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WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV296/2022WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA) AND ANOTHER
  • CACV643/2020WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA)
  • CAMP167/2021WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA) AND ANOTHER
  • HCMP129/2019WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA)
  • HCMP620/2017WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

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[2022] HKCFI 2949-EN-2022-09-26

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA) AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

[2022] HKCFI 2949

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

_________________

BETWEEN

 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東) Plaintiff
 and 
 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
 (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡))
1st Defendant
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

_________________

Before:  Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  21 September 2022

Date of Decision:  26 September 2022

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

1.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I adopt the definitions and abbreviations used in Master Kent Yee’s judgment herein dated 29 July 2022 (“Accounts Judgment”).

The application and relevant procedural background

2.  On 30 September 2016, I handed down judgment herein after trial (“Trial Judgment”) by which I ordered (1) Clara to account for the Kam Fai Proceeds; (2) Clara and the Company (“Defendants” collectively) to account for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds; (3) the Defendants to pay the plaintiff (“Father”) the sums found to be due on the taking of such accounts; and (4) the Company to transfer St Louis Flat 25C to Father.

3.  On 17 March 2017, which was more than 4½ months after the expiry of the time prescribed for an appeal, the Defendants applied under HCMP 620/2017 for extension of time for appeal from the Trial Judgment and a stay of execution pending the Defendants’ proposed appeal. In purported support of the application, the Defendants produced a draft notice of appeal signed by counsel and solicitors. The application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Yuen JA and Poon JA as the Chief Judge of the High Court then was) on paper on 28 February 2018: [2018] HKCA 109. It is worthy of note that the Court of Appeal found that the chances of success of the proposed appeal are not such that the court would extend time for appeal after the Defendants’ inexcusable substantial delay [28].

4.  On 6 March 2018, by a summons filed purportedly pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(7) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), the Defendants applied to the Court of Appeal for a reconsideration of its decision on 28 February 2018 at an inter partes oral hearing. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Defendants’ application on paper on 11 September 2018 for want of jurisdiction and lack of merits: [2018] HKCA 597.

5.  Neither of the Defendants has taken any steps to satisfy any part of the Trial Judgment. On 28 June 2018, upon Father’s application by summons dated 27 April 2018, I gave directions (with reasons) for the taking of the accounts I ordered under the Trial Judgment (“Accounts Directions”): [2018] HKCFI 1482. In so doing, I rejected the Defendants’ application for stay of execution of the Trial Judgment.

6.  Then, on 16 December 2020, after the time limit for appeal against the Accounts Directions had long expired, Clara issued a notice of appeal under CACV 643/2020, by which she sought to set aside the Accounts Directions. By a letter dated 18 January 2021, the Registrar of Civil Appeals informed Clara, amongst other things, and that she should have sought an extension of time to appeal against the directins. By the Registrar’s letter dated 19 March 2021, Clara was further advised, amongst other things, that she should have taken appropriate steps in this action if she intends to appeal against the Accounts Directions.

7.  By a summons issued herein on 25 March 2021, the Defendants applied for an extension of time to lodge an appeal to set aside the Accounts Directions. As the Defendants required leave to appeal under s 14AA of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), this court treated the application as one to extend time for an application for leave to appeal against the Accounts Directions. This application was dismissed for the reasons set out in [14]-[21] of my decision, with indemnity costs, handed down on 5 May 2021.

8.  By a summons dated 17 May 2021 issued in CAMP 167/2021, the Defendants applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to lodge a notice of appeal against the Accounts Directions.

9.  By a decision dated 13 September 2021 ([2021] HKCA 1311), the Court of Appeal (Yuen and G Lam JJA) made the following orders with indemnity costs: (1) dismissal of the Defendants’ summons dated 17 May 2021 for an extension of time to appeal from the Accounts Directions on the ground of inordinate and inexcusable delay alone; and (2) striking out the notice of appeal in CACV 643/2020 (to set aside the Accounts Directions); and dismissing the Defendants’ appeal.

10.  The lack of merit, and the timing, of the abovementioned applications by the Defendants smack of a delaying tactic. Needless to say, the court disapproves of such litigation strategy.

11.  After much inexcusable delay caused largely by various unmeritorious appeals and applications made by the Defendants (some of which are outlined above), the accounts ordered by the Trial Judgment were eventually taken before Master Kent Yee on 16 and 17 May and 2 June 2022, nearly 6 years after the Trial Judgment.

12.  Under the Accounts Judgment, it was determined that:

(1)  Clara owed Father HK$1,896,765.21 for the Kam Fai Proceeds; and

(2)  the Defendants owed Father $3,014,200 for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.

Both sums are to be paid within 28 days from the date of the Accounts Judgment with interest at 4% per annum from the date of the writ until judgement and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.

13.  The Defendants appealed against the Accounts Judgment by a notice of appeal filed on 1 August 2022 under CACV 296/2022 (“Appeal”).

14.  Now before the court is, simply put, the Defendants’ application, by summons dated 22 August 2022 (“Summons”) and purportedly supported by Clara’s 8th affirmation of the same date, for primarily a stay of execution of the Accounts Judgment pending the determination of the Appeal.

15.  For the sake of completeness, the Summons contains 4 paragraphs which, in addition to a stay of execution of the Accounts Judgment under paragraph 1, also purportedly seeks (1) to stay the execution of the Trial Judgment, the Accounts Directions and various costs orders against the Defendants in this action (paragraphs 2 and 4); and (2) to claim for the return of the monies so far recovered for Father by the Director of Legal Aid (paragraph 3). It should become clear, from the above outline of procedural background and the following discussion on the application for stay of execution of the Accounts Judgment pending appeal, as to why paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Summons are untenable.

16.  Further, on 26 August 2022, Clara wrote a letter to the Chief Judge of the High Court, stating that “The 1st Defendant does not believe that it would be in the best interests of the Defendants that Madam J Wong continues to sit as a judge in ruling the matters of HCA 899/2012, given the apparent bias displayed and carried out against the Defendants.” (“Recusal Application”) (emphasis added).

Recusal Application

17.  I shall deal with the Recusal Application first.

18.  The mere fact that a judge has in the past decided applications or issues adversely against a litigant is not a reason for that judge to recuse himself at further hearings. See, for instance, Mimmie Chan J’s detailed discussion in Cosimo Borrelli as Trustee of the SFC Litigation Trust v Allen Tak Yuen Chan[2020] HKCFI 2382 at [7]-[8] and [13]-[18], which was applied by Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui in Source View Dev Ltd v Café Happy Post Ltd[2022] HKCFI 511 at [6]-[8].

19.  Apart from complaining that I had previously ruled against them, the Defendants also raised an assortment of objections, which are unintelligible to me. Anyway, none of such objections would cause a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there is a real possibility that I am biased against the Defendants.

20.  I dismiss the Recusal Application and further make an order nisi that the Defendants shall pay Father’s costs of and occasioned by such application to be taxed, if not agreed, on an indemnity basis with certificate for counsel. Father’s own costs of the Recusal Application shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations (Cap 91A).

Stay application

Principles governing grant of stay of execution pending appeal

21.  An appeal does not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings: Order 59, rule 13(1).

22.  The principles governing an application for a stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal are well established. A summary of such principles can be found in, for example, the judgment of Chow J (as he then was) in Astro Nusantara International BV v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (No 2) [2016] 1 HKLRD 591 at [15] as follows, following the decision of Ma J (as the former Chief Justice then was) in Stay Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84:

“(1) The applicant is required to demonstrate a “good reason” for a stay of execution.

(2) Generally speaking, the existence of merely an arguable appeal cannot by itself amount to a sufficient reason to justify a stay. It is the minimum requirement before a court would even begin to consider granting a stay.

(3) In other words, if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted however exceptional the circumstances may otherwise be justifying a stay of execution.

(4) On the other hand, the existence of a strong appeal or a strong likelihood of success will usually by itself enable a stay to be granted because this would constitute a good reason for a stay.

(5) In most cases, where the court is faced with simply the existence of an arguable appeal, it becomes necessary for the applicant to provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(6) Commonly, this is done by demonstrating that without a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory, for example, because of an appreciable risk that the respondent to the appeal would not be able to repay in the event of a successful appeal against a money judgment, or because the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect on the applicant.

(7) In considering an application for a stay pending appeal, it would be impractical and even undesirable for the court to go deeply into the merits or strengths of the appeal, although the court must still form a preliminary view of these aspects.”

Discussion

23.  The Defendants’ notice of appeal dated 1 August 2022 sets out the proposed grounds of appeal in paragraphs numbered 1 to 12.

24.  Many of such proposed grounds are incomprehensible.

25.  Anyway, the prospects of success of the Appeal on these grounds are, in my view, slim if not unarguable.

26.  It is not necessary to go into each and every ground.

27.  Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 9, 10-11 and 12 target the Trial Judgment (or the findings made therein), the Accounts Directions and my abovementioned decision dated 5 May 2021 (refusing the Defendants’ application for time to lodge an appeal to set aside the Accounts Directions). First, the defendants’ applications for time to appeal against such determinations have already been finally determined against the Defendants by the Court of Appeal. The defendants cannot have a second bite of the cherry. Second, the arguments identified in these 6 paragraphs could have, but had apparently not, been raised in support of the Defendants’ multiple applications to appeal or otherwise challenge the Trial Judgment and the Accounts.

28.  As for the remaining paragraphs, they dispute the findings of fact, or what are in substance findings of fact[1], in the Accounts Judgment.

29.  The principles for the appeal court to disturb the findings of fact of the trial judge are well settled. See, for instance, the Court of Appeal’s summary of the threshold for an appeal against findings of fact at [33] and [34] of Yu Man Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen[2021] HKCA 1456:

“Palpable errors, whether of law or of fact, must be identified, and they must be sufficiently material to undermine the conclusions of the trial judge. In the absence of material errors, an appeal court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. What matters is whether the decision is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. That the judges in the appeal court may have reached a different conclusion is not a ground for intervention.

The principles for appellate intervention apply also to inferences of fact drawn from primary facts (unless the finding is based purely on inferences or otherwise has nothing to do with the witnesses’ demeanour or the trial judge’s having received the evidence at first hand), and findings of mixed fact and law, or an issue on which the judge had to come to a judgmental conclusion after taking a number of factors into account. The correct approach in reviewing such a conclusion is to treat the judge’s decision with utmost respect, and refrain from interference unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong. It is similar to an appeal against an exercise of discretion.”

30.  The Defendants have certainly not pinpointed any palpable error in the Accounts Judgment, whether of law or fact.

31.  Even if the Appeal should be arguable, the Defendants have not alluded to any additional reasons to justify a stay of execution pending the determination of the Appeal.

32.  To the contrary, against the procedural history outlined above, I question the fides of this application. I strongly suspect it is again motivated by an intention to delay.

33.  For the above reasons, it is inappropriate to, and I will not, stay the execution of the Accounts Judgment pending the Appeal.

34.  Accordingly, I dismiss the Summons. I also order on a nisi basis that the Defendants shall pay Father’s costs of and occasioned by the Summons to be taxed, if not agreed, on an indemnity basis with certificate for counsel. Father’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

  (Lisa Wong)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Nelson Miu, instructed by Cedric & Co, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant appeared in person

The 2nd defendant was represented by the 1st defendant



[1]  Paragraphs 9-12 are dressed up as concerning points of law raised by the Accounts Judgment.

[2022] HKCFI 2351-EN-2022-07-29

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

[2022] HKCFI 2351

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

_______________

BETWEEN

 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff
 and 
 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
(also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡) )
1st Defendant
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

_______________

Before:  Master Kent Yee in Chambers (Open to Public)

Dates of Hearing:  16, 17 May and 2 June 2022

Date of Judgment:  29 July 2022

___________________

J U D G M E N T

__________________

Introduction

1.  After a 5-day trial, Recorder Lisa KY Wong SC (as she then was) handed down a judgment dated 30 September 2016 (“the Judgment”) by which Mr Wong obtained judgment on his claim, among other things, that Madam Wong (“Clara”) should account for the sale proceeds of a flat and a car park (defined as “the Kam Fai Properties” in the Judgment) and that Clara and Wonggenos Enterprises Company Limited (“the Company”) should account for the sale proceeds of another flat (defined as “St Louis Flat 1D” in the Judgment). It was ordered in the Judgment that Clara and the Company should pay Mr Wong the sums found to be due on the taking of such accounts.

2.  The learned Recorder concluded that Clara and the Company should make such accounts on the basis of an express common intention, agreement or understanding between Mr Wong and Clara that Mr Wong should remain the beneficial owner of the Kam Fai Properties and Clara held them on constructive trust for him. Hence, the learned Recorder held that Mr Wong is entitled to tracing and that Clara and the Company are constructive trustees holding those sale proceeds on trust for Mr Wong.

3.  By the order of Lisa Wong J dated 27 June 2018 (“the Order”), the parties were given directions as to the filing of evidence and/or list of objections for the purpose of the accounts ordered in the Judgment and the accounts should be taken before a master.

4.  Accordingly, this court took the accounts. In this document, I shall adopt the abbreviations and definitions used in the Judgment unless otherwise stated. I shall also refer to the Judgment for the background facts and procedural history of this matter.

Preliminary matters

5.  Before resolving the substantive issues, I have to deal with some housekeeping matters. First, Clara is the sole shareholder and director of the Company and both Clara and the Company are not legally represented. Clara has not obtained any leave from the Registrar to represent the Company. Strictly speaking, the Company should be treated as being absent. Since practically Clara and the Company share the same position in this matter, the absence of the Company does not make any real difference. And Mr Miu, counsel for Mr Wong, does not take any issue with Clara speaking on behalf of the Company as well.

6.  Secondly, both parties filed further evidence after the close of evidence pursuant to the Order before this hearing. I grant leave for all such evidence to be admitted with the consent of the parties.

7.  Mr Wong himself has not filed any affirmation. Mr Lam, who is the handling solicitor acting for Mr Wong, has made two affirmations on his behalf. Mr Miu indicated to this court that Lam would not testify and be cross-examined by Clara at the hearing.

8.  Thirdly, Mr Miu indicated that the application that the Company do execute an assignment of all its rights and interests in St Louis Flat 25C to Mr Wong is no longer pursued for the time being despite Mr Wong’s entitlement under the Judgment.

9.  At the outset, I have to make it clear that this court is bound by the factual findings of the learned Recorder in the Judgment. This is a really sad case in that Mr Wong sues Clara being one of his daughters and Clara is obviously very unhappy with those findings against her. Clara has actually exhausted the legal means to challenge such findings including appeals to the Court of Appeal. At the hearing, Clara spent most of the time in the witness box in passing comments on the findings in the Judgment. She did so in her written submissions as well. This is unhelpful and irrelevant.

10.  Clara claims a number of sums which should be deducted from the Kam Fai Proceeds and among them, she makes a sizable claim generally for her remuneration in her accounts. She contends that she should be remunerated for being Mr Wong’s caretaker, agent, investment adviser and trustee taking care of the management of the relevant properties over the years. I should deal with this particular claim at the latter part of this judgment.

11.  I should first indicate that I do not find Clara, the only live witness, to be a reliable witness. I am sceptical about the accuracy of the figures given by her unless they are supported by undisputed documentary evidence. For instance, Clara claims that the stamp duty payable for the acquisition of St Louis Flat 25C was HK$140,000 but this is flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence. She cannot explain why the amount of the actual stamp duty paid by the Company is doubled in her claim.

The Kam Fai Proceeds

12.  The Kam Fai Proceeds refer to the sale proceeds of the Kam Fai Properties consisting of the Kam Fai Flat and the Kam Fai Carpark. The former was registered in the joint names of Mother, Clara and Agnes and the latter was registered in the name of Karen. By two sets of Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 4 December 2006 and an Assignment dated 10 January 2007, the Kam Fai Flat was sold at HK$7,900,000 and the Kam Fai Carpark was sold at HK$300,000.[1] The gross proceeds of sale stands at HK$8,200,000.

13.  In taking the account of the Kam Fai Proceeds, I am tasked with the ascertainment of the net sale proceeds. To this end, I have to find out all the costs and expenses incurred both before and after the sale and those costs arising from the sale. I should also take into account all the income derived from the Kam Fai Properties including rental income and mortgage loans raised.

14.  An amount of HK$82,000 as agency commission and an amount of HK$7,800 as solicitor’s fee were incurred in the sale of the Kam Fai Properties. These expenses are not in dispute and should be deducted from the gross proceeds of sale.

15.  I now scrutinize the use of the Kam Fai Proceeds by Clara.

16.  Out of the gross proceeds of sale, the evidence of Clara at trial was that she paid certain amounts to Mr Wong, Mother and her sisters.[2] The position of Mr Wong was that save the proper disbursements to Mother and her sisters, Clara received and retained the remaining net proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties as his trustee or agent pending his instruction for reinvestment.[3]

17.  For this account taking hearing, Clara in her affirmation stated that she paid AUD100,000 to Mother at her request, HK$200,000 to Karen, USD50,000 to Agnes for mortgage repayments and other expenses and AUD30,000 to her other sisters in Australia.

18.  Clara is able to produce a copy of the cheque issued to Karen dated 15 January 2007 in the amount of HK$ 200,000 and another cheque of the same date issued to Karen in the amount of HK$ 616,108 for Mother. Clara also produced a remittance to her bank account in Australia in the amount of AUD 20,000, which she said was to be paid to Mr Wong for his Europe trip.

19.  Clara says her payments to other sisters was made in cash when she visited them in Australia and she did not ask them to give her a receipt.

20.  Mr Miu did not seriously challenge these payments by way of cross-examination of Clara. In his written closing submissions, Mr Miu only accepts that Clara paid to Mother a sum of AUD100,000 (HK$616,000) and her sisters an aggregate sum of AUD30,000 (HK$184,800) and paid for his trip to Europe in the sum of HK$123,200.00. Mr Wong accepts that these amounts should also be deducted from the gross proceeds of sale.

21.  I accept Mr Wong’s concession relating to Clara’s financial contribution to his Europe trip in the sum of HK$123,200 and her payment made to her sisters in the sum of HK$184,800 despite the lack of documentary proof. I also accept Clara’s payment to Mother.

22.  However, the payment to Karen calls for separate consideration. According to Clara, the payment was in fact for Karen’s contribution to mortgage repayment which was an expense incurred before the sale of the Kam Fai Properties. I shall deal with it later.

23.  On the other hand, I cannot accept Clara’s alleged payment to Agnes. In her 4th affirmation, she alleged that she had paid USD50,000 to Agnes for mortgage repayments and other expense. However, her evidence at trial was that she had paid Agnes about USD80,000[4]. Clara did not explain why she now claims a lesser sum and on what basis she now arrives at a different figure. Also, there is no reason why she could not produce any documentary proof of her payment of USD50,000. At least she should ask Agnes to give her a receipt or a note acknowledging such a payment.

24.  The learned Recorder stated that she was prepared to accept that both Agnes and Clara must have over the years made some contribution to the repayment of the mortgage loan.[5] It is more probable than not that Clara had made some repayments to Agnes for her contribution. Clara has the burden to prove the exact amount paid and she has failed to discharge the burden.

25.  However, as with the repayment made to Karen, any repayment made to Agnes is irrelevant for the present purposes, as will be explained below.

26.  Thus, the total deduction allowed is: HK$(616,108 + 184,800 + 123,200) = HK$924,108.

27.  The parties are in agreement that the Kam Fai Proceeds were applied to fund the acquisition of three flats in the same buildings, namely, St Louis Flats 25C, 1D and 24A. The Company became the registered owner of St Louis Flats 25C and 1D in March 2007 whereas Clara acquired St Louis Flat 24A in her sole name in February 2007.

28.  As stated in the Judgment, the Company sold St Louis Flat 1D in January 2011 for HK$4,380,000[6]. On the other hand, according to its land search record, Clara sold St Louis Flat 24A in January 2021 at the price of HK$6,900,000, reaping a gross profit of HK$4 million.

29.  Clara produced the relevant documents prepared by Messrs. Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin (“AYCHT”), the handling solicitors acting for the Company and Clara in these transactions.

30.  Mr Wong accepts the information gleaned from those documents. For St Louis Flat 25C, the downpayment (35% of the purchase price of HK$3,250,000), stamp duty and solicitors’ fees were HK$1,137,500.00, HK$70,000 and HK$6,000 respectively. He also accepts the agent’s commission to be HK$32,500 being 1% of the purchase price. The total amount agreed by Mr Wong is HK$1,246,000.00.

31.  On the other hand, Clara claims that renovation costs in the sum of HK$100,000 was incurred upon acquisition of St Louis Flat 25C. She provides no documentary proof and I cannot accept her claim merely based on her assertion.

32.  Similarly, for St Louis Flat 1D, the downpayment, stamp duty and solicitors’ fees were HK$920,500 (35% of the purchase price of HK$2,630,000), HK$39,450 and HK$6,000 respectively. Mr Wong accepts the agent’s commission to be HK$26,300 being 1% of the purchase price. The total amount agreed by Mr Wong is HK$992,250.00.

33.  For St Louis Flat 24A, the downpayment, stamp duty and solicitors’ fees were HK$1,015,000.00 (35% of the purchase price of HK$2,900,000), HK$43,500 and HK$6,000 respectively. Mr Wong accepts the agent’s commission to be HK$29,000 being 1% of the purchase price. The total amount agreed by Mr Wong is HK$1,093,500.00.

34.  In the Judgment, the learned Recorder observed that Clara was rewarded the downpayment on St Louis Flat 24A by Mr Wong.[7] There is no further elaboration on this matter. It is not known whether Mr Wong agreed to pay the associated expenses arising from the acquisition of St Louis Flat 24A. He has adduced no evidence in this regard.

35.  In her affirmation, Clara demands Mr Wong to pay the remaining 65% of the purchase price of saying only a 35% downpayment was drawn from the Kam Fai Proceeds. I do not understand the basis of her demand but in any event it is never her case that Mr Wong has ever agreed to reimburse her the associated expenses.

36.  Therefore, on the available evidence, I conclude that only the 30% downpayment, i.e., HK$1,015,000.00 is deductible.

37.  Now I turn to the income and the outgoings from inception to the completion of the sale of the Kam Fai Properties.

38.  Both parties start at the SPC Loan in the sum of HK$2,000,000. The Kam Fai Properties were mortgaged to SPC to secure the SPC Loan in June 1997.

39.  It is not in dispute that out of the sum of HK$2 million, a sum of HK$1,008,655.74 was deposited into the account of Fullwin. Clara discloses, and now Mr Wong accepts, that another sum of HK$754,423.13 was used to discharge the Second Mortgage owed by Fullwin.

40.  Thus, there was a balance of the SPC Loan in the sum of HK$236,921.13 retained by Clara.

41.  Clara contends that the SPC Loan should be treated as a personal loan she extended to Mr Wong and she further claims interest at the rate of 8% per annum. This is not the finding of the learned Recorder and I reject her contention.

42.  The SPC Mortgage was redeemed by repayment made possible with the GE Loan secured by the GE Charge dated 11 May 2001. Clara does not provide any figure for the total amount of mortgage payments purportedly made by her and her sisters. What she has disclosed are three pages of payment records issued by AIG (formerly known as SPC) exhibited as “ST-1” but they only cover 21 April 1998 to 21 March 2001. There should be another payment record covering the first 11 instalments.

43.  Doing the best he can, Mr Miu suggests to take the average of the 1st instalment and the 12th instalment to be multiplied by 11 to work out the estimated payment for the first 11 instalments. I accept his suggestion. There is no other way to find out the actual amount of the first 11 instalments.

44.  On this evidence and by this calculation, the total amount of mortgage instalments paid to SPC/AIG is HK$1,369,935.60.

45.  As regards the GE Loan, it was followed shortly by the grant of the GE Facility by GE to Agnes and Clara and the GE Facility was secured by the Kam Fai Flat. With effect from 1 August 2003, the GE Loan (then standing at HK$1,034,181.58) and the GE Facility were consolidated and converted into a single loan of HK$1,518,291.15, i.e. the New GE Loan.

46.  I agree with Mr Miu that the GE Facility was for the personal purpose of Agnes and Clara and Mr Wong should only be held responsible for a part of the GE New Loan. I also agree with his apportionment of Mr Wong’s liability to pay the mortgage payments: the balance of the GE Loan/the New GE Loan, i.e. 1,034,181.58/1,518,291.15 = 68.11%.

47.  According to the Statement of Account prepared by AYCHT for the sale transaction of the Kam Fai Flat, the redemption money for the New GE Loan is HK$846,119.02. Mr Wong should only be liable to pay 68.11% of the same, i.e., HK$576,291.66 and this should be deductible.

48.  For the mortgage repayments made to GE over the years, Clara is not able to tell the total amount. She asserts that the monthly payment was HK$8,960.20 but this is again contradicted by the payment schedule issued by GE.

49.  On the materials available, Mr Miu helpfully points out that the total amount paid under the GE Loan should be HK$329,326.89 and the total amount paid under the New GE Loan should be HK$881,652.87. The former amount can be deducted whereas only 68.11% of the latter amount, i.e., HK$600,493.77 can be deducted as explained above.

50.  It should be noted that these deductions regarding mortgage repayments are made on the basis that Clara with the assistance of the sisters made all such mortgage repayments with her own fund. Thus, it does not matter how much she subsequently repaid Karen and/or Agnes for their past contributions and those reimbursements should not be taken into account again.

51.  As found by the learned Recorder, the Kam Fai Flat was rented out and generated rental income since September 1998. Such income was collected and kept by Clara and Clara applied the same to make the mortgage repayments.[8]

52.  Clara disclosed in her 5th Affirmation that the Kam Fai Flat yielded a monthly rent of HK$21,500 for 24 months and a monthly rent of HK$25,000 for 12 months. Clara then resided at the Kam Fai Flat for about 64 months. The total rental income should be HK$816,000. Mr Wong accepts this figure without demur. This sum obtained by Clara should be set off against the mortgage repayments.

53.  Clara claims several expenses of the Kam Fai Flat. She alleges that she paid the monthly management fees of HK$1,100 for 114 months. However, the tenancy agreement shows that it was the tenant who had to pay such management fees. Clara should also be responsible for such management fees when she occupied the Kam Fai Flat for her own purpose.

54.  Clara further claims a total sum of HK$100,000 for the renovation, repair and maintenance of the Kam Fai Flat. She could not provide any breakdown and give any particulars. No receipt is produced. However, after the acquisition of the Kam Fai Flat, there were bound to be expenses incurred to make it tenantable and repair and maintenance costs over the years were unavoidable. I am prepared to accept this amount to be deductible.

55.  Clara claims HK$10,000 as reinstatement costs of the Kam Fai Carpark in her 4th Affirmation whereas she claims HK$9,300 for the same costs in her 5th Affirmation. She refers to some documents to show the amount of the alleged costs (Exhibit ST-5) but I am unable to see how they can tell anything about the amount. She alleges that Mr Wong had a storeroom for his business erected on the Kam Fai Carpark and she had to demolish the storeroom and reinstate the carpark before it could be sold.

56.  Clara disclosed the minutes of an owners’ meeting dated 23 August 2002. It was recorded that all the unauthorised structures at the car park would be handled in accordance with the Deed of Mutual Covenant and that the owner of the Kam Fai Carpark had promised to demolish the unauthorised structure.

57.  It seems more likely than not that the storeroom was the unauthorised structure and it was demolished to comply with the Deed of Mutual Covenant in 2002, rather than with a view to the sale of the Kam Fai Carpark.

58.  Whatever the reason why the storeroom was demolished is, the storeroom was for the personal use of Mr Wong and he should bear the costs of its demolition. Clara was not cross-examined on this item at all. I find the costs to be reasonably incurred and I allow the sum of HK$9,300 to be deducted from the sale proceeds too.

59.  I can also see that Clara paid a sum of HK$4,400 to Messrs Philip Tsui & To on or about 9 December 2002 to settle their legal bill asking for HK$4,900. As stated in the legal bill, the charge was for their legal advice on the unauthorised structure erected on the Kam Fai Carpark.

60.  I accept that Mr Wong should reimburse Clara the sum of HK$4,400.

61.  In regard to Clara’s claim for government rates and rents allegedly paid by her from 1997 to December 2006, I am not convinced that she has made such payments. The government rates appear to have been borne by the tenants and there is no evidence that Clara has ever paid any government rents.

62.  Mr Wong accepts that agency commission for rental in the sum of HK$10,750 and miscellaneous expense in the sum of HK$10,000 were incurred. I then allow these sums to be deducted.

63.  I believe all the income and outgoings of the Kam Fat Properties. Now I turn to the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.

The St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds

64.  I have assessed the acquisition costs of St Louis Flat 1D at HK$992,250, which includes 30% of the purchase price as down payment.

65.  When it was sold at HK$4,380,000, Mr Wong accepts that there was an outstanding mortgage to be discharged. Instead of producing direct evidence such as the bank statements and the statement of costs prepared by the solicitors handling the conveyance, Clara after the close of evidence sent to this court a copy of draft profits tax computation to show that the outstanding mortgage was HK$1,315,000.00.

66.  Mr Miu does not believe that this is the correct figure but he accepts this for the present purpose.

67.  Clara has not provided proof of the mortgage payments over the years. She agrees that St Louis Flat 1D was leased out and the rental income was used for servicing mortgage, government rates and miscellaneous expense.

68.  Mr Miu asks this court to ignore any such mortgage payments. He refers this court to the audited account of the Company for the financial year ended 31 March 2012. The amount of HK$1,833,337 was recorded as “Gain on Disposal” representing the capital gain yielded on the sale of St Louis Flat 1D. The Retained Profits was recorded as HK$1,968,308 meaning there was a net profit of HK$134,971.

69.  Mr Miu then submits that the rental income indeed was able to cover all expenses including mortgage loan interest. He submits that the only deductible items are agency commission of HK$43,800, solicitors fee of HK$7,000 and outstanding mortgage of HK$1,315,000.

70.  I agree with his submissions. After deduction of the said three items, the net proceeds of sale stand at HK$3,014,200.

71.  Clara argues that the annual accounting expense and audit charges of the Company should be borne by Mr Wong. She relies on Mr Wong’s allegation that she acquired the Company under his instruction as a vehicle for reinvestment and hence the Company held St Louis Flats 25C and 1D on trust for him.

72.  I cannot accept her argument. Such charges have nothing to do with the sale transaction and the sale proceeds.

Clara’s remuneration

73.  Clara asks for a monthly fee of HK$45,000 or a grand sum of HK$12,780,000 from June 1997 to January 2021 for her various services rendered to Mr Wong. She is unable to explain the legal basis of this demand. She does not allege any promise of Mr Wong to pay such fees.

74.  Mr Miu, very fairly, refers this court to the relevant passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 5th Edn. (2019) Vol.98 at §376:

“A constructive trustee may be entitled to an allowance or remuneration in respect of the time and trouble expended by him on property of which he is rightfully in possession but of which he is in equity a constructive trustee.”

75.  Re Berkeley Applegate Ltd [1989] Ch. 32. There, Deputy Judge Edward Nugee Q.C. said (at p.50G to p.51B),

“The authorities establish, in my judgment, a general principle that where a person seeks to enforce a claim to an equitable interest in property, the court has a discretion to require as a condition of giving effect to that equitable interest that an allowance be made for costs incurred and for skill and labour expended in connection with the administration of the property. It is a discretion which will be sparingly exercised; but factors which will operate in favour of its being exercised include the fact that, if the work had not been done by the person to whom the allowance is sought to be made, it would have had to be done either by the person entitled to the equitable interest (as in In re Marin Mansions Co., L.R. 4 Rq. 601 and similar cases) or by a receiver appointed by the court whose fees would have been borne by the trust property (as in Scott v. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. Jun. 438); and the fact that the work has been of substantial benefit to the trust property and to the persons interested in it in equity (as in Philipps v. Boardman [1964] 1 W.l.R.993). In my judgment this is a case in which the jurisdiction can properly be exercised.

76.  I bear in mind that such discretion should be sparingly exercised. I do not think I should exercise my discretion in the particular circumstances of the present case.

77.  Mr Wong placed his trust and confidence in Clara because she is his daughter. But for Mr Wong’s delegation to her the management of his properties and investment matters, Clara could not have secured the GE Facilities for her own business and resided at the Kam Fai Flat for more than 5 years free of charge. In addition, she would not have been rewarded the downpayment for the purchase of St Louis 24A, which was eventually sold at a huge profit.

78.  In my view, Clara has already been rewarded sufficiently for her time and effort in dealing with the properties for Mr Wong. I refuse to exercise my discretion to allow her any additional remuneration.

Conclusion

79.  In light of the foregoing findings and analysis, the accounts of the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds are as follows:

Kam Fai Properties

 DescriptionAmount (HK$)
1Sale Price – Flat7,900,000.00  
 Sale Price – Carpark300,000.00  
 
Gross Proceeds of Sale

8,200,000.00  
 Less : Agency Commission82,000.00  
 Less : Solicitor's fees7,800.00  
 Less : 68.11% of the
Outstanding mortgage
 
 
 
576,291.66  
 
Therefore Net Proceeds of Sale

7,533,908.34  

2Mortgage instalments paid to
SPC/AIG Finance
1,369,935.60  
 GE for GE Loan329,326.89  
 GE for New GE Loan600,493.77  
 

2,299,756.26  
 Less: Balance of the SPC Loan 236,921.13  
 Less: Rental income received 816,000.00  
 
Net Mortgage Payments (A)

1,246,835.13  

3Other allowable expenses  
 Agency commission for rental10,750.00  
 Misc. expenses (with documents)
renovation, repair and maintenance
Demolition and reinstatement costs
Legal costs
10,000.00  
100,000.00  
9,300  
4,400  
 
Total authorized expenses

134,450.00  

4Authorized payments 
 To Mother (AUD 100,000)616,108.00  
 To Sisters (AUD 30,000)184,800.00  
 For Father's Europe trip123,200.00  
 
Total authorized payments (B)

924,108.00  

5Acquisition of Unit 25C
($3,250,000)
 
 Downpayment (35%)1,137,500.00  
 Agent's Commission32,500.00  
 Stamp Duty70,000.00  
 Solicitor's fees6,000.00  
 
 

1,246,000.00  

6Acquisition of Unit 1D
($ 2,630,000)
 
 Downpayment (35%)920,500.00  
 Agency commission26,300.00  
 Stamp Duty39,450.00  
 Solicitor's fees6,000.00  
 
 

992,250.00  

7Acquisition of Unit 24A
($2,900,000)
 
 Downpayment (35%)1,015,000.00  
 Agency commission29,000.00  
 Stamp Duty43,500.00  
 Solicitor's fees6,000.00  
 
 

1,093,500.00  

8Total of items (2) to (7)5,637,143.13  

9Therefore D1 liable to account
for (1) – (8) =
1,896,765.21  

St Louis Flat ID

 DescriptionAmount (HK$)
 Gross Proceeds of Sale4,380,000.00  
 Less : Agency commission43,800.00  
 Less : Solicitor's fees7,000.00  
 Less : Outstanding mortgage1,315,000.00  
 
Net Proceeds of Sale

$3,014,200.00  

80.  Pursuant to the Judgment, I order that Clara should pay Mr Wong HK$1,896,765.21 and that Clara and the Company should pay Mr Wong HK$3,014,200.00 within 28 days from the date of this order.

81.  Interest on such sums should be allowed. Mr Miu refers to this court a decision of Master J Wong in Willwin Development (Asia) Company Limited and Anor. v Wei Xing[2020] HKCFI 407. There, the master ordered pre-judgment interest at the rate of 4% from the date of the writ until judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.

82.  Mr Wong has taken much longer time to have the accounts completed after obtaining the Judgment. Yet, I should not lose sight of the various applications and appeals made by Clara in the wake of the Judgment and the delay should be partially attributable to them.

83.  I agree with Mr Miu that I should adopt the same rate of 4% as pre-judgment interest rate from the date of the writ until this judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment. I so order.

84.  There is nothing to justify a departure from the general principle of costs following the event. I make an order nisi that Clara and the Company should forthwith pay Mr Wong his costs of the account taking, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

85.  I further order that Mr Wong’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

86.  Lastly, I should Mr Miu for his fair and helpful submissions.

  (Kent Yee)
Master of the High Court

Mr Nelson Miu, instructed by Messrs. Cedric Yeung & Co and assigned by the Legal Aid Department, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant appeared in person

The 2nd defendant, not represented, absent



[1]  §35 of the Judgment.

[2]  §39 of the Judgment.

[3]  §40 of the Judgment.

[4]  §39(1) of the Judgment.

[5]  §89(3) of the Judgment.

[6]  §93 of the Judgment.

[7]  §93 of the Judgment.

[8]  §20 of the Judgment.

[2021] HKCFI 1740-EN-2021-06-17

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA) AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

[2021] HKCFI 1740

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN  
 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff

and

 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
(also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡)) 
1st Defendant
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

____________________

Before: Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers (paper disposal)

Date of Application: 17 May 2021

Date of Decision: 17 June 2021

______________________

DECISION ON COSTS

______________________

1.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to use the definitions and abbreviations adopted in the last reasoned decision that I handed down in this action on 5 May 2021 (“5.5.2021 Decision”) and references to numbered paragraphs are to paragraphs of such decision.

2.  By the 5.5.2021 Decision, I dismissed the Application (by Clara (the 1st defendant) for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision by which I, inter alia, gave standard directions for the taking of certain accounts by the defendants that I ordered after trial on 30 September 2016).

3.  I further made an order nisi that Clara should pay the costs of and occasioned to Father (the plaintiff) by the Application, to be taxed if not agreed on an indemnity basis (“Costs Order Nisi”).

4.  By a letter dated 17 May 2021 addressed to this court and apparently copied to Father’s solicitors, Clara stated the following:

“Regarding paragraph 23 of the Decision dated 5th May 2021, please indicate what kinds of loss, damage, or hurt the Defendants have caused whom or which party in this Application resulting in a cost order nisi on an indemnity basis. Please indicate fact instead of view (opinion).

The Defendants object to a cost order nisi on an indemnity basis.” (original emphasis)

5.  I shall treat Clara’s said letter dated 17 May 2021 as making an application to vary the Costs Order Nisi.

6.  I dismiss such application.

7.  As concluded in [23], the Application is an abuse of the court’s process.  In so ruling, I took into account the following matters.

8.  First, as observed in [14] to [21]:

(1)  The Application was made out of time for 2 years and 257 days.

(2)  There was no or no credible excuse for such extremely serious delay.

(3)  The proposed appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision was based on grounds that are utterly devoid of merits.

(4)  The Application was another attempt by Clara and the Company to further sabotage Father’s recovery of the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C, to which Father had obtained judgment back in September 2016.

9.  Second, as stated in [23] and summarised in [3] to [11], I viewed the Application against the background of Clara’s preceding litigation behaviour in:

(1)  refusing to render the accounts ordered against her and the Company[1] in breach of multiple court orders made against them since September 2016;

(2)  seriously missing deadlines for appeal with the delays then followed by repeated applications for leave to appeal out of time; and

(3)  then using the applications for leave to appeal out of time to ground applications for stay of execution of the judgment and orders against her (and the Company) pending the intended appeals or leave applications.

10.  It can be seen that the Application fell into the same pattern.

11.  Given that the only effect of Clara’s said litigation strategy was the delay of Father’s recovery of the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C, it would not be unreasonable for one to think that such tactics were adopted precisely to achieve such an improper object.

12.  For the above reasons, the Costs Order Nisi shall stand.

13.  As Clara is unrepresented and since I have not called upon Father to respond to her application to vary the Costs Order Nisi, I make no order as to costs on this occasion.

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance

 

Edmund Cheung & Co, for the plaintiff

The defendants were unrepresented

 

[1] Solely controlled by Clara.

[2021] HKCFI 1267-EN-2021-05-05

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA)

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HCA 899/2012

[2021] HKCFI 1267

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN  
 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff

and

 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)1st Defendant
 (also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡))  
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant
 (黃振諾企業有限公司) 

____________________

Before:Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:4 May 2021
Date of Decision:5 May 2021

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

1.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to use the definitions and abbreviations adopted in the reasoned judgment that I handed down after trial in this action on 30 September 2016 (“Judgment”).

2.  To recap, I gave judgment for Father (the plaintiff) on his claims against Clara (the 1st defendant) and the Company (the 2nd defendant), of which Clara has always been the sole shareholder and director, as follows:

(1)     that Clara should account for the Kam Fai Proceeds;

(2)     that Clara and the Company (“defendants” collectively) should account for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds;

(3)     that the defendants should pay Father the sums found to be due on the taking of such accounts; and

(4)     that the Company should transfer St Louis Flat 25C to Father.

3.  The defendants had applied to the Court of Appeal under HCMP 620/2017 for (1) leave to appeal against the Judgment out of time and (2) stay of execution of the Judgment pending the intended appeal.  On 28 February 2018, the Court of Appeal (Yuen JA and Poon JA as the Chief Judge of the High Court then was) dismissed the defendants’ application on paper.

4.  Upon the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the defendants’ application on paper as aforesaid, the defendants applied for reconsideration of their application by way of oral hearing before the Court of Appeal.  This was again met with dismissal by the Court of Appeal on 11 September 2018.

5.  In the meantime, as neither of the defendants had taken any step to satisfy any part of the Judgment, by summons issued on 27 April 2018, Father applied for:

(1)     directions for the taking of the accounts for the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds; and

(2)     an order that the Company do execute an assignment of all its rights and interests in St Louis Flat 25C to Father absolutely within 28 days.

6.  In response, the defendants had by Clara’s affirmation filed on 13 June 2018 “applied” for a stay of execution of, or all further proceedings on, the Judgment pending:

(1) the defendants’ appeal from the Judgment (in that the Court of Appeal was then yet to rule on the defendants’ application on 28 August 2018 for reconsideration of the dismissal of the defendants’ application for leave to appeal against the Judgment out of time); and

(2) the determination of DCMP 878/2018 (which was commenced by SCB on 23 March 2018 against the Company as borrower and mortgagor and against Clara as guarantor for payment of all principal and interests outstanding on the loan with which St Louis Flat 25C was acquired and which stood at HK$885,593.05 as at 19 April 2018 and for delivery of vacant possession of St Louis Flat 25C). 

7.  By a decision handed down on 27 June 2018 (“27.6.2018 Decision”), I dismissed the defendants’ application for stay pending their appeal from the Judgment and adjourned Father’s application relating to St Louis Flat 25C sine die to enable Father to be advised of, and consider, whether he should as beneficial owner of St Louis Flat 25C take any step in respect of DCMP 878/2018.  I further gave the following 2 sets of identical directions for the taking of the accounts of the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds (“Accounts Directions”):

(1) (a)     that Clara shall file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors an account of the Kam Fai Proceeds as well as an affirmation verifying the account and exhibiting supporting documents within 60 days from the date of the 27.6.2018 Decision (which expired on 27 August 2018);
 (b)     that Father shall file with the court and serve on Clara his list of objections to the account (if any) and the grounds therefor by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;
 (c)     that Clara should file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors her response to the list of objections (if any) by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;
 (d)     that there should be no further affirmation without leave of the court, the application for which must be supported by a draft of the further affirmation sought to be adduced;
 (e)     that the account should be taken before a Master;
 (f)     that any application for further directions should be made to the Master; and
(2)(a)     that Clara shall file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors an account of the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds as well as an affirmation verifying the account and exhibiting supporting documents within 60 days from the date of the 27.6.2018 Decision (which expired on 27 August 2018);
 (b)     that Father shall file with the court and serve on Clara his list of objections to the account (if any) and the grounds therefor by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;
 (c)     that Clara should file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors her response to the list of objections (if any) by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;
 (d)     that there should be no further affirmation without leave of the court, the application for which must be supported by a draft of the further affirmation sought to be adduced;
 (e)     that the account should be taken before a Master;
 (f)     that any application for further directions should be made to the Master.

8.  It is unnecessary for me to recount the tortuous procedural history after the 27.6.2018 Decision save that (1) both the defendants had failed to file or serve any account of, or verifying affirmation in relation to, either the Kam Fai Proceeds or the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and (2) with leave of the court, Father had issued an originating summons in HCMP 129/2019 (“Committal Proceedings”) on 28 January 2019 for the committal of Clara to prison for non-compliance with paragraphs 1(a) and (2)(a) of the Accounts Directions.  The Committal Proceedings were heard on 30 August 2019 and dismissed for reasons concerning service by my judgment dated 24 November 2020 (“Committal Judgment”).  By the Committal Judgment, I also extended the time for the defendants to comply with the Accounts Directions to 23 January 2021, being 60 days from the date of the Committal Judgment.

9.  The defendants have since purported to comply with paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) of the Accounts Directions by Clara’s 4th affirmation filed herein on 14 January 2021.  They have further filed Clara’s 5th affirmation on 9 March 2021 in purported compliance with paragraphs 1(c) and (2)(c) of the Accounts Directions.

10.  In the meantime, on 16 December 2020, Clara issued a notice of appeal under CACV 643/2020, by which she sought to set aside the Accounts Directions under the 27.6.2018 Decision and the extension of time for compliance with such directions under the Committal Judgment.

11.  By a letter dated 18 January 2021, the Registrar of Civil Appeals informed Clara, amongst other things, that the time limit to appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision had long expired and that she should have sought an extension of time to appeal against the same.  By the Registrar’s letter dated 19 March 2021, Clara was further advised, amongst other things, that she should have taken appropriate steps in this action if she intends to appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision.

12.  Against this procedural background, before the court now is Clara’s application by summons issued on 25 March 2021 for an extension of time to lodge an appeal to set aside the 27.6.2018 Decision (“Application”).  As Clara required leave to appeal under s 14AA of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4), I shall treat the Application as one to extend time for an application for leave to appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision.

13.  I shall dismiss the Application for the following reasons.

14.  First, the time for Clara to apply for leave to appeal against the 27.6.2018 Decision expired on 11 July 2018.  The summons by which the Application was made was not issued until 25 March 2021.  That is to say, Clara has been out of time for 2 years and 257 days, which is on any view an extremely serious delay.

15.  Second, such serious delay is also inexcusable. According to Clara, she had otherwise devoted her time to the defence of the Committal Proceedings, the compliance with paragraphs 1(a), (c), (2)(a) and (c) of the Accounts Direction and the pursuit of CACV 643/2020.  She made the Application as soon as she learnt of the leave requirement.  I am not persuaded by such excuse. 

(1)     Litigants in persons are expected to comply with the same practice and procedure as other users of the court.  Although a party acting in person does not have the benefit of paid legal advice and representation, they should make all reasonable enquiries necessary to ascertain the appropriate procedure for the next step that he intends to take so as not to jeopardise the timely progress of the cause or matter.

(2)     In this case, Clara had given no indication whatsoever that she wished to challenge the 27.6.2018 Decision until she filed the notice of appeal under CACV 643/2020 on 16 December 2020.  What had she done in the 2 years and 5 months between 27 June 2018 and 16 December 2020?

(3)     Clara specifically mentioned the Committal Proceedings.  The originating summons by which such proceedings were commenced was issued on 28 January 2019.  There is no explanation by Clara as to what she had done between 27 June 2018 and 28 January 2019. 

(4)     The Committal Proceedings were heard on 30 August 2019 and disposed of on 24 November 2020.  While judgment was being reserved, the parties were not required to do anything but wait.  Clara is silent as to that period of time when she did not have to deal with the defence of the Committal Proceedings, the performance of paragraphs 1(a), (c), (2)(a) and (c) of the Accounts Direction or the pursuit of CACV 643/2020.

16.  Third and most importantly, Clara’s proposed grounds of appeal are utterly devoid of merits.

17.  In support of the Application, by way of proposed grounds of appeal, Clara complained in her 6th affirmation filed on 25 March 2021[1] that I gave leave to Father to amend the statement of claim in the course of the trial on 8 September 2015 after completion of the evidence.  Clara contends, firstly, that in granting Father leave to amend, I had departed from Order 20, rule 8(1A) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) which prevents the court from ordering a pleading to be amended unless it is of the opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.  Second, Clara suggests that the amended statement of claim filed on 9 September 2015, upon which the Judgment and the 27.6.2018 Decision were based, was different from the original statement of claim.  Yet, none of the parties or their witnesses had been cross-examined on the amended statement of claim.  A trial on the amended statement of claim therefore never occurred.

18.  As stated in [13] to [15] of the Judgment, after the transfer by Father, Mother, Agnes and Clara mortgaged the Kam Fai Properties for the SPC Loan in the amount of HKD2,000,000.  It was common ground that a sum of HKD1,008,655.74 out of the SPC Loan was applied to redeem the prior encumbrance(s) against the Kam Fai Properties.  What was in issue relating to the SPC Loan was who had received the balance of HKD991,344.26. 

19.  The only amendment made by Father to the statement of claim was the addition of the words “part of” at the beginning of paragraph 32(2) concerning the application of the SPC Loan.  Such change was to clarify that only a part of the SPC Loan was used to discharge the prior encumbrance(s) against the Kam Fai Properties, which fact was not even in dispute.  As I see it, such amendment reflected the correct position about the SPC Loan and was, thus, necessary for the fair disposal of this action.

20.  Incidentally, I note from [21] to [27] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment dated 28 February 2018 in HCMP 620/2017 that Clara had not raised any ground of appeal out of the amendment of the statement of claim in her proposed appeal against the Judgment.

21.  Last but not least, I strongly disagree with Clara that Father would not be prejudiced by the extension of time sought by the Application.  Father is of an advanced age.  His personal financial circumstance cannot be described as comfortable.  He is legally aided.  He started this action almost a decade ago.  He obtained judgment to the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C almost 5 years ago.  Yet, he has not so far made any recovery in the real sense of the word.  This is a true case of “justice delayed is justice not done”.

22.  For the above reasons, I dismiss the Application. 

23.  I further make an order nisi that Clara should pay Father’s costs of and occasioned by the Application, to be taxed if not agreed on an indemnity basis.  In my view, the Application, viewed in the light of Clara’s litigation behaviour, is an abuse of the court’s process.  Pursuant to Order 42, rule 5B(6), such order shall become absolute within 14 days after today unless an application has been made to vary the same.

24.  Father’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations (Cap 91A).

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance

  

Miss Mui Yik Kwan of Edmund Cheung & Co, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant was unrepresented and appeared in person

The 2nd defendant was absent


[1] Which is said to have been made also on behalf of the Company which was, however, not mentioned as an applicant on the summons dated 25 March 2021.

   

[2019] HKCFI 1947-EN-2019-08-08

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

[2019] HKCFI 1947

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

_________________

BETWEEN  
 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff
 And 
 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
(also known as WONG PO LING CLARA(黃寶齡))
1st Defendant
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 23 July 2019

Date of Decision: 8 August 2019

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1.  The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are father and daughter. Together with the 2nd defendant, which is a company controlled by the 1st defendant, the parties have been entangled in litigations for years. Before me are the appeals by the 1st defendant against two separate decisions of the masters. After lodging the appeals, the 1st defendant took out another application, now also before me.

Background

2.  The plaintiff is legally aided.  He commenced this action in 2012 against the defendants.  Briefly, the plaintiff claimed against the defendants for account of the proceeds of the sale of certain properties and for the transfer of certain property by the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff, all held by the defendants but said to be on trust for the plaintiff.  At the trial of the action, the 1st defendant appeared in person and also represented the 2nd defendant.

3.  On 30 September 2016, Madam Recorder Lisa Wong SC (as the learned Judge then was) handed down judgment whereby she found in favour of the plaintiff (“the Judgment”).  The learned Recorder ordered the 1st defendant to account for the proceeds of sale of certain properties (defined, with reference to the name of the properties, as the “Kam Fai Proceeds” in the Judgment), the defendants to account for the proceeds of sale of another property (defined, again with the name of the property, as the “St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds” in the Judgment) and the 2nd defendant to assign another property (defined as the “St Louis Flat 25C” in the Judgment) to the plaintiff absolutely.  The defendants were also ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the action to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations, if not agreed.

4.  The defendants then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the Judgment out of time and stay of execution of the Judgment pending the intended appeal (HCMP 620/2017). For those proceedings, the defendants were legally represented.  On 28 February 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ application on paper with costs summarily assessed at HK$150,000.

5.  Pursuant to the plaintiff’s application, Hon Lisa Wong J gave directions on 27 June 2018 for the taking of accounts in respect of the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds pursuant to the Judgment.  For reason which will be explained below, the application for direction in respect of the assignment of the St Louis Flat 25C to the plaintiff was adjourned.

6.  On the basis that the 1st defendant has defaulted in complying with the court’s directions mentioned above, the plaintiff commenced committal proceedings against her (HCMP 129/2019).  These were heard by the learned judge in June 2018, and adjourned part heard to the end of August 2019.

7.  Upon the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the defendants’ application on paper as mentioned above, the defendants had also applied for reconsideration of their application by way of oral hearing before the Court of Appeal.  This again met with dismissal by the Court of Appeal on 11 September 2018.  The Court made no order as to costs on this occasion.

8.  The costs payable by the defendants pursuant to costs order under the Judgment have since been taxed at the sum of HK$1,427,167[1]. The defendants applied for review, which was dismissed[2] on 20 July 2018, with costs against the defendants summarily assessed at the sum of HK$19,700. The taxed costs were certified by the allocatur issued on 20 August 2018.

9.  In summary, the defendants have been adjudged liable to pay the following costs:

(1)  the costs of the action pursuant to the Judgment (HK$1,427,167);

(2)  the costs of the application for leave to appeal in HCMP 620/2017 (HK$150,000); and

(3)  the costs of the defendants’ application for review of taxation (HK$19,700).

All taxed costs carry interest until payment.

10.  The defendants have paid no part of the above costs.

11.  On 15 February 2019, the plaintiff obtained a charging order nisi against the property registered in the name of the 1st defendant, namely Flat 24A (“the Property”), which is at the same mansion as St Louis Flat 1D and St Louis Flat 25C mentioned above.

12.  On 9 April 2019, the 1st defendant appeared in person before the master.  Considering that she had failed to show cause why the charging order nisi should not be made absolute, the master made the charging order absolute on the same day (“the Charging Order”).

13.  By notice of appeal filed on 23 April 2019, the 1st defendant appeals the master’s decision dated 9 April 2019.  This is the first appeal before me.

14.  By summons filed on 29 March 2019, the 1st defendant applied for “directions from the master about the questions of / stay of execution”[3] of the Judgment.  This was dismissed by the master after hearing on 17 April 2019.  By notice of appeal filed on 30 April 2019, the 1st defendant appeals.  This is the second appeal before this court.

15.  While the above appeals are pending, the 1st defendant took out another application by summons filed on 15 July 2019, seeking to set aside the Judgment.  Hence the third matter before this court.

Overview

16.  The Charging Order was granted in respect of the debt arising out of the costs payable by the defendants pursuant to the Judgment and the subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal in dismissing the defendants’ application for leave to appeal and stay of execution of the Judgment.

17.  In response to the plaintiff’s application for directions for the taking of accounts, the defendants countered by their application[4] for, amongst others, stay of execution of the Judgment.  As mentioned, Lisa Wong J gave the directions for the taking of accounts and dismissed the defendants’ application for stay of execution.

18.  By her subsequent summons filed on 29 March 2019, the defendants again applied for so-called “directions about stay of execution”, which was dismissed by the master, and hence one of the appeals now before this court.

19.  By her recent summons filed on 15 July 2019, the defendants apply to set aside the Judgment altogether.

20.  It is immediately apparent that insofar as the 1st defendant’s attempt to impeach the Judgment is concerned, this is prima facie abuse of court process, in view of the fact that the defendants have exhausted the venue of appeal against the Judgment.  The decision of the Court of Appeal in this respect is binding on this court.

21.  Insofar as the 1st defendant’s application for directions on 29 March 2019 was filed with a view to staying the execution of the Judgment, this was likewise a repeated attempt of the same.  As explained below, the room for entertaining that is narrow.

22.  Insofar as the above applications by the 1st defendant were taken out separately with a view to the execution or stay of execution of the Judgment on the one hand and to the setting aside of the Judgment on the other hand, her stance is inherently inconsistent.

Principles governing the appeals

23.  An appeal under O58 of the Rules of the High Court is a re-hearing of the relevant application before the master.

24.  O58, r1(5) provides that no further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date on which the judgment, order or decision was given or made) may be received on the hearing of an appeal under this rule except on special grounds.  The party seeking to adduce further evidence must satisfy the conditions laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, namely:

(1)  that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below;

(2)  the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(3)  the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed.

The appeal in respect of the Charging Order

25.  Notwithstanding that it was for the 1st defendant to show cause why the charging order nisi in respect of the Property should not be made absolute, she appeared at the hearing before the master without any affirmation in support of the cause that she might intend to show.  In any event, the master heard her but found that she failed to show cause.

26.  Now together with her notice of appeal, the 1st defendant filed her affirmation in support.  In her affirmation, the 1st defendant made clear that its purpose is to provide additional information to court for the purpose of her appeal[5]. She has to satisfy the conditions mentioned above, before she may rely on the further evidence.

27.  In her affirmation filed for such purpose, the 1st defendant referred to the issue of the beneficial interest in the Property.  However, it is not that she denies her beneficial interest in the Property that is capable of being made subject to the Charging Order.  During the present hearing, the 1st defendant was adamant that the Property belongs to her legally and beneficially.  As far as I manage to understand, the premise for the 1st defendant’s query seems to be that the plaintiff sought, and was awarded, an order that the 1st defendant account to him the Kam Fai Proceeds, but part of such proceeds, according to her, had been applied towards the down payment for the purchase of the 3 properties mentioned above, including the Property.  She questions how the plaintiff should be entitled to the Charging Order on the Property, if he is allowed to trace his interest in the Kam Fai Proceeds, which has become part of the Property.

28.  The premise of the 1st defendant’s query is incorrect.

29.  Whilst the plaintiff managed to trace the Kam Fai Proceeds into the three properties mentioned above, the Property, unlike the other two, did not form part of his claim or relief granted[6]. Further, by preferring the plaintiff’s evidence, Lisa Wong J observed that the 1st defendant had been rewarded with, amongst other interests, the down payment on the Property, to which the plaintiff had agreed[7].  In other words, the plaintiff did not set out to claim beneficial interest in the Property as such.  There is nothing sinister about the plaintiff’s claim for an account of the Kam Fai Proceeds instead of any beneficial interest in the Property attributable to the contribution of part of such proceeds to its purchase.

30.  In her affirmation, the 1st defendant also referred to the plaintiff being a pensioner in Australia and not regularly residing in Hong Kong.  Neither of such references is remotely relevant to the attachment to the Property of the debt arising out of the taxed costs payable by the defendants.

31.  The 1st defendant also referred to the plaintiff being one of the defendants in another District Court action (DCMP 878/2018).  As explained in the written decision of Lisa Wong J dated 27 June 2018[8], the District Court action was commenced by the mortgagee bank of St Louis Flat 25C against the 2nd defendant in recovery of outstanding mortgage loan and vacant possession of that property.  Because of the interest of the plaintiff in that property pursuant to the Judgment, the plaintiff’s application for directions in respect of that property before the learned Judge, as mentioned above, was adjourned to enable the plaintiff to consider taking part in such proceedings in the District Court.  So it did apparently.  But that has nothing to do with the Property, subject matter of the Charging Order.

32.  The 1st defendant also asked the court to clarify several questions.  Only one of them is sensible and relevant.  The 1st defendant questioned why the Property belonging to her should be attached for the enforcement of the costs orders which are against both defendants.  The answer to that is that the costs orders against the defendants impose joint and several liabilities on them to pay.

33.  Considering the matters in respect of which the further evidence is sought to be adduced, I find that the 1st defendant fails to satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of the test under Ladd v Marshall, and I need say no more in respect of condition (3).  Leave to rely on the further evidence is therefore refused.

34.  As far as the 1st defendant’s affirmation contains submissions instead of further evidence, none of them demonstrates any valid cause against the making of the Charging Order.  Her submissions in court did not change that.

35.  In the circumstances, the appeal in respect of the Charging Order fails.

Appeal in respect of stay of execution of the Judgment

36.  The directions that Lisa Wong J gave on 27 June 2018 were essentially as follows:

(1)  The 1st defendant shall file and serve her account of the Kam Fai Proceeds with a verifying affirmation and supporting documents within 60 days.

(2)  The plaintiff shall file and serve his list of objections to the above account and the grounds therefor by affirmation with supporting documents within 28 days thereafter.

(3)  The 1st defendant shall file and serve her response to the above list of objections by affirmation with supporting documents within 28 days thereafter.

(4)  The account shall be taken before as master.

(5)  Any application for further directions should be made to the master.

37.  In addition to her affirmation filed in support of her summons filed on 29 March 2019, the 1st defendant filed two more affirmations on 10 April and 15 April 2019 respectively.  According to the affirmations, the Judgment cannot be executed without the court’s clarification and direction. She therefore requested the court to answer a number of questions set out in her affirmations.

38.  The order for account under the Judgment is simple and clear.  The defendants have to account for what had become of the relevant proceeds of sale at all material times up to the present.  I have also referred to the transcript of the hearing on 27 June 2018, which reveals that Lisa Wong J also explained to the 1st defendant what is expected to be included in such account.  Other than that, it is not for the court to give legal advice, as some of the 1st defendant’s questions seem to be seeking.  Some of the questions are effectively queries about the findings or reasoning of the learned judge in the Judgment, which are neither for the 1st defendant to raise under the guise of request for clarification nor for this court to take the findings further.

39.  Lisa Wong J has already given what are normally expected to be the necessary directions for the taking of account before the master.  The logistic is clear.  The defendants have to form their own judgment on what to produce for the purpose of full account in compliance with the Judgment and in accordance with the logistic set out in the directions.  Whether they have done so will be a matter before the master upon hearing both sides.  Attributing their inability to do so to the alleged difficulty in compliance as mentioned in the 1st defendant’s affirmations is both unsound and unacceptable.

40.  In her affirmation, and not on the face of her summons, the 1st defendant asked for the following orders from this court:

(1)  transfer DCMP 878/2018 from the District Court to the High Court for hearing;

(2)  discharge the charging order in respect of Unit 25C in DCMP 878/2018;

(3)  stay of execution of the Judgment and costs orders pending the hearing of DCMP 878/2018;

(4)  requiring the plaintiff to disclose his whereabouts in Hong Kong and Australia as well as his assets; and

(5)  costs of the defendants in this action and HCMP 620/2017 (ie, the proceedings before the Court of Appeal mentioned above) to be paid by the plaintiff.

41.  Pursuant to section 42 of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336, the District Court has the power to transfer any action or proceedings, or part of it, to the Court of First Instance of the High Court.  Pursuant to section 43 of Cap 336, the Court of First Instance may transfer any action or proceedings, or part of it, to the District Court that should be in the jurisdiction of the District Court.  Whether in terms of procedure or substance, I see no basis for the request for the master, or now this court, to transfer any part of the proceedings in DCMP 878/2018 to this level of court.

42.  As discussed in the previous section, the master was correct in making the Charging Order absolute. The proceedings in DCMP 878/2018, which concerns St Louis Flat 25C, are neither relevant to nor capable of altering that conclusion.

43.  As at today, the Judgment remains intact, despite the defendants’ attempts to appeal.  The defendants are not in a position to dispute liability under the various costs orders by seeking again to impeach the Judgment.  Likewise, the defendants have failed in their previous attempts to have the execution of the Judgment stayed pending the then intended appeal.  Whilst a party may[9] apply for stay of execution on the ground of matters which have occurred only after the date of a judgment, the basis for the 1st defendant’s renewed attempt to impeach the Judgment and to stay the execution of the Judgment is neither new nor justified in the present case.

44.  The request for an order compelling the plaintiff to disclose his whereabouts and assets in the outstanding proceedings in this action is totally unfounded and irrelevant for the present purposes.

45.  In the circumstances, this appeal must also fail.

46.  It follows that there is absolutely no basis for the application for costs of this action and the previous applications for leave to appeal.

Application to set aside the Judgment

47.  Notwithstanding her previous attempts and repeated attempt to impeach the Judgment for the purpose of her appeals before this court, the 1st defendant somehow saw fit to file yet another application by summons on 15 July 2019 returnable before this court, seeking to set aside the Judgment.  In her affirmation filed in support of such summons, the 1st defendant also asks this court to set aside the Charging Order and to grant the defendants their costs of the action.

48.  Not only has the 1st defendant persisted in taking out legal proceedings with a view to impeaching the Judgment notwithstanding the matters discussed above, but she has also chosen to do so notwithstanding the obvious multiplicity of proceedings.  Further, and fundamentally, this court does not have the jurisdiction to set aside the Judgment of another court of the first instance and in respect of the defendants’ challenge the appellate court has handed its ruling binding on this court.

49.  Clearly an abuse of legal process, this application must be dismissed.

Order

50.  The 1st defendant’s two appeals are dismissed with costs to the plaintiff.  So is her application by summons filed on 15 July 2019.  The plaintiff’s costs shall be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for counsel, in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.  This costs order is nisi.  In the absence of application in 14 days to vary, this costs order shall become absolute without further order of the court.

Remark

51.  Counsel for the plaintiff requested that the 1st defendant be warned, whether on her own behalf or purportedly on behalf of the 2nd defendant, not to bring further legal proceedings which is either defiance of proper procedure or effective re-litigation.  Vexatious and abuse of court process must stop, or she may be faced with restrictive order of the court pursuant to section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4.  The 1st defendant should consider herself so warned by the court.

 (Simon Leung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Paul H M Leung, instructed by Edmund Cheung & Co, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant appeared in person

The 2nd defendant was represented by the 1st defendant



[1] HK$40,614 were the costs

[2] For want of prosecution.

[3] As appearing on the summons.

[4] By affirmation and in the absence of a summons.

[5] At §§4 and 7.

[6] See §§1 and 96 of the Judgment.

[7] See §93 of the Judgment.

[8] See §§5-7 of the Decision.

[9] Discretion provided under O45, r11 RHC.

[2018] HKCFI 1482-EN-2018-06-27

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

[2018] HKCFI 1482

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

______________________

BETWEEN  
 WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff
 and 
 WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
(also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡)) 
1st Defendant
 WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

______________________

Before: Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 27 June 2018
Date of Decision: 27 June 2018

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

1.  I handed down judgment (“Judgment”) after trial in this action on 30 September 2016.  In this decision, unless otherwise stated, I shall continue to use the definitions and abbreviations adopted in the Judgment.

2.  To recap, I gave judgment for Father (the plaintiff) on his claims against Clara (the 1st defendant) and the Company (the 2nd defendant), of which Clara has always been the sole shareholder and director, as follows:

(1)  that Clara should account for the Kam Fai Proceeds;

(2)  that Clara and the Company (“Defendants” collectively) should account for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds;

(3)  that the Defendants should pay Father the sums found to be due on the taking of such accounts; and

(4)  that the Company should transfer St Louis Flat 25C to Father.

3.  Neither of the Defendants has taken any step to satisfy any part of the Judgment. 

4.  Father now applies by summons issued on 27 April 2018 for:

(1)  directions for the taking of the accounts for the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds; and

(2)  an order that the Company do execute an assignment of all its rights and interests in St Louis Flat 25C to Father absolutely within 28 days.

5.  In response, the Defendants have by Clara’s affirmation filed herein on 13 June 2018 “applied” for a stay of execution of, or all further proceedings on, the Judgment pending (1) the Defendants’ appeal from the Judgment and (2) the determination of DCMP 878/2018.  I propose to deal with such application despite the absence of a summons.  Clara’s affirmation, however, contains incomplete information about the proceedings used to justify a stay.  With a view to obtaining a better understanding of the bases of the Defendants’ application, I have accessed and reviewed the files kept by the courts in respect of HCMP 620/2017 (see paragraph 9 below) and DCMP 878/2018.

6.  Dealing first with DCMP 878/2018, as noted in paragraph 46 of the Judgment, St Louis Flat 25C was acquired in the name of the Company in March 2007 with the assistance of an instalment loan from SCB secured by an “all monies” mortgage of the property.  DCMP 878/2018 was commenced by SCB on 23 March 2018 against the Company as borrower and mortgagor and Clara as guarantor for payment of all principal and interests outstanding on the loan and for delivery of vacant possession of St Louis Flat 25C.  According to the supporting affirmation filed on 20 April 2018 on behalf of SCB, monthly repayment of the loan had stopped since December 2017 and the total amount of principal and interest outstanding stood at HK$885,593.05 as at as at 19 April 2018.  A further affirmation filed on 18 May 2018 discloses that SCB is considering about obtaining Counsel’s advice on inter alia the Judgment and its implications.

7.  Upon being advised of the nature and contents of DCMP 878/2018, especially SCB’s claim for delivery of vacant possession of St Louis Flat 25C, Mr Paul H M Leung, counsel for Father, (rightly in my view) invites the court to adjourn Father’s application relating to St Louis Flat 25C sine die to enable Father to be advised of, and consider, whether he should as beneficial owner of St Louis Flat 25C take any step in respect of DCMP 878/2018.

8.  This leaves only Father’s application for directions for the taking of the accounts for the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and the Defendants’ counter-application for a stay pending appeal.

9.  To put the application for stay pending appeal in context, on 17 March 2017, the Defendants applied to the Court of Appeal by a summons issued in HCMP 620/2017 for (1) an extension of time to appeal against the Judgment and (2) a stay of execution of the Judgment (“Time and Stay Applications”).  

10.  While Clara appeared in person for herself and represented the Company at the trial of this action before me, the Defendants are represented by both counsel and solicitors in HCMP 620/2017.  In particular, the Time and Stay Application was supported by a draft notice of appeal containing 5 grounds of appeal drafted by counsel for the Defendants.

11.  The Court of Appeal (Yuen and Poon JJA), on the basis of the parties’ written submissions (signed by counsel on behalf of the Defendants), dismissed the Time and Stay Applications with costs to Father on 28 February 2018 (“28.2.2018 Decision”). 

12.  Insofar as it is material for present purposes, the Court of Appeal held that:

(1)  The time for the Defendants to appeal the Judgment expired on 28 October 2016 so that they had, by the date of the summons for the Time and Stay Applications, been out of time for 4½ months, which is a substantial delay.

(2)  Such substantial delay is also inexcusable, the Defendants having failed to disclose any good reasons for the time taken.

(3)  The chances of success of the proposed appeal are not such that the court would exercise its discretion in the Defendants’ favour to extend time for appeal following a substantial and inexcusable delay.

13.  In light of these findings, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to consider either the prejudice that would be caused to Father if the time for appeal by the Defendants were extended or the application for stay pending appeal.

14.  By a summons/notice filed on 6 March 2018 pursuant to Order 59, rule 2A(7) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), the Defendants apply to the Court of Appeal for a reconsideration of the 28.2.2018 Decision at an oral hearing inter partes, which application is at the moment pending.

15.  An appeal (not to mention an application for leave to appeal out of time) would not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings: Order 59, rule 13(1).  The principles governing an application for a stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal are well established.  A summary of such principles can be found in, for example, Anderson Chow J’s judgment in Astro Nusantara International BV v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (No 2) [2016] 1 HKLRD 591 at [15] as follows, following the decision of Ma J (as the Chief Justice then was) in Stay Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84:

“(1)  The applicant is required to demonstrate a “good reason” for a stay of execution.

(2)  Generally speaking, the existence of merely an arguable appeal cannot by itself amount to a sufficient reason to justify a stay. It is the minimum requirement before a court would even begin to consider granting a stay.

(3)  In other words, if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted however exceptional the circumstances may otherwise be justifying a stay of execution.

(4)  On the other hand, the existence of a strong appeal or a strong likelihood of success will usually by itself enable a stay to be granted because this would constitute a good reason for a stay.

(5)  In most cases, where the court is faced with simply the existence of an arguable appeal, it becomes necessary for the applicant to provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(6)  Commonly, this is done by demonstrating that without a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory, for example, because of an appreciable risk that the respondent to the appeal would not be able to repay in the event of a successful appeal against a money judgment, or because the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect on the applicant.

(7)  In considering an application for a stay pending appeal, it would be impractical and even undesirable for the court to go deeply into the merits or strengths of the appeal, although the court must still form a preliminary view of these aspects.”

16.  Applying these principles, while the Court of Appeal is yet to rule on the Defendants’ application for reconsideration of the 28.2.2018 Decision, in light of the conclusions that it has reached on the basis of the parties’ written submissions (see paragraph 12 above), the prospects of the Defendants’ proposed appeal against the Judgment or of obtaining leave to appeal out of time are not strong, or even arguable.

17.  Even if the Defendants’ proposed appeal should be arguable, the Defendants have not alluded to any additional reasons as to why a stay of proceedings on the orders for account is justified.  The mere fact that there is a pending application to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of its dismissal of the Defendants’ application for leave to appeal the Judgment out of time is insufficient.

18.  The reason advanced by the Defendants before the Court of Appeal to justify a stay is that it would be very difficult to undo what Father has obtained from them under the Judgment in the event that they should succeed in their intended appeal.  As explained by me to Clara at the hearing this morning, further proceedings on the orders for account, which would take considerable time, are required to first determine the amounts payable by the Defendants to Father for the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.  In other words, the Defendants would not be compelled to pay Father any amount any time soon.  Any procedural steps taken in the meantime for the enforcement of the orders for account would be reversible even if the Defendants should prevail at the end of the day, to no one’s prejudice that could not be compensated by an appropriate costs order.

19.  In contrast, granting the stay sought by the Defendants would potentially cause seriousfurther delay to Father’s recovery of the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds should the Defendants fail to persuade the Court of Appeal to reconsider the 28.2.2018 Decision or, if leave be given, should the Defendants fail to prevail on appeal. This is prejudicial to Father, particularly given his advanced age, relative uncomfortable personal financial circumstances and the facts that he started this action 6 years ago and obtained the orders for account almost 2 years ago.

20.  For these reasons, I will start the ball rolling by giving directions for the taking of the accounts that I have ordered. 

21.  I therefore direct that:

(1)  Clara shall file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors an account of the Kam Fai Proceeds as well as an affirmation verifying the account and exhibiting supporting documents within 60 days from today;

(2)  Father shall file with the court and serve on Clara his list of objections to the account (if any) and the grounds therefor by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;

(3)  Clara should file with the court and serve on Father’s solicitors her response to the list of objections (if any) by affirmation exhibiting supporting documents (if any) within 28 days thereafter;

(4)  there should be no further affirmation without leave of the court, the application for which must be supported by a draft of the further affirmation sought to be adduced;

(5)  the account should be taken before a Master;

(6)  any application for further directions should be made to the Master.

22.  I also give the same directions against the Defendants for the taking of the account for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.

23.  The Defendants have, through Clara’s submission this morning, asked for at least 90 days (as opposed to the 28 days sought in Father’s summons) to prepare the accounts.  I am prepared to give the Defendants 60 days, giving allowance for their unrepresented status in this action.  I am however not convinced by Clara’s general and vague reference to anticipated difficulties arising from the long lapse of time, the volume of the materials to go through and the possible needs for the Defendants to obtain documents and information from third parties such as banks and go to professionals such as accountants for assistance.  Despite the passage of time, the accounts ordered are of a relatively straightforward nature.  The accounts were ordered back in September 2016.  Despite their application for leave to appeal out of time and stay of execution, the Defendants should have been prepared to be called upon to produce the accounts since the last quarter of 2016. 

24.  I further make an order nisi that the Defendants should pay Father’s costs of and occasioned by Father’s summons dated 27 April 2018, to be taxed if not agreed on a party and party basis with certificate for counsel for the hearing this morning.  Father’s own costs should be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations (Cap 91A).

  

  

 (Lisa Wong)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance

  

Mr Paul H M Leung, instructed by Edmund Cheung & Co, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant appeared in person

The 2nd defendant was represented by the 1st defendant

106143-EN-2016-09-30

WONG YUK TUNG v. WONG PO LING AND ANOTHER

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HCA 899/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 899 OF 2012

____________________

BETWEEN  
WONG YUK TUNG (黃煜東)Plaintiff
WONG PO LING (黃寶齡)
(also known as WONG PO LING CLARA (黃寶齡))
1st Defendant
WONGGENOS ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED
(黃振諾企業有限公司)
2nd Defendant

____________________

Before: Recorder Lisa K Y Wong SC in Court
Date of Hearing: 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8 September 2015
Date of Judgment: 30 September 2016

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

1.  This is an action in which a father (the plaintiff) claims against his daughter (the 1st defendant) and a company of which the daughter is the sole shareholder and director (the 2nd defendant) in respect of:

(1) what is left of the proceeds of sale of Apartment B on the 4th Floor with Laundry Space No 8 on the Roof and Car Parking Space No 8 on the Lower Ground Floor Garage, Kam Fai Mansion, 68A MacDonnell Road, Hong Kong (“Kam Fai Flat” and “Kam Fai Carpark” respectively and “Kam Fai Properties” collectively) of which the daughter was one of the registered owners;

(2) the proceeds of sale of Flat D, 1/F, St Louis Mansion, 20 MacDonnell Road (“St Louis Flat 1D”) of which the company was the registered owner; and

(3) Flat C, 25/F, St Louis Mansion (“St Louis Flat 25C”) of which the company is the registered owner.

Dispute and circumstances giving rise thereto

2.  The dispute regarding these properties and their proceeds of sale and the facts and circumstances giving rise to such dispute can be stated as follows.

3.  Mr Wong Yuk Tung Philip (“Father”), the plaintiff, and his ex‑wife, Madam Hui So Nui Angela (“Mother”), have 6 daughters (“Daughters”) in the following order of seniority:

(1) Wong Po Chi Agnes (“Agnes”), born in 1968;

(2) Wong Po Ling Clara (“Clara”), the 1st defendant, born in 1969;

(3) Wong Po Ching Karen (“Karen”), born in 1971;

(4) Wong Po San Anna (“Anna”), born in 1977;

(5) Wong Po Kwan Amy (“Amy”), born in 1981; and

(6) Wong Po Wah Jenny (“Jenny”), born in 1983.

4.  From 27 May 1976 to 18 June 1997, the Kam Fai Properties (which was the home of the Wong family in Hong Kong) were registered in the names of Father and Mother as joint tenants.

5.  It is Father’s case that the money for the purchase of the Kam Fai Properties in 1976 in his and Mother’s joint names was provided solely by him with no contribution from Mother and that as between him and Mother, they both recognised and acknowledged that the Kam Fai Properties were beneficially wholly owned by him.

6.  However, Mother who has given evidence as Father’s witness disagrees that she was just an owner in name.  She regards herself as having beneficial interest (a half share) in the Kam Fai Properties.  Indeed, she understands that as a joint tenant, she would become the sole owner of such properties if Father should predecease her.

7.  Apart from using the Kam Fai Properties as the family home, Father also used them as security to finance the operation of his shipping business.  More particularly, insofar as it is material, the Kam Fai Properties were successively charged/mortgaged to The Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Limited (“YYB”) under a Legal Charge dated 18 May 1987 to secure a loan of HKD700,000 which Father recalls was used by him to acquire a cargo ship and a Second Mortgage dated 3 January 1996 to secure banking facilities for the use of Fullwin Marine Limited (“Fullwin”), the Hong Kong company through which Father carried on his shipping business.

8.  In early January 1997, Father ran into difficulty in his said business.  One of the 3 ships beneficially owned by him through a Panamanian company (“Sunk Ship”) sank off the East China Sea. The Sunk Ship and two other ships that were also beneficially owned by Father had been mortgaged as joint collaterals to Den Norske Bank, Singapore Branch (“DNB”) for USD3,550,000 of which about USD3,100,000, secured by Father’s personal guarantee and Fullwin’s corporate guarantee, remained outstanding in early 1997 and was still being repaid by monthly instalments by Fullwin for the ship owning companies.  Although the Sunk Ship had been insured for USD2,300,000 and a claim for its total loss had been made, there was delay on the part of the insurers in settling the claim.  To ease the cash flow problems thereby created and to prevent DNB from arresting the other 2 ships in the event of default in the mortgage repayment by Fullwin, Father sold his remaining 2 ships in March and April 1997.  However, the sum realised was insufficient and left a shortfall of USD620,000 still being owed to DNB.

9.  Against this background:

(1) By a Transfer executed on 1 May 1997 (“Pinehurst Place Transfer”), Father transferred his half interest in fee simple in 9 Pinehurst Place, Carindale, Queensland, Australia, a property which he had hitherto owned in joint tenancy with Mother and the home of members of the Wong family in Australia, to Anna for a stated consideration of AUD150,000.

(2) By an Assignment dated 19 June 1997 (“Kam Fai Properties Assignment”), Father and Mother as vendors assigned the Kam Fai Properties to Mother, Agnes and Clara as purchasers and tenants in common in equal shares (ie one‑third each) for a stated consideration of HKD4,950,000.

10.  The central issue in dispute in this action is whether the Kam Fai Properties Assignment was really what it was made out to appear on paper.

11.  In this regard, as a matter of record, the Kam Fai Properties Assignment was preceded by an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 23 May 1997.  However, it is common ground that these 2 instruments, though bearing different dates with about one month apart, were in fact executed in one go by Father, Mother, Agnes and Clara on the same occasion on 19 June 1997.

12.  There is also no dispute that the said stated price of HKD4,950,000 did not change hands.  In fact, this figure was put down as the price because this was what the mortgagee valued the Kam Fai Properties to be worth at the time (see paragraph 18 below).

13.  Instead, by a Mortgage dated 19 June 1997 (“SPC Mortgage”), Mother, Agnes and Clara as mortgagors mortgaged the Kam Fai Properties to SPC Credit Limited (“SPC”) in return for a real estate loan of HKD2,000,000 (“SPC Loan”) of which Agnes and Clara were the borrowers.  By a letter dated 21 June 1997 from SPC to Clara, SPC informed Clara that it had on that day advanced to her HKD2,000,000 through the firm of solicitors acting for all the parties in the transaction.

14.  It is further common ground that a sum of HKD1,008,655.74 out of the SPC Loan was deposited into Fullwin’s current account with YYB on 23 June 1997, thereby settling Fullwin’s overdraft with that bank which stood at HKD990,283.13 immediately before this deposit.

15.  There is however disagreement between Father and Clara as to how the balance of the SPC Loan (which should be in the amount of HKD991,344.26) was applied.  Clara insists that the whole of the SPC Loan had been paid over to Father as vendor of the Kam Fai Properties whereas Father says that he had benefited from the SPC Loan only to the said extent of HKD1,008,655.74 deposited into Fullwin’s account and surmises that Clara had kept the balance.

16.  Pausing here, according to Father, the transaction effected by the Kam Fai Properties Assignment was not a genuine sale that was intended to pass the beneficial ownership of the Kam Fai Properties.  Its sole purpose was to put the Kam Fai Properties out of his name and therefore out of reach to his business creditors (the largest of which was DNB).  More particularly, Father says he proposed to Agnes and Clara respectively in a long‑distance telephone discussion (Agnes being in the USA) and a face to face discussion at the Kam Fai Flat about one month before the Kam Fai Properties Assignment that he would procure a nominal transfer of the Kam Fai Properties to them and Mother for the purposes of securing a mortgage loan to discharge the encumbrances against the Kam Fai Properties in favour of YYB and removing his name from such properties.  Both Agnes and Clara agreed to become Father’s nominees.  He requested Agnes and Clara, and they agreed, to provide their income proofs to secure the mortgage loan.  As Clara was then working in the banking and financial sector, it was Clara who arranged for the SPC Loan.  Father however paid all the transaction costs occasioned by the transfer (and this is accepted by Clara).  Notwithstanding the conveyance, Father remained the sole beneficial owner of the Kam Fai Properties, which Mother, Agnes and Clara held on trust for him.

17.  The Pinehurst Place Transfer was likewise in name only and motivated by the same considerations.  Anna never paid Father the stated price of AUD150,000 or any part thereof.  She was then just 20 years old and still a student in Australia with no independent means.

18.  Clara gives a totally different account. According to her, the Kam Fai Properties were purchased by Father and Mother as joint tenants in May 1976 at HKD265,000 (the suggestion being, I think, that Father was not the sole beneficial owner to begin with).  In about May 1997, Father represented to her that he urgently needed cash to resolve his financial problems and asked her to purchase his interest in the Kam Fai Properties at HKD2,000,000 with Agnes.  Prior to that, Father had tried, but failed, to sell the Kam Fai Properties in the open market.  Mother wished to retain her interest in the Property but agreed to Agnes and Clara becoming her new co‑owners. With a view to raising HKD2,000,000, Clara approached SPC which valued the Kam Fai Properties at HKD4,950,000 and approved the grant of the SPC Loan to her and Agnes.  The proceeds of the SPC Loan were wholly paid over to Father to ease his financial problems including to discharge the encumbrances against the Kam Fai Properties in favour of YYB.  She and Agnes had therefore provided consideration in the form of the SPC Loan for which they had assumed personal liability to repay under the SPC Mortgage.  The Kam Fai Properties Assignment was therefore the result of “a bona fide and at arm’s length transaction with due consideration” and was genuine.  Father did not tell her that she and Agnes were just to be his trustees in holding the Kam Fai Properties.  After the Kam Fai Properties Assignment, Father ceased to have any interest in the Kam Fai Properties and the same were not held on trust, whether express or implied or otherwise, for Father.  That being the case, none of the subsequent transactions affecting the Kam Fai Properties or involving the use of their proceeds of sale had anything to do with Father and he was not involved with the same.

19.  Agnes, Clara’s witness, gives a supporting account.  According to her, Father telephoned her (which he had never done before) one day in May 1997 out of the blue.  Although Agnes cannot now recall Father’s exact words, she understood him to be asking her to buy his half share interest in the Kam Fai Properties with Clara.  He mentioned the price of HKD2,000,000 which translated to USD300,000 odd for her.  He also told her that he had attempted to, but could not, sell the Kam Fai Properties.  Agnes agreed, having assessed that she would be able to afford half of the monthly mortgage repayments.

20.  Regardless of which of these 2 versions as to the intended purpose and effect of the Kam Fai Properties Assignment is true, moves were made thereafter for the Kam Fai Flat to be rented out for rental income in order to service the monthly repayments of the SPC Loan.  By then, only Father, Clara and Karen were living at the Kam Fai Flat.   Mother, Anna, Amy and Jenny had all emigrated to and been staying in Brisbane, Australia since early 1992 after Father applied for and was granted a business migration visa to Australia for the whole family.  Agnes was then in the USA.  After the Kam Fai Properties Assignment, Father, Clara and Karen continued to reside at the Kam Fai Flat for a short while.  In late 1997, Father left Hong Kong for good to join the family in Australia.  Before that, Father, Clara and Karen had already relocated to a rented unit in South Horizons, Apleichau, Hong Kong with a view to clearing the Kam Fai Flat for letting.

21.  The tenancy agreements and related documents produced by Clara show that the Kam Fai Flat was let by her for 2 years from 1 September 1998 to 31 August 2000 at $21,500 per month exclusive of rates and management fees and for a further 1 year period from 1 September 2000 to 31 August 2001 at $25,000 per month exclusive of rates and management fees.

22.  As for the Kam Fai Carpark, it had not been, and could not be, used as such for many years as Father had converted the space into a storeroom which he filled with stuff including the books, records and documents of Fullwin after it was closed down at the end of August 1997.

23.  According to Clara, she only managed to lease out the Kam Fai Flat for the aforesaid 3 years.  Father on the other hand claims that Clara had also entered into a short-term tenancy with a lady who used the Kam Fai Flat to store furniture before 1 September 1998, which Clara denies.  Father says it would not have made sense for the family to move to South Horizons thereby incurring rent if the Kam Fai Flat had all the time been untenanted.

24.  Further, it is Father’s evidence that throughout the search for a tenant, Clara had consulted him on the terms of the tenancies.  Clara denies this.

25.  It appears from the statements provided by SPC to Clara that the rent collected under the said tenancies was insufficient to cover the monthly instalments paid to SPC.

26.  There is a dispute as to the source(s) of funds used to make monthly repayment to SPC before the Kam Fai Flat was tenanted and thereafter to make up the shortfalls:

(1) On one hand, Father claims that he met these payments with his own monies and with monies left in Fullwin by leaving with Clara a handful of cheques and withdrawal slips that he had signed but otherwise left blank for such purpose.  In this regard, although Fullwin had by then practically ceased business,[1] Father points to the one page statement of Fullwin’s current account with YYB for the period from 31 May 1997 to 14 July 1997 which shows that Fullwin had continued to receive payments after 23 June 1997.  Father also claims to have remitted funds to Hong Kong in about 2002 and 2003 from the proceeds of sale of his property at 31 Regent Street, Eight Miles Plains, Queensland to help with the repayment of the loans borrowed against the Kam Fai Properties.  He further understands that Karen had also chipped in about HKD200,000.

(2) On the other hand, Clara says she and Agnes were solely responsible for repaying the SPC Loan (as well as all the subsequent loans and facilities obtained against the Kam Fai Properties to be mentioned below), though she took up a greater burden than Agnes who had her own obligations in the USA.  In support, Clara has produced customer’s receipts issued by SPC evidencing receipt of Clara’s personal cheques for the months of October 1998 and January, February, March, April, May, June and August 1999; a couple of documents evidencing the subsequent arrangement of autopay from her account with Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“SCB”) to GE Capital (Hong Kong) Limited (“GE”) (see paragraph 27 below); and statements of her accounts with SCB showing debit entries in favour of GE from November 2005 to April 2006.

(3) In this connection, Agnes’s understanding is that the SPC Loan repayment instalments were sourced from the rental income when the Kam Fai Flat was tenanted.  When such income was insufficient or when there was no tenant, Clara would from time to time send her faxes to tell her to remit funds to Hong Kong to contribute to the monthly repayments.  She estimates that she had over the years contributed more than USD50,000 but not quite as much as USD100,000.  Clara reckons that Agnes had shared about one‑third of the burden.

27.  The SPC Mortgage was subsequently redeemed by repayment.  This was made possible with a loan of HKD1,400,000 (“GE Loan”) borrowed in the names of Agnes and Clara from GE and secured by a Legal Charge of the Kam Fai Flat dated 11 May 2001 (“GE Charge”).  There is no dispute that the remortgage was to take advantage of the more favourable interest rate offered by GE (1% per annum below HSBC’s prime lending rate as opposed to 1.5% per annum above HSBC’s prime lending rate under the SPC Mortgage).  Moreover, the Kam Fai Carpark was released.

28.  This was followed shortly by the grant of a credit facility of HKD500,000 (“GE Facility”) by GE to Agnes and Clara as borrowers against the security of the Kam Fai Flat at 1% above HSBC’s prime lending rate in July 2001.

29.  Father claims, but Clara disagrees, that Clara had consulted him over, and he had agreed to, such refinancing arrangements and the further encumbrance of the Kam Fai Flat by the GE Facility for Clara’s own use in her start‑up business.

30.  Clara and Karen moved back to the Kam Fai Flat in about September 2001 following the expiry of its tenancy.  According to Clara, she was unable to find another tenant for the Kam Fai Flat for some time.  And since the lease for her rented unit in South Horizons happened to expire at about the same time, she thought they might as well return to the Kam Fai Flat to save on rent.

31.  Then, by an Assignment dated 7 October 2002 (“Kam Fai Carpark Assignment”), Mother, Agnes and Clara conveyed the Kam Fai Carpark to Karen for a stated consideration of HKD300,000, HKD210,000 (being 70% of the stated consideration of HKD300,000) of which was paid by a loan (“BOA Loan”) from Bank of America (Asia) Limited (“BOA”) secured by a mortgage of the Kam Fai Carpark (“BOA Mortgage”).

32.  According to Father, the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment was not a genuine sale that was intended to pass beneficial ownership of the Kam Fai Carpark to Karen.  It was effected with Father’s consent for the sole purpose of raising the BOA Loan for use by Clara for her start‑up business.  Indeed, Father’s evidence is that when Clara came up with the idea of carving out the Kam Fai Carpark to raise additional funds, he recommended Clara to approach Karen for assistance.  Notwithstanding such assignment, Father claims to remain the sole beneficial owner of the Kam Fai Carpark, which Karen held on trust for him.  This is disputed by Clara who puts forward the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment as a genuine and at arm’s length transaction, with Karen actually paying the price of HKD300,000.  Anyway, it had nothing to do with Father as he no longer had any interest in the Kam Fai Properties.  Karen has not been called to give evidence by either side.

33.  With effect from 1 August 2003, the GE Loan (then standing at HKD1,034,181.58) and the GE Facility (HKD500,000) were consolidated and converted into a single loan of HKD1,518,291.15 (“New GE Loan”) which carried interest at 1.5% per annum below HSBC’s prime lending rate.

34.  In about 2005, Karen got married and moved out of the Kam Fai Flat, leaving Clara as the only occupant of that property until its disposal (see paragraph 35 below).

35.  Then, by two sets of Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 4 December 2006 and an Assignment dated 10 January 2007, Mother, Agnes and Clara disposed of the Kam Fai Flat at HKD7,900,000 and Karen disposed of the Kam Fai Carpark at HKD300,000 respectively to the same purchaser.  Upon completion on 10 January 2007, both the GE Charge and the BOA Mortgage were discharged.  Although Karen was the registered owner of the Kam Fai Carpark, Clara accepts that she decided on the sale price, and handled the sale, of the Kam Fai Carpark.

36.  It is Father’s case that the sale of the Kam Fai Properties was effected by Clara with his prior authority and consent with a view to taking advantage of the rising property market and to re‑investing the proceeds of sale.  Father reckons that the net proceeds of sale, after repaying the New GE Loan (then standing at HKD347,771 + HKD500,000) and the BOA Loan (then standing at HKD133,042), should be about HKD7,220,000,[2] which figure Clara agrees.

37.  It is common ground that out of such net proceeds of sale, a payment of AUD100,000 (approximately HK$610,000) was made to Mother.  Clara portrays this as what Mother had asked for in full settlement of Mother’s share of and interest in the Kam Fai Properties.  Father initially said in paragraph 84 of his Witness Statement dated 16 December 2013 that Clara gave Mother, from whom Father had by then been divorced for some years,[3] this sum to provide for Mother in her old age, to which he agreed. In contrast, Father’s testimony in court is that although Mother did not contribute to the purchase of the Kam Fai Properties in 1976 and he regarded her as holding her share in those properties (which was one‑third before the disposal in 2007) on trust for him, at the time of their divorce, he gave Mother everything that was under her name.  He even says that at first he did not know Mother got only AUD100,000 which was less than one-third of the proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties.  In a Chinese statement dated 28 August 2012 drafted by Father and signed by Mother in front of a justice of the peace in Australia, Mother said that she received AUD100,000 only as partial settlement of her rights in the proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties and that she left the balance with Clara for safekeeping and re‑investment.  She takes the same stance in her evidence in court.  She has however admittedly not asked Clara for her balance share in the proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties or checked what Clara has done with the same all these years.  When pressed under cross‑examination, Mother then says she would give up her further claim to the proceeds.

38.  Father also says he instructed Clara that, if any of the Daughters had contributed towards the repayment of the loans borrowed against the Kam Fai Properties, they should be repaid, specifically mentioning that Karen had chipped in about HKD200,000.

39.  On the disbursement of the net proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties, it is Clara’s evidence that in addition to the sum of AUD100,000 (HKD610,000) paid to Mother, she had also given her sisters the following amounts:

(1) Agnes: about USD80,000 odd (say about HKD640,000) which was the figure given by Agnes to Clara as representing Agnes’ contributions;

(2) Karen: HKD300,000 which was the sale price of the Kam Fai Carpark plus HKD200,000 for her contributions to the mortgage repayments in respect of the Kam Fai Properties;

(3) Anna: USD20,000 (about HKD122,000) which was purely voluntary out of sisterly love; and

(4) Jenny: AUD10,000 (about HKD61,000) which was also purely voluntary out of sisterly love.

40.  It is Father’s case that, save for the proper disbursements to Mother and her sisters, Clara received and retained the remaining net proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties (“Kam Fai Proceeds”), which should be about HKD5,287,000 after deducting the distributions mentioned in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, on Father’s behalf as his trustee and/or agent pending his instructions for reinvestment.  To show that Clara treated the Kam Fai Proceeds as being at his disposal, Father recounts that after the completion of the sale of the Kam Fai Properties, Clara went to Brisbane to visit him.  While there, Clara asked if Father would like to use some of the Kam Fai Proceeds to pay off the mortgage of the property known as 313 Warrigal Road, Eight Mile Plains, Brisbane, a property purchased at AUD203,000 in the name of Anna but with the downpayment of AUD102,000 paid by Father. 

41.  These assertions regarding Father’s involvement in the sale of the Kam Fai Properties and rights over the Kam Fai Proceeds are of course denied by Clara.

42.  In the meantime, Wonggenos Enterprises Company Limited (“Company”), the 2nd defendant, was incorporated on 28 December 2006.  Clara has always been and still is the sole shareholder and director of the Company.  Karen was the secretary of the Company from sometime during the year ended 28 December 2008 until 11 June 2012.

43.  Father claims that the Company (whose English and Chinese names were chosen by him)[4] was acquired by Clara on his instruction as a vehicle for the reinvestment of the Kam Fai Proceeds and that Clara became the Company’s sole shareholder and director and Karen its secretary upon his nomination.

44.  Clara, however, points out that she herself had on 1 March 2003 already formed an unincorporated firm called “Wonggenos Enterprises Company” (“Firm”) for trading and investment purposes. Although Father suggested the names of the Firm to her during a casual chat, Clara was the sole‑proprietor of the Firm and Father did not have any interest in it.  Clara acquired the Company of her own accord with a view to using it to hold properties.  The Company’s name came from the name of the Firm.  Father therefore had nothing to do with the Company.  He was not entitled to, and he did not, nominate Clara to be the sole shareholder and director of the Company or Karen its secretary.  Nor has he got any interest in the Company’s assets.

45.  By an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 12 January 2007 and an Assignment dated 27 February 2007, Clara acquired in her own name Flat A, 24/F, St Louis Mansion (“St Louis Flat 24A”) at HKD2,900,000 which was paid partly with a loan from SCB secured by an “all monies” Mortgage dated 27 February 2007.

46.  By an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 25 January 2007 and an Assignment dated 9 March 2007, the Company acquired St Louis Flat 25C at HKD3,250,000, which was also paid partly with a loan from SCB secured by an “all monies” Mortgage dated 9 March 2007.

47.  By a Provisional Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 23 January 2007, an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 22 February 2007 and an Assignment dated 13 March 2007, the Company acquired St Louis Flat 1D at HKD2,630,000, which was likewise paid partly with a loan from SCB secured by an “all monies” Mortgage dated 13 March 2007.

48.  According to Clara, she paid a 35% downpayment on each of these 3 units in St Louis Mansion with the use of the Kam Fai Proceeds.  The total capital outlay should therefore add up to about HKD3,073,000, leaving just over HKD2,000,000 still in Clara’s hands if one allows for the payment of the incidental legal and other costs and expenses.

49.  The payment of the remaining 65% was financed by the loans secured by the SCB mortgages.  With regard to the 2 properties purchased by the Company, according to the Company’s annual return for the year ended 28 December 2007, the total amount outstanding as of 28 December 2007 on all mortgages and charges which were required to be registered under ss 80 and 82 of the since repealed Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) was HKD3,800,000.

50.  It is Father’s case that Clara acquired St Louis Flat 25C and St Louis Flat 1D in the name of the Company using the Kam Fai Proceeds after consulting him and obtaining his agreement.  And the Company held these 2 properties on trust for Father.  More particularly, Father says Clara had asked him if he would like to purchase one big flat of over 1,000 square feet or 3 smaller properties such as those in St Louis Mansion, which is also on MacDonnell Road not far from their old home.  Father indicated preference for the latter, believing that smaller units would fetch higher rental.  He further advised Clara to use the Kam Fai Proceeds to pay so much of the prices of such properties that the rental income would cover the mortgage repayments.

51.  In this connection, Father has further said in his Supplemental Witness Statement that he was under the impression until a few weeks before he made that statement on 9 June 2015 that Clara had only bought 2 units in St Louis Mansion, i.e. those acquired in the Company’s name.  He did not become aware of the purchase of St Louis Flat 24A by Clara in her own name until he received an investigation report dated 22 May 2015 on the property transactions entered into in the name of “Wong Po Ling / Wong Po Ling Clara” and “黃寶齡”. Father has even made the point in paragraph 28 of his Supplemental Witness Statement that he believes that Clara has separated her own personal investment (ie St Louis Flat 24A) from the investments that she has made and holds for Father (ie St Louis Flat 25C and St Louis Flat 1D).  Despite such written testimony, Father has then said, in my view somewhat inconsistently, in his evidence in court that he told Clara to put one of the 3 flats to be purchased into her own name and this would be her reward for looking after the Kam Fai Properties for him all those years.

52.  Clara regards St Louis Flat 25C and St Louis Flat 1D as her own investments through the Company and says that she has always been the person solely responsible for servicing the mortgage loans used for their purchase and other outgoings and expenses relating to these properties.

53.  In the meantime, the relationship between Father and the Daughters began to deteriorate in about 2006 or 2007 after Father developed a romantic relationship with a woman from Shanghai, a Miss Cai.  Both Father and Clara have recalled a confrontation between them at Clara’s office in 2009 at which, Father claims, Clara told him to consult a lawyer before talking to her again on matters concerning the Kam Fai Properties.  Father however says that his relationship with Clara had gradually calmed down afterwards.

54.  By an Agreement for Sale and Purchase dated 21 January 2011 and an Assignment dated 28 February 2011, the Company disposed of St Louis Flat 1D at HKD4,380,000, yielding a profit which Father estimates to be about HKD1,750,000 (ie HKD4,380,000 less HKD2,630,000) on a gross basis, which Father says is held by the Company on trust for him.  According to Father, his plan at the time was to use the net proceeds of sale of St Louis Flat 1D (“St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds”) to buy a property in Australia for his own use as he had since May 2010 been evicted from 313 Warrigal Road by Anna and was then renting a room in a multi‑room apartment on the same street and he had reached an understanding with Clara in January 2011 that she would remit the money to Australia after completion of the sale of St Louis Flat 1D.  He started to look for such a property in Brisbane in mid January 2011.  Such purchase however did not materialise.  By November 2011, Clara was only offering to subsidise Father AUD350 – 360 per week for rent on a townhouse.

55.  In mid November 2011, the relationship between Father and Clara changed for the worse.  According to Father, two things happened to bring about this.

56.  First, Anna circulated an email dated 8 November 2011 about Father’s request to her to sponsor his girlfriend Miss Cai for a visit to Australia to spend Christmas there with Father, which request Anna adamantly rejected.  Clara followed up with an email on the next day, saying that Father had become a completely different person and had created so much trouble since the sale of the Kam Fai Properties because he could not get what he wanted.  She warned her sisters not to sign any lease, mortgage or other legal documents “whether he kneels before you or beg you”.

57.  Second, Karen proposed at about the same time on 4 November 2011 that her friend’s townhouse could be rented at around AUD310 per week to be Father’s residence.  According to Father, Clara somehow perceived this to be a plan to rip her off and wrote back in terms that were very harsh and critical against Father on 7 and 8 November 2011.  This also caused the relationship between Clara and Karen to chill.  On 9 November 2011, Clara told Anna, Amy and Jenny that there was no need for them to continue to look for a townhouse to rent for Father.

58.  After November 2011, Father and Clara had stopped talking to each other.

Father’s claims

59.  By this action which was commenced on 28 May 2012, Farther claims against Clara and the Company for:

(1) accounts and inquiries as to:

(a) the Kam Fai Proceeds and what is left of it; and

(b) the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds; and orders for payment of the sums found to be due; and

(2) an order for the transfer of St Louis Flat 25C by the Company to Father.

60.  In support of these claims, Father asserts a resulting trust or alternatively a constructive trust of successively the Kam Fai Properties, the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C, arising from a common intention shared between Father and the various transferees which was express or alternatively to be inferred.

Real issue and relevant legal principles

61.  Given the allegations by both parties of express discussion and actual intention as to the incidence of beneficial ownership in the Kam Fai Properties after the Kam Fai Properties Assignment (from which the claims to the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C are derived), I see no scope for the operation of resulting trust: Re Superyield Holdings Ltd [2000] 2 HKC 90 at 111 and Liu Wai Keung v Liu Wai Man [2013] 5 HKLRD 9 at [45].  As it will be seen below, I do not propose to reject both parties’ evidence on intention.

62.  Hence, the real issue for me is whether the constructive trusts asserted by Father arose.

63.  For this purpose, it is sufficient for me to refer to Godfrey Lam J’s formulation in Liu Wai Keung at [46] of the elements that a plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a constructive trust in his favour:

(1) that there was a common intention between him and the defendant that the plaintiff was to be the beneficial owner of the property claimed despite that it was to be registered in the defendant’s name;

(2) that the plaintiff altered his position in detrimental reliance upon such common intention; and

(3) that it is unconscionable for the defendant to assert ownership in reliance on his legal title to the property.

64.  It should be reasonably apparent from the above summary of the dispute that, of these 3 elements, the existence or otherwise of a common intention that Father should remain the beneficial owner of the Kam Fai Properties is the real bone of contention.  If such common intention is established, I do not see any room for Clara to dispute the detrimental reliance by Father and the unconscionability of an assertion of ownership by her.  Nor would it be possible for her to contest the constructive trusts of the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds or St Louis Flat 25C to which the Kam Fai Properties can be traced.

65.  And given Father’s and Clara’s reliance on an express unambiguous agreement, arrangement or understanding that been reached between them before the Kam Fai Properties Assignment, the question for me is whose version is true on the balance of probabilities, which is essentially an issue of fact.  In this connection, what Godfrey Lam J said in Liu Wai Keung at [50] is also instructive:

“Even where, ..., reliance is placed on an express agreement, arrangement or understanding between the parties, their other conduct remains relevant as a matter by reference to which their assertions about the agreement or understanding must be gauged and tested.”

66.  Since I am able to find in favour of the express agreement, arrangement or understanding put forward by one party, I need not seek to infer from the parties’ conduct the existence or otherwise of an implied common intention.

Findings and reasoning

67.  Much depends on my assessment of the credibility, or rather relative credibility, of Father and Clara and their respective witnesses namely, Mother and Agnes.

68.  The two sides contradict each other on numerous points.  However, I do not think it is necessary for me to resolve all the conflicts and I do not propose to do so in order to maintain the focus of this judgment.

69.  On Father’s side, I do not think I can give any or any meaningful weight to Mother’s evidence.  Many of the matters alluded to by her in her said Chinese statement dated 28 August 2012, upon which she has been closely cross‑examined, are based on hearsay or assumptions that she seems unable to satisfactorily explain.

70.  As for Father, although there are aspects of his evidence that I find less than satisfactory (see for example paragraph 37 above regarding Mother’s interest in the Kam Fai Properties and the sum of AUD100,000 received by her out of proceeds of sale of the Kam Fai Properties and paragraph 51 above concerning the purchase of St Louis Flat 24A by Clara in her own name), in general and relative terms, I do find Father to be the more forthcoming and reliable witness.

71.  In contrast, Clara strikes me as being unduly guarded (sometimes bordering on the evasive) and defensive and argumentative (answering questions with questions and debating with Counsel).  Her answers are at times vague and at times obtuse (I believe, deliberately so).  Many of them are inconsistent with other parts of her evidence.

72.  For example, when questioned about what she had done with the Fullwin documents left by Father at the storeroom at the Kam Fai Carpark,[5] she says that she had never set foot inside the storeroom and had caused the structure to be cleared and the contents inside thrown away before the sale of the Kam Fai Properties in 2007.  Then, later, in answer to the question why Karen would want to buy the Kam Fai Carpark when that space could not be used by herself or let to others to park cars due to the obstruction of the storeroom, Clara claims that she had reinstated the Kam Fai Carpark by demolishing the storeroom erected there before the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment to Karen which is dated 7 October 2002.

73.  Another matter canvassed in the cross‑examination of Clara is how she found the 5 Fullwin documents that she has disclosed in this action, in particular, the YYB statement mentioned in paragraph 26(1) above.  Clara initially says that those documents including the said bank statement were contained in a yellow paper folder that was moved by Father from the Kam Fai Flat to the South Horizons flat after the Kam Fai Properties Assignment.  After Father left for Australia, the folder then followed Clara and Karen around when they moved once within South Horizons and then back to the Kam Fai Flat in September 2001.  When Clara vacated the Kam Fai Flat upon its sale in 2007, the folder was removed with everything else by the movers to her new home.  The folder had been lying in the bottom of a drawer in a wooden cabinet in her living‑room.  She stumbled upon it between April and June 2015 when she was asked by the solicitor who previously acted for her in this action to see if she could produce more relevant documents.  She duly disclosed them by a supplemental list of documents filed in June 2015.  In fact, Clara had disclosed the said bank statement on 5 August 2013.  Upon being confronted with this fact, Clara is forced to say that the said bank statement was not kept together, or found by her at the same time, with the other Fullwin papers disclosed by her.  However, she has not really been able to explain the circumstances in which she located this single page of document that belonged to Fullwin and Father.

74.  In short, I feel that I need to scrutinise Clara’s evidence with greater care.

75.  The doubt that Clara has left on my mind is not allayed by Agnes.   Even giving allowance for the long lapse of time, I find Agnes’ evidence to be too vague and reticent to be of any help.  Mostly importantly, I find the conduct that she describes not what I would expect from someone in the position of a 50% investor having a one‑third interest in a valuable property.

76.  That said, I have not based, to any significant degree, my choice of the version to believe on the impression that I have formed as to the general credibility of the witnesses from the manner in which they have testified.  I prefer to be guided by the inherently plausibility of the witnesses’ accounts and the congruity of such accounts with the undisputed/indisputable facts and circumstances of the case, of which there is no shortage.

77.  On this note, I turn to the inherent probabilities having regard to all the circumstances.

78.  Firstly, to buttress up her case that what Father wanted was to sell his interest in the Kam Fai Properties, Clara claims that Father had, prior to approaching her and Agnes, put the Kam Fai Properties on the market but to no avail.  Agnes has also given evidence that Father had told her the same in the course of their telephone conversation in May 1997. However, Clara has testified, and indeed put to Father who agrees, to the effect that the local property market was very active in the first half of 1997.  To explain why Father should be unable sell in such market, Clara says his asking price was too high.  This suggestion does not sit well with Clara’s case that Father asked for only HKD2,000,000 from Agnes and Clara for the Kam Fai Properties Assignment.  See paragraph 82(1) below.

79.  Secondly, the Kam Fai Properties Assignment was not an isolated transaction but occurred at about the same time as the Pinehurst Place Transfer.  Father’s evidence that the latter was a voluntary transfer that did not involve the actual payment of the stated consideration of AUD150,000 by Anna to him is easy to accept.  As noted above, Anna was at the time just 20 years old and still a student in Australia with no independent means.  This lends credence to Father’s evidence of a scheme on his part to keep the two family homes out of reach of his business creditors by removing them from under his personal name.

80.  Thirdly:

(1) If the parties had really intended a sale and purchase of just Father’s interest in the Kam Fai Properties at HKD2,000,000, I see no reason why the conveyancing documents could not have been prepared in a way that accurately reflect this.

(2) As it was, they show a sale and purchase of the whole of the Kam Fai Properties at HKD4,950,000.  In particular, the agreement for sale and purchase was backdated, purported to evidence receipt of deposits that were never paid and included terms that were never agreed or even discussed or raised.

(3) And SPC was misled in that Clause 11(a) of its facility letter dated 24 May 1997 expressly stated that the commitment of the SPC Loan was given on the borrowers’ and mortgagors’ representation and undertaking that the Kam Fai Properties were being purchased by the mortgagors at HKD4,950,000 which was the true price paid by them to the vendors thereof.

(4) On the other hand, Father, being motivated by a desire to evade creditors, would have every reason to want to create the false appearance of a complete disposal of the Kam Fai Properties at market price.

81.  Fourthly, the fact that Agnes and Clara were on paper made the owners of two‑thirds of the Kam Fai Properties is inconsistent with Clara’s case that it was agreed that she and Agnes would acquire just the half beneficial interest in the Kam Fai Properties that belonged to Father.

82.  Fifthly, if the Kam Fai Properties Assignment were the result of a genuine sale and purchase as suggested by Agnes and Clara, then none of the players involved had behaved in a manner that one would expect of parties to such a transaction:

(1) There is some evidence of the open market value of the Kam Fai Properties in the form of SPC’s valuation, i.e. HKD4,950,000.  A two‑third interest should proportionately be worth about HKD3,300,000.  It is difficult for me to understand why Father who was supposedly in dire financial circumstances would ask for only HKD2,000,000 from Agnes and Clara, especially when he had, according to Clara, previously listed the property for sale at an asking price that was above the market.

(2) On Mother’s case, her interest in the Kam Fai Properties shrank from that of one of 2 joint tenants with the right of survivorship to a one‑third share.  Yet she received no part of the sum of HKD2,000,000 said to have been paid by Agnes and Clara.

(3) Agnes and Clara were supposed to be equal investors.  Yet, Father approached them separately and they appeared to have made up their minds on the purchase separately.  There was apparently no discussion between the sisters on the wisdom of the transaction, their ability to afford the SPC Loan or how they were going to share the burden of ownership and as borrowers of the SPC Loan etc.

(4) Even allowing for the fact that they are sisters, Agnes was unrealistically contented in leaving everything to Clara throughout the years with the result that:

(a) Clara obtained the GE Facility by further encumbering the Kam Fai Properties without reference to Agnes or Mother or accounting to them for the drawings that had been made by her under such facility or the increases in mortgage repayments caused thereby.

(b) Clara supposedly received from Karen HKD300,000 for the Kam Fai Carpark.  Yet she did not appear to have shared this sum with Agnes or Mother or accounted to them for it.

(c) Clara was able to occupy the Kam Fai Flat for more than 5 years from September 2001 to December 2006, apparently rent free at the expense of Agnes and Mother because the apartment could have been let for rental income which would have reduced the contributionsrequired from Agnes towards the repayment of the borrowings obtained against the property.

(5) What strikes me as most absurd is the manner in which Clara disbursed the Kam Fai Proceeds (approximately HKD7,220,000) among those who supposedly had interests in the same:

(a) Mother, who was on paper a one‑third owner, was given just AUD100,000 (about HKD610,000) which was less than one‑tenth of the Kam Fai Proceeds.  In this regard, I am inclined to disbelieve Mother’s evidence that the said sum of AUD100,000 was accepted by her as partial settlement only.

(b) Agnes, another one‑third owner, received more than USD50,000 and less than USD100,000 according to Agnes and about USD80,000 (HKD640,000) according to Clara. Whatever the exact figure may be, both Clara and Agnes give evidence that it was Agnes who provided to Clara the amount that she would like to receive out of the Kam Fai Proceeds.  And Agnes worked out the figure by adding up what she had contributed over the years.  In other words, Agnes herself only aimed to recoup her outlay and not partake in the capital gain.  This is hardly how a true owner/‌investor would approach the final distribution process.  In a way, Agnes was worse off than Mother who at least did not have to put up any money on account of the Kam Fai Properties.

(c) In contrast, Clara, who was supposedly also just a one‑third owner, was able to amass more than HKD5,000,000 out of the Kam Fai Proceeds (see paragraph 40 above).

(6) This brings me to the way in which Clara applied the Kam Fai Proceeds.  The question arising is what caused her to put one of the St Louis Mansion units into her personal name and the other two under the Company if the whole Kam Fai Proceeds belonged to her and the Company was also beneficially wholly owned and controlled by her.  What was the point of segregating the two lots of investment?

83.  Sixthly, the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment is likewise peculiar as a sale and purchase:

(1) It is puzzling what Karen bought the Kam Fai Carpark for.  Though Clara claims that it had by the time of the conveyance to Karen been reinstated as a carparking space, the fact is that Karen did not appear to have made any gainful use of the Kam Fai Carpark at all while under her ownership.

(2) Clara, instead of, Karen named the price for the Kam Fai Carpark and handled its sale.

(3) Karen bought the space for HKD300,000 and sold it for exactly the same price 4 years later, which made the Kam Fai Carpark not much of an investment in the hands of Karen.  Meanwhile, she would have to pay interest on the BOA Loan if she were indeed the real borrower.

84.  None of the matters set out in paragraphs 82 and 83 above would have made any sense if the Kam Fai Properties Assignment or the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment had vested equal beneficial ownership of the Kam Fai Properties in Mother, Agnes and Clara or sole beneficial ownership of the Kam Fai Carpark in Karen.

85.  However, everything could have been explained and would have fallen into place if Clara had just been a caretaker and treasurer answerable to Father as the beneficial owner.

86.  This view is, to my mind, reinforced by the following emails from Clara to Father:

(1) First, by an email dated 8 November 2011 from Clara to Father and copied to the other Daughters, Clara confirmed that she had asked Father during her visit to Brisbane after the completion of the sale of the Kam Fai Properties if she could pay off the mortgage on 313 Warrigal Road, although the point that Clara was trying to make was that Father told her not to do so out of selfishness as he wanted Anna to continue to repay such mortgage like she was paying rent for the property and that putting money into 313 Warrigal Road would mean that Father would get less from Clara whose money Father treated as his.

(2) Second, Father and Clara had in a series of emails in January and February 2011 discussed the pros and cons of certain properties in Brisbane that Father had looked at with a view to buying with the use of the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.  In particular:

(a) By an email dated 22 January 2011, Father set out the particulars of 2 investment options involving 2 different properties and asked Clara, “Currently, how is the state of progress for the 28/2 closing?” and “which option you think more appropriate?  The defensive or the riskier one?”  28 February 2011 was the scheduled completion date for the sale of St Louis Flat 1D so the first question was a reference to completion of such sale.

(b) This becomes apparent from Clara’s reply email dated 24 January 2011 by which she informed Father, “1d is progressing smoothly.  Nothing extra should happen.  The deposit of 10% is stakeheld in the solicitor’s account until they have confirmed with the bank the loan balance, then they will release it.  28/2 is the settlement date.”  In answer to the second question, Po Ling advised, “defensive first and invest later.  I don’t want you to loss (sic) a place to live in when the investment is not smooth or fail”.

(c) Clara followed up with another email 18 minutes later, asking Father what the costs say agent’s commission percentage, conveyance fee, stamp duty etc would be and when the lease of his then residence would expire.

(d) On 26 January 2011, Clara emailed Father again, cautioning him to take time in finding the right house and concluding with this sentence: “The money won’t fly away.  So, don’t rush.”  Father reads “money” to be a reference to the proceeds of sale of St Louis Flat 1D.  Clara confirms this in her evidence in court.

(e) By an email dated 31 January 2011 to Father, Clara said, “Once you have identified a house, let me know the address and the detail, and I will have the bank do a valuation and arrange the financing and documents.  There are also other expenses, and the AUD is high too.  There are no reasons rushing to buy a property immediately like there is no tomorrow. I’d rather do it right.”

(f) On 31 January 2011, Clara wrote, “I will come most likely in March and after the completion of 1D.  Still need to buy AUG and clear up other costs in conveyance.  So can’t bid in Feb when nothing is ready.  In the meantime, look around and check the prices.”

87.  Clara deals with these emails on the basis that she offered to buy a house for Father in Australia out of her love for him and Anna as friction had been escalating between those two and Clara did not think they should continue to live together at 313 Warrigal Road.  Such explanation might be capable of belief if the emails were viewed in isolation.  However, I believe I should read them against the matters I have considered in paragraphs 82 to 85 above.  So viewed, these communications from Clara are consistent with Father having, and being regarded by Clara as having, an interest in the Kam Fai Proceeds and the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds.  Anyway, by the time of the January and February 2011 emails, Father was no longer living with Anna.

88.  None of the points made by Clara in evidence and in submissions, which I have carefully reviewed and weighed in the balance, detract from my above analysis.

89.  The only significant matters that have caused some initial hesitation in my assessment of Father’s and Clara’s competing accounts of the express common intention, agreement or understanding behind the Kam Fai Properties Assignment are the facts:

(1) that Father did enjoy the benefit of the SPC Loan at least to the extent of HK$1,008,655.74 (see paragraph 14 above);

(2) that Agnes and Clara did assume personal liability vis‑à‑vis SPC for the repayment of the SPC Loan;

(3) that Agnes and Clara must have over the years made some contributions to the repayment of such loan, which I am prepared to accept.

90.  In this connection, I should make it clear that I am unable, on the evidence presently available to me, to resolve the dispute as to the source(s) of funds used to make monthly repayments of the loans/facilities obtained against the Kam Fai Properties or quantify anyone’s contribution.  And I make no such finding.  It is not necessary that I do so, this not being a case in which the court is asked to infer an initial or changed common intention to share beneficial ownership from financial contributions.

91.  In the final analysis, I do not believe that these 3 matters are sufficient to displace the preference that I have, on the balance of probabilities, gained for Father’s case on the express common intention, agreement or understanding behind the Kam Fai Properties Assignment, as analysed in paragraphs 78 to 87 above.

92.  Further, although Agnes and Clara were on paper liable to repay the SPC Loan, I see some force in Father’s observation that their real exposure was minimal.  The Kam Fai Properties were to some extent self‑sufficient in that they could generate rental income.  The worst‑case scenario in the event of default was for SPC to foreclose and sell the security. Given that their market value exceeded the amount of the SPC Loan by quite a margin, neither Agnes nor Clara was at any real risk of having to make good any or any substantial shortfall.

93.  Anyway, insofar as Clara is concerned, she has been rewarded with the CE Facility, the consideration under the Kam Fai Carpark Assignment or the BOA Loan relating thereto, free use of the Kam Fai Flat from September 2001 to December 2006 and the downpayment on St Louis Flat 24A, to which Father had all agreed.

94.  For the above reasons, I find the existence of an express common intention, agreement or understanding between Father and Clara that Father should remain the beneficial owner of the Kam Fai Properties which Clara held on constructive trust for him.

95.  It also follows that the Kam Fai Proceeds, the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds and St Louis Flat 25C, to which the Kam Fai Properties can be traced, are likewise held on constructive trusts by Clara and the Company (as the case may be) for Father.

Orders

96.  I order that judgment be entered for the Plaintiff on his claim as follows:

(1) that Clara should account for the Kam Fai Proceeds;

(2) that Clara and the Company should account for the St Louis Flat 1D Proceeds;

(3) that Clara and the Company should pay Father the sums found to be due on the taking of such accounts;

(4) that the Company should transfer St Louis Flat 25C to Father.

97.  I also make a costs order nisi that Clara and the Company should pay Father’s costs of this action on a party and party basis, to be taxed if not agreed.  Father’s own costs should be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations (Cap 91A).

 (Lisa K Y Wong SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Mr Paul H M Leung, instructed by Edmund Cheung & Co, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant appeared in person

The 2nd defendant was represented by Ms Wong Po Ling



[1] Fullwin was subsequently struck off the Register of Companies and dissolved on 10 March 2006.

[2] According to Father, this estimate has not taken into account the fact that the GE Facility (HKD500,000) and the BOA Loan (HKD210,000) were used by Clara for her own purposes.

[3] Father and Mother separated in 1999, and their marriage was dissolved in Australia in December 2000.

[4] As explained by Father, “Wonggenos” is the concatenation of 2 words.  “Wong” and “黃” is the family name.  “Genos” is an ancient Greek work meaning folks of the same clan.  “振” and “諾” carry the respective meanings of “recovery” and “commitment”.

[5] Father claims that if he had had the bank statements of Fullwin going back to 1997, he would have been able to show that neither Fullwin or he had made use of the SPC Loan other than the sum of HKD1,008,655.74 paid into Fullwin’s YYB account on 23 June 1997. Unfortunately, he left all his books and records at the storeroom at the Kam Fai Carpark when he moved out of the Kam Fai Flat.  He suggests that Clara has retained some, if not all, such documents but has chosen to be selective in the discovery that she has made.