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2013

TAM MEI KAM v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD AND OTHERS

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93947-EN-2014-07-18

TAM MEI KAM v. HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD AND OTHERS

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CACV 124/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVILAPPEAL NO.124 OF 2013

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO.510 OF 2013)

____________

BETWEEN

 TAM MEI KAMPlaintiff (Appellant)
 and
 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED 1st Defendant
 HSBC TRUSTEE (HONG KONG) LIMITED 2nd Defendant
 MESSRS CLIFFORD CHANCE (a firm) 3rd Defendant
 MR JUSTICE JEREMY POON4th Defendant (Respondent)

____________

Before: Hon Cheung, Kwan & Chu JJA J in Chambers
Dates of submissions: 6 and 30 June 2014
Date of Decision: 18 July 2014

_______________

DECISION

_______________

 

Hon Chu JA giving the decision of the Court:

1.  On 4 April 2014, we gave judgment (“the Judgment”) dismissing the plaintiff's appeal against the Judgment of L Chan J dismissing his appeal against the Master’s decision to strike out her claim.

2.  On 15 April 2014, the plaintiff filed an Application to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Judgment.

3.  The plaintiff based her application under section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance Cap. 484, which provides that leave to appeal may be granted

“(b) at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the [Court of Final Appeal], from any other judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the [Court of Final Appeal], as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the [Court of Final Appeal] for decision”.

4.  In the application, the plaintiff sets out two questions which she contends are of great general or public importance. They are:

(a) Whether Article 85 of the Basic Law has granted absolute judicial immunity to a Judge regardless of whether he is honest or not, without regard to whether the same is subject to qualifications of Articles 8, 18 and 84 of the Basic law.

(b) Whether in the true context of the legal authority Sirros v. Moore & Others [1975] 1 QB 118, only honest Judges can enjoy absolute judicial immunity.

5.  The common law principle of judicial immunity is both ancient and well settled.  That a judge is absolutely immuned from personal civil liability for any judicial act done in his capacity as a judge, irrespective of whether he acted under gross error or negligence, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice and all uncharitableness is well recognized by the law: see Sirros v. Moore & Others at pp132D & 140A and Ma Kwai Chun (馬桂珍) v. Leung Siu Chung (梁紹中) [2001-2013] HKCLRT 286, 288 at para.9.

6.  The two questions that the plaintiff put forward in her Application seek to challenge whether judicial immunity is absolute.  In the appeal before us, the plaintiff had argued that under the common law, judicial immunity is not absolute; and Article 85 of the Basic Law, read together with Articles 8 and 18, should be interpreted as having the same effect as the common law.  We had in the judgment (at paragraphs 10 to 14) pointed out that, by reason of her misreading of Buckley LJ’s judgment in Sirros v. Moore& Others, she had misunderstood the common law position and in turn misinterpreted Article 85 of the Basic Law.

7.  We do not consider the two questions put forward by the plaintiff carry any great general or public interest, having regard to the well established common law principle on judicial immunity and this Court’s judgment in Ma Kwai Chun v. Leung Siu Chung on the interpretation of Article 85.  We are further of the view that the plaintiff's questions are not reasonably arguable.

8.  The plaintiff also relies on the “or otherwise” ground, contending that there has been miscarriage of justice and that substantial and grave injustice has been done to her.  The basis of her contention is that the 4th defendant had acted grossly recklessly or dishonestly or inconsistently and had caused undue hardship to her, and that the 4th defendant acted in concert with the other defendants.  

9.  The granting of leave to appeal under the “or otherwise” limb is an exceptional course. The threshold requirement for invoking the Court’s discretion under this limb is a high one: Chao Keh Lung v. Don Xia (2004) 7 HKCFAR 260, 263 at para.9.

10.  The plaintiff's arguments in support of this ground are in effect a repetition of the arguments advanced under the “great general or public importance” ground, namely, judicial immunity under the common law and Article 85 is not absolute.  As mentioned above, these arguments do not raise any question of great general or public importance and have no merits.

11.  For the above reasons, the present application does not come within section 22(1)(b) and fall to be dismissed.

12.  Applying the normal rule of costs follow the event, the plaintiff should pay the 4th defendant the costs of this application.  Mr Suen for the 4th defendant has provided a statement of costs for summary assessment.  The total amount claimed is $5,719.  Item D3 (preparation for hearing, $750) should be deducted as there is no oral hearing.  Other than this, we consider the amount claimed to be proper and reasonable.  We therefore assess the 4th defendant’s costs to be $4,969 (i.e. $5,719 - $750).

13.  Accordingly, we dismiss the plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and order the plaintiff to pay the 4th defendant’s costs of the application summarily assessed at $4,969.

(Peter Cheung)(Susan Kwan)(Carlye Chu)
Justice of AppealJustice of AppealJustice of Appeal

The plaintiff, unrepresented, acted in person.

Mr Suen Sze Yick, Ag. SGC of the Department of Justice, for the 4th defendant.

92390-CH-2014-04-04

TAM MEI KAM 對 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LTD AND OTHERS

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CACV 124/2013

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事上訴

案件編號:民事上訴案件 2013 年第124 號

(原高等法院民事訴訟2013 年第 510 號)

________________________

原告人TAM MEI KAM
及
第一被告人 HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED
第二被告人 HSBC TRUSTEE (HONG KONG) LIMITED
第三被告人MESSRS CLIFFORD CHANCE (a firm)
第四被告人 MR JUSTICE JEREMY POON

________________________

審理法官:高等法院上訴法庭法官張澤祐
 高等法院上訴法庭法官關淑馨
 高等法院上訴法庭法官朱芬齡
聆訊日期:2014年3月25日
判案書日期:2014年4月4日
判案書

上訴法庭法官朱芬齡頒發上訴法庭判案書:

1.  原告人就高等法院原訟法庭法官陳江耀(「原審法官」)2013年5月14日的判決,提出上訴。

HCA 510/2013

2.  原告人在2013年3月26日提出HCA 510/2013案。按原告人的「申索陳述書」所述,該案第一被告人是原告人已故女兒的遺產執行人,第二被告人是第一被告人的代理人,第三被告人是第一和第二被告人的代表律師,而第四被告人是高等法院原訟法庭法官。

3.  原告人在「申索陳述書」指稱,第四被告人以欺詐及不誠實方法處理HCMP 2981/2004一案,因此要求法庭「聲明[第四被告人]不誠實及不合理處理HCMP 2981/2004案件,不適合繼續處理HCMP 2981/2004或與原告人有關連之任何案件」,及「禁制[第四被告人]處理或插手任何與[原告人已故女兒]遺產案或與原告人有關連的任何案件」。

4.  原告人在「申索陳述書」中針對第四被告人的投訴,主要指在HCMP 2981/2004案中,第四被告人在處理一些有關從原告人已故女兒遺產中向原告人支付生活費和醫藥費的申請時,作出一系列不利原告人的判決和指示。

5.  2013年4月15日,律政司代表第四被告人發出傳票,申請剔除「申索陳述書」中所有針對第四被告人的內容,及撤銷原告人針對第四被告人的訴訟。2013年4月19日,聆案官批准申請,並頒令原告人以彌償基準支付第四被告人的訟費。

6.  原告人就聆案官的判決向原訟法庭提出上訴。2013年5月14日,原審法官駁回原告人的上訴,並頒令原告人以彌償基準支付第四被告人的上訴訟費。

原告人的上訴理由

7.  原告人就原審法官的判決,在2013年6月10日發出本案的上訴通知書。原告人提出兩項上訴理由:

(1)原審法官錯誤詮釋《基本法》第85條,沒有考慮它只保障法官誠實行事時的失誤和疏忽,而並不涵蓋不誠實或魯莽的行為。這是因為《基本法》第8、18和84條保留了普通法和衡平法的原則,而普通法和衡平法不豁免法官不誠實或刑事犯罪的行為不受法律追究;及

(2)原審法官沒有正確考慮Sirros v. Moore & Others [1975] 1QB 118案 的原則,即只有誠實行事的法官才可獲豁免不受法律追究。

本庭的判決

8.  原審法官認為原告人針對第四被告人的申索欠缺訴因,屬瑣碎無聊,亦構成濫用法庭程序,因此聆案官予以撤銷,是正確的決定。原審法官主要是基於《基本法》第85條的規定。有關條文的內容如下:

「香港特別行政區法院獨立進行審判,不受任何干涉,司法人員履行審判職責的行為不受法律追究。」

9.  原審法官亦引述上訴法庭在馬桂珍訴梁紹中[2001-2003]HKCLRT 282案的判決。原審法官指出,原告人投訴的是第四被告人在HCMP 2981/2004 案中所作的決定,但這些都是第四被告人履行其司法職責時作出的司法判決,因此免受法律追究。

10.  本庭同意原審法官的分析。上訴法庭在馬桂珍訴梁紹中一案明確裁定,《基本法》第85條為法官和司法人員在履行司法工作時所作的行為給予絕對保障,該等行為因此絶不受法律追究。這項豁免權的目的非為保障法官的個人利益,而是要確保司法制度獨立無私,從而保障公眾利益。原告人指《基本法》第85條不涵蓋不誠實、魯莽或刑事犯罪的行為,這是不正確的。馬桂珍訴梁紹中一案已闡明《基本法》第85條下的保障是絶對的。

11.  原告人引述的Sirros v. Moor& Others 䅁,當中的判決原則亦如出一轍。[1]

12.  原告人依賴 Buckley LJ 在該案的判辭 (第140至141頁)。然而,Buckley LJ 的判辭指出(140頁A),明確的法律原則是:高等法院法官在履行法官職責時的所有司法行為,都獲豁免民事法律責任;只有不是行使法官職責時的行為,才不受保障[2]。  Buckley LJ 在原告人所依賴的段落中,所討論的是法官職責範圍以外的行為。原告人稱在普通法和衡平法下,法官倘若有不誠實或刑事犯罪行為,不會享有豁免遭法律追究的保障,這說法欠缺法理支持。

13.  在本案中,原告人所投訴的,悉數都是第四被告人作為原訟法庭法官,審理HCMP 2981/2004 案中的申請時的判決和處理方法。換而言之,這些都是第四被告人履行法官職責的司法行為,因此受到絶對保障,可完全豁免民事法律責任。

14.  原告人認為,不誠實和蓄意違背公義的行為必然不合理亦非在法官權限之內。然而,在決定第四被告人的行為是否受到絶對保障,獲豁免民事法律責任時,關鍵的考慮是他是否以法官身分行事,是否在履行法官的職責。 他的判決是否合理、是否合符原告人所指的公義,不影響他是否獲豁免民事法律責任。一如Lord Denning 在Sirros v.Moore 指出(132頁D)[3],法官在行使法官職責時所作的言行,受到絶對保障,即使他作出的判決嚴重失誤,或出於嫉妒、仇恨或惡意,他仍然受到保障。

總結

15.  基於上述理由,原告人的上訴不能成立,應予以駁回。

16.  按一貫訴訟常規,原告人上訴失敗,應支付第四被告人的訟費。本庭因此頒令原告人支付第四被告人上訴的訟費,金額按彌償基準評定。

(張澤祐)
高等法院上訴法庭法官
(關淑馨)
高等法院上訴法庭法官
(朱芬齡)
高等法院上訴法庭法官

原告人(上訴人):無律師代表,親自出席。

第四被告人(答辯人):由律政司孫思益政府律師代表。



[1] 見下文註3。

[2] 原文為:“In my judgment, it should now be taken as settled both on authority and on principle that a judge of the High Court is absolutely immune from personal civil liability in respect of any judicial act which he does in his capacity as a judge of that court. He enjoys no such immunity, however, in respect of any act not done in his capacity as a judge.”

[3] 原文為:“Ever since the year 1613, if not before, it has been accepted in our law that no action is maintainable against a judge for anything said or done by him in the exercise of a jurisdiction which belongs to him.  The words which he speaks are protected by absolute privilege.  The orders which he gives, and the sentences which he imposes, cannot be made the subject of civil proceedings against him.  No matter that the judge was under some gross error or ignorance, or was actuated by envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness, he is not liable to an action.” (橫線後加,以作強調)