HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
2013

DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV202/2013DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CACV71/2013DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER
  • HCA752/2012DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER

Files (2)

91344-EN-2014-01-30

DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER

HTML content

CACV 71/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 71 OF 2013

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 752/2012)

______________

BETWEEN

 DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LPPlaintiff
 and
 LAM FUNG1stDefendant
 STARK MOLY LIMITED2nd Defendant

______________

AND

CACV 72/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 72 OF 2013

(ON APPEAL FROM HCMP 839/2012)

______________

BETWEEN

 DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LPPlaintiff
 and
 LAM FUNGDefendant
 STARK MOLY LIMITEDIntervener

______________

AND

CACV 202/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 202 OF 2013

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 752/2012)

______________

BETWEEN

 DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LPPlaintiff
 and
 LAM FUNG1stDefendant
 STARK MOLY LIMITED2nd Defendant

______________

(Heard Together)

Before: Hon Cheung CJHC, Barma JA and McWalters J in Court
Date of Hearing: 15 January 2014
Date of Judgment: 15 January 2014
Date of Reasons for Judgment: 30 January 2014

______________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

______________________________

 

Hon Cheung CJHC:

1.  At the conclusion of the hearing, we dismissed these appeals from two judgments given by Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon on 21 March 2013 and 10 September 2013 respectively. We now give our reasons.

The facts

2.  The facts pertaining to the issues before us can be very briefly stated.  Mr Lam Fung owned interests in a molybdenum mining business through a company called Fabulous Way Limited.  He sought capital injections from investors with a view ultimately to securing a listing for that business.  He therefore entered into an investment agreement dated 2 October 2007 with Dragonrider Opportunity Fund LP to sell 230,700 ordinary shares representing approximately 23.07% of the issued share capital of Fabulous Way to Dragonrider as “Investor”.  The total consideration payable was US$52.63 million.  Under the investment agreement, which was subsequently amended by a supplemental agreement dated 12 November 2007, Dragonrider was entitled to direct that any of the shares sold thereunder be transferred on completion to any nominee, assignee or other person (clause 5.2).

3.  The sale and purchase of shares were duly completed and the 230,700 shares sold were (at the direction of the Dragonrider) registered in the names of Dragonrider and other investors nominated by Dragonrider to take up the shares :

3,397 shares 0.3397% Dragonrider
87,033 shares 8.7033% Angel Wise
87,669 shares 8.7669% Stark Moly Ltd
32,876 shares 3.2876% SIG China Investments One Ltd
19,725 shares 1.9725% Addgood Holdings Ltd
230,700 shares 23.07%

4.  Clause 16 of the investment agreement (as amended) provided for a put option whereby Mr Lam would be bound to purchase all or part of the sale shares on exercise of the put option by way of service of a put option notice :

“16.1 Put Option

(a) In consideration of the sum of US $1.00 by the Investor (the sufficiency and receipt of which the Vendor hereby acknowledges), the Vendor hereby irrevocably grant to the Investor a right to require the Vendor to purchase all or part of the Ordinary Shares (“Put Option Shares”) held by the Investor at the Option Consideration on the terms and subject to the conditions of this Agreement (the “Put Option”) ...

(b) On the exercise of a Put Option by the Investor, the Vendor will become bound to purchase the Put Option Shares, and the Investor will become bound to complete, or to procure the completion of, the sale of the Put Option Shares on the Transfer Terms.

(c) Subject to Clause 16.1 (d), the Put Option may be exercised by the Investor in respect of all or part of the Ordinary Shares held by him by serving on the Vendor the Put Option Notice by facsimile or by registered post or by hand only during the Option Period … failing which it will lapse and cease to have any further effect. The Put Option Notice shall not be served on the Vendor in the event that a Listing has occurred.

...

(f) For the avoidance of doubt, the Put Option shall be exercisable by the Investor for such number of times as he may desire during the Option Period ... subject always to the provisions of Clause 16.1 (a) to (e).

(g) For the avoidance of doubt, notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, the Put Option shall lapse and cease to have any further effect upon a Listing occurring.

16.2 The Option Completion shall take place at such place as the Parties may agree on the date falling fourteen (14) days after the Exercise Date ... or such other date as the Investor and the Vendor may agree. On Option Completion: -

(a) the Investor shall deliver to the Vendor the share certificate(s) together with valid share transfer forms in respect of the Put Option Shares or otherwise procure the delivery of the Put Option Shares; and

(b) the Vendor shall deliver to the Investor cash, cheque or any other means as may be agreed between the Vendor and the Investor, payable to the Investor, and/or its nominee(s), for the full amount of the Option Consideration.

...”

5.  Clause 5.7 of the investment agreement provided :

“For the avoidance of any doubt, each of the Investor Nominees and/or Other Investor shall have the same obligations and rights as Dragonrider under this Agreement as if it is a party to this Agreement and may enjoy the benefit of or enforce the terms of this Agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, Chapter 53B of Singapore. The Vendor and the Company agree that the Investor Nominees and the Other Investors, shall be entitled to exercise the rights over Ordinary Shares registered under their names, through Dragonrider.”

6.  Both the investment agreement and the supplemental agreement are governed by Singapore law.  It is common ground amongst the Singapore law experts that the combined effect of clauses 5.7 and 16 under Singapore law was that “the Investor Nominees and/or Other Investor”, that is, Angel Wise, Stark Moly, SIG and Addgood, to whom some of the sale shares were transferred at the direction of Dragonrider, were all entitled to exercise the put option in relation to their respective shares.

7.  The listing attempt, however, failed, and on 3 and 30 December 2009 respectively, SIG and Stark Moly issued and served their respective put option notices to require Mr Lam to buy back the 32,876 shares and 87,669 shares in Fabulous Way which the two companies respectively held.  In both cases, Mr Lam failed to buy back the shares within the 14‑day period stipulated in clause 16.2 of the investment agreement.  SIG and Stark Moly therefore commenced proceedings seeking specific performance, and both obtained summary judgments against Mr Lam respectively (HCA 219/2011 and HCA 1581/2010).

8.  In the meantime, on 30 March 2010, Dragronrider issued and served a put option notice on Mr Lam.  It was issued by Dragonrider on behalf of itself and the other four investors.  The put option notice read:

“PUT OPTION NOTICE

We refer to the Investment Agreement dated 2 October 2007 between (1) the Vendor (as defined in the Agreement), (2) the Company (as defined in the Agreement), (3) and ourselves, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement dated 12 November 2007 (collectively, the “Agreement”) and the letters from inter alia the Vendor to ourselves dated 30 December 2009, 30 January 2010 and 26 February 2010.

Terms defined in the Agreement shall have the same meanings in this Put Option Notice unless the context requires otherwise. References to a Clause are to a clause of the Agreement.

We hereby notify you pursuant to Clauses 5.7 and 16.1 (c) of the Agreement that we wish to exercise the Put Option granted under Clause 16.1 of the Agreement to require you to buy 230,700 Ordinary Shares1 at US$82,660,962, per calculation in the footnote below.2

Yours faithfully,

ASIASONS PRIVATE EQUITY INC

For and on behalf of

DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.

[Signature]

_______________

JARED LIM CHIH LI

____________________

1 The 230,700 Ordinary Shares comprise of the 3,397, 87,033, 87,669, 32,876 and 19,725 Ordinary Shares registered in the names of Dragonrider Opportunity Fund L. P., Angel Wise Limited, Stark Moly Limited, SIG China Investments One, Ltd and Addgood Holdings Limited respectively.

2 Principal Amount = US$52,630,000

18% IRR compounded monthly= 1.5% per month

Assuming that Option Completion occurs on 13 April 2010 (14 days after Exercise Date pursuant to Clause 16.2 of the Investment Agreement)

No. of months elapsed from the Completion Date of Tranche 1 Sale Shares (3 October 2007) to Option Completion Date (13 April 2010) = 30.32

Option Consideration = US$52,630,000 x (1.015)^ 30.32”

The litigations

9.  Mr Lam again failed to buy back the shares pursuant to Dragonrider’s put option notice.  This gave rise to HCA 752/2012.  By her judgment dated 21 March 2013, the deputy judge ordered specific performance of clauses 16.1(b) and 16.2 of the investment agreement for the buying back of the Dragonrider and Addgood shares.  As for the Angel Wise shares, for a complication which it is not necessary to go into, they were hived off from the main Order 86 application for specific performance and were heard by the deputy judge separately.  By her judgment dated 10 September 2013, the deputy judge ordered specific performance in relation to those shares against Mr Lam as well.

10.  There was another dispute between Dragonrider and Mr Lam and it also related to the investment agreement.  On 12 October 2007, ten days after entering into the investment agreement, Mr Lam executed a share charge by way of a first fixed charge over Mr Lam’s remaining shareholding interest in Fabulous Way and some related assets in favour of Dragonrider to secure performance of his obligations under the investment agreement.  Clause 5.4 of the share charge provided for the transfer of the charged portfolio into the name of Dragonrider or its nominees after the occurrence of “an event of default”, which was defined to include the default by Mr Lam in the due performance of the investment agreement.

11.  In view of Mr Lam’s failure to buy back the shares pursuant to the put option notice served by Dragonrider, the deputy judge decided, in her judgment dated 21 March 2013 given under HCMP 839/2012, that an event of default had occurred, and therefore Mr Lam was obliged to transfer the relevant shareholding in favour of Dragonrider (or Stark Moly for reasons which again I need not go into).  It is common ground that the outcome of HCMP 839/2012 depended wholly on whether the deputy judge was right on her conclusion that Mr Lam had failed to honour Dragonrider’s put option notice.

12.  Aggrieved by the deputy judge’s decisions, Mr Lam appealed – CACV 71/2013 and CACV 72/2013 relating to the judgment of 21 March 2013; and CACV 202/2013 in relation to the later judgment dated 10 September 2013.

13.  Mr Tim Kwok, for Mr Lam, took various points (which he had run unsuccessfully before the deputy judge) in support of the three appeals, which may be conveniently referred to as the absence of authority point; severability point; and lack of subject matter point.  I will deal with them in the following order.

Severability and lack of subject matter

14.  I will first deal with the severability point and lack of subject matter point together.  Put very briefly, Mr Kwok’s argument is that on its true construction as a matter of Singapore law, the put option notice issued by Dragonrider was for the buy back of the “entire indivisible holding of 230,700 ordinary shares”.  However, first, Dragonrider lacked authority from the other investors to issue the put option notice in so far as it purported to cover shares transferred into the names of these other investors.  Secondly, in relation to the shares of SIG and of Stark Moly, these two companies had already exercised their respective put options by issuing prior put option notices for the buy back of their respective shares.  By the time of Dragonrider’s put option notice, those shares had already been contracted to be bought back by Mr Lam from SIG and Stark Moly under the contracts concluded by these two companies’ respective put option notices.

15.  Mr Kwok argued that since as a matter of Singapore law, the put option notice issued by Dragonrider was in relation to the entire indivisible block of 230,700 shares in Fabulous Way, it was simply invalid and of no effect.

16.  I accept the legal analysis of Mr Lam’s expert (Mr Lim Tat) that once SIG and Stark Moly exercised their respective put options by serving their respective put option notices, binding contracts for the buy back of their respective shares were concluded between Mr Lam and each of the two companies respectively.  Although Mr Lam failed to buy back the respective shares within 14 days, neither SIG nor Stark Moly accepted Mr Lam’s repudiatory breaches but insisted on specific performance of the respective contracts.  They eventually sued Mr Lam to judgment for specific performance.  In those circumstances, on a proper construction of the investment agreement (as amended) and the relevant put option notices, I have no doubt, as a matter of law, that Dragonrider could not subsequently issue a put option notice purporting to sell the same shares back to Mr Lam again.  Such purported exercise of the put option in relation to those shares must be of no legal effect.

17.  I therefore reject the suggestion that Dragonrider’s put option notice could somehow co‑exist with the put option notices of SIG and Stark Moly in so far as they covered the same shares.  On the facts, I also reject the argument that Dragonrider’s subsequent put option notice had the legal effect of superseding and extinguishing the earlier put option notices of SIG and Stark Moly.

18.  However, it does not follow that the put option notice of Dragonrider is ineffective and of no effect in its entirety.

19.  Mr Kwok argued that under Singapore law, it is not open to treat Dragonrider’s put option notice as covering anything other than the “entire indivisible holding of 230,700 ordinary shares”.  In this regard, Mr Kwok’s expert, Mr Lim, had this to say in his expert report (paragraph 21(k)) :

“In my view, a Singapore Court is likely to hold that the Put Option Notice constitutes the exercise of a Put Option for the entire indivisible holding of 230,700 Ordinary Shares for the following reasons:

(i) Based on an objective ascertainment of the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in paragraph 3 of the Put Option Notice, the Put Option was an exercise for the entire indivisible holding of all 230,700 Ordinary Shares.

(ii) The Option Consideration sought by Dragonrider in paragraph 3 of the Put Option Notice was for the lump sum of US$82,660,962. Notably, the Put Option Notice (including footnote 2 of the Put Option Notice) did not contain any breakdown of the sums payable to the Investor Nominees or Other Investors.

(iii) Asiasons Private Equity Inc’s letter to Mr Lam dated 30 March 2010 refers to the Put Option Notice ‘on behalf of Dragonrider Opportunity Fund L.P.’.  In the Put Option Notice, the identities of the shareholders of Fabulous Way were listed as a footnote (viz. footnote 1 of the Put Option Notice) instead of a specific reference to Dragonrider’s representation of these shareholders within the main text of the Put Option Notice.”

20.  Dragonrider’s expert, Professor Tan, disagreed.  In his supplemental opinion on Singapore law, he opined :

“2.5 In my respectful view, the reasons set out in paragraph 21(k) of the Aequitas opinion [ie Mr Lim’s report] do not support the view that the Put Option Notice constitutes the exercise of an indivisible holding of 230,700 Ordinary Shares. Indeed it seems to me to be very unusual to regard a shareholding stake as being indivisible. This is even more so where it is clear that the shares in question could be held by different parties. It is one of the fundamental principles of Company Law that each share in a company is transferable and unless there are provisions in the Articles of Association or in a contract to the contrary, there is no reason to regard any holding of shares to be an indivisible holding which can only be sold or otherwise disposed of in its entirety. In fact, the Form of Put Option Notice in Schedule 4 of the Investment Agreement is premised on it being possible for Put Option Notices to be given in respect of a portion of the Ordinary Shares that were purchased from Mr Lam. Clauses 16.1(c) and (f) also make it clear that the Put Option can be exercised over a portion of the 230,700 Ordinary Shares. Given that the 230,700 Ordinary Shares do not form an indivisible holding, I do not believe that Singapore law would construe the Put Option Notice as an exercise ‘for the entire indivisible holding of 230,700 Ordinary Shares’[1] and I know of no Singapore or Commonwealth authority (and none has been offered) that supports the position taken in the Aequitas opinion.

2.6 Furthermore, I do not agree that paragraph 3 of the Put Option Notice objectively construed leads to the conclusion that it was being exercised for an indivisible holding of all 230,700 Ordinary Shares. Footnote 1 of the Put Option Notice, which appears in relation to the reference to ‘230,700 Ordinary Shares’ immediately makes it clear that the ‘230,700 Ordinary Shares’ comprise ‘3,397, 87,033, 87,669, 32,876 and 19,725 Ordinary Shares registered in the names of Dragonrider Opportunity Fund L.P., Angel Wise Limited, Shark Moly Limited, SIG China Investments One, Ltd and Addgood Holdings Limited respectively.’ [underlining added] Accordingly, I am of the view that a Singapore court is likely to take the view that the Put Option Notice has clearly stated that the exercise of the Put Option Notice was for the respective number of Ordinary Shares held by the 5 shareholders which totaled 230,700 Ordinary Shares.

2.7 I am of the view that the reference to US$82,660,962 without any breakdown of the sums payable to the Investor Nominees or Other Investors is of no significance. First, not only does the Investment Agreement not require such a breakdown, the Investment Agreement makes it clear in Schedule 4 (Form of Put Option Notice) that a breakdown is not necessary. All that is required is that the party exercising the Put Option states the number of Ordinary Shares and the total amount payable. Second, given that the number of Ordinary Shares registered in the names of the Investor Nominees or Other Investors had been set out in footnote 1, it is a simple matter of arithmetic for the amounts due to the Investor Nominees or Other Investors to be ascertained based on the number of shares held by them as a percentage of the 230,700 Ordinary Shares. The Aequitas opinion at paragraph 21(k)(ii) appears to imply that if a breakdown of the sums due to the Investor Nominees or Other Investors had been set out the position may be different. It is my view that this is precisely what footnote 1 effectively does.

2.8 A further reason in the Aequitas opinion for its view is that there was no specific reference within the main text of the Put Option Notice that Dragonrider was representing the Investor Nominees and Other Investors. I know of no principle in the law of Agency in Singapore that requires notification of an agency in the main text of a document rather than say in a footnote, annex or other document comprising part of the agreement between the parties. The Aequitas opinion recognizes that Dragonrider’s representation of the Investor Nominees and Other Investors has been set out in the Put Option Notice but takes issue that this is not within the main text of the Put Option Notice. In my respectful view this is not a relevant consideration under Singapore law.

2.9    I would add that given the context within which the Investment Agreement was entered into, where Mr Lam knew that Dragonrider was free to direct that any of the Sale Shares be transferred to the Investor Nominees and Other Investors, together with the fact and knowledge of such transfers on Mr Lam’s part, these are relevant facts that a Singapore court would take into account in determining whether the Put Option Notice related to an indivisible holding of 230,700 Ordinary Shares regardless of the existence or otherwise of footnote 1.”

21.  Interpretation of documents is of course a matter for the court, not the experts.  Dragonrider’s put option notice was served pursuant to the investment agreement (as amended).  The latter formed the context of the notice.  The first relevant matter to note about the agreement is that there is nothing in the investment agreement to require that the entire block of shares sold thereunder must be bought back as one block.  In fact, the wording is to the contrary.  The put option can be exercised repeatedly in relation to any quantity of shares.  Moreover, the agreement provides for the sale shares to be registered in the names of different nominees or investors and it is worded in such a way that both the investors/nominees and Dragonrider (whether for itself or as agent for the investors/nominees) may exercise the put option in relation to some or all of the shares.

22.  Commercially speaking, one cannot see any reason why the shares must be viewed as an indivisible block.  It serves no commercial purpose.  The whole purpose of the put option is to enable Dragonrider and the other investors to sell back the shares to Mr Lam in case events do not happen in the way they have hoped.

23.  That being the case, it would really take a strong case in order to construe Dragonrider’s put option notice as covering the 230,700 shares as an “indivisible block”; in other words, an all‑or‑nothing sort of situation.  For this would simply make little if any commercial sense.

24.  Turning to the wording of the notice, the first thing to note is that there was nothing in that notice to say that either all the shares had to be bought back or none at all.  The notice itself referred to all the shares, even though by the time of the issue of the notice, both Mr Lam and Dragonrider knew full well that two earlier put option notices had been issued.  The evidence suggests that this was done deliberately to play safe, as it was not absolutely sure whether the earlier put option notices were effective – particularly when Mr Lam had failed to buy back the shares in question pursuant to those notices.  However, importantly, the notice made it very clear, in footnote 1, that the 230,700 shares comprised 5 different blocks, registered in the names of 5 different companies (including Dragonrider).  Given the known factual background of this case, there can be no doubt to anybody that Dragonrider’s notice was intended to require Mr Lam to buy back the 5 blocks of shares from the 5 companies respectively.

25.  I see nothing in the expert evidence before me to suggest that under Singapore law, the put option notice served by Dragonrider is any different in substance from five separate notices issued and served by Dragonrider in relation to the 5 blocks of shares set out in footnote 1, or a notice which contained 5 different parts, with each part covering the buy back of one block of shares.  The fact that Dragonrider has chosen to use a more economical way of exercising the put option by serving a composite put option notice cannot be a reason for rejecting the entire notice in favour of Mr Lam.

26.  The fact that the 5 blocks of shares were detailed in a footnote rather than the body of the notice is merely a question of drafting style rather than one of substance.  Viewed thus, the fact that for one reason or another the put option was not validly exercised in relation to one or more blocks of shares does not, by itself, affect the legal validity of the exercise of the put option in relation to the remaining blocks.  In this sense, Dragonrider’s put option notice must be regarded as “severable”.

27.  Mr Kwok argued that Mr Lam needed certainty under the put option to know precisely where he stood, given that a put option notice would lead immediately to a contract binding on him to buy back the shares covered.  That need required the shares covered by the notice to be absolutely certain.  This was achieved by requiring strict compliance with the put option (as a matter of Singapore law).  I can follow the apparent logic of the argument.  Where it breaks down is that the uncertainty here was brought about by the existence of two put option notices seeking to cover the same shares. That uncertainty was quite inevitable given that the investment agreement allowed both Dragonrider and the other investors to exercise the put option.  It simply could not be removed by construing Dragonrider’s notice as capable of covering one indivisible block only.  For even if Dragonrider were to serve five, instead of one, notices, Mr Lam would still have been left in the same uncertain position.

28.  There is nothing in the Singaporean case of MacarthurCook Property Investment Ptd Ltd v Khai Wah Development Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 93, a case heavily relied on by Mr Kwok, which bears any relevance to the present question of construction (under Singapore law).  In particular, I do not think the case suggested at all that objective intent or the contextual approach is irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the investment agreement or Dragonrider’s put option notice.

29.  For these reasons, I see no merit in the argument on severability and lack of subject matter.  In my view, the deputy judge was entirely correct in holding that Dragonrider’s put option notice was good in relation to Dragonrider’s own shares, as well as the shares in the names of Addgood and Angel Wise.

Absence of authority

30.  That leaves the absence of authority point.  Mr Kwok questioned the authority of Dragonrider to issue its put option notice on behalf of the other four investors.  For the reasons given above, in so far as Mr Kwok’s point relates to the authority from SIG and Stark Moly, it is wholly irrelevant.  In any event, for the reasons given in the judgment below, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the authority of Dragonrider to issue the put option notice on behalf of SIG and Stark Moly respectively (in so far as authority is concerned).

31.  In relation to Angel Wise which is in liquidation, there is a board resolution dated 1 March 2010 from Angel Wise authorising Dragonrider to exercise the put option on its behalf and to complete the transaction and/or to enforce the exercise of the put option as it deems fit without further reference or consultation with Angel Wise.  There is also a letter dated 23 April 2013 from Stephenson Harwood, solicitors then acting for Angel Wise’s liquidators, confirming Dragonrider’s authority to pursue any enforceable interest that Angel Wise has in the put option on behalf of Angel Wise in these proceedings.  Finally, there is also a letter dated 15 May 2013 from Reed Smith Richards Butler, solicitors for Stark Moly, confirming that Stark Moly consents to Dragonrider’s pursuit of its claims against Mr Lam to enforce its rights in relation to the Angel Wise shares (which have been charged to Stark Moly).

32.  The burden is on Mr Lam to raise a triable issue.  In relation to Angel Wise, Mr Lam has failed to raise any triable issue on this authority point.

33.  As regards Addgood, unlike the question of authority raised in relation to Angel Wise and Stark Moly, Mr Lam never took any point on authority in the draft defence or his opposing affirmation in relation to Addgood.  The first time it was mentioned was at a directions hearing before Master Kwang in which Mr Kwok orally raised doubts about Dragonrider’s authority from Addgood to issue the put option notice.  But it was not followed by any amendment to the draft defence, nor was there any evidence filed by Mr Lam on the point.

34.  The deputy judge was absolutely right in observing in her judgment (paragraph 24), that it is incumbent on the defendant to show that there is a triable issue or an arguable defence by affidavit or otherwise, and the defendant’s affidavit must “condescend upon particulars”, stating clearly and concisely what the defence is and what facts are relied on to support it.  She concluded, on the facts, that whilst Mr Lam did “condescend upon particulars” in relation to authority from Stark Moly and Angle Wise, he obviously failed to do so in relation to Addgood (and SIG).  She found it was too late for Mr Kwok to raise the absence of authority point in relation to Addgood before her.  I entirely agree with that approach.  There is simply nothing to back the bare suggestion by Mr Kwok that Addgood may not have authorised Dragonrider to issue the put option notice in so far as its shares are concerned.  This is particularly so when despite the lapse of 4 years, we have heard nothing from Addgood or others (apart from Mr Lam himself) to doubt the authority of Dragonrider to issue the put option notice regarding the Addgood shares.  According to Mr Kwok, his client has not even bothered to write to Addgood to find out the true position.

35.  There is no merit in this argument of Mr Kwok either.

An event of default

36.  For these reasons, an event of default has indeed occurred and the deputy judge was therefore right in giving judgment for Dragonrider in relation to the share charge.

Disposition

37.  For these reasons, the appeals were dismissed with costs on an indemnity basis as per clause 12.1 in the investment agreement (as amended) and clause 16.1 in the share charge respectively – we saw nothing to persuade us not to exercise our discretion to award indemnity costs in accordance with the contractual provisions.

Hon Barma JA:

38.  I agree.

Hon McWalters J:

39.  I agree with the judgment of Cheung CJHC.

(Andrew Cheung)(Aarif Barma)(Ian McWalters)
Chief Judge of the
High Court
Justice of Appeal Judge of the
Court of First Instance

Ms Catrina Lam, instructed by Squire Sanders, for Dragonrider Opportunity Fund LP

Mr Tim Kwok, instructed by Kenneth C C Man & Co, for Mr Lam Fung

Reed Smith Richards Butler, for Stark Moly Limited



[1] Paragraph 21(k) of [Mr Lim’s] opinion.

89137-EN-2013-08-06

DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LP v. LAM FUNG AND ANOTHER

HTML content

CACV 71 & 72/2013
(Heard together)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 71 & 72 OF 2013

(On appeal from HCA No. 752 & HCMP No. 839 of 2012)

______________________

CACV 71/2013

BETWEEN

 DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LPPlaintiff/
Respondent
 

and

 
 LAM FUNG1st Defendant/
Appellant
 STARK MOLY LIMITED2nd Defendant

______________________

CACV 72/2013

BETWEEN

 DRAGONRIDER OPPORTUNITY FUND LPPlaintiff/
Respondent
 

and

 
 LAM FUNGDefendant/
Appellant
 STARK MOLY LIMITEDIntervener

______________________

Before: Hon Barma JA in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 6 August 2013
Date of Decision: 6 August 2013

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

 

1. This is an application for a stay of execution pending the hearing of two appeals in January next year.  The appeals are fixed for 14 January 2014.  The appeals are from a decision of Deputy Judge Le Pichon in relation to Order 14 proceedings.

2. In summary, the plaintiff (“Dragonrider”), was an investor in a project that was owned by the defendant.  The project involves a molybdenum mining operation in Mainland China.  The original intention was that the mining operations, which were held ultimately by a company called Fabulous Way Investments Limited, should be the subject of a listing on the Stock Market in Hong Kong.  With a view to such listing, Dragonrider invested in the project by making funds available to Mr Lam and companies associated with him.  As part of the overall arrangement under which the investment was made, there was provided to Dragonrider a put option under which Dragonrider would be able to require Mr Lam to buy back the shares in Fabulous Way that it had acquired, at a price equivalent to the purchase price plus an agreed rate of return of about 1.5 per cent per month.

3. The investment agreement also provided that Dragonrider could bring in other investors to take up part of the shareholding which it acquired and that such other investors would have the same benefits as Dragonrider had under the investment agreement.  The investment agreement was governed by Singapore law and in clause 5.7 of the agreement it was stated that any other investors who were brought in should have the same rights as Dragonrider and would have the benefit of the Singapore statutory provisions governing the rights of third parties under contracts that affected them; in other words, it seems to have been envisaged that the third parties could exercise, in their own names and for themselves, the same rights as Dragonrider had under the investment arrangements.  The agreement also provided that Dragonrider could exercise on behalf of the third parties the rights of those third party investors, if it should become necessary to do so.

4. As a result of the failure of the project to reach fruition, in that no listing was or appeared likely to be achieved, Dragonrider in due course served a put option notice requiring Mr Lam to buy back the shares in Fabulous Way which it had acquired.  By this time the shares had been parcelled out to four other investors in addition to Dragonrider.  These were companies called Stark Moly, SIG, Addgood and Angel Wise.  In the months prior to Dragonrider’s giving of its put option notice, Stark Moly and SIG had in fact served put notices of their own in respect of the shares in Fabulous Way which were held by them.  None of the put option notices, whether those of Stark Moly or SIG, or that served by Dragonrider, were honoured by Mr Lam in that he did not take any steps to comply with his obligation to purchase the Fabulous Way shares that were the subject of the notices.  This led to these proceedings.

5. In the course of the Order 14 proceedings, Mr Lam took a number of points as to Dragonrider’s entitlement to recover judgment against him.  I should add that by the time the matter came to the Order 14 stage the only shares that the proceedings were still concerned with were the shares owned by Dragonrider and Addgood.  The shares of Stark Moly and Angel Wise had been hived off to be dealt with in separate proceedings brought by Stark Moly and it had also been agreed that the shares held by SIG should not form part of the Order 14 proceedings.

6. The first point that were taken by Mr Lam was as to whether or not Dragonrider had authority to act on behalf of Addgood in serving the put option notice that it did on 30 March 2010.  As to this, the argument was that Dragonrider had failed to put forward any evidence that it did, in fact, have the authority of Addgood to issue the notice at the time that the notice was issued, whether by way of prior authority or subsequent ratification, and that there was therefore a triable issue as to whether or not it was authorised by Addgood to serve the put option notice on his behalf.  The way in which the matter arose was that specific points as to Dragonrider’s authority to act for Stark Moly and Angel Wise had been taken in a draft defence that had been prepared for Mr Lam, which was exhibited to his affirmation in opposition to the Order 14 proceedings.  Issue was taken as to Dragonrider’s authority to act for Stark Moly and Angel Wise on the basis of specific documentation which had come into the hands of Mr Lam which suggested that Dragonrider might not in fact have had the authority of those parties to issue the put option notice at the time when the put option notice was issued.  These consisted of a letter written by Stark Moly’s solicitors some months after the service of the put option notice and also a letter by the liquidators of Angel Wise to the effect that no person could deal with the assets of Angel Wise, which included Angel Wise’s shareholding in Fabulous Way, without the express authority of the liquidators.

7. In the event, it would appear that the liquidator, for the avoidance of doubt, subsequently authorised Dragonrider to proceed on their behalf and, in any event, it seems that there was a relationship between Stark Moly and Angel Wise which has resulted in Angel Wise’s shares being hived off to other proceedings.

8. In relation to Stark Moly, the position was that there appeared to have been previous documentation which would suggest that Stark Moly had in fact authorised Dragonrider to issue the put option notice on 30 March 2010 on its behalf because of concerns as to whether or not the earlier notice it had issued on its own was a valid notice.

9. So far as Addgood is concerned, there is nothing to suggest any reason for thinking that Dragonrider did not have the authority of Addgood to act on its behalf when it issued the put option notice.  The point was first raised in the course of the Order 14 hearing before the master when Mr Kwok, who appeared for Mr Lam then as he did before the judge and today, suggested to the master that there might be a question as to Dragonrider’s authority to act on behalf of Addgood.

10. The master appears to have taken the view that since this was not a matter that was raised either in the draft defence or in the affirmation evidence before him, it was not a matter that he needed to deal with.  In the event, he did not deal with the Order 14 summons, but adjourned it to be heard at the same time as another application by Stark Moly for intervention in these proceedings which was eventually heard by Deputy Judge Le Pichon.  Thereafter, matters proceeded and Mr Kwok’s essential point is that, given that a question had been raised and the point had been mentioned, albeit only in the course of his submissions, it was incumbent on Dragonrider to put forward evidence as to its authority to act on behalf of Addgood in time for the Order 14 proceedings.

11. Miss Lam, who appears for Dragonrider today, submits that the position is quite the opposite; that it is for Mr Lam, as the defendant, to raise the triable issue by putting forward a case, if he is able to, to the effect that Dragonrider did not in fact have the authority of Addgood to issue the put option notice on its behalf.

12. As far as this point is concerned, I am prepared to accept that it is one that is, to put it no higher, arguable on behalf of Mr Lam.  However, for the purposes of today’s hearing, which is concerned with whether or not a stay of execution should be granted in respect of the orders made by Deputy Judge Le Pichon, I would not be prepared to go so far as to say that the point is one which is bound to succeed, or almost bound to succeed, so as to entitle Mr Lam to a stay of the proceedings without demonstrating anything more.

13. As Ma J (as he then was) pointed out in both Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Ltd (unreported, HCA 4726/2001, 28 May 2002) and Wenden Engineering Service Co.Ltd v Lee Shing Yue Construction Co.Ltd (unreported, HCCT 90/1999, 17 July 2002), which are perhaps two of the best known cases on the grant of a stay of execution, in order for a stay of execution to be granted, an appellant will at least have to show that his claim has some realistic prospect of success.  Where he is able to show that his claim has very strong prospects of success, in the sense that something had gone grievously wrong in the court below or it appears to the Court of Appeal that the prospects of success on the application are so high that it can be said to be bound or almost bound to succeed, that would, in itself, suffice to justify a stay being granted.  However, as Ma J went on to point out, that will not usually be the case.  The vast majority of cases will be neither cases in which the appeal has virtually no prospects of success nor cases in which the appeal is bound or virtually bound to succeed.  Rather, the likelihood is that most cases will be cases in which an appeal will have some prospects of success but not such strong prospects as to be almost bound to succeed.

14. In my view, that is the position in relation to this point here.  In those circumstances, it is necessary for the appellant to put forward other factors that would justify a stay.  I will come back to deal with whether or not those factors have been established in due course.

15. I turn next to the other points that were raised by Mr Kwok that will be argued at the appeal.  The other points that were raised related to the form of the notice that was served by Dragonrider.  The Dragonrider notice referred, in its body, to the put option being exercised in relation to the entirety of the shares that had been initially transferred to Dragonrider. By way of a footnote it was made clear that the shares were in fact not all held by Dragonrider itself but were held by Dragonrider and the four other investors whom I have mentioned, with the respective shareholdings being indicated.

16. Mr Kwok’s point was that, on the face of it, the notice was therefore a notice for a single and indivisible shareholding, being the entirety of the shareholding which had initially been transferred to Dragonrider in the first place.  That being the case, he said, it was not possible for Dragonrider, in the Order 14 proceedings, to seek only to enforce the put option notice in respect of a part of that shareholding; namely, the shares that were held by it and Addgood.  The basis for this submission was, as I understood it, twofold.  First on a simple construction of the put option notice, whether the put option notice referred, as Mr Kwok suggested, to the entirety of the shareholding or should properly be read as being a put option notice served in respect of the entirety of the shareholding or the several parts of it held by the respective investors.  The second point, which followed on from this, was that if it was the case that it was for an inseparable and single shareholding, it was suggested that the earlier exercise of the put option serviced by Stark Moly and SIG of their option notices had, in effect, disposed of the put option in relation to their respective shareholdings so that it was not possible for a put option notice to be served in respect of the entirety of the shareholding, including those shareholdings which had already been dealt with.

17. These contentions were the subject of evidence as to Singapore law as to the interpretation of the put option and the relationship that was created as a result of it.

18. The Deputy Judge below took the view that on the basis of an objective construction of the put option notice, and having regard to the fact that the identity and quantities of the shareholdings of the five individual investors, including Dragonrider, were spelt out in the footnote to the put option notice, it was clear that the put option notice was intended to operate as a put option in respect of each of the five shareholdings severally.  She therefore held that the put option notice was not one in respect of a single lot of shares but was one that was served in respect of each of the shareholdings of the five investors.

19. Mr Kwok endeavoured to suggest that that was not, in fact, the correct interpretation of the put option notice.  But again, despite his efforts, I am not persuaded that the argument that he puts forward is one that is so strong that it can be said to be almost bound to succeed.  It is, again, at best one that is arguable.

20. In those circumstances, it seems to me that on this other ground too, Mr Kwok fails to establish that the appeal is such a strong one that a stay of execution should be granted without regard to the other factors that would otherwise have to be shown.  It therefore seems to me that it is necessary for the appellant to show that there is some other good reason why a stay of execution should be granted.

21. The most common reason why a stay of execution might be granted is that the appeal would be rendered nugatory if no stay is granted.  In this case, Mr Kwok is constrained by the evidence that his clients have been able to place before this court and is in my view unable to establish (for the most part) that there is any real risk that the appeal will be rendered nugatory.  I deal with this issue in two parts.

22. There are in fact two appeals before the court, the first in relation to the order of the court requiring that the put option notice be complied with.  This in essence requires the payment of money by Mr Lam to Dragonrider in exchange for the shares that are to be transferred pursuant to the put option notice.  Mr Lam’s obligation is simply one to pay money.  In that respect it is little different from any other money judgment.  In such cases, an appeal will only be regarded as likely to be rendered nugatory by the refusal of the stay if there is some basis for thinking that there is a real risk that the money, if paid over to the successful party below, will not be repaid to the appellant in the event that he is successful in his appeal.  There is, quite simply, no such evidence before me in this case; nor is there any evidence to suggest that if Mr Lam is unable to provide the funds, which he says he is unable to do, that the consequences to him will be so serious that he faces possible ruination.  There being no suggestion as to this, it seems to me that so far as the appeal in relation to the specific performance of the put option is concerned, there is nothing demonstrated that would suggest that that appeal would be rendered nugatory in the event that a stay is refused.  Accordingly, I refuse a stay of execution in relation to the order made in respect of those proceedings; that is, HCA 752/2012.

23. Turning to the second appeal, this relates to the enforcement of a share charge that had been provided in respect of Mr Lam’s shareholding in Fabulous Way and its subsidiary, Wiseking, through which the molybdenum mine was ultimately operated.  The quantity of Fabulous Way shares that were the subject of the investment agreement in the put option was some 23 per cent of the shareholding therein.  What was charged represented a 55 per cent interest in Fabulous Way and its relevant subsidiaries.

24. In relation to this, Mr Kwok accepted that there was no concrete evidence of any particular detriment that would be suffered if the share charge were to be enforced by requiring the transfer of the charge shares of the charge portfolio to the plaintiffs. However, Mr Kwok suggested that evidence of that was not really required, having regard to the mutually-accepted position that the shareholding in question related to unlisted companies and that they were therefore not a shareholding in which there was any real liquidity.  He relied on the fact that the purpose of the order that was sought was to put the shares into the hands of the plaintiffs to enable them to effect their recovery of the amount that they had claimed to be owed, and that it was obviously to be inferred that this would be achieved by way of a sale of the charged portfolio.  He pointed out that if the charged portfolio were to be sold, and particularly if it were to be sold at a relatively low price given its unlisted nature and given the fact that the sale would be effectively by a mortgagee in possession, it might well be impossible for his clients to be restored to the position that they should be in, if his appeal were to succeed and at the end of the day it were to be held the put option notice was defective.

25. Recognising this, Miss Lam for the respondent plaintiffs indicated that her clients had considered the position and were willing to seek to address Mr Lam’s concerns by offering an undertaking.  At the end of the day, the undertaking offered was, in effect, not to sell the charge portfolio without first giving 3 weeks’ notice of their intention to do so to Mr Lam. This, it was suggested, would give Mr Lam sufficient time to consider the proposed sale if a buyer could be found, so that he could consider whether to agree to the proposed sale or to take steps to oppose it, making, if necessary, an application to the court on whatever basis he might think appropriate to prevent the proposed sale from taking place.

26. Mr Kwok suggested that the same result could be achieved by accepting an undertaking from Mr Lam not to dispose of the Fabulous Way or Wiseking shares pending the hearing and ultimate determination of the appeal.

27. With respect, it seems to me that that would not be a sufficient means of addressing the plaintiffs’ concerns.  The plaintiffs are in the position of being successful below and, as has been recognised in many cases, the successful party should not be deprived of the fruits of his victory in the court below without good reason.  In the present case, I can see no reason why the plaintiff should not have (as it is entitled to on the basis of the order made below) transferred to it the charged shares.

28. Mr Kwok’s fallback position was to ask that a more substantial amount of time be provided.  He suggested a period of 5 weeks by way of notice and he suggested also that there should be an undertaking by the plaintiff not to interfere in the management of Fabulous Way, Wiseking or any other of their subsidiaries.

29. With respect, it seems to me that a period of 3 weeks’ notice should be quite sufficient for Mr Lam to decide what he wishes to do and to take such steps as he may be advised to in order to prevent a sale if it is the case that he wishes to do so.  Although Mr Kwok suggested that it might take time for a valuation of the charged portfolio to be obtained, it does not seem to me that there is any reason why steps cannot be taken for such a valuation to be obtained and kept up to date if Mr Lam is truly concerned about the prospect of the charged portfolio being disposed of.  It seems to me that a period of 3 weeks, which is an increase on the original period proposed of 2 weeks, should be sufficient for Mr Lam at least to get himself before the court so that directions may be given to have the matter dealt with, if that should be necessary.

30. As far as the question of exercise of rights arising out of ownership of the shares under the charged portfolio is concerned, it seems to me that in all the circumstances of the case it would not be right to prevent the plaintiffs from being in a position to exercise those rights if they should feel it necessary to do so.

31. In those circumstances, I am prepared to accept the undertaking that was offered by Miss Lam, the precise terms of which were read out to me by Miss Lam in the course of the argument and a copy of which is appended to this judgment.  On the basis of that undertaking by Dragonrider on behalf of the plaintiffs, I will dismiss this application.

(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal

Mr Tim Kwok, instructed by Kenneth C C Man & Co, for the 1st defendant/appellant in CACV 71/2013 and the defendant/appellant in CACV 72/2013

Miss Catrina Lam, instructed by Squire Sanders, for the plaintiff/respondent in both cases

Reed Smith Richards Butler, for the 2nd defendant/respondent in CACV 71/2013 and the Intervener/respondent in CACV 72/2013, absent


APPENDIX

The Plaintiff undertakes, pending final determination of the appeals herein to the Court of Appeal:

“not to sell or otherwise dispose of all or any part of the shares in Wiseking Mining Investment Company Limited or Fabulous Way Limited transferred into the Plaintiff’s name without providing three weeks’ prior written notice to the Defendant’s solicitors of its intention to do so.”