S v S, HCMP 5547/1999, 22 June 2000, unreported Deputy High Court Judge Gill went through the authorities and said as follows:

“ From these authorities one can, I believe, summarize the following factors which might determine how a court should approach a contest on costs in a case involving a child or children:

1. In general circumstances there should be no order for costs. Parties who have a reasonable case to put forward going to a child’s welfare should not be dissuaded from doing so by threat of an adverse costs order if they do not succeed. And in a child related case there should be no perceived winner or loser, save that it is the child who is the winner.

2. If a party has by virtue of improper conduct attracted the proceedings which but for that may have been avoided then that might well warrant an adverse costs order.

3. If in the course of the proceedings one party behaves unreasonably in his or her conduct of the litigation then that might be recognised in an adverse costs order.

4. The financial circumstances of the parties and how an order for costs will impact on the parties is a factor for consideration.

5. The general rule of not ordering costs should not deter a court from exercising its discretion to do so in circumstances it finds to be exceptional not necessarily limited to a particular category of cases.”

112.  As stated in S v S, the financial circumstances of the parties and how an order for costs will impact on the parties is a factor for consideration in the court’s exercise of its discretion on costs.

113.  In the present case, the Mother said the Father is a very wealthy man while:-

(a) she comes from a modest family background;

(b) she has limited earning capacity;

(c) she has no assets.

The parties are in dispute of the abovementioned.  At the hearing of the Mother’s application for the Father’s contribution on her legal costs in relation to the children proceedings, the Father took the position that:-

(a) the Mother has no difficulty in meeting her legal costs at all;

(b) she has undisclosed assets that she can reasonably deploy, or she can borrow with or without security.

114.  Further affirmation evidence will be filed and witnesses will go to the box and be cross-examined during the substantive hearing of the question of ancillary reliefs, when a detailed examination of the party’s financial resources and needs will be taken.  With the benefit of further evidence and a detailed examination, the court is entitled to make its conclusion in the matter at the substantive hearing.  In the circumstance, I regard that the determination of the issue of costs of these children proceedings should be reserved pending the outcome of the substantive hearing of the question of ancillary reliefs.

In Summary

115.  It is ordered that joint custody of the child of the family be granted to the parties, with care and control to the Father and reasonable access to the Mother as defined in the terms set out in the paragraph 87 above, with an order nisi that costs be reserved pending the determination of the question of ancillary relief or further order.  The nisi order becomes absolute after 14 days hereof unless a party has applied to the court for variation of the order.

( K K PANG )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Giles Surman and Ms Christina Tseng instructed by Messrs T K Tsui & Co for the Petitioner

Mr Robert Pang, SC and Mr Eugene Yim instructed by Messrs Alvin Cheng & Rosaline Choy for the Respondent

88082-EN-2013-06-25

T v. L

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FCMC 8460 / 2012

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8460 OF 2012

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 TPetitioner
 And 
 LRespondent

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Coram: Deputy District Judge Pang in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 3 June 2013
Further Submission of the respondent: 14 June 2013
Date of Judgment: 25 June 2013

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J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance Pending Suit: Legal Costs)

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The application

1.  This is an application by summons filed on 12 March 2013 by the petitioner wife for maintenance pending suit (“MPS”) pursuant to s.3 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (“MPPO”) for an interim order that the respondent husband is to pay her a sum of $58,000 per month towards her legal costs in respect of her application for custody, care and control of her daughter, a child of the family.

Background

2.  The background of the parties and the history of the present litigation were succinctly set out in the Judgment (Maintenance Pending Suit) made by Deputy District Judge A. Yim on 13 November 2012 as follows: -

“2. The husband was receiving his secondary education overseas when his parents encountered a fatal traffic accident, he is the only child of his deceased parents and he received income from the estate since then. The husband claimed himself to be unemployed in his Form E. The wife is also the only child of her now separated parents, she was arranged to live with her grandmother in mainland since primary three and remained there until she completed secondary two and a one-year beauty consultant course, thereafter she returned to Hong Kong and started working.

3. The husband is now aged 25 while the wife aged 26, the parties were in their early twenties when they got to know each other in 2008, and they married in January 2009 after the wife found herself pregnant. Their daughter was born in May 2009. During marriage the couple was mainly provided by the estate of the husband’s late parents, while the wife worked briefly as beauty consultant between June 2011 to September 2011 and March 2012 to September 2012.

4. The couple separated in December 2011. The wife issued proceedings based on unreasonable behaviour on the 13 June 2012. The first appointment hearing was fixed on 3 September 2012, the wife issued summons applied monthly maintenance pending suit in the sum of $40,000 on 31 August 2012.

5. On 3 September 2012 I ordered the husband to pay the wife an interim monthly maintenance pending suit in the sum of $9,000 and adjourned the wife’s application for full argument to 12 November. Further, as the couple was not able to agree on the arrangement of the daughter, I also called for a social investigation report (SIR) to be available on the same date. The wife was earning on average $15,000 per month at the time she took out the summons but the SIR revealed that she lost her job shortly after the hearing on 3 September.

6. When the husband prepared his affirmation in reply to the maintenance pending suit application, he was working on the assumption that the wife was gainfully employed and offered to pay the wife monthly maintenance pending suit in the sum of $7,000. Although the husband claimed himself to be unemployed, it appeared in the SIR that the husband would spend about 2 to 3 hours per day in his late parents’ shop looking after the late parents’ business. It is stated in the skeleton submission of the husband that he is learning from his uncle about his deceased parents’ business.

7.  The daughter is being cared by the husband’s maternal aunt since May 2011, the SWO recommended to maintain the status quo.  The wife took out a summons for interim custody, care and control of the daughter after she received copy of the SIR.  And according to her latest affirmation dated 7 November 2012, she is now a part-time shop attendant, earning $30 per hour.”

3.  By the Judgment of Deputy District Judge A. Yim dated 13 November 2012, it is ordered that the husband is to pay the wife a sum of $25,000 per month as maintenance pending suit. The trial of the question of custody, care and control of the child of the family has been set down to start on 22 October 2013, with 8 days reserved. A pre-trial-review was fixed to take place on 27 September 2013.

4.  Ms. Yip for the husband argued that the wife’s application must be refused since she has failed to bring herself within the Currey test. In particular:-

(a) the wife has no difficulty in meeting her legal costs at all;

(b) she has undisclosed assets that she can reasonably deploy, or she can borrow with or without security;

(c) she may well be covered by a Sears Tooth arrangement in respect of her legal costs with the solicitors;

(d) there is no reason why she should not and cannot apply for legal aid;

(e) there is no skeleton bill filed.

5.  Ms Yip very emphatically said that the Currey test has now received confirmation by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal.

The Law

6.  It has been held that an application for MPS can include provision for legal costs. The leading Hong Kong case is KGL v CKY [2003] 2 HKLRD 301. In the present case, counsel for the parties accept that an application for MPS can include the wife’s instant application which is for costs contribution for the trial of the question of custody, care and control much the same as applications for costs contribution for the trial of the question of ancillary reliefs.

7.     Since the English Court of Appeal decision in Currey v Currey [2007] 1 FLR 946, judges in the Hong Kong Family Court have relied on the case as setting out the guiding principles for granting applications for costs contribution as MPS. It has been dubbed as the Currey test.

8.  The Hong Kong Court of Appeal recently examined the application of the Currey test to Hong Kong courts and the principles articulated by Wilson LJ in Currey v Currey were adopted as providing prudent guidance to both judges and practitioners in this jurisdiction in the case of HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 at 113-117 in the following manners:

“74. Whatever may have been the position ten years ago, it is no longer disputed that the words of s.3 of the Ordinance are wide enough to empower the Hong Kong courts to include an element towards a party’s legal costs in an order for maintenance pending suit: see KGL v CKY [2005] 1 HKFLR 215.

75. In submitting that, in light of existing authority, the wife had not made out a claim for a contribution towards her costs, Ms Stone relied principally on guiding principles enunciated by Wilson LJ, as he then was, in Currey v Currey [2007] 1 FLR 946.

76. Those principles have been adopted in the Matrimonial Division of the District Court: see H v H (Interim Maintenance) [2007] HKFLR 311. To my knowledge, however, they have not been adopted in this Court or the Court of First Instance.

77. Accordingly, before Poon J, the guiding principles set out in Currey, while of persuasive value, were in no way binding on him.

78. S.3 of the Ordinance, of course, still required the judge to be satisfied that any contribution towards the wife’s on-going legal costs was reasonable. That meant that he had to be able to conduct some analysis of the nature and extent and purpose of the contributions sought. On the part of the wife, that required some breakdown of her anticipated costs.

79. Aside from the fundamental requirement of supplying a sufficiently detailed breakdown of anticipated costs, I am of the view that the following principles articulated by Wilson LJ in Currey should in future be adopted as providing prudent guidance to both judges and practitioners in this jurisdiction.

80. In the view of Wilson LJ, the initial, overarching inquiry should be into –

“… whether the applicant for a costs allowance can demonstrate that she cannot reasonably procure legal advice and representation by any other means.  Thus, to the extent that she has assets, the applicant has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed, whether directly or as the means of raising a loan, in funding legal services.”

81. As Wilson LJ pointed out, satisfying that condition alone may not be sufficient. In the broad exercise of discretion, a judge may consider that other factors must come into play –

“The subject matter of the proceedings will surely always be relevant; and, insofar as it can safely be assessed at so early a juncture, the reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings will also be relevant.”

82. The period over which an allowance for legal costs was to be paid was also considered by Wilson LJ to be a factor of considerable relevance. Applicants should not therefore expect that an order that the allowance be paid until the final determination of all proceedings will be the inevitable order. It was observed that if the application for an allowance for legal costs was made before the FDR hearing, it may well be wise to order that the costs allowance should fund the applicant only up to that hearing –

“The FDR appointment is a watershed and all reasonable inducements to both parties there to negotiate positively in the light of informal judicial indications should be in place.  The knowledge of a spouse in receipt of a costs allowance that, absent settlement at or in the immediate aftermath of the FDR, she will have to apply for a further allowance, which may or may not be granted, seems to me to amount only to a reasonable inducement, as opposed to improper pressure, to reach settlement.”

83. In this regard, as Wilson LJ pointed out, if the FDR hearing fails, it will be for the new judge, on the basis of material properly before him – for example, rival open offers of settlement – to determine whether a new allowance for legal costs should be granted and, if so, in what amount.

84. Those observations accord with my understanding of the Hong Kong FDR procedures.

85. Wilson LJ spoke of a legal costs allowance being structured, especially as to its duration, so as to best encourage a spouse in receipt of the allowance to act reasonably, looking in good faith to try and reach settlement. In KGL v CKY (page 219), this Court adopted the same fundamental reasoning albeit by reference to the spouse paying the allowance:

“There is no reason why public funds should be expended to fund litigation when there are ample resources available within family funds.  With proposals for more active juridical involvement in pre-trial proceedings to restrict the incidence of costs this is in line with the modern approach.  The court can keep better control of litigation if it's funding is at least in part within its purview.  The party that controls the funds will be less willing to use them on unnecessary interlocutory procedures if he or she will have to provide funding for the other side.”

9.  Perhaps more importantly, it was stated that, at para [37(a)]:

The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is “reasonableness”, which is synonymous with “fairness”.

10.  I regard that the so-to-speak Currey test should not be taken as an exhaustive test. The only governing principle remains that the court will make such order as it considers reasonable in all circumstances of the case. The conditions in Currey v Currey were adopted by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal as providing prudent guidance to both judges and practitioners in this jurisdiction, but still the court has to consider all other factors that may influence the outcome of the application as well as the interaction between them and the conditions of the Currey test so as to achieve a reasonable and fair result.  

Discussion

Whether the wife has difficulty in meeting her legal costs at all; Whether she has undisclosed assets that she can reasonably deploy or she can borrow with or without security

11.  The husband contended that the wife has no difficulty in meeting her legal costs at all. The wife filed her 3rd Affirmation which was made on 12 Mach 2013 in support of her application. At para [16], she said she has paid the sum of HK$250,000 to 300,000 to Messrs. Chan & Chan, her former solicitors, including counsel fee of HK$109,000. At para [17], she said that with effect from 25 February 2012, she has changed to her present solicitors. At para [20], she said her up to-date costs including the Child Dispute Resolution hearing are HK$250,000, which includes the fees her attendance of counsel at the hearing. It can be seen from a letter from the wife’s solicitors dated 25 February 2013 that counsel fee for the CDR are HK$80,000.

12.  By a letter from her solicitors dated 27 May 2013, it was said that the wife wrongly believed the invoice was settled by her late uncle who died of a heart attack on 22 March 2013. It now turns out that he did not pay the invoice on her behalf before his untimely and sudden death. The uncle worked for the wife’s present solicitors.

13.  At the end of the hearing of this application, it is directed that: -

(a)  The solicitors for the wife are to on or before 10 June 2013 lodge with the court, with a copy to the other party, a letter from them to Messrs. Chan & Chan, asking for clarification on whether the wife’s legal costs have been paid and their replying letter, if any;

(b)   The husband may file and serve a replying submission on the new evidence within 7 days thereafter, if so advised.

14.  The solicitors for the wife lodged with the court a letter from Messrs. Chan & Chan dated 4 June 2013. By the said letter, it was stated that their legal costs and disbursements in this suit have not been settled. By a letter dated 7 June 2013, the husband asked for confirmation as to whether Messrs. Chan & Chan’s disbursements for the court fee for petition (HK$630), sealed copy petition (HK$56), sealed copy orders (HK$168), application fee and certified fee for marriage certificate (HK$420), company and land search fees (HK$240), copying charges (HK$600) have been paid. By a letter dated 8 June 2013, replying to the solicitors for the husband’s enquiry, the mediator confirmed that the wife has settled his fees (HK$21,750) through Messrs Chan & Chan. By the solicitors for the wife’s cover letter dated 11 June 2013, the wife sent the solicitors for the husband a letter from Messrs Chan & Chan dated 7 June 2013 in which they further stated:

“1. Due to our inadvertence, we omitted to mention that your client did deposit with us costs on account in the sum of HK$30,000 which purports to be partial settlement of disbursements and costs, out of which a sum of HK$21,750 was paid to Messrs Ho & Ip in settlement of mediator’s fees…

2. The papers were released to your client subject to her undertaking to settle our legal costs and disbursements.

3. [the uncle] was not our employee.”

15.  The husband contended that the wife’s evidence should not be accepted as it is full of contradictions and inconsistencies. It was submitted for the husband that it is extremely puzzling why Messrs Chan & Chan would have omitted to mention that the wife has paid HK$30,000 costs on account. It was queried why the wife was able to pay costs on account of $30,000. It was doubted how she funded her deficit way forward; how she is going to pay for her legal costs, past and future. Thereupon, it was argued that either the wife has the means to pay, or she can borrow, or she has an arrangement with her solicitors which she refuses to disclose. Regardless of the husband’s doubts and queries, the bottom line being it is confirmed in writing by Messrs. Chan & Chan that apart from that the wife has paid HK$30,000 costs on account which was applied to settle some of the costs and disbursements, she has not paid their costs and disbursements in this suit. I consider I have to be extremely wary about to disbelieve the said solicitors on the papers. The way I see it, for the purpose of this application, I should accept the confirmation written by Messrs Chan & Chan.

16.  One has to take an overview of this matter. The wife was a beauty consultant before the marriage. In the halcyon days of the marriage, the husband was responsible for all her living and household expenses. After their separation, she resumed working. It was said that since 22 October 2012, the wife has been working as a part-time shop assistant earning approximately HK$8,000 a month. The husband is paying the child’s school fees and an interim maintenance of HK$25,000 per month to the wife. She needs to contribute to the rent and household expenses to her mother at about HK$10,000 per month. She has been living on a meagre salary income. There is not a shred of evidence before me for the purpose of the present application that the wife can in any way amass a fortune. On the other hand, the evidence adduced before this court is that she has no assets. She does not come from a wealthy background, also not is it shown that she has any rich friends or relatives to whom she can turn to for borrowing, except from her late uncle.

17.  After having carefully considered the matter, for the present purpose I do not accept the argument that the wife has no difficulty in meeting her legal costs. Neither has she undisclosed assets that she can reasonably deploy, nor can she borrow with or without security.

18.  Maintenance pending suit applications are approached on a broad-brush basis. Further affirmation evidence will be filed and witnesses will go to the box and be cross-examined during the substantive hearing, when a detailed examination of the party’s financial resources and needs will be taken. With the benefit of further evidence and a detailed examination, the court is entitled to make its conclusion in the matter at the substantive hearing and any under provision or over provision in the maintenance pending suit order may be set off if it is fair and just so to do.

Whether the wife may well be covered by a Sears Tooth arrangement in respect of her legal costs with the solicitors

19.  As stated in the above, the wife’s application is for legal costs of her application for custody, care and control of her daughter. There is no money involved in the outcome of the litigation. It is clear that the wife cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation.

Legal Aid

20.  The wife has not applied legal aid. In her 4th Affirmation, the wife suggested that in the present case, public funds should not be used to pay for her litigation. The wife’s counsel is on the legal aid panel. Ms. Yip argued that there is no reason why she should not and cannot apply for legal aid and obtain the level of expertise apt to the proceedings. In his counter argument, Mr Surman relied on KGL v CKY where Woo JA at 307 stated:

“There is no reason why public funds should be expended to fund litigation when there are ample resources available within family funds.”

21.  Ms Yip responded as follows: -

(a)  First, KGL v CKY is pre-Currey.

(b)   Second, it is well known that the Legal Aid will impose a first charge on the property or amount recovered by the wife in these proceedings: s. 18A Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap. 91. So there is no misuse or abuse of public funds. Quite the contrary, the money will come out of the family funds, namely from the wife’s award of ancillary relief.

(c)  With difference, it is submitted by Ms Yip that the matter has not been thoroughly considered in KGL v CKY. The Legal Aid Ordinance has not been drawn to the attention of the Court of Appeal. At any rate, it is plain that this part of para [21] of KGL v CKY is purely obiter.

22.  To deal with the first and the last point in the above at the same time, against Ms Yip’s argument to the contrary, I take the view that this part of the principle laid out in KGL v CKY has been adopted by Hartmann JA (as he then was) in HJFG v KCY at para [85] (see above), whereas Currey v Currey is not binding on the Hong Kong Family Court.

23.  About the 2nd point, to put it simply, it is misconceived. This application is not relating to legal costs for ancillary reliefs. So far as to the wife’s application for custody, care and control is concerned, there is no money involved in the outcome of the litigation to which the first charge can be attached. Even more, so is the fact that in matters relating to children in the Family Court, usually there is no order as to costs, which means there will be little chance that the wife can recover her legal costs from the husband, even if she is “successful” in her application.

24.  Above all, it is to be noted that the objective of the exercise is to arrive at a fair decision by reference to what in the circumstance is reasonable. The husband being the sole beneficiary is going to inherit an estate of his late parents estimated by him to be valued in the region of HK$150 million. He is currently involved in the family-owned sports goods business, which is still generating income, and is provided with an average of HK$90,000 per month from the receiver of his late parents’ estate. In addition, he has been taking out loans from his late parents’ company and has free housing. It appears that his drawings from the late parents’ company are regular.

25.  According to the wife,

(a)  she comes from a modest family background;

(b)   she has no means to meet the costs of this action;

(c)  she has no assets;

26.  It is worth reiterating that, during the marriage, the husband was responsible for all living expenses of the wife and household expenses. As stated in the above, orders for MPS cover matters which were not ones of “daily living” and include the costs of the suit itself, which is a pressing need and expense. Given that there are adequate resources available in the family funds, I consider that fairness requires that the wife should be entitled to draw from the resources available within the family funds, just like what happened during the marriage, to meet her pressing need and expense, which include the legal costs for her application for the custody, care and control of the daughter, rather than that her legal costs are to be paid out by taxpayers.

27.  The complexity of the subject matter and the reasonableness of the applicant’s conduct of the proceedings are relevant considerations. Allegedly, it is for the best interest of the child of the family that the wife made the application for her custody, care and control and wants to be fittingly represented with an able and experienced legal team in the upcoming trial to ensure her view will be properly ventilated.

28.  In summary, the above consideration on this application is in favour of the wife.

Skeleton bill

29.  There is no skeleton bill filed for the purpose of the wife’s application. In HJFG v KCY the Hong Kong Court of Appeal stated that:

“122. The issue of a contribution towards the wife’s ongoing legal costs is more difficult to decide, mainly because of the lack of detail supplied by the wife in support of her claim. On behalf of the husband, it has been submitted that, in light of the Currey v Currey principles, I should reject the claim. It is to be reiterated, however, that, no matter how much wisdom is contained in the Currey v Currey principles, they were not binding on the Judge at first instance.

123. While I accept that the evidence as to the issue is not of substance and is justifiably open to criticism, nevertheless what does emerge in my view – sufficiently at least for the purpose of an interim application, one that can be amended if necessary when final determinations are made – is that the wife has either lost or no longer has access to much of her capital base. In the circumstances, it would appear that she will no longer be able to meet her reasonable ongoing legal costs unless some order concerning a contribution to her is made. As to the level of that contribution, I bear in mind that the ancillary relief proceedings are focused on complex corporate structures operating outside of this jurisdiction. That will no doubt add a level of complexity to the proceedings not encountered in other cases. I also take into account that, with the funds available to the marital estate, fairness demands that an attempt should be made to achieve some equality of arms. But that being said, it does not mean that the financial floodgates are to be opened without any reference to what in all the circumstances is reasonable.”

30.  It is clear that this application is only seeking to cover the wife’s counsel fees. In her 4th Affirmation made on 24 May 2013, she gave an explanation of her choice of counsel, Mr Surman, who also appeared for her at this hearing. I am prepared to hold that, for the present application, a skeleton bill should not be necessary, whilst I am fully aware that usually the applicant is required to supply a sufficiently detailed breakdown of anticipated costs so that the court will be able to conduct some analysis of the nature extent and purpose of the contributions sought. In all circumstances, the amount sought is, in my view, a reasonable and modest request.

The husband’s ability to pay

31.  The estate of the husband’s late parents has not yet been cleared. The husband is receiving in average HK$90,000 per month from the receivers, plus free housing and regular drawings from his late parents’ company. According to the husband’s From E dated 29 August 2012, his general expenses and personal expenses were about HK$13,000 and HK$33,700 respectively. He is also paying HK$25,000 per month as MPS to the wife. At first sight, the husband does not have the cash flow to make any extra MPS exceeding HK$20,000 per month. For the following reasons, however, I take the view that the husband has the ability to pay the said sum of HK$58,000 per month. It is trite that resources may include the husband’s ability to provide money by overdrafts or through loans. Based on the fact that he is the sole beneficiary of the estate of his late parents and that he is receiving substantive monthly payment for maintenance from the receivers and regular drawings from his late parents’ company, if he is ordered by the court to pay HK$58,000 per month as MPS to the wife, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he will be able to obtain loans from his late parents’ company and/or their estate to meet his liability under a court order. 

Conclusion

32.  I consider that an order that the husband is to pay a monthly sum of HK$58,000 to the wife as contribution to the costs for her application for the custody, care and control of the daughter would do broad justice to the situation. The said monthly payments will be paid on account of any sum eventually received when the question of ancillary reliefs is finally determined and on the condition that the said sums are to be punctually paid by the wife to her solicitors on account of her said legal costs. No to mention, the duration of the aforesaid MPS order is to be reviewed upon the disposal of the trial for the question on custody, care and control.

Costs

33.  By the letter dated 27 May 2013, the solicitors for the wife for the first time disclosed that the legal costs of her former solicitors are still outstanding and they were instructed that the wife wrongly believed that the bill was settled when she made the 3rd Affirmation dated 12 March 2013. The solicitors for the husband responded by a letter of even date requesting a confirmation from Messrs Chan & Chan to be sent to them and stating that they would deliver the brief to counsel for this hearing if they did not receive the same on or before 2 p.m. on 28 May 2013. Such confirmation by way of a letter was not made available to them until 5 June 2013. The question to ask is whether the parties would have been able to reach any sensible compromise and this hearing could have been dispensed with had the confirmation letter been produced as requested. The husband’s opposition to the wife’s present application has been based on the allegation that she has failed to bring her within all of the conditions (a) to (e) of the Currey test as above-mentioned. However, the query upon the payment or non-payment of the wife’s legal costs of her former solicitors only relates to the conditions (a) & (b). In any event, the husband has apparently remained unsatisfied in the face of such confirmation from Messrs Chan & Chan. In my view, it is unlikely that the parties will get rid of this hearing even if the confirmation letter from the wife’s former solicitors is supplied on time.

34.  The wife is successful in this application. Tentatively, I can see no reason why costs should not follow the event. I make an order nisi that the husband is to pay the wife’s costs of this application. The nisi order becomes absolute after 14 days of the date hereof unless a party has applied to vary the order. In view of the parties’ respective financial situation, I consider that it is justified to order that the husband shall pay the aforesaid costs forthwith.

Order

35.  

(a)  It is ordered that the respondent is to pay the petitioner a sum of HK$58,000 per month as maintenance pending suit from 12 April 2013 and thereafter on or before the 12th date of each succeeding month until 12 September 2013, or further order of the court, on the condition that the said monthly sums are to be punctually paid by the wife to her solicitors on account of her legal costs for the application for custody, care and control of the child of the family.

(b)   The respondent shall pay the outstanding maintenance pending suit for the period from 12 April 2013 to 12 June 2013 in the sum of HK$174,000 by three monthly instalments, the 1st payment of HK$58,000 on or before 12 July 2013, the 2nd payment of HK$58,000 on or before 12 August 2013 and the 3rd payment on or before 12 September 2013.

(c)  It is ordered nisi that the husband is to pay the wife’s costs of this application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed. The nisi order becomes absolute after 14 days of the date hereof unless a party has applied to vary the order.

( K.K. Pang )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Giles Surman instructed by Messrs T.K. Tsui & Co. for the petitioner

Ms Anita Yip instructed by Messrs Alvin Cheng & Rosaline Choy for the respondent