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Civil Action2012

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV471/2021CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER
  • CACV472/2021CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

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[2025] HKCFI 650-EN-2025-05-06

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

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HCA 263/2012

[2025] HKCFI 650

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 263 OF 2012

_______________________

BETWEEN

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED
 (國際永年紡織有限公司)
Plaintiff
and
LI DIANXIAO (李殿孝)1st Defendant
CONG BO WAI (叢博煒)2nd Defendant

_______________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee in Chambers
Date of Hearing:6 February 2025
Date of Decision:6 May 2025

________________________

DECISION

________________________


Introduction

1.  Capital Century Textile Company Limited (“the Company”) obtained judgment in this action against Li Dianxiao (“Li”) and Cong Bo Wai after trial before Lisa Wong J on 17 September 2021 (“the Judgment”). Li was unrepresented and absent at the trial.

2.  By the Judgment, as against Li, who was the former shareholder and director of the Company, is ordered to transfer the office of the Company registered in his sole name to the Company and give accounts of all the rental income received and retained by Li in respect of certain properties held in his name on trust for the Company and all the proceeds of sale received and retained by Li in respect of some of such properties. Li is further ordered to pay the Company all sums found to be due from him to the Company on the taking of such accounts.

3.  Li applied for a stay of execution pending the determination of his appeal to Lisa Wong J by summons dated 31 May 2023. His application was dismissed by a decision dated 14 September 2023 on the ground that his appeal was not arguable. Li was ordered to pay the Company’s costs of his application assessed at HK$90,000 by the learned judge on 18 October 2023 (“the CFI Application Costs”).

4.  Li renewed his application to the Court of Appeal by summons dated 10 November 2023 and was rejected by a decision dated 11 July 2024. By the decision, Li was ordered to pay the Company its costs of the application summarily assessed at HK$80,000 (“the CA Application Costs”).

5.  Li has done nothing to comply with the Judgment. It is common ground that Li was imprisoned in Beijing for corruption offences from 29 August 2008 to 28 August 2024.

6.  On 6 September 2024, the Company made an ex parte application to Winnie Tsui J for a post-judgment Mareva Injunction against Li (“the Ex Parte Application”). An interim Mareva Injunction (“the Interim Injunction”) was granted to the Company at the hearing (“the Hearing”).

7.  Pursuant to the Interim Injunction, the Company issued a summons dated 9 September 2024 (“the Injunction Summons”) for its application to, among other things, continue the Interim Injunction.

8.  By summons dated 12 September 2024 (“the Discharge Summons”), Li applies for an order that the Interim Injunction be set aside or discharged or alternatively be varied.

9.  I heard both the Injunction Summons and the Discharge Summons on 13 September 2024. I made an order that both Summonses be heard together on a date to be fixed and that the Interim Injunction be continued until the determination of the Summonses with a variation of the term to the effect that Li be allowed a sum of HK$300,000 as his legal expenses.

10.  Alarmingly, it was disclosed to this court at the hearing of another application of the Company on 12 December 2024 that Li made a total lump sum withdrawal of HK$615,937.91 (“the BOC Withdrawal”) from his account open with the Bank of China under account number 012-891-1-014955-7 (“the BOC Account”) on 13 September 2024 in breach of the Interim Injunction. The BOC Account has zero credit balance as a result. Mr Kwok, for Li, accepted unequivocally that it was a breach due to an oversight but he asserted that it was in a technical sense only.

11.  By summons dated 3 January 2025 (“the Release Summons”), Li applies for an order, among other matters, that a sum of HK$1,850,000.00 (“the Sum”) be released to him from the BOC Account restrained under the Interim Injunction.

12.  I agree with Mr Kwok that I should first dispose of the Discharge Summons.

The Discharge Summons

13.  Mr Kwok advances two broad grounds to support Li’s application to discharge the Interim Injunction. First, he submits that there is no justification that the application for the Interim Injunction was made on an ex parte basis without notice. Secondly, he submits that the Company failed to discharge its duty to make full and frank disclosure in the Ex Parte Application.

14.  Mr Kwok submits that there was neither urgency nor secrecy in the Ex Parte Application. He refers to Ho Tak Eng t/a Hung Man Interior Design Co v Fame Brilliant Ltd [2006] 1 HKLRD 34 in which Rogers VP at §8 explained the importance of these two requirements.

15.  First, Mr Kwok points out that Li was all along represented and he could always be found and informed of the making of the Ex Parte Application. The Company did not allege any impracticality of notification. I find no validity and relevance of this submission.

16.  Next, Mr Kwok stresses that there is no evidence to suggest that Li has ever taken any step to frustrate execution and hence there was no secrecy. He points out that the reliance of the Company on the propensity of Li’s dishonest conduct some 16 years ago and his recent release from the prison are misplaced. He says that the Company was able to enforce the Judgment during the incarceration of Li and thus his discharge should be irrelevant.

17.  Mr Kwok further argues that there was no exceptional circumstances that the Company should give no notice to Li and there were ample opportunities for the Company to do so. He highlights that the 10th Affirmation of Lai Siu Kuen in support of the Ex Parte Application (“the Supporting Affirmation”) was sworn on 5 September 2024 and the Ex Parte Application was heard in the late afternoon on the following day, which was a Friday, after a lapse of more than 24 hours. He submits that the lack of notice was a deliberate tactic deployed by the Company.

18.  Mr Kwok also draws my attention to the fact that the Interim Injunction was only served on Li on the following Monday, 9 September 2024, at around 5:30 p.m.. He says that the Ex Parte Application could have been made on 9 September 2024 with due notice given to Li to attend the Hearing since in any event Li would only be served the Interim Injunction in the afternoon of 9 September 2024.

19.  Mr Kwok relies on Shanghai Liyou Investment Management Ltd v Ningxia Zhongyincashmere International Group Co Ltd [2016] HKEC 1140 in which Recorder Madam Linda Chan SC (as she then was) found that the plaintiff had adopted a deliberate tactic of not giving any notice of its ex parte application to the defendants when it had ample opportunity to do so. The learned Recorder held that on this basis alone the injunction must be discharged.

20.  Mr Chong, for the Company, confirms that at the Hearing, the urgency and secrecy of the Ex Parte Application was canvassed and at the end, the learned judge was satisfied that the Interim Injunction should be granted on an urgent basis in the absence of Li.

21.  I am not impressed with Mr Kwok’s submission at all. I believe that the Company was fully justified to ask for the Interim Injunction on an ex parte without notice basis.

22.  First and foremost, the BOC Withdrawal provides a solid proof that Li is prone to dissipation of his assets intimating scant regard for his legal obligations in this litigation. Once Li was released from prison, he was able to deal with his monies in his bank accounts in Hong Kong and keeps them away from the Company. Hence, the Company could not afford to tip Li off by giving him notice of the Ex Parte Application.

23.  At the Hearing, the convictions of Li in the Mainland were emphasised. Li was found guilty of two corruption offences by two different courts in Beijing and the following details were provided by Mr Chong in his skeleton submissions:

(1) A corruption charge tried at the Beijing No 2 Intermediate People’s Court (北京市第二中級人民法院) where Li was found guilty and sentenced for 15 years custodian sentence (“First Corruption Charge”);

(2) A corruption charge tried at the Beijing No 3 Intermediate People’s Court (北京市第三中級人民法院) where Li was found guilty and sentenced for 16 years custodian sentence (“Second Corruption Charge”).

(3) The two custodian sentences were to run concurrently (i.e. 29th August 2008 to 28th August 2024).

(4) For the First Corruption Charge, it is stated in the court’s decision (p 32) found that:-

“本院認為: 被告人李殿孝身為受國有針織公司和永年公司委派到非國有永大公司中從事公務的國家工作人員,利用受針織公司和永年公司指派擔任永大公司董事長的職務便利,擅自變賣屬於針織公司的永大公司廠房,並將出售所得款項人民幣1500萬元據為己有,其行為屬於利用職務上的便利侵吞國有資產,已構成貪污罪,依法應予懲處…”

(5) As for the Second Corruption Charge, it is stated in the court’s decision (pp. 3 and 10) that:-

“經審理查明:-

北京市針棉織品進出口集團公司(以下簡稱針棉集團)為全民所有制企業,自1984年起,被告人李殿孝任該公司副總經理,後被派駐香港。1990年10月5日,國際永年紡織有限公司(以下簡稱永年公司)在香港成立,永年公司為針棉集團海外企業機構,被告人李殿孝為永年公司負責人。被告人李殿孝與原永年公司工作人員張九常,鍾群在香港開立多個聯名銀行帳戶用於永年公司經營。

1993年至1996年年間,被告人李殿孝利用擔任上述職務的便利,使用李殿孝,鍾群渣打銀行聯名帳戶(尾號523-8)內252249.41美元(折合人民幣213萬餘元)用於支付北京市西城區阜成門外大街2號A1912部分房款;使用上述帳戶內374464.48美元(折合人民幣324萬餘元)購買北京市朝陽區紫玉東路1號一期608號(紫玉山莊J9室)。

…

本院認為,被告人李殿孝作為國家工作人員,利用職務便利,非法占有公共財物,且數額特別巨大,其行為已構成貪污罪,依法應予懲處。北京市人民檢察院第三分院指控被告人李殿孝犯貪污罪的事實清楚、證據確實、充分、指控罪名成立。…”

24.  Mr Kwok says that the two Corruption Charges are irrelevant. He relies on Crete Maritime Corp v Emirates Shipping Line DMCEST [2017] 5 HKLRD 345. At §18, Anthony Chan J referred to Pacific Concepts (HK) Ltd v Michel Brennion (unreported, HCA 2672/2008, 13 March 2009) in which Andrew Cheung J (as he then was) said that it is not a proposition of law that an unacceptably low standard of commercial morality would constitute a real risk of dissipation. The learned judge then at §20 went on to say that it is no more than a matter of common sense for unacceptably low commercial morality to be taken into account in the assessment of risk of dissipation. The propensity of a defendant of such disposition to make himself judgment proof is only one piece of evidence and it would be exceptional to be able to support a case of dissipation of assets based on that one piece of evidence.

25.  On this basis, Mr Kwok submits that the Company cannot rely on the propensity evidence alone to infer a real risk of dissipation.

26.  Mr Kwok, moreover, repeatedly submits that the First and Second Corruption Charges were committed 16 years ago and Li has already become a very different person. He submits that those convictions could have no bearing on his present commercial morality and hence his propensity to dissipate his assets to avoid execution of the Judgment.

27.  I cannot accept these submissions. As pointed out by Anthony Chan J in Crete Maritime Corp at §21, in the context of unacceptably low commercial morality the court deals with a spectrum of conduct. At one end, there are clear cases of fraud and a good example is internet fraud. In those cases, the real risk of dissipation may be said to be self-evident and this sits with common sense because the fraudulent exercise is designed to deprive the plaintiff of his assets.

28.  In the present case, the Corruption Charges directly related to Li’s dealings in a joint venture company of which the Company is interested and involved Li’s misappropriation of the public properties in his office. These were undoubtedly dishonest offences. The conduct of Li is at or very close to the fraud or dishonesty end of the spectrum, as indicated by on the lengthy custodial sentence imposed on him. These should speak volume of Li’s lack of integrity and not just his commercial immorality. In the premises, the risk of dissipation must be self-evident.

29.  During his incarceration in Beijing, Li was unable to deal with his bank accounts in this jurisdiction. Upon his release, Li has been able to dissipate his monies promptly with ease and in light of his dishonest disposition, I accept the validity of the concern of the Company that Li might immediately dissipate his assets when he was made aware of the Ex Parte Application. Secrecy was indeed in existence and it justified the lack of notice given to Li.

30.  For the same reason, I accept that the release of Li constituted a triggering event and necessitated the Ex Parte Application. There was urgency in obtaining the Interim Injunction to prevent Li from dissipating his assets in Hong Kong.

31.  On the other hand, I cannot accept Mr Kwok’s submission that the lengthy sentence completed in the Mainland must have served its reformatory purposes and Li should have been successfully rehabilitated. I am unable to share his optimism. There is simply no evidence as to how Li has become a less dishonest person since his convictions. Quite on the contrary, the BOC Withdrawal, despite the purported explanation given by Li, shows that Li does not have due regard to his legal obligations and the court orders.

32.  This is also demonstrated by his unexplained refusal or failure to comply with the CFI Application Costs and the CA Application Costs.

33.  It is worthy of note that Li appears not to have treated this litigation seriously. As a result of his breach of Master Ho’s unless order dated 27 September 2016, Li was debarred from adducing any evidence at the trial. Indeed he was unrepresented and absent at trial. The claim of the Company was found to be made out in the absence of any evidence emanating from him. His appeal against the factual findings of Lisa Wong J in the Judgment in these circumstances appears to be a daunting task. Both Lisa Wong J and the Court of Appeal shared this view when rejecting Li’s applications for a stay of execution pending appeal.

34.  It is remarkable that there has been an inexplicable delay in his prosecution of his appeal too despite the repeated warnings of the Registrar of Civil Appeals. Up till now, according to Mr Chong, Li has failed to make an application to fix a hearing date for his appeal. This surely casts doubt on the bona fide of his appeal.

35.  In the premises, I am of the view that there was sufficient urgency and secrecy to justify the Ex Parte Application with no notice given to Li. Whether practically the Company could give notice to Li is beside the point. Nor does the slight delay in the service of the Interim Injunction on Li make any material difference. Li has not shown any prejudice suffered in any event.

36.  Now I turn to the allegation that the Company failed to discharge its duty to make full and frank disclosure. Mr Kwok observes that there is no mention of any urgency and secrecy of the Ex Parte Application in the Supporting Affirmation. He argues that the Company must have failed to draw the attention of Winnie Tsui J to the principles governing ex parte injunctions and the lack of exceptional circumstances for the Company not to give any notice to Li. He goes on to submit that such material non-disclosure is serious, tactical and deliberate. On this ground alone, the Interim Injunction should be discharged.

37.  Mr Kwok again relies on Shanghai Liyou Investment Management Ltd in which the learned Recorder reiterated that if material non-disclosure is established the court will be astute to ensure that a plaintiff who obtains an ex parte injunction without full disclosure is deprived of any advantage he may have derived by that breach of duty (§45).

38.  In that case, counsel for the defendant made a similar complaint about material non-disclosure when the application was made to a criminal judge on duty. Counsel for the plaintiff did not dispute the alleged non-disclosure.

39.  In the present case, the Ex Parte Application was heard by an experienced civil judge on duty. It would be surprising if the learned judge would have begun to consider the merit of the application for the post-judgment Mareva injunction without first having been convinced that the essential requirements of the application to be made on an ex parte without notice basis had been met.

40.  In addition, I accept the explanation of Mr Chong that the learned judge did have a discussion with him about the urgency and secrecy of the Ex Parte Application.

41.  In the premises, I fail to see any material non-disclosure and this ground must be rejected.

42.  The Discharge Summons falls to be dismissed.

The Injunction Summons

43.  Mr Kwok objects to the continuation of the Interim Injunction on the ground that there is no risk of dissipation and that the value of Li’s assets being frozen is excessive.

44.  I have already explained why I agree that there is actual risk of dissipation demonstrated by the dishonest conduct of Li. I need not make any repetition.

45.  In regard to the value of the assets to be frozen, Mr Kwok points out that HK$17 million is not justified. The amount comprises HK$3,887,413.70 of costs of the action to be taxed and HK$14 million to be found due after the taking of the accounts ordered.

46.  For the untaxed costs, Mr Kwok refers to Crete Maritime Corp at §§37-41 and submits that a claim for costs should not be included in a Mareva injunction without sufficient justification both as to entitlement and quantum or the application may become part of an application for security for costs.

47.  I do not think Crete Maritime Corp can assist Li. There, Anthony Chan J expressly indicated that he did not need to make a conclusion on the issue as to whether a Mareva injunction should include costs of the applicant in intended proceedings though he had a good deal of reservation.

48.  The learned judge’s major concern is the existence of many uncertainties on costs entitlement. He opined that even an applicant with a strong case may not get a favourable costs order at the end. The learned judge also considered that the amount of costs would be reduced after taxation.

49.  It should be borne in mind that the Company is already a judgment creditor and the Ex Parte Application was for a post-judgment Mareva injunction. It is a very different case from Crete Maritime Corp. Here, the Company has already been awarded a costs order against Li and there is no uncertainty about its entitlement to costs.

50.  The Supporting Affirmation reveals that the Company has incurred costs and disbursements of approximately HK$3,887,413.70 as shown in its Amended Bill of Costs dated 13 June 2024. The taxation hearing was fixed on 7 October 2024. At the hearing, the parties indicate to this court that the substantive taxation is yet to take place. I have not heard any submission from Mr Kwok that the amount claimed is grossly inflated and substantial deduction would be made after taxation.

51.  For the estimate of the amount of HK$14 million, it actually consists of HK$1,066,000 being net deposits forfeited from the aborted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997, HK$3,344,321.07 being net proceeds of sale of the said property in 1998, HK$7,780,000 being net proceeds of sales of the Pacific Palisades Flat in 2007 and HK$1,908,000 being rental income of the said property from 1998 to 2007. These net sale proceeds and rental income are the subject matters of the accounts ordered in the Judgment.

52.  In addition to the foregoing matters, Li is ordered to give an account of:

(1) The rental income yielded from letting the China Harbour Office since 2006;

(2) The rental income yielded from letting the China Harbour Office since 2006; and

(3) All the monies and benefits received from holding the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 to 3 July 2007

53.  The Company has not included any sums likely to be payable by Li after the taking of the accounts of these matters in the estimated amount of HK$14 million.

54.  Thus, on this evidence, I opine that there is a sound basis for the court to order a post-judgment Mareva injunction up to HK$17 million worth of the assets of Li.

55.  Next, Mr Kwok refers to the charging order the Company obtained in respect of a property owned by Li known as Kashi Court (“the Kashi Court Property”) granted by Lisa Wong J dated 18 October 2023. The valuation of the Kashi Court Property is about HK$6 million as at 3 September 2024 according to a surveyors’ report. Mr Kwok argues that the amount to be frozen by the Interim Injunction should have taken into this security.

56.  In the Supporting Affirmation, it is averred that the Kashi Court Property is charged for the CFI Application Costs only and given the modest amount of HK$90,000, the charging order could be easily discharge and hence Li could avoid an order for sale. This must be right.

57.  All in all, I find no merit in the submissions of Mr Kwok. The Company is clearly entitled to the Interim Injunction. Mr Kwok has failed to persuade me that there is any impropriety in the Interim Injunction.

58.  On the other hand, by the Injunction Summons, the Company also seeks a disclosure order (“the Disclosure Order”) in the following terms:

(1) Li do, within 14 days from the date of the Order to be made, make and serve on the Company an affidavit disclosing all bank accounts and securities brokerages accounts owned by him and their balance, with copies of bank statements, whether solely or jointly, within Hong Kong from 6 September 2006 to the date of the order;

(2) Li do within 14 days from the date of the order to be made, provide and render a true and proper account on the sum of HK$615,937.91, being the BOC Withdrawal, supported by documents and verified by an affirmed by Li.

59.  Mr Chong draws my attention to Chinachem Charitable Foundation Limited v Chan Chun Chuen & Anor. (unreported, HCAP 8 of 2007, 27.2.2012) at §§37-39 where Poon J (as he then was) explained the nature of a post-judgment disclosure order in the following terms:

37. A pre-judgment disclosure order should be no wider than the injunction to which it is ancillary. However, there is no similar restriction for a post-judgment disclosure order : see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1, paras 29/1/77 and 29/1/78. The court may order disclosure after judgment in order to render the judgment effective, in the sense of capable of enforcement : Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council (No 2) [1989] Ch 286, per Kerr LJ at p 303F-G.

38. In Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatneand Another [1990] Ch 13, Nicholls LJ observed at pp 42G-43D that in the post-judgment regime where the judgment creditor is at liberty to attach assets of the judgment debtor in execution of the judgment, a freezing order may often be ancillary to a disclosure order for the obvious reason that the disclosure order is needed in order to ascertain the whereabouts of assets which may be attached but a freezing order may be necessary in order to prevent an unscrupulous judgment debtor from removing those assets from an identifiable location before attachment can be effected.

39. In other words, in a post-judgment situation, the jurisdiction to make the disclosure order arises both as a power ancillary to and in support of the injunction and independently of the injunction as a power in support of the execution of the judgment : Gidrxslme Shipping Co Ltd v Tantomar-Transportes Maritimos Lda [1995] 1 WLR 299, per Colman J at p 310E-G. His Lordship went on to observe at p 312E-F that in cases of post-judgment, “it is just and convenient that the judgment or award creditor should normally have all the information he needs to execute the judgment or award anywhere in the world”.

60.  Mr Kwok does not dispute the foregoing legal principles. Nor does he make any submission to oppose the grant of the Disclosure Order.

61.  On the application of such legal principles to the present case, I opine that it is just and convenient that the Disclosure Order should be granted to the Company to assist its enforcement of the Judgment in particular by way of policing the Interim Injunction against Li. The Company clearly needs the Disclosure Order in light of the BOC Withdrawal to avoid further dissipation in violation of the Interim Injunction.

The Release Summons

62.  Li now applies for an order that he be allowed to withdraw the Sum from the bank accounts restrained under the Interim Injunction, which should retrospectively include the BOC Withdrawal.

63.  In his 3rd Affirmation, Li explains that he requires the Sum to pay his ongoing litigations including his appeal in this action. He alleges that Madam Lai who is a director and shareholder of the Company has all along been in total control of his finance. Li claims that he literally has no money to spend and all his legal actions would be stifled without funding.

64.  Mr Kwok merely refers to the non-proprietary test and urges this court to consider that the Company is not making any proprietary claim of the money of Li.

65.  First of all, different considerations apply when the funds are being frozen by a post-judgment injunction. As noted by the learned editors of CommercialInjunctions (7th Edn.) at §3-024, once the claimant has obtained an enforceable judgment, the position is different. The claimant may then be able to make an individual defendant bankrupt. The following observation of Sir John Donaldson MR (with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed) about the nature of a post-judgment injunction in Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft GmbH v R’as Al-Khaimah National Oil Co (No.1) [1990] 1 A.C. 295 is referred to:

“The purpose of the injunction was … to maintain the status quo during the period covered by the stay of execution and not to preserve assets against the probability that DST (the defendant) might at some later date be able to establish its claim – the ordinary Mareva situation.”

66.  Here, Li has failed to obtain a stay of execution twice. The Company is fully entitled to enforce the Judgment against the assets of Li. The threshold that Li should meet to obtain a release of his fund which will inevitably obstruct or frustrate execution of the Judgment must be high and a release cannot be ordered lightly in the absence of cogent reasons.

67.  Li has failed miserably to meet the threshold on the evidence. As pointed out by Mr Chong, Li managed to pay for his legal costs during his incarceration. Li was involved in a number of lawsuits with legal representation. He was represented in the criminal trials in Beijing. He made different applications to the court in Hong Kong in this action. He also instituted an action in the High Court under HCA751/2022 against, among other persons, the Company and Madam Lai and in that action, he was involved in some interlocutory applications.

68.  It cries out for an explanation as to how Li settled all the legal costs thus far incurred. Li must have his financial resources. Yet, Li does not say a word about his financial sources and merely asserts that his legal actions will be stifled if the Sum is not made available to him.

69.  On an application for a variation to permit funds to be released to meet legal costs, it is relevant to take into account whether legal costs have in the past been met from other funds or by third parties, and if so whether there is a real risk that if the variation were not permitted the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. It is relevant to consider not only the defendant’s own assets but whether there are others who may be willing to assist the defendant to obtain legal advice and representation. If relevant evidence is not adduced which would be reasonably available the court may draw negative inference about the underlying facts: CommercialInjunctions §21-047.

70.  Li only has himself to blame when he chose not to adduce relevant and persuasive evidence of his financial position to support his application for a release of the Sum to him.

71.  This court has then come to the conclusion that I should not exercise my discretion to allow a variation or a release in the absence of good grounds shown. The Release Summons must be rejected.

Conclusion and orders

72.  For the reasons given, this court is of the view that both the Discharge Summons and the Release Summons are unmeritorious and must be dismissed.

73.  On the other hand, the Interim Injunction should be continued and, accordingly, the Injunction Summons should be allowed. This court also grant the Disclosure Order.

74.  Costs should follow the event. I make an order nisi that costs of and occasioned by all the three Summonses including all costs reserved should be paid by Li to the Company, to be taxed if not agreed.

 (Kent Yee)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Alvin Chong, instructed by Liu, Choi & Chan, for the Plaintiff

Mr Kwok Kam Kwan, instructed by C.S. Chan & Co., for the 1st Defendant

[2023] HKCFI 2053-EN-2023-09-14

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 263/2012

[2023] HKCFI 2053

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 263 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN

 CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED Plaintiff
 (國際永年紡織有限公司) 
 and 
 LI DIANXIAO (李殿孝)1st Defendant
 CONG BO WAI (叢博煒)2nd Defendant

______________________

Before: Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 14 June 2023
Date of Decision: 14 September 2023

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to use the definitions and abbreviations adopted in the reasoned judgment ([2021] HKCFI 2216) handed down herein on 27 September 2021 (“Judgment”).

Application before the court  

2.  By the Judgment, I held in favour of CCT (plaintiff) against both Mr Li (1st defendant) and Mr Cong (2nd defendant) after trial[1] and gave reasons for such determination.

3.  More particularly, as against Mr Li:

(1)  I declared that he held and still holds the China Harbour Office on trust for CCT.

(2)  I further declared that he also held the following properties on trust for CCT: (a) the Provident Centre Flat; (b) the Pacific Palisades Flat; and (c) the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007.

(3)  I ordered him to transfer the China Harbour Office to CCT or at its direction.

(4)  I ordered him to account to CCT for the following:

(a)  the rental income from letting the China Harbour Office since 2006;

(b)  the net deposits forfeited from the aborted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997;

(c)  the net proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1998;

(d)  the rental income from letting the Pacific Palisades Flat between 1998 and 2007;

(e)  the net proceeds of sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat in 2007; and

(f)  all the money and benefits received from holding the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007.

(5)  I further ordered an inquiry into the aforesaid accounts.

(6)  Lastly, I ordered Mr Li to pay CCT all sums found to be due from him to CCT on the taking of such accounts.

4.  By a notice of appeal dated 15 October 2021 and a supplemental notice of appeal dated 13 June 2023 (“NOA” and “Supplemental NOA” respectively and “Notices” collectively) issued under CACV 471/2021, Mr Li appealed from the Judgment against him (“Appeal”).

5.  Before the court now is Mr Li’s application by summons dated 31 May 2023 for a stay of execution of the Judgment against him pending the determination of the Appeal (“Application”).

Principles governing grant or refusal of stay of execution pending appeal

6.  An appeal does not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings: Order 59, rule 13(1).

7.  The principles governing the grant or refusal of a stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal are well established. A summary of such principles can be found in, for example, the judgment of Chow J (as he then was) in Astro Nusantara International BV v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (No 2) [2016] 1 HKLRD 591 at [15] as follows, following the decision of Ma J (as the former Chief Justice then was) in Stay Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84:

“(1) The applicant is required to demonstrate a “good reason” for a stay of execution.

(2) Generally speaking, the existence of merely an arguable appeal cannot by itself amount to a sufficient reason to justify a stay. It is the minimum requirement before a court would even begin to consider granting a stay.

(3) In other words, if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted however exceptional the circumstances may otherwise be justifying a stay of execution.

(4) On the other hand, the existence of a strong appeal or a strong likelihood of success will usually by itself enable a stay to be granted because this would constitute a good reason for a stay.

(5) In most cases, where the court is faced with simply the existence of an arguable appeal, it becomes necessary for the applicant to provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(6) Commonly, this is done by demonstrating that without a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory, for example, because of an appreciable risk that the respondent to the appeal would not be able to repay in the event of a successful appeal against a money judgment, or because the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect on the applicant.

(7) In considering an application for a stay pending appeal, it would be impractical and even undesirable for the court to go deeply into the merits or strengths of the appeal, although the court must still form a preliminary view of these aspects.”

The Appeal has no merits

8.  The merits of the Appeal should be assessed with regard to the grounds of appeal that Mr Li has actually advanced in the Notices.

9.  I turn firstly to paragraph 1 of the grounds of appeal set out in the NOA, by which Mr Li disputes the finding that CCT was the beneficial owner of the Eternal Building Flats (“Ground1”).

10.  The principles for the appellate court to disturb the findings of fact of the trial judge are well settled. See, for instance, the Court of Appeal’s summary of the threshold for an appeal against findings of fact at [33] and [34] of Yu Man Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen[2021] HKCA 1456:

“Palpable errors, whether of law or of fact, must be identified, and they must be sufficiently material to undermine the conclusions of the trial judge. In the absence of material errors, an appeal court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. What matters is whether the decision is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. That the judges in the appeal court may have reached a different conclusion is not a ground for intervention.

The principles for appellate intervention apply also to inferences of fact drawn from primary facts (unless the finding is based purely on inferences or otherwise has nothing to do with the witnesses’ demeanour or the trial judge’s having received the evidence at first hand), and findings of mixed fact and law, or an issue on which the judge had to come to a judgmental conclusion after taking a number of factors into account. The correct approach in reviewing such a conclusion is to treat the judge’s decision with utmost respect, and refrain from interference unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong. It is similar to an appeal against an exercise of discretion.”

11.  The beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flats is raised by the defendants in defence to CCT’s claim in respect of the Tanner Garden Flat. In this connection, as a matter of record, the Tanner Garden Flat was transferred from CCT to Mr Li on 7 September 2004 for a stated consideration of $3,980,000 and then further transferred by Mr Li to Mr Cong on 3 July 2007 for a stated consideration of $4,800,000.

12.  It is CCT’s case (and my findings) that: (1) the transfer of the Tanner Garden Flat from CCT to Mr Li was carried out upon Mr Li’s direction in breach of his fiduciary duty to CCT; (2) Mr Li had not paid the stated or any consideration to CCT for the transfer; (3) Mr Li was therefore, in the absence of evidence of an intention on the part of CCT to gift the property to him, holding the property on a resulting trust for CCT. See [105], [111] to [113] of the Judgment.

13.  The beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flats assumes significance because, in defence to CCT’s claim for the recovery of the Tanner Garden Flat, the defendants allege that: (1) CCT had received and kept the sum of about $4,000,000 realised from the sale of the Eternal Building Flats (which were registered in Mr Li’s name) in 1994; (2) such proceeds had “remained on the account of [CCT]” which held the monies on trust for Mr Li; and (3) Mr Li satisfied the stated consideration of the Tanner Garden Flat by set-off by using the said $4,000,000 allegedly held by CCT on trust for him.

14.  Mr Li’s challenge to the finding that he held the Eternal Building Flat on trust for CCT is premised solely upon the fact that CCT was incorporated on 5 October 1990, which post-dated the transfer of the Eternal Building Flats into Mr Li’s name and the discharge of the mortgage loan owed to KWB on 6 September 1990.

15.  In gist, Mr Li contends that he could not have held the Eternal Building Flats on trust for CCT, nor could CCT have discharged the expenses arising from the conveyance of the property into Mr Li’s name (including the outstanding mortgage loan) before the incorporation of CCT.

16.  With respect, this argument is made out of context and in disregard of the background against which the Eternal Building Flats were purchased in Kingpower’s name and the background against which CCT came into existence:

(1)  The Eternal Building Flats were in the first place acquired in Kingpower’s name in the course of its co-operation with the Beijing Company.

(2)  Kingpower acquired the Eternal Building Flats for the benefit of the Beijing Company. These properties represented part of the Beijing Company’s profits from its co-operation with Kingpower.

(3)  They were transferred by Kingpower into Mr Li’s name free of any actually paid consideration to return to the Beijing Company its share of profit from the co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower upon the termination of such co-operation in the late 1980’s or early 1990’s.

(4)  CCT was formed to take over the functions previously performed by Kingpower as the Beijing Company’s branch office/window company in Hong Kong.

(5)  Mr Li was, throughout the relevant period of time, merely an employee of the Beijing Company.

See [15] to [26], [31], [36] to [37], [56] to [58] and [63] to [64] of the Judgment. It is worthy of note that Mr Li has not, in either of the Notices, disputed any of these findings.

17.  There is no merit in Ground 1.

18.  Turning then to paragraph 2 of the grounds of appeal set out in the NOA, it is contended that I have erred in ordering Mr Li to account for the monies and benefits received by him from holding the Provident Centre Flat, the Pacific Palisades Flat and the Tanner Garden Flat, “[i]n view of Mr Li’s beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flat[s]” (“Ground2”).

19.  I have concluded above why Mr Li’s claim to the beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flats is unarguable. It follows that Ground 2, which is premised upon Mr Li being the beneficial owner of the Eternal Building Flats, must also fail.

20.  In any event, Mr Li has never set up any connection between the beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flat and the beneficial ownership of the Provident Centre Flat or the Pacific Palisades Flat.

21.  Ground 2 is likewise unarguable.

22.  By the Supplemental NOA, Mr Li complains that CCT’s claim herein against him ought to have been dismissed for want of authority to sue on the part of CCT upon the finding that Mr Li gained beneficial ownership of the CCT Shares registered under his name (representing a 95% shareholding) by virtue of the 2001 Agreement (“Ground 3”).

23.  It is pertinent to Ground 3 to note that the court went into the question of the beneficial ownership of the CCT Shares only because of Mr Li’s assertion in paragraphs 37 and 38 of his amended defence that CCT’s complaints about his dealings with the Subject Properties, even if established, can by reason of his 100% beneficial ownership of all the CCT Shares be regarded as having been authorised or ratified by all shareholders of CCT and therefore by CCT. See [35] and [94] to [96] of the Judgment.

24.  Mr Li was, at the time of the amendment of his defence, represented by counsel and solicitors. They drafted and signed the pleading including paragraphs 37 and 38 thereof, which were added by amendment. In the circumstances, one would have expected Mr Li to have been fully advised by counsel and solicitors on all the implications of the matters averred in the 2 new paragraphs, including the possibility that CCT might not have been properly authorised to commence and prosecute this action.

25.  A defendant cannot by his defence dispute the plaintiff’s authority to sue, nor can he do so at the trial. The proper way to challenge the lawfulness of the legal proceedings on the ground that they have been issued and conducted by the plaintiff without proper authority is by an application to strike out. Such application should be taken out at an early stage. The issue of the plaintiff’s authority to sue should, where there a real doubt, be resolved first before the case is allowed to go any further. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, volume 1, pages 557 to 558, paragraph 18/19/23.

26.  Mr Li, despite have legal representation from 11 November 2015 to 21 September 2016, did not see fit to so apply.

27.  I therefore see nothing in Ground 3 either.

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

28.  To conclude, the Appeal is, in my opinion, not arguable. The Application should be, and is, dismissed on this ground alone.

29.  I also make an order nisi that Mr Li should pay CCT the costs of and occasioned by the Application which, if not agreed, shall be taxed on a party and party basis with certificate for one counsel.

  (Lisa Wong)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr K M Chong and Mr Alvin Chong, instructed by Liu, Chan & Choi, for the plaintiff

Mr Kwok Kam Kwan, instructed by C S Chan & Co, for the 1st defendant



[1] At which Mr Li, who was then unrepresented, was absent due to his imprisonment in Beijing.

  

[2023] HKCFI 320-EN-2023-02-03

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

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HCA 263/2012

[2023] HKCFI 320

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 263 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN

 CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED
(國際永年紡織有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 LI DIANXIAO (李殿孝)1st Defendant
 CONG BO WAI (叢博煒)2nd Defendant

______________________

Before:Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:31 October 2022
Date of Decision: 3 February 2023

______________________

DECISION

______________________

1.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to use the definitions and abbreviations adopted in the reasoned judgment I handed down on 27 September 2021 [2021] HKCFI 2216 (“Reasoned Judgment”).

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2.  By the Reasoned Judgment, I held in favour of CCT (plaintiff) against both defendants and gave reasons for such determination. More particularly, insofar as it is material for present purposes:

(1) As against Mr Li (1st defendant), I declared (a) that he held and still holds the China Harbour Office on trust for CCT and (b) that he held the Tanner Garden Flat on trust for CCT between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007. See [157(1) and (2)(c)]. In consequence of the declaration regarding the China Harbour Office, I further ordered Mr Li to, interalia, transfer the property to CCT or at its direction. See [157(3)].

(2) As against Mr Cong (2nd defendant) who became the registered owner of the Tanner Garden Flat by virtue of the purported sale and purchase of the same between him and Mr Li by the agreement for sale and purchase and the assignment dated 3 July 2007:

(a) I declared that he has since 3 July 2007 been holding the Tanner Garden Flat on trust for CCT.

(b) I set aside the said purported sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat.

(c) I ordered him to, interalia, transfer the Tanner Garden Flat back to CCT or at its direction.

(d) I further ordered him to account for all the money and benefits received by him by holding the Tanner Garden Flat since 3 July 2007 and to pay CCT all sums found to be due from him to CCT on the taking of such account.

See [158].

3.  Following the handing down of the Reasoned Judgment, on 5 October 2021, CCT submitted for the court’s approval a draft of the judgment that it proposed to invite the court to seal (“Draft Sealed Judgment”).

4.  Insofar as it is presently material, the Draft Sealed Judgment contained the following provisions:

(1) In addition to transferring the China Harbour Office to CCT or at its order and direction, Mr Li shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of such property together with all its title deeds and documents to CCT (paragraph 2).

(2) In case Mr Li should default in transferring the China Harbour Office to CCT within 28 days, the Registrar of the High Court (“Registrar”) is authorised to execute all transfers, assignments and/or deeds necessary to transfer the legal title of such property to CCT or at its order and direction (paragraph 3).

(3) In addition to transferring the Tanner Garden Flat to CCT or at its order and direction, Mr Cong shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of such property together with all its title deeds and documents to CCT (paragraph 14).

(4) In case Mr Cong should default in transferring the Tanner Garden Flat to CCT within 28 days, the Registrar is authorised to execute all transfers, assignments and/or deeds necessary to transfer the legal title of such property to CCT or at its order and direction (paragraph 15).

(5) The defendants shall pay CCT interest on all sums found and as may be found payable by them or each of them (paragraph 19).

5.  With a view to affording the defendants an opportunity to consider and make submission on the formal judgment (if so advised) and to eliminating any unnecessary argument in the future, this court directed CCT to provide a copy of the Draft Sealed Judgment to each of the defendants.

6.  CCT did so under cover of a letter of the same date (i.e. 5 October 2021) from its solicitors, Messrs Liu, Choi & Chan (“LCC”), to the court and copied to

(1) Mr Li (who was then unrepresented) at the Hong Kong address given by him in his notice to act in person dated 22 September 2016 (“MrLi’s Address”); and

(2) Mr Cong’s solicitors, Messrs C S Chan & Co (“CSC”).

7.  Mr Li did not respond to LCC’s letter.

8.  As for Mr Cong, by a letter dated 6 October 2021 from CSC to the court and copied to LCC and Mr Li (at Mr Li’s Address), Mr Cong disputed only paragraph 19 of the Draft Sealed Judgment, pointing out that a claim for pre-judgment interest must be specifically pleaded; that CCT had failed to plead such a claim in the ASOC; and that CCT was therefore not entitled to any award of pre-judgment interest. Save for its objection to the provision for interest under paragraph 19, Mr Cong did not take issue with the rest of the Draft Sealed Judgment, specifically paragraphs 14 and 15 thereof.

9.  After considering LCC’s letter of 5 October 2021 and CSC’s letter of 6 October 2021, by a letter dated 8 October 2021 to all parties, this court directed that the question of interest should be left to the Master taking the various accounts as it would depend on whether any sums are found to be due to CCT from both or either of the defendants.

10.  On 22 October 2021, CCT submitted for this court’s approval a revised version of the Draft Sealed Judgment, which removed paragraph 19 (“Revised Draft Sealed Judgment”). Upon this court’s approval given on the same day, judgment as per the Revised Draft Sealed Judgment (“Sealed Judgment”) was sealed and filed on 27 October 2021.

11.  The Sealed Judgment (indorsed with a penal notice) was then personally served on Mr Cong on 29 October 2021.

12.  In partial breach of paragraph 14 of the Sealed Judgment, Mr Cong has refused and/or failed to transfer the legal title to the Tanner Garden Flat to CCT. In this regard, CCT has, by LCC’s letter dated 12 November 2021 to CSC, provided Mr Cong with a draft assignment (“Assignment”) for his execution by 26 November 2021.

13.  In further breach of paragraph 14, Mr Cong has not delivered up vacant possession, or any title deeds or documents, of the Tanner Garden Flat either.

14.  In view of Mr Cong’s refusal and/or failure to execute the Assignment whether by 26 November 2021 or at all, CCT invoked paragraph 15 of the Sealed Judgment and submitted the Assignment to the Registrar for his execution. See LCC’s letter dated 14 January 2022 to the Registrar, drawing his attention to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment; CSC’s letter of 12 November 2021 to LCC with the Assignment attached; and Mr Cong’s neglect in executing the Assignment in breach of paragraph 14 of the Sealed Judgment.

15.  In response, by a letter dated 24 January 2022 to LCC and CSC, the Registrar pointed out that the provisions in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment for (1) the delivery of vacant possession and the title deeds and documents of the Tanner Garden Flat and (2) the authorisation of the Registrar to execute the Assignment in the event of default by Mr Cong were not part of the orders made against Mr Cong at [158] of the Reasoned Judgment. CCT and Mr Cong were invited to make submissions on the following questions: (1) the legal basis for requesting the Registrar to execute the Assignment which was not provided for in the Reasoned Judgment; (2) whether such relief was prayed for in the ASOC; and (3) whether the addition of paragraphs 14 and 15 to the Sealed Judgment was by consent or argued and or was drawn to my attention or granted by me. The parties’ attention was specifically directed to Pang Man Ming v Pang Wan Li Yan [2020] 4 HKLRD 864.

16.  To cut a long story short, after considering the respective submissions of CCT and Mr Cong, on 16 February 2022, the Registrar directed the parties to seek clarification and directions from this court.

17.  In the meantime, both Mr Li and Mr Cong have appealed from the judgment against them by notices of appeal respectively issued under CACV 471/2021 and CACV 472/2021.

18.  Insofar as Mr Cong is concerned, the supplemental notice of appeal dated 8 July 2022, which raised 3 new grounds of appeal (“Ground3”, “Ground4” and “Ground5” respectively and “Grounds” collectively), supersedes the notice of appeal dated 15 October 2021[1].

APPLICATIONS BEFORE THE COURT

19.  Against such procedural background, there are now before the court the following applications (“Applications” collectively):

(1) by Mr Cong by summons dated 11 July 2022 for stay of execution of the judgment against him pending the determination of his appeal under CACV 472/2021 (“Stay Application”); and

(2) by CCT by summons dated 29 August 2022 for “clarification” of [157] and [158] of the Reasoned Judgment and paragraphs 2, 3, 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment (““Clarification” Application”).

“CLARIFICATION” APPLICATION

20.  I can immediately say that the citation of Order 20 rule 11 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), which is popularly referred to as the “slip rule”, in the margin of CCT’s summons is misconceived.

21.  The true principles are those stated by Lam JA (as he then was) in Lam Chi Tat Anthony v Kam Yee Wai Andrew (No.2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1085 at [7] to [9]

“7. Very often, in a reasoned judgment the court focuses on matters argued before it. There may well be matters which are consequential and per se uncontroversial between the parties which the court does not deal with expressly in the reasoned judgment. It does not mean that such matters should not be attended to in the formal order. On the contrary, there is every reason why the formal order should cover those consequential matters. Parties should do their best in coming up with a draft order which deals with every indisputable consequential item that needs to be addressed in the proceedings. Otherwise, it would simply be a recipe for further applications before the court which would generate more costs and time to be incurred. That would not be consistent with underlying objectives in Order 1A. Of course, if there are outstanding matters which are disputed, it would not be appropriate to include those in a draft order as if it is undisputed, at least not until such disputes have been properly ventilated and decided by the court.

8. Therefore, whenever a party responsible for drawing up a formal order detects there are matters which are within the ambit of the legal proceedings but not expressly addressed in the reasoned judgment, he or she should discuss with the other parties to see to what extent such matters are consequential and uncontroversial. Parties should be mindful of what we said above and their duties under Order 1A Rule 3 in handling the situation. If parties can come to agreement on those matters, they can submit a draft order (endorsed with their consent) covering those matters for the approval of the court. If the parties cannot agree, and if one party has good reason to believe that the additional paragraph should not be disputed, he or she can write to the court with a draft order seeking directions. However, in cases of serious disputes, he or she should make an application by summons. In the meantime, the formal order would not be perfected.

9. It must be emphasized that what we said above is confined to matters properly within the ambit of the set of legal proceedings which the court is seised with. Matters outside the ambit of the proceedings cannot be added to the formal order as the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same.”

22.  Applying these principles, focusing first on paragraphs 2 and 14 of the Sealed Judgment, the enjoyment of possession and the custody of the title deeds and documents are natural and essential incidents of land ownership. The declaration of beneficial ownership and the transfer of legal title, without being accompanied by the delivery up of possession and the title deeds and documents, would be incomplete and ineffective as relief. Once it is found that CCT is the beneficial owner of the China Harbour Office and the Tanner Garden Flat, it could not be suggested that CCT should nevertheless still be deprived of possession, or the title deeds and documents, of the properties. And it was not so suggested by either of the defendants whether at the trial or upon being provided with the Draft Sealed Judgment for their consideration and comment. The defendants subsequently simply jumped on the bandwagon when the Registrar called for submission on paragraphs 2, 3, 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment.

23.  Turning then to paragraphs 3 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment, the jurisdictional basis for such provisions is s 25A(1)(a) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), which empowers the Court of First Instance to nominate any person to sign any conveyance, contract or other document, the execution of which has been ordered in a judgment or order if the person ordered to execute such conveyance, contract or other document neglects or refuses to comply with the judgment or order.

24.  In Pang Man Ming v Pang Wan Li Yan, supra, at [17], Queeny Au-Yeung J identified the 2 matters that an applicant under s 25A must prove:

(1) a pre-existing judgment directing a person to execute a conveyance or other document; and

(2) neglect by that person to comply, which is usually after efforts have been made to request him to sign within a specified time.

25.  In many cases, the party in whose favour the pre-existing judgment for the execution of document is made would make the application under s 25A(1) in subsequent and separate proceedings after the opposite party has neglected to comply with the judgment. See the procedure and the safeguards discussed in Pang Man Ming at [18] and [19].

26.  Nevertheless, I can detect no objection in principle to the alternative practice of incorporating in the same judgment:

(1) the obligation on the unsuccessful party to execute the subject document in the first instance; and

(2) the identification and authorisation of a third person to do so in place of the unsuccessful party in the event of default,

provided that:

(a) the unsuccessful party has had an opportunity to address the court on the inclusion of the s 25A(1) direction; and

(b) it is made clear that the third party can and should be called upon to execute the document only on proof, whether on oath or otherwise, of neglect by the party primarily obligated to do so.

27.  The obvious advantage of such a practice is the saving of the time and costs of a potentially unmeritorious and delaying satellite applications under s 25A.

28.  In the instant case, both the defendants had in fact been afforded an reasonable opportunity to contest (if so advised) the terms of the Sealed Judgment when they were copied the Revised Draft Sealed Judgment for their consideration and comment. In particular, in the case of Mr Cong, by objecting to paragraph 19 only, he can be taken as consenting to, or at least not opposing, the remaining provisions of the Sealed Judgment including paragraphs 14 and 15.

29.  To conclude, not only was I alerted to paragraphs 2, 3, 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment, I fully intended to grant formal judgment in terms including those paragraphs, after being satisfied that the defendants had had a reasonable chance to persuade me otherwise, if so advised.

STAY APPLICATION

Principles governing grant of stay of execution pending appeal

30.  An appeal does not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings: Order 59, rule 13(1).

31.  The principles governing an application for a stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal are well established. A summary of such principles can be found in, for example, the judgment of Chow J (as he then was) in Astro Nusantara International BV v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (No 2) [2016] 1 HKLRD 591 at [15] as follows, following the decision of Ma J (as the former Chief Justice then was) in Stay Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84:

“(1) The applicant is required to demonstrate a “good reason” for a stay of execution.

(2) Generally speaking, the existence of merely an arguable appeal cannot by itself amount to a sufficient reason to justify a stay. It is the minimum requirement before a court would even begin to consider granting a stay.

(3) In other words, if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted however exceptional the circumstances may otherwise be justifying a stay of execution.

(4) On the other hand, the existence of a strong appeal or a strong likelihood of success will usually by itself enable a stay to be granted because this would constitute a good reason for a stay.

(5) In most cases, where the court is faced with simply the existence of an arguable appeal, it becomes necessary for the applicant to provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(6) Commonly, this is done by demonstrating that without a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory, for example, because of an appreciable risk that the respondent to the appeal would not be able to repay in the event of a successful appeal against a money judgment, or because the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect on the applicant.

(7) In considering an application for a stay pending appeal, it would be impractical and even undesirable for the court to go deeply into the merits or strengths of the appeal, although the court must still form a preliminary view of these aspects.”

Discussion

Ground 3

32.  Ground 3 is based on the supposed discrepancies between [157] and [158] of the Reasoned Judgment and paragraphs 2, 3, 14 and 15 of the Sealed Judgment.

33.  For the reasons stated under the above section on the “Clarification” Application, I am not satisfied that Ground 3 is arguable.

Grounds 4 and 5

34.  These grounds can be dealt with together.

35.  To put them in proper context, I made the following chain of findings of fact in the Reasoned Judgment that impact upon the beneficial ownership of the Tanner Garden Property:

(1) Beginning from about 1988, Kingpower functioned as the Beijing Company’s Hong Kong branch office/window company ([17] and [18]).

(2) In the course of the co-operation with the Beijing Company, Kingpower took up the assignments of the Eternal Building Flats, with the assistance of an instalment loan of $1,770,000 from KWB, for the benefit of the Beijing Company ([20] and [21]).

(3) In about the late 1980’s or early 1990’s, the co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower ceased ([22]).

(4) In place of Kingpower, CCT was set up on 5 October 1990 to be the Beijing Company’s new branch office/window company in Hong Kong ([21(2)], [25], [26]).

(5) As part of the arrangement made upon termination of the co-operation between Kingpower and the Beijing Company, Kingpower transferred the Eternal Building Flats into Mr Li’s name on 6 September 1990 free of any actually paid consideration, save that CCT as the Beijing Company’s replacement branch office/window company in Hong Kong shall repay the outstanding KWB loan and discharge the costs and expenses incidental to the transfers ([21(2)], [23]).

(6) It was CCT that repaid the KWB loan then outstanding on the Eternal Building Flats and discharged the costs and expenses incidental to the transfers by Kingpower to Mr Li ([24(6)).

(7) There was no evidence that Mr Li then had the personal means to afford these payments ([24(6)).

(8) Mr Li held the Eternal Building Flats on trust for CCT ([24]).

(9) CCT kept the net proceeds of $4,056,032.04 realised from the sales of the Eternal Building Flats in 1994. Four million of such proceeds were subsequently deployed by CCT to reduce the mortgage loan due in respect of the Provident Centre Flat, likewise acquired and held in the name of Mr Li on trust for CCT ([24(7), [58], [61], [64]).

(10) The Tanner Garden Flat were acquired and paid for by CCT ([68], [83]).

(11) The defendants’ case that Mr Li had provided consideration for the Tanner Garden Flat, which was transferred from CCT to Mr Li by a purported agreement for sale and purchase and an assignment respectively dated 10 August 2004 and 7 September 2004, with the use of the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats cannot stand ([105]-[111]).

(12) Mr Li had not paid any consideration for the Tanner Garden Flat ([112]).

(13) Mr Li held the Tanner Garden on a resulting trust for CCT ([113]).

(14) Mr Li could not subsequently validly pass to Mr Cong the beneficial title to the Tanner Garden Flat ([114]).

36.  In gist, by Grounds 4 and 5, Mr Cong seeks to attack my findings at to the beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flats.

37.  The principles for the appeal court to disturb the findings of fact of the trial judge are well settled. See, for instance, the Court of Appeal’s summary of the threshold for an appeal against findings of fact at [33] and [34] of Yu Man Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen[2021] HKCA 1456:

“Palpable errors, whether of law or of fact, must be identified, and they must be sufficiently material to undermine the conclusions of the trial judge. In the absence of material errors, an appeal court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. What matters is whether the decision is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. That the judges in the appeal court may have reached a different conclusion is not a ground for intervention.

The principles for appellate intervention apply also to inferences of fact drawn from primary facts (unless the finding is based purely on inferences or otherwise has nothing to do with the witnesses’ demeanour or the trial judge’s having received the evidence at first hand), and findings of mixed fact and law, or an issue on which the judge had to come to a judgmental conclusion after taking a number of factors into account. The correct approach in reviewing such a conclusion is to treat the judge’s decision with utmost respect, and refrain from interference unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong. It is similar to an appeal against an exercise of discretion.”

38.  First, Mr Cong questions my acceptance of Ms Lai’s evidence that it was CCT that repaid the KWB mortgage loan secured by the Eternal Building Flats and discharged the costs and expenses occasioned by the transfers of such properties from Kingpower to Mr Li on 6 September 1990. In support, Mr Cong relies on the incorporation of CCT after 6 September 1990. What is being suggested is that CCT could not have made payments that accrued before its formation.

39.  With respect, such reasoning displays a failure to appreciate the background against which CCT came into existence. CCT was formed or acquired with the backing of the Beijing Company to take over the business that the Beijing Company had formerly carried on in Hong Kong through the co-operation with Kingpower and the assets generated by such co-operation and business, including the Eternal Building Flats.

40.  In any event, Ms Lai was not cross-examined on paragraph 49 of her witness statement, where she dealt with CCT’s payments in respect of the Eternal Building Flats.

41.  Second, it is argued that Mr Li’s non-payment of the stated considerations for the Eternal Building Flats should, at most, give to Kingpower a lien against Mr Li for the unpaid purchaser price and should not deprive Mr Li of the beneficial ownership of the Eternal Building Flats.

42.  With the greatest respect, this argument misleadingly treats the transfers of the Eternal Building Flats from Kingpower to Mr Li as arm-length commercial sales and purchases, which they were not. Though taking the form of a sale and purchase, the transfers of the Eternal Building Flats to Mr Li were in substance a return, or division, of assets upon termination of the co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower. The concept of liens that may arise in a sale and purchase simply has no application.

43.  For the above reasons, I am not persuaded that there is any palpable error (whether of law or fact) in the judgment against Mr Cong. It is thus inappropriate to, and I will not, stay the execution of such judgment pending Mr Cong’s appeal under CACV 472/2021.

44.  Accordingly, I allow the “Clarification” Application and dismiss the Stay Application.

45.  I also order on a nisi basis that Mr Cong shall pay CCT’s costs of and occasioned by the Applications to be taxed on a party and party basis, if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr K M Chong and Mr Alvin Chong, instructed by Liu, Chan & Choi, for the plaintiff

Mr Chu Ming Tung, instructed by C S Chan & Co, for the 1st defendant

Mr Kwok Kam Kwan, instructed by C S Chan & Co, for the 2nd defendant



[1]   See paragraph 5 of the submission for Mr Cong dated 20 October 2022.

[2021] HKCFI 2216-EN-2021-09-17

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

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HCA 263/2012

[2021] HKCFI 2216

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 263 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN  
 CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED
(國際永年紡織有限公司)
Plaintiff

and

 LI DIANXIAO (李殿孝)1st Defendant
 CONG BO WAI (叢博煒)2nd Defendant

______________________

Before:  Hon Lisa Wong J in Court

Date of Hearing: 8, 9, 10, 11 and 28 May 2018

Date of Judgment:  17 September 2021

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

1.  In this judgment, unless otherwise stated, all references to numbered pages are to pages of the trial bundles and all monetary figures are denominated in Hong Kong dollars.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

2.  In this action, the plaintiff, Capital Century Textile Company Limited (“CCT”) claims:

(1)  against its former shareholder and director - the 1stdefendant - Li Dianxiao (“Mr Li”):

(a)  a declaration that Mr Li held and still holds Office B, 15/F (including one lavatory), China Harbour Building, 370-374 King’s Road, Hong Kong (“China Harbour Office”), of which Mr Li was and is still the registered owner, on trust for CCT;

(b)  an order for the transfer of the China Harbour Office by Mr Li to CCT or at its direction;

(c)  an account of all the rental income received and retained by Mr Li from letting the China Harbour Office since 2006[1];

(d)  an account of all the rental income received and retained by Mr Li from 1996 to 1998 from letting Flat A, 11/F, Block 6, Provident Centre, 31 Wharf Road, Hong Kong (“Provident Centre Flat”), of which Mr Li was the registered owner;

(e)  an account of the deposits forfeited and retained by Mr Li from an aborted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997;

(f)  an account of the net proceeds of sale received and retained by Mr Li from the sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1998;

(g)  an account of all the rental income received and retained by Mr Li between 1998 and 2007 from letting Flat A, 7/F, Tower 9, Phase II, Pacific Palisades, 1 Braemar Hill Road, North Point, Hong Kong (“Pacific Palisades Flat”), of which Mr Li was the registered owner;

(h)  an account of the net proceeds of sale received and retained by Mr Li from the sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat in 2007;

(i)  a declaration that between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007, Mr Li held Flat B, 17/F, Block 3, Tanner Garden, 18 Tanner Road, North Point, Hong Kong (“Tanner Garden Flat”) on a constructive/resulting trust for CCT;

(j)  an account of all the money and benefits received by Mr Li from holding the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007;

(k)  if necessary, an inquiry into the accounts to be provided by Mr Li; and

(l)  an order for the payment of all sums found to be due from Mr Li to CCT on the taking of such accounts;

(2)  against the 2nd defendant, Cong Bo Wai (“Mr Cong”):

(a)  a declaration that Mr Cong has since 3 July 2007 been holding the Tanner Garden Flat on a constructive/ resulting trust for CCT;

(b)  an account of all the money and benefits received by Mr Cong from holding the Tanner Garden Flat since 3 July 2007;

(c)  an inquiry into such account;

(d)  an order for the payment of all sums found to be due from Mr Cong to CCT on the taking of such account; or

(e)  alternatively to (a) to (d) hereof, an order setting aside the sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat between Mr Li and Mr Cong (“defendants” collectively) on 3 July 2007 upon the repayment by CCT to Mr Cong of the purchase price of $4,800,000.

ISSUES

3.  The issues raised by the parties’ pleadings are numerous.  They can be summarised as follows:

As between CCT and Mr Li:

(1)  regarding the timing of this action: whether CCT is estopped by laches from claiming against Mr Li;

(2)  regarding the issued shares in CCT (“CCT Shares”):

(a)  whether the CCT Shares, be they registered in the names of Mr Li or others, were/are held on trust for a PRC company called Beijing Knitwear Import & Export Group Corporation (北京針棉織品進出口集團公司)[2] (“Beijing Company”) or held by Mr Li as beneficial owner and by others on trust for him;

(b)  if the latter, whether (as contended by Mr Li) CCT’s complaints about Mr Li’s dealings with the 4 properties specified in [2(1)(a)], [2(1)(d)], [2(1)(g)] and [2(1)(i)] above (“Subject Properties” collectively), even if established, can be regarded as having been authorised or ratified by all shareholders of CCT and therefore by CCT;

(3)  regarding the China Harbour Office:

(a)  whether it is and/or was held by Mr Li on a resulting/constructive trust for CCT because all the payments associated with its acquisition were made from bank accounts held by, or on trust for, CCT;

(b)  whether it was let for rental income after it ceased to be used as CCT’s office in 2005;

(c)  if so, whether Mr Li had received and kept such rental income;

(d)  whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such rental income;

(4)  regarding the Provident Centre Flat:

(a)  whether it was held by Mr Li on a resulting/constructive trust for CCT because all the payments associated with its acquisition were made from bank accounts held by, or on trust for, CCT;

(b)  whether it was let for rental income from 1996 to 1998;

(c)  if so, whether Mr Li had collected and kept such rental income;

(d)  if so, whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such rental income;

(e)  whether Mr Li had further received and kept the deposits totalling $1,153,000 which was forfeited when the attempted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997 fell through;

(f)  if so, whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such forfeited deposits;

(g)  whether Mr Li had also received and kept the proceeds from the sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1998;

(h)  if so, whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such proceeds;

(5)  regarding the Pacific Palisades Flat:

(a)  whether it was held by Mr Li on a resulting/constructive trust for CCT because all the payments associated with its acquisition were made from bank accounts held by, or on trust for, CCT;

(b)  whether it was let for rental income between 1998 and 2007;

(c)  whether Mr Li had received and kept such rental income;

(d)  whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such rental income;

(e)  whether Mr Li had received and kept the proceeds from the sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat in 2007;

(f)  if so, whether Mr Li was obliged, but had failed, to account to CCT for such proceeds;

(6)  regarding the Tanner Garden Flat, which was transferred by CCT to Mr Li on 7 September 2004 for a stated consideration of $3,980,000:

(a)  whether Flats A and B, 22/F, Eternal Buildings, 112-114 Tsat Tsz Mui Road (“Eternal Building Flat A” and “Eternal Building Flat B” respectively and “Eternal Building Flats” collectively) which were transferred from one Kingpower Textile Limited (港佳紡織有限公司) (“Kingpower”) to Mr Li in 1990 for no paid consideration were held on trust by Mr Li for CCT;

(b)  if not, whether the approximate sum of $4,000,000 realised from the sale of the Eternal Building Flats in 1994 had nevertheless been received and kept by CCT;

(c)  if so, whether such proceeds beneficially belonged to, and was held by CCT on trust for, Mr Li;

(d)  if so, whether Mr Li had paid the said consideration of $3,980,000 for the transfer of the Tanner Garden Flat from CCT to him on 7 September 2004 by set-off against the said sum of $4,000,000 held by CCT on trust for him;

As between CCT and the defendants:

(e)  whether the sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat between Mr Li and Mr Cong on 3 July 2007 at $4,800,000 was at an undervalue, CCT and Mr Cong having agreed the open market value of such property at the time of the transaction to be $5,200,000[3];

(f)  in any event, whether Mr Cong did pay Mr Li the stated purchase price of $4,800,000;

(g)  whether the sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat between Mr Li and Mr Cong was a genuine transaction; and

(h)  even if so, whether Mr Cong was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

4.  Further, arising from the conduct of Mr Cong’s defence at the trial, Counsel for CCT, Mr KM Chong (with him, Mr Alvin Chong) takes a point of procedure.

(1)  Due to the circumstance mentioned in [138] below, Mr Li did not appear at the trial, nor has he given any discovery or made any witness statement in breach of Master Ho’s unless order dated 27 September 2016.

(2)  In spite of such circumstance, Mr Li was represented by solicitors and counsel for a brief period from 11 November 2015.  A request for further and better particulars of the ASOC[4] was served on Mr Li’s behalf.  His amended defence[5], signed by counsel and solicitors, was filed on 3 August 2016.  

(3)  Mr Li began to act in person again from 26 September 2016.  Since then, other than urging the court to stay or adjourn this action until his release from prison in the PRC, Mr Li has not taken any meaningful step in this action.

(4)  Counsel for Mr Cong, Mr Alvin Tsang, rightly accepts that his client is not entitled to advocate or argue Mr Li’s case.

(5)  However, Mr Chong complains that Mr Tsang has been doing exactly that, under the pretext that the success or failure of Mr Cong’s defence would be affected by whether Mr Li had acquired the beneficial ownership of the Tanner Garden Flat by the time he sold and conveyed the same to Mr Cong.

(6)  In particular, Mr Tsang has put to CCT’s witnesses Mr Li’s contentions that:

(a)  He has been the beneficial owner of the CCT Shares since the inception of CCT.

(b)  The transfer of the CCT Shares under his name to Ms Lai on 22 June 2009 (see [99]-[101] below) was solely for Ms Lai to hold the same upon trust for him.

(c)  He was the legal and beneficial owner of the Eternal Building Flats.

(7)  Mr Chong also questions how Mr Cong could have put such propositions to CCT’s witnesses.  I believe Mr Chong is referring to the fact that Mr Cong has no personal knowledge of, and has not purported to give or adduce evidence on, the subject matters of the said cross-examination by Mr Tsang.

5.  I shall now deal with Mr Chong’s procedural complaint.  In my view, Mr Tsang is legitimately concerned with those aspects of Mr Li’s defence that may impact upon whether Mr Cong can keep the Tanner Garden Flat.  Of course, and I am very mindful that, counsel may not cross-examine without a proper foundation built on admissible, material and credible evidence already before the court.  I shall disregard any question asked against such principle.  However, where the evidence before the court sufficiently throws a favourable light on an aspect of Mr Li’s defence that, if proved, would assist Mr Cong’s defence, I do not see why counsel for Mr Cong is prevented from putting the matter to CCT’s witness(es) concerned with such matter.  Indeed, he should do so out of fairness to CCT if he intends to make submissions on the point against CCT.

FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS

6.  [15] to [139] below set out my findings of essential facts, in the chronological order in which events occurred.  Key findings are highlighted by underlining for easy reference.  Some of these findings will directly answer some of the questions listed in [3] above.  Others will lay the foundation for arriving at answers to the remaining questions.

7.  Given the somewhat disorganised state of the trial bundles, in addition to identifying the evidence on which I base my findings, in the case of documentary evidence, I will for ease of reference also state where it can be found in the trial bundles.

8.  Before I go into the facts, it will be seen that they are partly derived from records, the authenticity and materiality of which is undisputed or indisputable save for the few documents disclosed and relied on by Mr Cong.

9.  They are further partly based on the evidence of CCT’s witnesses namely, Ms Lai, Zhang Jiu Chang (張九常) (“Mr Zhang”), Zhong Qun (鍾群) (“Mr Zhong”) and Xie Gui Ru (謝桂茹) (“Ms Xie”)[6]. Unless otherwise stated:

(1)  I find these 4 witnesses to be credible and reliable. 

(a)  Mr Zhang, Mr Zhong and Ms Xie have all retired from or left the employ of CCT and/or the Beijing Company.  They have no apparent, and it is not suggested that any of them have any, interest in the outcome of this action. 

(b)  As for Ms Lai[7], she still holds some shares in CCT and she is entitled to 5% of CCT’s profits as shown in CCT’s financial reports under the 1993 Agreement (defined and set out in [33] below).  However, CCT has long ceased operation, which means that there should be no profit in which Ms Lai can partake.

(2)  The testimonies of these 4 witnesses are inherently plausible.

(3)  In most cases, they sit well with relevant contemporaneous records and/or known objective facts.

(4)  There is no evidence to the contrary from Mr Li or, in many instances, Mr Cong who, for obvious reasons, has no personal knowledge.

10.  In contrast, the same cannot be said of the defendants’ evidence.  First of all, as stated above, Mr Li did not participate at the trial to defend himself.  Nor has he given discovery or made witness statement.  Nevertheless, he has filed and served an amended defence, which I cannot ignore.  For the record, I have used my best endeavours, but without much success, in searching through the trial bundles for evidence that might lend or tend to lend credence to the averments in Mr Li’s amended defence.

11.  Turning to Mr Cong, he is concerned only with the Tanner Garden Flat.  Mr Cong was still a student[8] with no independent means back in July 2007 when he purportedly purchased the Tanner Garden Flat from Mr Li at the price of $4,800,000 without requiring a mortgage loan.  In support of his defence to CCT’s claim to such property, apart from himself, Mr Cong has called his mother, Cong Tao (叢濤) (“Ms Cong”), who was, on Mr Cong’s and her evidence, the person handling the purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat on Mr Cong’s behalf.  Ms Cong had admittedly been in an intimate relationship with Mr Li.  I find it necessary to approach their testimonies with caution[9] for the following reasons:

(1)  They were guarded and not at all forthcoming under cross-examination.

(2)  Questions that are perfectly legitimate and pertinent were often evaded and need to be repeated, on occasions, multiple times.

(3)  Most importantly, as observed in [119] to [132] below, their evidence is inherently implausible in material aspects and does not bear scrutiny.  The manner in which Mr Cong’s purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat was proceeded with was most unusual and significantly departed from standard conveyancing practice in Hong Kong. 

12.  My findings below are also partly founded upon the summary of the factual evidence before the Second Intermediate People’s Court of the Beijing Municipality (北京市第二中級人民法院) (“PRCCourt”) at the criminal trial of Mr Li, as recorded in the PRC Court’s criminal judgment (刑事判決書) dated 19 September 2010 (“PRC Judgment”)[10].  

13.  In particular, I have paid regard, and given weight, to the testimonies of (1) the following personnel of the Beijing Company at the material times: 楊書武 (general manager), 吳大蚌 (party secretary), 印培良 (deputy manager), Mr Zhang (salesman), Mr Zhong (salesman) and 郭世明 (deputy general manager and party committee member); and (2) Kingpower’s former general manager 何岱as to:

(1)  Mr Li’s employment with the Beijing Company from the 1980’s to early 2001;

(2)  the business co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower which acted as the Beijing Company’s branch office/window company in Hong Kong (駐港機構/窗口公司);

(3)  the transfer of Messrs Li, Zhang and Zhong by the Beijing Company from Beijing to Hong Kong to work in Kingpower;

(4)  the subsequent formation of CCT by Mr Li with the authorisation of the Beijing Company; the replacement of Kingpower by CCT as the Beijing Company’s Hong Kong branch office/window company; and the consequential transfer of the Beijing Company’s assets and properties and personnel in Kingpower from Kingpower to CCT;

(5)  the business of CCT and the business and financial support given by the Beijing Company to CCT;

(6)  the 1996 Agreement (defined and set out in [65] below); and

(7)  Mr Li’s resignation from the Beijing Company in early 2001 and the 2001 Agreement (defined and set out in [85] below).

I have no reason to question the accuracy of the PRC Court’s summary of the abovementioned witnesses’ testimonies.  Nor do I see any cause to doubt their credibility or reliability. 

14.  For the avoidance of doubt, my reference to and reliance on the PRC Judgment is limited as aforesaid.  I accord no weight to the PRC Court’s findings or conclusions. I come to my own on the evidence before me.

Beijing Company

15.  The Beijing Company was a state-owned enterprise, more specifically, a company owned by the whole people (全民所有制企業).

Co-operation between Beijing Company & Kingpower

16.  Kingpower was incorporated on 1 August 1986[11].

17.  In about 1988, the Beijing Company commenced business in Hong Kong through co-operation with Kingpower. In gist, the Beijing Company provided Kingpower with knitwear export quotas and shared the profits generated to Kingpower through the use or sale of such quotas[12].

18.  Kingpower functioned as the Beijing Company’s HongKong branch office/window company.  In support, I accept the following evidence:

(1)  paragraph 5 of Ms Xie’s witness statement;

(2)  paragraph 5 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement;

(3)  paragraph 5 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement;

(4)  paragraph 3 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; and

(5)  the Beijing Company’s statement in its letter dated 3 October 1988 to the then Bank of China, Hong Kong Branch (“BOCHK”) (page 1190):「茲確認港佳紡織有限公司為我公司的駐港機構。」, which was written to procure the grant of banking facilities to Kingpower.

19.  At some stage, Mr Li, then the deputy general manager (副總經理) of the Beijing Company[13], together with Mr Zhang and Mr Zhong, were posted by the Beijing Company from Beijing to Hong Kong to work in Kingpower[14]. As the most senior staff of the Beijing Company in Hong Kong, Mr Li was responsible for reporting to, and obtaining instructions from,  the general manager of the Beijing Company who was楊書武 at the time[15].

Acquisition of Eternal Building Flats in Kingpower’s name

20.  In the course of the co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower, Eternal Building Flat A and Eternal Building Flat B were conveyed into the name of Kingpower by assignments dated 2 December 1989 at the respective price of $984,126 and $985,986 (see land search records at pages 1174 and 1182). The purchases were financed to the extent of $1,770,00 by an instalment loan from The Ka Wah Bank Ltd (“KWB”)[16].

21.  Kingpower acquired the Eternal Building Flats for the benefit of the Beijing Company.  According to paragraph 49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, the Eternal Building Flats were parts of the Beijing Company’s profits from its co-operation with Kingpower.  I find such statement credible.

(1)  First, it was Mr Li, the Beijing Company’s most senior employee posted to work in Kingpower, who had entered into the agreements for sale and purchase dated 18 January 1989 as purchaser[17].  Kingpower took up the assignments only by nomination of Mr Li on 2 March 1989 (pages 1822-1825 & 1826-1829).  If Kingpower was the beneficial owner of these properties, why would it have to go through Mr Li in the first place?  In this connection, as per paragraph 9 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement, to which I accord weight, Mr Li had told Mr Zhong that he had purchased the properties at Tsat Tsz Mui Road (which, on the evidence, could only be the Eternal Building Flats) for the Beijing Company’s Hong Kong branch office/window company after reporting to, and obtaining authorisation from, 楊書武.

(2)  Second, Kingpower subsequently transferred the Eternal Building Flats into Mr Li’s name free of any actually paid consideration upon the cessation of its business relationship with the Beijing Company in about the late 1980’s or early 1990’s[18] upon terms that CCT (the Beijing Company’s replacement branch office/window company in Hong Kong)[19] just had to repay KWB the outstanding mortgage loan and to discharge the stamp duties and the legal costs and expenses incidental to the transfers.  See [24(6)] below.  It would have been unlikely for Kingpower to do so had it been the beneficial owner of these properties.

Termination of co-operation between the Beijing Company & Kingpower & transfer of Eternal Building Flats by Kingpower into Mr Li’s name

22.  In about the late 1980’s or early 1990’s, the co-operation between the Beijing Company and Kingpower ceased.  

23.  As part of the arrangements made upon the termination of the co-operation between Kingpower and the Beijing Company, Kingpower transferred the Eternal Building Flats into Mr Li’s name by assignments dated 6 September 1990 (pages 1830-1834 & 1835-1840) for stated considerations of $984,126 and $985,986.  Such stated considerations were notably the same as the purchase prices that had been paid for these units.  They were not actually paid[20].

24.  Mr Li held the Eternal Building Flats on trust for CCT, the Beijing Company’s new branch office/window company in Hong Kong.

(1)  I have already ruled in [21] above that Kingpower held the Eternal Building Flats on trust for the Beijing Company. 

(2)  I will in [26] below hold that CCT was the Beijing Company’s new branch office/window company in Hong Kong.

(3)  The transfers of the Eternal Building Flats by Kingpower to CCT were effected to return to the Beijing Company its share of profit from its co-operation with Kingpower[21]. 

(4)  Mr Li was at all material times the Beijing Company’s most senior employee posted to work in Hong Kong, firstly in Kingpower and then in CCT (see [36]-[37] below).

(5)  As noted in [21(1)] above, Mr Li had told Mr Zhong that he had purchased the properties at Tsat Tsz Mui Road (i.e. the Eternal Building Flats) for the Beijing Company’s Hong Kong branch office/window company after reporting to, and obtaining authorisation from, 楊書武[22].

(6)  It was CCT that repaid KWB the mortgage loan then outstanding on the Eternal Building Flats and discharged the stamp duties and the legal costs and expenses incidental to the transfers by Kingpower to Mr Li[23]. There is certainly no evidence indicating that Mr Li then had the personal means to afford these payments.

(7)  It was CCT that kept the proceeds of sales of the Eternal Building Flats and deployed the same to partially repay the mortgage loan due in respect of the Provident Centre Flat (which I will find in [61] below to have been acquired and held in the name of Mr Li on trust for CCT).  See the table under [56] below.

Setting up of CCT as the Beijing Company’s new HK office/company

25.  In place of Kingpower, CCT was formed on 5 October 1990[24] upon Mr Li’s proposal to the Beijing Company and the approval of such proposal by the Beijing Company[25].  Ms Lai handled all the formalities of the setting up of CCT[26].

26.  CCT took over the role of the Beijing Company’s branch office/window company in Hong Kong. In support, in addition to paragraph 7 of Ms Xie’s witness statement, paragraph 6 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement, paragraph 8 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement, paragraphs 6 and 19 of Ms Lai’s witness statement and the testimonies of楊書武,  吳大蚌, 何岱, 郭世明, 胡明智, 趙俊波and 宋紅英as recorded in the PRC Judgment (pages 414, 416, 417, 420 and 422), to which I accord weight, I find the following extracts (with emphasis added) forceful:

(1)  the first sentence of the Beijing Company’s letter dated 4 October 1991 to BOCHK to procure the grant of banking facilities by BOCHK to CCT (page 1063): 「国际永年纺织有限公司系我公司驻港机构。」;

(2)  Mr Li’s handwritten indorsement on such letter:「本人李殿孝乃北京市针棉织品进出口公司于1990年派驻香港人员,在港代北京市针棉织品进出口公司开辦子公司 “國際永年纺织品有限公司” …」;

(3)  the first sentence of the 1996 Agreement (pages 532-533), to which Mr Li was a party :「香港国际永年纺织有限公司是甲方于一九八八年以李殿孝个人名义在香港注册的分支机构。」; and

(4)  the remark on the undated BOCHK “information for company account” (「公司帳戶資料紀錄」) (pages 1679-1680):「該司 (clearly referring to CCT) 为北京针棉织品进出口公司驻港机构」.

CCT shareholding & directorship before 2001 Agreement

27.  At its inception, only 2 subscribers’ shares of $1 each in CCT were issued and allotted, one to Mr Li and one to a Man Ping (萬平) (“Mr Man”), who also formed the board of directors of CCT[27].  Neither Mr Li nor Mr Man paid for their respective share in, or provided any working capital to, CCT[28].  Mr Man was made a shareholder and director of CCT to comply with the then legal requirement for a company to have at least 2 shareholders and 2 directors.  He was not actually involved in CCT’s operations[29].

28.  On 24 January 1991, at the direction of the Beijing Company[30], Mr Man transferred his 1 share in CCT to Mr Zhong[31] who also replaced Mr Man as a director[32]. No consideration moved from Mr Zhong to Mr Man for the transfer[33].

29.  On 25 June 1994, at the direction of the Beijing Company and upon Mr Zhong’s transfer back to Beijing[34], Mr Zhong transferred his 1 share to Ms Lai[35] who also took Mr Zhong’s place on CCT’s board of directors[36].  As in the case of the transfer from Mr Man to Mr Zhong, no consideration moved from Ms Lai to Mr Zhong[37].

30.  Then, within the year ended 5 October 1995, CCT issued 19,998 more shares of $1 each which were allotted to Mr Li as to 18,998 shares and Ms Lai as to 1,000 shares so that Mr Li and Ms Lai respectively held 18,999 shares and 1,001 shares in CCT[38]. 

Beneficial ownership of Mr Li’s CCT Shares before 2001 Agreement

31.  Leaving aside for the time being the 2001 Agreement and its proper construction (which I will consider in [91]-[94] below), I have formed the opinion that Mr Li held all the CCT Shares registered under his name on trust for the benefit of the Beijing Company.  And I reject the claim in paragraph 37 of Mr Li’s amended defence that he was the beneficial owner of all CCT Shares, not even those registered under his name, insofar as the period before the 2001 Agreement is concerned.

(1)  As I have held in [26] above, CCT was set up to be the Beijing Company’s new branch office/window company in Hong Kong.  Indeed, its formation was proposed by Mr Li to the Beijing Company and authorised by the Beijing Company.

(2)  Mr Li remained an employee of the Beijing Company until early 2001.  As noted in [36]-[37] below, he was posted to work in, and appointed the general manager of, CCT by the Beijing Company.  He was in fact the Beijing Company’s most senior employee in Hong Kong.

(3)  As noted in [26(2)] above, Mr Li had indorsed on the Beijing Company’s said letter dated 4 October 1991 to BOCHK (page 1063):「本人李殿孝乃北京市针棉织品进出口公司于1990年派驻香港人员,在港代北京市针棉织品进出口公司开辦子公司 “國際永年纺织品有限公司” …」(emphasis added).

(4)  It would have been unlikely for the Beijing Company to devote so much resources to CCT as set out in [40] below had it not been the beneficial owner of its share capital.  On the other hand, there is no evidence of any financial contribution by Mr Li to the operation of CCT.

(5)  Mr Li entered into the 1996 Agreement with this opening statement:「香港国际永年纺织有限公司是甲方于一九八八年以李殿孝个人名义在香港注册的分支机构。」(emphasis added)

(6)  The 1996 Agreement would have been otiose had the Beijing Company not then been the beneficial owner of the CCT Shares held by Mr Li.

(7)  The same can be said of the 2001 Agreement.

32.  While on the relationship between CCT, the Beijing Company and Mr Li, I have not overlooked the statement made by Ms Lai at an interview with the representative(s) of the Second Branch of the People’s Procuratorate of the Beijing Municipality (“PRCProcuratorate”) on 7 May 2009[39] that Mr Li had told her that CCT could represent to third parties that it was the Beijing Company’s window company in Hong Kong but it was in fact his own company.  This is a hearsay statement of an allegation made by Mr Li.  While I should take note that Mr Li had allegedly made such a claim, I must also weigh it against the material listed in the preceding paragraph.

Beneficial ownership of Ms Lai’s 5% Shares

33.  As for Ms Lai’s position, the allotment to Ms Lai of 1,000 new shares, which accounted for 5% of the shareholding, in CCT (“MsLai’s 5% Shares”), in 1995 was effected pursuant to an agreement made between Mr Li for and on behalf of CCT and Ms Lai back on 1 April 1993 (page 1739) (“1993 Agreement”).  The 1993 Agreement stipulates as follows:

協議書

甲方:國際永年紡織有限公司        李殿孝 身份証號:xxxxxxx(x)

乙方:黎少娟小姐 身份証號:xxxxxxx(x)

甲乙雙方經友好協商,達成協議如下:

一.  甲方根據香港法律在港注册之公司必須最少兩名股東之規定及考慮到乙方多年來為公司所做之貢獻,同意將國際永年紡織有限公司之股份,分出百份之五予乙方。

二.  雙方明确,乙方在本公司服務期間內,按公司財務報表決算可每年按比例參與分紅。但公司在港之房產及其它生意,與乙方無關。

三.  無論因何種原因,如乙方離開國際永年紡織有限公司,上述百份之五之股份,乙方自應歸還與甲方。

此協議正本一式三份,雙方各執一份,另一份留北京市針棉織品進出口集團公司備查,具有同等法律效力。

甲方:  乙方:
國際永年紡織品有限公司黎少娟
李殿孝 
 1993年4月1日

34.  Under the 1993 Agreement:

(1)  Ms Lai’s 5% Shares were allotted to, inter alia, reward Ms Lai for her service to CCT.

(2)  Ms Lai is entitled to hold such shares only while she remains an employee of CCT.  She is obliged to return the shares to CCT once she leaves its employ for whatever reasons.

(3)  As holder of Ms Lai’s 5% Shares, Ms Lai is entitled to share 5% of CCT’s profits as shown in CCT’s financial reports. 

(4)  However, she has nothing to do with CCT’s landed properties in Hong Kong.

35.  In view of the 1993 Agreement, I reject the averment in paragraph 37(2) of Mr Li’s amended defence that Ms Lai held the 1,001 CCT Shares registered in her name on trust for him.  Ms Lai was already the holder of 1 share in CCT, thereby satisfying the legal requirement for at least 2 shareholders.  Mr Li has not explained the purpose served by allotting 1,000 more shares to Ms Lai in 1995 for her to hold on trust for him or the reason why he could not hold those shares himself.  In the circumstance, Ms Lai’s 5% Shares are clearly held by Ms Lai in her own right for as long as she remains in the employ of CCT.  Ms Lai only asserts beneficial ownership to Ms Lai’s 5% Shares (including the 1 share then held by Ms SW Lai).  She acknowledges that she held 95% of the CCT Shares on trust for the Beijing Company[40].  I shall assess the validity of such position when I discuss the 2001 Agreement and its meaning and effect in [91]-[94] below.

Mr Li’s position in CCT other than as a shareholder & director

36.  Mr Li, together with Mr Zhang and Mr Zhong were again stationed by the Beijing Company in Hong Kong, this time, to work in CCT[41].

37.  Further, Mr Li was appointed the general manager of CCT[42]. Throughout the period from 1990/1991 to 2005/2006, CCT submitted to the Inland Revenue Department (“IRD”) employer’s returns in respect of the remuneration paid by CCT to Mr Li as its employee for the purpose of computing the salaries tax payable by Mr Li[43]. 

38.  As the most senior employee of the Beijing Company in Hong Kong, Mr Li continued to (1) report to the general manager of the Beijing Company[44] and (2) take the Beijing Company’s directions and instructions and convey them to other officers and employees of CCT for execution[45].

CCT’s business & Beijing Company’s business & financial support

39.  The business of CCT was similar to that of Kingpower[46].

40.  The Beijing Company supported the business of CCT in various ways.

(1)  First, the initial working capital of CCT came from (a) the profit generated to the Beijing Company from its co-operation with Kingpower which was kept, and subsequently transferred to CCT, by Kingpower; and (b) certain outstanding receivables due from some customers of Kingpower for the sale and purchase of knitwear export quotas provided by the Beijing Company[47].

(2)  Second, the Beijing Company supplied to CCT, at no or low costs or on credit, knitwear export quotas which CCT then sold for profit or used to produce and export knitwear[48]. 

(3)  Third, the Beijing Company sometimes directly provided working capital to CCT[49].

(4)  Fourth, on occasions, the Beijing Company acted as guarantor to procure various banking facilities for CCT’s use[50].

Beneficial ownership of bank accounts opened & maintained by Messrs Li, Zhang & Zhong

41.  In addition to paragraphs 9 to 13 of Ms Lai’s witness statement dated 19 December 2016, I am satisfied on the documentary evidence before me[51] that Mr Li held, inter alia, the savings and current bank accounts with BOCHK and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”) either singly or jointly with either Mr Zhang or Mr Zhong as particularised in paragraphs 3(d) to 3(g) of the ASOC.  

42.  Consistently with paragraph 13 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, there are documents in the trial bundles showing that Mr Li also held other accounts with various banks singly[52] or jointly with Mr Zhang[53] or Mr Zhong[54].  Of significance are the accounts numbered 247-10-030552-3 and 247-20-092767-8(“Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account” and “Mr Li’s 2nd LCH Account” respectively) opened and maintained by Mr Li with Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd (“LCH”).

43.  I accept that the setting up of bank accounts in the names of Messrs Li, Zhang and Zhong was necessitated by the non-completion of the incorporation formalities of CCT, which prevented CCT from opening bank accounts[55]. After the formation of CCT, these accounts were kept for use by CCT for its business operations[56]. For instance, to facilitate the compilation of sales statistics, the income from sales achieved by Mr Zhong would be paid into the joint account(s) of Mr Li and Mr Zhong while the income from sales achieved by Mr Zhang would be deposited into the joint account(s) of Mr Li and Mr Zhang[57].

44.  Contrary to the denials in paragraph 3 of Mr Li’s amended defence, the funds kept in all the abovementioned bank accounts came from, and belonged to, CCT, not the account holders.  In support, I refer to paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, paragraphs 12 and 13 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement and paragraphs 10 to 12 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement.  I accept these witnesses’ evidence for 4 reasons. 

(1)  First, the explanation given by Ms Lai and Mr Zhong for the opening of the accounts in question pending the completion of the formalities for the incorporation of CCT is plausible.

(2)  Second, the amounts deposited into, and withdrawn from, such accounts were very sizable.  There is no evidence suggesting that any of the 3 gentlemen would personally have funds of such magnitude at his disposal.  Mr Zhang has volunteered in paragraph 11 of his witness statement that from 1988 to 1992, his monthly salary in Kingpower and CCT was just $5,000.

(3)  Third, I find the existence of joint accounts between Mr Li and Mr Zhang and between Mr Li and Mr Zhong telling.  The only connections between Mr Li and Mr Zhang and between Mr Li and Mr Zhong were that they were colleagues in CCT.  Such relationships should not and would not normally entail the holding of joint bank accounts unless the accounts were opened and maintained for the business of CCT.  Mr Li has certainly not provided any reason for opening and maintaining joint accounts with either Mr Zhang or Mr Zhong.

(4)  Fourth, the joint accounts involving Mr Zhang and Mr Zhong were operated even after Mr Zhang and Mr Zhong were transferred back to Beijing in 1992 and 1994 respectively: paragraph 18 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.  See also the tables in [46] and [56] below.

Property dealings before 1996 Agreement

Purchase and beneficial ownership of China Harbour Office

45.  Mr Li became the registered owner of the China Harbour Office on 4 November 1991 (see land search record at page 1251).

46.  The purchase price of $2,616,761 and the associated costs and expenses were paid as follows:

Payment Date Payment Nature Amount Account from which payment came Supporting trial bundles references
 
21.9.91 Initial deposit $130,838.05 Mr Li & Mr Zhang
HSBC 599-3-009706
Cashier order application form & cashier order at page 1227
30.9.91 Further deposit $261,676.10 Ditto Cashier order application form & cashier order at page 1228
30.9.93 Estate agent’s commission $26,000.00 Ditto Form of withdrawal from Mr Li & Mr Zhang’s account; Standard Chartered Bank cheque drawn on Ms Lai’s account & estate agent’s receipt at pages 1230-1232
25.10.91 Balance of purchase price & legal costs & expenses $2,366,261.25 $1,300,000 from BOCHK mortgage loan
$1,066,261.25 from Mr Li & Mr Zhang HSBC 599-3-009706
Facility letter at pages 1233-1235
Cashier order application form & cashier order at page 1239
4.12.91 – 6.4.92 Mortgage instalments $1,188,038.71 Mr Li & Mr Zhang
BOCHK 012-875-0-018351-8
Direct debit instruction & 5th instalment debit advice at pages 1241 & 1245
§42(i) of Ms Lai’s witness statement
4.5.92 -4.2.96 Mortgage instalments Mr Li & Mr Zhong
BOCHK 012-875-1-082128-6
7th & 51st instalments debit advices at pages 1245-1246
§42(ii) of Ms Lai’s witness statement
4.3.96 – 4.5.99 Mortgage instalments Mr Li
BOCHK 012-891-1-012650-1
53rd instalment debit advice at page 1246
§42(iii) of Ms Lai’s witness statement
4.6.99 Balance of mortgage loan $873,030.22 CCT
BOCHK 012-875-1-077784-0
Withdrawal slip & exchange memo showing withdrawal from CCT BOCHK account & deposit into Mr Li BOCHK account at pages 1247-1248
§42(iv) of Ms Lai’s witness statement

47.  It can be seen that the bulk of the BOCHK mortgage loan ($873,030.22) was repaid with funds out of a bank account of CCT.

48.  Although parts of the initial capital outlays and expenses and mortgage repayments for acquisition of the China Harbour Office came immediately from bank accounts held in the names of Messrs Li, Zhang and Zhong, the ultimate source of the funds in those accounts was CCT.  I repeat the evidence identified, reasons stated and finding made in [44] above. 

49.  CCT would not have so financed the purchase of the China Harbour Office had it not intended to obtain the beneficial ownership of the property.

50.  Such conclusion is supported, firstly, by Ms Lai’s evidence-in-chief in court that she was put in charge of this transaction and that what purported to be Mr Li’s signature on the relevant provisional agreement (「買賣確定書」) was in fact signed by her as it was actually a purchase by the company (which would have to be CCT).

51.  Secondly, Mr Li himself had volunteered on a couple of occasions that the purchase of the China Harbour Office was financed by funds given by the Beijing Company to CCT.

(1)  As observed (more than once) above, Mr Li indorsed by hand on the Beijing Company’s said letter dated 4 October 1991 to BOCHK:「本人李殿孝乃北京市针棉织品进出口公司于1990年派驻香港人员,在港代北京市针棉织品进出口公司开辦子公司 “國際永年纺织品有限公司”, 由本人从現金带来香港开辦费用及購買寫字樓首期,並由北京公司向中國银行香港分行提供書本证明及担保有关 (illegible)」(emphasis added).  Of the 4 Subject Properties,the China Harbour Office is the only office property.

(2)  In the IRD questionnaire signed by Mr Li himself (pages 1484-1485) (“IRD Questionnaire”), Mr Li stated under part 6 (“particulars of amounts received from person other than the mortgagee to finance the purchase of property”) that with regard to the acquisition of the China Harbour Office, a non-repayable amount of $1,400,000 was provided by the Beijing Company, which was described by him as the Chinese parent company (「中國母公司 90年派驻香港」).

52.  Thirdly, clause 2(2) of the 1996 Agreement, to which Mr Li was a party, conclusively proves that Mr Li has been holding only the legal title to the China Harbour Office.   See [65] below.

53.  Fourthly, the use and occupation of the China Harbour Office by CCT as its office after acquisition (apparently without payment of rent) is another circumstance consistent with CCT’s beneficial ownership of the property.

54.  In the circumstances, in the absence of evidence to the contrary from Mr Li and in the papers before me, I consider it improbable for CCT not to intend to acquire the beneficial interest in the premises purchased wholly with its funds.  On this premise, I find that Mr Li held and still holds the China Harbour Office on trust for CCT.

Purchase and beneficial ownership of Provident Centre Flat

55.  Mr Li became the registered owner of the Provident Centre Flat on 16 November 1993 (see land search record at page 1317).  

56.  The purchase price of $7,850,000 and the associated costs and expenses were paid as follows:

Payment Date Payment Nature Amount Account from which payment came Supporting trial bundles references
 
9.8.93 Initial deposit $200,000.00 CCT
BOCHK 012-875-0-018761-7
CCT cheque 734693 at page 1270
18.8.93 Further deposit $585,000.00 Ditto CCT cheque 734707 at page 1270
18.8.93 Stamp duty $215,875.00 Ditto CCT cheque 734708) at page 1271
18.8.93 Estate agent’s commission $78,500 Ditto CCT cheque 734709 at page 1271
15.11.93 Balance of purchase price & legal costs & expenses $7,103,385.00 $5,000,000 from BOCHK mortgage loan
$2,103,385 from CCT BOCHK 012-875-1-077784-0
Facility letter at pages 1272-1274
Solicitors’ receipt for $2,103,385 at page 1284
Exhibit P2 (copy of CCT BOCHK 012-875-1-077784-0 passbook)
15.12.93-14.3.96 Mortgage instalments $4,977,235.94 Mr Li & Mr Zhong
BOCHK 012-875-1-082128-6
Direct debit instruction at page 1291
1st, 2nd & 27th instalments debit advices at pages 1288-1290 & 1296
§48 of Ms Lai’s witness statement
3.8.94 Mortgage part- repayment $1,000,000 from proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flat A Land search record showing sale of Eternal Building Flat A at $2,900,000 completed on 30 July 1994 at page 1175  
BOCHK receipt at page 1293
§49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement
15.11.94 Mortgage part-repayment $3,000,000 from proceeds of sale of Eternal Building Flats Land searches records showing sale of Eternal Building Flats A & Eternal Building Flat B at $2,900,000 & $2,630,000 completed on 30.7.94 & 26.8.94 respectively at pages 1175 & 1183
BOCHK receipt at page 1294
§49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement
15.4.96 –15.5.98 Mortgage instalments Mr Li BOCHK 012-891-1-012650-1 29th instalment debit advice at page 1296
§48 of Ms Lai’s witness statement
8.7.98 Balance of mortgage loan $737,678.93 Out of proceeds of sale of property Completion statement at page 1308

57.  As shown in the above table, CCT directly paid $3,182,760 ($200,000 + $585,000 + $215,875 + $78,500 + $2,103,385) at the time of purchase.

58.  The proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats, which we have established in [24] above as beneficially belonging to CCT, was used to make partial repayments of the mortgage loan secured by the Provident Centre Flat.  Such application is to a large extent corroborated by Mr Li’s own disclosure in the IRD Questionnaire that $3,066,067.04 of the purchase monies of the Provident Centre Flat came from the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats.  (I pause at this point to put a marker down that Mr Cong’s contention that Mr Li had paid for the Tanner Garden Flat with the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats[58], regardless of the beneficial ownership of such premises and proceeds, is false and contradicted by Mr Li’s said statement in the IRD Questionnaire.)

59.  The monies for mortgage repayments made out of Mr Li’s account and Mr Li and Mr Zhong’s joint account came from CCT, as found in [44] above. 

60.  I cannot think of any reason (and none has been put forward) why CCT would wholly finance the acquisition of the Provident Centre Flat but would then give up the beneficial interest in such property, thereby making a gift of the same to Mr Li.  As in the case of the China Harbour Office, clause 2(2) of the 1996 Agreement conclusively establishes that Mr Li was holding only the legal title to the Provident Centre Flat.

61.  In the circumstances, in the absence of evidence to the contrary from Mr Li and in the papers before me, I am satisfied that MrLi held the Provident Centre Flat on trust for CCT.

62.  The Provident Centre Flat was initially used as a quarter for the staff and visitors from the Beijing Company until late 1996 when Mr Li began to let it for rental income.  As in the case of the China Harbour Office, CCT’s use and occupation of the Provident Centre Flat after purchase (apparently rent-free) is a circumstance lending support to CCT’s claim to the beneficial ownership of the property.

Sale of Eternal Building Flats

63.  In the meantime, in the summer of 1994, the Eternal Building Flats, held in Mr Li’s name but belonging beneficially to CCT, were sold for the total price of $5,530,000 ($2,900,000 + $2,630,000). 

64.  Out of such sale proceeds, $1,444,866.96 was used to redeem the mortgages on the flats[59] and $29,101.00 ($14,726 + $14,375) went to settle the costs and disbursements of the sales[60].  Without taking into account the estate agent’s commissions, the proceeds left after these payments should have been $4,056,032.04 ($5,530,000 - $1,444,866.96 - $29,101.00).  Out of such balance of the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats, as noted in the table in [56] above, $4,000,000 had been applied towards the reduction of the mortgage loan due in respect of the Provident Centre Flat[61]. Only a modest sum of $56,032.04 would have been left.  I would be surprised if the disbursement of the estate agent’s commissions did not wipe out such residual sum, having regard to the amounts of the sale prices.

1996 Agreement between Beijing Company and Mr Li

65.  On about 16 February 1996, the Beijing Company and Mr Li entered into a「承包協議書」 (“1996 Agreement”) (pages 532-533)[62] in the following terms (emphasis added):

承包协议书

甲方:北京市针棉织品进出口集团公司

乙方:北京市针棉织品进出口集团公司李殿孝

    香港国际永年纺织有限公司是甲方于一九八八年以李殿孝个人名义在香港注册的分支机构。成立八年来,在李殿孝的努力下,为甲方的资产增值、市场拓展,货源保证、掌握信息、接待服务等方面作出显著成绩。

    为适应香港及国际市场日趋激烈的竞争,尽快与国际市场接轨,确保该公司在香港生存、发展,甲方同意李殿孝个人承包香港国际永年纺织有限公司。

一.  甲方同意乙方在遵守香港政府法律、法令的前提下,完全自主独立经营香港国际永年纺织有限公司。其经营品种、经营范围及经营方式完全按照国际市场的具体情况和惯例由乙方自行决定,甲方不再干预。

如因乙方经营不善发生亏损或倒闭,概由乙方自行负责。甲方自乙方承包之日起不再承担任何法律和经济责任。

二.  双方一致同意:乙方在承包前置办下列产业的使用权和所有权为甲方所有。其中包括:

1.  与国内企业合资的北京永大制衣有限公司、北京永达制衣有限公司、北京美丹永年制衣有限公司的股权。

2.  在香港购买的香港英皇道振华大厦15号B室写字楼和香港北角和富道和富中心第六座11楼A室住宅。

3.  以香港国际永年纺织有限公司职员个人名义购买的奔驰500小卧车二辆,宝马5201小卧车二辆,丰田CAMRY小卧车三辆。

三.  乙方自承包之日起至2000年12月31日止,每年上交甲方110万港币,五年共上交甲方550万港币。用以还清为购买上述香港物业之全部银行贷款,保证甲方资产增值。

四.  乙方在完成上交甲方以外的盈利,除要继续做好过往团组接待工作和完成甲方交待的其他任务外,其余归乙方所有,甲方不再干预。

五.  乙方2000年以后的承包方式及内容,届时根据具体情况商定。

此协议书正本一式四份,双方各执两份具有同等法律效力。

甲方:北京市针棉织品                  乙方:北京市针棉织品

           进出品集团公司                              进出口集团公司 李殿孝

66.  On a natural and ordinary reading, under the 1996 Agreement:

(1)  In return for $5,500,000 to be paid by Mr Li to the Beijing Company in 5 annual sums of $1,100,000 each, the latter relinquished to the former the right to operate CCT’s business independently of, and without interference from, the Beijing Company for 5 years expiring on 31 December 2000.

(2)  During those 5 years, Mr Li shall be solely entitled to CCT’s profits in excess of the said annual payments to the Beijing Company and shall solely bear CCT’s losses.  The Beijing Company shall have no financial obligation towards CCT.

(3)  The Beijing Company shall, however, retain the ownership of, and the right to use, the assets and properties acquired by Mr Li before the 1996 Agreement.

(4)  The arrangement to be adopted after the expiry of the 1996 Agreement will be negotiated against the circumstances prevailing on 31 December 2000.

67.  It is highly pertinent that the China Harbour Office and the Provident Centre Flat were specifically identified in the 1996 Agreement as assets in respect of which the Beijing Company retained ownership.  This may at first glance be incongruent with CCT’s case that it is/was the beneficial owner of these 2 properties.  However, the 1996 Agreement was a homemade document drafted by laymen. The drafting is understandably loose.  It also unsurprisingly displays an ignorance of the principles that a company is a legal entity separate from its shareholders and that the holders, not to mention the beneficial holders, of shares in a company do not thereby own, whether legally or beneficially, the assets of the company.  I think the parties to the 1996 Agreement clearly meant the arrangement made thereunder did not affect the beneficial title to the assets and properties acquired by Mr Li in name only before the 1996 Agreement.

Property dealings during term of 1996 Agreement (1.1.1996 – 31.12.2000)

Purchase of Tanner Garden Flat

68.  CCT became the registered owner of the Tanner Garden Flat on 10 September 1996 at the price of $6,450,000[63]. The purchase was financed to the extent of $3,100,000 by an instalment loan advanced by BOCHK[64]. The balance of the purchase price in the sum of $3,350,000 and the associated costs and expenses were paid by CCT[65]. This is uncontroversial.

Letting of Provident Centre Flat

69.  Contrary to the non-admission in paragraph 13(2) of Mr Li’s amended defence that the Provident Centre Flat had ever been rented out, there is, at pages 1309-1312, photocopy of a tenancy agreement dated 8 December 1996, whereby Mr Li let the Provident Centre Flat for a term of 2 years from 16 December 1996 to 15 December 1998 at a monthly rent of $38,000 exclusive of rates and management fee[66]. The parties later agreed on the early determination of the tenancy on 31 March 1998[67].

70.  There should be no other tenancy agreement or lease in respect of the Provident Centre Flat.  This is so because this property was initially used by CCT as accommodation for its directors and guests until 1996 when CCT began to let the same and then it was sold in 1998.

71.  Mr Li was the landlord under the said tenancy agreement.  In the normal course of event, to ensure a valid discharge, the tenant would pay rent to the landlord.  The tenant’s cheques mentioned in footnote [66] were made payable to Mr Li.  However, none of CCT’s witnesses dealt with, and there is no evidence as at, what Mr Li did or failed to do about the rental income from the Provident Centre Flat.

Sale of Provident Centre Flat

72.  In the meantime, Mr Li proposed to sell the Provident Centre Flat.  For that purpose, on 14 July 1997, he executed a power of attorney in favour of Ms Lai to entrust the sale of the Provident Centre Flats to her[68].

73.  Ms Lai then signed a provisional agreement for sale and purchase dated 8 September 1997 (page 1297), as attorney for Mr Li, for the sale of the Provident Centre Flat at $11,530,000. Deposits totalling $1,153,000 ($400,000 + $753,000) were paid to Mr Li[69].  Mr Li incurred estate agent’s commission and legal costs in the respective sums of $75,000[70] and $12,000[71] for this sale.  This transaction, however, fell through as a result of the purchaser’s default and Mr Li forfeited the said deposits.  After deducting the said costs and expenses, a net sum of $1,066,000 ($1,153,000 - $75,000 -$12,000) should have been realised.  Under normal circumstances, the cheques for the deposits would be made payable to the registered owner, i.e. Mr Li, in this case.  It is Ms Lai’s evidence in paragraph 54 of her witness statement, which I accept, Mr Li had not paid the net forfeited deposits back to CCT on an examination of CCT’s accounts.  In short, the net forfeited deposit from the attempted sale of the Provident Centre Flat is yet to be accounted for.

74.  By another provisional agreement for sale and purchase dated 22 April 1998 entered into by Ms Lai as attorney for Mr Li (pages 1303-1304), Mr Li agreed to sell the Provident Centre Flat at $10,200,000 and to pay the estate agent $102,000 for commission.  Deposits totalling $1,020,000 ($300,000 + $720,000) were paid to Mr Li on 22 April 1998 and 5 May 1998 respectively[72].  These deposits were paid into Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account[73]. As to the balance of purchase price, according to the relevant completion statement and completion cheque (page 1308), the proceeds of sale, after deducting the redemption money paid to BOCHK ($737,678.93) and solicitors’ costs and disbursements ($16,000), was $8,426,321.07, which was paid to Mr Li on 8 June 1998.[74]

75.  I cannot find any document in the trial bundles showing the account into which Mr Li had deposited this sum.  After taking into account the abovementioned commission payable to the estate agent, the net proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat should be about $9,344,321.07 ($1,020,000 + $8,426,321.07 - $102,000).  Under normal circumstances, the cheques/cashier orders for the deposits and the balance of the purchase price would be made payable to the registered owner, i.e. Mr Li, in this case.  According to paragraph 55 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, Mr Li had deposited such sums into an (unspecified) account held in his sole name with LCH.  It will be seen under the next heading that $6,000,000 of the proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat was applied towards the acquisition of the Pacific Palisades Flat, as summarised in the table under [77] below.  That being the case, a sum of approximately $3.3 million  ($9,344,321.07 - $6,000,000) from the sale of the Provident Centre Flat remains unaccounted for.

Purchase and letting of Pacific Palisades Flat

76.  Mr Li became the registered owner of the Pacific Palisades Flat on 26 June 1998 (see land search record at page 1375). 

77.  The purchase price of $7,700,000 and the associated costs and expenses were paid as follows:

Payment Date Payment Nature Amount Account/source from which payment came Supporting trial bundles references
 
3.6.98 Initial deposit $100,000 $6,000,000 from proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat (§56 of Ms Lai’s witness statement at page 341)[75]
$1,700,000 from mortgage loan from Citibank NA (loan statement at page 1339)
Acknowledgment of receipt of LCH cheque 315714 in provisional agreement at page 1336
336 Further deposit $250,000 Handwritten reference to LCH cheque 315715 on provisional agreement at page 1336
12.6.98 2nd further deposit $420,000 Solicitors’ receipt for LCH cheque 315717 at page 1337
15.7.98 Balance of purchase price $6,930,000 Clause 2(d) of provisional agreement at page 1335
12.6.98 Stamp duty $211,750  Solicitors’ receipt for LCH cheque 315719 at page 1338
12.6.98 Estate agent’s commission $77,000  Clause 9 of provisional agreement at page 1336
26.6.98 Legal costs & expenses $38,760  
24.7.99 Partial repayment of mortgage loan $1,000,000 Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account Request to make partial payment signed by Mr Li at page 1340
Mr Li’s cheque 328948 at page 1341

78.  It can be seen that the price was paid as to $6,000,000 out of the proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat which, as determined in [61] above, was held by Mr Li on trust for CCT.  The monies used to make partial repayment of the mortgage loan due to Citibank, i.e. $1,000,000, though coming out immediately from Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account, belonged beneficially to CCT (see [44] above).

79.  However, Ms Lai’s testimony deals only with the sources of the purchase price of the Pacifica Palisades Flat, but not the stamp duty, estate agent’s commission and the legal costs and expenses.  Although it is asserted in Schedule III to the ASOC that the stamp duty and legal costs and expenses were paid out of Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account, save for the stamp duty that appears to have been paid by a LCH cheque in sequence with those settling the 3 tranches of deposit drawn on Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account, there is no evidence as to who paid the estate agent’s commission or the legal costs and expenses.  In the absence of evidence, I cannot make any finding as to the source(s) of the fund(s) used for settlement of such commission or expenses.

80.  However, the lack of evidence on who paid the relatively modest estate agent’s commission and the legal costs and expenses does not prevent me from holding, on the basis of the capital outlays totalling $7,000,000 mentioned in [78] above, that the intention was for CCT to have the beneficial ownership of the Pacific Palisades Flat.  And I so hold.  Consequently, Mr Li held the Pacific Palisades Flat on trust for CCT.

81.  After purchase, the Pacific Palisades Flat was let for rental income as follows:

Tenancy agreement date Term of tenancy Tenant Monthly rent Supporting trial bundles references
 
Unknown 27.6.98 – 31.8.00 Sony International (Hong Kong) Ltd Unknown Tenant’s confirmatory letter dated 3.5.00 at page 1344
17.7.00 1.9.00 – 31.8.02 Noriyuki Hironaka $31,000 inclusive of government rate & management fee Provisional tenancy agreement at page 1345
Formal tenancy agreement at pages 1346-1350
30.4.04 5.5.04 - 4.5.06 NYK Line (Hong Kong) Ltd $25,000 inclusive of government rent & rate & management fee Tenancy agreement at pages 1352-1363
27.10.06 10.11.06 – 9.11.08 Zhou Guo Min $23,500 inclusive of government rent & rate & management fee Provisional tenancy agreement at pages 1364-1365

82.  Although there is no direct evidence, Mr Li was the landlord under the abovementioned tenancy agreements.  In the normal course of event, to ensure a valid discharge, the tenant would pay rent to the landlord.  Ms Lai (whose evidence[76] I accept) subsequently found out that Mr Li had not returned the Pacific Palisades Flat rental income to CCT, thereby suggesting that Mr Li had misappropriated the monies.

Redemption of Tanner Garden Flat

83.  CCT paid off the mortgage on, and redeemed, the Tanner Garden Flat in June 1999[77].

2001 Agreement & its meaning & effect

84.  The 1996 Agreement expired on 31 December 2000.

85.  On 18 February 2001, the Beijing Company (represented by its then general manager, Dai Xiu Fang (戴秀芳)) and Mr Li signed a memorandum of agreement in the following terms (“2001 Agreement”) (page 1821):

协议备忘录

     北京市针棉织品进出口集团公司(以下简称甲方)与香港国际永年纺织有限公司李殿孝先生(以下简称乙方)经友好协商,达成如下协议备忘录。

1.  乙方原为甲方职工并曾任副经理职务,鉴于乙方已于1988年至香港经商,并于数年前移居香港,为此,再継续保留其在甲方的工职及职务已不适宜,现乙方向甲方提出辞职申请,甲方同意乙方的要求,并相应免去其原副经理的职务。

2.  甲方同意,以乙方的名义在香港注册的国际永年纺织有限公司,自乙方辞职后,即与甲方完全脱离关系。甲方明确,对于乙方以前及今后的经营管理及贷款负债等所有事项,概不承担任何责任,一切责任由乙方自负。

3.  双方同意,如有其它未尽事宜,将本着友好合作的精神,协商解决。

     此协议备忘录正本一式两份,双方各执一份,签字盖章有效,并具有同等法律效力。

甲方:北京市针棉织品乙方:国际永年纺织
           进出口集团公司           有限公司
           (Chop of the PRC Company &            (Chop of CCT &
           signature of Dai Xiu Fang)           signature of Mr Li)

(emphasis added)

86.  There is no dispute as to the provenance of the 2001 Agreement.  Paragraph 32 of the PRC Judgment quoted its content. A number of witnesses who gave evidence before the PRC Court (Mr Zhang, 郭世明 and胡明智) were aware or had heard of such agreement.  The actual photocopy kept amongst CCT’s records and papers has been produced by CCT as exhibit P1.  Mr Cong has also obtained a copy from Mr Li’s son.

87.  Despite the averment in paragraph 37 of Mr Li’s amended defence that he was the sole beneficial shareholder of CCT, Mr Li himself made no mention of the 2001 Agreement in his pleading. 

88.  Mr Cong seems to be the first party to raise the 2001 Agreement.  He did so by adding paragraph 14B when he filed his re-amended defence on 4 April 2018.  Mr Cong apparently became aware of the existence and content of the 2001 Agreement from reading the PRC Judgment.  Other than pleading the terms of the 2001 Agreement and the fact that it was entered into after the 1996 Agreement, Mr Cong has not elaborated on what he contends to be the meaning or effect of such agreement.

89.  CCT’s response in respect of Mr Cong’s pleading of the 2001 Agreement is contained in paragraph 4 of its reply to the re-amended defence of Mr Cong as follows (sic):

“… the [2001 Agreement] concerned only on the management of [CCT] and was silent on the beneficiary ownerships of any real properties in question. It is further averred that, it was an express term of the 1996 Agreement (承包協議書) that “二. 雙方一致同意:乙方在承包前置辦下列產業的使用權和所有權為甲方所有. 其中包括:…2. 在香港購買的香港英皇道振華大廈15B室寫字樓和香港北角和富道和富中心第六座11樓A室住在”. In the premises aforesaid, the said express term was never contradicted by any subsequent agreement and [Mr Li] had been a trustee holding all real properties in question or the sale proceeds at all material times, as the case may be.”

90.  Other than the production of the 2001 Agreement by CCT and Mr Cong, no meaningful evidence has been given on its factual matrix (save that it was made at the time of Mr Li’s resignation from the Beijing Company).

91.  I agree with CCT that the 2001 Agreement did not affect or purport to affect CCT’s beneficial title to any of the Subject Properties.  This agreement was made between the Beijing Company and Mr Li only.  CCT was not privy to it.  The Beijing Company and Mr Li could not and did not between themselves purport to deprive CCT of the ownership, legal or beneficial, to any property.

92.  In my view, what the 2001 Agreement sought to deal with was the Beijing Company’s beneficial ownership of the 95% CCT Shares registered under Mr Li’s name.  In the absence of any factual matrix pointing to a different interpretation, on the face of the 2001 Agreement:

(1)  Mr Li tendered, and the Beijing Company accepted, Mr Li’s resignation from the Beijing Company.

(2)  With effect from Mr Li’s resignation, the Beijing Company completely severed its relation with CCT (「以乙方的名义在香港注册的国际永年纺织有限公司,自乙方辞职后,即与甲方完全脱离关系」) and shall have no more responsibility for the operation and management of CCT by Mr Li, or the loans and indebtedness etc incurred, before and after such agreement, all liabilities for which shall be borne by Mr Li.

93.  On the materials before me, the only relation between the Beijing Company and CCT that is apparent to me was the former’s then beneficial ownership of the 95% CCT Shares held by Mr Li[78]. As I see it, by completely severing its relation with CCT (「完全脱离关系」) by entering into the 2001 Agreement, the Beijing Company was terminating the trust of the CCT Shares in question and giving up its beneficial interest therein to Mr Li so that from the date of the 2001 Agreement, Mr Li became both the legal and beneficial owner of the CCT Shares registered in his name.  First, Mr Li was the only other party to the 2001 Agreement.  Second, the beneficial estate usually follows the legal one.  Third, Mr Li was made to bear sole liability for CCT’s loans and indebtedness (「贷款负债」)[79].

94.  That Mr Li had become the legal and beneficial owner of 95% of the CCT Shares, does not, however, support his proposition in paragraph 38 of his amended defence that CCT’s complaints about his dealings with the Subject Properties, even if established, can be regarded as having been authorised or ratified by all shareholders of CCT and therefore by CCT. 

95.  It bears repeating that a company is a legal entity separate from its shareholders and that the holders, not to mention the beneficial holders, of shares in a company do not thereby own, whether legally or beneficially, the assets of the company or can deal with company assets as they like.  The only qualification is where the principle in Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 2 Ch 365 at 373C is satisfied.  Simply put, where it could be shown that all shareholders who had a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assented to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent was as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be, provided that the decision of the shareholders must be made honestly at a time when the company was solvent.  See Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] 1 Ch 258 at 288D-E; and Bowthorpe Holdings Ltd v Hills [2003] 1 BCLC 226 at [49]-[52].

96.  The Duomatic principle has no application here.  Mr Li had never at any material times held all the CCT Shares.  Anyways, I have no evidence as to the solvency or otherwise of CCT at the times of Mr Li’s dealings with Subject Properties.

97.  For the sake of completeness, I should make a note here that according to paragraph 40 on page 20 of the PRC Judgment, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the Beijing Municipality (北京市人民政府國有資產監督管理委員會) had expressed the view that the 2001 Agreement is illegal.  The reason therefor is that the Beijing Company was a state-owned enterprise.  The interest in the shares of CCT that was “formed” by the Beijing Company’s investment (「其投資所形成的股權」) was therefore a state-owned asset (國有資產).  Those involved in signing the 2001 Agreement were therefore suspected of (「涉嫌」) the unlawful disposal of a state-owned asset.  However, the legality or otherwise of the 2001 Agreement has not been raised or argued before me.  I have no expert evidence on the relevant PRC law.  I do not propose to explore the matter.  Anyways, it is unnecessary for me to do so.

98.  Further, I am not unaware that the subsequent dealings with the CCT Shares held in Mr Li’s name are inconsistent with my above interpretation of the 2001 Agreement.

99.  First, on 22 June 2009, the shares registered in Mr Li’s name were transferred to Ms Lai and Ms Lai, in turn, transferred 1 share under her name to her sister, Lai Siu Wan (黎少雲) (“Ms SW Lai”)[80], so that Ms Lai and Ms SW Lai respectively held 19,999 shares and 1 share in CCT[81].  Ms SW Lai also replaced Mr Li as director of CCT[82].

100.  Regarding such change of shareholding, it is Mr Li’s case as pleaded in paragraph 37(3) of his amended defence that Ms Lai and Ms SW Lai held all the CCT Shares as trustees for him.  On the other hand, according to paragraph 27 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, before his return to the Mainland at some point in 2007/2008 (which is uncontroversial), Mr Li had executed undated documents to resign as director of CCT and to transfer the CCT Shares registered under his name to Ms Lai, without any actually paid consideration.  The formalities were not completed until 22 June 2009 only due to delay on the part of CCT’s accountant(s).  What raises question is that it is also implicit in paragraph 27 of Ms Lai’s witness statement that Mr Li’s resignation and disposal of the CCT Shares were done at the direction of the Beijing Company.

101.  Mr Li did not attend trial to give evidence to make out the case pleaded in paragraph 37(3) of his amended defence.  However, there is no evidence that the 2001 Agreement had ever been rescinded or reversed after its conclusion and before the transfer by Mr Li.  That being the case, on the construction of the 2001 Agreement in [92]-[94] above, Mr Li was the legal and beneficial owner of 95% of the shareholding in CCT before he transferred the same to Ms Lai.  In the absence of evidence of any intention on the part of Mr Li to gift the shares to Ms Lai, the presumption is that Ms Lai held the shares on a resulting trust for Mr Li. I am therefore not inclined to accept the implicit suggestion in paragraph 27 of Ms Lai’s witness statement that by 2007/2008, the Beijing Company still had any proprietary interest in the CCT Shares held by Mr Li to give Mr Li direction for their disposal.

102.  Second, according to paragraph 30 of Ms Lai’s witness statement[83], the Beijing Company had in the meantime been wound up and dissolved on 7 August 2008, with the result that all the assets and properties of the Beijing Company were taken over by one 北京對外經貿控股集團有限責任公司. The 95% shareholding in CCT was apparently included as the assets and properties of the Beijing Company.  And the said北京對外經貿控股集團有限責任公司appointed one Wang Huiping (王輝平) (“Mr Wang”) as its representative to hold such shares in CCT.  Towards this end, on 18 November 2013, Ms Lai, one Mr Hui Sung Sat (許崇實) (“Mr Hui”)[84] and Ms SW Lai respectively transferred to Mr Wang 11,400 shares, 7,600 shares and 1 share in CCT.  After this round of transfers, the CCT Shares were held by Mr Wang as to 19,000 shares, Ms Lai at to 600 shares[85] and Mr Hui as to 400 shares[86].  After disposing of her 1 share, Ms SW Lai ceased to be a director.  In her place, Mr Wang was appointed.

103.  To complete the picture, Mr Wang’s shareholding and directorship in CCT were passed onto one Ma Guowei on 31 May 2017.

104.  As already noted, there is no evidence that the 2001 Agreement has at any stage been rescinded or reserved.  The transactions mentioned in the preceding 2 paragraphs disregarded the 2001 Agreement.  It has not been explained to me how these transactions could sit well with the 2001 Agreement, as construed above. Anyway, it is unnecessary to, and I do not, make any finding.

Dealings with properties after making of 2001 Agreement

Transfer of Tanner Garden Flat from CCT to Mr Li

105.  By an agreement for sale and purchase dated 10 August 2004 (pages 1762-1780) and an assignment dated 7 September 2004 (pages 1783-1788), CCT “sold” and transferred the Tanner Garden Flat to Mr Li for the stated consideration of $3,980,000.  According to Ms Lai[87], whom I believe, this transaction was carried out only upon Mr Li’s insistence.

106.  The said agreement and assignment were in the forms and on the terms commonly adopted in Hong Kong in this type of transactions.  In particular, they contained purported acknowledgments of receipt of different parts of the stated consideration.

107.  In the present case, on Mr Li and Mr Cong’s own pleaded case, the stated consideration of $3,980,000 for the transfer of the Tanner Garden Flat from CCT to Mr Li was not satisfied by Mr Li by direct payments by cheques/cashier orders, as is normally done.  

108.  Instead, Mr Li barely asserts in paragraph 26(3) of his amended defence that CCT held a sum of $4,000,000 in its bank account(s) on trust for him and that he paid CCT the consideration of the Tanner Garden Flat by set-off against the $4,000,000 allegedly held by CCT for him.  Mr Li has, however, given no particular of the circumstances in which CCT came to hold $4,000,000 on trust for him or where the sum originated from.

109.  On the other hand, Mr Cong has condescended to more particulars.  In paragraphs 14(2)(i), (ii), (iii) and (v) and 14A of his re-amended defence, Mr Cong asserts that Mr Li had “declared and confirmed” with him (1) that he was the registered and beneficial owner of the Eternal Building Flats; (2) that he disposed of the 2 properties, and discharged the mortgages thereon, in July and August 1994; (3) that the combined proceeds of sale of $4,000,000 “remained on the accounts of [CCT]” and was held by CCT as his trustee; and (4) that in 2004, the board of directors of CCT resolved to sell the Tanner Garden Flat to Mr Li and to use the sum of $4,000,000 owed by CCT to Mr Li to set off the purchase price of $3,980,000.

110.  I have already found that Mr Li held the Eternal Building Flats, not as beneficial owner, but on trust for CCT (see [24] above); and that the $4,000,000 realised from the sale of such properties completed on 30 July 1994 and 26 August 1994 (which belonged to CCT beneficially) had been applied to make 2 partial repayments of the loan secured by the mortgage of the Provident Centre Flat on 3 August 1994 and 15 November 1994 (see [56] & [58] above).

111.  In view of these findings, the defendants’ case that Mr Li had provided consideration for the Tanner Garden Flat with the use of the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats cannot stand.

112.  Neither Mr Li nor Mr Cong has put forward an alternative case.  It would have been difficult for them to do so with credibility.  I find, as a matter of fact, that Mr Li had not paid any consideration for the Tanner Garden Flat.

113.  Without an exchange of values and in the absence of evidence of an intention on the part of CCT to gift the property to Mr Li, Mr Li held the Tanner Garden Flat on a resulting trust for CCT.  I pause to reiterate that a company and its shareholders are separate entities and that a shareholder, not even a 95% shareholder like Mr Li, has no proprietary interest in the company’s assets and properties.

114.  It follows that Mr Li could not subsequently validly pass to Mr Cong the beneficial title to the Tanner Garden Flat.

Letting of China Harbour Office since 2006

115.  As stated above, it is CCT’s pleaded case, and I find, that Mr Li had rented out the China Harbour Office since 2006 after CCT ceased to use and occupy the property as its office. 

116.  Although there is no direct evidence, in the normal course of event, one would have expected the tenancy agreement(s) to be entered into by the registered owner, Mr Li, as landlord and the tenant to pay rent to Mr Li.  CCT, as beneficial owner of the China Harbour Office, was in turn entitled to receive from Mr Li the rental income derived from such property.  However, according to Ms Lai[88] (whom I believe), she could not find any record of receipt of any rental income from the China Harbour Office in the accounts of CCT, thereby suggesting that Mr Li had misappropriated the monies, at least before he left Hong Kong in 2007/2008.

Transfer of Tanner Garden Flat from Mr Li to Mr Cong

117.  By an agreement for sale and purchase (“Purported SPA”) and an assignment (“Purported Assignment”), both dated 3 July 2007, between Mr Li as vendor and Mr Cong as purchaser, Mr Li sold and conveyed the Tanner Garden Flat to Mr Cong for the stated consideration of $4,800,000.  Such agreement and assignment were registered with the Land Registry on 26 July 2007 (see land search record at pages 1430 & 1434).

118.  This transfer had been made without notice to CCT despite CCT’s beneficial ownership of the Tanner Garden Flat (see [113] above).  Ms Lai learnt of it after the incarceration of Mr Li in Beijing[89].

119.  I repeat the conclusion in [114] above.  That being the case, I do not think that Mr Cong can claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of CCT’s beneficial interest in the Tanner Garden Flat.  In this regard, Mr Li was a director of CCT.  This fact should and would have become plain to Mr Cong upon sight of the minutes of CCT’s directors’ meeting on 7 September 2004 (page 1781), which document is described by counsel for Mr Cong as “part of the title documents” of the Tanner Garden Flat[90]. The Tanner Garden Flat was CCT’s property.  By acquiring the Tanner Garden Flat from CCT, Mr Li was putting himself in a position of conflict of interests and, therefore, in breach of his fiduciary duty to CCT.  Requisition should have been, but was not, raised by Mr Cong.  Indeed, the whole stage of investigation of title, which is usually the most significant in a typical conveyancing transaction in Hong Kong, had peculiarly been skipped in this case.  Mr Cong obviously did not care about, and turned a blind eye to, whether Mr Li had a good title to the property.

120.  This should be sufficient to dispose of the dispute between CCT and Mr Cong in favour of the former over the beneficial ownership of the Tanner Garden Flat.

121.  For the sake of completeness, as in the case of the transfer from CCT to Mr Li, the Purported SPA and the Purported Assignment were likewise in the forms and on the terms commonly adopted in Hong Kong in this kind of transactions. 

122.  I am sceptical about Mr Cong’s entire case on his purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat.  The matters to be mentioned in [123]-[133] below are particularly worthy of note.

123.  First, there is no evidence of any negotiation or discussion between vendor and purchaser on the terms of the Purported SPA as one would find in a genuine arms-length transaction. 

124.  Second, the parties then completed the transaction on the same date by the Purported Assignment, without allowing any time for the usual steps between agreement and completion to take place.  I have already observed in [119] above that there was no investigation of Mr Li’s title.  This is so despite Mr Li’s express obligation under clause 8(a) of the Purported SPA (page 1792) to prove title in accordance with s 13 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap 219).  It is most unlikely for a bona fide purchaser of real estate to forgo his contractual right to be satisfied that the vendor does have a good title to the property that he is purchasing.

125.  Third, apart from clause 8(a) which the parties well knew would not be performed, the manner in which the purchase price was allegedly paid also completely disregarded clause 2(b) and Part II of the Second Schedule to the Purported SPA (pages 1791 & 1801).  These provisions, read together, required payment of the whole purchase price on 3 July 2007, being the date of the Purported SPA as well as the date of completion, by either cashier order(s) or solicitors’ cheque(s).

126.  As it turned out, Mr Cong paid no part of the purchase price of $4,800,000 on 3 July 2007.  Nor did he pay by cashier order(s) or solicitors’ cheque(s) either.  Instead, Mr Cong allegedly paid Mr Li by[91]:

(1)  waiving the principal and interest totalling RMB2,746,000 (then equivalent to $2,590,000) of a loan (in the principal amount of RMB2,000,000) (“Alleged Loan”) advanced by Mr Cong to Mr Li’s brother, Li Dian Yi (李殿義) (“MrDYLi”), in December 2002 and secured by Mr Li’s personal guarantee; and

(2)  remitting RMB2,622,000 (converted from $3,000,000) to one Li Yuan (李元) (“Mr Y Li”), Mr Li’s son, on 14October 2008.

127.  It is absurd for Mr Cong to have paid the purchase price of the Tanner Garden Flat to Mr Li in the said alleged manner.

(1)  Mr Cong would have “paid” Mr Li $5,590,000 ($2,590,000 + $3,000,000), which is considerably more than $4,800,000.  Neither Mr Cong nor Ms Cong has given any credible explanation for such generosity.

(2)  On the other hand, Mr Li did not receive any payment on the date of completion.  Conveyance and payment are normally simultaneous and inter-dependent obligations.

(3)  The said alleged settlement of the purchase price rendered the acknowledgment of receipt of the deposit and part payment in the amount of $480,000 in clause (a) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Purported SPA (page 1801) untrue.  So was the acknowledgment of receipt of the purchase price in the amount of $4,800,000 in clause 1 of the Purported Assignment (page 1806).  I can see no good reason why the parties should insert such falsities in the transaction documents which will become part of the title deeds and documents of the Tanner Garden Flat.

(4)  And the flip side is that there was, much against Mr Li’s interest, no acknowledgment of his discharge from the guarantee of the Alleged Loan to his brother.

128.  Fourth, other than departing from the contractual provisions governing the payment of the purchase price, the supporting documents disclosed by Mr Cong as proofs of payment of the purchase price of $4,800,000 as aforesaid raise more questions than they answer.

129.  In this connection, in support of the allegation in [126(1)] above, Mr Cong relies on (1) what purports to be a Chinese loan agreement dated 1 December 2002 (“Purported Loan Agreement”) between「北京市國都寵物樂園法人代表李殿義先生」(as borrower) and Mr Cong (as lender) but also signed by Mr Li as「中介擔保人」(page 1814); and (2) what appears to be a page downloaded from a website called「全國企業信用信息公示系統 (北京)」showing that Mr DY Li was the legal representative of 北京市國都寵物樂園有限公司 (page 1813).

130.  The problems that I see are:

(1)  As per clause 1 of the Purported Loan Agreement, repayment of the Alleged Loan was due on 31 October 2004, which was almost 3 years before the date of the Purported SPA and the Purported Assignment.

(2)  Notwithstanding clause 4 of the Purported Loan Agreement, there is before me no or no credible proof of any agreement to extend the repayment date of the Alleged Loan. 

(3)  If the consensus or intention was to write off this very stale debt owed by Mr Li as guarantor in part payment of the purchase price of the Tanner Garden Flat, why was this not reflected in the Purported SPA or the Purported Assignment? 

(4)  It is even more mind-boggling that the parties then saw fit to include false acknowledgments of receipt in the Purported SPA and the Purported Assignment.

131.  In support of the allegation in [126(2)] above, Mr Cong has disclosed (1) copy of a cheque dated 14 October 2008 in the sum of $3,000,000 drawn by Ms Cong on her account with Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd in favour of one 茂信興貿易公司 (page 1812); and (2) a remittance receipt dated 14 October 2008 issued by one Multi Easy Hing Trading Co (茂信興找換) showing the remittance of RMB2,622,000 (converted from $3,000,000) from Ms Cong to Mr Y Li (page 1815).

132.  Again, I have queries arising from these supporting documents.  While these documents show a payment of RMB2,622,000 by Madam Cong to Mr Y Li, there is no indication of the nature of the payment other than Mr Cong and Madam Cong’s words.  The lack of such objective or independent evidence assumes significant when the date of this payment is considerably later than the date of completion of the purported sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat between Mr Li and Mr Cong.   I have already noted the delayed payment of this part of the purchase price.

133.  On the aforesaid summary and analysis of the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that Mr Cong had paid the stated consideration of $4,800,000 for the sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat under the Purported SPA and the Purported Assignment whether as alleged or at all.

134.  In the premises, it is unnecessary to determine whether $4,800,000 was an under-value.

Sale of Pacific Palisades Flat

135.  By a provisional agreement for sale and purchase dated 13 August 2007 (pages 1342-1343), Mr Li as vendor agreed to sell the Pacific Palisades Flat at $7,780,000 and to pay the estate agent $77,800 for commission.  Under such agreement, deposits of $233,400 and $544,600 and the balance of purchase price of $7,002,000 should have been paid to Mr Li on 13 August 2007, 3 September 2007 and 18 October 2007 respectively. In addition, the said estate agent’s commission would also be due on 18 October 2007.  There is no evidence as to whether any sum was still outstanding under the mortgage loan from Citibank or the amount of the legal costs and expenses incurred for the sale.  In any event, even if no redemption money was payable to Citibank, the net proceeds of sale, after deducting the said estate agent’s commission and legal costs and expenses should be somewhat less than $7,780,000.

136.  According to Ms Lai[92], Mr Li had misappropriated the profit realised from the sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat.  I believe Ms Lai is speaking loosely.  Strictly speaking, the gross profit from the sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat should be the difference between the purchase price and the sale price, which is only $80,000 ($7,800,000 - $7,700,000).  Indeed, taking into account the costs and expenses incurred on the purchase and sale, the holding of the Pacific Palisades Flat resulted in a loss.  I believe, and I proceed on the basis, that what Ms Lai is saying (which I accept) is that Mr Li had not paid to CCT the net proceeds of sale that he received from selling the Pacific Palisades Flat.

Cessation of CCT’s business of selling knitwear export quotas

137.  Beginning from 2006, CCT has ceased its business of selling knitwear export quotas following the gradual abolition of the quota system for the export of textile goods in Mainland China after the PRC joined the World Trade Organisation[93].

Incarceration, conviction & imprisonment of Mr Li

138.  Mr Li was tried and convicted by the PRC Court of corruption in disposing, and misappropriating the proceeds of sale, of the landed properties of one 北京永大製衣有限公司[94] while he was the legal representative and chairman of that company from May 2003 to February 2007.  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 15 years from 29 August 2008 to 28 August 2023, which he was still serving at the time of the trial of this action[95]. 

Winding up & dissolution of Beijing Company

139.  I have already mentioned Ms Lai’s evidence in paragraph 30 of her witness statement that the Beijing Company had in the meantime been wound up and dissolved on 7 August 2008.  For the effects of the liquidation of the Beijing Company on CCT, see [102] and [103] above. 

ANSWERS

140.  I can now answer the questions set out in [3] above.

Laches

141.  I am unimpressed by Mr Li’s case on laches which runs like this: CCT made no complaint whatsoever to, or against, Mr Li regarding his dealings with the Subject Properties in breach of duties until the commencement of this action on 20 February 2012, by which time he had already lost his freedom and has therefore become unable to himself testify, locate material witnesses to give evidence or find relevant documents in his defence in this action.

142.  Mr Li was the most senior person stationed by the Beijing Company in Hong Kong.  As explained by Ms Lai in paragraphs 37 and 38 of her witness statement, Mr Li led and dominated the management of CCT’s business and operation prior to his departure from Hong Kong in 2007/2008.  She therefore thought that whatever Mr Li did had been authorised by the Beijing Company.  It did not occur to her to challenge his conduct in relation to CCT.  

143.  Ms Lai did not investigate into CCT’s books and records and found out and realised that Mr Li had misappropriated CCT’s assets in acquiring properties in his personal name until after the representatives of the People’s Procuratorate had come to Hong Kong to make inquiries about CCT.  In this connection, included in the trial bundles are copies of records of interviews of Ms Lai by the People’s Procuratorate in Hong Kong in May 2009 (pages 545-549) and a notarised Chinese statement dated February 2010 by Ms Lai to the People’s Procuratorate (pages 552-556).

144.  I accept Ms Lai’s evidence, on the basis of which I rule out any delay in CCT’s action against Mr Li.

145.  Further, prejudice is an essential element for a defence based on the doctrine of laches.  See, for example, Cuvelier Jacques R v Chen Qizhi[2019] HKCFI 2386 at [52].  However, the court does not act on bare and unparticularised assertions of detriment.  During the period from 11 November 2015 to 26 June 2016, Mr Li was represented by solicitors who instructed counsel on his behalf.  Mr Li was able to give instructions to his legal representatives for the amendment of his defence. Yet, paragraphs 10, 19(4), 22(2), 24(3) and 36 of Mr Li’s amended defence in which Mr Li’s case on laches is pleaded are couched in the most ambiguous and obscure terms.  Mr Li did not condescend to particulars of what testimony he could have personally given, what witness(es) he could have located or contacted or what document(s) he could have unearthed to establish a defence.

146.  CCT is not estopped by laches.

CCT Shares

147.  nbsp;   Prior to the date of the 2001 Agreement, Mr Li held the CCT Shares registered in his name (which was not 100%) on trust for the Beijing Company.  He only acquired the beneficial ownership of such shares by virtue of the 2001 Agreement.

China Harbour Office

arbour

148.  Mr Li held and still holds the China Harbour Office on trust for CCT. 

149.  Further, Mr Li let such property and received rental income therefrom since 2006 without accounting to CCT for such income.

Provident Centre Flat

150.  Mr Li held the Provident Centre Flat on trust for CCT. 

151.  Also, Mr Li had received the following monies in respect of this property without accounting to CCT: (1) the net forfeited deposit when the attempted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997 fell through; and (2) the net proceeds from the sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1998.

Pacific Palisades Flat

152.  Mr Li held the Pacific Palisades Flat on trust for CCT

153.  Also, Mr Li had received the following monies in respect of this property without accounting to CCT: (1) rental income between 1998 and 2007; and (2) the net proceeds from the sale in 2007.

Tanner Garden Flat

154.  Mr Li held the Eternal Building Flats on trust for CCT.  Hence, the approximate sum of $4,000,000 realised from the sale of the Eternal Building Flats in 1994 beneficially belonged to CCT.

155.  Mr Li had not paid any consideration for the transfer of the Tanner Garden Flat from CCT to him on 7 September 2004 with the consequence that he did not acquire the beneficial ownership of such property, which he held on trust for CCT from 7 September 2004 to 3 July 2007.

156.  Mr Cong did not pay Mr Li any consideration for the transfer of the Tanner Garden Flat to him on 3 July 2007.  The purported sale and purchase of such property between Mr Li and Mr Cong was not a genuine transaction.  And Mr Cong was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of CCT’s beneficial interest in the Tanner Garden Flat.

RELIEF

157.  For the above reasons, as against Mr Li:

(1)  I declare that he held and still holds the China Harbour Office on trust for CCT.

(2)  I further declare that he held these properties on trust for CCT: (a) the Provident Centre Flat; (b) Pacific Palisades Flat; and (c) the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007.

(3)  I order him to transfer the China Harbour Office to CCT or at its direction.

(4)  I order him to account to CCT for the following:

(a)  the rental income from letting the China Harbour Office since 2006;

(b)  the net deposits forfeited from the aborted sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1997;

(c)  the net proceeds of sale of the Provident Centre Flat in 1998;

(d)  the rental income from letting the Pacific Palisades Flat between 1998 and 2007;

(e)  the net proceeds of sale of the Pacific Palisades Flat in 2007; and

(f)  all the money and benefits received from holding the Tanner Garden Flat between 7 September 2004 and 3 July 2007.

(5)  There shall be an inquiry into the aforesaid accounts to be rendered by Mr Li.

(6)  I order Mr Li to pay CCT all sums found to be due from Mr Li to CCT on the taking of such accounts.

158.  As against Mr Cong:

(1)  I declare that he has since 3 July 2007 been holding the Tanner Garden Flat on trust for CCT;

(2)  I set aside the purported sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Flat between Mr Li and him by the agreement for sale and purchase and the assignment both 3 July 2007 and respectively registered at the Land Registry by memorials numbers 07072601190012 and 07072601190027.

(3)  I order him to transfer the Tanner Garden Flat back to CCT or at its direction.

(4)  I further order him to account for all the money and benefits received by him from holding the Tanner Garden Flat since 3 July 2007.

(5)  There shall be an inquiry into such account.

(6)  I order Mr Cong to pay CCT all sums found to be due from him to CCT on the taking of such account.

159.  The parties should apply to the masters for directions for taking the accounts and conducting the inquires ordered above.

160.  Costs usually follows the event.  I make an order nisi that the defendants shall pay CCT the costs of this action to be taxed on a party and party basis, if not agreed.

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr K M Chong and Mr Alvin Chong, instructed by Liu, Chan & Choi for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant was unrepresented and did not appear

Mr Alvin Tsang instructed by C S Chan & Co for the 2nd defendant



[1] There is a discrepancy between (1) §8 of the amended statement of claim dated 20.3.12 (“ASOC”) alleging that the China Harbour Office was let for rental income since CCT had ceased to use it as its office in 2005 and (2) §44 of the witness statement of Lai Siu Kuen also known as Pinky Lai (黎少娟) (“Ms Lai”) alleging that CCT moved to a new office in about 2001 and that since then Mr Li had rented out the China Building Office.  I will go by the case pleaded in the ASOC by which CCT is bound without an amendment.

[2] Formerly known as北京市針棉織品進出口公司, and before that, China National Textiles Import & Export Corporation, Beijing Knitwear Branch (中國紡織品進出口公司北京針棉織品分公司).

[3] See the joint letter dated 16.5.16 by Liu, Choi & Chan, solicitors for CCT, and CS Chan & Co, solicitors for Mr Cong, at page 778.

[4] Which CCT answered on 22.12.15.

[5] Superseding Mr Li’s various prior “defence” documents, including the「抗辯書」filed on 17.9.12, the letter dated 10.1.13 to Anthony Chan J setting out his「抗辯意見」and the「補充抗辯書」dated 15.4.13.

[6] As per §3 of her witness statement, Ms Xie was the Chief Accountant (總會計師) of the Beijing Company in 1982 when Mr Li first joined the Beijing Company as a salesman (業務員).

[7] Ms Lai switched employment from Kingpower to CCT just prior to, or at the time of, CCT’s incorporation at Mr Li’s invitation.

[8] Mr Cong apparently remained a student as at the date of his witness statement, i.e. 19.12.2016.

[9] To refresh my memory, I have listened to Mr Cong and Ms Cong’s testimonies through the recoding system of the court.

[10] I have, by a decision dated 3.4.18 ([2018] HKCFI 729), ruled that the PRC Judgment should be admitted in evidence for the statements therein of the factual evidence before the PRC Court that are relevant to the issues in this action.

[11] Certificate of incorporation and certificate of incorporation on change of name at pages 779 & 780 respectively.

[12] §§2 & 3 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; §§5 & 7 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; §7 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement; and testimonies of 楊書武, 吳大蚌and何岱as noted in the PRC Judgment at pages 414, 416 & 417.

[13] §4 of Ms Xie’s witness statement; §3 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; and §4 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement.

[14] §5 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement; §5 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; §6 of Ms Xie’s witness statement; and testimonies of楊書武,  吳大蚌 and 何岱 as recorded in the PRC Judgment at pages 414, 416 & 417.

[15] §8 of Ms Xie’s witness statement.

[16] Facility letter at pages 1195-1199.

[17] Recitals in the relevant nominations.

[18] See [22] below.

[19] See [26] below.

[20]§49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[21] §49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; and testimonies of楊書武 and何岱as stated in the PRC Judgment at pages 415 & 417.

[22] §9 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement.

[23]§49 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[24] Certificate of incorporation at page 809.

[25] §4 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[26] §6 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[27] Page 649, an uncontroversial summary of CCT’s shareholders and directors from incorporation to 2017.  See also the said BOCHK’s “information for company account” (pages 1679-1680).

[28]§8 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[29]§7 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[30] §24 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[31] List of members in CCT’s annual return made up to 4.4.1992 at page 811.

[32] Particulars of directors in CCT’s annual return made up to 4.4.1992 at page 812.

[33] §27 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[34] §§25 & 26 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[35] List of members in CCT’s annual return made up to 5.10.1995 at page 824.

[36] Particulars of directors in CCT’s annual return made up to 5.10.1995 at page 825.

[37] §27 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[38] Summary of share capital and list of members in CCT’s annual return made up to 5.10.1995 at pages 822-824.

[39] Record of interview at pages 545-549.

[40] §28 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[41] §§4-6 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; §6 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; §9 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement; and testimonies of 楊書武, 吳大蚌and何岱as noted in the PRC Judgment at pages 415, 416 & 417.

[42] §5 of Ms Xie’s witness statement.

[43] Pages 1449-1479.

[44] Who was at the time still 楊書武.

[45] §8 of Ms Xie’s witness statement; §8 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; §10 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement; and §37 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[46] §7 of Ms Xie’s witness statement; and §7 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement.

[47] §8 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[48] §§14, 16 & 19 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; §7 of Ms Xie’s witness statement; §7 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; and testimonies of楊書武, 吳大蚌 and 印培良as noted in the PRC Judgment at pages 415, 416 & 419 respectively.

[49] §16 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.  See also page 1104 (by which the Beijing Company informed the general manager of CCT namely, Mr Li that the Beijing Company would transfer to CCT a sum of A$416,485.94 for CCT to use as working capital (流動資金) & page 1106 (credit advice confirming receipt of A$416,485.94 by CCT).

[50] §17 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; the letter of guarantee at pages 1125-1127; page 2 of the facility letter at page 1129, the letter of guarantee at pages 1188-1189; and page 4 of the facility letter at page 1193.

[51] See the tables in [46], [56] and [77] below setting out, inter alia, the accounts from which the payments for the purchase of the China Harbour Office, the Provident Centre Flat and the Pacific Palisades Flat came and the corresponding supporting documents.

[52] See, e.g., pages 1305 & 1307.

[53] See, e.g., pages 1084, 1085, 1087, 1088-1105, 1107-1118 & 1140-1150.

[54] See, e.g., pages 1056-1072, 1074, 1076, 1077, 1078-1083, 1086 & 1638-1655.

[55]§9 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; §10 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement; and §12 of Mr Zhang’s witness statement.

[56] §15 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; and §11 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement.

[57] §10 of Mr Zhong’s witness statement.

[58] §§14(2)(i), (ii), (iii) & (v) & 14A of Mr Cong’s re-amended defence dated 4.4.18.

[59] BOCHK receipt for $1,444,866.96 at page 1222.

[60] Relevant solicitors’ bills at pages 1223 & 1225.

[61] It is worth repeating that the application of the proceeds of sale of the Eternal Building Flats to the acquisition of the Provident Centre Flat is to a large extent corroborated by Mr Li’s own statement in the IRD Questionnaire that $3,066,067.04 of the purchase monies of the Provident Centre Flat came from the sale of the Eternal Building Flats.

[62] There is no dispute as to the authenticity or provenance of the 1996 Agreement.  Its content is set out in§39 of the PRC Judgment.  Upon learning of the existence of the 1996 Agreement from reading the PRC Judgment, Ms Lai obtained a copy from the Beijing Company: §§34 & 36 of her witness statement.  CCT then disclosed it as item 80 on its list of documents filed on 19.5.15.

[63] Land search record at page 1430 and assignment at pages 1384-1393.

[64] Facility letter dated 12.9.1996 at page 1402.

[65] §59 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[66] There are copies of the tenant’s cheques dated 5.11.96 and 1.10.97 for payment of rent (page 1315). 

[67] See the tenant’s letter dated 11.9.97 and Mr Li’s letter dated 16.9.97 (pages 1313-1314).

[68]§52 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.  Ms Lai did enter into the 2 agreements for the sale of the Provident Centre Flat on behalf of Mr Li.

[69] Cheque for initial deposit and cashier order for further deposit, both payable to Mr Li, at pages 1298 & 1299 respectively.

[70] Cheque and receipt for commission at pages 1300 & 1301 respectively.

[71] Solicitors’ official receipt at page 1302.

[72] Pay-in slip for initial deposit and pay-in slip and cashier order for further deposit, both payable to Mr Li, at pages 1304 & 1306 respectively.

[73] Pay-in slips for the deposits at pages 1305 & 1307.

[74] Purchaser’s solicitors’ cheque dated 8.6.98 payable to Mr Li at page 1308.

[75] According to Schedule III to the ASOC, such fund came immediately from Mr Li’s 1st LCH Account and 2nd LCH Account.  However, I understand Ms Lai to be deposing in paragraph 56 of her witness statement to the ultimate source of the fund used to pay the purchase price of the Pacific Palisades Flat not covered by the mortgage loan.  I accept Ms Lai’s evidence. 

[76] §57 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[77] §60 of Ms Lai’s witness statement; and BOCHK’s debit advice and receipt dated 1.6.99, evidencing the payment of a sum of $878,137.16 by CCT to BOCHK for loan account No 012-875-4-015150-4 with the remark 「提早清還全部貸款」(page 1401).

[78] It has been established in [35] above that 5% of the CCT Shares are vested in Ms Lai as long as she remains in CCT’s employ.

[79] The parties to the 2001 Agreement appear to have ignored the principle that a company and its shareholder(s) are separate entities as a matter of law so that the latter is not liable for the former’s debts and liabilities over and above his share capital contribution.

[80] Presumably to comply with the legal requirement for at least 2 shareholders.

[81] Details of members in CCT’s annual return made up to 5.10.2009 at page 921.

[82] Details of individual directors in CCT’s annual return made up to 5.10.2009 at page 927.

[83] Ms Lai’s evidence in this connection may appear inconsistent with the paragraph numbered 6 on page 29 of the PRC Judgment, stating that the documents relating to the insolvency of the Beijing Company showed that after the liquidation (破產清算) of the Beijing Company, CCT and the Beijing Company’s investment therein had not been included in the list of assets of the Beijing Company to be realised by auction.

[84] According to the summary at page 649, before Mr Wang came into the picture on 18 November 2013, Ms Lai had on 24 April 2013 transferred 8,000 shares (representing a 40% shareholding) to Mr Hui who was also appointed a director in addition to the Lai sisters.  Ms Lai has however not explained Mr Hui’s identity and the reason why he became involved in CCT. 

[85] Which represents just a 3% shareholding, which falls short of the 5% Ms Lai is entitled to under the 1993 Agreement.  There is no explanation for this inconsistency.

[86] Summary at page 649.

[87] §61 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[88]§45 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[89]§62 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[90] Paragraph 1.2(2) of Mr Tsang’s opening submission.

[91] All the funds came from Madam Cong who had allegedly saved up the monies for Mr Cong’s education or marriage.

[92]§58 of her witness statement.

[93]§23 of Ms Lai’s witness statement.

[94] According to §20 of Ms Lai’s witness statement, this company was a joint venture formed in 1993 between CCT (acting under the instruction of the Beijing Company) and one 北京市延慶縣大榆樹農工商聯合企業總公司.  CCT had invested RMB 4.5 million plus plants and equipment and vehicles etc into the company.

[95] Although the PRC Court handed down the PRC Judgment on 19 September 2010, Mr Li had in fact been incarcerated since 29 August 2008 as stated in the first paragraph of the PRC Judgment.  He was apparently given credit for the time already served.

[2018] HKCFI 729-EN-2018-04-03

CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE CO LTD v. LI DIANXIAO AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 263/2012

[2018] HKCFI 729

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 263 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN  
 CAPITAL CENTURY TEXTILE COMPANY LIMITED (國際永年紡織有限公司) Plaintiff
 and 
 LI DIANXIAO (李殿孝)1st Defendant
 CONG BO WAI (叢博煒)2nd Defendant

______________________

Before: Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 14 March 2018
Date of Handing Down Decision: 3 April 2018

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

Applications before the court

1.  Before the court are the 2nd defendant’s applications to:

(1)  exclude from the evidence at the trial of this action:

(a)  the criminal judgment dated 19 September 2010 (“PRC Judgment”)[i] of the 2nd Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing (北京市第二中級人民法院刑事判決書) (“PRC Court”), by which the 1st defendant was convicted of corruption and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 years from 29 August 2008[ii] to 28 August 2023 (which the 1st defendant is serving at the北京市第二監獄 (“PRC Prison”); and

(b)  paragraphs 31 to 36 of the witness statement dated 20 December 2016 of Madam Lai Siu Kuen (黎少娟) (“Madam Lai”) (for the plaintiff) which mentioned, and produced as annex 5 thereto a copy of, the PRC Judgment

on the ground that the PRC Judgment is irrelevant and inadmissible as a matter of law;

(2)  file and serve a re-amended defence;

(3)  file and serve a supplemental witness statement; and

(4)  adjourn the trial of this action sine die pending the 1st defendant’s release from prison.

2.  These applications are made by summonses issued on 7 and 14 February and 6 March 2018, which are on any view late given that the trial of this action is fixed for 8 to 15 May 2018 before me with the pre-trial review on 7 February 2018.  

3.  The plaintiff opposes all the applications.

4.  As for the 1st defendant, he had as a matter of fact himself repeatedly applied, unsuccessfully, to adjourn or stay this action on the ground that he would not be able to defend or effectively defend the same until his release from prison.  See the 1st defendant’s letters to the court dated 10 January 2013, 18 December 2014, 22 September 2016, 15 and 21 February 2017.  See also the last sentence of the paragraphs numbered 1 of the document entitled “補充抗辯書” dated 15 April 2013.  The 1st defendant has by letters dated 6 and 25 February, 5 and 20 March 2018 from his son, Mr Li Yuan (李元), as well as the PRC lawyer who represented the 1st defendant in his criminal trial, a Mr Peng Xian Hua (彭憲華), to the court renewed his application for either an adjournment or a stay of this action pending his release from prison.

This action

5.  The plaintiff is a private limited company incorporated in Hong Kong on 5 October 1990. 

6.  Between 15 October 1990 and 22 June 2009, the 1st defendant was registered as a shareholder (holding 18,999 out of 20,000 shares since 5 October 1995) and director of the plaintiff.  On 22 June 2009, the 1st defendant transferred all the shares in the plaintiff registered under his name to Madam Lai (who has herself since 5 October 1995 been, and who still is, a director of the plaintiff).

7.  In this action, the plaintiff claims to be the beneficial owner of the following landed properties acquired in, or transferred into, the name of the 1st defendant who holds/held the same on trust for the plaintiff:

(1)  Office B, 15/F, China Harbour Building, 370-374 King’s Road, Hong Kong (“China Harbour Office”) acquired in the 1st defendant’s name on 1 October 1991;

(2)  Flat A, 11/F, Block 6, Provident Centre, 31 Wharf Road, Hong Kong (“Provident Centre Flat”) acquired in the 1st defendant’s name on 18 August 1993 and disposed of by sale on 8 June 1998 at a profit;

(3)  Flat A, 7/F, Tower 9, Phase II, Pacific Palisades, 1 Braemar Hill Road, North Point, Hong Kong acquired in the 1st defendant’s name on 3 June 1998 and disposed of by sale in 2007 at a profit; and

(4)  Flat B, 17/F, Block 3, Tanner Garden, 18 Tanner Road, North Point, Hong Kong (“Tanner Garden Property”) which was:

(a)  acquired in the plaintiff’s name on 10 September 1996 at $6,450,000;

(b)  transferred from the plaintiff’s name into the 1st defendant’s name on 7 September 2004 at a stated consideration of $3,980,000; and

(c)  transferred from the 1st defendant’s name into the 2nd defendant’s name on 3 July 2007 at a stated consideration of $4,800,000.

8.  The plaintiff so claims on the ground that the monies used to pay the purchase price, mortgage repayment instalments and associated costs and expenses of these properties belonged to it.  Where some of the monies used to make these payments came from accounts held in the names of the 1st defendant and others, the plaintiff contends that such accounts were also held on trust for it.

9.  By this action, the plaintiff claims declarations of beneficial ownership, orders for transfer, accounts of profits and income etc.

10.  More particularly, with regard to the Tanner Garden Property with which the 2nd defendant is concerned, it is the plaintiff’s case that:

(1)  The consideration of $3,980,000 stated for the transfer from the plaintiff to the 1st defendant was never paid so that the 1st defendant held the Tanner Garden Property upon a constructive/resulting trust for the plaintiff.

(2)  The 1st defendant has refused or failed to account for the rental income of the Tanner Garden Property to the plaintiff since 7 September 2004.

(5)  With a view to defeating the plaintiff’s claim for beneficial ownership, the 1st defendant transferred the Tanner Garden Property to the 2nd defendant (with whose mother the 1st defendant was co-habiting as husband and wife and whom the 1st defendant treated as his own child) for a stated consideration of $4,800,000 which was not paid or, if paid, was an undervalue being 25% less than the open market value.[iii]

11.  Insofar as the 2nd defendant is concerned, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that he has been holding the Tanner Garden Property upon a constructive trust for the plaintiff and an order for an account and inquiry in respect of all the money and profits received by the 2nd defendant from the Tanner Garden Property since 3 July 2007 or, alternatively, an order that the sale and purchase of the Tanner Garden Property between the 1st and 2nd defendants be set aside upon the plaintiff’s repayment of $4,800,000 to the 2nd defendant.

12.  It is unnecessary for present purposes to go into all the defendants’ grounds of defence or the plaintiff’s points of reply.  It is sufficient for me to highlight the following.

13.  By way of general defence, the 1st defendant claims (in paragraphs 37 and 36 of his amended defence dated 3 August 2016 prepared by counsel and solicitors) that he was at all material times the beneficial owner of all the shares in the plaintiff (including those held in others’ names which were held on trust for him) so that even if the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the subject properties be true, the dealings complained of could be regarded as having been authorised or ratified by the plaintiff and all its shareholders.

14.  The plaintiff denies such allegation and counters that the 1st defendant at all material times held all the shares in the plaintiff registered in his name as trustee of a PRC company called 北京針棉織品進出口集團公司 (“Beijing Company”).  More particularly:

(1)  The 1st defendant was an employee of the Beijing Company.

(2)  In 1986, the Beijing Company commenced business in Hong Kong through a Hong Kong company called Kingpower Textile Limited (“Kingpower”).  The 1st defendant was posted by the Beijing Company to Hong Kong to work in Kingpower.

(3)  The plaintiff was set up by the Beijing Company as its window company in Hong Kong in place of Kingpower with capital provided by the Beijing Company.

(4)  The 1st defendant was assigned by the Beijing Company in the course of his employment with the Beijing Company to be the shareholder and director of the plaintiff since 1990.

(5)  On about 16 February 1996, the Beijing Company and the 1st defendant entered into a 承包協議 by which the 1st defendant acquired the right to operate the plaintiff independently of and without interference from the Beijing Company at his own profit/loss on terms which included the 1st defendant’s acknowledgment that the Beijing Company retained full beneficial ownership of, inter alia, the China Harbour Office and the Provident Centre Flat.

15.  With regard to the Tanner Garden Property, the 1st defendant claims inter alia that immediately prior to the transfer from the plaintiff to him, the plaintiff held a sum of $4,000,000 in its bank account on trust for the 1st defendant, out of which $3,800,000 was applied to set off the price of the Tanner Garden Property payable by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff.

16.  The plaintiff denies it had ever held any monies on trust for the 1st defendant.

The 1st defendant’s circumstances

17.  As stated above, the 1st defendant has since 29 August 2008 been imprisoned at the PRC Prison.  In other words, he had lost his freedom by the time the writ of summons herein was issued on 20 February 2012.  Subject to what I will say in the next paragraph, the 1st defendant is not due for release until 28 August 2023.

18.  While being imprisoned, the 1st defendant has recently been tried before the 3rd Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing for other corruption charge(s) in November 2017.  The verdict is still pending.  According to the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant’s said son anticipates a decision on the new charge(s) within a few months.

19.  Despite his incarceration at the PRC Prison, the 1st defendant was able to retain and give instructions to solicitors and counsel to act for him in this action from 11 November 2015 to 26 September 2016.  His amended defence was filed and served during this period on 3 August 2016. 

20.  The 1st defendant began to act in person again since 26 September 2016.  Other than writing to the court for the adjournment or stay of this action until his release from prison before the hearings before Master Ho on 27 September 2016 and 28 February 2017, the 1st defendant has not taken any meaningful part in this action.  In particular, I note that he has not complied with the unless orders made by Master Ho on 27 September 2016 for the filing and service of list of documents and witness statements.

Admissibility of PRC Judgment

21.  On the admissibility/inadmissibility of the PRC Judgment, counsel, Mr K M Chong (leading Mr Alvin Chong) for the plaintiff and Mr Alvin Tsang for the 2nd defendant, has each referred me to cases which he considers to support his contention and distinguished or criticised the decisions cited by the other.  I do not propose to burden this decision by dealing with each and every authority raised by counsel. Decisions on the admissibility/inadmissibility of an earlier judicial decision are essentially fact sensitive.  I consider it more constructive to approach the matter before me with reference to principle.

22.  On this note, I turn to the PRC Judgment. It is a 33 page document.  In assessing its admissibility/inadmissibility, it is important to appreciate that the PRC Judgment did not contain just the PRC Court’s verdict(s) on the charge(s) laid against the 1st defendant and findings of fact in support of such verdict(s).  It also summarised the factual evidence presented to the PRC Court.

23.  It is trite that a judgment and factual finding of another court or tribunal in earlier proceedings, whether civil or criminal, is inadmissible in subsequent proceedings, unless the party against whom the finding is sought to be deployed is bound by it by reason of an estoppel per rem judicatam.  See Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587 which, though controversial (and even considered to have been wrongly decided)[iv], has never been overruled.  In Hong Kong, its application to reliance on a domestic criminal conviction in subsequent civil proceedings has been abolished by s 62 of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) (“EO”).  This section has no application to a foreign conviction such as the PRC Judgment.

24.  Anyway, quite apart from the rule in Hollington, the offence(s) with which the 1st defendant was convicted under the PRC Judgment did not concern the plaintiff or its properties at all.  Rather, they arose out of the 1st defendant’s disposal of the landed properties of one 北京永大制衣有限公司 (“Beijing Yong Da”) while he was the legal representative and chairman of that company from May 2003 to February 2007.  Hence, the 1st defendant’s conviction(s) and the findings of fact in support thereof are clearly irrelevant (in the true sense of the word) to, and are therefore admissible at, the trial of this action.  I do not think the plaintiff disputes this.

25.  Nevertheless, for reasons that will become apparent shortly and since Mr Tsang places reliance on Hollington, Hui Chi Ming v The Queen [1992] 1 AC 34, Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v Gold Global Ltd, HCCL 17/2009, unreported, Master de Souza (9 November 2010) and Chen Mei Lan v Registrar of Companies [2017] 1 HKLRD 924 (all of which applied Hollington) in seeking to exclude the entire PRC Judgment, it would be instructive to remind ourselves of the rationale behind the Hollington principle. 

26.  A modern statement of such rationale can be found in Rogers v Hoyle [2015] QB 265 (which concerned the admissibility of a report produced by the Department of Transport’s Air Accident Investigation Branch into the crash of a vintage bi-plane).  At first instance, Leggatt J said at [59], [93] and [104]:

“59. A central part of a judge’s task in a civil case is to evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties and to decide what conclusions may be properly drawn from that evidence. It is a cardinal principle, and an essential ingredient of the right to a fair trail before an impartial and independent tribunal, that in carrying out this task judges must form their own opinions by making their own evaluation of the evidence and must not defer to the opinion of anyone else. …

…

93. When the Court of Appeal[v] described the opinion of the criminal court as “irrelevant”, I therefore do not think that the term was being used in the sense defined earlier to denote evidence which is not logically probative. What I believe they meant is that the opinion of another court, like the opinion of a bystander, is not a matter to which a court required to decide the issue ought to have regard. The underlying rationale in my view, albeit not clearly spelt out in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, is the rationale to which I referred earlier for the exclusion of opinion evidence in general: namely, that it is the duty of a court to form its own opinion on the basis of the evidence placed before it; and that it would not be proper for the court in forming that opinion to be influenced by the opinion of someone else, however reliable that person’s opinion is likely to be. In so far as the evidence before the later court is the same as the evidence before the earlier court, the later court is in as good a position to draw inferences and conclusions from the evidence. In so far as the evidence is different, the opinion of the earlier court does not assist the court’s task.

…

104. As in the case of the rule which excludes opinion evidence generally, therefore, the true justification for the rule in Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd, as I see it, is not that the opinion of an earlier court is irrelevant but lies in the requirements for a fair trial.  The responsibility of a judge to make his or her own independent assessment of the evidence entails that weight ought not to be attached to conclusions reached by another judge – all the more so where the party to whose interests the conclusions are adverse was not a party to the earlier proceedings. …”

27.  On appeal, Christopher Clarke LJ (with whose judgment Treacy and Arden LJJ agreed) said at [38]-[40]:

“38. The reasoning that has survived is that set out in the following passage of Lord Goddard’s judgment in the Hollington case [1943] KB 587, 595:

“It frequently happens that a bystander has a complete and full view of an accident.  It is beyond question that, while he may inform the court of everything that he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent.  The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but, in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant.  Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.  The well recognised exception in the case of scientific or expert witnesses depends on considerations which, for present purposes, are immaterial.  So, on the trial of the issue in the civil court, the opinion of the criminal court is equally irrelevant.”

39. As the judge rightly recognised the foundation on which the rule must now rest is that findings of fact made by another decision maker are not to be admitted in a subsequent trial because the decision at that trial is to be made by the judge appointed to hear it (“the trial judge”), and not another. The trial judge must decide the case for himself on the evidence that he receives, and in the light of the submissions on that evidence made to him. To admit evidence of the findings of fact of another person, however distinguished, and however thorough and competent his examination of the issues may have been, risks the decision being made, at least in part, on evidence other than that which the trial judge has heard and in reliance on the opinion of someone who is neither the relevant decision maker nor an expert in any relevant discipline, of which decision making is not one. The opinion of someone who is not the trial judge is, therefore, as a matter of law, irrelevant and not one to which he ought to have regard.

40. In essence, as the judge rightly said, the foundation of the rule must now be the preservation of fairness of a trial in which the decision is entrusted to the trial judge alone.”

28.  In short, the exclusion of the factual findings and conclusions of an earlier court or tribunal from subsequent proceedings serves to ensure a fair trial, not in any general sense as suggested by Mr Tsang, but in the specific sense that the judge appointed to hear and determine the subsequent case makes his own decision on the evidence and submissions presented to him, without being influenced by the opinion of an earlier adjudicator.

29.  Such concern however does not exist in relation to the evidence referred to in an earlier judgment such as the contents of documents or the evidence of witnesses.  In Rogers v Hoyle, the statements or reported statements of fact in the AAIB report, even those unattributed, were admitted as not falling foul of the Hollington rule at all.  See also JSC BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov [2017] EWHC 2906 (Comm) at [26]-[28] (per Sir Ross Cranston).

30.  In the instant case, insofar as the PRC Judgment contained a summary of the factual evidence presented to the PRC Court, the 1st defendant’s relationships with and positions in the Beijing Company and the plaintiff also featured in the PRC Judgment.  In particular, pages 3 to 14 of the PRC Judgment summarised the testimony of 18 prosecution witnesses (including 謝桂如, 鍾群and 張九常 who have made witness statements and will give evidence herein for the plaintiff).  One of the matters covered by these witnesses was the 1st defendant’s relationship with and position in the Beijing Company and the plaintiff, which tends to contradict his said general ground of defence.  Such evidence was adduced at the 1st defendant’s criminal trial in the PRC because, according to the PRC Judgment, it was the prosecution case that the plaintiff was set up by the 1st defendant in 1990 upon the assignment and instruction of the Beijing Company, a state-owned enterprise, and that the plaintiff in turn co-operated with 北京市延慶縣大榆樹農工商聯合企業總公司 to set up Beijing Yong Da in 1993 at the direction of the Beijing Company so that the properties of Beijing Yong Da disposed of by the 1st defendant were state-owned properties, the unauthorised disposal of which would constitute corruption.

31.  For these reasons, I am of the view that the statements or reported statements in the PRC Judgment of the factual evidence before the PRC Court are not excluded by the operation of the rule in Hollington.

32.  The only other objection to such statements or reported statements is that they are hearsay or even double hearsay.  The rule against the admission of hearsay has been abolished in civil proceedings by the amendments to the EO in 2009.

33.  Mr Tsang has expressed concern that what appears to be a statement describing the evidence in the PRC Judgment may embrace the PRC Court’s assessment of the credibility of the evidence.  Counsel is so concerned because the summary of witnesses’ testimony mentioned in paragraph 30 above was preceded by these words: “上述事實,有下列經當庭舉證、質證,本院予以確認的證據證實” (emphasis added). 

34.  This may or may not be a valid concern but it need not be dealt with here and now.  It appears to me that such concern goes to the weight to be attached to the summary of evidence in the PRC Judgment and does not provide any basis for contesting its admissibility.  In this regard, s 49 of the EO requires the court, in estimating the weight, if any, to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, to have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence, including:

(1)  whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness;

(2)  whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated;

(3)  whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;

(4)  whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters;

(5)  whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;

(6)  whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight;

(7)  whether or not the evidence adduced by the party is consistent with any evidence previously adduced by the party.

A similar point was made in Roger v Hoyle, supra.  See Leggatt J at [56] and Christopher Clarke LJ at [30].

35.  To conclude, I rule the PRC Judgment admissible but only for the statements or reported statements therein of the factual evidence before the PRC Court that is relevant to the issues in this case. Beyond this, I do not think it is necessary for me to carry out an immediate editing exercise to precisely identify paragraph by paragraph or even sentence by sentence what comes within or without this ruling.  As the trial judge, I shall see the whole of the PRC Judgment and leave out of account any part of it that is inadmissible.  Leggatt J adopted the same approach in Roger v Hoyle, supra, at [118].

36.  Before I leave the PRC Judgment, for the sake of completeness, the plaintiff also challenges the 2nd defendant’s locus standi to make the application on the ground the PRC Judgment is relied upon by the plaintiff against the 1st defendant.  In view of my ruling, it is strictly speaking unnecessary for me to deal with this point.  However, to the extent that it is said that the PRC Judgment is relevant to the 1st defendant’s said general ground of defence which, if successful, would take away the basis for the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the Tanner Garden Property, I am inclined to think that the 2nd defendant is interested in the admissibility or otherwise of the PRC Judgment.

Paragraphs 31 to 36 of Madam Lai’s witness statement

37.  Paragraphs 34 to 36 of Madam Lai’s witness statement, though put under the heading “第一被告人於國內被刑事檢控”, do not in fact deal with the PRC Judgment but the承包協議 mentioned in paragraph 14(5) above.  I do not see any basis for expunging these paragraphs.

38.  I shall however expunge paragraphs 31 to 33 as falling foul of the Hollington rule.  Paragraph 1 mentions the 1st defendant’s arrest, conviction and imprisonment for corruption relating to Beijing Yong Da’s properties, which have no relevance to any issues in the present case.  Paragraphs 32 and 33 mentions and relies on the PRC’s court’s disbelief of the 1st defendant’s defence and finding that the 1st defendant was deployed by the Beijing Company to set up and manage the plaintiff.  The making of finding as to the 1st defendant’s relationships with and positions in the Beijing Company and the plaintiff is a matter for me as the trial judge without reference to the opinion of the PRC Court.

Adjournment

39.  As mentioned above, the 1st defendant will not complete his current term of imprisonment until 28 August 2023.

40.  In seeking to adjourn the trial of this action sine die pending the 1st defendant’s release from prison, the defendants are putting their case on the basis that the 1st defendant may be released earlier.  Such case has been variously put as follows:

(1)  According to the 1st defendant’s said son’s letters to the court dated 6 February and 3 March 2018, “根據中國大陸不成文的規定,只要年滿70歲的服刑人員就可以申請假釋,我父親李殿孝今年68,只要再過兩年就會符合資格”(emphasis added).

(2)  According to paragraph 4 of the 1st defendant’s said PRC lawyer’s letter to the court dated 25 February 2018, “李殿孝年近70歲了,如果在後期的案件沒有被判為有罪,根據內地的政策會申請保外就醫,屆時,會通過審批會回港參加庭審”(emphasis added).

(3)  According to paragraph 13 of the 2nd defendant’s 1st affirmation dated 6 February 2018, the 1st defendant’s said son had told him that “it is highly likely that the 1st Defendant will released within these two years, because the usual practice in China that a prisoner will be released from prison early when he attains the age of 70 years old” and that “the 1st Defendant will be 70 years old in 2019.”

(4)  According to paragraph 5 of the 2nd defendant’s 2nd affirmation dated 14 February 2018, the 1st defendant’s said son had told him that “the 1st Defendant would apply for compassionate release from prison, and is currently in frail health” and that “the 1st Defendant suffers hypertension, severe diabetes and ankylosing spondylitis” and that his expert on relevant PRC laws had advised him that “the health condition of a prisoner would be favourably considered in the release application”.

41.  It can be seen that the defendants have not been entirely consistent as to the nature of the early release (parole or temporary service of sentence outside prison to seek medical treatment) or the legal basis therefor (unwritten rules or practice vs state policy).  I think I can be forgiven for being sceptical about the suggestion of early release of the 1st defendant.  Indeed, I note that the 1st defendant had, in his letter to the court dated 18 December 2014, expressed hope that he would be released in 2016 if his application for commutation of his sentence or parole should succeed or in late 2017 or early 2018 if such application failed or if he did not apply for parole.

42.  Indeed, according to the 2nd defendant’s PRC law expert, Dr Chen Li, he has not been provided with any information that the 1st defendant is eligible to apply for a commutation of his sentence.  See paragraph 8 of Dr Chen’s report dated 21 February 2018.

43.  Further, it is clear on the evidence before me that the 1st defendant has not made any application for either parole or temporary service of the remainder of his sentence outside prison for medical reasons.

44.  Nor have the defendants adduced any or any sufficient evidence that the 1st defendant is or would be eligible for either parole or temporary service of the remainder of his sentence outside prison for medical reasons which are governed, not by any unwritten rules or practice or state policy as initially suggested, but by statutes.

45.  On parole:

(1)  Article 81 of the PRC Criminal Law (Revised) (《中華人民共和國刑法(修訂)》) provides:

“被判處有期徒刑的犯罪分子,執行原判刑期二分之一以上,…,如果認真遵守監規,接受教育改造,確有悔改表現,假釋後不致再危害社會的,可以假釋。…” (emphasis added)

(2)  Article 3 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Specific Application of Law in Handling Commutation and Parole Cases (《最高人民法院關於辦理減刑、假釋案件具體應用法律的規定》) explains the requirement of “true repentence” (“確有悔改”) as follows:

“確有悔改表現"是指同時具備以下條件:

(一) 認真悔罪;

(二) 遵守法律法規及監視,接受教育改造;

(三) 積極參加思想、文化、職業技術教育;

(四) 積極參加勞動,努力完成勞動任務。

對職務犯罪、破壞金融管理秩序和金融詐騙犯罪、組織(領導、參加、包庇、縱容)黑社會性質組織犯罪等罪犯,不積極退贓、協助追繳贓款贓物、賠償損失,或者服刑期間利用個人影響力和社會關係等不正當手段意圖獲得減刑、假釋的,不認定其“確有悔改表現"。” (emphasis added)

46.  According to paragraph 12 of Dr Chen’s report, he is not sure whether the 1st defendant has satisfied the conditions for parole given the limited information made available to him.  Nor do I have such information in evidence.

47.  Indeed, as observed by the plaintiff’s PRC law expert Mr Sun Sheng Ai, the 1st defendant had served half of his sentence, and would have become eligible to apply for parole had he complied with the other conditions, by late February 2016.  In the absence of any explanation as to why the 1st defendant did not apply for parole after February 2016, the court is entitled to infer that such other conditions (including the extra requirements of compensation etc imposed upon a “職務犯罪罪犯” of which the 1st defendant is one) had not been satisfied.

48.  Turning then to the prospect of temporary service of the remainder of his sentence by the 1st defendant outside prison for to seek medical treatment, article 254 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》) provides:

“對被判處有期徒刑或者拘役的罪犯,有下列情形之一的,可以暫予監外執行:

(一) 有嚴重疾病需要保外就醫的;…

對罪犯確有嚴重疾病,必須保外就醫的,由省級人民政府指定的醫院診斷並開具證明文件。” (emphasis added)

49.  The Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Justice and the National Health and Family Planning Commission jointly issued the Provisions on Temporary Service of Sentences outside Prisons (《暫予監外執行規定》) on 24 October 2014 to provide detailed guidance.  Of relevance are:

(1)  Article 5 which clarifies that an applicant under article 254(1) of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law should suffer from a serious illness specified in the attached 《保外就醫嚴重疾病範圍》to the extent that he requires medical treatment outside prison.

(2)  Article 6 which states that “對職務犯罪、… 的罪犯適用保外就醫應當從嚴審批,對患有高血壓、糖尿病、心臟病等嚴重疾病,但經診斷短期內沒有生命危險的,不得暫予監外執行。”

(3)  Article 7 which requires an applicant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years or above to have served at least one-third of his sentence, though such requirement may relaxed in case of inter alia s prisoner who is over the age of 65.

50.  In short, to be eligible to apply to serve the remainder of his sentence outside prison to seek medical treatment, the 1st defendant being a prisoner who had committed his offence in the course of his employment has to be certified by a hospital nominated by the provincial people’s government to be suffering from an illness within the said 《保外就醫嚴重疾病範圍》to a life-threatening extent.

51.  Save for the bare assertion that the 1st defendant suffers from hypertension, severe diabetes and ankylosing spondylitis, neither the 1st defendant nor the 2nd defendant has seen fit to adduce any medical evidence whatsoever as to the 1st defendant’s physical condition to enable me to assess the credibility of their assertion that the 1st defendant may be allowed to serve the remainder of his sentence outside prison to seek medical treatment (which would give the 1st defendant some limited “freedom” to advance his defence in this action).  In this regard, I am afraid I cannot detect any basis for Dr Chen’s assessment in paragraph 19 of his report that it is more likely than not that the 1st defendant could be granted temporary service of his sentence outside prison.

52.  In the absence of evidence, the factual ground upon which the adjournment is sought is simply not made out and the application should be be dismissed.

53.  Given my said reason for dismissing the application for adjournment, it is not necessary for me to deal with the parties’ arguments made with reference to Arko Ship Leasing Ltd v Winsmart International Shipping Ltd [2013] 2 HKLRD 121 and Velatel Global Communications Inc v Chinacomm Ltd, HCA 1978/2011, unreported, 22 March 2016 which dealt with applications to move trial dates due to unavailability of witnesses.

54.  For the sake of completeness, while I do not under-estimate the difficulty faced by the 1st defendant in his present circumstances, I am not impressed by, and cannot act on, his bare assertion without any particular that it is necessary for him to personally handle his defence to this action because “本案件涉及事件人物龐大,歷史遠久,案情複雜,需要大量人證和物證”.  In particular, this is certainly not the first time that the 1st defendant he has to deal with the case that he held the shares in the plaintiff as trustee for the Beijing Company.  As said earlier, evidence to such effect was given for the prosecution and sought to be answered by him in defence in his criminal trial in the PRC.  Presumably, a body of evidence was gathered on the 1st defendant’s behalf back then.  The same PRC lawyer who defended the 1st defendant at his PRC criminal trial wrote on his behalf to this court on 20 March 2018.

Re-amendment of the amended defence

55.  The principles governing the grant or refusal of leave to amend pleadings are trite and need not be repeated here: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2018, Volume 1, paragraph 20/8/6.

56.  The only objection of the plaintiff is essentially that this application is made at a very late stage. 

57.  Despite the lateness of the application, I am prepared to give leave. 

58.  The only substantive allegation sought to be added is to identify the source of the sum of $4 million said to be held by the plaintiff on trust for the 1st defendant and used to pay for the transfer of the Tanner Garden Property from the plaintiff to the 1st defendant.  In short, the 2nd defendant wishes to plead that the sum of $4 million came from the proceeds of sale of Flats 22A and 22B, Eternal Building, 112-114 Tsat Tsz Mui Road, Hong Kong (“Eternal Building Flats”).  According to the relevant land search records:

(1)  The Eternal Building Flats were acquired in the name of Kingpower on 2 December 1989 at $985,986 and $984,126.

(2)  They were transferred from the name of Kingpower into the name of the 1st defendant on 6 September 1990 for a stated consideration of $985,986 and $984,126.

(3)  They were disposed of by the 1st defendant in 1994 at $2,900,000 and $2,630,000.

59.  As I see it, the issues raised by this amendment are as to the beneficial ownership of Kingpower and the Eternal Building Flats. These are not new issues as far as the plaintiff is concerned.  This is because the plaintiff itself has expressly pleaded in paragraphs 7(1) and (3) of its amended reply to the 1st defendant’s amended defence that the Beijing Company commenced business in Hong Kong through Kingpower and that the Beijing Company had through and in the name of Kingpower acquired the Eternal Building Flats.

Supplemental witness statement

60.  Apart from saying that the supplemental witness statement is required to support the re-amendments to his defence, the 2nd defendant has not seen fit to provide the court or the plaintiff a draft of such statement.

61.  It is unusual for the court, and I am not prepared, to give blanket leave for further witness statement at this stage without sight of at least a draft.

Dispositions

62.  For the above reasons, I make the following rulings and orders:

(1)  The PRC Judgment should be admitted in evidence and included in the trial bundles but only for the statements or reported statements therein of the factual evidence before the PRC Court that is relevant to the issues in this case.

(2)  Paragraphs 31 to 33 of Madam Lai’s witness statement dated 20 December 2016 should be expunged.

(3)  The application for adjournment of the trial is dismissed.

(4)  The 2nd defendant should have leave to re-amend his defence as per the draft attached to his summons dated 6 March 2016 within 3 days hereof.

(5)  The plaintiff shall have leave to file and serve a reply to the 2nd defendant’s re-amended defence within 14 days thereafter.

(6)  There is no order on paragraph (3) of each of the 2nd defendant’s summons dated 6 February and 6 March 2018 (re supplemental witness statement).

63.  I shall hear the parties on costs which I will then deal with on paper.  The plaintiff and the 2nd defendant should lodge and exchange

(1)  written submissions on costs within 14 days from today; and

(2)  reply submissions on costs within 14 days thereafter.

Further directions

64.  I have not given any directions for the preparation of the trial at the pre-trial reviews on 7 February and 14 March 2018 as a result of the applications dealt with above.  I now direct that:

(1)  The plaintiff should lodge with the court and serve on the 1st and 2nd defendants the trial bundles and its written opening submission and list of authorities on or before 24 April 2018.

(2)  The 1st and 2nd defendants should each lodge with the court and serve on the plaintiff and the other defendant his written opening submission and list of authorities on or before 2 May 2018.

  

  

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance

  

Mr K M Chong and Mr Alvin Chong, instructed by Liu, Chan & Choi for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant was unrepresented and did not appear

Mr Alvin Tsang instructed by C S Chan & Co for the 2nd defendant

 

[i] The PRC Judgment was first disclosed by the plaintiff as item 222 of its 1st supplemental list of documents dated 20 November 2015.

[ii] This was the date from which the 1st defendant was first incarcerated.

[iii] The plaintiff and the 2nd defendant have since agreed the open market value of the Tanner Garden Property as at 3 July 2007 to be $5,200,000.

[iv] See, for example, Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 543 (per Lord Diplock with whose speech the other members of the appellate committee agreed).

[v] In Hollington, supra.