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Civil Action2013

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in Provisional Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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Files (21)

[2021] HKCFI 378-EN-2021-02-25

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

[2021] HKCFI 378

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

________________________

BETWEEN  
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)
2nd Plaintiff

and

 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 ZHONG CHI GUANG (FORMERLY TRADING AS QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO.)6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD.11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD.12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Court

Dates of Hearing: 11 – 14 & 18 – 20 January & 4 February 2021

Date of Judgment: 25 February 2021

____________

JUDGMENT

____________

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Page
A.     OVERVIEW 4
B.     BACKGROUND 6
C.     PS’ CASE 14
D.     LAI’S CASE 25
E.     THE PRINCIPLES 28
 E1.     Issues defined by the pleadings 28
 E2.     Breach of Directors’ Duties 29
  E2.1     Duty to act for proper purposes 30
  E2.2      Duty not to misapply corporate assets 31
  E2.3     No conflict duty 34
  E2.4      Duty to act bona fide in best interests of company 35
  E2.5     Relief as a result of breach of director’s duties 36
 E3.      Third-Parties Involved in Directors’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty 37
  E3.1     Dishonest assistance 39
  E3.2     Knowing receipt 42
  E3.3     Restitution for unjust enrichment  44
 E4.     Conspiracy to Injure by Unlawful Means 45
 E5.     Credibility of Witnesses 46
 E6.     Standard of Proof 47
 E7.     Criminal conviction as evidence in civil proceedings 47
F.     PS’ WITNESSES 49
G.     LAI’S EVIDENCE 57
H.     FICTITIOUS TRANSACTIONS & ROUND ROBIN SCHEME 68
 H1.     Corporate entities controlled by and associated with Chun and Lai  68
 H2.     Fictitious Transactions – Overview 69
 H3.     2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions 70
  H3.1     Central Steel’s financial position as recorded 70
  H3.2     Funds flow analysis by Morrison 73
  H3.3     Mukundan Expert Report: Analysis of bills of lading 77
  H3.4     Other matters specific to Lane Tone USA / Jason Metal / Cheung Fat  80
 H4.     2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions 83
 H4.1     Central Steel’s financial position as recorded 83
  H4.2     Morrison Expert Report: Funds flow analysis 84
  H4.3     Mukundan Expert Report: Analysis of bills of lading 88
  H4.4     Other matters 88
 H5.     Close Connections Between Related Parties and Chun/Lai 90
 H6.     Financial Position of Central Steel in FY2010 and FY2011 91
 H7.     True Financial Position of the Group 2009-2012 93
I.     THE JUNE/JULY 2013 PAYMENTS 103
J.     MY FACTUAL FINDINGS 107
K.     LIABLITY OF CHUN 108
L.     LIABILITY OF LAI  111
M.     ARTICLE 164 OF CHINA METAL’S ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 119
N.     LIABILITY OF CHEUNG FAT AND WELLRUN 120
 N1.     Cheung Fat 120
 N2.     Wellrun 121
O.     UNLAWFUL ACT CONSPIRACY 122
P.     RELIEFS 123
 P1.     The Dividends 123
 P2.     The June/July 2013 Payments 126
 P3.     Joint and several liabilities 126
 P4.     Compound Interest 127
 P5.     Costs 127
Q.     DISPOSITION 130
ANNEX 2 135

A.     OVERVIEW

1.  In these proceedings, the Liquidators (“Liquidators”) of China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) (the 1st Plaintiff, “China Metal”) and Central Steel (Macao Commercial Offshore) Ltd (in compulsory liquidation) (the 2nd Plaintiff, “Central Steel”) (collectively, “Ps”) make a claim against Ps’ former Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and majority shareholder, Mr Chun Chi Wai (the 1st Defendant, “Chun”), his wife Ms Lai Wun Yin (the 2nd Defendant, “Lai”), and their connected entities and nominees.  Ps’ case is that Ps have suffered loss and damage as a result of a large-scale and long-running fraud operated by Chun and Lai in breach of the fiduciary duties Chun and Lai owed to Ps.

2.  This action was brought following investigations by the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) into the listing and affairs of China Metal, the ultimate holding company of a group of companies (“the Group”), which purportedly carried on the business of scrap metal trading. As a result of the investigations, SFC presented a winding-up petition against China Metal on 26 July 2013 in HCCW 210/2013 (“the HCCW Proceedings”) on public interest ground (“the SFC Petition”).

3.  The trial of the SFC Petition took place before Harris J from 24 to 26 February 2015.  Harris J allowed the SFC Petition and wound up China Metal on 26 February 2015.  Reasons for the Decision were handed down on 9 March 2015 (“the 2015 Judgment”).  On 13 April 2015, the learned judge also made a winding up order against Central Steel.

4.  In the 2015 Judgment, Harris J found that Chun and those in charge of China Metal had perpetrated a “fraud on a massive scale”, in that the vast majority of the transactions and hence revenue of Central Steel (the main driver of the Group’s revenue pre-and post-listing) in 2007-2009, 2012 and 2013 were in fact fictitious, financed by “round robin” fund flows and conducted with main “suppliers” and “customers” which were set up and/or controlled by Chun or persons associated with him (“the Round Robin Scheme”).

5.  Ps’ case is that the fraud as found by Harris J resulted in, inter alia, the gross inflation of the revenue and profit of the Group between 2007 and 2013, and enabled China Metal to, inter alia, (1) raise HK$1.6 billion from the investing public in its initial public offering (“IPO”) in Hong Kong; (2) declare and pay out very substantial dividends totalling HK$672.9 million for the financial years ended on 31 December 2009 (“FY2009”), 31 December 2010 (“FY2010”) and 31 December 2011 (“FY2011”) (collectively “the Dividends”); and (3) wrongfully moved very substantial cash in excess of HK$1.9 billion out of Central Steel (“the June/July 2013 Payments”) and into Chun’s nominees, for Chun’s and Lai’s own benefit and the benefit of others.

6.  In these proceedings, Ps are seeking relief with respect to (1) the Dividends and (2) the June/July 2013 Payments.

7.  Both Chun and Lai faced criminal charges with respect to the aforesaid matters.

(1)  In October 2015, Chun absconded and has since been a fugitive from justice.

(2)  Lai was convicted after trial by a jury on 19 December 2019 (“the Conviction”) and was sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years on 23 January 2020[1].  Lai is now serving her sentence in custody.

8.  Ps have obtained default judgments against the 3rd, the 4th, the 6th, the 7th, the 8th, the 9th and the 10th Defendants.  Ps have discontinued their claims against the 11th and the 12th Defendants. Accordingly, the remaining defendants are Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat Metal Recycling Co Ltd (the 5th Defendant, “Cheung Fat”); and Wellrun Ltd (the 13th Defendant, “Wellrun”).  Cheung Fat’s defence was struck out and Cheung Fat was de-barred from defending these proceedings[2].  Chun’s and Wellrun’s defences were struck out on 12 October 2015[3].  The only defendant who remains actively defending these proceedings is Lai.  Lai was legally represented in these proceedings until 21 September 2017.  From that time onwards, Lai has been acting in person in these proceedings.

B.     BACKGROUND

9.  I would first set out the facts which are either undisputed or indisputable as a background.

10.  China Metal is and was at all material times a limited company incorporated in the Cayman Islands on 18 July 2007 and a non-Hong Kong company registered under s.333 (now repealed) of the Companies Ordinance. In particular, it is the ultimate holding company of the Group, which includes 38 subsidiaries in the BVI, Hong Kong, Macau, Mainland China, Singapore and Taiwan.  The majority of the Group’s operations were carried out by the subsidiaries in Mainland China and the sub-subsidiaries of China Metal.

11.  Central Steel was at all material times one of China Metal’s main operating subsidiaries.  It was incorporated in Macau on 21 March 2005 with limited liability and is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of China Metal.  Its sole shareholder is Huan Bao Steel Ltd (“Huan Bao”), which in turn is also an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of China Metal.

12.  The Group was founded by Chun and Lai.  At all material times:

(1)  Chun was the Chairman of China Metal’s Board of Directors (“the Board”) and Chief Executive Officer of China Metal until 26 July 2017, when he was removed from these positions by the provisional liquidators (“PLs”) appointed by the court.[4]

(2)  Lai was a non-executive director of China Metal.

(3)  Chun, through his personal corporate vehicle Wellrun, held 53% of the issued shares in China Metal (after listing).

13.  On 10 June 2009, China Metal issued its Prospectus for Global Offering (“the Prospectus”), inviting applications to subscribe for its shares.  As stated in the “Summary” section of the Prospectus:

(1)  The Group was at all material times engaged in the principal business of recycling, processing and marketing of both ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

(2)  China Metal and the Group had 2 primary business models:

(a)  The purchase of scrap metal from suppliers and produce recycled scrap metal products which “meet customers’ requirements”; and

(b)  The resale of scrap metal which China Metal has purchased without further processing.

(3)  China Metal was the “largest scrap metal recycling company in China based on [its] revenue of HK$6.5 billion for the year ended 31December 2008”.

14.  On 22 June 2009, the shares of China Metal (Stock Code: 773) were listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (“the Stock Exchange”) and commenced trading. About HK$1.685 billion (net of listing expenses) were raised by the IPO.

15.  From 2006 to 2012, the financial statements showed that Central Steel contributed a very substantial portion of the Group’s profit.  In particular, between 2008 and 2012, save and except 2010, Central Steel’s purported external profit (excluding inter-company transactions) was 100% or more of the Group’s reported purported consolidated profit (which means that the other businesses of the Group were running at a loss but the Group’s overall financial results were propped up by Central Steel).  The relevant figures are as follows:

HK$’m
2006
(audited)
2007
(audited)
2008
(audited)
2009
(audited)
2010
(audited)
2011
(audited)
2012
(unaudited)
Revenue of the Group
1,090.3
1,942.4
6,526.6
9,063.2
22,508.2
52,140.5
85,829.4
Revenue of Central Steel (% of Group revenue)
379.2
(34.8%)
1,171.2
(60.3%)
3,105.0
(47.6%)
7,074.9
(78.1%)
11,012.3
(48.9%)
19,924.6
(38.2%)
31,441.4
(36.6%)
Revenue of Central Steel after elimination of intergroup sales
(% of Group revenue)
358.6
(32.9%)
1,036.2
(53.3%)
2,920.2
(44.7%)
6,476.9
(71.5%)
10,801.8
(48.0%)
18,484.8
(35.5%)
28,941.2
(33.7%)
Profit of the Group
95.4
178.7
307.9
478.7
891.9
1,872.6
1,768.9
Profit of Central Steel
(% of Group profit)
66.3
(69.5%)
140.5
(78.6%)
369.4
(120.0%)
682.7
(142.6%)
894.6
(100.3%)
1,979.6
(105.7%)
2,280.1
(128.9%)
Profit of Central Steel after elimination of profits associated with intergroup sales
(% of Group profit)
64.2
(67.3%)
123.1
(68.9%)
356.8
(115.9%)
689.9
(144.1%)
888.6
(99.6%)
2,011.5
(107.4%)
2,447.7
(138.4%)

16.  On 22 November 2009, the SFC began to investigate whether any persons might have engaged in disclosure of false or misleading information inducing transactions in the shares of China Metal.

17.  On 28 January 2013, Glaucus Research, a US securities research firm that specialises in short selling stocks, published a report in relation to the fraudulent activities of the Group.  On the same date, trading in the shares of China Metal was suspended.

18.  On 26 July 2013, the SFC presented the SFC Petition in the HCCW Proceedings against China Metal seeking a winding-up order on the public interest ground pursuant to s.212(1) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance.  The basis of the petition is as follows:

(1)  China Metal had overstated its financial position in the Prospectus (covering FY2006-FY2008) and in its 2009 Annual Report as a result of the Round Robin Scheme and the fictitious transactions.

(2)  The fictitious transactions continued after China Metal’s successful listing.

(3)  Chun was the central figure in those fictitious transactions and the frauds.

19.  The basis of the SFC Petition, insofar as it relates to the underlying fraud, is same as the basis of this action.

20.  On the same date (ie 26 July 2013), Harris J appointed Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Borrelli”) and Ms Jocelyn Chi (“Chi”) as the PLs over China Metal with powers to, inter alia, investigate and manage China Metal’s affairs and to take control of the Group, including all of China Metal’s subsidiaries in Hong Kong and overseas.  On 8 August 2013, Borrelli and Chi were also appointed the PLs of Central Steel and Huan Bao.

21.  On 26 February 2015, Harris J allowed the SFC Petition and wound up China Metal on public interest ground.

22.  On 13 April 2015, Harris J also ordered that Central Steel and Huan Bao be wound-up.

23.  The PLs were appointed as Liquidators of China Metal on 14 May 2015, and as Liquidators of Central Steel and Huan Bao on 10 July 2015.

24.  On 8 March 2016, a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud was laid against Lai and Ms Bobo Choy Ling Ling (“Choy”, former General Manager in charge of the administration of China Metal).  It was alleged that between 2 June 2008 and 27 June 2009, Lai and Choy conspired together with Chun and others to defraud the Stock Exchange and/or its offices servants or agents, by dishonestly submitting or causing to be submitted false financial results and information of China Metal and thereby inducing the Stock Exchange to accept the same as true and accurate and approve the application of China Metal for listing on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange.  This is the subject matter in HCCC 66/2018.

25.  After a 60-day trial before Alex Lee J sitting together with a jury commencing on 16 September 2019, both Lai and Choy were found guilty as charged.  Lai was convicted by the jury by a majority of 7:2.  On 23 January 2020, Lai was sentenced by Alex Lee J to imprisonment for a period of 7 years.

26.  In his Reasons for Sentence, Alex Lee J said:

“As regards the role of [Lai] in the offence there is evidence showing that:

(a) her company, [Aprima Logistics Ltd (“Aprima”)], her as involved in the circular funds flow concerning three parcels of money. Parcel A, US$5,000,020 withdrawn on 4 December 2007, parcel B, US$2,500,020 withdrawn on 7 December 2007, and parcel C, 26 million Hong Kong withdrawn on 11 December 2007;

(b) she had, between 2007 and 2009, signed 22 remittance applications of [Central Steel] involving multimillion dollars of money, which according to PW17, accounted for about 10 per cent of the total movement of funds from CSM to Cheung Fat and Lane Tone Hong Kong and those funds were involved in or formed part of the “Circular Funds Flow” as identified by PW17;

(c) she had signed a company cheque of Worldwide, another company of hers, in the amount of 47,900 Hong Kong, on 20 September 2007, to pay for Simon Chan & Co for the setting up of Cheung Fat;

(d) she was present at the long board meeting of [Central Steel] held at the office of Messrs Sidley Austin on 22 May 2009. There was also evidence that D1 had signed various documents, which directors of [China Metal] had to sign for the listing.

The above matters show that [Lai] was a party to the conspiracy at a relatively early stage and not as a latecomer. The above matters also show that [Lai’s] role in the conspiracy was a relatively limited one, mainly if not solely about signing of cheques or remittance applications in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is because of the evidence that although she had a room in the offices of [China Metal] she was not seem (sic) to have been involved in the daily management of [China Metal] or its subsidiaries. She had been granted an option to purchase about 2.18 million shares in [China Metal]’s IPO but she did not exercise any of those. She was paid 150,000 Hong Kong per annum for her role as a non-executive director. On the other hand, I do not lose sight of the fact that her husband, Mr Chun, did make a huge profit from the fraud.

There were immigration movement records showing that Mr Chun was out of Hong Kong from time to time.  In all the circumstances, although D1 did not give evidence, I am prepared to accept the mitigation advanced by Mr Leung that it may be the case that she was acting under the influence of her husband. Nevertheless, [Lai’s] participation, I should say knowing participation in the conspiracy carried with it an element of breach of trust because of her position as a director of [China Metal], albeit a non-executive one.”

27.  From what has been said by the trial judge in the criminal proceedings, it can be known that there is evidence in the criminal proceedings showing that:

(1)  Lai was “a party to the conspiracy [to defraud the Stock Exchange] at a relatively early stage”, albeit that her role in the conspiracy was a “relatively limited one”.

(2)  Although it might have been the case that Lai was acting under the influence of Chun, Lai had a “knowing participation in the conspiracy” which carried with it an element of breach of trust because of her position as a director of China Metal.

28.  The evidence was accepted by the jury.  As summarized by the trial judge in the Reasons for Sentence, by their verdict,

“… the jury was sure that there was a conspiracy to defraud the Stock Exchange to cause it to allow [China Metal] to become listed by means of false financial results and information which grossly overstated [China Metal]’s profit. Furthermore, the jury found as a fact that the defendants were knowing parties to that conspiracy. In the event, the object of the conspiracy was to cheat the Stock Exchange into permitting the listing of the company on the strength of the financial statements which contained material falsehood. Members of the public were tricked thereby into subscribing for shares in that company.”

29.  Lai has lodged an appeal against the Conviction.  The appeal has not yet been heard.

C.     Ps’ CASE

30.  Ps are seeking, interalia, equitable compensation and proprietary relief for breaches of fiduciary duties, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt against the defendants.  Ps’ claims are largely based upon the findings and investigations of the SFC, as well as further investigations by the PLs, who subsequently became the Liquidators.

31.  As explained in the above, at the time of the trial, the remaining defendants are Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun.

32.  Ps’ case is as follows:

(1)  At all material times, (a) Chun (by himself and/or through his own personal corporate vehicle, Wellrun); and (b) Lai, through a network of individuals and entities, established, associated with or otherwise controlled a number of purported suppliers and purported customers of scrap metal of the Group.

(2)  Between 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2013, Chun and Lai, through the aforesaid network of entities they controlled and individuals closely associated with them, caused or procured Central Steel (being one of China Metals’ main operating subsidiaries and which alone was responsible for 100% or more of the Group’s gross profits between 2008 and 2012) to enter into fictitious scrap metal trading transactions with purported suppliers and customers established and controlled by them. The fictitious transactions entered into in 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2013 are referred to as “2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions” and “2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions” respectively, and are collectively referred to hereinunder as “Fictitious Transactions”.

(3)  To effect the Fictitious Transactions, Chun and/or Lai caused or procured Central Steel to:

(a)  embark upon the Round Robin Scheme in 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2013 in which: (i) very substantial funds originating from Central Steel were paid out to the purported suppliers, (ii) who then transferred on to the purported customers and (iii) which were eventually circulated back to Central Steel to “pay” for the “goods’ allegedly purchased by purported customers from Central Steel; and

(b)  create bogus bills of lading and other falsified documents to support the Fictitious Transactions.

(4)  Accordingly, a very large percentage of the purported purchases by Central Steel from its purported suppliers, and an equally large percentage the purported sales of the goods from Central Steel to its purported customers, were fictitious.  It is Ps’ case that Chun and/or Lai were the masterminds behind the fraudulent scheme.

(5)  Further, given (a) the existence of the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme in 2009 and 2012; (b) the extent of the Fictitious Transactions leading up to 2009 and beyond; and (c) the continued growth and importance of Central Steel to the overall financial performance of the Group for FY2010 and FY2011, the only reasonable inference is that the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme had continued throughout FY2010 and FY2011.

33.  Ps submit that their case on the Fictitious Transactions is supported and corroborated by, inter alia, the following:

(1)  Evidence from Ps’ expert on forensic accounting, Mr Kenneth Morrison (“Morrison”), who has conducted funds flow tracing analyses in respect of the transfer of funds amongst Central Steel and its purported suppliers and customers in 2007 to 2009 and 2012.  Morrison concludes that for the period from 2007 to 2009 and 2012, between 83.26%-99.95% of the funds which Central Steel purportedly paid out to the purported suppliers were circulated back, over the span of between 11-21 days.

(2)  Evidence from Ps’ expert on shipping matters, Mr Pottengal Mukundan (“Mukundan”), who has analyzed the bills of lading concerning the purported shipments of scrap metal from various world ports to China between 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2013 in relation to the transactions between Central Steel and its purported suppliers and customers.  Mukundan concludes that of the 1,042 bills of lading he analyzed between the aforesaid period: (a) a vast majority of them (ie 71.50%) were found to be not representing a genuine shipping; (b) a further 9.60% were considered unlikely to represent a genuine shipping.

(3)  Evidence from Ps’ factual witnesses.

(4)  Expert evidence accepted by Harris J in the 2015 Judgment, which was evidence from Morrison and Mukundan.  The said evidence is also evidence before the court in these proceedings.

34.  As a result of the Fictitious Transactions, the Group’s overall revenue and profits were grossly inflated for the years from 2007 to 2013.  Accordingly, the financial positions of China Metal and the Group for the financial years 2007 to 2013 have been substantially overstated and are completely unreliable.

35.  Further, between 13 June 2013 and 29 July 2013 (ie immediately prior to the commencement of HCCW Proceedings by the SFC and the appointment of the PLs on 26 July 2013), Chun arranged the remittance of a total amount of HK$1,960,887,984.44 (ie, the June/July 2013 Payments) from Central Steel’s bank accounts to the bank accounts of Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal Recycle Ltd (the 10th defendant, “Pacific Metal HK”).  To date, the Liquidators have been unable to identify any underlying transactions or other commercial justifications for the June/July 2013 Payments.  It is Ps’ case that such transfers were made by Chun to dissipate Central Steel’s very substantial cash assets in order to place them outside the reach of the Liquidators and the Group’s creditors.

36.  Ps are seeking seek relief (1) against Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun for equitable compensation and/or knowing receipt arising from the unlawful payment of the Dividends; and (2) against Chun and Cheung Fat for equitable compensation and/or knowing receipt arising from the June/July 2013 Payments. 

37.  Specifically, Ps are seeking the following:

(1)  As against Chun:

(a)  By virtue of his positions as a Chairman of the Board of Directors of China Metal and an administrator of Central Steel at the material times, Chun owed fiduciary duties to Ps, including: 

(i)  a fiduciary dutyto act bona fide and in the best interests of China Metal and/or Central Steel;

(ii)  a fiduciary duty in the exercise of his powers and the discharge of his duties not to act for any collateral or improper purpose;

(iii)  a fiduciary duty to use assets of China Metal and/or Central Steel in a manner which he honestly believed to be in the best interests of China Metal and/or Central Steel, and also to deal with those assets in a manner consistent with the duties of a trustee; and

(iv)  a fiduciary duty not to act in the affairs of China Metal and/or Central Steel in circumstances where there existed an actual or potential conflict between his duties to China Metal and/or Central Steel as director and his other duties or interests.

(b)  Given his involvement and participation in, and detailed knowledge of, the Fictitious Transactions, Chun was clearly in breach of the aforementioned fiduciary duties in that he: (i) well knew, or at least turned a blind eye to the fact that, his actions were in breach of his said duties and injurious to the interests of China Metal and Central Steel; and (ii) notwithstanding such knowledge, he proceeded to carry out such acts to the prejudice of China Metal and/or Central Steel and for his own benefit.

(c)  As to loss and damage:

(i)  By reason of the above, Chunwas well aware that the financial results as shown in China Metal’s 2009 Annual Report, 2010 Annual Report and 2011 Annual Report were false or at least unreliable; and he also well knew, or turned a blind eye, to the fact that China Metal was in fact not in a position to pay the Dividends to shareholders totalling HK$672.9 million for FY2009 to FY2011.

(ii)  Accordingly, Chun is liable to pay equitable compensation for his breaches of fiduciary duties in the amount of Dividends.

(iii)  Further or alternatively, at all material times Chun and Wellrun held 0.1% and between 51.16% and 64.21% of the issued share capital of China Metal, and accordingly received cash and/or scrip dividends equivalent to around HK$0.8 million and HK$357.4 million respectively out of the Dividends. Accordingly, Chun is liable to account for the sum of HK$0.8 million he received as Dividends which were wrongly paid out.

(d)  Chun has also dissipated very substantial amounts of cash of Central Steel in excess of HK$1.9 billion (ie the June/July 2013 Payments) in breach of his fiduciary duty in favour of Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK, which were then further dissipated to other entities associated with Chun and/or Lai. Chun is therefore liable to pay equitable compensation for his breaches of fiduciary duty in respect of the said amount of HK$1.9 billion.

(2)  As against Lai:

(a)  By virtue of her positions as a director of China Metal and an administrator of Central Steel at the material times, Lai also owed the fiduciary duties to China Metal and Central Steel.

(b)  Lai must also have been aware (alternatively, she turned a blind eye to the fact) of the existence of the Round Robin Scheme and the Fictitious Transactions, and the fact that these were injurious to the interests of China Metal and Central Steel, given: (i) her involvement in the management and operation of China Metal and the Group at least until 2012; (ii) her role as bank signatory or authorised person of Central Steel’s bank and brokerage accounts and her involvement in authorising payments in and out of Central Steel’s bank accounts; (iii) her actual participation in the Round Robin Scheme through Aprima, her personal corporate vehicle of which she was the sole shareholder and director; and (iv) the sheer scale and the schemes and the significant amount of purported revenue generated by the same.

(c)  Notwithstanding such knowledge, Lai, in breach of the fiduciary duties, proceeded to: (i) participate in and carry out the Round Robin Scheme to the prejudice of China Metal and Central Steel; (ii) approve the 2009, 2010 and 2011 Annual Report; and (iii) approve the relevant declarations and payment of the Dividends.  Accordingly, Lai is liable to pay equitable compensation for her breaches of fiduciary duty in the amount of the Dividends.

(3)  As against Cheung Fat:

(a)  Cheung Fat, as a purported supplier of Central Steel, was centrally involved in the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme, and without its involvement Chun could not have effected and continued with the same.  Cheung Fat was described in China Metal’s internal records as a company of Chun, and Chun controlled the same, such that his knowledge should be attributed to Cheung Fat.

(b)  Further, Chun caused Central Steel to make the June/July 2013 Payments in excess of HK$1.9 billion in breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK.  Of that amount, Cheung Fat received the total sum of HK$1,215,099.463.37.

(c)  In the premises, Cheung Fat is liable (i) in dishonest assistance for assisting Chun’s breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme, and (ii) as knowing recipient of the HK$1.2 billion it received, and has also been unjustly enriched at Central Steel’s expense in circumstances where Chun had caused the transfer of the HK$1.2 billion from Central Steel to Cheung Fat in breach of fiduciary duty and/or without authority.

(4)  As against Wellrun:

(a)  As the holders of issued share capital of China Metal, Chun and Wellrun received Dividends of HK$0.8 million and HK$357.4 million respectively out of the HK$672.9 million Dividends paid.

(b)  As Chun is the sole director and shareholder of Wellrun, and Wellrun is the corporate vehicle of Chun, Chun’s knowledge is imputed to Wellrun.  In the circumstances, Wellrun had knowledge or turned a blind eye to the matters set out in [37(1)(c)(i)] above.

(c)  In the circumstances, Wellrun is liable in dishonest assistance to the full extent of the Dividends, and for knowing receipt as constructive trustee for the sum of HK$357.4 million Dividends it received.

38.  Ps no longer pursue any loss and damage arising from:

(1)  the false and misleading information contained in the Prospectus leading to China Metal’s listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange;

(2)  bank liabilities, interest and charges incurred by Central Steel for payments and transactions which served no genuine or commercial purpose and provided no legitimate benefit for China Metal and/or Central Steel; and

(3)  loss and damage arising from the winding-up of China Metal and Central Steel.

39.  On 31 December 2020, Ps took out a summons (“Ps’ Summons”) for leave to file and serve a Supplemental Expert Report on Cayman Islands law prepared by Mr Jonathan Guy Manning dated 29 December 2020 (“Manning’s Supplemental Report”).  At the beginning of the trial, after hearing submissions from Ps and Lai, I allowed the application and awarded costs of the application to Lai in any event.  My reasons for this decision are as follows:

(1)  The purpose of Manning’s Supplemental Report is to clarify the articles in China Metal’s Articles of Association with respect to the declaration of dividends – the applicable articles should be the 2009 version, whereas the Manning Report dated 13 February 2018 (“the 1st Report”) referred to the 2007 version.  Chinese translation of Manning’s Supplemental Report has been provided to Lai before the commencement of the trial.

(2)  In Manning’s Supplemental Report, the expert observes that:

(a)  At [77] – [90] of the 1st Report, his views in relation to China Metal’s power to lawfully declare dividends were expressed in the context of Article 16 of China Metal’s Articles of Association adopted on 28 August 2007 (“the 2007 Articles”).

(b)  However, given that the Dividends which form the subject matter of the claims herein were declared and paid by China Metal between FY2009 to FY2011, the applicable articles should be Articles 133-134 of China Metal’s Articles of Association adopted on 22 May 2009 (“the 2009 Articles”).

(c)  The wording of Article 16 (2007) and the wording of Article 134 (2009) are substantially the same.  

(d)  The expert is of the view that applying Articles 133-134 (2009), the opinion he expressed in the 1st Report remains unchanged.

(e)  The expert opines that:

(i)  under the 2009 Articles, the Board continues to have a power to declare dividends;

(ii)  under Article 134 of the 2009 Articles, dividends may be paid out of China Metal’s profits or share premium;

(iii)  although Article 134 of the 2009 Articles (unlike Article 16 of the 2007 Articles) imposes an additional condition that an ordinary resolution be passed where it is proposed that payment of a dividend is to be made out of share premium or any other fund/account which can be authorised for this purpose, this does not arise on the facts of the present case since there is no evidence that the Dividends were paid out of share premium.

(3)  Manning’s Supplemental Report only seeks to clarify the applicable Articles of Association prevailing at the material times (being the 2009 Articles).  It is clearly helpful and of assistance to the court that the correct legal basis for the payment of the Dividends be identified.

(4)  Ps do not shy away from that fact that this is a late application.  However, notwithstanding the lateness of the application, I am of the view that Manning’s Supplemental Report is relevant evidence, and admission of the same would not prejudice Lai.  As said in the above, the analysis and conclusion of the expert remain the same after the admission of the supplemental report.  The fact that different Articles of Association apply to the payment of the Dividends has no impact on the expert’s conclusions at all.  Further, Lai has chosen not to adduce any expert evidence on Cayman law. There is therefore no question of her having to prepare responsive expert evidence to the Manning’s Supplemental Report.

(5)  The primary aim in exercising the case management powers of the court is to secure the just resolution of the disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties[5].  With all the aforesaid in mind, in my judgment, Ps’ application as per the summons ought to be allowed.  However, since Ps are seeking an indulgence from the court, the costs of Ps’ Summons should be paid by Ps to Lai in any event.

40.  Ps have called 5 factual witnesses and 3 expert witnesses to give viva voce evidence at the trial in support of Ps’ case.

(1)   Ps’ factual Witnesses:

(a)  Borrelli

(b)  Mr Qiu Guo Ming (“Qiu”)

(c)  Mr Cheng Hiu Fan (“Cheng”)

(d)  Mr Chan Po Kau Simon (“Simon Chan”)

(e)  Ms Chan Yok Ha Jenny (“Jenny Chan”)

(2)  Ps’ expert witnesses:

(a)  Morrison (on forensic accounting and fund flow analysis)

(b)  Manning (on Cayman law)

(c)  Mr Jorge Neto Valente (on Macanese law) (“Valente”)

41.  Originally, Ps were prepared to call Mukundan to give expert evidence in the trial on shipping.  However, in response to the enquiry made by the court, Lai said that she had no question for Mukundan. With no objection from Lai, I directed that the reports made by Mukundan be deemed as evidence before the court without requiring Mukundan to attend the trial to give viva voce evidence.

D.     LAI’s CASE

42.  Lai filed an Amended Defence dated 22 June 2015. The Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme as alleged by Ps are not admitted by Lai.  Further, Lai avers that even if the fraud as alleged by Ps is true, she has no knowledge and no participation in the fraud.

43.  Shortly before the trial, by a summons dated 5 December 2020 (“Lai’s Summons”), Lai made an application for leave to file and serve: (1) a Re-Amended Defence; (2) a Supplemental Witness Statement dated 5 December 2020; and (3) a Supplemental List of Documents.  At the beginning of the trial, after hearing submissions on this summons from the parties, I dismissed the summons with costs to Ps in any event.  These are my reasons for the decision.

(1)  By making the applications as set out in Lai’s Summons, Lai intends to put forward a contention in the trial that an application for telegraphic remittance dated 5 December 2007 concerning USD 5 million from Aprima’s account in DBS (“Aprima Remittance Form”) to Qi Le Metal Recycling Co (“Qi Le”) was not signed by her and the signature thereon was not her signature.

(2)  As to whether Lai should be allowed to introduce this contention at the trial, in fact I have heard the parties on 18 November 2020.  In the hearing on 18 November 2020, after hearing the parties, I ruled that Lai should not be allowed to introduce the contention in these proceedings, for Lai had admitted in [20A] of Amended Defence dated 22 June 2015[6] that the Aprima Remittance Form was signed by her upon the invitation by Chun (“the November Ruling”).  By seeking to introduce the contention, Lai was attempting to withdraw the admission made by her in her pleading.  However, no satisfactory reason was provided by Lai as to why she attempted to withdraw the admission.  I therefore held that Lai should not be allowed to withdraw the admission and Lai was not allowed to introduce the contention in these proceedings.

(3)  By Lai’s Summons, Lai is trying to reargue what has already been determined by the court in the November Ruling.  Lai said that at the time of preparing the Amended Defence, she and her solicitors did not have the Aprima Remittance Form.  She mistakenly made an admission in [20A] of the Amended Defence that the Aprima Remittance Form was signed by her. However, when she saw the document at a later time, she realized that the Aprima Remittance Form in fact was not signed by her.

(4)  I do not accept the explanation offered by Lai.

(a)  The Amended Defence was prepared by Lai’s solicitors when she was legally represented.  The Amended Defence was verified by a Statement of Truth signed by Lai on 22 June 2015.  Under the Statement of Truth, there is a declaration signed by a partner of the law firm, in which the solicitor declared that the Amended Defence had been interpreted to Lai.  In view of the Statement of Truth made by Lai, the explanation offered by Lai is unconvincing.

(b)  There is nothing from Lai’s former solicitors providing support to the explanation sought to be relied upon by Lai.

(c)  In the light of all these, I refused to accept Lai’s explanation.

(5)  There has not been any change of circumstances since the November Ruling.  That being the case, Lai is not entitled to ask the court to revisit the November Ruling.

(6)  Issues to be resolved in the trial are defined by the pleadings.  If Lai is allowed to withdraw the admission made by her in [20A] of the Amended Defence and put forward the new contention at the very late stage of these proceedings, the trial simply cannot proceed, for it cannot be right to deprive Ps the opportunity to adduce evidence to meet the new case put forward by Lai.  However, the trial has been adjourned once due to the unreasonable conduct of Lai[7]. It would not be just and fair to adjourn the trial again, just because Lai intends to put forward a new case without a satisfactory and convincing explanation.

44.  Apart from a witness statement made by her dated 27 July 2017, there is no other witness statement and there is no expert report filed by Lai in support of her case.

E.     THE PRINCIPLES

45.  I would set out the applicable principles in this section.  With all these principles in mind, I analyze the evidence and the issues in this case. 

E1.    Issues defined by the pleadings

46.  Issues in a trial are defined by pleadings, not by evidence.  One cannot slip in an unpleaded issue by saying that there is evidence on the issue[8]. My task therefore is to consider and determine whether the cases pleaded by Ps against Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun are established.  As to Lai, I would also consider and determine whether the matters pleaded by Lai in her Amended Defence are proved.

E2.    Breach of Directors’ Duties

47.  It is Ps’ case that Chun and Lai have breached the directors’ duties owed by them to China Metal and Central Steel:

(1)  the duty of a director to act bona fide in the interests of the company;

(2)  the duty of a director to exercise his power solely for a proper purpose;

(3)  the duty of a director not to misapply or misappropriate corporate assets or funds; and

(4)  the duty of a director not to place himself in a position where there would or may be a conflict between his own personal and separate interests/duties and the interests of the company.

48.  The duties owed by a director, which arise only from the director’s relationship with the company and relate to the internal management of the company, are governed by the law of the place of the company’s incorporation[9].

49.  Ps have adduced expert evidence to show that the aforesaid duties exist under Cayman law (ie China Metal’s place of incorporation) and Macanese law (ie Central Steel’s place of incorporation).  This is not challenged by Lai.  I find that these duties in fact exist under Cayman law and Macanese law.

50.  Ps have also adduced expert evidence to show that for Central Steel, although Chun and Lai are referred to as “administrators” of Central Steel (instead of directors), the distinction is in fact not relevant and administrators are treated as directors under Macanese law. This is also not challenged by Lai.  I accept the point made by Ps.

51.  Unless otherwise specified below, for the purposes of the said duties, Cayman law and Macanese law are same as Hong Kong law.

E2.1  Duty to act for proper purposes

52.  A director owes a fiduciary duty to exercise his power solely for the purposes for which they are conferred.  The rule is not concerned with excess of power by doing an act which is beyond the scope of the instrument creating it as a matter of construction or implication.  It is concerned with abuse of power, by doing acts which are within its scope but done for an improper reason[10].

53.  The law is summarised in Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood[11], in which DHCJ Crow said:

(1)  The test is an objective one.

(2)  A four-stage test should be applied in the following manner:

(a)  identify the power whose exercise is in question;

(b)  identify the proper purpose for which that power was delegated to the directors;

(c)  identify the substantial purpose for which the power was in fact exercised – this is a question of fact and turns on the actual motives of the directors at the time; and

(d)  decide whether that purpose was proper.

54.  Since the test is an objective one, “it matters not whether the director honestly believed that in exercise the power as he did he was acting in the interests of the company; the power having been used for an improper purpose, its exercise will be liable to be set aside”[12].

E2.2 Duty not to misapply corporate assets

55.  According to Valente’s opinion, although an administrator has a duty to manage the assets of a company in a manner which he honestly believed to be in the best interests of the company and with diligence that may reasonably be expected from a careful and organised business administrator, Macanese law does not have the common law concept of a trust.  That being the case, Ps fairly point out that the principles set out in [56] to [58] below only apply to China Metal and not Central Steel.

56.  Directors owe a duty not to misapply or misappropriate company funds.  This duty arises because directors, as human agents of the company, are vested with powers to control its property.  In this respect, they are akin to trustees, although they are not properly speaking as such[13].

57.  Once a prima facie case is shown that the director has acted in breach of fiduciary duty in misapplying company assets:

(1)  The evidential burden shifts to the director to demonstrate the proprietary of the transaction[14].

(2)  It is no excuse that a director blindly followed the act of other directors[15].

(3)  Although the court is entitled to take into account the totality of evidence before it in ascertaining whether the disposal of corporate asset was for proper purpose and in good faith, the absence of a satisfactory explanation from the director is highly material, and may in an appropriate case drive the court to conclude that there was no proper justification for the disposal[16].

58.  With respect to payment of dividends (which is a disposal of corporate assets):

(1)  There is a common law rule against distribution of capital to a shareholder, known as the “capital preservation rule”.  It is devised for the protection of the creditors of a company, such that unless a distribution of a company’s assets to a shareholder – which is a return of capital – is in accordance with specific statutory procedures, it is unlawful and ultravires the company[17].

(2)  Where the director has caused the company to declare and pay dividends in circumstances which are not permissible under the company’s articles of association or statute, the director acts in breach of fiduciary duty and he needs to account for the dividends unlawfully paid out[18].

(3)  The burden of proving that dividends were paid out of capital lies on the company, or its liquidator[19].

(4)  No limitation period applies to such claims against the director[20].

(5)  There are authorities suggesting that such liability is strict; it is up to the director to establish a defence under s.727 of the 1985 Companies Act or s.358 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) (now s.903 of Companies Ordinance (Cap.622))[21].  However, there is no provision in the Cayman Companies Law (2016 rev.) equivalent to s.727 of the 1985 Companies Act or s.903 of the Companies Ordinance.

(6)  Ps have fairly drawn my attention to a recent decision, ie ReBurnden Holdings (UK) Ltd (in liquidation)[22], in which Zacaroli J expressed the view that liability for payment of unlawful dividends was fault-based, ie a director would not be liable “if they were unaware of facts which rendered the dividend unlawful … provided they had taken reasonable care to secure the preparation of accounts so as to establish the availability of sufficient profits to render the dividend lawful”[23].

(7)  Ps submit that Re Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) does not represent the law in Hong Kong. The true position should be the one reflected in Moulin Global Eyecare v OliviaLee.  

(8)  Ps have also fairly drawn my attention to Manning’s opinion on this issue.  According to Manning, whether or not liability is strict or fault-based is an open question under Cayman law.

(9)  After considering all the evidence, I am of the view that it would not be necessary for me to make a ruling on the question. As explained in this judgment, in my judgment, even if such liability is fault-based, such threshold has been surmounted in this case.

E2.3  No conflict duty

59.  Directors owe a fiduciary duty[24]:

(1)  not to place themselves in a position where there would or may be a conflict between their personal or separate interests / duties and the interests of the company; and

(2)  not to make a profit from their position:

60.  The no conflict and no profit rules are proscriptive duties (ie they forbid or restrict a director from acting in certain manner), which duties are strictly enforced, even in the absence of conscious wrongdoing [25]. They are “inflexible rule[s] [which] must be applied inexorably by [the] Court which is not entitled … to receive evidence, or suggestion, or argument as to whether the principal did or did not suffer any injury in fact by reason of the dealing of the agent”[26].

61.  The test for determining whether there has been a breach of that duty is an objective one.  Hence, the no conflict rule operates where the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case think that there is a “real sensible possibility of conflict” or “a real or substantial possibility of conflict”[27].

E2.4 Duty to act bona fide in best interests of company

62.  The question of whether a director has breached the duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the company is ordinarily a subjective one, i.e. whether the director genuinely believed the transaction to be in the interests of creditors.  In Regentcrest, DHCJ Jonathan Parker J said at [120]:

“The duty imposed on directors to act bona fide in the interests of the company is a subjective one … The question is not whether, viewed objectively by the court, the particular act or omission which is challenged was in fact in the interests of the company; still less is the question whether the court, had it been in the position of the director at the relevant time, might have acted differently. Rather, the question is whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interests of the company. The issue is as to the director’s state of mind. No doubt, where it is clear that the act or omission under challenge resulted in substantial detriment to the company, the director will have a harder task persuading the court that he honestly believed it to be in the company’s interest; but that does not detract from the subjective nature of the test.”

63.  Once such knowledge is established, it then becomes necessary to consider whether the director has acted appropriately in the circumstances. In this regard, where there is no evidence that the director gave actual consideration to the interests of the company, the proper test to be applied is an objective one, ie whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transaction was for the benefit of the company[28].

E2.5  Relief as a result of breach of director’s duties

64.  Where a fiduciary such as a director has committed a breach of some fiduciary duty, the breach was complete when the money was paid out of the company wrongfully, and the loss was incurred at that point[29].

65.  Where the breach of fiduciary duty involves unlawful payment of dividend out of capital, the director is strictly liable to account to the company for the same[30].

66.  In respect of China Metal, it is China Metal’s case that the breaches committed by Chun and Lai leading directly to damage to or loss of trust properties, ie the Dividends.  The propositions advanced by Ps are as follows:

(1)  The director holds the misapplied corporate property (if he receives it himself) as constructive trustee for the company[31].

(2)  Where such property cannot be returned in specie, or restoration in specie is not considered an adequate or just remedy, the director comes under a personal liability to pay equitable compensation restoring the value of what has been misapplied[32].

(3)  Causation is established on a “but for” basis without the constraints of common law causation rules on remoteness and foreseeability, and the duty of mitigation only has very limited application.  The court is entitled to assess compensation with the full benefit of hindsight[33].

67.  In respect of Central Steel, Central Steel’s case is that the breaches committed by Chun leading directly to the loss suffered by Central Steel, ie the June/July 2013 Payments.  According to Valente’s opinion, when a director breaches his duties owed to the company, he would be liable to the company for the loss and damage suffered by the company as a result of the breaches committed by that director.

E3.    Third-Parties Involved in Directors’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty

68.  As against third parties who are involved in directors’ breach of their fiduciary duties, through assistance or receipt of misapplied corporate assets, recovery can be made by the company on the basis of: (i) dishonest assistance (for equitable compensation, where the third party did not receive or no longer holds the misapplied corporate asset); (ii) knowing receipt (where the third party has received and continues to hold the misapplied asset); and (iii) restitution for unjust enrichment (where the third party has received corporate asset).

69.  Ps are claiming:

(1)  dishonest assistance against Cheung Fat and Wellrun, for assisting in Chun’s breaches of fiduciary duty;

(2)  knowing receipt against Cheung Fat (the June/July 2013 Payments) and Wellrun (Dividends); and

(3)  restitution for unjust enrichment against Cheung Fat (the June/July 2013 Payments).

70.  Cheung Fat is a Hong Kong company and Wellrun is a BVI company.

71.  Where there is no evidence of foreign law, the court will ordinarily apply Hong Kong law on the basis that the foreign law is presumed to be the same as the lex fori[34].  The presumption is generally applied, although there have been situations where it is not, typically where the court considers that “the default application of a rule of English law is simply too problematic to be appropriate”[35].

72.  The concepts of dishonest assistance, knowing receipt and unjust enrichment are based upon common law and not upon statute law, which would be more relevant to consideration of whether the presumption should be disapplied.  As explained in Dicey, Morris & Collins (15th edn), [9-027]:

“The recent practice of the English courts also suggests that the default application of English law where foreign law is not proved, is not unqualified, and is more likely to be challenged where the rule of English law is statutory rather than being a rule of the common law. In principle, an English statute may not be applied to a matter governed by a foreign law, in circumstances where that foreign law has not been proved, if the English statutory rule appears to state a rule of purely domestic law, or where the wording of the statute would need to be adapted or changed in order to be made applicable to facts which do not otherwise fall within it.  The proposition that the gist of a statute may be extracted from its precise wording, and then applied to a case which is not governed by English law but for which the content of the applicable law has not been proved, on the basis that states a rule of “general application”, is dubious and probably wrong…”

73.  Further, Ps’ claims are accessory to the breaches of fiduciary duty by Chun, with respect to a company listed in Hong Kong (ie China Metal) and/or acts predominately took place in Hong Kong.

74.  Chun was either the de jure director, or the person in control, of the company in question.  He never raised or took issue on foreign law, prior to his being debarred from defending this action.

75.  With all the aforesaid in mind, I am of the view that there is no unfairness arising from the application of the presumption in this case.  I would proceed on the basis that Hong Kong law applies to both the claims against Cheung Fat and the claims against Wellrun.

E3.1  Dishonest assistance

76.  There are 4 requirements for the imposition of liability for dishonest assistance[36]:

(1)  a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant;

(2)  in which the defendant assisted;

(3)  dishonestly; and

(4)  resulting in loss.

77.  On assistance:

(1)  The defendant must have lent assistance to the commission of a primary breach of trust.  This essentially means that the defendant’s actions or omissions[37] must have had some causative impact (ie that the acts or omissions must have “made a difference”)on the breach of trust[38].

(2)  There is no need for the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s action or omission “inevitably [had] the consequence that a loss [was suffered]”[39], nor can a defendant resist such a claim by contending that the breach would “probably have occurred without his assistance”[40].

(3)  In other words, “but for” causation is not required in the context of dishonest assistance, and a defendant may be fixed with liability for loss flowing from the primary breach even where there is no direct causal link between his actions and the loss[41].  However, the plaintiff must at least show that the defendant’s actions “have made the fiduciary’s breach of duty easier than it would otherwise have been”[42].

78.  As to dishonesty:

(1)  Dishonestydoes not require any subjective/self-conscious dishonesty of the kind described by Lord Lane CJ in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 (ie the criminal standard).  Instead, it is entirely an objective test: the conduct complained of must be conduct which is dishonest by the standards of ordinary and reasonable people[43].

(2)  In Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd, Lord Hoffmann said[44]:

“… liability for dishonest assistance requires a dishonest state of mind on the part of the person who assists in a breach of trust. Such a state of mind may consist in knowledge that the transaction is one in which he cannot honestly participate (for example, a misappropriation of other people's money), or it may consist in suspicion combined with a conscious decision not to make inquiries which might result in knowledge … Although a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state, the standard by which the law determines whether it is dishonest is objective. If by ordinary standards a defendant's mental state would be characterised as dishonest, it is irrelevant that the defendant judges by different standards. The Court of Appeal held this to be a correct state of the law and their Lordships agree.”

(3)  Hence, a defendant will be liable for dishonest assistance whenever his conduct transgresses the ordinary standard of honest behaviour (to be assessed by reference to right-thinking members of society), whether or not he is aware of this fact and whatever his motives may have been.

79.  Since dishonest assistance relates not to any loss or damage which may be suffered but to the breach of fiduciary duty, once liability for dishonest assistance is established, the defendant is liable for all loss or damage resulted from the breach of fiduciary duty which has been dishonestly assisted[45].

80.  A claim in dishonest assistance is properly characterised as a “tort” for the purposes of choice of law rules.  In OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft v Abramovich, Christopher Clarke J said[46]:

“If it was necessary, I would strongly incline to holding that a claim in dishonest assistance was, for the purposes of the [Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995] a “tort” … Dishonest assistance, a form of equitable wrongdoing, is so closely analogous to a claim in tort (as characterised for purely domestic purposes) that it should, I would have thought, be so characterised for private international law purposes.”

81.  Accordingly, the proper law to apply is the law of the country in which the events constituting the dishonest assistance occurred, or, if they occurred in more than one, the law of the country in which the most significant element or elements of those events occurred[47].

82.  It is Ps’ case that the events constituting the dishonest assistance against Cheung Fat and Wellrun both substantially occurred in Hong Kong, as this was the location where:

(1)  Chun and/or Lai hatched the fraudulent scheme and caused the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme to be implemented;

(2)  Cheung Fat assisted them in doing so; and

(3)  Wellrun assisted in Chun and/or Lai’s concealment and continued perpetration of the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme by (a) causing them to be re-elected as directors of China Metal in 2010 and 2012; (b) and causing the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Annual Reports to be approved and auditors to be re-elected at China Metal’s annual general meetings[48].

83.  Ps submit that for the reasons above, Hong Kong law applies to Ps’ cause of action in dishonest assistance.  I agree and accept the submissions made by Ps.

E3.2  Knowing receipt

84.  There are 6 requirements for liability for knowing receipt[49]:

(1)  there is property subject to a trust;

(2)  the property is transferred;

(3)  the transfer is in breach of trust;

(4)  the property (or its traceable proceeds) is received by the defendant;

(5)  the receipt is for the defendant’s own benefit; and

(6)  the defendant receives the property with the requisite knowledge.

85.  The defendant must “know enough of the facts surrounding the misapplication of trust property to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of his receipt.”[50]  In other words, the recipient’s state of knowledge must be such as to make it “unconscionable” for the recipient to retain the benefit of the receipt[51].

86.  As to relief, the third party knowing recipient is treated as holding the property upon constructive trust for the company and should restore the same[52]. Where it cannot restore the property in specie, or restoration in specie is not considered an adequate or just remedy, it would be liable to pay equitable compensation.

87.  With respect to the claim for knowing receipt against Wellrun for the Dividends, the Dividends were declared in Hong Kong (by China Metal as a listed company in Hong Kong) and paid to Wellrun in Hong Kong.  Accordingly, the proper law (being the place of receipt) should be Hong Kong in any event.

E3.3  Restitution for unjust enrichment

88.  Ps are relying upon this cause of action against Cheung Fat only.

89.  Transfers made in circumstances where there is no authority to do so – and therefore no consent from the transferor – provide a basis for imposing restitutionary liability on the recipient[53].

90.  The ground of want of authority relied upon by P arises in circumstances where a director of a company (ie an agent) has acted contrary to the best interests of the company (ie the principal). Where an agent acts in furtherance of his own interests to the detriment of his principal, that will negative any actual authority given to the agent to bind the principal to a transaction[54]. In Lysaght v Falk Bros & Co Ltd[55], Griffiths CJ put the principle simply as follows:

“It has never been doubted that an agent who is not acting for his principal but for his own benefit is acting beyond the scope of his authority.”

91.  With respect to the restitution claim against Cheung Fat in respect of the June/July 2013 Payments, Ps’ pleaded case is that Chun had breached his fiduciary duties in that the payments were not for any genuine or legitimate commercial purpose or for the benefit of Central Steel or China Metal.  Accordingly, Ps have pleaded a proper basis for its restitutionary claim based on want of authority.

E4.    Conspiracy to Injure by Unlawful Means

92.  A conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is actionable where the plaintiff proves that it has suffered loss or damage as a result of unlawful action taken pursuant to a combination or agreement between the defendant and another person(s) to injure it by unlawful means, whether or not it is the predominant purpose of the defendant to do so[56].

93.  The elements of this cause of action are as follows:

(1)  a combination, arrangement or understanding between 2 or more people.  It is not necessary for the conspirators to all to join the conspiracy at the same time, but the parties to it must be sufficiently aware of the surrounding circumstances and share the same object for it properly to be said that they were acting in concert at the time of the acts complained of;

(2)  an intention to injure another, albeit with no need for that to be the sole or predominant intention.  The necessary intent can only be inferred if it can be shown that the act is done deliberately and with knowledge of the consequences;

(3)  concerted action (in the sense of active participation) consequent upon the combination or understanding;

(4)  use of unlawful means as part of the concerted action; and

(5)  loss being caused to the target of the conspiracy.

94.  In Ps’ case, the creation of the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme are the unlawful means forming parts of the concerted action.

E5.    Credibility of Witnesses

95.  The approach on assessing the credibility of witnesses is well-established[57].

(1)  Contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged are of the greatest importance in assessing credibility.

(2)  In deciding whether to accept a witness’ account, importance should also be attached to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic of events.

(3)  In determining a witness’ credibility, it is also important to have regard to the consistency of the witness’ evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness’ evidence, which is to be tested by a comparison between the witness’ oral testimony and his witness statement.

96.  In assessing the evidence, the rule in Browne v Dunn is also relevant.

(1)  The rule in Browne v Dunn is a rule of practice or procedures designated to achieve fairness to witness and a fair trial between the parties[58].

(2)  The applicability of the rule has been explained by DHCJ Reyes (as he then was) in Kaifull Investments Ltd v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue,[59]:

“(1) The general principle is that, where an attack on a witness’ evidence is to be made, notice should normally be given to the witness in cross-examination of the nature of the attack if such is not otherwise obvious.

(2) There is no breach of the principle if the witness knew or ought to have known that his version of events was being challenged or that adverse inferences might be drawn against him.

(3) Even if the procedural rule is transgressed, it does not inexorably follow that matters which have not been put to a witness in cross-examination cannot be relied on. It may be a question of the weight to be given to a witness’ testimony taking into account all the available evidence. Thus, for example, a witness’ evidence may be so incredible as to be incapable of belief or his evidence may be unsupported or contradicted by known facts and contemporaneous documents.

(4) The principle does not inflexibly require every point which might be used against the witness to be put to him.  There can no hard-and-fast rule.  The paramount consideration is fairness to the witness.  In essence, the principle is breached if in all the circumstances an omission to cross-examine on a specific point is unfair to a witness.”

E6.    Standard of Proof

97.  Where serious allegations (e.g. for breach of trust) are made, a high level of probability is required, although not as high as the criminal standard[60].

E7.    Criminal conviction as evidence in civil proceedings

98.  Ps are relying upon the Conviction as a matter in support of Ps’ case against Lai.

99.  S.62 of the Evidence Ordinance (“the EO”) provides:

“(1) In any civil proceedings the fact that a person has been convicted of an offence by or beforeany court inHongKong shall, subject to subsection (3), be admissible in evidence for thepurpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any issue in those proceedings, that he committed that offence, whether he was so convicted upon a plea of guilty or otherwise and whether or not he is a party to the civil proceedings; but no conviction other than a subsisting one shall be admissible in evidence by virtue of this section.

(2) In any civil proceedings in which by virtue of this section a person is proved to have been convicted of an offence by or before any court in Hong Kong-

(a) he shall be taken to have committed that offence, unless the contrary is proved; and

(b) without prejudice to the reception of any other admissible evidence for the purpose of identifying the facts on which the conviction was based, the contents of any documentwhich is admissible as evidence of the conviction, and the contents of the information, complaint, indictment or charge on which the person in question was convicted, shall be admissible in evidence for that purpose. ” (Emphasis added)

100.  The burden of proving the relevance of the conviction remains with the party seeking to rely on it[61].  The effect of pleading and proving a criminal conviction under s.62 of the EO is to shift the legal burden of proof upon the party against whom a criminal conviction is made of disproving the offence or alleging that such conviction or finding was erroneous[62].

101.  Once the criminal conviction (and the facts supporting the conviction) are adduced in evidence, the Court is bound to give some weight to the conviction.  However, the weight to be ultimately given depends on the particular facts of the case and the issues involved.  A person may plead guilty in error or simply to save time and expenses. In contrast, great weight is likely to be attached to a conviction where there was a full hearing[63].

102.  Where there is on foot an appeal against the criminal conviction, the court would not finally dispose of civil proceedings in reliance on a criminal conviction alone while the conviction is subject to appeal or liable to be quashed[64].

F.     Ps’ WITNESSES

103.  Save and except the evidence given by Jenny Chan, the evidence given by Ps’ factual witnesses has not been challenged by Lai. Having seen and heard their evidence, I am of the view that all Ps’ factual witnesses (including Jenny Chan) are forthcoming and have directly answered the questions put to them by Lai.  Their evidence is in line with the contemporaneous documents. In my view, all Ps’ factual witnesses are honest and reliable, and I accept their evidence in full.

104.  The evidence given by Ps’ factual witnesses are summarized below.

105.  Borrelli

(1)  Borrelli is one of the Liquidators and has no personal knowledge of the events leading to the collapse of the Group.  His knowledge is reconstructed on the basis of the documents and the information available to him.  He was cross-examined by Lai on some matters, which he provided answers in a forthcoming, and readily acknowledged that he did not know the answer when such was the case.

(2)  His evidence sets out the overall factual context and basis for Ps’ claims.  The key aspects of Borrelli are summarized as follows:

(a)  Facts showing the role and extent of involvement of Chun in the business of the Group;

(b)  Facts showing the role and extent of involvement of Lai in the business of the Group, in particular Central Steel, as well as some of the related entities (including the defendants in this action);

(c)  Facts showing the close connection between Chun and Lai and the corporate defendants and other related entities;

(d)  Role and significance of Central Steel and its Southern China suppliers and customers to the financial performance of the Group;

(e)  Facts in support of the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme, including:

(i)  summary of forensic evidence from Morrison and Mukundan;

(ii)  factual evidence gathered by the Liquidators;

(f)  Facts in support of the 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions and Further Round Robin Scheme, including:

(i)  summary of forensic evidence from Morrison and Mukundan;

(ii)  factual evidence gathered by the Liquidators;

(g)  The June/July 2013 Payments and the fact that the Liquidators were unable to identify any underlying transactions, commercial justification or document to support these were genuine transactions, and how funds received by the defendants were then further dissipated to other corporate the defendants or related entities;

(h)  The Liquidators’ analysis of what the Group’s financial position should have been once the Fictitious Transactions are excluded; and

(i)  The Liquidators’ analysis of the Group’s cash flow and bank borrowings that the Group did not have cash flow to pay the Dividends which were wholly financed by loans.

(3)  For (2)(g) above, Borrelli clarified in his oral evidence:

(a)  Although the 3 payments made by Central Steel to (i) Cheung Fat dated 13 June 2013 of RMB130,218,382.28; (ii) Cheung Fat dated 9 July 2013 of US$1,827,068.98; and (iii) Pacific Metal HK dated 4 July 2013 of RMB83,988,209.74 are not borne out by the supporting documents  (in the sense that they are less in amount than the sum stipulated in the documents), this is because at the time of those respective payments, the books and records of Central Steel showed a liability to Cheung Fat and/or Pacific Metal HK (as the case may be). Although the Liquidators do not accept that these payments have any commercial justification (as they have not been able to locate any evidence or underlying transaction documents supporting those payments), they have, out of an abundance of caution, treated those payments as settling the alleged liabilities and recorded the outstanding balance of those remittances as being unsupported and without commercial justification.

(b)  Of the 3 transfers for which no remittance application forms have been produced (because the Liquidators could not find them), the basis for his evidence that Chun had authorized them is that the sole signatory for the relevant bank account at the time of payments was Chun.

106.  Simon Chan was (1) the sole proprietor of Simon Chan & Co (“SCC”), an accounting firm; (2) the person operating CPK Secretarial Company Ltd (“CPK”), a Hong Kong secretarial services company, the directors and registered shareholders of which are Simon Chan’s family members; and (3) SCC and CPK were situated at Room D, 11/F, 8-10 Hart Avenue, Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong (“Hart Avenue Address”).  The main aspects of his evidence are as follows:

(1)  In 2007, he was asked to set up a number of Hong Kong and BVI companies through SCC and CPK on the instructions of: (1) Bobo Choy; (2) 陸寶玉 (阿玉) (“Ar Yuk”) and/or (3) 伍小姐 (“Ms Ng”, also known as “Jing Jeh” (晶姐) or “Ar Jing” (阿晶)), all of whom appeared to be business associates connected to each other. Those companies included:

(a)  Cheung Fat;

(b)  Lane Tone HK (the 3rd defendant herein);

(c)  Jason Metal (the 4th defendant herein);

(d)  Hoi Cheung (the 8th defendant herein);

(e)  Chak Kwan (“the 9th defendant herein”);

(f)  Qing Yuan Xin Xin Metal Recycling Ltd (“Qing Yuan Xin Xin”); and

(g)  Aprima

(2)  The Hong Kong-incorporated companies, namely Cheung Fat, Lane Tone HK, Hoi Cheung and Chak Kwan, all used the Hart Avenue Address or SCC’s storage address as their registered addresses, and at the outset all correspondence addressed to these companies would be delivered to Chun’s office, or collected by a messenger of China Metal or by Mr Xie Baixing.  Later, Simon Chan was instructed by Bobo Choy to redirect the post to Ar Yuk or Ms Ng at the Asia Steel Building in the Mainland.

(3)  He also provided nominee services for a number of companies associated with Chun.

(4)  He would arrange for delivery of bank documents of various corporate defendants on instructions of Mr Xie Baixing, Ar Yuk or Ms Ng.     

(5)  He would be asked by Ar Yuk to settle sundry payments for Cheung Fat and Metallurgical Industry Limited (“Metallurgical”, the 7th defendant herein).

(6)  In 2013, when Simon Chan received a request for documents from the SFC, he was instructed by Chun personally on who the “contact persons” for each of Cheung Fat, Lane Tone HK, Hoi Cheung and Chak Kwan should be.   

107.  Jenny Chan was employed as the Administrative and Accounting Manager of Central Steel from 2012 to 2015.  The main aspects of her evidence are as follows:

(1)  She provided a factual description of how Central Steel handled the documentation concerning its sales and purchases, confirming that Central Steel mainly dealt with the Southern China (70%) and East China (30%) operations.

(2)  For the Southern China operations, the documents would not go through the Group “OA System”, but were delivered by hand, and she dealt with firstly Yuki Ip and later 陸寶玉 (阿玉) (ie Ar Yuk).

(3)  During her time as an employee of Central Steel, the only suppliers that she was aware of were Cheung Fat, Smith Steel and Pacific Metal HK, and the only customers that she was aware of were Chak Kwan, Metallurgical, Hoi Cheung and Qing Yuan Xin Xin (and in June or July 2013, Guangzhou Asia Steel Co Ltd).

(4)  After Central Steel went into provisional liquidation, in October 2013, Ar Yuk contacted her to try to obtain the last contract and invoice numbers Central Steel had used up to May 2013, so that she could “provide” the information of suppliers and customers in June and July 2013 to Central Steel.

108.  Under cross-examination, an answer given by Jenny Chan was challenged by Lai.  Lai put to Jenny Chan that she was lying in that answer.  This was denied by Jenny Chan.

(1)  Under cross-examination, Jenny Chan was asked by Lai whether anyone had ever told Jenny Chan to get instructions from Lai while Jenny Chan was working in Central Steel.  Jenny Chan answered that she was told by a person called Lai Chi (黎枝) at one time that Lai Chi would need to consult Chun or Lai if Lai Chi himself/herself was unable to answer the enquiries made by Jenny Chan.  This answer was challenged by Lai.  Lai accused that Jenny Chan lied in giving that answer.

(2)  Facing the challenge, Jenny Chan maintained her answer.  However, Jenny Chan clarified that she merely reported what Lai Chi had told her.  Jenny Chan herself did not know why Lai Chi would need to consult Lai.  Jenny Chan fairly said that Lai Chi’s answer could mean if Chun could not be found, Lai Chi might need to ask Lai as to the whereabouts of Chun for the purpose of finding Chun.

(3)  In my view, since Jenny Chan and Lai Chi were colleagues and they had a working relationship, it is inherently probable that Lai Chi did tell Jenny Chan what Jenny Chan has now said in her evidence.  There is nothing contradicting Jenny Chan’s evidence.  Notwithstanding Lai’s challenge, I accept Jenny Chan’s evidence in full.

109.  Cheng was employed by Huan Bao (parent company of Central Steel) as a clerical assistant from around 2006 to March 2015, who assisted with submitting documents to banks.   The main aspects of his evidence are as follows:

(1)  The bank books of various companies including inter alia Metallurgical and Cheung Fat were in fact held by the Group.

(2)  He was asked to take various documents (including bank documents relating to Metallurgical) to Mr Xie Baixing, an employee of the Group, for signing. Mr Xie was named the sole signatory of Metallurgical’s and Cheung Fat’s bank accounts.

(3)  He would be instructed by Lai Yuk Wa or Bobo Choy to deliver Qi Le’s, Lane Tone (HK)’s and Cheung Fat’s bank documents to banks. 

110.  I accept Cheng’s evidence in full.  Cheng’s evidence shows that individuals such as Cheng (who were employees of the Group or otherwise closely connected with Chun) were repeatedly arranging physical deliveries such as transfer slips, withdrawal slips, fund remittance application forms on behalf of entities which were involved in the Round Robin Scheme, such as Cheung Fat, Lane Tone HK, Qi Le and Metallurgical, notwithstanding that such individuals had no connection with those companies.

111.  Qiu is a former officer of Jason Metal.  The main aspects of his evidence are as follows:

(1)  From 2004 to 2007, Jason Metal only sourced 30,000 to 40,000 tonnes of steel priced at approximately US$250 to US$300 per ton (worth around US$7.5 million to US$12 million in total).

(2)  In 2008, Jason Metal only sourced 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes of metals (worth around US$5 million to US$9 million in total).

(3)  From 2009 to 2011, Jason Metal did not source any scrap metal at all. 

(4)  The transaction records between Jason Metal and Central Steel for the years 2007 to 2009 disclosed by China Metal to the SFC (which have since been disclosed to the Liquidators) are not the true business records.

(5)  Qiu was instructed by Chun to sign documents purportedly to confirm, on behalf of Jason Metal and Lane Tone USA respectively, under different names (neither of which was his real name), purchase orders allegedly placed by Central Steel with those entities to address questions raised by China Metal’s auditors and the SFC.

(6)  Jason Metal was closed down in 2011 by Chun because it was being investigated by the SFC. 

112.  As to Ps’ expert witnesses, as said in the above, Lai has no question for Mukundan.  In respect of Morrison, Manning and Valente, although Lai has asked them some questions, Lai in fact has no challenge against their respective expertise, the analyses in their respective expert reports, and the answers given by them in their oral evidence.  I find that each of them has the relevant expertise to give expert evidence in this case.  Having considered the expert evidence given by Ps’ experts, I am of the view that the evidence given by each expert is well founded and I accept the expert evidence.  The evidence given by Ps’ expert witnesses is set out in various parts in this judgment.

G.     LAI’s EVIDENCE

113.  Lai was, inter alia,

(1)  from 28 May 2008 to 21 May 2009, a director of China Metal, and thereafter a non-executive director of China Metal; and

(2)  from 17 July 2007 to 14 April 2010, an administrator of Central Steel. 

114.  The essence of Lai’s evidence is as follows:

(1)  She was a mere housewife responsible only for home duties.

(2)  The directorship or bank signatories that she held was at the request of Chun for the sole purpose of complying with the statutory requirement of maintaining a sufficient number of directors in those companies or as a reserve signatory.

(3)  She had not participated in the operations or management of China Metal, Central Steel and/or Huan Bao at all, and had no knowledge and no involvement in the management of those companies.

(4)  She relied upon Chun, staff of the Group and professionals (including auditors).

(5)  She had no knowledge of the Fictitious Transactions or Round Robin Scheme.

(6)  She claims to have no knowledge of any of the 3 payments made into Aprima (ie of which she is sole director and shareholder) and out to Qi Le (which were then used as part of the Round Robin Scheme), including the US$5 million payment made by Aprima to Qi Le on 5 December 2007 by the Aprima Remittance Form signed by her.

(7)  Although she admits to her signature on the cheque issued by Worldwide Int’l Inspection Ltd (of which she is sole director and shareholder) paying for the incorporation expenses of Cheung Fat, she claims to have no recollection about the payee or the purpose of the payment.

115.  Lai’s evidence is contradicted by contemporaneous documents on various material aspects.

116.  There is clear and cogent documentary evidence showing that Lai was actively involved in the business of the Group, being a co-founder with Chun, had assisted Chun with its operations and development, and with special focus on overseeing the financial and administrative functions. Her active involvement was both before and after the listing of China Metal in 2009.

(1)  As shown in the Prospectus signed and confirmed by Lai, Lai “co-founded [the Group] with Mr Chun” and that she had “over 8 years of experience in financial and administrative management”.

(2)  As per the due diligence questionnaire signed and confirmed by Lai on 27 February 2008 for the purposes of listing, Lai herself described her job responsibilities within the Group as “assisting the Group Chairman to expand the Group’s PRC business” (協助集團董事長開拓中國業務).

(3)  Further, in the confirmation document signed by Lai relating to the listing exercise, Lai annexed a personal CV thereto which was “true, accurate, not misleading and complete”.  In that CV, Lai was described as having not only co-founded the Group, but having been “responsible for overseeing the financial and administrative functions of the Group’s business”.

(4)  Lai was responsible for overseeing the financial and administrative functions is borne out by the fact that:

(a)  she approved and signed the payment forms of various payments Central Steel made which were part of the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme; and

(b)  she was the one who made decisions on salary increases and employment-related payments of various companies managed as part of the Group (廣州亞鋼置業有限公司 and 廣州誠摯物業管理有限公司).

(5)  After China Metal’s listing in 2009, Lai (despite her re-designation as a non-executive director) continued to be actively involved in the general business and operations of China Metal and the Group companies.

(a)  In the email from Mr Yan Qiping (“Yan”) dated 28 December 2012, Yan expressly addressed Lai as “黎總” alongside Chun. That is the usual greeting made by a subordinate in Mainland China to a superior.  Yan himself was a senior staff of the Group at the time.  The fact that he found it necessary to send the email to only Chun and Lai (as opposed to other directors, executive and non-executive, of China Metal) and to address Lai as “黎總” (instead of “Mrs Chun”) bears significance.  This shows that Lai continued to remain involved in the operations of the company and was of a vital role in the Group[65].

(b)  As shown in the Group’s employee directory dated 6 March 2013, Lai still had a listed telephone number with a dedicated line (showing that she had an office in the Shanghai office), fax number (which only Chun, Lai, Yan and the deputy CEO had) and 2 company email addresses with the Group in 2013, well after she had already been re-designated as non-executive director.

(c)  Lai would also sign documents on behalf of Central Steel, for example, the provisional invoice and packing list, both dated 23 April 2010.

(d)  Further, the events as set out in [116(4)(b)] above occurred in 2011 and 2012.

117.  It is indisputable that Lai was entrusted with important positions within the Group.

(1)  She was the director / shareholder / legal representative of no less than 13 companies affiliated with Chun.

(2)  She was one of 2 bank account signatories of Central Steel from July 2007.  This is a significant matter: Central Steel was the subsidiary of the Group contributing to a very substantial portion of the Group’s profit (ie contributing to 100% or more of the Group’s reported consolidated profit between 2008 and 2012).  Lai was in a position with the authority of controlling the Group’s cash.

(3)  It would have been wholly unnecessary for Lai to have been put in so many important positions within the Group if the intention was not for her to be involved in the Group’s management and operations. No satisfactory explanation has been suggested by Lai for her taking up all of these roles.

118.  There is also indisputable evidence showing that Chun and Lai had placed family members and friends in critical positions in the Southern China office of the Group (which managed all of the purported suppliers and customers involved in the Fictitious Transactions), through whom Chun and Lai maintained control and oversight of the operations of the Southern China office:

(1)  The list of relatives can be seen from Chun’s Singapore immigration investment application – all siblings of Chun (save one) worked in Guangzhou and 3 of them (ie Chun Chi Sun, Chun Yim Fong and Chun Mei Yung) worked for Guangzhou subsidiaries of the Group.

(2)  Further, Lai confirmed under cross-examination that the staff as shown in the China Metal staff record for Guangzhou included a number of Chun’s siblings and Lai’s own sister.

(3)  As to Ar Yuk, as per the Group’s internal records, she was an employee of one of the Guangzhou subsidiaries of the Group and a “friend” of Lai.  Lai confirmed under cross-examination that Ar Yuk was the wife of her neighbour (although Lai denied that Ar Yuk was her friend), and Lai had known that neighbour for many years (ie since Lai was in the secondary school).  On Lai’s own admission, Ar Yuk was someone whom Lai has known for a very long time.  Based upon the evidence before the court, I am of the view that Ar Yuk was a person trusted and relied upon by Lai.

119.  There is direct evidence showing Lai was actually and directly involved in the 2007-2009 Round Robin Scheme and Fictitious Transactions.

(1)  Lai had authorized and signed remittances on behalf of Central Steel for no less than 24 transactions in the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme.

(2)  Lai:

(a)  accepted that she had signed the payment voucher dated 15 October 2009 and other similar payment vouchers;

(b)  accepted that she would not merely sign without looking but would indeed “check” through the documents to make sure they were “okay” before signing the relevant payment vouchers; and

(c)  gave evidence to the effect that not only did she sign the relevant remittance application dated 15 October 2009, she was contacted by the bank directly thereafter to confirm the details of the remittance, including payee and amount.

(3)  Such evidence (that she would check the details of the transaction before approving and signing the same) is consistent with her background and experience in business and finance, and is clear evidence showing that she must have been fully aware of the transactions and their nature.

(4)  Lai had also deployed her corporate vehicle, Aprima, and its bank accounts, to facilitate the Round Robin Scheme. 

(a)  In December 2007, approximately US$12.2 million was transferred into Aprima’s DBS account, which were then paid out to Qi Le in 3 transactions on 4 December 2007, 7 December 2007 and 11 December 2007 and were then transferred to Central Steel as part of the Round Robin Scheme.  Of the 3 remittances made from the Aprima DBS account to Qi Le’s bank accounts, the one dated 5 December 2007 (ie the Aprima Transfer Document) bore Lai’s signature.

(b)  Notwithstanding the admission made by Lai in [20A] of the Amended Defence, Lai insisted and denied that the signature of the Aprima Remittance Form was not her signature.  This denial is plainly untrue.

(c)  The relevant chronology is as follows:

(i)  On 21 May 2015, Ps re-amended the Amended Statement of Claim to plead interalia that payments were made out of the Aprima DBS Account on the instructions of Chun or Lai to Qi Le.

(ii)  On 22 May 2015, Ps filed and served the 2nd Supplemental List of Documents, which included item 1467.  Item 1467 included the Aprima Remittance Form.

(iii)  On 3 June 2015, Lai’s solicitors (Lai was legally represented at that time) requested for copies of items 1454 to 1482 (which included item 1467) on Ps’ 2nd Supplemental List of Documents.

(iv)  On 4 June 2015, Ps’ solicitors provided the requested items to Lai’s solicitors.

(v)  On 22 June 2015, Lai signed a Statement of Truth verifying her Amended Defence, which containing the new [20A].

(vi)  On 25 June 2015, Lai filed the Amended Defence.

(d)  Looking at the chronology, the truth is that when Lai signed the Statement of Truth to verify the Amended Defence on 22 June 2015, she had already obtained a copy of the Aprima Remittance Form.

(e)  At the final submissions stage, I drew Lai’s attention to the chronology above and sought an explanation from her.  Lai said that her solicitors had never shown the Aprima Remittance Form to her.  This new allegation is obviously in contradiction with what Lai has told the court at an earlier time, ie both she and her solicitors did not have the Aprima Remittance Form at the time of the preparation of the Amended Defence.

(f)  Lai’s evidence is that she has never herself deposited any substantial funds into Aprima’s DBS account  (indeed the bank statement of Aprima reveals that there was insubstantial funds in Aprima’s DBS account prior to the US$5 million deposited into the same), and she accepted that she must have known, prior to her signing the remittance dated 5 December 2007, that someone else must have placed US$5 million into Aprima’s bank account, which she was then asked to transfer out on the following day to an entity in which Aprima had no apparent dealings with.  In the premises, Lai must have been aware that the transfer of funds could not be for any genuine commercial reasons of Aprima but Aprima was being used to facilitate fund flow.

(5)  Lai’s involvement in the Round Robin Scheme is also evidenced by her payment of Cheung Fat’s incorporation expenses through Worldwide Int’l Inspection Ltd.  She must have known about the setting up and use of Cheung Fat, given also the registered address of Cheung Fat was the same as that of Aprima (Hart Avenue Address).

120.  Lai says that she ceased to be an administrator of Central Streel in April 2010, and hence she should not be taken of having any knowledge and participation in the 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions as claimed in Ps’ case. For the reasons set out in [116] above, at all times after the listing of China Metal in 2009 until the appointment of PLs (including the time after April 2010), Lai continued to be in a key position in the Group, being involved in the general business and operations of the Group.  That being the case, and in view of the magnitude of the Fictitious Transactions and the fact that she is Chun’s wife, I refuse to accept that Lai has no knowledge of the 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions.

121.  Lai claims that she has placed trust in China Metal’s management and relied upon professionals (including auditors) in the company’s business and operations, and that she therefore had no knowledge of the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme.  However, under cross-examination, it was pointed out to her, by reference to the annual reports of the Group, that auditors were not tasked with preparing the company’s accounts – rather, it was the directors’ duty to prepare the company’s financial statements truly and fairly. Lai was unable to offer any explanation in response to this challenge.

122.  Lai alleged that she never owned any interest in the Group and the only benefit received by her was a non-executive directors’ remuneration of HK$200,000 per annum after its listing.  This is not true.  In saying so, what Lai has not mentioned is the substantial benefit that she and her family derived from the fraud perpetrated on China Metal and Central Steel.

(1)  As she accepted, her family fortunes were wholly tied to Chun, with whom she shared a family, including three daughters.

(2)  The fact of China Metal becoming a listed company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and the declaration of the Dividends in FY2009 to FY2011, on the basis of patently false financial information, was a matter which enabled Chun (through himself and his personal corporate vehicle, Wellrun), to obtain very substantial dividends in the amount of HK$358.20 million.

(3)  As a result, Chun and Lai were able to live a luxurious lifestyle, including having lavish residences, and having the ability to afford the significant expenses incurred by Lai and by the 3 daughters during the relevant period.

123.  In her final submissions, Lai mentioned some new factual matters[66] which had not been mentioned by her during the evidence stage.  As to the new factual matters raised by Lai in her final submissions, these are not matters in her evidence and Lai is not entitled to introduce these matters in her final submissions.  Ps have no opportunity to test these new matters by cross-examination.  If these new matters are regarded as admissible evidence or any weight is given to these matters, that would be grossly unfair to Ps.

124.  In my judgment,

(1)  It is clear that Lai’s involvement in the Group was real and substantial. She was actively involved in assisting Chun to expand the business of the Group, with a particular focus on overseeing the financial and administrative functions. This included being one of the 2 bank account signatories of Central Steel from July 2007 and authorizing no less than 24 transactions in the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme on behalf of Central Steel.

(2)  Contrary to Lai’s allegation, her position as a director and authorized signatory was not simply to fill a vacancy or be a “reserve signatory”.

(3)  I reject Lai’s allegation that she was a mere housewife with no involvement at all in the business and affairs of the Group, and that she had no knowledge of the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme (from 2007 to 2013).  Given her role and ongoing involvement in the business and affairs of the Group, and the magnitude of the fraud with respect to the overall financial position and well-being of the Group, Lai must be aware of the scheme of Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme.

(4)  I find that Lai had knowledge of the Round Robin Scheme and Fictitious Transactions as a whole, and was directly involved in some of them.

(5)  I also reject her allegation that she relied on others in looking after the business or in preparing the financial statements, which she had approved as a director and on the basis of which the Dividends were declared. I find that she approved the financial statements for FY2009 to FY2011 and recommended the declaration of Dividends with knowledge of the fraud and that the stated financial performance was wholly false and unreliable.

125.  Save and except the admissions made by Lai which are against her interest, I reject Lai’s evidence in its entirety.

H.     FICTITIOUS TRANSACTIONS & ROUND ROBIN SCHEME

126.  Based upon the evidence accepted by this court, for the reasons set out below, I find that the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme as pleaded in Ps’ case are proved.

H1.    Corporate entities controlled by and associated with Chun and Lai

127.  With respect to the 3rd to the 10th defendants (D3 to D10), on the face of the Group’s records, they were said to be:

Top Supplier of Central Steel
Top Customer of Central Steel
D3 (2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions)
D6 (2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions)
D4 (2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions)
D7 (2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions; 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions)
Cheung Fat (D5) (2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions; 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions)
D8 (2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions)
D10 (2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions)
D9 (2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions)

128.  It is Ps’ case that the evidence clearly shows that these corporate defendants (as well as other corporate entities identified in Annex 2 to Ps’ Written Opening dated 28 December 2020 (“Annex 2”), which had involvement in the Fictitious Transactions) were controlled by Chun and Lai for the purpose of carrying out the same.  Having examined the evidence adduced by Ps, I am satisfied that the matters set out in Annex 2 are proved.  For ease of reference, Annex 2 is annexed hereto and should form part of this judgment[67].

H2.    Fictitious Transactions – Overview

129.  As said in the above, Central Steel had a vital role in the financial performance of the Group, in that its revenue and profits accounted for a very significant proportion of that of the Group.  Between 2008 and 2012, Central Steel’s purported external profit (excluding inter-company transactions) was 100% or more of the Group’s reported purported consolidated profit.

130.  The evidence shows that Central Steel was at the centre of the fraudulent scheme, in that the overwhelming majority of its reported sales and purchases between 2007 and 2009 and 2012 and 2013 were fictitious, conducted with purported suppliers and customers who were controlled by or associated with Chun and/or Lai, and financed by the Round Robin Scheme.

131.  The evidence in support of the existence of the Round Robin Scheme and the Fictitious Transactions are as follows:

(1)  evidence gathered by the SFC and presented in the SFC Petition, which the Liquidators have adopted and on top of which the Liquidators have conducted further investigations and analyses;

(2)  expert evidence of Morrison, setting out his analysis on the funds flow tracing in respect of the transfer of funds amongst Central Steel, its purported suppliers and its purported customers in 2007-2009 and 2012;

(3)  expert evidence of Mukundan, setting out his analysis on the bills of lading concerning the purported shipments of scrap metal from various world ports to China between 2007-2009 and 2012-2013 in relation to the transactions between Central Steel and its purported suppliers and purported customers; and

(4)  evidence from Ps’ factual witnesses on other suspicious circumstances on the operations of China Metal and the Group.

H3.    2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions

H3.1  Central Steel’s financial position as recorded

132.  Based on the records of Central Steel available to the Liquidators, in particular Central Steel’s Sales and Purchase Day Books (being electronic files showing details of the sale and purchase transactions conducted by Central Steel each year) (“Day Books”), the top 5 suppliers and customers of Central Steel between 2006 and 2012 were as follows:

Top 5 Suppliers of Central Steel (in HK$)

No
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1
Slemetal Inc
($236m)
Jason Metal
($330m)
Lane Tone USA
($1,013m)
Jason Metal
($1,748m)
Cheung Fat
($2,856m)
Cheung Fat
($4,983m)
Smith Steel ($7,270m)
2
New Moon ($47m)
Lane Tone USA
($244m)
Jason Metal
($649m)
Cheung Fat
($1,542m)
Jason Metal
($2,261m)
Pacific Metal Corp.
($4,534m)
Cheung Fat
($7,191m)
3
Chan Kee Reclamation Co Ltd
($10m)
Cheung Fat
($150m)
Cheung Fat
($498m)
Lane Tone USA
($1,074m)
Lane Tone USA
($1,449m)
Smith Steel
($2,738m)
Pacific Metal Corp. ($6,910m)
4
金力
($9m)
New Moon ($83m)
Sempra
($153m)
Corporacion Nacional Del Cobre De Chile
($552m)
United Metal
($1,362m)
United Metal
($2,246m)
China Ordins Group
($1,551m)
5
全記五金
($4m)
Alpert & Alpert
($57m)
Europe Metals
($145m)
Trafigura
($548m)
Corporacion Nacional Del Cobre De Chile
($748m)
China Ordins Corp
($525m)
Hanrui (Hong Kong)
($432m)
Legend:
Words in italicsidentifies a Defendant in this action;
Words in italics and with underlineidentifies parties who were closely associated with a Defendant in this action as set out in Annex 2;
Words in italics and with double underlineidentifies parties who had close connections with Mr Chun/ Ms Lai as detailed in Annex 2

Top 5 Customers of Central Steel (in HK$)

No
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

1
Guangzhou Qi Le
($267m)
Guangzhou Qi Le
($762m)
Foshan  Cheng Qun ($761m)
Foshan Yi Zhang
($1,589m)
Metallurgical
($3,161m)
Hoi Cheung
($5,330m)
Hoi Cheung ($8,052m)

2
Golden Union International Limited
($82m)
Guangzhou Metallurgical
($262m)
Metallurgical
($628m)
Foshan Cheng Qun
($1,572m)
Chak Kwan
($2,606m)
Chak Kwan
($5,081m)
Chak Kwan
($7,098m)

3
Guangzhou Asia Steel ($21m)
Guangzhou Asia Steel ($135m)
Guangzhou Metallurgical
($579m)
Metallurgical
($1,541m)
Hoi Cheung
($2,557m)
Metallurgical
($5,056m)
Metallurgical
($6,680m)

4
Smorgon
($9m)
 
清遠恆潤($12m)
GS Nonferrous Metal
($311m)
Guangzhou Asia Steel ($567m)
Foshan Cheng Qun
($620m)
Qing Yuan Xinxin
($768m)
Qing Yuan Xinxin
($2,073m)

5
Shyeh Sheng Fuat
($0.2m)
-
Foshan Yi Zhang ($207m)
Eco Metal
($443m)
Foshan Yi Zhang
($606m)
Guangzhou Asia Steel ($621m)
Guangzhou Asia Steel ($767m)
Legend:
Words in italicsidentifies a Defendant in this action;
Words in italics and with underlineidentifies parties who were closely associated with a Defendant in this action as set out in Annex 2;
Words in italics and with double underlineidentifies parties who had close connections with Mr Chun/ Ms Lai as detailed in Annex 2

133.  Most of the “top” suppliers and customers of Central Steel between 2007 and 2012 are in italics.  In particular:

(1)  D3 to D8 (in italics) and their related entities (in italics with underline) were recorded to have consistently been the largest suppliers and customers of Central Steel between 2007 and 2012.

(2)  The other top suppliers and customers (in italics with double underline) were also entities associated with Chun and/ Lai, even though they were not named as defendants in this action.

(3)  Over 78% of the sales transactions (totalling HK$58.1 billion in value) and over 76% of the purchase transactions (totalling HK$51.1 billion in value) of Central Steel over this period were undertaken with entities identified in italics in the above tables, all of which were associated with Chun and/or Lai in some way.

134.  As shown in the tables above, Central Steel’s top 3 suppliers between 2007 to 2009 were: (1) Lane Tone Int’l Material Inc (“Lane Tone USA”); (2) Jason Metal Recycle Corp (D4) (“Jason Metal”); and (3) Cheung Fat.

135.  As to Lane Tone USA:

(1)  According to the Prospectus, and the 2009 Annual Report of the Group, the annual total sums paid by the Group to Lane Tone USA in relation to the direct purchase of scrap metals for 2007, 2008 and 2009 purportedly approximated HK$241.8 million, HK$1,012.9 million and HK$1,073.6 million respectively.

(2)  This corresponds to the records in the Day Books, which state the value of direct purchases of scrap metal from Lane Tone USA in 2007, 2008 and 2009 as US$31.3 million (HK$244.1 million), US$129.9 million (HK$1,013.2 million), and US$137.7 million (HK$1,074.1 million) respectively.

136.  As to Jason Metal, according to the Day Books, the value of the total purchases from Jason Metal was US$42,292,955 in 2007, US$83,269,144 in 2008 and US$224,170,247 in 2009.

137.  As to Cheung Fat, according to the Day Books, the value of the total purchases from Cheung Fat by Central Steel was allegedly US$19,196,060 in 2007, US$63,846,420 in 2008 and US$197,790,428 in 2009.

H3.2  Funds flow analysis by Morrison

138.  The forensic accounting analysis of the fund flows between Central Steel and its purported suppliers and purported customers between 2007 and 2009 performed by Morrison indicates that:

(1)  funds sourced from the bank accounts of Central Steel were first transferred to the bank accounts of some of its “top” purported suppliers, namely: (a) Lane Tone HK (purportedly for goods purchased from Lane Tone USA even though the 2 entities were not connected in any way); (b) Jason Metal; and (c) Cheung Fat (supposedly for payment of purchase of scrap metal from these purported suppliers);

(2)  a substantial amount of those funds was then transferred to the bank accounts of some of the purported customers, namely: (d) Qi Le (ie D6) and (e) Metallurgical Industry Ltd (ie D7) (“Metallurgical”), despite there being no apparent commercial dealings between these purported suppliers (a), (b) and (c) and the purported customers (d) and (e); and

(3)  a substantial amount of those funds received by Qi Le and Metallurgical was then circulated from their bank accounts back to the bank accounts of Central Steel (supposedly for sale of scrap metal to these purported customers).

139.  Taking 2008 as an example:

(1)  According to its internal accounting records, Central Steel made 85 payments totaling US$272,484,590.66 and HK$35,359,630.22 to Lane Tone USA, Jason Metal and Cheung Fat.

(2)  The majority of those payments recorded in the internal accounting records of Central Steel to be for settlement of purchases from Lane Tone USA (ie 34 out of 38 payments) were in fact paid into bank accounts of Cheung Fat and Lane Tone HK.  Lane Tone (HK) has a similar name as Lane Tone but there is no apparent commercial relationship between the two entities, or between Lane Tone (HK) and Cheung Fat, as to provide an explanation for the receipt by these companies of funds supposedly payable to Lane Tone USA.

(3)  Transfers totaling US$273,810,257.61 and HK$35,312,768.07 sourced from Central Steel were then paid by Lane Tone HK/Jason Metal/Cheung Fat to the purported customers, namely Qi Le and Metallurgical.

(4)  Each transfer of funds from Central Steel to the purported suppliers and then from the purported suppliers to the purported customers occurred within 8 days.

(5)  Thereafter, a substantial portion of the funds transferred to the purported customers’ bank accounts, totaling US$276,702,855.11 and HK$4,679,830 (after deducting bank charges), were circulated back to Central Steel within 8 days.

(6)  Combining the above findings with Morrison’s findings onthe payments from Central Steel made in early 2008, theamount of funds which were circulated back to Central Steel in 2008 totaled US$320,001,881.46, which made up of 99.95% of fundswhich were originally paid out of Central Steel to thesuppliers (ie US$320,174,953.14).

140.  Morrison concludes that in the absence of satisfactory evidence or information to the contrary, the circular funds flow transactions were likely fictitious, lacking bona fide commercial substance, and hence fraudulent.

141.  Morrison’s findings in respect of each of the years under his review are summarized in the following table:

Review PeriodPurported Suppliers InvolvedPurported Customers InvolvedInitial Payment out of Central SteelAmount Circulated back to Central Steel% Funds Circulated BackTimeframe of Circulation
2007Cheung Fat;
Jason Metal
Qi LeUS$48,794,577.66US$40,625,757.9983.26%11 days
2008Lane Tone USA;
Lane Tone (HK);
Cheung Fat;
Jason Metal
Metallurgical; Qi LeUS$320,174,953.14US$320,001,881.4699.95%8-16 days
2009Lane Tone USA;
Lane Tone (HK);
Cheung Fat;
Jason Metal
Metallurgical; Qi LeUS$458,710,360US$457,257,015.2699.68%21 days
2012[68]Cheung Fat[69];
Smith;
Pacific
Hoi Cheung; Metallurgical;
Chak Kwan; Qing Yuan
Xin Xin
US$2,397,822,505.70US$2,338,130,866.4397.51%12 days

142.  As shown in the table above:

(1)  The amounts involved in the round robin funds flows had continuously and significantly increased over the years.

(2)  The amounts of funds circulated back to Central Steel consistently formed a high percentage of the funds which were originally paid out of Central Steel.

(3)  The number of entities involved in the Round Robin Schemes grew over the years.

143.  Morrison’s findings are consistent with the Liquidators’ investigations:

(1)     Morrison’s conclusions are consistent with the information recorded in a spreadsheet with the title “2006股息” dated as at 9 January 2008setting out the circulation of funds amongst various purported suppliers and purported customers and Central Steel between November 2007 and December 2007 located in the computer of Bobo Choy, the former General Manager in charge of administration in China Metal.

(2)     The Liquidators have not identified any evidence which suggests that there could be any legitimate transactions or dealings between Lane Tone HK, Jason Metal and Cheung Fat on one hand and Qi Le and Metallurgical on the other hand that could justify the transfer of substantial funds between them.

144.  Based upon all these, I find that the purchases from Lane Tone USA, Jason Metal and Cheung Fat during 2007 and 2009 (and the corresponding sales to Qi Le and Metallurgical) are not genuine transactions.

H3.3  Mukundan Expert Report: Analysis of bills of lading

145.  The aforesaid conclusion is further supported by the analysis done by Mukundan of the bills of lading found by the Liquidators.

(1)  The expert has investigated and analysed the bills of lading relating to the alleged transactions between Central Steel and its suppliers or customers to ascertain whether the relevant shipment of scrap metal had actually taken place. The scope of investigation covered the years 2007 to 2009, 2012 and 2013.

(2)  A vast majority of the bills of lading which formed the subject of investigation were issued by Non Vessel Owning Common Carriers (“NVOCC”), ie companies which do not own or operate the vessel but assume the responsibility of the carriage of the cargo through the issuance of a NVOCC bill of lading.

(3)  The expert checked, verified and commented on a total of 1,042 bills of lading, broken down into 4 categories:

(a)  Category 1: Bills of lading for the period between December 2012 and May 2013 (“the 2013 Bills of Lading”), comprising 30 NOCC bills of lading;

(b)  Category 2: Bills of lading for the 6 months ended on 31 December 2012 (“the 2012 Bills of Lading”), comprising 343 NOCC bills of lading;

(c)  Category 3: Bills of lading in relation to Lane Tone USA (“the Lane Tone Bills of Lading”), comprising 22 NOCC bills of lading; and

(d)  Category 4: Bills of lading for the period between 2007 to 2009 (“the 2007-2009 Bills of Lading”), comprising 647 NOCC bills of lading.

146.  After examining the 1,042 bills of lading, the expert is of the view that the vast majority of them (71.50%) do not represent a genuine shipment, and a further 9.60% are considered unlikely to represent a genuine shipment.

147.  The expert has detailed his methodology and analyses in his report. The following are the major reasons as to why a bill of lading purportedly representing a transaction of Central Steel would be regarded as not representing or unlikely to represent a genuine shipment:

(1)  Non-compliance with the ISO 6346 container numbering system: it is not common practice for containers on ocean-going international voyages to be numbered differently from ISO 6346.

(2)  No corresponding master bill of lading issued by the shipping company: every NVOCC bill of lading is supposed to have a corresponding master bill of lading with identical details of the name of the vessel, voyage number, container number(s), port of loading and discharge evidencing the physical movement of the goods.  Such master bill of lading would have been required if the physical carrier had actually transported the containers.

(3)  Significant discrepancies between the master bill of lading (obtained by the SFC from the shipping company) and the NVOCC bill of lading: eg the ports of loading or discharge are geographically in a different area (which made it impossible for the container to be loaded at a particular port in time as described on the NVOCC bill of lading), or different descriptions of cargoes.

(4)  NVOCC’s contact details missing from the bill of lading: this is unusual because the consignee or notify party of the shipment would not know how to contact the carrier or whom to contact so as to have the cargo delivered to them at the port of discharge or if they have a claim for loss or partial loss of the cargo.

(5)  Goods received by consignees under the master bill of lading or further processed by them at the end of the sea passage: this would mean the bill of lading operation had come to an end and the different shippers and consignees mentioned on the NVOCC bill of lading could have no role in the shipment.

(6)  Confirmation from the physical carrier, shipper and/or consignee on the master bill of lading regarding the actual commercial transaction and shipment (which are different from those contemplated on the NVOCC bill of lading), or confirmation from the physical carrier that it had no relationship with the NVOCC enabling it to issue the NVOCC bill of lading or no knowledge of the NVOCC.

(7)  The master bill of lading being “Non Negotiable Unless Consigned to Order”: where the shipment is not consigned to order and the master bill of lading has a named non-NVOCC shipper and consignee, the physical carrier would deliver the container to the named consignee, and there would be no role for the NVOCC in the shipment.

(8)  No record of the vessel (named under the NVOCC bill of lading) existing or operating at the relevant time.

(9)  At least one container on each master of billing was loaded with cargoes other than metal/scrap.

148.  Mukundan’s evidence is not challenged by Lai at all.  I accept and agree with the analysis done by the expert.  In my judgment, the expert has cogently demonstrated that a large proportion of the trading activities supposedly carried out by the Group are fictitious.

149.  The expert finds that all the Lane Tone Bills of Lading (ie 100%) are fictitious.  Ps submit that this finding, coupled with the findings by Morrison as set out in the above, provides a strong basis to infer that all of the bills of lading relevant to the other purported suppliers and purported customers are also fictitious.  I agree and accept the submissions made by Ps.

H3.4  Other matters specific to Lane Tone USA / Jason Metal / Cheung Fat

150.  Ps refer to the the following additional matters which support that the transactions which Central Steel purported entered into with its top 3 suppliers (ie Lane Tone USA, Jason Metal and Cheung Fat) between 2007 to 2009 are fictitious.

151.  In relation to Lane Tone USA, there is affirmation evidence from the former VP-Officer of that company, Ms Zhao Yuping (also known as Happy Zhao), that[70]:

(1)  For the 3 years from 2007 to 2009, Lane Tone USA only had 17 direct sale transactions with Central Steel. Lane Tone USA had no other direct sale transactions with China Metal, including all of its subsidiaries and associate companies, during that period.

(2)  During that period, the aggregate value of all the direct sale transactions between Lane Tone USA and Central Steel amounted to approximately US$2.7 million only.

(3)  In other words, over 99% of the purported purchases recorded in the Day Books (and which alleged values were also consistent with those recorded in the Prospectus and the 2009 Annual Report) are not verified by Lane Tone USA. It is clear that those purported transactions are not genuine.

152.  In relation to Jason Metal, according to the evidence given by Qiu[71], a former officer of Jason Metal, that:

(1)  From 2004 to 2007, Jason Metal only sourced 30,000 to 40,000 tonnes of steel priced at approximately US$250 to US$300 per ton (worth around US$7.5 million to US$12 million in total).

(2)  In 2008, Jason Metal only sourced 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes of metals (worth around US$5 million to US$9 million in total).

(3)  From 2009 to 2011, Jason Metal did not source any scrap metal at all.

(4)  The transaction records between Jason Metal and Central Steel for the years 2007 to 2009 disclosed by China Metal to the SFC (which have since been disclosed to the Liquidators) are not the true business records.

(5)  Qiu was instructed by Chun to sign documents purportedly to confirm, on behalf of Jason Metal and Lane Tone USA respectively, under different names (neither of which was his real name), purchase orders allegedly placed by Central Steel with those entities to address questions raised by China Metal’s auditors and the SFC.

(6)  Jason Metal was closed down in 2011 by Chun because it was being investigated by the SFC.

153.  In view of the evidence given by Qiu, Jason Metal could not have sold any material amount of scrap metals to Central Steel as recorded in the Day Books.  It is clear that significant purported purchases made by Central Steel from Jason Metal are not genuine business transactions.

154.  In relation to Cheung Fat, it has to be borne in mind the close connection between Cheung Fat on the one hand and Chun, Lai and the Group on the other.  The close connection is shown by the following:

(1)  the incorporation expenses of Cheung Fat were funded by a company called Worldwide Int’l Inspection Ltd, of which Lai was the sole shareholder and director;

(2)  Cheung Fat's office telephone number, as shown in the account opening documents of its Bank of East Asia accounts, was a number subscribed by Asia Steel (HK) Ltd, a subsidiary of China Metal; and

(3)  Mr Xie Baixing, who was an employee of the Group during the material time, was the sole signatory or at least one of the two signatories of Cheung Fat’s bank accounts at the material times.

155.  In my judgment, all the aforesaid further reinforce the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of the transactions entered into by Central Steel with its purported top suppliers are fictitious, such that the figures recorded in the Day Books during this period have been substantially inflated and cannot be reliable.

H4.    2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions

H4.1  Central Steel’s financial position as recorded

156.  In the draft reports and consolidated financial statements of the Group for the financial year ended on 31 December 2012, the Group claimed to have, on a consolidated basis:

(1)  a gross profit of HK$2.34 billion and an overall net profit of HK$1.768 billion;

(2)  cash and bank balances of HK$1.65 billion; and

(3)  current liabilities of HK$21.2 billion and current assets of HK$27.9 billion.

157.  According to the Day Books:

(1)     The top 3 suppliers of Central Steel for 2012 were Cheung Fat, Pacific Metal Corp Recycle Corp (D10) (“Pacific Metal Corp”) and Smith Steel Corp (“Smith Steel”), while the top 3 customers were Hoi Cheung Metal Recycling Limited (D8) (“Hoi Cheung”), Chak Kwan Metal Recycling Ltd (D9) (“Chak Kwan”), and Metallurgical.  Details are shown in the table below:

No
Related Supplier
Related Customer
1
Pacific Metal Corp
(HK$4,274 million)
Metallurgical
(HK$2,240million)
2
Cheung Fat
(HK$3,063 million)
Hoi Cheung
(HK$2,140 million)
3
Smith Steel
(HK$772 million)
Chak Kwan
(HK$2,168 million)
4
-
Qing Yuan Xinxin
(HK$1,274 million)
Total
HK$8,109 million
HK$7,823 million

(2)     The transactions between Central Steel and these 6 purported top customers and top suppliers were mostly in a “single-to-single” or “paired-up” pattern, in that all the goods sourced from a particular top supplier were recorded to have been sold to a designated top customer, as set out in the following table:

Top supplier of Central Steel
Top customer of Central Steel
No. of transactions
Total value
US$
Cheung Fat
Hoi Cheung
277
1,032,783,548
Pacific Metal Corp
Chak Kwan
244
910,461,402
Smith Steel
Metallurgical
230
856,854,520

(3)     For the reasons set out below, all or nearly all of the transactions identified above table are fictitious transactions.

H4.2  Morrison Expert Report: Funds flow analysis

158.  Morrison has conducted forensic accounting analysis of the fund flows between Central Steel and its purported suppliers and purported customers in 2012.  The expert discovered the following in his analysis:

(1)  funds sourced from the bank accounts of Central Steel were first transferred to the bank accounts of its 3 purported top suppliers for 2012, namely: (a) Cheung Fat; (b) Pacific Metal Corp; and (c) Smith Steel (supposedly for payment of purchase of scrap metal from these purported suppliers);

(2)  a substantial amount of these funds was then, through a further entity called New Metal Recycle Corp (“New Metal”), transferred to the bank accounts of (a) Hoi Cheung; (b) Chak Kwan; (c) Metallurgical; and (d) Qing Yuan Xinxin Metal Recycling Ltd (“Qing Yuan Xinxin”), despite there being no apparent commercial dealings between these purported suppliers and purported customers; and

(3)  a substantial amount of those funds was then circulated from the above purported customers’ bank accounts back to the bank accounts of Central Steel (supposedly for sale of scrap metal to these purported customers).

159.  The expert says that:

(1)  According to its payment vouchers and the underlying supporting documents, Central Steel made 431 payments totaling US$2,397,822,505.70 to Cheung Fat, Pacific Metal Corp and Smith Steel during the 6-month period ended 31.12.2012.

(2)  419 payments totaling US$2,380,779,438.57 were then transferred by Cheung Fat, Pacific Metal Corp and Smith Steel to New Metal. Of this amount, US$2,373,474,101.45 was found to be sourced from Central Steel.

(3)  Thereafter, 374 payments totaling US$2,352,965,392.76 were then transferred by New Metal to Metallurgical, Hoi Cheung, Chak Kwan and Qing Yuan Xinxin.

(4)  In the end, funds totaling US$2,338,130,866.43 were circulated back to Central Steel, constituting 97.51% of the funds originally paid out of Central Steel (ie US$2,397,822,505.70). The entire round robin circulation was complete within a timeframe of 12 days.

(5)  The aforesaid funds flow circulation transaction for the 6 months ended on 31 December 2012 is illustrated in the diagram below[72]:

160.  The expert concludes that circular funds flow transactions among the bank accounts of Central Steel, the purported suppliers, New Metal and the purported customers for 2012 are unusual and appear to lack commercial substance.  He further opines that in the absence of satisfactory evidence or information to the contrary, the circular funds flow transactions were likely fictitious, lacking bona fide commercial substance, and hence fraudulent.

161.  I agree and accept the opinion evidence given by Morrison.  In my judgment, Morrison’s evidence supports the conclusion that the purchases and sales by Central Steel with its top purported suppliers and top purported customers in 2012 are not genuine but fictitious transactions.

H4.3  Mukundan Expert Report: Analysis of bills of lading

162.  Mukundan’s analysis in relation to the 2013 bills of lading and my finding concerning the bills of lading have been set out in section H3.3 above.

H4.4  Other matters

163.  In respect of January 2013 up to May 2013, there is further evidence showing that the bills of lading of Central Steel are false and the underlying transactions could not be genuine:

(1)  For the period from 31 December 2012 to May 2013, no financial results of China Metal or Central Steel are available. However, the SFC located 30 NVOCC bills of lading of Central Steel during that period, which related to about 172 containers, all of which were said to involve Cheung Fat or Pacific Metal Corp.

(2)  According to Orient Overseas (International) Ltd (“OOCL”), which owns or charters many of the containers specified in those 30 bills of lading, those containers were in fact carried under different master bills of lading at the material times.  That means many of the alleged containers recorded in the 30 bills of lading were in fact shipped under different shipments during the times and could not possibly have been in use under the 30 bills of lading associated with the alleged transactions of Central Steel.

(3)  Further, the shippers and consignees identified in the master bills of lading issued by OOCL confirmed that the relevant containers were in fact shipped under different NVOCC bills of lading (ie not the ones found in the records of Central Steel).

(4)  Consignees of the goods set out in those NVOCC bills of lading also confirmed that those goods were delivered to their local customers after the containers arrived at the port of discharge, and the vast majority of them were further processed before selling to local buyers. Thus, it would not have been possible for any on-sale of the entire containers of goods to the purported shippers as suggested in the relevant NVOCC bills of lading.

164.  In the course of the Liquidators’ enquiries on the bills of lading as described above, OneSteel Recycling Hong Kong Limited (“OneSteel”), the shipper of a number of master bills of lading, confirmed that it did not have any business relationship with Central Steel in 2011 or 2012.  This is inconsistent with the breakdown of the purchase transactions between Central Steel and its purported suppliers for each of the financial years between 2006 and the 9 months ended 30 September 2012 prepared by Deloitte, in which OneSteel was said to be a supplier of Central Steel for 2011 and 2012, with total purchases of MOP 9,259,151.

165.  The above further shows that the transactions recorded in Central Steel’s records of its business transactions and turnover for 2012-2013 could not possibly be genuine or reliable.

H5.    Close Connections Between Related Parties and Chun/Lai

166.  As shown in Annex 2, that each of D3 to D10 were controlled by Chun and/or Lai, and used for the purpose of the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme. Further, of the “top” 5 suppliers and customers of Central Steel between 2007 and 2012, all of them were connected in some way to Chun and/or Lai, and accounted for over 78% of the sales transactions (totalling HK$58.1 billion in value) and over 76% of the purchase transactions (totalling HK$51.1 billion in value) of Central Steel during this period.

167.  In respect of Lane Tone HK, Cheung Fat, Qi Le and Metallurgical, there is evidence showing that various individuals (who were not their account signatories, directors, shareholders or owners or employees but were closely associated with China Metal or Central Steel or Chun/Lai) assisted them in repeatedly arranging physical deliveries of banking and other documents on behalf of these entities to their banks. Those individuals are as follows:

BankAccount No.Delivery by
Transaction
Wing Hang Bank418369-168
(022795-130)
Chan Kin Kau Johnny
1
Simon Chan
89
Cheng Hiu Fan
159
Cheng Hoi Bun
1
Lu Baoyu
12
Wing Hang Bank626810-160Cheng Hiu Fan
59
Xie Baixing
17
Wing Hang Bank196722-130 Cheng Hiu Fan
1
Wing Hang Bank311082-168
(196722-130)
Cheng Hiu Fan
258
Ho Mei Fong Joyce
2
Lu Baoyu
2
Xie Baixing
85
Zhou Renshan
1
Wing Hang Bank313398-101 Cheng Hiu Fan
13
Bank of East Asia015-51620016892 Cheng Hiu Fan
1
Bank of East Asia015-51610262326 Cheng Hiu Fan
1
Bank of East Asia015-51640056115 Cheng Hiu Fan
10

168.  Of the individuals identified in above:

(1)  Mr Cheng Hiu Fan had been employed by the Group as an office assistant/messenger since 2006, whose scope of work duties included delivery of documents and making payments at banks.

(2)  Ms Lu Baoyu, also known as “Ar Yuk” (阿玉):

(a)  was a staff member of the Group stationed in Guangzhou; and

(b)  as confirmed by Simon Chan, gave instructions to him in relation to the incorporation of Hoi Cheung, Chak Kwan and other companies and their related matters.

(3)  Mr Xie Baixing:

(a)  has worked at the operating site of Huan Bao at least during the period between August 2008 and July 2011;

(b)  was an employee of Guangzhou Jitong at least in 2011 and until February 2012; and

(c)  sole signatory of Cheung Fat and Metallurgical.

(4)  Mr Zhou Rezhan:

(a) has been an employee of the Group since 2001;

(b) was the Vice General Manager of Wuhan Yagang Metal Co Ltd, one of the PRC Subsidiaries; and

(c) sole signatory of Lane Tone HK.

H6.    Financial Position of Central Steel in FY2010 and FY2011

169.  For the financial position of Central Steel in FY2010 and FY2011, Ps submit that:

(1)  the forensic evidence and findings of Morrison and Mukundan have clearly shown the existence and prevalence of fraud with respect to the transactions and revenue of Central Steel between 2007 and 2009 and 2012 and 2013;

(2)  the evidence also shows how the purported suppliers and customers of Central Steel (in particular D3 to D10) were not genuine suppliers and customers but were controlled or closely associated with Chun and/or Lai and used for the purpose of the Fictitious Transactions;

(3)  in FY2010 and FY2011, (a) the reported revenue and profits of the Group continued to increase; and (b) the reported profits were solely attributable to Central Steel’s profits (since the contribution by Central Steel’s profits were near or over 100%); and

(4)  for FY2010 and FY2011, the purported suppliers and customers constituted the bulk of the revenue reportedly earned by Central Steel from its top 5 suppliers (in FY2010 it was HK$7,928 million ie 91%; and in FY2011 it was HK$15,026 million ie 96.5%).

170.  Ps submits that by reason of the aforesaid, there is a strong case to infer that the fictitious transactions financed by the round robin circulation of funds were being operated in the same manner as the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme for FY2010 and FY2011.

171.  Lai, in her cross-examination of Morrison and in her oral evidence, raised for the first time that given no fund flow analysis had been performed for 2010 and 2011, it should be inferred that the transactions in those years could be genuine.  This is also a point made by Lai in her final submissions.

172.  In my judgment, this point is not open to Lai. In the trial, Borrelli is the first witness giving evidence.  As to why no investigation as to the fund flow in 2010 and 2011 was done, this is a factual question which ought to have been addressed to Borrelli so that Ps would have a proper opportunity to explain.  Lai has failed to do so.  Bearing the rule in Browne v Dunn in mind, I am of the view that Lai could not be allowed to rely on the absence of fund flow analysis for 2010 and 2011 as a point against Ps. That would be unfair to Ps if Lai is allowed to do so.

173.  In my judgment, given the matters as set out in [169] above, there is evidence before the court in support of Ps’ contention that the fictitious transactions financed by the Round Robin Scheme continued in FY 2010 and FY 2011.  If Lai is trying to put forward a positive case and argue that the transactions in 2010 and 2011 are genuine, Lai has to raise the same in her pleading and adduce evidence to prove her case.  However, none of these has been done by Lai.

174.  I accept Ps’ case and hold that the fictitious transactions financed by the round robin circulation of funds were being operated in the same manner as the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme for FY2010 and FY2011.

H7.    True Financial Position of the Group 2009-2012

175.  As a result of the Fictitious Transactions, the true financial position of the Group (on consolidated basis) between 2009 and 2012 was such that it did not have any or any sufficient distributable profits as to allow China Metal to have declared and paid the Dividends in FY2009, FY 2010 and FY2011.

176.  The consolidated income statements and consolidated balance sheet of the Group for FY2009 to FY2012, as per the audited and unaudited financial statements of China Metal and the Group, are set out below:

Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income

HK$'000
31 December 2009
31 December 2010
31 December 2011
31 December 2012
(audited)
(audited)
(audited)
(unaudited)
Revenue
9,063,175
22,508,182
52,140,520
85,829,413
Costs of sales
(8,273,221)
(21,272,828)
(50,057,188)
(83,494,179)
Gross profit
789,954
1,235,354
2,083,332
2,335,234
Other income
7,973
65,655
109,584
57,743
Distribution and selling expenses
(6,559)
(8,597)
(49,406)
(58,215)
Administrative expenses
(83,548)
(182,832)
(257,382)
(252,731)
Other expenses
(13,365)
-
-
-
Net (loss) gain on derivative financial instruments
(72,336)
(77,534)
338,123
265,340
Finance costs
(120,425)
(95,289)
(294,652)
(460,773)
Share of results of an associate
1,941
(1,534)
(5,765)
(167)
Gain on disposal of a subsidiary
-
9,278
198
-
Profit before taxation
503,635
944,501
1,924,032
1,886,431
Income tax expenses
(24,950)
(52,598)
(92,189)
(117,559)
Profit for the year
478,685
891,903
1,831,843
1,768,872

 

Consolidated Statements of Financial Position

HK$'000
31 December 2009
31 December 2010
31 December 2011
31 December 2012
 
audited
audited
audited
unaudited
Non-current assets
 
 
 
 
Property, plant and equipment
88,989
426,817
454,205
595,383
Investment properties
1,731
1,638
-
-
Prepaid lease payments – non current portion
94,529
194,631
199,938
330,359
Interest in an associate
97,113
96,625
304,586
304,757
Deposits paid for acquisition of property, plant and equipment
55,130
18,281
108,266
2,878
Deposits paid for land use rights
45,653
129,072
137,026
123,142
Fixed deposits
-
-
60,976
61,350
 
383,145
867,064
1,264,997
1,417,869
Current assets
 
 
 
 
Inventories
727,538
1,747,136
2,640,496
4,629,917
Trade and other receivables and deposits
2,524,325
7,347,811
8,042,864
16,067,432
Bill receivable
248,067
717,160
2,303,746
2,077,360
Prepaid lease payments - current portion
3,460
9,733
10,243
13,444
Deposit paid to a related party
115
120
264
293
Amount due from a related party
-
-
-
31
Amount due from an associate
-
-
36,585
21,806
Derivative financial instruments
36,940
66,745
94,480
86,659
Taxation recoverable
-
3,888
3,342
4,580
Pledged bank deposits
210,376
1,630,541
1,334,043
2,403,787
Restricted bank deposits
62,284
251,972
220,635
948,028
Fixed deposits
 
 
109,817
-
Bank balances and cash
554,417
1,088,536
1,518,945
1,651,417
 
4,367,522
12,863,642
16,315,460
27,904,754
Current liabilities
 
 
 
 
Trade and other payables
981,796
4,171,503
2,841,311
8,504,010
Discounted bills
139,810
1,109,965
2,418,230
3,672,008
Amount due to a non-controlling shareholder of a subsidiary
-
1,960
23,911
1,960
Amount due to the Holding Company
 
 
 
444
Amount due to associates
-
-
28,080
118,264
Derivative financial instruments
62,144
320,588
986,593
1,234,895
Bank borrowings - due with one year
451,576
134,837
86,663
124,660
Secured guaranteed senior notes
-
2,960,962
4,300,320
7,407,684
Taxation payable
25,072
49,578
68,222
158,811
 
1,660,398
8,749,393
10,753,330
21,222,736
Non-current liabilities
 
 
 
 
Bank borrowings - due after one year
-
352,941
365,854
-
Other long term payable
454
235
-
-
 
454
353,176
365,854
-
Net Current Assets
2,707,124
4,114,249
5,562,130
6,682,018
Net Assets
3,089,815
4,628,137
6,461,273
8,099,887

177.  As can be seen from the above, between 2009 and 2012, the “Trade and other receivables and deposits” represented 46% to 55% of the total assets of the Group.  The Liquidators’ analyses show that 71% to 82% of the “Trade and other receivables and deposits” were purported accounts receivable from Central Steel’s purported customers in the Southern China operations payable to Central Steel.

178.  As can be seen from [15] above, Central Steel’s profit generated from the sales with external parties in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 was greater than the Group’s consolidated profit, indicating that the rest of the Group (in aggregate) was loss-making and that the financial position of the Group was heavily reliant on the (fictitious) performance of Central Steel.

179.  The Liquidators have conducted an analysis of deducting the revenue and costs of sales generated by the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions and 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions from the consolidated financial statements of China Metal. The summary tables of China Metal’s consolidated financial position and consolidated profit and loss accounts for the period from FY2009 to FY2012 after excluding the Fictitious Transactions are as follows:

Adjusted Consolidated Financial Position of China Metal

After Deducting Fictitious Transactions

Consolidated Assets and Liabilities
31 December 2009
31 December 2009
31 December 2010
31 December 2010
31 December 2011
31 December 2011
31 December 2012
31 December 2012
(HK$'000)
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Unaudited
Unaudited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Total non-current assets
383,145
383,145
867,064
867,064
1,264,997
1,264,996
1,417,869
1,417,869
Current assets
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade receivables
2,301,571
448,348
6,303,704
269,450
6,909,521
480,834
14,440,403
2,965,633
Other receivables, deposits and prepayment
222,752
222,752
1,044,107
1,035,836
1,133,340
1,133,136
1,627,029
1,626,825
Bank balances and cash
554,417
550,070
1,088,536
1,088,536
1,518,945
1,518,945
1,563,012
1,563,012
Other current assets
1,288,782
1,276,385
4,427,295
4,427,295
6,753,654
6,753,654
10,252,179
10,252,179
Total current assets
4,367,522
2,497,554
12,863,642
6,821,117
16,315,460
9,886,569
27,882,623
16,407,649
Total assets
4,750,667
2,880,699
13,730,706
7,688,181
17,580,457
11,151,565
29,300,492
17,825,518
Current liabilities
Trade payable
(889,939)
(103,404)
(3,761,774)
(70,975)
(2,441,457)
(572,783)
(7,429,721)
(3,029,858)
Other payables and accrued charges
(91,860)
(91,860)
(409,729)
(409,729)
(399,854)
(399,854)
(1,074,289)
(1,074,114)
Bank borrowings – within 1 year
(451,576)
(450,257)
(2,960,962)
(2,960,962)
(4,300,320)
(4,140,735)
(7,407,684)
(7,368,703)
Other current liabilities
(227,023)
(227,023)
(1,616,928)
(1,616,928)
(3,611,699)
(3,611,699)
(5,288,914)
(5,288,914)
Total current liabilities
(1,660,398)
(872,544)
(8,749,393)
(5,058,594)
(10,753,330)
(8,725,071)
(21,200,608)
(16,761,589)
Net current assets (liabilities)
2,707,124
1,625,010
4,114,249
1,762,523
5,562,130
1,161,499
6,682,015
(353,941)
Net assets
3,090,269
2,008,155
4,981,313
2,629,587
6,827,127
2,426,495
8,099,884
1,063,928

 

Adjusted Consolidated Profit and Loss Position of China Metal

After Deducting Fictitious Transactions

Consolidated Profit and Loss
31 December 2009
31 December 2009
31 December 2010
31 December 2010
31 December 2011
31 December 2011
31 December 2012
31 December 2012
(HK$'000)
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Audited
Audited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Unaudited
Unaudited and Excluding Fictitious Transactions
Turnover
9,063,175
4,361,176
22,508,182
12,925,601
52,140,520
35,883,492
85,829,413
61,909,167
Cost of sales
(8,273,221)
(3,909,952)
(21,272,828)
(12,742,338)
(50,057,188)
(35,470,531)
(83,494,179)
(62,122,988)
Gross profit/(loss)
789,954
451,225
1,235,354
183,264
2,083,332
412,961
2,335,234
(213,821)
Other income
7,972
7,972
74,933
74,933
109,782
109,782
57,743
57,743
Distribution cost
(6,559)
(6,559)
(8,597)
(8,597)
(49,406)
(49,406)
(58,215)
(58,215)
Administrative expenses
(96,913)
(96,913)
(182,831)
(182,831)
(257,382)
(257,382)
(252,731)
(252,731)
Gain on disposal of derivatives financial instrument
(47,131)
(47,131)
(34,909)
(34,909)
310,453
310,453
303,341
303,341
Loss on changes in fair value of derivatives
(25,204)
(25,204)
(42,625)
(42,625)
27,670
27,670
(38,001)
(38,001)
Share of results of associates
1,941
1,941
(1,534)
(1,534)
(5,765)
(5,765)
(167)
(167)
Finance cost
(120,425)
(120,425)
(95,289)
(95,289)
(253,901)
(253,901)
(460,773)
(460,773)
Profit/(loss) before tax
503,635
164,906
944,502
(107,588)
1,964,783
294,412
1,886,431
(662,624)
Taxation
(24,950)
(24,950)
(52,598)
(52,598)
(92,189)
(92,189)
(117,559)
(117,559)
Profit/(loss) after tax
478,685
139,956
891,904
(160,186)
1,872,594
202,223
1,768,872
(780,183)

180.  After excluding the Fictitious Transactions:

(1)  the Group’s gross profit for FY2009 to FY2011 decrease substantially between 43% to 80% and has become gross loss of HK$213.8 million for FY2012;

(2)  the Group’s profit before tax for FY2009 and FY2011 decrease substantially by 67% and 85% respectively and has become loss before tax of HK$107.6 million and HK$662.6 million for FY2010 and FY2012 respectively; and

(3)  The Group’s profit after tax for FY2009 and FY2011 decreased substantially by 71% and 89% respectively and has become loss after tax of HK$160.2 million and HK$780.2 million for FY2010 and FY2012 respectively.

181.  The Liquidators have explained that the adjusted financial statements set out above has not taken into account the other fraudulent schemes involving the subsidiaries of the Group in Mainland China due to the limited books and records available to the Liquidators and the uncooperative stance of the management and officers of the Mainland Chinese subsidiaries.

182.  Based upon their investigations, the Liquidators concluded that, given the true financial position of the Group, China Metal would never have been in any position to declare dividends as it purported to do for FY2009 to FY2011.  In particular,

(1)  the declaration of Dividends was possible only because the financial position of the Group was artificially inflated by the Fictitious Transactions; and

(2)  in order to pay for the operating expenses and dividends of China Metal which it did not have the cashflow or assets to support given the true financial position, very substantial bank loans had been taken out by China Metal.

183.  Morrison has separately undertaken an analysis to determine the extent of the overstatement of revenue and gross profit of China Metal for the FY2007 to FY2009 and FY2012.  Morrison estimates that:

(1)  For FY 2007, there was an overstatement of revenue in the range of 34%-45% and an overstatement of gross profit in the range of 35%-45%.

(2)  For FY 2008, there was an overstatement of revenue in the range of 36%-38% and an overstatement of gross profit in the range of 61%-64%.

(3)  For FY 2009, there was an overstatement of revenue in the range of 33%-56% and an overstatement of gross profit in the range of 58%-90%.

(4)  For FY 2012, there was an overstatement of revenue of approximately 12% and an overstatement of gross profit of approximately 49%.

184.  In calculating the figures for FY2009, Morrison did not have information for those transactions which more accurately should be regarded as 2009 sales but which were settled by China Metal funds in 2010. Hence, he considers that the amount of alleged overstatement of fictitious sales revenue (and hence gross profit) for FY2009 is likely to be understated.  Similarly, as he did not have information regarding transactions which more accurately should be regarded as 2012 sales but which were settled by China Metal funds in 2013, Morrison considers that the amount of alleged fictitious sales revenue (and hence gross profit) for FY2012 is also likely to be understated.

185.  Morrison has separately reviewed the Liquidators’ adjusted consolidated financial results of China Metal for FY2009-FY2012, as set out above.  Although the Liquidators and Morrison adopted different methodologies, Morrison is of the view that the amount of fictitious transactions identified by the Liquidators and the amount of fictitious transactions estimated by him are reasonably similar.  The expert therefore considers that the methodology adopted by the Liquidators is reasonable and acceptable in the circumstances.

186.  Morrison has further analysed whether, on the basis of the Liquidators’ adjusted financial statements, China Metal had sufficient retained profits for FY2009 to FY2011 for the Dividends to be declared.  Morrison concludes that:

(1)  For FY2009, the adjusted profit attributable to owners of China Metal was HK$139,692,000, which was sufficient for the FY2009 Dividend of HK$125,400,000. However, the accumulated loss as at 31 December 2009 is estimated to be HK$290.2 million. In practice, it would be unlikely for a company with substantial accumulated losses to declare dividends. Moreover, in the event that it became known that there had been significant fictitious transactions and fraud, as a result of which the financial results of China Metal and the Group had been materially overstated, there would be immediate demands for repayment of bank loans, particularly if the banks considered a company to be financially unsound or to have liquidity problems.

(2)  For FY2010, the accumulated loss carried forward from 2009 is estimated to be HK$229,228,000 and the adjusted results for 2010 attributable to shareholders of China Metal was a net loss after tax of HK$165,529,000. Therefore, China Metal did not have sufficient profits or reserves to declare the FY2010 Dividend of HK$182,303,000.

(3)  For FY2011, the accumulated loss carried forward from 2010 is estimated to be HK$581,157,000 and the adjusted results for 2011 attributable to shareholders of China Metal was a profit after tax of HK$191,568,000. Therefore, China Metal did not have sufficient profits or reserves to declare the FY2011 Dividend of HK$365,771,000.

187.  In my judgment, Ps have proved that had the Fictitious Transactions not been carried out and the true financial position of the Group been properly reflected in the audited accounts for the relevant years, for FY2009 to FY2011, China Metal would either not have made a profit, or would not have made profits sufficient to justify declaring and paying the Dividends.

I.     THE JUNE/JULY 2013 PAYMENTS

188.  One of Ps’ claims is various substantial amounts paid from Central Steel’s bank accounts to Cheung Fat (D5) and Pacific Metal HK (D10) shortly before the appointment of the PLs in 2013.

190.  First, 12 payments totalling approximately HK$1.215 billion were made from Central Steel’s bank accounts to Cheung Fat’s 2 bank accounts maintained with Bank of China, Guangzhou Branch (“BoC Guangzhou”):


DateCentral Steel
Bank Account
Amount[73]
13 June 2013中國銀行—廣州開發區分行
RMB130,218,382.28
(HK$163,515,222.63)
25 June 2013 中國銀行—廣州開發區分行
RMB23,000,000.00
(HK$28,881,100.00)
2 July 2013 中國銀行—廣州開發區分行
RMB162,500,000.00
(HK$204,051,250.00)
4 July 2013Deutsche Bank
RMB102,200,000.00
(HK$128,332,540.00)
9 July 2013Standard Chartered
USD1,827,068.98
(HK$14,173,158.74)
15 July 2013 Deutsche Bank
USD2,700,000.00
(HK$20,944,764.00)
15 July 2013 Deutsche Bank
RMB134,500,000.00
(HK$168,891,650.00)
15 July 2013 Standard Chartered
USD4,400,000.00
(HK$34,132,208.00)
15 July 2013 Standard Chartered
RMB102,100,000.00
(HK$128,206,970.00)
23 July 2013 Standard Chartered
RMB98,000,000.00
(HK$123,058,600.00)
26 July 2013 Deutsche Bank
RMB70,000,000.00
(HK$87,899,000.00)
29 July 2013 Standard Chartered
RMB90,000,000.00
(HK$113,013,000.00)
 
Total:
HK$1,215,099,463.37

191.  Second, 11 payments totalling approximately HK$745.78 million were made from Central Steel’s bank accounts to Pacific Metal HK’s bank accounts maintained with ICBC Guangzhou Huangpu District Branch and with BoC Guangzhou:



DateCentral Steel
Bank Account
Amount[74]
01.07.2013中國銀行—廣州開發區分行
(NRA653560693533)
RMB65,000,000.00
(HK$81,620,500.00)
04.07.2013Standard Chartered
(44717843516)
RMB83,988,209.74
(HK$105,463,994.97)
05.07.2013Deutsche Bank
(0019596-05-0)
USD1,700,000.00
(HK$13,187,444.00)
08.07.2013 Deutsche Bank
(0019596-05-0)
USD2,600,000.00
(HK$20,169,032.00)
08.07.2013Deutsche Bank
(0019596-04-8)
RMB78,000,000.00
(HK$97,944,600.00)
10.07.2013 Standard Chartered
(44717843516)
RMB49,000,000.00
(HK$61,529,300.00)
11.07.2013 中國銀行—廣州開發區分行
(NRA653560693533)
RMB101,893,000.00
(HK$127,947,040.10)
15.07.2013 Deutsche Bank
(0019596-05-0)
USD5,500,000.00
(HK$42,665,260.00)
18.07.2013 Standard Chartered
(44717843516)
RMB44,000,000.00
(HK$55,250,800.00)
18.07.2013 Standard Chartered
(44717843516)
RMB36,500,000.00
(HK$45,833,050.00)
19.07.2013 Deutsche Bank
(0019596-04-8)
RMB75,000,000.00
(HK$94,177,500.00)
 
Total:
HK$745,788,521.07

192.  There is clear evidence showing that Chun authorised the remittance of these sums from Central Steel’s bank account to the respective bank accounts of Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK.  Save in relation to the payments made from Central Steels account maintained with中國銀行—廣州開發區分行, Chun’s signature appeared on each one of the remittance application forms that the Liquidators were able to locate.  As to the payments from Central Steels account maintained with中國銀行—廣州開發區分行, Chun was the sole authorised bank signatory of the account at the material times. 

193.  There is no document and no evidence of any underlying transaction in support of these transfers. No defendant in these proceedings has provided any plausible explanation, justification or documents in support of such transfers.

194.  Shortly after receipt of the June/July 2013 Payments, Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK transferred some HK$1.82 billion to 5 entities (“Further Recipients”), including 3 of the defendants in these proceedings and a company closely connected to Chun.

Further Recipients
Amount (HK$)
Chak Kwan
204,032,414.50
Hoi Cheung
864,614,001.86
Metallurgical
565,249,670.50
Qing Yuan Xinxin
119,159,651.50
Hong Kong Dashine Investment Company Ltd (“HK Dashine”)
71,159,337.47
Total
1,824,215,075.83

195.  According to the Liquidators’ analysis of the bank statements of the Further Recipients, during June and July 2013:

(1)  The majority, if not all, of the relevant bank accounts of Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK did not contain sufficient funds to make the onward transfers to the Further Recipients without the prior receipt of the June/July 2013 Payments from Central Steel.

(2)  No material transaction is recorded in these bank accounts after 30 July 2013.

(3)  The majority of the bank accounts of Cheung Fat and Pacific Metal HK only have minimal balances (not exceeding HK$200,000) after 30 July 2013.

196.  In my judgment, in respect of Chak Kwan, Hoi Cheung HK, Metallurgical and Qing Yuan Xinxin, who were all closely connected with Chun, there is an irresistible inference that the transfers were a deliberate act on Chun’s part to dissipate very substantial amounts belonging to Central Steel to these entities which were at all material times controlled by Chun or his associates.

J.     MY FACTUAL FINDINGS

197.  For the reasons given in this judgment, I make the following factual findings:

(1)  the corporate entities identified in Annex 2, including in particular the corporate defendants in this action, were controlled by Chun and Lai for the purpose of carrying out the transactions which are the subject matter of these proceedings;

(2)  the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions as pleaded in Ps’ case are not genuine and fictitious, and are financed by the Round Robin Scheme;

(3)  the 2012-2013 Fictitious Transactions as pleaded in Ps’ case are not genuine and fictitious, and are financed by the Round Robin Scheme;

(4)  given the prevalence of the Fictitious Transactions and the financial impact arising therefrom, the vast majority (if not all) of the transactions and hence revenue of Central Steel for FY 2010 and FY 2011 are also fictitious;

(5)  the true financial position of the Group for FY 2009, FY 2010 and FY 2011, had the fact and extent of the fictitious transactions been properly reflected, was such that China Metal could not have been in a position to declare the Dividends;

(6)  there was no transaction or commercial justification for any of the June/July 2013 Payments by Central Steel; and

(7)  Both Chun and Lai knowingly participated in the fraud.

K.     LIABLITY OF CHUN

198.  Based upon the evidence accepted by this court, it is clear that Chun has knowledge and has participated in the Round Robin Scheme and in causing the June/July 2013 Payments.

199.  There is clear evidence showing that Chun was heavily involved in, and had detailed knowledge in and overall control over the business and affairs of the Group.

(1)  Chun was not just the Chairman but the Chief Executive Officer of China Metal until the appointment of the PLs in 2013.

(2)  Chun has been one of the 2 administrators of Central Steel since its incorporation until 31 December 2012.

(3)  The Prospectus (the contents of which had been certified by Chun as correct) and 2011 Annual Report of China Metal stated that “since [the Group’s] establishment in 2000, [Chun] has been leading us through the growth and expansion of our business” and that the Group was “dependent on the continued service of [Chun]”.

(4)  Chun was deeply involved in the Mainland China business operations of the Group. This is evidenced by

(a)  China Metal’s announcement dated 28 March 2011, where Chun is quoted extensively speaking to the details of the Mainland China operations of the Group;

(b)  board minutes of China Metal dated 17 September 2009 where it was Chun who reported to the board on the Group’s proposed investment into a port in the Mainland and the details and future development of the same.  Chun was also the legal representative and/or director of 9 of the Mainland subsidiaries prior to the appointment of the PLs.  The Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme were centrally concerned with the Mainland subsidiaries in the Southern China region.

(c)  According to China Metal’s own minutes dated 27 March 2012, Chun’s overall control and management of the Group increased in the 2 years prior to the presentation of the SFC Petition (such as to justify increasing Chun’s remuneration package).

(d)  Chun was also closely connected to the management of the other Mainland subsidiaries, and many of the senior management of the Mainland subsidiaries also played substantial roles in the business and operational affairs of the private companies of Chun.

(e)  Chun controlled the Group’s funds. He was the sole signatory of Central Steel’s bank accounts in Guangzhou.  He was also one of the 2 signatories of Central Steel’s bank accounts with DBS (the other signatory was Ms Lai).  He signed all the remittance application forms for the June/July 2013 Payments that the Liquidators were able to locate.

200.  Prior to the listing of China Metal, the companies within the group were wholly owned by Chun.  The evidence shows that in 2007 and 2008 (during which China Metal was solely owned by Chun), the Group had already engaged in the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions.  As the sole shareholder of China Metal and sole owner of the Group, Chun must have been aware of, and must have directed and orchestrated, the 2007-2009 Fictitious Transactions, since no one else (certainly not any of the staff who were only employed and had no personal stake in these acts of falsification) would have the financial interest to do so.

201.  The very substantial extent of falsification and resultant inflation of the financial performance of Central Steel and the Group was such that it is inconceivable that Chun would have been unaware of the same.

202.  In the light of all the above, Chun was clearly aware of, and also directed and orchestrated the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme.

203.  As to the June/July 2013 Payments, each of the said payments was personally authorized by Chun.  There is no evidence justifying these payments.  In the premises, in causing China Metal and Central Steel to carry out the Fictitious Transactions and to make the June/July 2013 Payments, Chun was plainly in breach of each of the fiduciary duties he owed to China Metal and Central Steel.

L.     LIABILITY OF LAI

204.  Based upon the evidence accepted by this court, I am of the view that Lai was aware of and has knowingly participated in the fraud complained by Ps.

205.  Lai argues that according to Ps, the funds eventually went back to China Metal in the Round Robin Scheme, and hence China Steel should have suffered no loss.  There is no merit in this submission.  Ps case is that the Round Robin Scheme has created a false financial position of China Steel, and the Dividends were declared on the basis of the false financial position created by the Round Robin Scheme.  In the circumstances, the Dividends were paid out unlawfully, and hence China Metal is entitled to claim back the Dividends.

206.  That fact that Lai was a non-executive director of China Metal (instead of an executive director) from 22 May 2009 makes no difference to the director’s duties owed by her to the company.  As confirmed by Ps’ expert on Cayman Islands law, the common law represents Cayman Islands law, and executive directors and non-executive directors owe the same duties as fiduciaries.

207.  Under the common law, there is no distinction between executive and non-executive directors insofar as director’s duties are concerned.  In Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing[75], a company brought an action against 3 directors (2 of whom were non-executive directors) for breaches of their duty of skill and care and breaches of fiduciary duty.  After trial, Foster J found all 3 directors to have acted in breach of duty, including the non-executive directors who were infrequently in the office and had signed blank cheques to be signed by the executive director at a later date.  The learned judge expressly rejected the proposition that non-executive directors had no duties to perform and held that under the Companies Act 1948, and the judge held that “the duties of a director whether executive or not are the same”[76].  I agree.

208.  Lai was at all times one of the 2 administrators of Central Steel (together with Chun).  She was also one of the 2 signatories of Central Steel’s bank accounts with DBS (together with Chun, each with power to sign singly).

209.  Contrary to her assertions that she was just a homemaker, her own statement to the IPO adviser in the questionnaire dated 27 February 2008 (which she had verified to be true) was that she had assisted Chun to develop and expand the business of the Group.  This is consistent with the statements in the Prospectus that Chun and Lai “co-founded” the Group (which was verified by Lai and was submitted to the Stock Exchange).

210.  Notwithstanding her re-designation from executive director to non-executive director of China Metal in 2009, the Liquidators’ investigations have revealed that Lai continued to be involved in the management and operation of China Metal and the Group companies until at least the end of 2012:

(1)  There is evidence showing that internal operational problems of the Mainland subsidiaries would be reported to Lai.  An example is the email from Yan dated 28 December 2012, in which Yan was reporting to both Chun and Lai concerning the recovery of account receivables by Tianjin China Metal.

(2)  Lai authorized and signed payment instructions for and on behalf of Central Steel as well as payment authorizations for Central Steel’s bank and brokerage accounts. This is evidenced by payment vouchers, remittance application forms and other bank documents signed by Lai for payments from Central Steel’s various bank accounts from 2007-2009 maintained with:

(a)  Sucden Financial Ltd;

(b)  DBS Bank;

(c)  Standard Chartered Bank; and

(d)  Hang Seng Bank

(3)  There is also a Central Steel’s resolution dated 1 January 2007 resolving to appoint Lai as an authorized signatory of all of the bank accounts of Central Steel.

(4)  Lai signing contracts entered into by Central Steel: see the signed Provisional Invoice dated 23 April 2010 from Central Steel and issued to Yieh United Steel Corporation.

(5)  Lai took part in meetings and discussions with senior management on business review, business development and the preparation of business plans for China Metal and the Group companies, as evidenced by the meeting minutes and other records.

(6)  At all material times, Lai had an office in China Metal’s Hong Kong office at The Centrium in Central, Hong Kong.

211.  Lai was also directly involved with some of the counterparties to the Round Robin Scheme:

(1)  Lai, through a company Worldwide Int’l Inspection Ltd (of which she was the sole shareholder and director), funded the incorporation expenses of Cheung Fat, whose transactions with Central Steel were central to the Round Robin Scheme.

(2)  Aprima, another company of which Lai was the sole shareholder and director, had been used to channel funds to Central Steel through its purported customers as part of the Round Robin Scheme.  Lai (together with Chun) were authorized to make payments on behalf of Aprima from its bank accounts with DBS Bank, and she in fact did make such payments.

(3)  The involvement of Aprima in the Round Robin Scheme is further confirmed by an Excel spreadsheet which the Liquidators located in the computer of Bobo Choy, former General Manager in charge of administration of China Metal, deliberately hidden under a surreptitious folder.  The excel file depicts a fund flow diagram which shows that monies paid in Chun’s bank accounts were paid into Aprima’s DBS account, which were then paid out to Qi Le and eventually paid back to Central Steel.

212.  Based upon the aforesaid, I find that:

(1)  Lai had an active management role within China Metal and the Group.

(2)  Due to Lai’s active involvement within the management and operations of China Metal and the Group, she must have knowingly participated in the Round Robin Scheme and must have procured or facilitated the procurement of the Fictitious Transactions.

(3)  In causing China Metal and Central Steel to carry out the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin, Lai acted in breach of each of the fiduciary duties she owed to China Metal and Central Steel.

213.  I shall deal with a complaint made by Lai in the trial.  Lai criticized the Liquidators for not trying to find witnesses who would give evidence favourable to Lai, and failing to adduce evidence from those witnesses.  Lai mentioned that the witnesses in her mind would include Wong Hok Leung 王學良 (“Wong”), Lai Yuk Wa 黎旭華 (“YW Lai”), Ip Un Kei 葉婉琪 (“Ip”), Fung Ka Lun 馮嘉倫(“Fung”) and Lam Po Kei Kenneth (林寶基) (“Lam”).  In my judgment, there is no merit in this complaint at all.

(1)  Lai has never put to Borrelli that the Liquidators have concealed evidence in favour of Lai in these proceedings. That being the case, Lai would not be entitled to make this criticism in her submissions.

(2)  With Lai’s consent, on 1 February 2018, DHCJ Kent Yee ordered that some affidavits and affirmations filed in HCCW 210/2013 with witness statements attached thereto be deemed as evidence in the trial in these proceedings.  Among those documents, there are witness statements made by Wong, YW Lai, and Ip.  I have read those witness statements. In my view, nothing therein provides support to Lai’s case.

(3)  This is a civil case.  Our system is an adversarial system.  It is Lai’s duty to adduce evidence in support of her own case.  These proceedings were commenced by the Liquidators in 2013.  Lai has many years to prepare evidence to meet the Liquidators’ case.  However, apart from one witness statement made by herself, Lai did not file any other witness statement in these proceedings.

(4)  As submitted by Ps, there is no property in a witness.  The addresses of Wong, YW Lai and Ip are set out in their witness statements filed in HCCW 210/2013.  Lai could try to contact them at those addresses and to obtain statements from them.  However, Lai did not do so.

(5)  As to Fung and Lam, Lai did not try to get in touch with them and to obtain statements from them.

(6)  In my view, there is no basis for me to have a view that there would be evidence favourable to Lai from these witnesses.  In any event, Lai can only blame herself for not adducing evidence favourable to her (if any) in support of her case.

214.  In her final submissions, Lai alleged that what she did was, in her honest belief, in the interest of China Metal.  In my judgment, Lai cannot rely upon the alleged honest belief as a defence.

(1)  The alleged honest relief is unpleaded.  Bearing in mind that issues are defined by the pleadings, Lai is not entitled to take this point at the trial.

(2)  There is nothing in Lai’s evidence in support of the alleged honest belief.

(3)  In any event, I have refused to accept Lai’s evidence.  Hence, there is no evidence accepted by this court proving the alleged honest belief.

(4)  Further, honest belief without any reasonable basis cannot be a defence to breach of director’s duties.  As said in the above, it is no excuse that a director blindly followed the act of other directors[77].

215.  Lai also raised a point that the Liquidators have not done any fund flow analysis in respect of FY2006.  In my view, this point is irrelevant for the purpose of these proceedings.  The Liquidators are not alleging that there was any fraudulent transaction or fraudulent act in the Group in FY2006.  There is no claim in respect of the matters occurred in FY2006.  Further, Lai has not raised any matter occurred in FY 2006 which would provide any support to her case.  In any event, as to why no fund flow analysis was done in respect of FY2006, the point has not been put to Borrelli during cross-examination, and Borrelli has been deprived of an opportunity to give a reply on this point.  Lai is therefore not entitled to ask this court to draw any adverse inference against the Liquidators by relying upon the absence of fund flow analysis for FY2006.

216.  For the sake of completeness, I would briefly discuss the relevance of the Conviction in relation to Lai’s liability.

217.  Lai was convicted of one count of conspiracy to defraud in HCCC 66/2018.  The particulars of the offence are that between 2 June 2008 and 27 June 2009, Lai and Choy conspired together with Chun and others to defraud the Stock Exchange and/or its offices servants or agents, by dishonestly submitting or causing to be submitted false financial results and information of China Metal and thereby inducing the Stock Exchange to accept the same as true and accurate and approve the application of China Metal for listing on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange.

218.  I have refused to accept the evidence given by Lai in this case.  Accordingly, there is no evidence before this court rebutting the presumption in s.62(2)(a) of the EO.  Lai shall be taken as having committed the offence in these proceedings.

219.  Notwithstanding the appeal against the Conviction lodged by Lai, I shall give effect to the presumption prescribed in s.62(2)(a) of the EO.  In doing so, I am aware of the fact that Lai pleaded not guilty to the charge in the criminal case.  Having heard and considered the evidence in a 60-day trial, the jury convicted Lai by a majority of 7:2.  In other words, the Conviction was the outcome of a contentious criminal trial. The Conviction is relevant to the fictitious transactions from 2007 to 2009 and the dividends paid in 2009, which are the subject matters in these proceedings. In light of all these, I would attach heavy weight to the Conviction.

220.  In my judgment, the Conviction has provided further support to Ps’ case.  However, I am of the view that even without the Conviction, there is already sufficient evidence before me supporting the finding that Lai has knowingly participated in the fraud.  Accordingly, the existence of Lai’s appeal against the Conviction would not affect the outcome of these proceedings in any way.  Even if Lai succeeds in her appeal against the Conviction at a later time, that would not have any impact on my ruling on Lai’s liability.

221.  Lai submits that I should stay the proceedings herein and refrain from making a decision in this case pending the outcome of her appeal against the Conviction.  For the reason set out in the paragraph above, there is no justification in support of this approach.  I refuse to accede to Lai’s request.

M.     ARTICLE 164 OF CHINA METAL’S ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION

222.  Lai raised the indemnity clause in Article 164 of China Metal’s Articles of Association (“Article 164”) in her Amended Defence.  Article 164 is as follows:

“(1) The Directors, Secretary and other officers and every Auditor for the time being of the Company and the liquidator or trustees (if any) for the time being acting in relation to any of the affairs of the Company and everyone of them, and everyone of their heirs, executors and administrators, shall be indemnified and secured harmless out of the assets and profits of the Company from and against all actions, costs, charges, losses, damages and expenses which they or any of them, their or any of their heirs, executors or administrators, shall or may incur or sustain by or by reason of any act done, concurred in or omitted in or about the execution of their duty, or supposed duty, in their respective offices or trusts; and none of them shall be answerable for the acts, receipts, neglects or defaults of the other or others of them or for joining in any receipts for the sake of conformity, or for any bankers or other persons with whom any moneys or effects belonging to the Company shall be placed out on or invested, or for any other loss, misfortune or damage which may happen in the execution of their respective offices or trusts, or in relation thereto; PROVIDED THATthis indemnity shall not extend to any matter in respect of any fraud or dishonesty which may attach to any of said persons.

(2) Each Member agrees to waive any claim or right of action he might have, whether individually or by or in the right of the Company, against any Director on account of any action taken by such Director, or the failure of such Director to take any action in the performance of his duties with or for the Company; PROVIDED THAT such waiver shall not extend to any matter in respect of any fraud or dishonesty which may attach to such Director.” (Emphasis supplied)

223.  I have found that Lai has knowingly participated in the fraud perpetrated against China Metal.  As a result of this finding, Lai cannot rely upon Article 164 to claim any indemnity from China Metal.

N.     LIABILITY OF CHEUNG FAT AND WELLRUN

N1.    Cheung Fat

224.  In my judgment, Ps’ claim for dishonest assistance against Cheung Fat is established.

(1)  Chun’s breaches in causing China Metal and Central Steel to enter into the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme are clearly established.

(2)  Cheung Fat’s assistance in the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme is indisputable.

(3)  Dishonesty is established, given (a) Cheung Fat was established by Chun and Lai; (b) it was described in Central Steel’s internal records as a “company of Mr Chun”; and (3) its business licence was kept by Chun.  All these show that Cheung Fat was controlled by Mr Chun, such that Chun’s knowledge should be attributed to it.  I have no doubt that Chun was acting dishonestly when he procured and implemented and Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme.

(4)  As to loss, the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme, which resulted in the overstatement of the financial performance and profits generated by the Group, led to the wrongful declaration and payment of the Dividends by China Metal.

225.  I am also of the view that Ps’ claim for knowingly receipt against Cheung Fat with respect to the June/July 2013 Payments is established.  Cheung Fat’s receipt of 12 of the June/July 2013 Payments is indisputable.  Given that Chun’s breaches of fiduciary duty are proved and Chun’s knowledge should be attributed to Cheung Fat, Ps’ claim for knowingly receipt against Cheung Fat with respect to the June/July 2013 Payments is also proved.

226.  With respect to P’s claim for restitution of the June/July 2013 Payments, the claim has also been substantiated.  Chun’s want of authority is clearly established.  Cheung Fat’s receipt cannot be disputed. There can be no relevant change of position, since the Further Recipients were all closely associated with Chun.

N2.    Wellrun

227.  As to Wellrun:

(1)  Wellrun is the alter ego of Chun, as Chun being the sole shareholder and the sole director of Wellrun.  As such, Chun’s knowledge with respect to the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme would be attributed to it.

(2)  Wellrun was in receipt of substantially all of the Dividends in Hong Kong.

(3)  For reasons similar to those set out in the above, Wellrun is clearly liable to Ps in (a) dishonest assistance for Chun’s breaches of fiduciary duty, and (b) knowing receipt for the Dividends.

O.     UNLAWFUL ACT CONSPIRACY

228.  I am also of the view that Ps’ claim of unlawful act conspiracy against Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun is also established.

(1)  Based upon the evidence accepted by this court, there was a combination, arrangement or understanding among Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat (with respect to which Chun’s knowledge should be attributed by reason of their control over the same) and Wellrun (Chun’s alter ego).

(2)  The intention to injure others (being China Metal and Central Steel, as well as public investors in China Metal) is also established, given the procurement of the Fictitious Transactions, the Round Robin Scheme and the making of the June/July 2013 Payments were all done deliberately and with knowledge of the consequences.

(3)  There was concerted action in that each party took steps to (a) carry on and continue with the Fictitious Transactions and the Round Robin Scheme; (b) make the June/July 2013 Payments; and (c) procure Chun and Lai to continue to remain in office as directors such that these breaches of fiduciary duties could continue to be perpetrated, consequent upon the combination or understanding.

(4)  There was use of unlawful means, namely the breaches of fiduciary duties by Chun and Lai.

(5)  Loss has been caused to Ps, in the form of the unlawful Dividends and the June/July 2013 Payments.

P.     RELIEFS

229.  Based upon the findings made by this court, in my judgment, Ps are entitled to have the reliefs set out below.

P1.    The Dividends

230.  China Metal is claiming against Chun and Lai for the Dividends paid out by China Metal for FY2009-FY2011 in the amount of HK$672.9 million on 2 bases.

231.  First, as a matter of law, where dividends were declared and paid in circumstances where the company made no profit, they would have been paid out of capital and as such would be unlawful.  It is clear that at least for FY2010 and FY2011, there was no or no sufficient net profits for the purpose of the Dividends declared and paid.  As such, the Dividends for FY2010 and FY2011 were clearly paid out of capital and hence unlawful.  Since I have found that both Chun and Lai had knowingly participated in the fraud, whether or not liability is strict or fault-based does not make really matter.

232.  Second, even if a small net profit had been made such that the dividends declared and paid would not per se be unlawful (as in FY2009), Chun and Lai are still liable for the same as loss flowing from their breaches of fiduciary duty, specifically their involvement in and knowledge of the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme.

(1)  Ps’ pleaded case is that the Dividends (for FY2009 to FY2011) were loss from Chun and Lai breaches of fiduciary duty, in that they were aware, when resolving and approving the Dividends, that the reported financial results were false or at least unreliable.

(2)  That the board of directors of China Metal (and the general meeting which acted on the board’s recommendation) proceeded on the premise that China Metal had returned much higher level of profits to justify the Dividends is clearly borne out by the respective board minutes for FY2009, FY2010 and FY2011 (all these minutes were signed by Chun and Lai), which recorded that China Metal would keep the remaining profits after distribution of the Dividends (保留餘下溢利).

(3)  This premise was clearly erroneous by reason of the Fictitious Transactions and Round Robin Scheme, as Chun and Lai well knew.

(4)  Accordingly, the premise upon which the board and the general meeting approved the Dividends was entirely false and occurred by reason of Chun’s and Lai’s breaches of fiduciary duty – despite their knowledge on the falsity, at no time did Chun or Lai voice out.  The payment of Dividends (which is a corporate asset) is a loss of trust property flowing from Chun’s and Lai’s breaches of fiduciary duties.

(5)  The “but for” causation is not broken by the fact that the net profits for FY2009 exceeded the 2009 Dividends declared.  As shown in Morrison’s analysis, China Metal did not actually have funds to pay the 2009 Dividends, and was only able to do so by equity and debt financing, which had the fraud been known would have been highly unlikely for the banks to lend.  Indeed the banks would have demanded repayment, further reducing the cashflow of China Metal).  Further, had the fraud been known, it was also most unlikely that independent investors would have been prepared to accept placed shares of China Metal for the purpose of equity financing.  As such, that China Metal might have had a “book entry” net profit for FY2009 is no answer to Ps’ claim for the 2009 Dividends as loss flowing from Chun’s and Lai’s breaches of fiduciary duty.

233.  I agree and accept these submissions.

234.  Accordingly, in respect of the Dividends:

(1)  Chun and Lai: Chun and Lai are liable to pay equitable compensation to China Metal for breaches of fiduciary duties owed by them to China Metal in the amount of HK$672.9 million, being the full amount of Dividends for FY2009 to FY2011.

(2)  Cheung Fat and Wellrun: Cheung Fat and Wellrun are liable to pay equitable compensation to China Metal for their dishonest assistance in Chun’s and Lai’s breaches of fiduciary duty in the amount of HK$672.9 million, being the full amount of Dividends for FY2009 to FY2011 in respect of which they had assisted.  A dishonest assistor should be liable for all loss or damage resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty which has been dishonestly assisted[78].

(3)  Chun and Wellrun: Further, as Chun and Wellrun received cash and/or scrip dividends equivalent to HK$0.8 million and HK$357.4 million respectively out of the Dividends paid out, they hold those sums, and are liable to account for the same, as constructive trustees.

P2.    The June/July 2013 Payments

235.  In relation to the June/July 2013 Payments:

(1)  Chun: Chun is liable to pay equitable compensation to Central Steel for breach of fiduciary duty owed by him to Central Steel in the amount of HK$1,960,887,984.44, being the full amount of June/July 2013 Payments wrongfully transferred from Central Steel to (a) Cheung Fat and (b) Pacific Metal HK.

(2)  Cheung Fat: Cheung Fat is liable to Central Steel for knowing receipt, alternatively for restitution for unjust enrichment, for HK$1,215,099,463.37, being the amounts actually received by Cheung Fat.

P3.    Joint and several liabilities

236.  The liabilities set out in the above should be joint and several.  It is trite that third parties who are implicated in a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty are jointly and severally liable with the trustees or fiduciaries, and with one another, for the harm suffered by the beneficiaries.  Hence any one of the fiduciaries or third parties may have to make good the loss in full[79].

P4.    Compound Interest

237.  As to pre-judgment interest, apart from the usual rate of pre-judgment interest, ie 1% over the prime rate[80], Ps also ask for pre-judgment interest being awarded on a compound basis. I am of the view that Ps’ application is justified and allow the application.

(1)  Where a fiduciary has in breach of fiduciary duty misapplied the company’s money or obtained and retained the same, the court has a discretion, and the normal order is to award compound interest from the date of the breach[81]. In my view, there is no reason why I should not exercise my discretion to make this normal order.

(2)  Compound interest should also be awarded against Cheung Fat and Wellrun with respect to equitable compensation payable for their dishonest assistance in Chun’s and Lai’s breaches of fiduciary duty, for in such a case the measure of loss is by reference to the loss arising from the breaches of fiduciary duty.

(3)  There is a further basis for awarding compound interest on the FY2010 and FY2011 Dividends, which were unlawfully declared out of capital[82].

P5.    Costs

238.  I have heard submissions on costs.  There is no reason to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event. Further, this is a complicated case, with numerous factual and legal issues involved.  In my view, it is plain and obvious that a certificate for 2 counsel is justified in this case.  I so order.

239.  Ps are also seeking indemnity costs.

240.  The principles concerning indemnity costs are well established.  The court may award indemnity costs where the proceedings are scandalous or vexatious, or have been initiated or prosecuted maliciously, or for an ulterior motive, or in an oppressive manner, or are prosecuted in such circumstances as to constitute an affront to the court, though the court’s discretion is a broad one and is not limited to the above circumstances[83].  These principles apply equally to defendants[84].  The parties’ conduct is a relevant consideration to the court’s exercise of discretion[85].

241.  Ps submit that an award of indemnity costs is justified by reason of the following:

(1)  Chun and Lai engaged in deliberate, serious and fraudulent breaches of fiduciary duty against a Hong Kong listed company, thereby seriously prejudicing the interests of the investing public. The sums of money which Chun and Lai obtained as a result of their breaches for their own personal benefit were vast. Indeed, one can hardly think of a more serious case of breach of fiduciary duty owed to a company.

(2)  The manners in which Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun defended each of their respective cases in these proceedings are highly objectionable and constitute an affront to the court.  In particular:

(a)  Chun and Wellrun: Chun has throughout these proceedings repeatedly gone out of his way to obstruct the Liquidators from identifying and securing his assets for the purposes of the Mareva injunctions obtained against him (in the amount of up to HK$1.6 billion). In particular: Chun has: (i) failed to give proper disclosure of his assets as required under the disclosure obligation in the Mareva injunctions; and (ii) committed contumelious breaches of the Mareva injunctions in dissipating assets covered by the same.  Due to his persistent and deliberate failure to give proper disclosure of his assets as required under the Mareva injunctions that his and Wellrun’s Defences herein were struck out[86].

(b)  Lai: Lai has also conducted herself unreasonably throughout these proceedings, in that she: (i) unhelpfully provided very limited discovery; (ii) deliberately derailed the initial trial dates of this action (originally fixed to commence on 14 October 2019 with 30 days reserved) by not disclosing such trial dates to the criminal court in her criminal proceedings, such as to engineer a situation where the dates of the criminal trial overlapped with the initial trial dates and causing the latter to be vacated and re-fixed (with a delay of 15 months)[87]; (iii) taking out unnecessary and vexatious applications, including repeatedly making unmeritorious applications to introduce handwriting expert evidence concerning the Aprima Remittance Form at the eleventh hour of these proceedings (notwithstanding such handwriting expert evidence had been available to her for over a year, ie since her criminal trial).

(c)  Cheung Fat: Cheung Fat has likewise been unreasonable throughout these proceedings.  Its repeated refusal to provide discovery ordered by the court eventually resulted in its Defence and Counterclaim being struck out and it be debarred from defending these proceedings[88].

242.  I agree and allow Ps’ application for indemnity costs.

Q.     DISPOSITION

243.  For the reasons set out in the above, in my judgment, Ps have proved their case against Chun, Lai, Cheung Fat and Wellrun. I am also of the view that Ps are entitled to have costs of these proceedings (including all costs reserved) on an indemnity basis, with a certificate for 2 counsel.  I make an order in terms of the draft judgment submitted by Ps[89].  The terms of the order made by me are as follows:

In relation to the “said Dividends” as defined in the Re-re-amended Statement of Claim

(1)  The 1st and 2nd Defendants and each of them do pay the 1st Plaintiff equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty in the amount of HK$672.9 million.

(2)  The 5th and 13th Defendants and each of them do pay the 1st Plaintiff equitable compensation for dishonest assistance in the amount of HK$672.9 million.

(3)  The 1st Defendant holds the sum of HK$800,000 (being the cash and/or scrip dividends received by the 1st Defendant out of the dividend payments by the 1st Plaintiff in respect of the financial years ended 2009, 2010 and 2011 (as pleaded in paragraph 66 of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim)) as constructive trustee for the benefit of the 1st Plaintiff, that the 1st Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the said sum of HK$800,000 and the 1st Defendant is liable to return this sum to the 1st Plaintiff together with all profits generated therefrom.

(4)  The 1st Defendant do pay the said sum of HK$800,000 (as particularised in paragraph 3 above) to the 1st Plaintiff.

(5)  There be an inquiry as to damages / equitable compensation or, alternatively (at the 1st Plaintiff’s option) an account of profits from the 1st Defendant in relation to the said sum of HK$800,000 particularised in paragraph 3 above.

(6)  There be payment by the 1st Defendant to the 1st Plaintiff of all sums found due upon such inquiry as to damages or equitable compensation or account of profits under paragraph 5 above together with interest on the damages compensation and/or profits accountable to the 1st Plaintiff or interest pursuant to s48 of the High Court Ordinance at such rates or for such periods as the Court thinks fit.

(7)  The 13th Defendant holds the sum of HK$357.4 million (being the cash and/or scrip dividends received by the 13th Defendant out of the dividend payments by the 1st Plaintiff in respect of the financial years ended 2009, 2010 and 2011 (as pleaded in paragraph 66 of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim)) as constructive trustee for the benefit of the 1st Plaintiff, that the 1st Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the said sum of HK$357.4 million and the 13th Defendant is liable to return this sum to the 1st Plaintiff together with all profits generated therefrom.

(8)  The 13th Defendant do pay the said sum of HK$357.4 million (as particularised in [(7)] above) to the 1st Plaintiff.

(9)  There be an inquiry as to damages / equitable compensation or, alternatively (at the 1st Plaintiff’s option) an account of profits from the 13th Defendant in relation to the said sum of HK$357.4 million particularised in paragraph 7 above.

(10)  There be payment by the 13th Defendant to the 1st Plaintiff of all sums found due upon such inquiry as to damages or equitable compensation or account of profits under paragraph 9 above together with interest on the damages compensation and/or profits accountable to the 1st Plaintiff or interest pursuant to s48 of the High Court Ordinance at such rates or for such periods as the Court thinks fit.

In relation to “the June / July 2013 Payments” as defined in Re-re-amended Statement of Claim

(11)  The 1st Defendant do pay the 2nd Plaintiff equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty in the amount of HK$1,960,887,984.44.

(12)  That the 5th Defendant holds the sum of HK$1,215,099,463.37 (as pleaded in paragraph 95(1) of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim) as constructive trustee for the benefit of the 2nd Plaintiff, that the 2nd Plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the said sum of HK$1,215,099,463.37 and the 5th Defendant is liable to return this sum to the 2nd Plaintiff together with all profits generated therefrom.

(13)  The 5th Defendant do pay the 2nd Plaintiff the said sum of HK$1,215,099,463.37 (as particularized in [(12)] above).

(14)  There be an inquiry as to damages / equitable compensation or, alternatively (at the 2nd Plaintiff’s option) an account of profits from the 5th Defendant in relation to the said sum of HK$1,215,099,463.37 particularised in paragraph 12 above.

(15)  There be payment by the 5th Defendant to the 2nd Plaintiff of all sums found due upon such inquiry as to damages or equitable compensation or account of profits under paragraph 14 above together with interest on the damages compensation and/or profits accountable to the 2nd Plaintiff or interest pursuant to s48 of the High Court Ordinance at such rates or for such periods as the Court thinks fit.

(16)  Further to [(13)] above, the 5th Defendant do pay the 2nd Plaintiff equitable compensation for knowing receipt and/or in restitution for monies had and received in the amount of the said sum of HK$1,215,099,463.37.

And it is further adjudged that

(17)  The 1st, 2nd, 5th and 13th Defendants and each of them do pay: (i) pre-judgment interest on the amounts ordered against each of them in paragraphs 1, 2 and 11 above at the rate of prime plus 1% at compound interest from the date of breach to the date of judgment; (ii) pre-judgment interest on the amounts ordered against each of them in paragraphs 4, 8, 13, and 16 above at the rate of prime plus 1% at simple interest from the date of breach to the date of judgment; and (iii) post-judgment interest at judgment rate on the amounts ordered against each of them of 8%.

(18)  The 1st, 2nd, 5th and 13th Defendants and each of them do pay to the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs the costs of and occasioned by this action (including all costs reserved), to be taxed if not agreed on an indemnity basis, with certificate for two counsel.

244.  I direct that this judgment be orally interpreted to Lai at the time of handing down of the same by a court interpreter in the High Court Building.

245.  Lastly, I must register my gratitude to Ms Eva Sit SC and Mr Justin Ho.  The documents in this case are voluminous and various factual and legal issues with complexity are involved in these proceedings.  Senior Counsel and Counsel for Ps have provided the court the most helpful assistance by presenting evidence and submissions to the court systemically, succinctly and fairly.  The able and helpful assistance rendered by them to the court is highly appreciated.

( MK Liu )
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Eva Sit SC, leading Mr Justin Ho, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

The 2nd defendant appeared in person

 


[1]  HCCC 66/2018

[2]  Order of DHCJ Saunders dated 25 June 2014

[3]  Order of DHCJ Anita Yip SC dated 12 October 2015

[4]  As per the 2015 Judgment, [4]

[5]  Order 1A rule 2(2)

[6]  [20A] is a new paragraph added in the Amended Defence dated 22 June 2015.

[7]  See [2019] HKCFI 1068

[8]  Kwok Chin Wing v 21 Holdings Ltd (2013) 16 HKCFAR 663, per Ma CJ at [21] and [22].

[9]  Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157, per Tuckey LJ at [56]-[58], per Arden LJ at [69]; applied in Hong Kong in East Asia Satellite (Holdings) Ltd v New Cotai LLC [2011] 3 HKLRD 734, per Tang ACJHC at [35], [45] and [47]

[10]  Mortimore, Company Directors (3rd edn, 2017), [11.35]

[11]  [2003] 1 BCLC 598, [92]-[93]

[12]   Regentcrest plc (in liq) v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80, per Jonathan Parker J at [123]

[13]Re Lands Allotments Co [1894] 1 Ch 616, per Lindley LJ at 631; Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2012] Ch 453, per Lord Neuberger at [34]

[14]   Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No 2) [1994] 1 All ER 261, supra, per Hoffmann LJ at 265, per Ralph Gibson LJ at 269; Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas (CACV 10/2014, 20 May 2016) at [38]; GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] 2 BCLC 369, per Newey J at [149]

[15]  Maxwell (No 2), supra, per Hoffmann LJ at 265

[16]  Re Idessa (UK) Ltd [2012] 1 BCLC 80, per DHCJ Lesley Anderson QC at [28]

[17]RMF Market Neutral Strategies (Master) Ltd v DD Growth Premium 2X Fund [2014] (2) CILK 316, [24]

[18]Re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society (1886) 35 Ch D 502, 509, 516; Re Exchange Banking, Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21 Ch D 519, 533-534

[19]  Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 1 Ch 407, 477

[20]  Re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society, supra, 509; Flitcroft’s Case, supra, 535

[21]Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland, in re Paycheck Services 3 Ltd [2010] 1 WLR 2793, per Lord Hope at [45]-[47], per Lord Walker at [124], per Lord Clarke at [146]; applied in Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd v Lee Sin Mei Olivia [2019] 3 HKLRD 833 (CFI), per Peter Ng J at [81]

[22]  [2019] Bus LR 2878, at [103]-[159]

[23]  At [139], see also [157]

[24]  Kao Lee & Yip v Koo Hoi Yan Donald [2003] 3 HKLRD 296, per Ma J (as he then was) at [46]

[25]  Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd v Lee Sin Mei Olivia (2014) 17 HKCFAR 466, [36]

[26]Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, per Lord Wright at 155, citing Parker v McKenna (1874) LR 10 Ch App 96

[27]Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, per Lord Upjohn at 123C-124C; applied in Kao Lee & Yip, supra, at [50]

[28]  Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62, per Pennycuick J at 74E-F

[29]  The Liquidator of Wing Fai Construction Company Limited (in liquidation) v Yip Kwong Robert [2018] 1 HKC 472, per G Lam J at [280], [283]

[30]  Re Oxford Benefit Building and Investment Society, supra, at 516; Flitcroft’s Case, supra, at 534

[31]  JJ Harrison (Properties) Ltd v Harrison [2002] 1 BCLC 162, [25], [27]-[29]

[32]  Underhill & Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees (19th edn, 2016), supra, [98.33]; Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall (2013) 16 HKCFAR 681, [78], [87]-[88]

[33]  Libertarian, supra, [79]-[81]; [90]-[91]

[34] Johnston, The Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong (3rd edn, 2017), [2.075]; Dicey, Morris & Collins: TheConflict of Laws (15th edn, 2012), [9-002] – [9-011]

[35]  Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws (15th edn, 2012), [9-029]

[36]  Grupo Torras SA v Al-Sabah (No 5) [1999] CLC 1469, per Mance J at 1664A-B

[37] A defendant’s failure to act may be capable of constituting “assistance”; however, “mere passive acquiescence” is unlikely to suffice: See Re-Engine Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fergusson [2007] VSC 57, at [120].

[38]  Underhill & Hayton, supra, [98.53]

[39]  Baden v Société Générale SA [1993] 1 WLR 509, per Peter Gibson J at 575

[40]  Balfron Trustees Ltd v Peterson [2001] IRLR 758, per Laddie J at 761

[41]  Grupo Torras, supra, per Mance J at 1667

[42]  Underhill & Hayton, supra, [98.56]

[43]  Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 389

[44]  [2006] 1 WLR 1476, at [10]

[45]  Grupo Torras SA v Al Sabah (No 5) [2001] CLC 221, at [119]

[46]  [2008] EWHC 2613, at [223]

[47]  OJSC Oil v Abramovich, at [221]

[48]  The Liquidators have commenced proceedings against the auditors in respect of the fraud which is the subject matter of these proceedings.

[49]Lewin on Trusts (20th edn, 2020), [42-023], expanding on the 3 established criteria in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685, per Hoffmann LJ at 700g

[50]  Snell’s Equity (34th edn, 2020), [30-072]

[51]Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, per Nourse LJ at 455E-F, applied in Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) v Akai Holdings Ltd (No 2) (2010) 13 HKCFAR 479, per Lord Neuberger NPJ at [127]-[128], [134]

[52]JJ Harrison, supra, [26]; Belmont Finance Corp v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393, per Buckley LJ at 405

[53]  Goff & Jones, The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, 2016), [8-104] - [8-118] 

[54]  Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (21st edn, 2018), [3-010] – [3-011]; Hopkins v TL Dallas Group Ltd [2005] 1 BCLC 543, per Lightman J at [99]; Sweeney v Howard (2007) 13 BPR 24381, per Windeyer J at [55] – [58]

[55]  (1905) 2 CLR 421, at 430

[56]  Kuwait Oil Tanker SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271, at [108]

[57]  Esquire (Electronics) Ltd v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd [2007] 3 HKLRD 439, [135]; Hui Cheung Fai v Daiwa Development Ltd (HCA 1734/2009, 8 April 2014), [77] – [83]

[58]  HKSAR v Chan Hing Kai [2020] 1 HKLRD 1082, [38]

[59]  [2002] 1 HKLRD 858, [31]

[60]  Re H [1996] AC 563

[61]  The Kang Oh v Wong Yik Fai (HCPI 791/1995, 10 July 1996), per Woo J (as he then was) at p.5

[62]  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, Volume 1, [18/7A/3]

[63]  China Everbright-IHD Pacific Ltd v Ch’ng Poh (CACV 513/2001, 19 February 2002), [37] - [40]

[64]  Re Raphael [1973] 1 WLR 998; Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, Volume 1, [18/7A/5]

[65]  In this email, Yan provided a comprehensive report to Chun and Lai regarding the “clearing of debts” (which suggests difficulty in recovering account receivables) by Tianjin China Metal.  Lai has tried to argue that this email shows that she has duly discharged the director’s duties owed by her to China Metal.  I refuse to accept this argument for (1) there is no evidence showing that Lai has taken any action as a result of this email (in fact, Lai claimed that she had never seen this email); and (2) further, the matter mentioned in this email is not one of the matters being complained by the Liquidators in these proceedings.  The Liquidators’ case is that in respect of the matters being complained by the Liquidators in these proceedings, Lai has breached her duties.  Lai cannot rely upon this email as an answer to the Liquidators’ claim.

[66]  For example, in her final submissions, Lai alleged that she was asked by Chun to monitor the matters relating to the employees’ salaries in 廣州集通倉碼公司, 廣州誠摯物業管理公司, 廣州亞鋼置業公司from about late 2011 to February 2012.  She only did the said monitoring work for a short period of time.

[67]  The references to the trial bundles in Annex 2 are in the form [Bundle#/Item#/Page#].

[68] For 2012, funds were first transferred from the Purported Suppliers to New Metal before they were transferred further to the Purported Customers.

[69] One of the bank accounts used for receiving payments from Central Steel and making payments to New Metal in 2012 was an account held at Bank of America in the name of “Cheung Fat Metal Recycling Co., Limited”, which was a company incorporated in the State of California in the United States.

[70]  The evidence is not challenged by Lai.

[71]  Qiu’s evidence is not challenged by Lai and is accepted by this court.

[72]  Abbreviations used in the diagram:

CMR – Central Steel;

CF-HSBC-1 – Business integrated account in HSBC held by Cheung Fat;

CF-BOA-1 – Account in Bank of America held by Cheung Fat;

SS-Citi-1 – USD checking account in Citibank N.A. held by Smith Steel;

SS-EWB-1 – Business checking account in East West Bank held by Smith Steel;

PM-EWB-1 - Business checking account in East West Bank held by Pacific Metal;

NM-JPM-1 – Account in JPMorgan Chase Bank held by New Metal;

NM-EWB-1 – Business checking account in East West Bank held by New Metal;

NM-Citi-1 – USD checking account in Citibank N.A. held by New Metal;

CK-HSBC-1 – Business integrated account in HSBC held by Chak Kwan;

HC-HSBC-1 – Business integrated account in HSBC held by Hoi Cheung;

ML-WHB-1 – Account in Wing Lung Bank Limited held by Metallurgical;

QX-HSBC-1 – Business integrated account in HSBC held by Qing Yuan Xinxin

[73]  HKD equivalents are based upon the exchange rates of US$1 = HK$7.75732 and RMB1 = HK$1.2557 as at 26 July 2013

[74]  HKD equivalents are based upon the exchange rates of US$1 = HK$7.75732 and RMB1 = HK$1.2557 as at 26 July 2013

[75]  [1989] BCLC 498

[76]  At 505g; See also Mortimore, Company Directors (3rd edn), [3.53], and The Company Director: Powers, Duties and Liabilities (12th edn), [6.39]

[77]  Maxwell (No 2), supra, per Hoffmann LJ at 265

[78]  Grupo Torras, supra, [119]

[79] Underhill and Hayton, supra, [97.25; Bank of Ireland v Pexxnet Ltd [2010] EWHC 1872 (Comm), per DHCJ Jonathan Hirst QC at [54]

[80]  This is the appropriate measure to compensate a party for being kept out of its damages, as it reflects the theoretical cost to the plaintiff of borrowing the sums withheld. See Waddington, supra, [171]-[185]

[81]  Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QC 373, per Lord Denning MR at 388B-H, per Buckley LJ at 397C-398G; Wing Fai, supra, at [345], [351]; Tam Po Kei v Tam Bo Kin (No 2) [2011] 2 HKLRD 272, per Harris J at [3], [7]; Kao Lee & Yip, supra, per Ma J (as hen then was) at [131]

[82]  Re Oxford Benefit Building, supra, per Kay J at 516

[83]  Choy Yee Chun v Bond Star Development Ltd [1997] HKLRD 1327, at 1334 and 1338

[84]  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, Volume 1, [62/App/12], 1st para

[85]  Order 62, rule 5(1)(e) and 5(2)

[86]  Order of DHCJ Anita Yip SC dated 12 October 2015

[87]  [2019] HKCFI 1068

[88]  Order of DHCJ Saunders dated 25 June 2014

[89]  Annex 13 to Ps’ Closing Note dated 29 January 2021

[90]    The facts and matters set out in this Annex are based upon and an expansion of Appendix 1 [B1/1-1/89-1 – 89-19] to the Witness Statement of Cosimo Borrelli dated 13.07.2017 [B1/1/1-89].

[91]    See Item 11.

[92]    See Item 18.

[93]    See Item 10.

[94]    See Item 14.

[95]    See Item 15.

[96]    See Item 16.

[97]   See Item 6.

[98]   See Item 6.

[99]   See Item 3.

[100] See Item 1.

[101] See Item 4.

[102] See Item 1.

[103] See Item 1.

[104] See Item 3.

[105] See Item 2.

[106] See Item 2.

[107] See Item 3.

[108] See Item 1.

[109] See Item 6.

[110] See Item 1.

[111] See Item 1.

[112] See Item 5.

[113] See Item 5.

[114] See Item 1.

[115] See Item 1.

[116] See Item 5.

[117] See Item 12.

[118] See Item 1.

[119] See Item 1.

[120] See Item 1.

[121] See Item 13.

[122] See Item 8.

[123] See Item 12.

[124] See Item 14.

[125] See Item 16.

[126] See Item 1.

[127] See Item 16.

[128] See Item 1.

[129] See Item 13.

[130] See Item 16.

[131] See Item 1.

[132] See Item 14.

[133] See Item 15.

[134] See Item 1.

[135] See Item 5.

[136] See Item 1.

[137] See Item 5.

[138] See Item 5.

[139] See Item 3.

[140] See Item 4.

[141] See Item 1.

[142] See Item 5.

[143] See Item 5.

[2020] HKCFI 1385-EN-2020-06-24

WING ON FINANCE CO LTD v. CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (In Compulsory Liquidation) AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1412/2013

[2020] HKCFI 1385

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

_____________

BETWEEN  
 WING ON FINANCE COMPANY LIMITEDApplicant

and

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 (In Compulsory Liquidation) 
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 (In Compulsory Liquidation) 

and

 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORPORATION4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 ZHONG CHI GUANG (formerly trading6th Defendant
 as QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO.) 
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

_____________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Maurellet SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing:24 June 2020
Date of Ruling:24 June 2020

________________________

RULING

________________________

1.  This is the hearing of the summons dated 4 December 2018 (“the Summons”) taken out by Wing On Finance Company Limited (“the Applicant”) in these proceedings so that “the Mareva injunction Order against the 1st Defendant (“D1”) dated 30 July 2013 as amended by the Orders dated 7 August 2013 and 3 June 2014 be varied (collectively the “Injunction Order”) such that the sum of HK$3,845,343 together with interest thereon at Judgment rate accruing from 28 February 2015 until payment and costs of HK$12,000 pursuant to summary assessment be excluded from the scope of D1’s assets subject to the Injunction Order”.

2.  It appears that the Summons, when issued had only been served on Mr Borrelli and Ms Chi being the liquidators of the Plaintiff.

3.  The Applicant had commenced HCA1492/2017 in or around June 2017 against D1.

4.  It obtained a default judgment before Master Lai on 20 November 2017 (“the Judgment”) for the sum as set out in paragraph 1.  It is apparent from the Statement of Claim that the basis of the judgment was the enforcement of a loan agreement entered in writing on 4 April 2014 between the Applicant and D1.

5.  It would appear from D1’s then solicitors by their letter dated 4 December 2017 that D1 was “financially capable and willing to repay the loan save that his accounts have been frozen by a Court Order in [the present proceedings]”.  It then went on to produce a list of bank accounts and other assets of D1.  The indication from D1 is thus that he is willing to pay back the loan but for the existence of the Injunction Order.

6.  The Applicant explains that after it obtained the Judgment it sought to enforce it and in that respect sought garnishee proceedings against D1’s bank accounts held with HSBC, BOC and DBS.

7.  The Court granted Garnishee Orders Absolute against HSBC on 23 February 2018 and BOC on 29 August 2018.

8.  It would appear that while HSBC felt it was not in a position to release any funds as a result of the Injunction Order, BOC felt able to do so.

9.  Lok J on 27 December 2018 upon the joint application of the solicitors of the Applicant and those of the Plaintiff by consent granted leave to the Plaintiff and D1 to file evidence in opposition if they so wished and further directed D1 should be notified of the listing appointment.  This was because the Applicant had apparently not served the Summons on D1.  Clearly D1 should be given notice of this application.

10.  The Applicant has since filed an affirmation of service of this application on D1 by sending the papers to D1’s address by ordinary post.  It does not appear that D1 responded.  Given his previous position that is not surprising.

11.  The Receivers have indicated that they do not intend to make any submissions since this application concerns the scope of the Injunction order.

12.  Mr Dobby, Solicitor Advocate for the Plaintiff has filed helpful submissions and suggested how the Injunction Order could be varied so as to achieve what the Applicant wished to achieve while keeping the original Order in its original form as much as possible.

13.  Mr Lee, solicitor for the Applicant helpfully drew to my attention the judgment of DHCJ Le Pichon in United Asia Finance Limited v Yiu Tsz Ngar [2015] 2 HKLRD 189, where her Ladyship cited with approval the dicta of Lehane J in Re Ling, Ex parte Enrobook Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 87 at 92, where the precise character of Mareva relief was described in these terms:

“... It deprives the party subject to its restraint neither of title to nor of possession of the property to which it extends. It does not create a security interest, confer priority or in any sense rewrite insolvency law (AJ Bekhor & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] 2 All ER 565 at 579, 580 per Ackner LJ …); it is an order in persona restraining the party to whom it is directed from disposing of assets or removing them from the reach of creditors. The administration of the property is not placed in the hands of a receiver, trustee or other officer of the court, nor is it assumed by the court itself. For those reasons, to speak of a Mareva injunction as ‘freezing’ assets may, with respect, be somewhat misleading: it operates as a personal restraint against the party to whom it is directed. …

…

More importantly, however, the purpose of the Mareva injunction is to prevent a defendant from dissipating assets, or putting them beyond the reach of creditors, in circumstances where there is a real fear that, unless restrained, the defendant will do so. Its purpose is not to prevent creditors from exercising their rights. …

…

… a Mareva injunction is not a form of administration of the debtor’s property and should not be taken to have the effect on creditors’ rights or claims that an administration in bankruptcy, or an external administration under the Corporations Law, has ...”

14.  Having regard to the applicable principles as set out above I have not difficulty making an Order substantially in the form suggested by the Plaintiff which was agreed to by the Applicant.

15.  It remains for me to thank both parties’ solicitors for their helpful assistance.

(José Maurellet SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

  

Mr Lee Ming Tak of Lee & Yik Lawyers, for the applicants

Mr Chris Dobby (Solicitor Advocate) of Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

The 1st defendant was not represented and did not appear

[2019] HKCFI 1068-EN-2019-04-15

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

[2019] HKCFI 1068

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS)1st Plaintiff
 LIMITED (in liquidation) 
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL2nd Plaintiff
 OFFSHORE) LIMITED (in liquidation) 
and
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING5th Defendant
 COMPANY LIMITED 
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD 
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL12th Defendant
 LOGISTICS LTD(Discontinued)
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Chambers
Date of Hearing:15 April 2019
Date of Decision:15 April 2019

_______________

DECISION

_______________

Introduction

1.  By a summons filed on 21 March 2019 (“the summons”), the 2nddefendant seeks an order that (a) the trial which has been scheduled to commence on 14 October 2019 with 30 days reserved, i.e. until 22 November 2019 (“the Civil Trial Dates”), be vacated; and (b) the trial be re-fixed to commence on a date not before 16 December 2019 with 30 days reserved.  The application is opposed by the plaintiffs.

2.  I would first set out the relevant background.

Background

3.  In these proceedings, the 1st plaintiff is a listed company now in liquidation.  The 2ndplaintiff is the 1stplaintiff’s main operating subsidiary.  On 9 March 2015, Harris J handed down a judgment in which the learned judge found, in acceding to the Securities and Futures Commission’s petition to wind up the 1st plaintiff on public interest ground, that a fraud on a massive scale had been perpetrated by those in charge of the 1stplaintiff, on the basis that of, inter alia, the “Round Robin Scheme” and false bills of lading relating to the 2nd plaintiff in 2007 – 2009, 2012 and2013 involving the 2nd plaintiff’s suppliers and customers which were set up upon the instructions of the 1stdefendant or persons associated with him.  The learned judge found that the 1stdefendant exercised control over the 1stplaintiff and its subsidiaries at the relevant time [1].

4.  These proceedings were commenced by the liquidators acting on behalf of the plaintiffs against the 1st defendant (Chairman, CEO and majority shareholder of the 1st plaintiff), the 2nd defendant (the 1st defendant’s wife and co-founder and director of the plaintiffs), and various entities controlled or associated with them (the 3rd to the 10th defendants).  The 13thdefendant is the corporate vehicle and alter ego of the 1stdefendant.  The liquidators are trying to recover the loss and damage the plaintiffs have suffered by reason of a large-scale fraudulent scheme operated by those in control thereof and the related parties.

5.  The 2nd defendant is now the only defendant defending these proceedings.  The plaintiffs have discontinued this action against the 11th and the 12th defendants.  In respect of the other defendants, there have been default judgments entered against some of them, and the remaining defendants have been debarred from defending this action.

6.  Apart from these civil proceedings, the 2nd defendant is also a defendant in a set of criminal proceedings, HCCC 66/2018. The matters in the criminal proceedings are related to these civil proceedings. The 2nddefendant has been legally represented at all times in the criminal proceedings.

7.  In these civil proceedings, the 2nd defendant was legally represented at all times until 21 September 2017.  From that time onwards, the 2nddefendant has been acting in person. Her legal representatives representing her in this case management conference only have limited instructions to act for her in relation to the summons.  The 2nddefendant claims that due to the financial burden created by these civil proceedings and the criminal proceedings, she intends to act in person in the trial in these civil proceedings.

8.  On 1 February 2018, in a hearing before DHCJ Kent Yee in which the 2nddefendant appeared in person, the 2nddefendant agreed that this action should be set down for trial and raised no objection to the plaintiffs’ estimated length of the trial, ie 30 days.  The court ordered that this action be set down for trial with 30 days reserved.

9.  On 10 April 2018, the plaintiffs’ representatives and the 2nddefendant attended an appointment before the listing clerk and the Civil Trial Dates were fixed in that appointment.

10.  On 17 April 2018, the court issued a notice to the parties in this action, notifying the parties the Civil Trial Dates.

11.  On 27 December 2018, the liquidators’ solicitors received a letter from the 2nddefendant dated 21 December 2018, in which the 2nd defendant for the first time told the liquidators that the trial in HCCC 66/2018 had been fixed to commence on 16 September 2019 with 60 days reserved, ie until 10 December 2019 (“the Criminal Trial Dates”).  In her letter, the 2nd defendant said since the Criminal Trial Dates overlapped the Civil Trial Dates, she requested the liquidators to consent to postpone the trial in these civil proceedings.  Thereafter, there was correspondence passing between the liquidators’ solicitors and the 2nddefendant.  The liquidators do not agree to postpone the trial herein.

12.  The 2nd defendant has filed her 5thaffirmation in support of the summons, in which she claims the following:

(1)   On 18 December 2017, the criminal case was committed to the High Court.

(2)   On 26 February 2018, there was a hearing in the High Court, in which the prosecution sought an adjournment.

(3)   On 18 April 2018, the 1st case management hearing (“CMH”) in the criminal proceedings was held.

(4)   On 28 May 2018, the 2nd CMH was held.  In this CMH, it was pencil marked that the criminal trial would commence on1 August 2019.  The 2nd defendant realized that if the criminaltrial did last for 60 days, a few dates in the criminal trial would overlap with the Civil Trial Dates.  However, since the dates were only pencil marked and not yet confirmed, “it was entirely reasonable for [her] not to seek an adjournment of the Civil trial at that time.” [2]

(5)   On 12 July 2018, the 3rd CMH was held.

(6)   On 28 September 2018, the 4th CMH was held.

(7)   On 21 December 2018, in the 5th CMH, the Criminal Trial Dates were fixed.

(8)   After the 5th CMH, the 2nd defendant wrote to the liquidators notifying them the overlap of the Criminal Trial Dates and the Civil Trial Dates and requesting the liquidator to consent to postpone the trial in these civil proceedings. The liquidators have not agreed.

(9)   On 22 February 2019, the 6th CMH was held.  The liquidators’ solicitors attended this CMH.  The overlap of the Criminal Trial Dates and the Civil Trial Dates was discussed in that CMH.  The criminal court took the view that the criminal trial should proceed as scheduled.  

13.  The liquidators are not privy to the matters in the criminal proceedings, save and except that they attended a hearing in the Eastern Magistrates’ Court on 16 January 2017 and the 6thCMH.

Discussion

14.  Now there is a complete overlap of the Criminal Trial Dates and the Civil Trial Dates. The 2nddefendant must be present in the criminal court throughout the criminal trial.  That means if the Civil Trial Dates remain unchanged, the 2nddefendant would not be able to be present in the civil court during the civil trial.

15.  In my view, the 2nd defendant herself is the author of this difficult situation:

(1)   As pointed out by the liquidators, prior to the issue of the summons, the 2nd defendant has never informed the civil court the progress of the criminal proceedings in all the 13 case management conferences herein which took place over the period of July 2014 to February 2018.  I further note that in the hearing on 1 February 2018, the 2nddefendant did not draw the civil court’s attention to the fact that the criminal case had been committed to the High Court on 18 December 2017.  Had this been done, the civil court would have had been able to take the progress of the criminal proceedings into account in deciding whether this case should be set down for trial before the conclusion of the criminal case, and if yes, whetherit should be specified that the civil trial should take place after the conclusion of the criminal trial.

(2)   On 10 April 2018, while the parties were fixing the trial datesin these proceedings before the listing clerk, the 2nd defendant did not tell the liquidators’ representatives that the criminal case had been committed to the High Court.

(3)   In the criminal proceedings, in all the CMH took place between 18 April 2018 and 21 December 2018, the 2nddefendant did not tell the criminal court the Civil Trial Dates. 

(4)   At the time of the 2nd CMH held on 28 May 2018, the 2nddefendant knew that the trial dates in the criminal proceedings might at least partially overlap with the Civil Trial Dates.  Notwithstanding this, the 2nddefendant chose to remain silent.  The 2nd defendant did not tell the criminal court, nor the prosecution, nor the civil court, nor the liquidators of the risk of the overlap of the trial dates in the criminal case and the Civil Trial Dates.

(5)   In the 5thCMH held on 21 December 2018, before the criminal court fixing the trial dates, the 2nddefendant did not tell the criminal court the existence of the Civil Trial Dates.

16.  As the matter now stands, if I do not alter the Civil Trial Dates,the 2nd defendant would not be able to attend the civil trial.  On the other hand, if I re-fix the trial dates, realistically the liquidators would have to wait for a much longer time in order to have their day in court.  Ms Eva Sit, counsel for the plaintiffs, informs the court that the latest estimation of the length of the trial is approximately 18 – 20 days.  Ms Sit requests that the trial be re-scheduled to take place in the period between January and March 2020.  I have tried to accommodate counsel’s request but a 20-day timeslot is not available in the first quarter of 2020 in the court’s diary.  I have also checked the court’s diary and it is also not possible to find a 20-day timeslot to accommodate the civil trial before the commencement of the criminal trial on 16 September 2019.  In other words, once the trial dates are re-fixed, the trial would take place at a time after March 2020, probably a long time after the 1st quarter of 2020.  The delay caused by the re-fixing is substantial.

17.  Having considered the matter anxiously, I reluctantly come to the conclusion that the trial dates in these proceedings should be re-fixed, but the 2nddefendant has to pay the costs of and occasioned by the summons, including the costs thrown away by the adjournment of the trial, on an indemnity basis forthwith.  I would direct that the trial be re-fixed with 20 days reserved and the earliest available dates be given, in consultation with counsel’s diary. 

18.  The Civil Trial Dates are milestone dates and may not be varied unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation[3]. In my view, the fact that the 2nd defendant would not be able to attend the civil trial if the Civil Trial Dates remain unchanged constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying the variation of the trial dates. 

19.  The court has the duty to ensure that all the parties in these proceedings have a fair trial [4].  A fair trial means, inter alia, that each party would have the opportunity to attend the trial and to participate in the trial process, including to give evidence as a witness in the trial [5]. The 2nddefendant now intends to defend herself in person in the civil trial.  The 2nddefendant has the right to do so.  Even if the 2nddefendant is legally represented in the trial, the 2nd defendant still has the right to attend the trial in person to observe the trial process.  Further, the 2nddefendant herself is a factual witness in the trial.  She has the right to attend the trial to give evidence in support of her case.  The court cannot deprive the 2nddefendant of these rights.  In these circumstances, there is no other alternative and the trial dates in these proceedings have to be re-fixed.

20.  As said in the above, I am of the view that the 2nd defendant herself is the author of this difficult situation.  To show the court’s disapproval of her conduct, I am of the view that the 2nd defendant must pay the costs of and occasioned by the summons, including all costs thrown away, to the plaintiffs forthwith on an indemnity basis.  Those costs are to be summarily assessed on paper.

Disposition

21.  For the reasons above, I make the following order on the summons:

(1)   The trial scheduled to commence on 14 October 2019 with 30 days reserved be vacated;

(2)   The pre-trial review fixed on 12 June 2019 be vacated;

(3)   The trial be re-fixed with 20 days reserved in consultation with counsel’s diary, and the earliest available dates be given;

(4)   The pre-trial review be re-fixed with 30 minutes reserved in consultation with counsel’s diary, and the date of the pre-trial review be not less than 16 weeks before the re-scheduled trial;

(5)   The parties do attend the registry by tomorrow to re-fix the trial dates and the date of the pre-trial review;

(6)   Costs of and occasioned by the summons, including all costs thrown away by the adjournment of the trial, be paid by the 2nddefendant to the plaintiffs forthwith on an indemnity basis, and such costs be summarily assessed on paper.

22.  I further direct that the plaintiffs do lodge a bill of costs for summary assessment with the court and provide the same to the 2nddefendant within 7 days, and the 2nddefendant do provide a written reply to that bill to the court and to the plaintiffs within 7 days thereafter.

23.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for the assistance rendered to the court.

 
 

 (MK Liu)
 Deputy High Court Judge

  

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Ms Sharon HW Chan, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, limited instructions to act for the 2nd defendant in relation to the summons only

The 2nd defendant appeared in person (for the case management conference)



[1]Re China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd (No 3) [2015] 2 HKLRD 415

[2] 2nd defendant’s 5th affirmation, §11

[3] Rules of the High Court, Order 25, rule 1B(2) and (3); Practice Directions 5.2 §42

[4] Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Article 10

[5]Yu Cho Lam v Commissioner of Police & ors CACV 180/2014 (17 February 2015), [9] – [10]

108812-EN-2017-03-24

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (In Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

_____________________

BETWEEN
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (In Liquidation)1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED (In Liquidation)2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
 and 
 CHUN HEI MAN1st Respondent
 CHUN SIN WA2nd Respondent
 CHUN KA MAN3rd Respondent

_____________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Lee in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 27 February 2017
Date of Judgment: 24 March 2017

_____________________

JUDGMENT

_____________________


INTRODUCTION

1.  There are two applications before the court:

(a)   the application of the plaintiffs (P1 and P2) for continuation of the order of DHCJ Yee made on 22 August 2016 (“the Amendment Order”)[1] until further order;[2] and

(b)   the application of the respondents (R1‑R3, collectively “Rs”) for discharge or alternatively variation of the Amendment Order.[3]

2.  The Amendment Order is about the following two Mareva injunctions previously made and then amended by other judges:

(1)   the order first made by Tong J on 30 July 2013[4](“Tong Order”) against D1‑D12 in the main action, which was subsequently amended by DHCJ Geiser[5] and by Ng J;[6] and

(2)   the order first made by DHCJ Geiser on 7 August 2013[7] (“Geiser Order”) against D13 in the main action, which was subsequently amended by Ng J.[8]

3.  As far as the present applications are concerned, the effects of the Amendment Order are twofold:

(i)   to extend the Mareva injunctions against D1 and D13 to R1‑R3 as third parties, so that R1‑R3 are not allowed to dispose of or deal with or diminish the value of the assets belong to D1/D13 or which D1/D13 has the power to direct, dispose of or deal with.  In particular, R1 is restrained from dealing with a London property (“the Property”) or its proceeds; and

(ii)   to require R1‑R3 to make disclosure in respect of the Property in particular and also generally other assets held by them since 30 July 2013 on behalf of D1/D13 or administered or dealt with by them in accordance with D1’s/D13’s instruction or acquired with funds provided by or derived from D1/D13.[9]

There are provisions in common in Tong Order and Geiser Order extending/elaborating on the scope of the assets under restraint and in respect of which R1‑R3 are required to make disclosure.  Apart from the extended Mareva injunctions obtained in Hong Kong, Ps have also obtained an English ancillary order[10] against R1‑R3 in substantially the same scope as the Hong Kong orders which remains in place to date.

4.  Rs are the daughters of Mr Chun Chi‑wai (D1). D1 is the former chairman and CEO of P1.  He has jumped bail, resulting in forfeiture of his bail money.  Mrs Chun, his wife and Rs’ mother, I am told, has been charged by the police in relation to the massive fraud allegedly committed by her and her husband.  However, the criminal case is still at an early stage and no trial dates have been fixed.  Rs are all university students now studying full time in London.

5.  The Property, which is subjected to the freezing orders, is a luxurious apartment situated in Central London registered in the sole name of R1 which was purchased in cash (GBP 1.8 million) in late February 2014 without any mortgage.  As aforesaid, there are also substantial amounts of cash held respectively in Rs’ respective bank accounts in UK and in Hong Kong.[11] So far as it is relevant to the present applications, the current position is that:

(i)   Rs are not allowed to in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any assets of D1 and D13 (a company which he allegedly controlled) subject to a cap of HK$1,682,198,420, which is also the amount Ps are claiming against D1 and D13;

(ii)   R1‑R3 are allowed to live in the London Property; and

(iii)   each of R1‑R3 is allowed GBP 48,000 a year on tuition and living expenses and another GBP 25,000 on legal advice and representative.

THE ISSUES

6.  It is not in dispute that Rs, being full time students either in their young adulthood or late teen, do not have financial resources of their own.  The factual dispute between the parties is about the source of the purchase price of the Property and the substantial amounts of cash in the Rs’ bank accounts.  Rs’ case is that their assets were provided by Mrs Chun and their paternal grandmother (Madam Qin) which had nothing to do with Mr Chun.  On the other hand, it is Ps’ case that both Mrs Chun and Madam Qin are in fact nominees of Mr Chun and that any money which they might have provided to Rs was in fact property from or related to Mr Chun and therefore should also be subject to the various injunctions which have already been imposed.

7.  Apart from the factual disputes, R1‑R3 also raised two legal issues.  Firstly, they argue that the restraint and duty of disclosure imposed on them by the Amendment Order are wilder in scope than what is supported by the relevant case authorities.  In respect of the freezing order against them, they ask that the following be struck out:

(a)   §1.5: the words “or assets acquired through the use of funds provided by or deriving (directly or indirectly) from [D1/ D13]”; and

(b)   §1.6 in its entirety, namely: “For the purpose of paragraph 1.5, [D1’s/D13’s] assets include any asset which [he/it] has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were [his/its] own.  [D1/D13] is to be regarded as having such a power if a third party (including the Respondents or any one of them) holds or controls the asset in accordance with [his/its] direct or indirect instructions”.

8.  Secondly, for the same reason, R1‑R3 also ask that the following part of the consequential Disclosure Orders be either discharged or struck out:

“or administered by them or dealt with by them in accordance with [D1’s/D13’s] direct or indirect instructions or acquired through the use of funds provided by or deriving (directly or indirectly) from [D1/D13]”[12]

9.  Thirdly, R1‑R3 argue that the remainder of Tong Order and Geiser Order against them are defective in that they require Rs to ascertain for themselves whether the assets they held in fact belong to D1 or D13.  The task, it is submitted, is “impossible” for Rs.  It is further submitted that two Orders fall foul of being unclear by making reference only to the “assets of [D1/D13]” without identifying those assets with precision so that “everyone should know exactly what acts are prohibited by the injunction”.

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

10.  Rs are not parties to the main action.  The extended Mareva injunctions against them were sought on Chabra basis, following the decision in TSB Bank International v Chabra.[13]

11.  The relevant legal principles are well‑established.  The threshold for the exercise of Chabra jurisdiction is where there is “good reason to suppose” that the assets of the third party are, in truth, the assets of the injuncted defendant.  In such cases, the Chabra jurisdiction will be exercised where it is “just and convenient” to do so.  The court is not obliged to discharge the injunction on the mere say‑so of the third party: SCF FinanceCo Ltd v Masri.[14]  However, this jurisdiction is exceptional and should be exercised with caution, taking care that it should not operate oppressively to innocent third parties who have not acted to frustrate the administration of justice.  The ultimate test is always whether there is good reason to suppose that the assets would be amendable to execution of a judgment obtained against the defendant in the main action: see XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor[15] citing with approval Paul Cardile v LED Building Proprietary Ltd.[16]

12.  “Good reason to suppose” in this context means a good arguable case that there are assets, apparently vested in the third party, which may be beneficially the property of the defendant and therefore available to satisfy the plaintiff’s claims against him if established at trial.  The plaintiff does not need to demonstrate a balance of probabilities.  A good arguable case is “one which is more than barely capable of serious argument, but yet not necessarily one which the judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success”: Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmbH.[17]

13.  As to the scope of assets that can be subject to Chabra jurisdiction, it is not limited to cases where the assets to which the defendant is beneficially entitled can be specifically identified in the hands of the third party; once the court is satisfied that there are such assets in the possession or control of the third party, the court could make an order over the third party’s assets up to the amount of the defendant’s assets of which the third party appears to have possession and control: see Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investments Corp.[18]

BACKGROUND

14.  Before dealing with the issues, it is pertinent for me to make reference to the history of the case, which is lengthy and protracted, insofar as it is relevant to the present proceedings.

15.  There have already been many court proceedings before various judges.  A narrative of it is neatly summarised by DHCJ Judge Yee,[19] which I gratefully adopt as follows:

“3. China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited (“China Metal”) is now in compulsory liquidation. It was incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of business situated in Hong Kong. It is the holding company of a number of subsidiary companies in the PRC, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands (“the China Metal Group”). The China Metal Group carried on a worldwide trade in scrap metal with the major operations being vested in the subsidiaries in the Mainland.

4. Central Steel (Macao Commercial Offshore) Limited (“Central Steel”) is also in compulsory liquidation. It was incorporated in Macau and was purportedly the sourcing arm of the China Metal Group.

5. The scrap metal recycling business of the Group was said to be on a grand scale in the Mainland. On 22 June 2009, the shares of China Metal were listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and about HK$1,685 million was raised by the initial public offering.

6. Mr Chun and Madam Lai, husband and wife, founded the China Metal Group. Mr Chun was the Chairman and CEO of China Metal and its controlling shareholder.

7. The investigation of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) in late 2009 lifted the lid on the alleged misdeeds of Mr Chun and Madam Lai leading to the present proceedings. The SFC found out that Mr Chun had committed fraud on a massive scale on China Metal, Central Steel and the Stock Exchange. As a result, more than HK$5 billion were misappropriated from these two companies mainly by means of a number of fictitious transactions over the years with the assistance of all other defendants.

8. On 26 July 2013, in a winding-up petition commenced by SFC under HCCW 210/2013, Mr Borrelli and Ms Chi were appointed provisional liquidators in respect of China Metal and on 8 August 2013, they were appointed provisional liquidators in respect of Central Steel.

9. On 30 July 2013, the provisional liquidators obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against Mr Chun and Madam Lai and all other defendants in this action except Wellrun Limited (“Wellrun”) up to the value of HK$1,682,198.420.  Wellrun, a corporate vehicle of Mr Chun, was joined as the 13th defendant in this action and an ex parte Mareva injunction in respect of the like amount was granted against Wellrun on 7 August 2013.

10. On 4 June 2014, Ng J extended the Mareva injunctions to 13 companies which Mr Chun allegedly held substantial assets through his relatives and close associates.  Among these companies, the three daughters of Mr Chun own Chung Shing Finance Holding Limited (Belize) (“Chung Shing Belize”), which holds Chung Shing Development Pte Limited (Singapore) and Chung Shing Investment Pte Ltd (Singapore), the second respondent (“R2”). R2 holds Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Limited (HK), the 1st respondent (“R1”).  R1 holds 4 PRC subsidiaries which include the 4th respondent (“R4”), Zhongjin Goldman (Jiangsu) Investment Co Ltd (“the Jiangsu Company”), the 3rd respondent (“R3”) and the 5th respondent (“R5”).

11. The provisional liquidators allege that Wellrun purportedly loaned a sum of US$82 million to R1.  The purported loan was transferred to R3 and the Jiangsu Company subsequently.  As mentioned, Mr Chun’s three daughters have become the shareholders of Chung Shing Belize.  The purported loan is suspect.

12. On 26 February 2015, Harris J ordered that China Metal be wound up.  On 14 May 2015, Mr Borelli and Ms Chi (hereinafter “the Liquidators”) were appointed as liquidators in respect of China Metal and on 10 July 2015 in respect of Central Steel. 

13. In the present action, China Metal and Central Steel (hereinafter collectively “Ps”) claim against both Mr Chun and Madam Lai for an indemnity for any claims against China Metal arising from the IPO, equitable damages and/or compensation for breach of trust and/or fiduciary duty and /or damages for conspiracy.  They also claim against Wellrun for an identical indemnity and equitable damages and/or compensation for dishonest assistance and/or damages for conspiracy.

14. Default judgment has been entered against the 3rd, 4th, 7th 8th, 9th and 10th defendants.  The 5th defendant has been debarred from defending this action pursuant to the order of Saunders, J dated 25 June 2014. Ps discontinued this action against the 11th and 12th defendants.

15. On account of their failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in aid of the Mareva injunctions despite its being enforced by the unless order of Chow J dated 17 November 2014, DHCJ Anita Yip SC ordered that the defence of Ds be struck out without entering default judgment against them on 12 October 2015.

16. On 5 February 2016, DHCJ Keith heard and disposed of an inter partes application of Ps for an appointment of interim receivers (“the 1st Receivership Application”) over the assets of five company respondents.[20]  [C1‑C5] The deputy judge accepted that there is a triable issue over whether the liquidation of the Jiangsu Company and the current whereabouts of its assets were deliberately concealed from the Liquidators and whether the Mareva injunctions were breached.

17. The deputy judge also accepted that there is a triable issue as to whether there is a risk that there will be further breaches of the Mareva injunctions unless drastic action of some kind is taken.  The deputy judge opined that the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of [C1], [C2] and [C5] would be a proportionate response to the need to protect the assets of the Jiangsu Company from further dissipation subject to the personal undertaking of Mr Fung who is a certified public account in his executive control of the relevant respondents that he would ensure none of their assets would be disposed of in breach of the Mareva injunctions.  On that basis, the deputy judge agreed to place trust in Mr Fung and adjourned the 1st Receivership Application so that it could be renewed at the same time as the application as against the [C3] and [C4] which Ps had not been able to effect service of their summons.”

16.  In respect of the shares of Chung Shing Belize (which ultimately controlled the company which had received US$82 million from D13) mentioned at §10 of the judgment of DHCJ Yee above, the daughters (R1‑R3) have given an undertaking to the court not to deal with those shares or to do anything to diminish the value of their shareholding.[21]  The daughters’ case, which was based on an affirmation given by their mother, was that the shares were a “secret gift” from their father which they had not even known about.[22]

CONSIDERATION ON LEGAL ISSUES

As to the scope of restraint

17.  Ms Sit, counsel for Ps, argues that Chabra jurisdiction can be exercised in situations where the defendant, even without any legal or equitable right to the assets (in the strict trust law sense), has some right in respect of, or control over, or other rights of access to, the assets.  In other words, as long as he has “substantive control” over the assets that would suffice.  References are made to Dadourian Group International Inc v Azuri Ltd[23] and Akai Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Ho Wing On Christopher.[24]

18.  Ms Sit’s above submission is on its face attractive.  However, a closer reading of the relevant parts of Dadourian and Akai shows that they do not in fact support her broad proposition that “substantive control” of itself is sufficient to invoke Chabra jurisdiction, nor was the point appeared to have been argued at any length in the two cases she relies upon.  What the two cases have decided is that “substantive control” is an important consideration and that Chabra jurisdiction “can be” exercised where a defendant is shown to have “substantive control” over the assets held by a third party.  I note, however, that in Akai, Tang VP (as he then was), giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said,

“48. It is true that there is as yet no claim made against Accolade, although one cannot rule out the possibility of a claim against Accolade on the basis that if Accolade was indeed the beneficial owner of the Ho Family Trust, Mr Ho acted as its servants or agent in the alleged fraud. However, for the present purpose, it is sufficient if there is good reason to suppose that Mr Ho has substantive control over the Ho Family Trust Assets. The nature and degree of control may have to be investigated in due course. (Mr Kosmin suggested as a possibility, in execution of judgment.) It is sufficient for the present purpose that for all intents and purposes, Mr Ho has represented to the whole world that he was the beneficial owner of the trust. Also notwithstanding the assertion that Accolade and its directors actually managed and controlled the trust, there has been no explanation how it was that the trust was silent all these years about Mr Ho’s representation that he was the beneficial owner of the trust. These may have to be properly investigated in due course.” (Emphasis supplied)

By emphasizing twice “for the present purpose” in the above paragraph, it is obvious that Tang VP was not laying down any general principle that “substantive control” would in all circumstances be sufficient.   In my humble view, what Tang VP was saying that in the factual context of the case before him, “substantial control” would be sufficient for invoking Chabra jurisdiction against Accolade (a third party), which was the trustee of the Ho Family Trust, when, Mr Ho had represented to the whole world that he was the beneficial owner of the trust and the latter had kept silent about it.

19.  That said, I have no difficulties with the proposition that in a suitable factual situation “substantial control” by a defendant of the asset of a third party may well be a factor, or even a strong factor, in favour of the inference that the asset in fact belongs to the defendant.  I also have no difficulty that Chabra jurisdiction can also be invoked even in cases where a defendant does not have some sort of proprietary entitlement over the asset of a third party.  As said in Paul Cardile v LED Building Proprietary Ltd,[25]

“What then is the principle to guide the courts in determining whether to grant Mareva relief in a case such as the present where the activities of third parties are the object sought to be restrained?  In our opinion such an order may, and we emphasise the word “may”, be appropriate, assuming the existence of other relevant criteria and discretionary factors, in circumstances in which:

(i) the third party holds, is using, or has exercised or is exercising a power of disposition over, or is otherwise in possession of, assets, including “claims and expectancies”, of the judgment debtor or potential judgment debtor; or

(ii) some process, ultimately enforceable by the courts, is or may be available to the judgment creditor as a consequence of a judgment against that actual or potential judgment debtor, pursuant to which, whether by appointment of a liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or otherwise, the third party may be obliged to disgorge property or otherwise contribute to the funds or property of the judgment debtor to help satisfy the judgment against the judgment debtor.

It is that principle which we would apply to this case. Its application is a matter of law, although discretionary elements are involved.”

20.  On the other hand, there are clear case authorities that “substantial control” is not the test for Chabra.  In PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Maksimov,[26] which was cited with approval in XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor, Popplewell J said at §32:

“(5) Substantial control by the CAD[27]over the assets in the name of the NCAD[28]is often a relevant consideration, but substantial control is not the test for the existence and exercise of the Chabra jurisdiction. Establishing such substantial control will not necessarily justify the freezing of the assets in the hands of the NCAD. Substantial control may be relevant in two ways. First, evidence that the CAD exercises substantial control over the assets may be evidence from which the court will infer that the assets are held as nominee or trustee for the NCAD as the ultimate beneficial owner. Secondly, such evidence may establish that there is a real risk of dissipation of the assets in the absence of a freezing order, which the claimant will have to establish in order for it to be just and convenient to make the order. But the establishment of substantial control over the assets by the CAD will not necessarily be sufficient: a parent company may exercise substantial control over a wholly owned subsidiary, but the principles of separate corporate personality require the assets to be treated as those of the subsidiary not the parent. The ultimate test is always whether there is good reason to suppose that the assets would be amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against the CAD.” (Emphasis supplied)

As a matter of stare decisis, I am bound by XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor which is a judgment of the Court of Appeal directly on point.

21.  I now turn to the relevant parts of the injunctions which are challenged by Mr Mok.  For the sake of convenience, they are reproduced below, with the parts objected to under this ground underscored.

1.5   Subject to the monetary value of HK$1,682,198,420 capped at paragraph 1.1 above, the 1st to 3rd Respondents (“Respondents”) and each of them (whether acting by herself and/or through others howsoever, including but not limited to her agents and/or nominees and/or servants) must not in any way dispose of or deal with or diminish the value of any assets of [D1/D13].  This applies to all of the assets of [D1/D13] whether or not they are in his name, whether they are solely or jointly owned and whether he is interested in them legally, beneficially or otherwise (which for the avoidance of doubt and without limitation includes assets held by any one or more of the Respondents as nominee or trustee for [D1/D13] or assets acquired through the use of funds provided by or deriving (directly or indirectly) from [D1/D13]).

1.6   For the purpose of paragraph 1.5, [D1’s/D13’s] assets include any asset which [he/it] has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were [his/its] own.  [D1/D13] is to be regarded as having such a power if a third party (including the Respondents or any one of them) holds or controls the asset in accordance with [his/its]direct or indirect instructions.

22.  The parts underscored above can be divided into three broad categories:

(i) assets acquired through the use of funds provided by D1/D13;

(ii) assets which D1/D13 has the power to dispose of or deal with as his/its own; and

(iii) assets held in accordance with the instructions of D1/D13.

23.  I fully accept the proposition that the above three categories are capable of being important pointers to the existence of good reasons to suppose that the assets under consideration are amenable to the execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13.  However, applying XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor, the categories are not in themselves the test for invoking Chabra jurisdiction.  In particular, whilst Category (i) is capable of giving rise to the inference that the asset under consideration in fact belongs to D1/D13, in my view a distinction should be drawn between a piece of evidence adduced for proving a certain matter and the matter itself.  As regards Categories (ii) and (iii), with respect, they are different ways of saying that the asset under consideration is subject to the “substantial control” of [D1/D13].  Insofar as Clauses 1.5 & 1.6 seek to equate an asset falling within the three categories to an asset of D1/D13, this, with respect, is incorrect in view of PJSC Vseukrainskyi Aktsionernyi Bank v Maksimov and XY, LLC v Jesse Zhu & Anor.

24.  Given my view that as a matter of law assets falling within any of the three categories above are not necessarily amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13, I do not think that the presence of the words underscored about can be justified on the basis that assets falling within them may turn out to be so amenable.  In my view, since the breach of an injunction may lead to penal consequences, it is imperative that its terms should comply strictly with the law.

25.  In the circumstances, I accept Mr Mok’s submission that those parts in Clauses 1.5 & 1.6 underlined above have gone beyond what is permitted pursuant to Chabra jurisdiction and should therefore be struck out from the extended Mareva injunctions.

As to the injunctions as a whole

26.  Mr Mok submits that the remainder of the injunctions are defective in that they fall foul of the principle that an injunction must identify the assets with precision so that “everyone should know exactly what acts are prohibited by the injunction”. It is submitted that it is no good for a freezing order to prohibit a third party from dealing with the assets of the defendant, leaving it to the third party to find out for himself what those assets might be.  In the present case, so far as R1‑R3 are aware, the funds in their bank accounts were from their mother and grandmother.  Given such state of their knowledge, it would have been impossible for R1‑R3 to identify any of the monies in their respective bank accounts as constituting the assets of D1 or D13.

27.  In reply, Ms Sit draws my attention to the following passage from Dadourian,[29] which I respectfully agree:

“Since the purpose of granting such an injunction against the co‑defendant was to preserve the assets of the principal defendant so as to be available to meet a judgment against him, the form of order made against the co‑defendant should be as specific as the circumstances permitted in respect of the principal defendant's assets of which the co-defendant had possession or control. Thus, generally, the form of injunction would be tailored to that purpose and should be no wider than was necessary to achieve it. However, subject to that requirement, if a co‑defendant was mixed up in an attempt to make the principal defendant judgment‑proof and the assets or their proceeds were not readily identifiable in his hands it was open to the court, where it was just and convenient to do so, to make an order which caught the co-defendant's general assets up to the amount of the principal defendant's assets of which he appeared to have possession and control. That was, in fact, the position in Chabra (TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231) itself.” (Emphasis supplied)

28.  Applying the above passage to the present case, I am unable to accept Mr Mok’s submission that the remainder of the freezing orders against R1‑R3 (ie after deleting the words underscored as discussed above), is defective.  My reasons are as follows:

(a)   As aforesaid, R1‑R3 are young and do not have business or financial resources of their own. Therefore, the inference is that nearly all they have were given to them by their close relatives.  A further inference can be drawn that they should know where their assets come from.

(b)   In any event, since there is nothing to suggest that R1‑R3 have received any substantial assets from anyone other than their parents (D1 and Mrs Chun) and their grandmother (Madam Qin), the possible sources of the respondent’s assets are very limited.  The task for R1‑R3 to ascertain the source of their assets is therefore not “impossible”.

(c)   However, as can be seen in the later discussion, there are at least good reasons to suppose that even Mrs Chun and Madam Qin are nominees of D1.

(d)   The incident about the alleged “secret gift” of the shares of Chung Shing Belize mentioned above speaks volumes that D1 had used Rs to hold shares which were worth as much as US$82 million.  That, coupled with the fact that Rs are D1’s daughters and therefore would be trusted by him, in my view gives rise to at least goods reasons to suppose that D1 would also have used them to hold other assets for him.

(e)   Mr Mok submits that it would be “wholly unreasonable to expect the Daughters to be able to second-guess” what their mother told them were the sources of their funds.  With respect, that is not a reason not to make a freezing order against Rs if there are good reasons to suppose that their assets are amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13 and that it is just and convenience that a freezing order be made against Rs pending the outcome of the Masri procedure. In this regard, I note that it is Rs’ case that the shares of Chung Shing Belize were transferred to them without them knowing about it.  Despite their alleged lack of knowledge, they have still given an undertaking to the court not to deal with those shares.  There is little dispute that but for Rs’ undertaking to the court, a freezing order would have been made.   

29.  Based on the above, given what my view is about the sources of Rs’ assets in the discussion below, I can see no objection to the making of an order which catches the general assets of Rs up to the amount of D1 of which they appear to have possession and control.  Rs are only students and they do not require any money for doing business.  There is nothing to suggest that the present levels of allowances given to R1 R3 for their tuition fees and living expenses on the one hand and legal fees on the other are insufficient for their purpose.  The freezing orders, after removing the parts underscored as discussed about, are not in my view objectionable.

As to scope of disclosure order

30.  Clause 2.7(a) of Tong Order and Clause 2.3(a) of Geiser Order are similarly phrased.  Again, for the sake of convenience, they are reproduced as below with the part objected to under this ground underscored:

“all assets with a value of HK$50,000 or more which have at any time since 30 July 2013 been held by any one or more of the Respondents on behalf of [D1/D13], or administered by them or dealt with by them in accordance with [D1’s/D13’s] direct or indirect instructions or acquired through the use of funds provided by or deriving (directly or indirectly) from [D1/D13], giving the current value, location and details of all such assets and the manner in which they have administered or dealt with the same.”

31.  In considering whether the words underscored above should be struck down or varied, I bear in mind that disclosure of assets is a necessary adjunct of a freezing order to make it effective.  I also bear in mind the general principles stated in Pacific King Shipping Holdings Pte Ltd v Huang Ziqiang.[30]  Jeremy Poon J (as he then was), giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, noted that the main underlying consideration for ordering disclosure is to prevent abuse by the defendant to frustrate or defeat the very purpose of the Mareva injunction.  Absent any evidence of abuse such as non-compliance with the Mareva injunction, the court will normally refuse to order further disclosure in addition to the standard disclosure.  His Lordship also quoted with approval a passage from Gee on Commercial Injunction (5th ed) that there are situations where the court would order disclosure against a third party, eg there may be an issue as to whether certain assets belong beneficially to the defendant, and therefore should be subject to a Mareva injunction, or information may be needed to enable the court to formulate injunctions against several defendants in appropriate terms, as in A v C (No 1),[31] or to make a Mareva injunction fully effective (eg by enabling the court to specify particular assets in the order which can then be notified to non-parties holding the defendant’s assets).  It may be that information is needed because the defendant cannot be relied upon to obey the court order and it is necessary to take steps to preserve the assets in the hands of non‑parties.[32]

32.  I am alive that the power to order disclosure, if too readily resorted to, could easily become an oppressive procedure especially in case of a third parity.  Therefore, this court must strike a balance between what Ps would reasonably require as against the need to avoid making an order that was unreasonable, unnecessary or oppressive.

33.  Having considered the written and oral submissions from both sides, I am of the view that the present case is very unlike the situation in Pacific King Shipping Holdings and that the underlined part of the disclosure order against R1‑R3 above is not objectionable in that it has not gone beyond the ambit of the associated freezing orders and is no more than what is necessary in order to make the underlying Mareva injunction effective.  My reasons are as follows:

(a)   There have already been many occasions where D1 had apparently attempted to frustrate or defeat the Mareva injunction against him, a prime example of which is the US$82 million worth of “secret gift” which he had allegedly given to R1‑R3.  D1 has denied knowing the current whereabouts of the residual sums of the US$82 million.[33]

(b)   There is substantial evidence before the court that D1 cannot be relied upon to obey court order and it is necessary to take steps to preserve the assets in the hands of non-parties.  In fact, the non‑compliance by D1/D13 with the unless order imposed by Chow J has already caused their defence to be struck out.[34]  Their appeal against the striking‑out has recently been dismissed by the Court of Appeal.[35]

(c)   There is also substantial evidence before the court of D1’s habitual practice to use members of his family as nominees.[36] 

(d)   There is an issue as to whether the assets of R1‑R3 in fact belong beneficially to D1/D13 and therefore should be subject to a Mareva injunction.[37]

(e)   Ps are not seeking to have a tracing remedy as if in a proprietary claim.  Ps, by the disclosing order made against R1‑R3, are simply seeking to ascertain whether there are other assets (not yet known to Ps) which R1‑R3 are holding for D1/D3 which should also be subject to the associated freezing orders.  Information pertaining to the words underscored above in the disclosure order is plainly relevant to and necessary for Ps’ enquiry and is necessary for prevention of abuse by D1/D13.[38]

(f)    Rs are only required to make disclosure of assets with a value of HK$50,000 or more relating to D1/D13 and there is also a time restriction from 30 July 2013.  The burden on them is reasonable.

34.  In the circumstances, I refuse R1‑R3’s application to strike out or varied the disclosure orders made against them.

MRS CHUN & MADAM QIN

35.  Evidence has been filed, in the form of an affirmation from Mrs Chun,[39] on behalf of R1‑R3 which purports to explain that Mrs Chun and Madam Qin were the sources of the purchase price of the Property and the funds in the bank accounts of R1‑R3.  In particular, Mrs Chun explained that the purchase price of the Property and the funds in Rs’ bank accounts came mainly from the following:

(a)   the proceeds (HK$18.5 million) of sale on 28 March 2013 of a property belonging to Mrs Chun’s company (Whampoa) which she then tried to transfer to R1’s UK account on 7 August 2013;

(b)   a loan (RMB 24.49 million) dated 20 September 2013 secured by the mortgage[40] of Mrs Chun’s Shanghai property which loan proceeds she claims to have gifted to R1‑R3; and

(c)   a cash transfer of GBP 749,993 from Madam Qin to R1 on 22 August 2014 which sum is said to be the proceeds of sale of Madam Qin’s property in 2013.

36.  On the other hand, Ms Chi, one of the joint and several liquidators, has filed a lengthy affirmation giving a detailed rebuttal of the version given by Mrs Chun.

37.  Ms Sit, in her very helpful written and oral submissions, has given a plethora of reasons as to why this court should reject what Mrs Chun said in her affirmation.  In my view, the reasons given by Ms Sit are valid ones.  For present purpose, it suffices for me to name just a few of them:

(a)   It is plain that neither Mrs Chun nor Madam Chun would have been in a position to gift away such substantial amounts of cash to Rs:

(i)   as regards Mrs Chun, if what she says about her means (HK$250,000 per annum, which ceased from August 2013 onwards)[41] and assets (which amount to about HK$4.75 million) were true,[42] then she would be unable to meet her living expenses (running at HK$344,000 per month)[43] and the legal fees of her family, including those of D1 and Rs;[44] and

(ii)   as regards Madam Qin, by way of background, she is said to be a retired worker employed by the Environmental Bureau in Guangzhou.[45]  After that, she was on the payroll of GAS Property Ltd with a monthly salary of a mere RMB 3,000.[46]  Although she is the shareholder of the Asia Steel group of companies, Ng J has already held[47] that there are good reasons to suppose that she held those shares (and their assets) as nominee for D1, such that his Mareva injunctions should be extended to over those companies and assets.  There has been no appeal from Ng J’s order.  As to the assertion that Madam Qin is a skilled investor, there is evidence that she held her trading account as a nominee for D1.[48]

(b)   As regards Mrs Chun’s company, Whampoa, D1 was one of its initial shareholders and directors.  D1 resigned as director and assigned his shares to Mrs Chun only on 2 December 2008 at the eve of the IPO of P1.[49] However, Whampoa had been used to receive and defray payments on behalf of D1 as a matter of course.  As regards the Whampoa property, all mortgage payments came either from the company or D1.  D1 even repaid on Whampoa’s behalf its book debts owed to Mrs Chun.  Conversely, there is no evidence that Mrs Chun ever contributed to the purchase price of the Whampoa property and/or paid any sum in discharge of the mortgages.[50]  The way in which the proceeds of the sale of the property were transferred is also highly suspicious.  The proceeds were originally transferred to Mrs Chun’s UK bank account in June/July 2013.  On 26 July 2013, the SFC presented a petition against P1.  On 30 July 2013, a Mareva injunction was granted against Mrs Chun with a disclosure order requiring her to disclose all her assets within 48 hours.  However, she did not file her disclosure affirmation until 8 August 2013 and when she did that the disclosure affirmation did not contain any information about her attempted transfer to R1 of GBP 1.6 million the day before on 7 August 2013.[51]  It is noted, however, that R1, as a student, would not be in need of such a huge sum of money at the time, as the pre-sale agreement for the Property only entered into by R1 in late February/March 2014.  All of the above, in my view, give rise to at least good reasons to suppose that Mrs Chun had been acting as D1’s nominee as regards the affairs of Whampoa and that the GBP 1.6 million which she subsequently transferred to R1 was in fact D1’s money which D1 sought to hide from the liquidators.

(c)   As regards the Shanghai property, Mrs Chun in her affirmation filed for the present purpose is silent as to the source of funds used to acquire it.  She does not say that the Shanghai property or the source of funds was a “gift” to her or admit that they were derived from D1.  In D1’s own case, however, he said that the Shanghai property was in fact paid by him.[52] Concerning the alleged mortgage loan from one “Chen Min Dai”, the mortgage was never registered.  This stands in stark contrast with the Guangzhou property the mortgage of which was registered.  The lack of registration of the Shanghai loan casts grave doubt on its genuineness, especially in view of the allegedly large amount involved.  Regarding the alleged loan proceeds, Mrs Chun asserted that she had kept part of the money (HK$12.7 million) in cash in Hong Kong which she later remitted to her daughters with the help of moneychangers.  The notion that Mrs Chun would have kept such a large sum in cash is suspicious to say the least.  Moreover, there is no documentary proof linking the alleged mortgage loan with the transfers to R1‑R3.  On the other hand, her assertion about the use of moneychangers in effecting the transfers makes little sense, as both her and her daughters have bank accounts with the same bank (ie HSBC) in UK and she had regularly made direct transfers from her bank account to theirs.  All in all, what Mrs Chun says about the alleged mortgage loan is on its face so beset with difficulties that for present purpose I can hardly attach any weight to it.

(d)   Out of the GBP 1.6 million which Mrs Chun transferred to R1 in August 2013, GBP 140,000 was not traceable to the proceeds of sale of the Whampoa property.[53]  Mrs Chun has failed to explain the source of those GBP 140,000 in her affirmation filed for the present hearing.[54]

(e)   As regards the money allegedly came from Madam Qin, as discussed above, there are in my view strong reasons to doubt that she was in fact a person of substantial means.  There are also no bank statements or other documents to show her total assets.  On the other hand, it was apparent that the PRC property, which she said she had realised with a net gain of just under RMB 10 million in August 2013, had been the only property in her name as she had since lived in the Guangzhou property of Mrs Chun.  And yet, on 22 August 2014, which was a year after the sale, she remitted GBP 749,993 to R1.  There was no documentary proof linking the same sale with the transfer.  Besides, one would doubt why R1, still a full time student, would need such an amount of cash at the time.  In all the circumstances, including the aforesaid evidence which points to Madam Qin being a nominee of D1, there is in my view at least good reasons to suppose that the money she remitted to R1 was in fact D1’s money.

(f)   There were two payments into R1’s bank account of HK$1.4 million[55] and HK$200,000[56] which have not been satisfactory accounted for.  Although R1 asserts that those were from Mrs Chun, as pointed out by Ms Sit (i) there are no documentary proof of that, when those documents could have been easily obtained; and (ii) even Mrs Chun in her affirmation has not corroborated those bare assertions of R1.

38.  In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Ps have shown that there are at least good reasons to suppose that the Property as well as the funds in Rs’ bank accounts in Hong Kong and in UK are in fact assets of D1 or that they are amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13.  In coming to the above view, I have not ignored Mr Mok’s submission that there is an assumption of advancement in favour of Mrs Chun (and perhaps also Rs) regarding the assets which were or believed to have originated from D1.  Yet, as noted by Litton NPJ in Cheung Pui Yuen v Worldcup Investments Inc,[57] the presumption of advancement is nothing more than an evidential tool; its weight varies with the circumstances of the case.  In Suen Shu Tai v Tam Fung Tai,[58] the Court of Appeal observed that the presumption of advancement is a rather weak concept these days.  I am also alive that I am not conducting a mini trial on affirmation evidence.  What I need to decide is whether, in view of the assumption of advancement in favour of Mrs Chun and Rs, Ps can still show that in the circumstances of the present case there are “good reasons to suppose” that the various assets under consideration (the shares and the properties) are in true D1’s assets or assets which are amenable to execution of a judgment obtained against D1/D13.  In my view, looking at all the relevant evidence as a whole, there are such good reasons to suppose even after taking into account the assumption of advancement.

39.  I am also satisfied that it is obviously just and convenient that the freezing orders (subject to the deletion of the words underscored above) and the disclosure order against Rs should continue, bearing in mind that Rs are allowed to stay in the Property, that there are no suggestions that the allowances they are currently permitted are not sufficient for their purpose or that they have suffered any hardship.

CONCLUSION

40.  I allow Ps’ application for the continuation of the Amendment Order, subject to the deletion from the freezing orders the words underscored as discussed above.

41.  Rs’ application for the variation of the freezing orders is allowed to the limited extent as discussed above.  However, their application for the discharge/variation of the disclosure order is refused.

42.  As aforesaid, the issue about the ownership of Rs’ assets should be the subject matter of a trial according to the Masri procedure. However, Rs are still studying and preferably the Masri procedure should take place not during school term.  Moreover, the date for the criminal trial of Mrs Chun, who will be an important witness for Rs, is not yet known. Therefore, I leave it for the parties to discuss the preferable hearing dates for the Masri procedure.  For avoidance of doubt, whilst I have expressed certain views above in relation to the probabilities or otherwise of certain matters, those views are necessarily provisional in the sense that they are based solely on affirmation evidence.  The judge who is going to preside over the Masri procedure will of course be entitled to form his own views on those matters and he will also have the added advantage, which I do not have, of seeing and hearing to witnesses giving evidence in the witness box.

COSTS

43.  Given the aforesaid results, I am of the view that Ps are the major winner of this hearing, although Rs are successful in having part of the freezing order against them varied.  Looking at the matter in the round, I make an order nisi that Ps have three‑fourth of their costs relating to the two applications before this court, to be taxed, if not agreed.

   

  

 (Alex Lee)
Deputy High Court Judge

  

Ms Eva Sit instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Lau, Kwong & Hung, for the 1st and 13th defendants, excused

Mr Johnny Mok SC and Mr Alexander Tang instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the respondents



[1] Core Bundle [CB]/4/12

[2] Ps’ Summons, CB/1/1

[3] Rs’ Summons, CB/2/5

[4] CB/11/123

[5] On 7 August 2013, CB/4/16

[6] On 3 June 2014, CB/4/35

[7] CB/12/141

[8] On 3 June 2014

[9] Rs are, however, not required to provide again any information or documentation that they have already provided pursuant to the Order of B Chu J dated 17 August 2015 (at A/p 115, concerning the whereabouts of the US$82 million originated from D13): see Clauses 2.7(a) & 2.9, CB/p 21; and Clauses 2.3 & 2.5, CB/p39.

[10] On 23 August 2016

[11] R1: about GBP 300,000 in UK NatWest account and about HK$186,000 in HK HSBC account

(E/1/6-9)

R2: about GBP 400,000 in UK NatWest account and about HK$1,590,000 in HK HSBC account

(E/4/266-268)

R3: about GBP 400,000 in UK NatWest account and about HK$568,000 in HK HSBC account

   (E/2/189)

[12] Clause 2.7(a), CB/4/20; Clause 2.3(a), CB/4/39

[13] [1992] 1 WLR 231

[14] [1985] 1 WLR 876, 880H, 881B, 884B-E

[15] CACV 11/2016 (5 December 2016), at §24.

[16] (1999) 198 CLR 380

[17] [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600, at 605

[18] [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 113, at §§43‑44

[19] See the judgment by DHCJ Yee dated 10 March 2016.

[20] Namely, Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd [C1]; Chung Shing Investment Pte [C2]; Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Financing Lease Co Ltd [C3]; Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Equity Investment Management Co Ltd [C4]; and Chung Shing Finance Corporation Ltd [C5].

[21] See the judgment of DHCJ Keith, dated 5 February 2016, at §6

[22] See the judgment of B Chu J, dated 21 August 2015, at §18.

[23] [2005] EWHC 1768, at §30

[24] HCMP 1718/2009 (24.9.2009), at §§46 and 48

[25] Supra, at §§57-58

[26] [2013] EWHC 422 (Comm), at §7

[27] “CAD” stands for cause of action defendant

[28] “NCAD” stands for non-cause of action defendant

[29] Supra, at §27

[30] [2015] 1 HKLRD 830.  The case was about a domestic Mareva injunction obtained in aid of a Singapore injunction.  The subject matter was a disclosure order against a third party bank [B] “relating to all bank accounts of [D], whether inside or outside Hong Kong, of which [B] has knowledge”.

[31] [1981] QB 956

[32] Supra, at §§31-32

[33] See the 21st Affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli (“Borrelli 21st ”), at §§10-27, CB/5/57‑62.

[34] See the judgement of DHCJ Anita Yip, SC in this series dated 12 October 2015.  See also the judgment of Louis Chan J in China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Ltd v Chun Chi Wai [2014] HKLRD 951, at §§6 & 7.

[35] CACV 109/2016 (19 January 2017)

[36] See generally Borelli 21st.

[37] The issue should be tried in due course under the Masri procedure: see Vogue Town Ltd v Right Head Ltd (HCA 4935/1998) (16 December 1998).

[38] Borrelli 21st , supra, at §58, CB/5/72

[39] 4th Affirmation of Lai Wun Yin (“Lai 4th”), CB/9/95

[40] At an interest of 12% per annum: D/8/38

[41] See Mrs Chun’s tax return for 2012/13: D/21/113

[42] Mrs Chun deposed in her affirmation filed on 8 August 2013 that her own assets consisted of (i) cash of no more than HK$3.6 million; (ii) assets of Whampoa of HK$1.15 million; (iii) Shanghai property; and (iv) Guangzhou property.  However, the loan proceeds of the Shanghai property she now says she had gifted to Rs.  As regards the Guangzhou property, as pointed out by Ms Sit, it had already been encumbered prior to 2014 and it is most unlikely that the replacement mortgage in 2014 would have generated any new money to her. 

[43] See Mrs Chun’s 1st affirmation, B/2/37

[44] D1 claimed that his legal fees had been paid (at least in part) by Mrs Chun: Borelli 21, §37, CB/5/66.  Mr Chun had engaged 3 firms of solicitors and 7 counsel (including 4 silks).  Mrs Chun, as a defendant, would have to pay for her own legal costs in this action.  Besides, it is apparent that the legal costs of R1‑R3 are also paid by Mrs Chun: Borrelli 21, at §39, CB/5/67.

[45] C/12/114

[46] B/9/207

[47] On 3 June 2014

[48] CB/10/120-121

[49] 11th Affirmation of Chi Lai Man Jocelyn (“Chi 11th ), at §24, CB/10/113

[50] Chi 11th , at §§16-23, CB/10/109-112

[51] B/2/38.  Unbeknown to Mrs Chun, the transfer was rejected by the bank and the money remained in Mrs Chun’s UK HSBC account.  The transfer was eventually effected on 23.8.2013: D/4/24.

[52] Chun 17th , §§21-23, B/10/224

[53] See Chi 11th , at §§19 & 20, CB/10/109; D/4/24 & 26

[54] Lai 4th , CB/9/95

[55] E/1/54

[56] E/1/59

[57] (2009) 12 HKCFAR 31, at §6

[58] [2014] 4 HKLRD 436, at §10.17

  

107795-EN-2017-01-19

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

________________________

BETWEEN
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)2nd Plaintiff
 and
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
 CHUN HEI MAN1st Respondent
 CHUN SIN WA2nd Respondent
 CHUN KA MAN3rd Respondent


HCMP 3396/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 3396 OF 2015

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER OF an application by China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited (In Compulsory Liquidation) and Central Steel (Macao Commercial Offshore) Limited (In Compulsory Liquidation) against Chun Hei Man, Chun Sin Wa and Chun Ka Man for Orders of Committal

______________________

BETWEEN
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)2nd Plaintiff
 and
 CHUN HEI MAN1st Defendant
 CHUN SIN WA2nd Defendant
 CHUN KA MAN3rd Defendant

______________________

(Heard Together)

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 15 November 2016
Date of Judgment: 19 January 2017

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________


Introduction

1.  The background to the present applications has been set out in this court’s judgment in the contempt proceedings HCMP 3396 of 2015 (“Contempt Proceedings”) handed down on 18 November 2016 (“Contempt Judgment”).  In the present judgment, I shall continue to adopt the abbreviations in the Contempt Judgment, unless otherwise indicated.

2.  The 3rd respondent, Carmen, only reached the age of majority on 20 February 2016 and she had no guardian ad litem acting on her behalf in the Main Action and the Contempt Proceedings prior to her reaching the age of majority.

3.  As stated in the Contempt Judgment, this problem was only raised the day prior to the commencement of the trial in the Contempt Proceedings as a result of which the Contempt Proceedings against Carmen were later adjourned pending her present application.

4.  There are now three applications before this court, one issued on behalf of Carmen to set aside all steps and decisions made on her behalf and/or against her in the Main Action, and two applications issued by Ps respectively in the Main Action and in the Contempt Proceedings for all such steps and decisions to remain valid and any irregularities be cured and regularized.

5.  Ps had also sought that all costs of and incidental to and occasioned by their applications and Carmen’s application be paid by Carmen’s solicitors Messrs Chong & Partners LLP forthwith to Ps on a solicitor and own client basis, to be taxed if not agreed.

6.  Ms Eva Sit appeared for Ps, and Mr Anson Wong SC was Senior Counsel appearing for Carmen with Mr Ross Li.  Mr Alexsander Wong appeared for Carmen’s solicitors Messrs Chong & Partners in relation to the costs orders sought by Ps.

The legal principles

7.  Order 80 rule 2(1) of RHC states as follows :

“(1) A person under disability may not bring, or make a claim in, any proceedings except by his next friend and may not acknowledge service, defend, make a counterclaim or intervene in any proceedings, or appear in any proceedings under a judgment or order notice of which has been served on him, except by his guardian ad litem.”

8.  Under Order 80 rule 1, a person under disability includes a minor.

9.  Order 80 rule 3(6) further states:

“(6) Except where the next friend or guardian ad litem, as the case may be, of a person under disability has been appointed by the Court-

(a) the name of any person shall not be used in a cause or matter as next friend of a person under disability,

(b) service shall not be acknowledged in a cause or matter for a person under disability, and

(c) a person under disability shall not be entitled to appear by his guardian ad litem on the hearing of a petition, summons or motion which, or notice of which, has been served on him, unless and until the documents listed in paragraph (8) have been filed in the Registry.”

10.  Under Order 80 rule 3(8), the documents required to be filed where the person under disability is a minor are :-

(a)   a written consent to be next friend or guardian ad litem, as the case may be, of the person under disability in the cause or matter in question given by the person proposing to be such friend or guardian; and

(b)   a certificate made by the solicitor for the person under disability certifying-

(i) that he knows or believes, as the case may be, that the person to whom the certificate relates is a minor; and

(ii) except where the person named in the certificate as next friend or guardian ad litem, as the case may be, is the Official Solicitor, that the person so named has no interest in the cause or matter in question adverse to that of the person under disability.

11.  It has however been held by the Court of Appeal in Ng Hong Ki and Leung Fong Kiu [2012] 1 HKLRD 435 that, among other things, where steps in proceedings have been taken before lack of capacity due to disability under Order 80 is raised, the court is not powerless to act and does not have to direct the parties to start all over again[1].

12.  It was further held by the Court of Appeal in the above case  that under Order 2 rule 1(1) of RHC, the failure to comply with Order 80 rule 2(1) will be treated as an irregularity and would not be nullified by reason of the non-compliance; and the court has power under Order 2 rule 1(2) to make such order dealing with the proceedings generally as it thinks fit, and the court has power to regularize the position retrospectively provided everyone has acted in good faith and there has been no manifest disadvantage to the person subsequently found to be under disability[2].

13.  It was also held that by the Court of Appeal that the court is not bound to appoint a friend or guardian ad litem even if it is satisfied that the person is under disability, and the court will still need to consider if the appointment is beneficial to that person[3].

14.  There was no real dispute between the parties over the above broad principles.

The Disputed Issues

15.  The main issues in the present application were (1) whether there was lack of good faith on the part of Ps and (2) whether there was a manifest disadvantage to Carmen.

Lack of good faith

16.  Carmen complained that Ps had knowledge that she was a minor and that the procedures under Order 80 must be followed and that knowing that the appointment of a guardian ad litem was necessary, Ps failed to draw the same to the attention of the court, and that Ps’ decision to seek injunction against Carmen was clearly motivated by their repeated failures to elicit the allegedly necessary information from Mr Chun.

17.  As pointed out by Ms Sit, there was in fact no allegation of bad faith made in Carmen’s affirmations. Such allegations were only made in Counsel’s submissions and Ms Sit had complained that Ps did not have a chance to file any evidence in reply.

18.  In any event, having considered all the evidence, I really do not find such allegations were substantiated. My reasons are set out below.

19.  In the Contempt Judgment, I had mentioned that it was only in Mr Chun’s 10 affirmation filed on 22 April 2014 that he disclosed for the first time that he had executed a Deed of Gift on behalf of Wellrun transferring Wellrun’s 100% in Chung Shing HK to Chung Shing Singapore, a company wholly owned by Chung Shing Belize of which the 3 daughters are the 3 sole registered shareholders. Further, he disclosed for the first time that he had transferred US$82m from Wellrun to Chung Shing HK which in turned transferred the sum to two PRC companies.

20.  In other words, Mr Chun had gifted the Wellrun’s interest in Chung Shing HK to the 3 daughters, and this was at the time when Mr Chun was a person under investigation by the SFC. The US $82m formed part of the sale proceeds of Wellrun’s shares in China Metal, and Mr Chun and Wellrun were both obliged under the Chan Order to provide disclosure of full information relating to the whereabouts of the sale proceeds.

21.  It was only when Mr Chun and Wellrun failed to comply with the disclosure order that Ps took out an injunction with disclosure obligations on 2 June 2015, namely Ps’ Summons, against the 3 respondents Judy, Kristy and Carmen based on the Chabra principles.

22.  Mr Wong SC submitted Ps’ decision to seek an injunction against Carmen was “clearly motivated by their repeated failures to elicit the allegedly necessary information from Mr Chun”.  It was indeed in light of Mr Chun’s repeated failure to comply with his disclosure obligations and his sudden disclosure of the Gift to the 3 daughters that Ps’ Summons was issued.  I do not see how this can be said to be a lack of good faith on the part of Ps when the Liquidators were only carrying out their duty to find out the whereabouts of the sum of US$82m.

23.  It was also submitted that Ps had “turned a blind eye” to the protection mechanism under Order 80 of RHC. 

24.  Order 80 rule 16 provides that service on a person under disability shall be as follows:

“(1) Where in any proceedings a document is required to be served personally or in accordance with Order 10, rule 1(2) on any person and that person is a person under disability this rule shall apply.

(2) Subject to the following provisions of this rule and to Order 24, rule 16(3) and Order 26, rule 6(3) the document must be served-

(a) in the case of a minor who is not also a mentally incapacitated person, on his father or guardian or, if he has no father or guardian, on the person with whom he resides or in whose care he is;

(b) in the case of a mentally incapacitated person, on the person (if any) who is authorized under Part II of the Ordinance to conduct in the name of the mentally incapacitated person or on his behalf the proceedings in connection with which the document is to be served or, if there is no person so authorized, on the person with whom he resides or in whose care he is;

and must be served in the manner required by these rules with respect to the document in question.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (2), the Court may order that a document which has been, or is to be, served on the person under disability or on a person other than a person mentioned in that paragraph shall be deemed to be duly served on the person under disability.

(4) A judgment or order requiring a person to do, or refrain from doing, any act, a notice of motion or summons for the committal of any person, and a writ of subpoena against any person, must, if that person is a person under disability, be served personally on him unless the Court otherwise orders.”

25.  P’s Summons, together with Mr Borelli’s 14th affirmation and sealed copies of the Injunction Orders referred therein were sent under a letter dated 2 June 2015 from Ps’ solicitors addressed to Carmen’s father Mr Chun on behalf of Carmen, informing Mr Chun that Ps wished to effect personal service of the Injunctions Orders on Carmen and requesting a time and date to be nominated (“02.06.15 Letter”).

26.  In the 02.06.15 Letter, Ps’ solicitors stated clearly that the letter was sent to Mr Chun on behalf of Carmen pursuant to Order 80 rule 16 of the Rules of the High Court[4]. 

27.  Mr Chun had instructed his solicitors Messrs Anthony Siu & Co to reply on 4 June 2015.  Messrs Anthony Siu & Co referred to the 02.06.15 Letter and further in their reply letter, they had had set out the respective ages of the 3 daughters and proposing, among other things, to appoint an independent trustee for them to hold and exercise their rights in their shares in Chung Shing Belize.  As it was not quite clear from this reply as to whether Messrs Anthony Siu & Co were acting for the 3 daughters in relation to Ps’ Summons or not, Ps sought to clarify this on 8 June 2015 followed by another letter on 10 June 2015 setting out various proposals. There appeared to have been no response from Messrs Anthony Siu & Co to these letters.

28.  In any event, the provisions of Order 80 rule 16 were specifically drawn to the attention of Mr Chun on behalf of Carmen and Mr Chun’s solicitors in the 02.06.15 Letter, and Mr Chun and his solicitors should be fully aware of Carmen’s minority and those provisions under Order 80.

29.  The hearing of Ps’ Summons was fixed on 12 June 2015 before Ng J.  On 10 June 2015, Messrs Chong & Partners came into the picture and they wrote to Ps’ solicitors to say they had received instructions to represent the 3 daughters, and a notice to act was duly filed the following day. There was no evidence that Messrs Chong & Partners had not been provided a copy of the 02.06.15 Letter and copies of correspondence between Mr Chun’ solicitors and Ps’ solicitors.

30.  In any event, there was no sufficient evidence that Ps or their solicitors had any reason to believe that Carmen’s solicitors would not be aware of the fact that Carmen was then 17 years old and the provisions of Order 80.

31.  Under Order 80 rule 2(1), Messrs Chong & Partners should not have appeared at the hearing before Ng on behalf of Carmen, or offered the Undertaking on behalf of Carmen, before a guardian ad litem had been appointed for her. 

32.  After the hearing before Ng J, Carmen and her two sisters issued a summons at end of July 2015 seeking leave for their legal title in the shares in Chung Shing Belize to be transferred to Fung as a trustee.  It was clear in that application that Carmen’s solicitors and Counsel were fully aware of her age.

33.  The parties were embroiled in the arguments in respect of this application on behalf of the daughters at the hearing before this court on 17 August 2015.  It is fair to say both Senior Counsel for Ps and Counsel for Carmen had overlooked the provisions of Order 80 at that hearing, notwithstanding they were clearly aware that Carmen was then 17.  In fact, this court had equally overlooked those provisions.

34.  The 17.08.15 Order was subsequently served personally on Carmen with a penal notice, and there was never any issue taken by Carmen on service.

35.  As Ps had referred to Order 80 rule 16 to Mr Chun on behalf of Carmen in the 02.06.15 Letter, Ps cannot really be blamed for what went wrong afterwards, particularly when the 3 daughters had also instructed their own solicitors and also Counsel, and at one stage Senior Counsel, to represent them.

36.  Allegations of bad faith are serious allegations.  Having considered all the evidence, I find that there was really no sufficient evidence that Ps were not acting in good faith.

Manifest Disadvantage to Carmen

37.  Mr Wong SC had submitted that in the present case, Carmen’s position could have been different had a guardian ad litem been appointed for her.

38.  Carmen’s mother, Mrs Chun was the person advising Carmen throughout and in making all the decisions on her behalf.  It was Carmen’s evidence that her mother Mrs Chun had taken various steps including engaging the legal team and Mr Fung on behalf of Carmen without consulting Carmen or showing her the relevant documents, and further Carmen was asked by her mother to give the Undertaking without understanding the terms and implications thereof and that Carmen acknowledged the receipt of the 17.08.15 Order containing the Disclosure Obligations without understanding the precise terms and implications thereof. 

39.  Mrs Chun had filed an affirmation to support her daughters’ case in the Contempt Proceedings but chose not to attend the trial to be cross-examined on oath, and her affirmation was in the end not admitted.

40.  Anyway, Carmen claimed that even though she had signed on the backsheet acknowledging the receipt of the 17.08.15 Order with the penal notice, she did not remember the details of it and did not remember whether there was anyone who had explained to her the contents of that order at the time she signed it.  She claimed that she did not receive the Fung Report until July 2016, nor did she receive the 14.10.15 Letter from Ps’ solicitors complaining of their noncompliance with the Disclosure Obligations.  She did not know that potential consequences of the Contempt Proceedings and that she had put the entire matter into her mother’s hands.  Carmen had also said she trusted her elder sister Judy.

41.  As seen in Lily Cheung v Cheung Wai Kwok & Anor, HCAP 3/2008, unrep, 6 February 2014, it is desirable that the guardian ad litem is a relation, connection or friend of the family[5].  Whatever one may now say with benefit of hindsight, the evidence indicated that Mrs Chun, Carmen’s mother, whom Carmen had trusted, would have been the natural choice as her guardian ad litem at the time in June 2015, as Mrs Chun was also handling all the proceedings on behalf of Judy and Kristy.

42.  It was submitted by Mr Wong SC that had the proceedings been properly constituted, Mrs Chun could not have been appointed as Carmen’s guardian at the outset and handled the proceedings on her behalf, as Mrs Chun had beyond dispute interest in these proceedings and may be in a position of conflict vis-à-vis Carmen, and could not, in all likelihood, have been a proper person to be appointed as Carmen’s guardian.

43.  In this respect, that Mrs Chun is the 2nd defendant in this action should be known to all those acting for the 3 daughters.  As seen in Lily Cheung, there is no rule that a co-defendant cannot act as a guardian ad litem for another defendant[6].  The issue is not whether Mrs Chun has interest in this action, but whether she has any interest adverse to that of Carmen.

44.  There was no evidence in Carmen’s affidavit as to what interest Mrs Chun had which was adverse to hers. In fact, the evidence showed that throughout this action and the Contempt Proceedings, Mrs Chun had been de facto acting on behalf of the 3 sisters, and if their solicitors had been able to accept instructions from Mrs Chun so far, there would not seem to have been any concern for conflict of interest between Mrs Chun and the 3 daughters, or among the 3 daughters.  In fact, Messrs Chong & Partners have continued to act for Carmen notwithstanding her present application.

45.  Judy, whom Carmen had trusted, could also have been a proper person to be appointed as Carmen’s guardian.  There was no evidence that Judy had any interest which was adverse to Carmen.  In fact, what Carmen had said in her affirmation was almost identical to what Judy had said. Throughout the Main Action, and the Contempt Proceedings, Judy had made affirmations on behalf of herself and her two sisters, and there was no evidence from Carmen whether before or after her coming of age, that she was not bound by any of Judy’s evidence.

46.  In any event, there was no evidence from Carmen as to whom she would have appointed as her guardian ad litem. 

47.  Even if a person other than Mrs Chun or Judy had been appointed to represent Carmen, it was very likely that there would still have been joint representations, which is now the position adopted by Carmen since she came of age and has now received independent legal advice from senior counsel.  There was in any event no evidence that a guardian would have taken a different course from Carmen’s sisters.

48.  It was argued on behalf of Carmen that her position had been severely prejudiced by reason of the following:

(i) Mr Wong SC relied on Leach (A Minor) v Taylor (A Minor) [1996] CLY 928 and submitted that when determining whether to accept an undertaking of a minor, the court must exercise great care to satisfy itself that the minor understands the terms of the same[7], and the court was not made aware of the heightened standard when accepting Carmen’s Undertaking;

(ii) Mr Wong had also referred to Wookey v Wookey, In re S (A Minor) [1991] Fam 121, [1992] CLY 2513 and argued that when seeking an injunction against a minor, the applicant should adduce evidence of the personal circumstances of the minor for the court to consider whether the injunction could be effectively enforced against the same[8] and no evidence of Carmen’s personal circumstances was placed before the court when the 17.08.15 Order was made.

49.  In Leach (A Minor), the Court had held that it could accept an undertaking from a minor of 17, instead of making an injunction against him, having taken great care to satisfy itself that the minor had understood the meaning of an undertaking.  In the present case, Carmen had instructed Counsel to represent her before Ng J and the Undertaking was given through her Counsel.

50.  In June 2015, Carmen was a year 12 student at a well known boarding school in England and taking the A-level examinations. Her English should be of high standard.  Even on her own evidence, Carmen did go with her mother and her two sisters to meet with Fung, her solicitors and her then Counsel in around mid July 2015 and Judy’s evidence was during that meeting, she and Carmen had been advised on the Undertaking and the disclosure order sought by Ps.  Judy later had filed an affirmation on behalf of herself, Kristy and Carmen to confirm the Undertaking given by them.  There was no reason to believe that Carmen did not understand the terms of the Undertaking.

51.  In Wookey v Wookey, In re S (Minor), there were in fact two cases during the appeal.  In the second case In re S (a Minor), it was held that the equitable discretionary remedy of an injunction could be enforced by committal to prison, by sequestration of property or by fine; but there was no power to commit a minor under the age of 17 to prison, and since it was unrealistic to order any sequestration of the property and as S had no money to meet a fine, an injunction against him would be unenforceable. 

52.  In the present case, the evidence before the court at the hearing on 17 August 2015 was that Carmen was one of the registered shareholders of Chung Shing Belize through which held Chung Shing Singapore which in turn held Chung Shing HK which was the recipient of some US$82m.  This is not a case like In re S where the minor had no property.  Further there were no submissions that this court did not have the power to commit a minor under the age of 17 to prison. In any event, by the time of the trial of the Contempt Proceedings, Carmen already reached 18.

53.  As seen from The London Borough of Harrow v G [2004] EWHC 17(QB), if an injunction is one that cannot be properly or effectively enforced, it should not have been granted.  However, the minor concerned in that case was only 13 years old at the time the interlocutory injunction was made. 

54.  There was no evidence and indeed no submissions, even up to the hearing of the present applications, that the 17.08.15 Order could not be effectively enforced against Carmen, and as I have said in the Reasons[9], there was no real opposition to the Disclosure Obligations or the 17.08.15 Order being made at that time.

55.  Mr Wong SC had also relied on Re “L” Minor [1992] WL 12678806 which concerned an appeal by a young man who was aged 17 against a committal order imposed for contempt of court, and he was said to be in breach of a non molestation order, ordering him not to molest a young girl who was made a ward of court.  His grounds of appeal were that (i) the non molestation order was defective as it did not contain a penal notice required by the new rules; (ii) there was no guardian ad item appointed for him at the contempt proceedings; (iii) the form of the application did not specify in detail the breaches as required by the practice.  The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal having regard to the cumulative effect of those 3 errors, but more importantly that the young man did not have the benefit of the advice of a guardian ad litem, and the time at which the young man needed the help of a guardian ad litem was after the original order was made and that someone in that position would have been able to explain to him, even if the penal notice had not been in the correct form, that if he disobeyed the order of the court he might well find himself sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

56.  In fact, in the above case, the non-molestation order had contemplated that a guardian ad litem from the appropriate panel would be appointed for the young man.  Indeed when making the non-molestation order, the judge directed that the young man should be added to the wardship proceedings as a second defendant by a guardian ad litem appointed for that purpose from the appropriate panel.  This was not done.

57.  In my view, the facts of the present case are different.  In the present case, Carmen has all along been legally represented since the Ng Order until the present, and both Senior and Junior Counsel have been instructed to appear on her behalf at various times.  As mentioned earlier, Carmen had attended a conference with her then counsel in around June 2015 when she and Judy had been advised on the Undertaking and the disclosure obligations and that the Undertaking was confirmed by Judy on behalf of Carmen in Judy’s subsequent affirmation.

58.  As I have said earlier, Carmen had never said she was not bound by the evidence filed by Judy on her behalf.  In fact, Carmen had also never said that she was not explained the penal notice endorsed on the 17.08.15 Order.  Carmen was in Hong Kong from 9 July 2015 until late August 2015. She personally signed and acknowledged service of the 17.08.15 Order endorsed with the penal notice on 27 August 2015.  What she said in her affirmation filed herein was “Even though I received a copy of the Order and I have signed on its back sheet acknowledging receipt, I do not remember the details of it.  I do not remember whether there was anyone explained to me the contents of the order at the time I signed it.”  

59.  In fact, during the trial of the Contempt Proceedings, although Judy’s evidence was similarly that she could not remember at the time of the trial what her solicitor’s explanation was, she admitted that she had been explained the penal notice at the time when she was personally served, and that every time her solicitor asked her to sign a document, her solicitor would go through the document with her and had explained the same to her.

60.  Carmen turned 18 on 20 February 2016, 4 days after the Amended Statement was filed in the Contempt Proceedings.  So far, Carmen’s evidence was only that she did not remember, but she did not say that no one had explained the terms of the 17.08.15 Order and the penal notice at the time when she personally signed on the backsheet.

61.  In my view, there was no sufficient evidence that Carmen had not been explained the penal notice at the time when she acknowledged the service of the 17.08.15 Order.  I am therefore of the view that the facts of the present case can be distinguished from Re “L” Minor.

62.  There was no evidence from Carmen was to what “forensic disadvantage or manifest disadvantage she had suffered as a result of her having no guardian ad litem.  There was no evidence from Carmen what procedural steps whether in the present action or in the Contempt Proceedings, she would have taken or would have been advised to take, which would be different from those taken by Judy and Kristy.  Mr Wong SC had said the guardian could have contested Ps Summons in seeking the injunction.  There was no evidence from Carmen to say she had wanted to contest the injunction, contrary to the stance taken by Judy and Kristy.   What Carmen had said was in fact she trusted her mother and Judy.  Carmen was only about 8 months away from 18 at that time.

63.  Looking at the circumstances of this case, even if a guardian ad litem were appointed in June 2015, it would likely to have been her mother or Judy, and even if a person other than Mrs Chun or Judy was appointed, there was no sufficient evidence that any guardian ad litem would have been advised to take a course of action which was different from Judy and Kristy. 

64.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that Carmen has been prejudiced in any way by the lack of a guardian ad litem, and that I am of the view that Carmen was sufficiently protected in the Main Action and in the Contempt Proceedings, prior to her reaching 18. 

Restrospective Regularisation

65.  Order 80 is to ensure that a minor litigant is properly protected from her lack of capacity in conducting litigation and not to provide a vehicle to reopen litigation, and as said by Kennedy LJ in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2003] 1 WLR 1511:

“31 … Provided everyone has acted in good faith and there has been no manifest disadvantage to the party subsequently found to have been a patient at the relevant time I cannot envisage any court refusing to regularize the position. To do otherwise would be unjust and contrary to the overriding objection of the Civil Procedure Rules, but in any given case the ultimate decision must depend on the particular facts. In the context of litigation, rules as to capacity are designed to ensure the plaintiffs and defendants who would otherwise be at a disadvantage are properly protected, and in some cases that parties to litigation are not pestered by other parties who should be to some extent restrained. However, finality in litigation is also important, and the rules as to capacity are not designed to provide a vehicle for reopening litigation, which, having apparently been properly conducted (whatever the wisdom of the individual decision in relation to it), has for long been understood to be at an end[10].”

66.  The Undertaking was given in June 2015, some 18 months ago. The 17.08.15 Order was made some 16 months ago.  Carmen was 18 some 11 months ago.

67.  Since coming of age, Carmen, jointly with Judy and Kristy, had authorized Mr Fung to file his 2nd affirmation in the Contempt Proceedings on 14 March 2016.  Further on, 21 July 2016, Carmen, jointly with Judy and Kristy, had instructed their solicitors to issue a summons for leave for them to file and serve a further affirmation from Judy and also a further affirmation from their mother to support their defence in the Contempt Proceedings and for the hearing on 26 July 2016, Carmen, together with her sisters, had instructed Senior Counsel appearing on their behalf.  Judy and Mrs Chun duly filed their affirmations on 26 July 2016 on behalf of Carmen.  These were all steps taken by Carmen after she turned 18.

68.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that all steps and decisions in this action in so far it had concerned Carmen prior to her reaching 18 had been properly conducted, Ps have acted in good faith and there has been no manifest disadvantage to Carmen.  I am prepared to regularize all irregularities, in respect of steps taken and decisions made on behalf of and/or against Carmen on or before 19 February 2016, retrospectively, notwithstanding Carmen had been a minor without a guardian ad litem.

Conclusion

69.  In light of the above, I dismiss Carmen’s summons issued on 19 August 2016, and grant an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the two summonses issued by Ps on 4 November 2016, respectively in the Main Action and the Contempt Proceedings.

70.  I have indicated at the hearing that costs will be reserved. This matter is to be dealt with on paper unless otherwise directed.  I direct that Ps are to lodge their written submissions on costs within 21 days, and Carmen and Messrs Chong & Partners to lodge theirs within 21 days thereafter.  Leave to Ps to lodge reply submissions within 14 days thereafter.



 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge for the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in both HCA 1412 of 2013 and HCMP 3396 of 2015

Mr Anson Wong SC and Mr Ross Li, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for the 3rd respondent in HCA 1412 of 2013 and the 3rd defendant in HCMP 3396 of 2015

Mr Alexsander Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners LLP, for Chong & Partners LLP



[1] See Holding (3), at pg 436

[2] At pg 437

[3] At pg 437

[4] A:246

[5] At para 37

[6] See discussion in paras 35-39

[7]Leach (A Minor) v Taylor (A Minor) [1996] CLY 928

[8]The London Borough of Harrow v G [2004] EWHC 17(QB), Wookey v Wookey [1991] Fam 121

[9] Handed down on 21 August 2015

[10] At para 31, pg 1525

104096-EN-2016-05-19

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
2nd Plaintiff
 AND 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 19 May 2016
Date of Decision: 19 May 2016

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

 

1. I have before me a summons taken out by the 1st and 13th defendants on 14 April 2016 (“the Leave Summons”) seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from an order made by me on 8 April 2016 (“the Order”) dismissing their application for relief from sanction imposed by an earlier unless order made by me on 17 November 2014 (“the Unless Order”).

2. The procedural history of this matter has been set out in two previous decisions given by me on 17 November 2014 and 8 April 2016 respectively.  I do not propose to repeat them here, save to state the following.

3. On 17 November 2014, I made the Unless Order requiring the 1st and 13th defendants to comply with a previous disclosure order made by L Chan J on 9 April 2014 (“the Chan Order”) within 14 days of the Unless Order, failing which the defence of the 1st and 13th defendants was to be struck out.

4. On 12 October 2015, Deputy High Court Judge Anita Yip, SC held that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to comply with the Unless Order, and the sanction of strike out of the 1st and 13th defendant’s defence automatically took effect by reason of their failure to comply with the Unless Order. 

5. By a summons dated 5 November 2015 (“the Relief Summons”), the 1st and 13th defendants applied for relief from sanction.  In that summons, the 1st and 13th defendants sought:-

(1)  an extension of time to make the application for relief from sanction; and

(2)  relief from sanction imposed in the Unless Order, whereby the amended defence of the 1st and 13th defendants shall be reinstated.

6. On 8 April 2016, I dismissed the Relief Summons in its entirety.

7. As explained in paragraph 6 of my written decision dated 6 May 2016 (relating to the 1st and 13th defendants’ application that the Order is one that is referred to in Order 59, rule 21(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, ie an order determining in a summary way the substantive rights of a party to an action, and hence leave to appeal from it is not required), the dismissal of the Relief Summons meant that the application for extension of time to apply for relief from sanction was refused.

8. The 1st and 13th defendants now apply for leave to appeal against the Order.

9. The applicable principles for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order made by a judge at first instance to the Court of Appeal are well established.  Under section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance shall not be granted unless the court hearing the application for leave to appeal is satisfied that:-

(1)  the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(2)  there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

10.    The expression “reasonable prospect of success” for the purpose of section 14AA(4)(a) has been interpreted to mean that the prospects of success of the appeal must be more than “fanciful” but do not have to be shown to be “probable”: see SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125, at paragraph 17 per Le Pichon JA.

11. In considering the question of whether the proposed appeal in the present case has a reasonable prospect of success, it is important to bear in mind that whether to grant an extension of time is a matter of discretion which is general in nature. Likewise, a decision whether to grant relief from sanction under Order 2, rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court involves an exercise of discretion, although the matters which are relevant to the exercise of that discretion are set out, not exhaustively, in rule 5(1) of that order.

12. This morning, Mr Tang has raised a few points in support of the Leave Summons. 

13. First, it is said that there is a pending appeal from the decision of the learned Deputy Judge to the Court of Appeal, and it is postulated that the Court of Appeal may make findings regarding the “nature and extent” of the breach of the Unless Order which may impact on the issue of relief from sanction.  As I see it, if the Court of Appeal upholds the 1st and 13th defendants’ appeal, no question of relief would arise.  On the other hand, if the Court of Appeal dismisses the 1st and 13th defendants’ appeal, but makes findings which may impact on the question of relief and considers that relief from sanction ought to be granted, the Court of Appeal would have ample power to deal with the situation as it deems just in all the circumstances of the case, including granting leave to appeal out of time. That is matter entirely for the Court of Appeal.

14. Second, Mr Tang argues that I failed to take into account a number of relevant matters and took into account a number of irrelevant matters in dismissing the Relief Summons. I agree with the submissions made by Miss Sit in paragraphs 9 to 11 of her skeleton submissions dated 17 May 2016 in relation to those complaints, and do not propose to repeat them here.

15. I would only mention that, in so far as it is said that the 1st and 13th defendants had a good explanation for the delay in making the relief application, namely, that until the learned Deputy Judge handed down her decision on 17 November 2014, the 1st and 13th defendants did not know the reason or basis for their breach of the Unless Order and thus would have no good reason to apply for relief prior to that date, the grounds of the plaintiffs’ contention that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to comply with the Unless Order were made known to them by the time that the parties appeared before Anthony Chan J in June 2015. Further, I have been informed by Ms Sit that, at both hearings before Anthony Chan J in June 2015 and the learned Deputy Judge in September 2015, the plaintiffs expressly raised the point that the 1st and 13th defendants had not made any application for relief from sanction and thus that was not an issue which the court should be concerned with.  As I see it, the 1st and 13th defendants could, but chose not to, apply for relief from sanction earlier.

16. In my view, the 1st and 13th defendants’ real complaint, if any, is that they should not have been found by the learned Deputy Judge to have failed to comply with the Unless Order.  That is an issue which I understand will be fully ventilated before the Court of Appeal in due course.  If the Court of Appeal agrees with the learned Deputy Judge that the 1st and 13th defendants failed to comply with the Unless Order, it seems to me plain that their application for relief from sanction is without merit, and there would be no ground to grant any extension of time to enable them to apply for relief from sanction.  It follows that I do not consider that leave to appeal from the Unless Order should be granted on either limb under section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance.

17. For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the Leave Summons.  I shall now deal with the question of costs, including summary assessment of those costs.

(Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Miss Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Alexander Tang instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants

103882-EN-2016-05-06

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL
 (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
2nd Plaintiff
 AND 
 CHUN CHI WAI1ST DEFENDANT
 LAI WUN YIN2ND DEFENDANT
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3RD DEFENDANT
JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4TH DEFENDANT
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5TH DEFENDANT
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6TH DEFENDANT
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7TH DEFENDANT
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8TH DEFENDANT
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9TH DEFENDANT
  PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10TH DEFENDANT
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11TH DEFENDANT
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12TH DEFENDANT
 WELLRUN LIMITED13TH DEFENDANT

____________

Before:  Hon Chow J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:  6 May 2016
Date of Decision:  6 May 2016

__________________

D E C I S I O N
__________________

 

1.  I have before me a summons taken out by the 1st and 13th defendants on 12 April 2016 (“the Direction Summons”) seeking a direction from the court on whether the order that I made on 8 April 2016 (“the Order”) dismissing their application for relief from sanction imposed by an unless order made on 17 November 2014 (“the Unless Order”) is one that is referred to in Order 59, rule 21(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4 (ie an order determining in a summary way the substantive rights of a party to an action), and hence leave to appeal from it is not required.

2.  On 12 October 2015, Deputy High Court Judge Anita Yip SC held that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to comply with the Unless Order, and the sanction of strike out of the 1st and 13th defendants' defence automatically took effect by reason of that failure. 

3.  The 1st and 13th defendants then applied for relief from sanction by a summons dated 5 November 2015 (“the Relief Summons”), under which the 1st and 13th defendants sought:-

(1) an extension of time to make the application for relief from sanction; and

(2) relief from sanction imposed in the Unless Order, whereby the amended defence of the 1st and 13th defendants shall be reinstated.

4.  The reason why the 1st and 13th defendants needed an extension of time to make the application is because, under Order 2, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court, any application for relief from sanction for failure to comply with a court order should be made within 14 days of the failure.  It was not in dispute that, if the 1st and 13th defendants had indeed failed to comply with the Unless Order (which was not accepted by them), the time for making the relief application had expired by the time that the 1st and 13th defendants took out the Relief Summons on 5 November 2015.

5.  In paragraph 32 of the decision handed down on 8 April 2016 (“the Decision”), I explained why I dismissed the 1st and 13th defendants’ application for relief from sanction, as follows:-

“If, as found by the Judge, the 1st and 13th defendants failed to fully comply with paragraph 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order, I would not exercise my discretion to grant any relief from the sanction imposed by the Unless Order, having regard to the following matters:-

(1) The application for an extension of time to comply with the Unless Order was made on 5 November 2015, which was more than 11 months after the deadline for complying with the Unless Order (1 December 2014).

(2) The 1st and 13th defendants’ obligation to make the relevant disclosure was first imposed by L Chan J on 9 April 2014, that being nearly 19 months before the date of the application.

(3) At paragraphs 51 to 56 of the Unless Order Decision, I explained why an unless order should be made in the present case. I also expressed the view, at paragraph 54(4) of that decision, that ‘it is well within [the 1st and 13th defendants’] ability to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order’.

(4) The history of this matter, as summarized in paragraphs 7 to 23 of the Unless Order Decision, clearly indicates that the 1st and 13th defendants are not willing to make full and proper disclosure of their assets as required by various orders that have been made by the court.”

6.  Although I did not state in the above paragraph that the application for extension of time was refused, I made an order dismissing the Summons in its entirety (see paragraph 33 of the Decision).  It follows from the dismissal of the Summons that the application for extension of time to apply for relief from sanction was refused.

7.  The question is whether, in such circumstances, leave to appeal from the Order is required.

8.  I dealt with a somewhat similar question in Astro Nusantara International BV and Others v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and Others [2016] 1 HKLRD 591.  In that case, I had given a judgment refusing an application by a debtor for an extension of time to apply to set aside certain orders granting leave to the creditors to enforce five foreign arbitration awards in Hong Kong, although I also indicated in my written judgment that even if I were minded to grant an extension of time, I would still have refused the debtor’s setting aside application on the merits. On the debtor’s application for a direction that leave to appeal from the judgment was not required either because it was a “final” judgment or order, or because, albeit interlocutory, it was one referred to in Order 59, rule 21(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, I held that the judgment could not be regarded as being a final judgment or order, applying the well known “application test”.  I also held that the judgment was not one determining in a summary way the “substantive rights” of a party to an action within the meaning of Order 59 rule 21(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court, because it only determined the “procedural”, as opposed to “substantive”, rights of the debtor to apply to set aside the orders granting leave to enforce the foreign arbitration awards.  Accordingly, leave to appeal from the judgment was required under section 14AA(1) of the High Court Ordinance.

9.  For the same reason, I consider that the Order in the present case is “interlocutory” and not “final”, and it is not an order determining in a summary the substantive rights of the 1st and 13th defendants.

10.  In any event, even if the Order is to be regarded as simply an order refusing to grant relief from sanction for the failure to comply with the Unless Order:-

(1) It is obvious that the Order would fail the “application test” as explained by Chan PJ in Shell Hong Kong Limited v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 62.  I pause to observe that the Direction Summons taken out by the 1st and 13th defendants pre-supposes that the Order is an “interlocutory” and not “final” order.

(2) The Order did not determine in a summary way any “substantive rights” of the 1st and 13th defendants.  If any order did, it would be the Unless Order coupled with the 1st and 13th defendants’ failure to comply with it, as confirmed by Deputy High Court Judge Anita Yip SC’s decision given on 12 October 2015.

11.  For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the 1st and 13th defendants’ summons dated 12 April 2016 with costs to the plaintiffs.

(Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Chrisopher Dobby, of Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Alexander Tang instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants

103839-EN-2016-04-08

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD AND OTHERS v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN  
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
1st Plaintiff

CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATORS APPOINTED)
2nd Plaintiff

and 
 CHUN CHI WAI1ST defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2ND defendant

LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED
3RD defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4TH defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5TH defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6TH defendant
METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7TH defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8TH defendant
CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9TH defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10TH defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11TH defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12TH defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13TH defendant

____________

Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 7 January 2016
Date of Decision: 8 April 2016

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

APPLICATIONS

1.  I have before me two applications:-

(1)  the first is an application (“the Re-Opening Application”) made by the 1st and 13th defendants by letter dated 19 October 2015 seeking to re-open the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Anita Yip SC (“the Judge”) on 12 October 2015; and

(2)  the second is an application (“the Relief Application”) made by the 1st and 13th defendants by summons dated 5 November 2015 seeking relief from the sanction imposed by an unless order made by this court on 17 November 2014 (“the Unless Order”).

BACKGROUND FACTS

2.  The background facts giving rise to the Unless Order have been set out in a decision handed down by this court on 17 November 2014 (“the Unless Order Decision”) and will not be repeated here.

3.  At paragraph 49 of the Unless Order Decision, I reached the conclusion that the 1st and 13th defendant had failed to fully and properly comply with an order made by L Chan J on 9 April 2014 (“the Chan Order”).  At paragraph 56 of the Unless Order Decision, I conclude that it was just, appropriate, and proportional to make an unless order to give the 1st and 13th defendants one last opportunity to comply with the Chan Order.

4.  Paragraph 1 of the Unless Order states as follows:-

“The 1st and 13th defendants shall, by 4 p.m., on the 14th day following the date of this order, each serve an affidavit or affirmation on the Plaintiffs’ solicitors:

(a) providing full and proper disclosure of all their respective assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in their own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets;

(b) in the event that any assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more have been disposed of, encumbered or otherwise dealt with between 30 July 2013 and the date on which the said affidavit or affirmation is sworn, providing a full explanation as to what has become of the proceeds and the value thereof;

(c) providing a full explanation as to what has become of the monies received by the 13th defendant amounting to approximately HK$636,000,000 received by the 13th defendant in respect of its disposal of 60,000,000 shares in China Metal on 27 April 2011 and approximately HK$170,461,770.68 received by the 13th defendant in respect of various cash dividends declared and paid by the 1st Plaintiff (as described at paragraph 58 of the Third Affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli dated 26 October 2013 and the exhibit referred to therein) and, in the event that any part of those monies have been used, spent or disposed of, providing full particulars of the circumstances (including a full explanation as to what has become of the monies and their current whereabouts and value);

(d) exhibiting all documents which evidence the matters set out in paragraphs 1(a) to (c) above.”

5.  Paragraph 2 of the Unless Order further states as follows:-

“Unless the 1st and 13th defendants do fully and properly comply with paragraph 1 above within the time specified, the Defence of the 1st and 13th defendants be struck out and the Plaintiffs shall be at liberty to enter judgment against the 1st and 13th defendants with costs.”

6.  In compliance, or purported compliance, with the Unless Order, the 1st defendant filed his 17th affirmation on 1 December 2014 exhibiting thereto a report prepared by a forensic accountant, Mr Frank Yuen of KLC Kennic Lui & Co dated 1 December 2014 (“Mr Yuen’s 1st Report”).  The 1st defendant’s 17th affirmation was also filed on behalf of the 13th defendant.

7.  The plaintiffs considered that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to fully comply with the terms of the Unless Order and took out a summons on 21 April 2015 (“the Striking Out Summons”) seeking to (i) strike out the defence of the 1st and 13th defendants, and (ii) enter judgment against them in this action.

8.  In opposition to the Striking Out Summons, the 1st defendant filed his 18th affirmation on 24 June 2015 exhibiting thereto a supplemental report prepared by Mr Yuen dated 24 June 2015 (“Mr Yuen’s 2nd Report”), and his 19th affirmation on 4 August 2015 exhibiting thereto a second supplemental report prepared by Mr Yuen dated 29 July 2015 (“Mr Yuen’s 3rd Report”).

9.  The Striking Out Summons eventually came before the Judge on 24 and 25 September 2015.  She gave a written decision on 12 October 2015 (“the Striking Out Decision”).

10.  As can be seen from the Striking Out Decision:-

(1)  The plaintiffs relied on six grounds of complaint in support of the Striking Out Summons (paragraph 17).

(2)  The Judge found that the first, fourth, fifth and sixth grounds were either not made out or of no substance (paragraphs 28, 118, 126 and 130).

(3)  The second ground related to five items totalling about HK$384 million.  Four of them were either not pursued by the plaintiffs or rejected by the Judge (paragraphs 93, 94, 96 and 99).

(4)  The remaining item under the second ground related to a sum of about US$11 million.  I shall come back to this item later in this decision.

(5)  The third ground related to the 1st and 13th defendants’ failure to provide all documents as required by paragraph 1(d) of the Unless Order.  The Judge found the plaintiffs’ complaint to be justified in respect of the general ledgers of the 13th defendant and those of Asia Huan Bao, being items 19 and 20 referred to in Appendix 1 to Mr Yuen’s 1st Report (paragraph 106).  Nevertheless, the Judge would have been disposed to grant an extension of time to the 1st and 13th defendants to provide the outstanding documents if the failure to provide the ledgers had been the only breach of the Unless Order (paragraph 139).

11.  The Judge considered, however, that the 1st and 13th defendants’ failure to provide the ledgers was not the only breach of the Unless Order, because she found that they had also failed to give a full explanation of the US$11 million mentioned above.  The Judge considered this latter failure to be “obvious, serious and significant” (paragraph 139 of the Striking Out Decision).

12.  The US$11 million was part of the monies referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the Unless Order which, according to Mr Yuen’s 1st Report, was paid into the 13th defendant’s USD current account numbered 8.00188.8.4000 with Bank Sarasin & Cie AG, Hong Kong Branch (“the Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account”) on 18 May 2012. The 1st and 13th defendants’ case is that this US$11 million was used to partly repay a “Money Market Loan” (numbered 113400) of US$15 million which the 13th defendant obtained from Sarasin on 21 February 2012.

13.  Mr Yuen’s analysis, adopted by the 1st and 13th defendants, of the fund flow in respect of the US$11 million is very complicated.  Putting the matter as simply as I can, I understand Mr Yuen’s analysis to be as follows:-

(1)  On 30 June 2011, the 13th defendant received US$38,709,674 (Item (a)[1]) which represented part of the sale proceeds of the 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff referred to paragraph 1(c) of the Unless Order.

(2)  Out of those sale proceeds, the 13th defendant transferred US$15 million (Item j) to Huan Bao Steel Ltd on 3 January 2012.

(3)  Item (j) was the source of funds for the following three transfers made by Huan Bao Steel Ltd to the 13th defendant -

(a)  Item (q) – US$4 million on 29 March 2012

(b)  Item (s) – US$8.7 million on 17 May 2012

(c)  Item (t) – US$2,299,997 on 17 May 2012.

(4)  Items (s) and (t) together were the source of funds for the transfer of US$11,000,019 (Item (u)) to the Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account on 18 May 2012.

(5)  This transfer of the US$11,000,019 to the Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account effected a partial repayment of the Money Market Loan which the 13th defendant had earlier obtained from Sarasin on 21 February 2012 (Item (m)).

14.  The Judge’s reasons for coming to the conclusion that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to give a full explanation of the US$11 million appear in the following passages of the Striking Out Decision:-

“59. But I think, by extension, Ms Chan’s complaint is equally applicable to some of the sums listed in table 7… Likewise, how can one be sure that the US$15 million at Item (j) was the source for items (q), (s) and (t)? After all, even though the amounts were similar, the proceeds did stay in Huan Bao’s account for a few months before they went back into the 13th defendant’s account.

60. Ms Chan once said by way of a general comment that to fully comply with the Unless Order, the defendants should have produced fund flow charts for each relevant sum of the proceeds. I take it to mean that for example … for the US$15 million, Item (j), there should be another fund flow reconstruction account of the same nature which tells what had happened to this US$15 million in the relevant Huan Bao account.

61. In my view, the failure to explain the whereabouts of the US$15 million (Item j) alone constitutes a breach of the Unless Order. The Unless Order requires the defendants to give a complete and proper disclosure of ‘what has become of the monies received by the 13th defendant ...’: para 1(c).

62. Plainly, this US$15 million (Item j) was, according to the defendants’ own accountant report, part of the US$38,709,674 (Item a) which represented monies received by the 13th defendant. Mr Yuen said this amount was the source of the funds in Items (q), (s) and (t). But this is the accountant’s own words of the flow. What is crucial and required under the Unless Order is that there should be first, a full explanation; and second, supported by all documents. Fundamentally, I cannot see how, in the absence of documents relating to Item (j), such as the accounts, ledgers and bank statements of Huan Bao, that Mr Yuen could conclude that Item (j) was the source of funds for Items (q), (s) and (t).

63. I note from Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report, that the defendants had only produced the bank statements of Huan Bao Steel’s DBS HKD account: see Item 16 of Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report. At para 35 of Yuen’s 1st report, he said:

‘35. According to the Confirmation for Outward Chats dated 3 January 2012 issued by CBI to Huan Bao Steel (‘Huan Bao’) (Appendix – 36), Wellrun remitted US$15,000,000 (Table 7 Item (j)) to Huan Baos’ account numbered 53293149418 in Bank of Communications Company Limited (‘Huan Bao BOCOM Account’). Nevertheless, it is noted that US$4,000,000 (Table 7 Item (q)), US$8,700,000 (Table 7 Item (s)) and US$2,299,997, net of bank charges of US$3 (Table 7 Item (t)) were remitted from Huan Bao to Wellrun CKW USD Savings Account on 29 March 2012, 17 May 2012 and 17 May 2012 respectively which together make a total of US$14,999,997.’

64. The Huan Bao BOCOM account statements for the relevant [period] which would show the deposit of US$15 million and its subsequent movements have never been produced. This is a clear breach of para 1(d) of the Unless Order. Without the production of the BOCOM statements, or the Huan Bao ledgers of the relevant period, it is unknown whether this enormous sum of US$15 million has been applied for some other use or has acquired some other assets which the defendants were under a duty to disclose. There is no evidence that the defendants were not in possession of the documents evidencing the movements of this US$15 million.

…..

67. It is further noted that no documents at all in relation to Items (q), (s) and (t) US$4,000,000, US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 were produced. At para 36 of Yuen’s 1st report, he said:

‘36. Out of the sum of US$14,999,997, US$4,000,000 was transferred to Chung Shing on 29 March 2012 while US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 were transferred to Wellrun’s Sarasin USD current account numbered 8.00188.8.4000 (‘Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account’) on 18 May 2012 as set out in Table 10 below.’

68. No documents were produced. In the absence of the relevant documents, how can Mr Yuen conclude that these three big sums were sourced from Item (j)? The obligation to give a full explanation of US$4,000,000, US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 is absolute. It is the defendants’ own case these sums came from Item (j) US$15 million which in turn was sourced from Item (a). Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the defendants did not have the relevant documents to show the flow of items (q), (s) and (t).

69. The failure to give a full explanation of Items (q), (s) and (t) and non‑production of documents in relation thereto constitute breaches of paras 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order.

70. I am aware it was accepted by the plaintiffs themselves that no tracing was required: para 33, Decision of Chow J. However, the defendants were alive to the fact that the money flow was circular and extremely complicated. Given the complexity, tracing was inevitable in order to comply with the court order. Indeed, most parts of the accountant report were about tracing.

71. The fact that the defendants fully understood what was required of the Unless Order could be seen by the detailed tracing of the US$4,000,000 (Item (l)) in section E.2.5.4 of Yuen’s 1st report.

72. The situation is compounded by the lack of full explanation. For example, why was it necessary to transfer part of the proceeds to Huan Bao, then back to the 13th defendant before injecting into Chung Shing? Why was it necessary to create a money market loan to fund the capital injection before part of the sale proceeds were used to repay part of the money market loan? These remain unanswered and the defendants are in breach of the Unless Order.

…..

79.  I find that the complaint that the defendants had not given a full explanation of the US$11 million established.”

15.  The Judge held that the sanction of strike out of the 1st and 13th defendant’s defence automatically took effect by reason of their failure to comply with the Unless Order (see paragraphs 2 and 141 of the Striking Out Decision). She did not, however, enter judgment for the plaintiffs against the 1st and 13th defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs still had to prove their case against the 2nd defendant and had to prove fraud against the 2nd defendant to establish liability (paragraph 143 of the Striking Out Decision).

16.  On 19 October 2015, before the order of the Judge made on 12 October 2015 had been sealed, Messrs Anthony Siu & Co (on behalf of the 1st and 13th defendants) wrote to the court seeking to re-open her decision on the ground of “certain misunderstanding of the relevant facts and matters”, details of which were set out in that letter.  At paragraph 13 of Messrs Anthony Siu & Co’s letter, the following was stated:-

“Having regard to all the circumstances, including the above, our Clients respectfully submit that, it would be appropriate for this matter to be dealt with by relief being granted through an extension of time (as intimated in §138 of the Decision). This course would appear to be particularly apposite, particularly in light of the Court’s observation at §73 of the Decision that ‘the parties have not made direct submissions to [the above‑mentioned] observations of the court’, which had not been raised by the Plaintiff and was mentioned for the first time in the Decision.”

17.  As earlier mentioned, on 5 November 2015, the 1st and 13th defendants also took out a summons seeking relief from the sanction imposed by the Unless Order.

18.  In support of their applications, the 1st and 13th defendants filed (inter alia):-

(1)  Mr Yuen’s 1st affirmation dated 5 November 2015 “in response to observations made in relation to [Mr Yuen’s 1st Report] in [the Striking Out Decision]”;

(2)  the 1st defendant’s 20th affirmation dated 11 November 2015;

(3)  Mr Yuen’s 2nd affirmation dated 27 November 2015 in response to various matters raised in the 17th affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli dated 19 November 2015[2];

(4)  the 1st defendant’s 21st affirmation dated 4 December 2015;

(5)  Mr Yuen’s 3rd affirmation dated 28 December 2015.

PRINCIPLES FOR RE-OPENING A DECISION

19.  There is no doubt that the court has jurisdiction to re-open a decision, whether final or interlocutory, where the relevant judgment or order has not yet been drawn up or sealed.

20.  In Charlesowrth v Relay Roads Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 230, a defendant applied to amend its pleadings between judgment and the drawing up of the order.  It was held by Neuberger J (as he then was) that the court had a discretion to permit the defendant to do so, even if the proposed amendments would involve a new argument being put forward and further evidence being adduced.  In relation to the principles for the exercise of this discretion, Neuberger J, after reviewing a number of authorities, stated as follows at 238E-H:-

“In these circumstances, I conclude that the following principles apply where a party is seeking to call fresh evidence on a new point after judgment has been given but before the order has been drawn up: (1) the court has jurisdiction to grant an application to amend the pleadings to raise new points and/or to call fresh evidence and/or to hear fresh argument; (2) the court must clearly exercise its discretion in relation to such an application in a way best designed to achieve justice; (3) the general rules relating to amendment apply so that: (a) while it is no doubt desirable in general that litigants should be permitted to take any reasonably arguable point, it should by no means be assumed that the court will accede to an application merely because the other party can, in financial terms, be compensated in costs; (b) as with any other application for leave to amend, consideration must be given to anxieties and legitimate expectations of the other party, the efficient conduct of litigation, and the inconvenience caused to other litigants; (4) quite apart from, and over and above, those principles, because it is inherently contrary to the public interest and unfair on the other side that an unsuccessful party should be able to raise new points or call fresh evidence after a full and final judgment has been given against him, it would generally require an exceptional case before the court was prepared to accede to an application where the applicant could not satisfy the three requirements in Ladd v. Marshall ; (5) almost inevitably, each case will have particular features which the court will think it right to take into account when deciding how to dispose of the application before it; (6) the court should be astute to discourage applications which involve parties seeking to put in late evidence, but cases where new evidence is found after judgment is given and before the order is drawn up will be comparatively rare.”

21.  In Re Blenheim Leisure (Restaurants) Ltd (No 3), Times 9 November 1999, Neuberger J expressed the view that:-

(1)  Even in relation to an interlocutory judgment in which the order had not been drawn up, it was undesirable for a court to be asked to reconsider an earlier decision unless there were strong reasons for doing so.

(2)  Those strong reasons included: a plain mistake on the part of the court; a failure of the parties to draw to the court's attention a fact or point of law that was plainly relevant; or discovery of new facts subsequent to the judgment being given. Another good reason was if the applicant could argue that he was taken by surprise by a particular application from which the court ruled adversely to him and that he did not have a fair opportunity to consider.

(3)  It would be foolish to pretend that that was a comprehensive list of all the possible circumstances in which it would be appropriate to ask the court to reconsider its decision.

(4)  It would be equally foolish to pretend that in every application where one or more of those requirements was satisfied the court should think it right to reopen the case.

22.  In Chow Siu Po v Wong Ming Fung [2004] 1 HKC 10, the plaintiff commenced a probate action seeking (i) a revocation of a grant of probate in respect of a will made in 1994, and (ii) an order that an earlier will made in 1990 be admitted to probate.  After trial, Deputy High Court Judge Lam (as he then was) decided to revoke the grant, but did not pronounce for the 1990 will in view of the absence of evidence of due execution of that will, stating also that “the action is not finally disposed of in any event … and it might be possible for the Plaintiff to argue that he should be allowed to re-open the case on this issue and to adduce evidence as to due execution”[3].  Thereafter, the plaintiff made an application to re-open his case to adduce evidence to prove due execution of the 1990 will.  Deputy High Court Judge Lam considered that exceptional circumstances were required for a court to re-open a decision following judgment, and held that adopting such a course would be appropriate on the facts of that case.  In relation to the need to show exceptional circumstances, the following was stated at paragraphs 11 and 12 of his judgment:

“11. … In general, the court should not offer an opportunity to a litigant to supplement his evidence after judgment. In Born Chief Co v Tsai George [1996] 2 HKC 282 at p. 292E, Nazareth VP (as he then was) said,

‘Such a result … must have offended the judge’s sense of justice. But the good, efficient and increasingly, the affordable administration of justice requires that parties present their entire cases and cannot expect a second bit at the cherry simply because they failed to … produce their requisite evidence.’

…

12. The crucial issue is therefore whether there are exceptional circumstances to justify the re-opening of the case as to prayer (b). In this connection, in Townsend v Achilleas (unreported, 6 July 2000), the English Court of Appeal held that the test is slightly more flexible than Ladd v Marshall when the application to re-open the case is made to the trial judge instead of the Court of Appeal. Mummery LJ said,

‘In principle, however, it is difficult to see why there should be a more restrictive test for the reception of fresh evidence by the judge who has tried the case than would be applied by the Court of Appeal on an appeal from the judge.  Indeed, there is a good case for the cautious application of a slightly more flexible test for the reasons given by Neuberger J in Charlesworth v Relay RoadsLtd (supra) at 238 B-H.  The trial judge would have the advantage over the Court of Appeal of having seen the witnesses.  He would be in a better position to look at the evidence as a whole closer to the trial.  In that way it might be possible to avoid the risk of the Court of Appeal having to inflict on the parties the expense and delay consequent on ordering a retrial by a different judge at a much later date.’”

23.  In all, although the court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to permit a party to re-open a decision where the judgment or order has not yet been drawn up or sealed, the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the court to exercise this jurisdiction must be exceptional.   In my view, a party who is dissatisfied with a decision made by a court should ordinarily lodge an appeal or apply for leave to appeal (where required) against that decision.  The need for exceptionality is all the more obvious where the party seeking to re-open a decision wishes to rely on fresh evidence but could not satisfy the requirements laid down in Ladd v Marshall for admission of fresh evidence on appeal.

NO PROPER BASIS TO PERMIT THE 1ST AND 13TH DEFENDANTS TO RE‑OPEN THE STRIKING OUT DECISION

24.  In his submissions in support of the Re-Opening Application, Mr Johnny Mok SC raised three main points.

25.  First, Mr Mok argued that the Judge’s finding that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to give a full explanation of the US$11 million was based on certain “observations” on her part which the parties had no notice and the defendants had not been given an opportunity to address the Judge on those matters.  It was said that this amounted to a breach of natural justice which alone would justify the court in re-opening the Striking Out Decision (see paragraphs 17 to 20 of Mr Mok’s Revised Skeleton Argument dated 4 January 2016).

26.  The Judge in fact gave express consideration to the question of whether the 1st and 13th defendants ought to be given an opportunity to specifically deal with her “observations”.  She considered that, in the circumstances before her, there was no unfairness to the 1st and 13th defendants for her to proceed without giving them the opportunity to make direct submissions on those observations or, in the words of the Judge, “another chance to explain”.  The Judge also considered that her analysis was covered by a particular submission that had been made by Ms Linda Chan SC who then appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs before her.  The Judge’s detailed reasoning for deciding to proceed in the way that she did appears in paragraphs 73 to 77 of the Striking Out Decision, as follows:-

“73. I am also aware that the parties have not made direct submissions to these observations of the court. It might be suggested by the defendants that they ought to be given an opportunity to specifically deal with these observations.

74. I disagree. The defendants were at all times most ably represented by leading counsel and solicitors. They knew full well it was their obligation to comply fully and properly with each term of the Unless Order. They had been given a number of opportunities to make good their own disclosure.

75. More importantly, this is not a matter of submissions. This is a factual matter. If they had not provided a complete disclosure of what had happened to Items (j) and (k) with documentary evidence; and had not provided documents evidencing that Items (q), (s) and (t) sourced from Item (j), they had not fully explained the application of the US$11 million and are in breach of the Unless Order.

76. There is no unfairness to the defendants. They could apply for relief from sanction if they faced any difficulty about disclosure. They had practically done this once before A Chan J when they applied for leave to file more reports to tackle the plaintiffs’ complaints in relation to the HK$53 million odd. After all, this is an Unless Order, the final chance the court gave to the defendants, subject only to relief from sanction if an application has been made. I am of the view that it is wrong and unfair to the plaintiffs if the defendants were given another chance to explain.

77.    Moreover, the aforesaid analysis was certainly covered by the wider and general submission of Ms Chan that the court should not assume that one sum which has gone at a particular point of time into a particular account of the defendants was the same sum which was paid out later, even though they looked similar or was of the exact amount.  Ms Chan has helpfully drawn my attention to the fact that the defendants had many accounts which were in turn divided into various sub‑accounts.  There were many sums which were of the same or very similar amounts going in and out and travelling between the defendants’ various accounts.  The burden of showing a complete picture of the fund flow falls squarely on the defendants.” 

27.  Second, Mr Mok argued that there was a factual error in the Judge’s “observations”, in that the Judge had apparently mixed up 2 companies with similar names, one being “Huan Bao” (which is the abbreviation for “Huan Bao Steel Ltd” in Mr Yuen’s 1st Report) and the other being “Asia Huan Bao” (the abbreviation for “Asia Huan Bao Steel Limited”) (see paragraphs 21 to 23 of Mr Mok’s Revised Skeleton Argument).  The factual error, it was said, appeared in the Judge’s statement in paragraph 63 of the Striking Out Decision that “the defendants had only produced the bank statements of Huan Bao Steel’s DBS HKD account”, and the further statement in paragraph 64 of the decision that “[w]ithout the production of the BOCOM statements, or the Huan Bao ledgers of the relevant period, it is unknown whether this enormous sum of US$15 million has been applied for some other use or has acquired some other assets which the defendants were under a duty to disclose”.

28.  According to Anthony Siu & Co’s letter dated 19 October 2015, the “Huan Bao Steel’s DBS HKD account” mentioned in paragraph 63 of the Striking Out Decision was a reference to an account of “Asia Huan Bao Steel Limited”, a private company owned by the 1st defendant, while the “BOCOM statements” mentioned in paragraph 64 of the Striking Out Decision was a reference to the statements of “Huan Bao Steel Ltd” which was an indirect subsidiary of the 1st plaintiff.  It was further said in Anthony Siu & Co’s letter that “Huan Bao Steel Ltd” had been taken over by the then provisional liquidators a long time ago and there was no basis to infer that the 1st and 13th defendants had possession or control of that company’s documents.

29.  Even if there was some confusion regarding these two entities, it is apparent, from paragraphs 67 to 68 of the Striking Out Decision, that the Judge also found that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to produce documents relating to Items (q), (s) and (t) mentioned in paragraph 13(3) above and failed to give a full explanation of the three sums in question (ie, US$4,000,000, US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,977), and she concluded at paragraph 69 of the Striking Out Decision that the failure to give a full explanation of Items (q), (s) and (t) and non-production of documents in relation thereto constituted breaches of paragraph 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order.

30.  Third, Mr Mok took the court through the relevant parts of Mr Yuen’s 1st Report to show that the Judge was wrong in her conclusion that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to give a full explanation of the US$11 million (see paragraphs 24 to 35 of Mr Mok’s Revised Skeleton Argument).  Mr Mok also relied upon, in so far it might be necessary to do so, the additional evidence not before the Judge to make good his submission. It is not with disrespect to Mr Mok that I do not propose to examine in detail the analysis carried out by counsel, for I am clearly of the view that even if I were to disagree with the Judge’s conclusion (a matter on which it is not necessary for me to express any view), that cannot be a sufficient basis for me to re-open her decision.  The Striking Out Decision is made by a judge of co‑ordinate jurisdiction.  I have no appellate jurisdiction over that decision.  Disagreement between two judges hearing any issue on two separate occasions, particularly one involving detailed examination of accounting records and forensic accounting evidence, cannot amount to an exceptional circumstance justifying the re-opening of the first judge’s decision.  In my view, the 1st and 13th defendants’ proper avenue to challenge the Judge’s conclusion is to lodge an appeal to the Court of Appeal.  This comment also applies to the other two grounds advanced by Mr Mok on behalf of 1st and 13th defendants to seek to re-open the Striking Out Decision.

31.  In all, I reject that the 1st and 13th defendants’ Re-Opening Application.

THE RELIEF APPLICATION

32.  I can deal with this application briefly.  If, as found by the Judge, the 1st and 13th defendants failed to fully comply with paragraph 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order, I would not exercise my discretion to grant any relief from the sanction imposed by the Unless Order, having regard to the following matters:-

(1)  The application for an extension of time to comply with the Unless Order was made on 5 November 2015, which was more than 11 months after the deadline for complying with the Unless Order (1 December 2014).

(2)  The 1st and 13th defendants’ obligation to make the relevant disclosure was first imposed by L Chan J on 9 April 2014, that being nearly 19 months before the date of the application.

(3)  At paragraphs 51 to 56 of the Unless Order Decision, I explained why an unless order should be made in the present case.  I also expressed the view, at paragraph 54(4) of that decision, that “it is well within [the 1st and 13th defendants’] ability to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order”.

(4)  The history of this matter, as summarized in paragraphs 7 to 23 of the Unless Order Decision, clearly indicates that the 1st and 13th defendants are not willing to make full and proper disclosure of their assets as required by various orders that have been made by the court.

DISPOSITION

33.  I dismiss both the Re-Opening Application and Relief Application, with costs to the plaintiffs to be taxed if not agreed.

34.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank Mr Mok and Mr Dobby for the assistance that they have rendered to the court.

(Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Chris Dobby, of Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Johnny Mok, SC, Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants



[1] References to items are to “Table 7” of Mr Yuen’s 1st Report reproduced in paragraph 46 of the Striking Out Decision.

[2] The 17th affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli was filed in reply to (inter alia) the 1st defendant’s 20th affirmation and Mr Yuen’s 1st affirmation.

[3] See paragraph 123 of the judgment delivered by Deputy High Court Judge Lam in HCAP 3/1998 on 30 January 2003.

103109-EN-2016-03-10

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN  
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED1st Plaintiff
(IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED (IN COMPULSORY LIQUIDATION)2nd Plaintiff
and
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 ZHONG CHI GUANG (FORMERLY TRADING AS QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO.)6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD.11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD.12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
and
 CHUNG SHING FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LTD.1st Respondent
 CHUNG SHING INVESTMENT PTE LTD.2nd Respondent
 ZHONGJIN GOLDMAN (TIANJIN) FINANCING LEASE CO. LTD.3rd Respondent
 ZHONGJIN GOLDMAN (TIANJIN) EQUITY INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CO. LTD.4th Respondent
 CHUNG SHING FINANCE CORP. LTD.5th Respondent

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Kent Yee in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 March 2016
Date of Decision: 10 March 2016

__________________

DECISION

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1.  This is an application of Mr Chun and Wellrun Limited (collectively “Ds”) for a stay of the ex-parte order granted by this court on 19th February 2016 (“the Receivership Order”).

2.  This matter has a long history and many other courts have disposed of various applications in this action before. For present purposes, I shall only give a brief summary of the relevant background facts as follows.

3.  China Metal Recycling (Holdings) Limited (“China Metal”) is now in compulsory liquidation. It was incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of business situated in Hong Kong. It is the holding company of a number of subsidiary companies in the PRC, Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and the British Virgin Islands (“the China Metal Group”). The China Metal Group carried on a worldwide trade in scrap metal with the major operations being vested in the subsidiaries in the Mainland.

4.  Central Steel (Macao Commercial Offshore) Limited (“Central Steel”) is also in compulsory liquidation. It was incorporated in Macau and was purportedly the sourcing arm of the China Metal Group.

5.  The scrap metal recycling business of the Group was said to be on a grand scale in the Mainland. On 22 June 2009, the shares of China Metal were listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and about HK$1,685 million was raised by the initial public offering.

6.  Mr Chun and Madam Lai, husband and wife, founded the China Metal Group. Mr Chun was the Chairman and CEO of China Metal and its controlling shareholder.

7.  The investigation of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) in late 2009 lifted the lid on the alleged misdeeds of Mr Chun and Madam Lai leading to the present proceedings. The SFC found out that Mr Chun had committed fraud on a massive scale on China Metal, Central Steel and the Stock Exchange. As a result, more than HK$5 billion were misappropriated from these two companies mainly by means of a number of fictitious transactions over the years with the assistance of all other defendants.

8.  On 26 July 2013, in a winding-up petition commenced by SFC under HCCW 210/2013, Mr Borrelli and Ms Chi were appointed provisional liquidators in respect of China Metal and on 8 August 2013, they were appointed provisional liquidators in respect of Central Steel.

9.  On 30 July 2013, the provisional liquidators obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against Mr Chun and Madam Lai and all other defendants in this action except Wellrun Limited (“Wellrun”) up to the value of HK$1,682,198.420. Wellrun, a corporate vehicle of Mr Chun, was joined as the 13th defendant in this action and an ex parte Mareva injunction in respect of the like amount was granted against Wellrun on 7 August 2013.

10.  On 4 June 2014, Ng J extended the Mareva injunctions to 13 companies which Mr Chun allegedly held substantial assets through his relatives and close associates. Among these companies, the three daughters of Mr Chun own Chung Shing Finance Holding Limited (Belize) (“Chung Shing Belize”), which holds Chung Shing Development Pte Limited (Singapore) and Chung Shing Investment Pte Ltd (Singapore), the second respondent (“R2”). R2 holds Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Limited (HK), the 1st respondent (“R1”). R1 holds 4 PRC subsidiaries which include the 4th respondent (“R4”), Zhongjin Goldman (Jiangsu) Investment Co Ltd (“the Jiangsu Company”), the 3rd respondent (“R3”) and the 5th respondent (“R5”).

11.  The provisional liquidators allege that Wellrun purportedly loaned a sum of US$82 million to R1. The purported loan was transferred to R3 and the Jiangsu Company subsequently. As mentioned, Mr Chun’s three daughters have become the shareholders of Chung Shing Belize. The purported loan is suspect.

12.  On 26 February 2015, Harris J ordered that China Metal be wound up. On 14 May 2015, Mr Borelli and Ms Chi (hereinafter “the Liquidators”) were appointed as liquidators in respect of China Metal and on 10 July 2015 in respect of Central Steel.  

13.  In the present action, China Metal and Central Steel (hereinafter collectively “Ps”) claim against both Mr Chun and Madam Lai for an indemnity for any claims against China Metal arising from the IPO, equitable damages and/or compensation for breach of trust and/or fiduciary duty and /or damages for conspiracy. They also claim against Wellrun for an identical indemnity and equitable damages and/or compensation for dishonest assistance and/or damages for conspiracy.

14.  Default judgment has been entered against the 3rd, 4th, 7th 8th, 9th and 10th defendants. The 5th defendant has been debarred from defending this action pursuant to the order of Saunders, J dated 25 June 2014. Ps discontinued this action against the 11th and 12th defendants.

15.  On account of their failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in aid of the Mareva injunctions despite its being enforced by the unless order of Chow J dated 17 November 2014, DHCJ Anita Yip SC ordered that the defence of Ds be struck out without entering default judgment against them on 12 October 2015.

16.  On 5 February 2016, DHCJ Keith heard and disposed of an inter partes application of Ps for an appointment of interim receivers (“the 1st Receivership Application”) over the assets of all the five respondents. The deputy judge accepted that there is a triable issue over whether the liquidation of the Jiangsu Company and the current whereabouts of its assets were deliberately concealed from the Liquidators and whether the Mareva injunctions were breached.

17.  The deputy judge also accepted that there is a triable issue as to whether there is a risk that there will be further breaches of the Mareva injunctions unless drastic action of some kind is taken. The deputy judge opined that the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of the R1, R2 and R5 would be a proportionate response to the need to protect the assets of the Jiangsu Company from further dissipation subject to the personal undertaking of Mr Fung who is a certified public account in his executive control of the relevant respondents that he would ensure none of their assets would be disposed of in breach of the Mareva injunctions. On that basis, the deputy judge agreed to place trust in Mr Fung and adjourned the 1st Receivership Application so that it could be renewed at the same time as the application as against the R3 and R4 which Ps had not been able to effect service of their summons.

18.  After this lengthy narrative of the background facts, I now come to the subject matter of this stay application, i.e. the Receivership Order. On 19 February 2016, Ps applied to this court on an ex-parte without notice basis for the appointment of interim receivers in aid of the Mareva injunctions (“the 2nd Receivership Application”). The underlying complaint was the recent discovery of the Liquidators (on 15 February 2016) of the dissolution of Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Equity Investment Fund Partnership (“the Partnership”).

19.  Mr Chun had 99.98% interest in the Partnership and R4 had the remaining 0.02% interest prior to its dissolution. On 13 July 2015, as its 99.8% owner, Mr Chun signed a resolution to dissolve the Partnership and eventually the Partnership was dissolved on 23 October 2015.

20.  In any view, Mr Chun did cause one of his assets being his interest in the Partnership to be dissipated and arguably this was in breach of the Mareva injunctions. Alarmingly, he did not disclose the dissolution of the Partnership to the Liquidators and no mention was made about this when the parties argued about the liquidation of the Jiangsu Company before DHCJ Keith.

21.  At the ex-parte hearing, Ms Sit appearing for Ps highlighted to this court the following matters in support of Ps’ application:

(1) The registered capital of the Partnership in the amount of USD500m;

(2) The salient observations of DHCJ Keith in the 1st Receivership Application and in particular his conclusion that a case for appointment of interim receiver including further breaches of the Mareva injunctions and dissipation of assets was prima facie made out;

(3) The concealment of the dissolution of the Partnership even in the course of Ds’ assertion of their non-involvement in the liquidation of the Jiangsu Company before DCHJ Keith;

(4) The repeated breaches of the Mareva injunctions and their ancillary disclosure obligations leading to the striking out of his defence, the dishonesty of Mr Chun and his cynical disregard of previous court orders; and

(5) The departure of Mr Chun from Hong Kong and his failure to answer his police bail.

22.  Against this backdrop, Ms Sit submitted that an urgent appointment of receiver was warranted without any forewarning to be given to Mr Chun so that he could not have any opportunity to further dissipate his remaining assets.  

23.  On the evidence, I was satisfied that a prima facie case of an appointment of interim receiver had been made out. I nevertheless expressed my concern about the necessity and propriety of the application to be made on an ex parte and without notice basis given the fact that the 1st Receivership Application was argued at an inter partes hearing. At last, I was persuaded by Ms Sit and thus made the Receivership Order whereby Messrs John Horward Batchelor and Roderick John Sutton as receivers (“the Receivers”) with the usual ancillary disclosure obligations. For the avoidance of doubt, the Receivership Order does not concern R1, R2 and R5.

24.  Prior to the return day fixed on 26 February 2016, upon receipt of the summons of Ps dated 22February 2016 for their application to continue the Receivership Order (“the Continuation Application”), this court indicated by letter dated 23 February 2016 that should Ds intend to discharge the Receivership Order with their own evidence, the parties should try to agree on the timetable for filing of their respective evidence and adjourn the intended discharge application and the Continuation Application to a date to be fixed. This court also indicated to the parties that this court would be available on 3 March 2016 to deal with their urgent applications, if any.

25.  On the following day, Ds issued a summons for their application to discharge the Receivership Order (“the Discharge Application”) and a stay pending determination thereof (“Stay Application”).  

26.  Absent agreement on directions to be sought, the parties came before this court on the return day. On that occasion, Mr Johnny Mok SC (with Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow) appearing for Ds proposed certain directions which were by and large agreed by Ms Linda Chan SC for Ps. This court hence made an order mostly in terms of the proposed directions whereby, among other things, directions for filing evidence for the Discharge Application and the Continuation Application were given so that the two applications could be dealt with in a 2-day hearing at the same time before this court (“the Return day order”).

27.  Mr Mok indicated to this court that Ds would proceed with their Stay Application on 3 March 2016. He lastly made an application for an interim stay pending the determination of the Stay Application. Ms Chan opposed the application and eventually I made my ruling against Ds with reasons orally given.

28.  I should mention that I agreed to allow an extension of time for Ds to comply with the ancillary disclosure obligations in the Receivership Order until 10 March 2016, i.e. the intended date of my determination of the Stay Application in the Return day order.

Stay Application

29.  Mr Man SC (with Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow) for Ds at the outset of the hearing suggested that this court should adopt the following approach for the purpose of the Stay Application. He submitted that it should be treated to be made at the very first inter partes hearing after the grant of the Receivership Order notwithstanding the return day. As such, Ds should be entitled to argue that the Receivership Order should be forthwith discharged and this court should refuse to make any regrant. Naturally this suggestion attracted the strong objection of Ms Sit.

30.  I accept in certain situations where there are strong reasons to discharge an ex-parte order on the return day even without any opposition evidence filed, the court can discharge the ex-parte order when it feels certain of its impropriety upon the submissions of the party at the receiving end. However, I am unable to accept Mr Man’s suggestion given the position previously indicated by the parties as reflected in the Return day order. The parties had already agreed to argue both the Discharge Application and the Continuation Application together at a 2-day hearing with full evidence filed by both sides. Ds could not take Ps by surprise and ask for an immediate discharge of the Receivership Order outright on this occasion though the effect of a stay might be akin to a temporary discharge.   

31.  This court then asked for assistance as to the applicable test to be adopted in the Stay Application. Ms Sit was right to point out that Mr Man was unable to provide any authorities setting out the applicable test and she went on to submit that the use of interim stay was entirely inappropriate in light of the lack of proper legal basis for the court to exercise such discretion in these circumstances.

32.  In my judgment, this court must have inherent jurisdiction to accede to the Stay Application and suspend the operation of the Receivership pending the determination of the Discharge Application and the Continuation Application to do justice in the particular circumstances of the present case. This Ms Sit agreed and stressed that any exercise of power by this court must be done judicially and on a principled basis.

33.  Mr Man urged this court to bear in mind that the Receivership Order was granted arguably in breach of natural justice and Ds should not be saddled with any extra heavy burden to prove its invalidity since this was the very first time they had the opportunity to mount such a challenge. I cannot fully accept his submission.

34.  I believe the correct analysis is this. This court accepted the substantive merits and appropriateness of Ps’ ex-parte application and hence the Receivership Order was made. Unless there is shown an arguable case of discharge supported by evidence and/or legal submissions advanced on behalf of Ds, this court has no reason to deviate from its previous conclusion that an interim receiver should be appointed and to suspend the operation of the ex-parte order pending the determination of the Discharge Application and the Continuation Application.  

35.  In assessing whether there is an arguable case of discharge, it is true that Ds may argue for a discharge of the Receivership Order by way of legal submissions without adducing their own evidence. However, Ds have agreed to have their Discharge Application to be adjourned pending filing of evidence and there is no reason why they should now be allowed to argue on legal principles alone for a stay, which is a discharge in effect before the Discharge Application is heard.  On the other hand, I do not think that it is appropriate for this court to embark on a thorough investigation into the merits on affidavit evidence and form any definitive view in the absence of full evidence and before the substantive hearing of the Discharge and Continuation Applications.

36.  If it appears to this court that it is an open and shut case that the Discharge Application is doomed to failure, the Stay Application should be dismissed without further ado.

37.  However, if this court is satisfied that there is an arguable case of discharge, this court should proceed to consider the balance of convenience. In particular, the court has to consider whether the greater injustice might arise from refusing a stay which it subsequently turns out that the Receivership Order ought not to have been granted, or from the suspension of the Receivership Order which it subsequently turns out ought to have remained operative.

Ds’ case of discharge

38.  Mr Man advanced three main grounds for the Stay Application. First, Mr Man argued that there is no justification for Ps to have proceeded the 2nd Receivership Application ex parte without notice. He argued that there was no urgency or confidentiality of their application given the worldwide Mareva injunctions in place.

39.  Mr Man highlighted to me the fact that even the 1st Receivership Application was proceeded inter partes before DHCJ Keith and there is no reason why the 2nd Receivership Application was made on a different basis.

40.  Mr Man further argued that if the Mareva injunctions could not stop Mr Chun from dissipating his assets, the Receivership Order could not be of any additional assistance.

41.  Mr Man pointed out that the acquisition of Mr Chun’s assets by the Receivers would take some time and so would their investigations, hence the Receivership Order could not add anything to the Mareva injunctions immediately. Put bluntly, Mr Chun could still dissipate his assets before the Receivers are able to lay their hands on his assets and so there is no reason why the 2nd Receivership Application should be made on an urgent basis without giving any notice to Ds.

42.  I am not impressed by this submission. One of the general functions of an appointment of receivers is to ensure compliance with Mareva injunctions. As rightly pointed out by Ms Sit, a receivership order may be granted where a Mareva injunction is breached, or there is a real risk of such a breach: Akai Holding Ltd v Ho Wing On Christopher, unreported, HCCL 37/2005 at §41.

43.  Whilst I may accept that receivership has its inherent limitations to ensure immediate cessation of dissipation of assets, it does not follow that it should never be granted on an urgent and without notice basis.   

44.  Mr Man next submitted that the dissolution of the Partnership being the last straw that breaks the camel’s back was completed months ago before the 2nd Receivership Application and has already become a stale event. Thus, he submitted that there was neither urgency nor confidentiality in this matter.

45.  I cannot accept this submission. The last straw contended by Ps is actually the late discovery of the secretive dissolution of the Partnership apparently in breach of the Mareva injunctions, which is indicative of an imminent danger or risk of further dissipation of their assets in the absence of effective measures taken against them. 

46.  The second broad ground is that there was material non-disclosure about the paid up capital of the Partnership. Mr Man pointed out that this court was given a false picture that the registered capital of USD 500M was actually paid up and in fact Chun has never paid any capital to the Partnership. This court was misled into equating the dissolution of the Partnership with an evaporation of a substantial asset of Mr Chun.

47.  Mr Man submitted that to begin with, the official records and documents of the Partnership in the possession of the Partnership should show that the information of the registered and actual paid up capital was inconsistent at best. It is apparent that Mr Chun was only required to pay up the capital he subscribed by 1 August 2016. Indeed Mr Borrelli, one of the Liquidators, said so in his 7th Affidavit dated 3 June 2014.

48.  Furthermore, Mr Chun’s solicitors by letter dated 9 June 2014 informed Ps that in the Partnership, Mr Chun’s interest is below HK$50,000.

49.  Mr Chun himself in his 14th Affirmation dated 26 August 2014 positively asserted that the Partnership was dormant with no substantial assets and due to the fact that the investment plan did not materialize, no capital has ever been paid into the Partnership.

50.  A letter of R4 to Mr Chun dated 27 April 2015 was exhibited to the 5th Affirmation of Anthony Siu filed for the Stay Application and it explained that due to the non-payment of any of the registered capital and the lack of any assets, the Partnership was unable to operate. R4 demanded Mr Chun to comply with the investment plan and make contribution within 30 days lest R4 should terminate the partnership and dissolve the Partnership. There is no evidence that the Liquidators had any knowledge of this letter and I do not think it assists in Ds’ allegation of material non-disclosure.

51.  Mr Man submitted that Mr Chun’s explanation should have been drawn to the attention of this court at the ex-parte stage so as to give this court a balanced view of the matter.

52.  Ms Sit explained that the Liquidators should be entitled to rely on the information contained in the two official annual check reports of the Partnership for the years of 2011 and 2012 prepared by apparently independent professionals for the submissions to the authorities and it should prevail over other information in the pre-formation records or documents. She pointed out that the dissolution documents are dubious and the reliability of the three persons who prepared them is very much questionable by reason of their affinity to Mr Chun.

53.  I can well see the force of Mr Man’s submission on the alleged material non-disclosure but I cannot say that the validity of the allegation is so overwhelming that I can find full justification to discharge the Receivership Order or suspend its operation without further ado. Suffice it to say, I would for present purposes accept that there is an arguable case of material non-disclosure to be further tested/argued at the hearing of the Discharge Application.

54.  I nevertheless continue to explain Mr Man’s third broad ground in brief. It was centered around the well-known draconian, intrusive and less reversible nature of the appointment of receivers. He submitted that receivers should only be appointed as the last resort in light of an imminent risk of dissipation of assets. A fortiori, only in exceptional circumstances such a remedy should be allowed when the application is proceeded ex parte without notice. Mr Man then went on to submit that the evidence of Ps failed to meet the threshold.

55.  I do not think there is any argument about the general principles and I need not refer to the relevant authorities cited to me in this Decision. I am just not persuaded that Ps plainly failed to justify the appointment on their evidence.

56.  Before leaving the merits of Ds’ case of discharge, I should make it clear I make no reference to the additional allegations contained in the 7th Affirmation of Ms Chi filed on 26 February 2016 for this hearing. I do not believe that it is relevant to the Stay Application.

Balance of convenience

57.  Having accepted that there is an arguable case of discharge, I proceed to consider the balance of convenience. In this balancing exercise, general complaints about the undesirable effect of a receivership order do not assist Ds. They have failed to adduce any evidence to show that the appointment of the Receivers did or would cause any serious disruption to the business of those companies concerned including Wellrun. There is no suggestion that any of these companies are a going concern and have genuine business operation. Nor is there any allegation that any of their assets, commercial transactions or contracts would ever be jeopardized or prejudiced by the Receivership Order and as a result they would suffer any irreparable loss. The failure of Ds to adduce such evidence is inexcusable after I already pointed this out in my refusal of the interim stay application on the return day.

58.  Mr Man submitted that Ds may be prejudiced in their defence to this action if they are subject to the Receivership Order in the meantime.

59.  I am not persuaded. The Receivers are officers of the court and they should know very well their mandates and duties of their appointment. I do not, in the absence of evidence, believe that they would in any way impede Ds’ preparation of their defence.

60.  On the contrary, I am satisfied that there is an arguable case that Ds would dissipate their assets prime facie in breach of the Mareva injunctions. I am of the view that if the Stay Application is granted, Ps would be exposed to this genuine risk and suffer irreparable loss.

61.  In the premises, I am driven to the conclusion that I should not exercise my discretion to grant a stay of the Receivership Order. Nor do I find any legitimate ground to allow Ds a suspension of their disclosure obligations thereunder.

Conclusion and Orders

62.  For the reasons given, I dismiss the Stay Application in paragraph 3 of Ds’ summons. I order that the Receivership Order be continued until the determination of the Discharge and Continuation Applications or further order of the court. I allow Ds more time to comply with the disclosure obligations in the Receivership Order by extending the time to comply with paragraph 2 of the Return day order from 10 March 2016 to 21 March 2016.

63.  Costs should follow the event and I make a costs order nisi that Ds do pay Ps costs of this application forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.

64.  Lastly, I thank counsel for their helpful assistance rendered to this court in this matter.

( Kent Yee )
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Bernard Man SC, Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co. for the 1st and 13th defendants

102693-EN-2016-02-05

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in compulsory liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

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BETWEEN  
 (1) CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(in compulsory liquidation)
Plaintiffs
 (2) CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
 (in compulsory liquidation)
and
 (1) CHUN CHI WAIDefendants
 (2) LAI WUN YIN
 (3) LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED
 (4) JASON METAL RECYCLE CORPORATION
 (5) CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED
 (6) ZHONG CHI GUANG (formerly trading as QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO)
 (7) METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED
 (8) HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED
 (9) CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED
 (10) PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED
 (11) HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LIMITED
 (12) GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LIMITED
 (13) WELLRUN LIMITED
and
 (1) CHUNG SHING FINANCE (HOLDINGS) LIMITEDRespondents
 (2) CHUNG SHING INVESTMENT PTE
 (3) ZHONGJIN GOLDMAN (TIANJIN) FINANCING LEASE COMPANY LIMITED
(中金高盛(天津)融資租賃有限公司)
 (4) ZHONGJIN GOLDMAN (TIANJIN) EQUITY INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY LIMITED
(中金高盛(天津)股權投資基金管理有限公司)
 (5) CHUNG SHING FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED

________________________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Keith in Court
Date of Hearing:  5 February 2016
Date of Judgment:  5 February 2016

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J U D G M E N T
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1.  This is litigation on a grand scale. The plaintiffs are two companies in compulsory liquidation, and their action against the defendants is being continued by their liquidators. They alleged that the first defendant, Chun Chi Wai, and a company wholly owned by him, Wellrun Ltd (“Wellrun”), the thirteenth defendant, fraudulently conspired with other defendants to inflate the value of the plaintiffs’ business by the creation of a series of fictitious transactions and a fictitious flow of funds. As a result of this fraud, the plaintiffs claim to have suffered loss and damage in excess of HK$5 billion. The defence of Mr Chun and Wellrun was struck out for their failure to comply with their obligations under a Mareva injunction to disclose what had become of sums in excess of HK$780 million which Wellrun had received in 2010 and 2011.

2.  The current application before the court, which was only issued at the end of last week, is for the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of a particular company, together with three of its subsidiaries and its parent company, on the basis that the company has been used to dissipate the assets of Mr Chun and Wellrun.  The application is urgent if the liquidators’ concern about the further dissipation of those assets is justified, and if this judgment is less comprehensive than it might otherwise have been, I trust that the parties will understand why. 

3.  The case has a long history, but previous orders of the court mean that for present purposes I can be relatively brief.  In June 2014, the Mareva injunction which had previously been granted was extended to cover a number of companies incorporated in Hong Kong, the PRC, Singapore and Belize through which Mr Chun was alleged to have held substantial assets.  Those companies included the five respondents to the current application, being five companies (two incorporated in Hong Kong, two incorporated in the PRC and one incorporated in Singapore) over whose assets the appointment of interim receivers is sought, as well as another company incorporated in the PRC, Zhongjin Goldman (Jiangsu) Investment Co Ltd (“the Jiangsu company”). 

4.  One of the grounds on which the Mareva injunction was extended to cover those companies was that it was claimed that Wellrun had “lent” US$82 million to Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd, the first respondent (“R1”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong, which was a wholly‑owned subsidiary of Chung Shing Insurance PTE Ltd, the second respondent (“R2”), a company incorporated in Singapore, which was itself a wholly‑owned subsidiary of Chung Shing Finance Holding Ltd, a company incorporated in Belize (“the Belize company”).  It was claimed that R1 had then transferred the US$82 million to two of its subsidiaries, Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Financing Lease Co Ltd, the third respondent (“R3”), a company incorporated in the PRC, and the Jiangsu company.  US$30 million was alleged to have been received by R3, and US$52 million was alleged to have been received by the Jiangsu company.

5.  It has also been claimed that the shareholding in the Belize company (which, as I have said was the ultimate owner of R1) was transferred by way of gift to Mr Chun’s three daughters.  In that way, Mr Chun’s daughters became the beneficial owners of R1 and its four subsidiaries, those four subsidiaries being

(1) R3;

(2) Zhongjin Goldman (Tianjin) Equity Investment Management Co Ltd, the fourth respondent (“R4”), a company incorporated in the PRC;

(3) Chung Shing Finance Corporation Ltd, the fifth respondent (“R5”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong; and

(4) the Jiangsu company.

By that route, Mr Chun’s three daughters are said to have controlled what remains of the US$82 million transferred to R3 and the Jiangsu company.  There is nothing to suggest that they had done anything to warrant such munificence, and accordingly they appear to have acquired very substantial assets for nothing. 

6.  In the light of that, the plaintiffs applied for the Mareva injunction to be extended to cover Mr Chun’s daughters, and that resulted in his daughters undertaking that they would not dispose of, deal with or diminish in any way the value of their shareholding in the Belize company or the assets, whether held directly or indirectly, of a number of companies including the five respondents, the Belize company, and the Jiangsu company.  Mr Chun’s daughters were also ordered to disclose the assets of those companies, but it is claimed that they have failed to do so.  Leave to commence proceedings against them for their committal for contempt of court in respect of that alleged breach of the order for disclosure has been granted.  

7.  Against that background, I come to the events which have given rise to the present application.  The application for the committal of Mr Chun’s daughters was due to be heard yesterday.  The evidence now before the court is that in the course of preparing for that hearing, the plaintiffs’ liquidators discovered that R1 had passed a resolution signed by Li Jinquan in March 2015 cancelling the registration of the Jiangsu company and forming a committee to place it into liquidation, that in breach of the Mareva injunction by August 2015 its assets and funds in excess of RMB216 million had been distributed to R1, and that in November 2015 the de‑registration of the Jiangsu company had been lodged with the relevant authorities in the PRC. 

8.  The liquidators claim that it is inconceivable that Mr Chun would not have known about the liquidation of the Jiangsu company. Indeed, they claim that he instigated it.  In my opinion, the liquidators have reasonable grounds for believing that to be the case, having regard to the reasons given in para 21 of the 20th Affidavit of Cosimo Borelli, one of the liquidators, not least of which is that Mr Li is a close associate of Mr Chun, and that two of the three members of the liquidation committee of the Jiangsu company were connected to companies in which Mr Chun had a controlling interest. 

9.  I should say something about the Jiangsu company’s assets.  According to the liquidation report of the Jiangsu company, they consisted for the most parts of accounts receivable in excess of RMB23 million and prepayments in excess of RMB192 million which the liquidation report stated had been distributed to R1.  That does not sit easily with what Mr Li informed R1’s solicitors only last Friday, namely that the liquidation committee of the Jiangsu company was continuing “to recover the debt receivables on behalf of the [Jiangsu] company to minimise the losses of” R1.  Either all the assets of the Jiangsu company had been distributed to R1 or they had not.  The fact is that it is not known whether R1 still has the Jiangsu company’s assets, or whether it has disposed of them elsewhere, perhaps to its parent company, R2, or to its subsidiaries, R3, R4 or R5. 

10.  When these events came to light, the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ solicitors wrote to Mr Chun, his three daughters, Wellrun, R1 and Mr Li.  They asked the recipients of those letters to disclose to them what had become of the assets of the Jiangsu company. Neither R1 nor Mr Li replied.  Mr Chun and Wellrun claimed to have no knowledge of the liquidation of the Jiangsu company and claimed not to have received any of its assets.  Mr Chun’s daughters also claimed to know nothing about the liquidation of the Jiangsu company, but confirmed that they would hold any money or assets they might subsequently receive from the Jiangsu company in accordance with their previous undertaking to the court. 

11.  That brings me to the current application.  The parties to whom the summons seeking the appointment of interim receivers was addressed are Mr Chun, Wellrun, Mr Chun’s daughters and the five respondents.  Service of the summons and the supporting evidence has been effected on Mr Chun and Wellrun, but they have decided to take no position on the plaintiffs’ application for interim receivers to be appointed as their case, though strongly disputed by the plaintiffs’ liquidators, is that they no longer have anything to do with the five respondents.  Mr Chun’s daughters have also been served with the summons and the supporting evidence, service having been effected on their solicitors in Hong Kong.  They have not appeared and are not represented.

12.  As I have said, R1 and R5 were incorporated in Hong Kong and the summons seeking the appointment of interim receivers together with the supporting evidence has been served on them in the usual way.  On the other hand, R2 was incorporated in Singapore, and R3 and R4 were incorporated in the PRC.  Leave to serve them out of the jurisdiction was granted by Master Wong last Monday.  Service has been effected on R2, but not on R3 or R4.  That is because there was no one at the addresses of their registered offices when couriers engaged by the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ solicitors went there to serve the summons and the supporting evidence.  Of course, if Mr Chun is still behind R3 and R4 as the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ contend, it can properly be said that those in control of R3 and R4 know about the hearing today and that the plaintiffs’ liquidators are seeking the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R3 and R4 as well as over the assets of R1, R2 and R5.  But that is not a sufficient basis for getting round the fact that R3 and R4 have not been served with the summons and the supporting evidence.  It follows that the application for the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R3 and R4 will have to be adjourned until such time as they have been properly served, or a further order for substituted service is made on the basis that they have been deliberately evading service.  Ms Eva Sit for the plaintiffs’ liquidators did not seriously seek to argue against that. 

13.  I go back to R1, R2 and R5.  In an affirmation affirmed yesterday by a certified accountant, Fung Kwok Leung, which was filed yesterday on behalf of R1, R2, R5 and Mr Chun’s daughters, Mr Fung said that Mr Chun’s daughters had appointed him to assist them in their disclosure obligations under their undertaking to the court, and that in order to do so, he is in the process of assuming responsibility himself for the affairs of R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5.  He has been able to do that for R1, R2 and R5 which is how they have come to appear today, but he has not been able to do that for R3 and R4.  He claims that before he can do so, various administrative steps have to be taken.  He estimates that it will take at least 20 working days for that to be done. 

14.  That is the background against which Mr Alan Leong SC for R1, R2 and R5 applies for today’s hearing to be adjourned so that all five respondents can be heard on it.  It is said there is no real need for the plaintiffs’ application to be determined today. The application was triggered by events which were disclosed recently but which happened some time ago.  If R1 was going to dispose of the assets of the Jiangsu company, it has had plenty of time to do so before today.  If it has not done so yet, then the plaintiffs, so it is said, are sufficiently protected from it doing so by the Mareva injunction in place freezing its assets and by Mr Fung now being in effective control of R1, R2 and R5.

15.  Leaving aside the question whether Mr Fung’s role provides the plaintiffs with sufficient protection, which is a topic to which I shall return when I consider the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ application on its merits, I cannot go along with Mr Leong’s argument at all.  The Mareva injunction in place freezing the assets of R1 may well not be sufficient protection for the plaintiffs against the disposal by R1 of such assets as it got from the Jiangsu company if it still has them.  I say that because the Mareva injunction in place against the Jiangsu company did not prevent it from transferring its assets to R1, and if, as the plaintiffs allege, Mr Chun is still the moving force behind R1 — just as they say he was the moving force behind the Jiangsu company — he cannot be trusted not to dispose of R1’s assets despite the Mareva injunction freezing its assets. 

16.  I turn, then, to the merits of the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ application for the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R1, R2 and R5.  Lack of time prevents me from embarking upon a detailed analysis of the circumstances in which the appointment of interim receivers in aid of a Mavera injunction is appropriate.  A statement of the relevant principles is all that it is required.  The power may be exercised when it is just or convenient to do so (see section 21L(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4)), and the court would usually regard it as just or convenient to do so if there is good evidence of a failure to comply with a Mareva injunction.  The principle was succinctly expressed in Gee’s Commercial Injunctions, 5th ed, para 16.008 as follows:

“If (1) assets are liable to be dissipated or are otherwise in jeopardy and (2) cannot satisfactorily be preserved by injunction, then it may be appropriate to appoint a receiver.”

Examples where that might arise were said to be when

“… the defendant controls a network of overseas trusts or companies and it appears that he has arranged his affairs in such a complicated way that if the step were not to be taken he might be judgment proof … [or] where the defendants are likely to act in disregard of an injunction or have already done so.”

17.  The evidential test which the court applies, rightly in my opinion, is the conventional American Cyanamid test.  That was confirmed by Kwan J (as she then was) in Tan Man Kou v Chime Corporation Ltd and others (HCMP 4146/2001), unreported, 25 June 2003, and followed by Stone J in Akai Holdings Limited (in compulsory liquidation) and others v Ho Wing On Christopher and others (HCCL 37/2005), unreported, 1 September 2009.  Accordingly, the court will determine whether there is a serious issue to be tried and a risk of dissipation of assets, it will take into account the efficacy of the current regime for protecting the interests of the party seeking the appointment of a receiver, it will assess the risk of damage to any party if a receiver is appointed and whether that damage can be adequately compensated for by a cross‑undertaking as to damages, and whether a less drastic remedy is suitable in the particular circumstances of the case.  On that last issue, Stone J in Akai held that where a defendant has deliberately withheld disclosure such as to deny the plaintiff information about its assets which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to under the Mareva injunction as a means to police it, the court will be unlikely to entertain any suggestion that a lesser remedy or partial receivership will suffice, since (i) the court and the plaintiff are simply not in a position to assess, given the lack of disclosure, whether the lesser remedy is sufficient to protect the plaintiff’s interests, and (ii) it is entirely within the power of the defendant to put an end to the receivership by giving full disclosure or putting up security. 

18.  Applying those principles to the present case, there is clearly a triable issue over whether the liquidation of the Jiangsu company and the current whereabouts of its assets were deliberately concealed from the plaintiffs’ liquidators, and whether the Mareva injunction was not complied with.  There is also a triable issue over whether there is a risk that there will be a further breach of the Mareva injunction unless drastic action of some kind is taken.  The Mareva injunction and the associated requirement of disclosure have not been sufficient to protect the interests of the plaintiffs so far because they have left the plaintiffs’ liquidators in a state of ignorance about the current whereabouts of the Jiangsu company’s assets. 

19.  Moreover, subject to the position of Mr Fung, I think that the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R1, R2 and R5 would be a proportionate response to the need to protect the assets of the Jiangsu company from further dissipation.  Neither Mr Chun nor Wellrun nor his daughters can be heard to complain of being prejudiced by the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R1, R2 or R5 because none of them claim any connection with R1, R2 or R5.  R1, R2 or R5 could be significantly affected by such an appointment if they were trading, but Mr Leong acknowledged in his written submissions that they are not.  R1’s only asset is its shareholding in R3, R4 and R5.  R2 is only an intermediate holding company, and R5 is a dormant company.  So I come back to the question whether Mr Fung’s role within R1, R2 and R5 gives the plaintiffs’ liquidators the protection they need.  The evidence is that last Monday Mr Li was removed from the management of those companies, and Mr Fung was appointed a director in his place, and he asserts that he alone has full executive control of them.

20.  Ms Sit tenaciously argued that Mr Fung is no substitute for independent receivers.  He is too closely aligned to Mr Chun’s daughters to be regarded as independent.  And if he really was helping them to comply with their disclosure obligations, he has not done a very good job of it.  If one of the things they had to disclose was what happened to the US$52 million paid by R1 to the Jiangsu company, the first thing he might be expected to have done was to find out more about the Jiangsu company.  And yet he claims not to have known anything about its liquidation or de‑registration until that had been discovered by the plaintiffs’ liquidators.  There are other respects in which Ms Sit criticizes Mr Fung’s competence and his ability to get on with things promptly. 

21.  There is a good deal of force in all of that, but I cannot ignore the fact that Mr Fung is a Hong Kong permanent resident with a professional qualification in Hong Kong and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of his profession.  He is aware of the existence of the Mareva injunction, and he knows how serious his position would be, from a disciplinary point of view, if he helped anyone to act in breach of it.  The fact is that if Mr Fung is now in executive control of R1, and if he would not act in a way which enables R1 to dispose of such of the Jiangsu company’s assets as it still has, the plaintiffs should be adequately protected for the time being.  And if R1 has already disposed of those assets to R2 or R5, the fact that Mr Fung is in executive control of them as well should be sufficient protection for the plaintiffs — on the assumption, of course, that he will not act in a way which enables R2 or R5 to dispose of those assets if they have them.  That can be reinforced by making Mr Fung directly responsible to the court, and that can be achieved if Mr Fung is prepared to give his personal undertaking to the court that in his capacity as the officer in executive control of R1, R2 and R5, he will not act in a way which enables any of them to dispose of any of their assets in breach of the Mareva injunction freezing those assets.  Mr Leong has said that Mr Fung would be prepared to give such an undertaking. 

22.  Having said all that, since I have adjourned the plaintiffs’ liquidators’ application for the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R3 and R4, I do not think that I should today dismiss their application for the appointment of interim receivers over the assets of R1, R2 and R5.  The better course is to adjourn that application so that it can be renewed at the same time as the application in respect of the assets of R3 and R4, on Mr Fung giving the personal undertaking to the court in the terms I have mentioned.  

(Brian Keith)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the first and second plaintiffs

Mr Alex Tang, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the first and the thirteenth defendants

Mr Alan Leong SC and Mr Martin Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners, for the first, second and fifth respondents

The third and forth respondents did not attend and were not represented

100977-EN-2015-10-12

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD(In Provisional Liquidation)AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND ANOTHER

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

__________________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
 (In Provisional Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED 2nd Plaintiff
   

and

 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
_____________________
 
Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Anita Yip SC in Chambers
Dates of Hearing: 24 and 25 September 2015
Date of Decision:  12 October 2015

__________________

DECISION
__________________

THE APPLICATION

1. This is the plaintiffs’ application for an order, inter alia that, the 1st and 13th defendants having failed to comply with the order of Chow J dated 17 November 2014, the Defence of the 1st and 13th defendants be struck out and judgment be entered against them respectively: for the 1st defendant with damages to be assessed; and as regards the 13th defendant, for a declaration that it holds the sum of HK$357.4 million as constructive trustee for the benefit of the 1st plaintiff, alternatively, as their fall‑back position, for an order that the 13th defendant shall pay the plaintiffs the sum of HK$357.4 million with interest: see the plaintiff’s summons dated 21 April 2015.

2. Ms Linda Chan SC (together with Ms Eva Sit) said at the hearing that para 1 of the summons, ie, the striking‑out of the Defence, is unnecessary as under the new rules post‑Civil Judicial Reform, default of compliance with an unless order automatically triggers the sanction: see Order 2, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court, Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas [2007] 1 WLR 1864; Daimler AG v Leiduck [2012] 3 HKLRD 119.  All that is left is for the plaintiffs to apply to enter judgment against the defendants.

3. Mr Johnny Mok SC (together with Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow) resist the application, alleging that both defendants have complied with the unless order.  They submit that if there had been breach, the nature was technical and minor and urged the court to exercise its discretion to grant relief, relying on Daimler v Leiduck. 

BACKGROUND

4. The relevant background prior and leading to Chow J’s order of 17 November 2014 has been succinctly summarized in his Decision dated 17 November 2014 and will not be repeated here: see paras 2 to 17, 20 to 24, 27, and 29 to 32. 

5. In short, the plaintiffs claimed against the defendants, inter alia, for conspiring with the other named defendants to inflate the business volume through round‑robin circulation of funds and fictitious transactions. 

6. Investigation by the SFC led to the suspension of trading of the 1st plaintiff’s shares (the listed company) being suspended on 28 January 2013.  Provisional liquidators for the plaintiffs were appointed upon the application of the SFC[1].

7. The plaintiffs obtained Mareva injunctions[2] and an ancillary order for disclosure of the defendants’ assets.  As a result the defendants filed five Statements of Assets.

8. The plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the disclosure under the five statements.  It is the plaintiffs’ case that the defendants had received (approximately) HK$822 million since about 2010, which sum was made up of dividends and sale of 60 million shares. 

9. On 9 April 2014, upon the plaintiffs’ application, L Chan J ordered the defendants to disclose, inter alia, what had become of the HK$822 million.  Although finding the disclosure inadequate, he did not make an unless order. 

10. After that, the 1st defendant filed a number of affirmations seeking to give further disclosure. 

11. Dissatisfied, on 4 July 2014, the plaintiffs took out an application for an unless order against the 1st and 13th defendants compelling them to comply with their disclosure obligations under the Mareva injunctions.

12. The matter came before Chow J and the following order was made on 17 November 2014 (“the Unless Order”):

(1) The 1st and 13th defendants shall, by 4 pm on the 14th day following the date of this order[3], each serve an affidavit or affirmation on the plaintiffs’ solicitors:

(a) Providing full and proper disclosure of all their respective assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in their own names or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets.

(b) In the event that any assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more have been disposed of, encumbered or otherwise dealt with between 30 July 2013[4] and the date on which the said affidavit or affirmation is sworn, providing a full explanation as to what has become of the proceeds and the value thereof.

(c) Providing a full explanation as to what has become of the monies received by the 13th defendant amounting to approximately HK$636,000,000 received by the 13th defendant in respect of its disposal of 60,000,000 shares in China Metal on 27 April 2011 and approximately HK$170,461,770.68 received by the 13th defendant in respect of various cash dividends declared and paid by the 1st plaintiff (as described at para 58 of the 3rd Affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli dated 26 October 2013 and the exhibit referred to therein) and, in the event that any part of those monies have been used, spent or disposed of, providing full particulars of the circumstances (including a full explanation as to what has become of the monies and their current whereabouts and value).

(d) Exhibiting all documents which evidence the matters set out in paras 1(a) to (c) above.

(2) Unless the 1st and 13th defendants do fully and properly comply with para 1 above within the time specified, the Defence of the 1stand 13th defendants be struck out and the plaintiffs shall be at liberty to enter judgment against the 1st and 13th defendants with costs.

13. The 1st defendant filed his 17th Affirmation on 1 December 2014 pursuant to the Unless Order annexing a report prepared by a forensic accountant, Mr Frank Yuen of KLC (“Yuen’s 1st report”).

14. The plaintiffs were of the view that the defendants had failed to comply with the terms of the Unless Order.  Accordingly, they filed their present summons on 21 April 2015. 

15. The matter first came before A Chan J on 10 June 2015.  A Chan J adjourned the plaintiff’s summons for argument and gave leave to the plaintiffs to file an additional ground of complaint.  Leave was also granted to the defendants to file further expert reports to answer the matters set out in para 30 of the plaintiffs’ submissions dated 5 June 2015[5] and the plaintiffs’ additional ground of complaint. 

16. Consequently, the defendants filed the supplemental and 2nd supplemental reports of Mr Frank Yuen. The contents of Mr Yuen’s supplemental reports were confirmed to be true and accurate by the 1st defendant’s 18th and 19th Affirmations.

THE PRESENT SUMMONS

17. In the plaintiffs’ Skeleton Submissions, Ms Chan raised six grounds of complaint in support of their strike‑out/judgment summons. They will be discussed below.

The 1st ground: failure to provide own explanation

18. It is submitted by the plaintiffs that the defendants had failed to provide their own explanation of the assets as required under the Unless Order.  Although the 1st defendant had filed his 17th Affirmation, this was inadequate as he had only said that “the information provided to KLC for the purpose of compilation of the Report is true and correct[6]”. The defendants had not themselves confirmed the contents of the report as true complete and correct.

19. She said it is very important because the Unless Order mandated the defendants themselves to make an affidavit and in view of the previous breaches of disclosure obligations by the defendants, it became all the more important that they should swear to their own statement. She said the plaintiffs would be unable to move them for contempt for breach of the Unless Order if they had not verified the accountants’ work and analyses.

20. Furthermore, Ms Chan said the relevant date and time of compliance was 4 pm, 1 December 2014 and thus, the court should only consider the evidence filed before the deadline, ie, only the 1st defendant’s 17th Affirmation and Yuen’s 1st report.  In other words, she said I should ignore the 18th and 19th Affirmations of the 1st defendant.

21. Mr Mok submits it is obvious that the defendants have in effect adopted the conclusions of Yuen’s 1st report at para 12 of the 1st defendant’s 17th Affirmation in which he said that the total payment of HK$806,461,770.68[7] has been accounted for. 

22. At any rate, Mr Mok said that in his 18th Affirmation filed on 24 June 2015, the 1st defendant has confirmed for himself and on behalf of the 13th defendant that the facts and matters stated in Yuen’s 1st report, as well as the supplemental report were “true and correct to the best of my knowledge information and belief”: see para 3 of the 1st defendant’s 18th Affirmation.

23. In his 19th Affirmation, likewise, the 1st defendant confirmed for himself and the 13th defendant that the 2nd supplemental report of Yuen to be true and correct: para 4 the 1st defendant’s 19th Affirmation.

    Non‑confirmation?

24. This ground can be dealt with swiftly. I am satisfied that the defendants have adopted the contents of Yuen’s 1st report in his 17th Affirmation in the manner aforesaid.  I take the view that the deadline for filing the evidence has been met by the filing of the 17th Affirmation which attached to it Yuen’s 1st report on 1 December 2104.  There was no breach of the time element of the Unless Order.  I also take the view that there is no reason why the court should ignore the 18th and 19th Affirmations which merely confirmed the contents of the 17th Affirmation and the supplemental reports filed pursuant to the order of A Chan J.  For all intents and purposes, the materials contained in these two affirmations (which essentially were the additional reports of Mr Yuen) were simply facts and matters which supplemented the matters contained in the 17th Affirmation which was filed within time.

25. I understand Ms Chan’s submission that A Chan J granted limited leave to the defendants only, and they were supposed to just deal with matters arising out of para 30 of their submissions before A Chan J and the additional ground of complaint. Thus, the defendants should not be allowed to raise other matters in their supplemental reports. 

26. But the reality is that throughout the two‑day hearing, both the plaintiffs and defendants have made submissions on the contents of the supplemental reports.  When the plaintiffs suggested the defendants had not been full and proper with their disclosure, they have not confined themselves to Yuen’s 1st report but have referred to the supplemental reports, typically footnote 6 (see discussion below) which in fact formed one of their main grounds of attack.  I do not see how the defendants could resist or respond to the plaintiffs’ submissions without reference to the supplemental reports, nor could the court consider the parties’ positions if it were to disregard those reports.

27. At any rate, if I am wrong, I am prepared to grant leave to the defendants to file and serve the materials contained in the supplemental reports which were otherwise not covered by the order of A Chan J.  I do not see the absence of application for leave by the defendants would prohibit granting leave.  The court certainly has inherent jurisdiction to regulate these procedural matters.

28. Accordingly, I find the 1st ground not substantiated.

The 2nd ground: use of HK$384,340,667, in breach of 1(c) and (d)

29. At Table 22 of Yuen’s 1st report[8] was a summary of the usage of the funds, the subject matter of disclosure under para 1(c) of the Unless Order, less the charges[9], ie, approximately HK$806 million – HK$22 million odd = HK$784 million odd.

30. The plaintiffs’ complaint under this ground relates to five sums, totalling about HK$384 million, which were said to be used to repay the loans owing to Sarasin, BOCI and Citibank.  These five sums were (a) US$11 million or HK$85,250,000; (b) US$27,710,552 or US$214,756,778; (c) HK$31,190,000; (d) HK$51,000,000 and (e) HK$2,143,869.  They were highlighted yellow in table 22.

31. They complained that the defendants have not fully explained the use of the loans or identify the assets acquired through the use of the loans and they provided inconsistent explanations of their use.

32. They instanced the US$11 million and the US$27.7 million as examples to illustrate the non‑compliance with paras 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order.

33. They said in Yuen’s 1st report, it was stated that US$11 million was paid into Wellrun (the 13th defendant’s) Sarasin USD account to repay the money market loan no 113400 but in Yuen’s 2nd supplemental report, it was changed to suggest that the US$11 million became part of the funds which the 13th defendant transferred to Chung Shing Hong Kong as capital injection of the Chung Shing PRC companies.  These were two different versions.  The plaintiffs also said that not all of the Sarasin bank statements were provided, which constituted a breach of para 1(d) of the Unless Order.

34. As regards the US$27.7 million, it was first said in Yuen’s 1st report that HK$300 million (being part of the sale proceeds of the 60 million shares) equivalent to approximately US$38,594,144 was used to repay the money market loan no 44803 of US$27.7 million, leaving a balance of US$10,855,672.  The balance of this amount, together with a sum of US$4,318,147 being the 2010 final dividend received from the 1st plaintiff, formed part of the US$42 million which was transferred to Chung Shing PRC as capital injection: see para 69 Yuen’s 1st report. 

35. The plaintiffs said this explanation changed when Mr Yuen said at footnote 6 of his 2nd supplemental report that the entire amount of HK$300 million including the US$27.7 million was injected into Chung Shing PRC. 

(a) Explanation for US$11 million

36. The relevant statements of the Sarasin USD account for that period were annexed to Yuen’s supplemental reports[10] at pp 78 to 84.  It can be seen that on 21 February 2012, there was a reference of “Open a new Money Market Loan … 21.02.12 – 28.01.12 (113400)” and US$15 million was credited.

37. Tracing through the statements reveals that this US$15 million was rolled over at 7‑day intervals until 18 May 2012 when US$10,999,989.69 (US$11 million less charges) was paid into this account to partly repay this US$15 million loan (which had by then become US$15,086,650.96 together plus interest, ref no 132077), leaving a negative balance of US$3,170,601.15.

38. The genesis of this US$11 million could be found at table 7, Yuen’s 1st report, where he set out the movements of the HK$300 million.  It is not in dispute that this HK$300 million was part of the sale proceeds of 60 million shares. 

39. At Item (u) of table 7 was the connotation of a transfer on 18 May 2012 of US$11,000,019 to the 13th defendant’s Sarasin USD current account which could be cross-referenced to the Sarasin Citic Ka Wah USD passbook account where the corresponding withdrawal of US$11,000,019.32 on 18 May 2012 was found.  The payment voucher of the 13th defendant, which was also produced, recorded a transfer of US$11 million (less bank charges) on 18 May 2012[11].

40. Thus, Mr Mok says it seems quite clear that the US$11 million was fully consumed for the payment of the US$15 million money market loan.

41. In reply, Ms Chan contended that the court should only look at the existing evidence.  Mr Yuen said the US$11 million was used to repay the loan no 132077: see para 46 of Yuen’s 1st report; and there was no evidence to show that loan no 132077 was the same loan with reference no 113400.  Thus, she said the US$11 million which was used to repay the US$15 million loan with no 113400 could be a different US$15 million loan with no 132077.

42. There is actually evidence.  When one looks at the previous statements relevant to the US$15 million loan, it is readily discernable that when the loan was first created on 21 February 2012, it bore the no 113400.  In fact, it was assigned a new number each time it rolled over.  The reference number was 132077 for this US$15 million loan when it was rolled over to 16 May 2012 and this was the loan which Mr Yuen said was repaid by the US$11 million: para 46, Yuen’s 1st report, which quite clearly was numbered 113400 when it was first opened on 21 February 2012.

43. This complaint was unjustified but it was not the plaintiffs’ only complaint.

44. It is noted that Mr Yuen said in his 2nd supplemental report at para 32(c) (internal p 18) as follows:

“ On 18 May 2012, US$10,999,990, being part of the Sales Proceeds (Section E2.5.2.2 in the 2014 Report), was deposited into the Sarasin USD Current Account [D4C/84] and used to settle part of a money market loan with transaction reference number 113400 of US$15,000,000 that was first drawn down on 21 February 2012 and it outstanding balance was rolled-over by way of drawdowns and repayments of money market loans until the outstanding liability was repaid in full. The loan proceeds were transferred to Wellrun’s CKW USD Savings Account on 21 February 2012 [D4C/78] and eventually to Chung Shing on 29 March 2012 (described in Section E2.5.2.1 of the 2014 Report) (Column N, row (22) of Table 6).”

45. This appears to be Ms Chan’s complaint about two different versions being given.  However, in my view, it is quite obvious from the documents that this was not a different version or inconsistency but rather a different description of the same US$11 million.

46. It is necessary to refer to table 7 of Yuen’s 1st report for elaboration.  This table sets out the movements of US$38,709,674 (about HK$300 million) which represented part of the sale proceeds of the 60 million shares:

Table 7—Movements in Wellrun CKW USD Savings Account for the period from 7 June 2011 to 18 May 2012

DateDescriptionDeposit US$ItemWithdrawal US$ItemBalance US$
7 June 2011Balance brought forward
 

 

 

 
323,346
30 June 2011 Transfer from CMR Macao38,709,674(a)
 

 
39,033,021
30 June 2011Bank Interest27(b)
 

 
39,033,048
4 July 2011Interest from CMR Macao154,664(c)
 

 
39,187,711
5 July 2011Transfer to CMR Macao
 

 
20,000,000(d)19,187,711
14 July 2011Transfer to Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd
 

 
19,005,000(e)182,711
17 October 2011Professional fee
 

 
9,977(f)172,734
29 December 2011Interest from CMR Macao261,198(g)
 

 
433,932
29 December 2011Transfer from CMR Macao20,000,000(h)
 

 
20,433,932
31 December 2011Bank Interest117(i)
 

 
20,434,049
3 January 2012Transfer to Huan Bao Steel Ltd.
 

 
15,000,000(j)5,434,049
4 January 2012Transfer to CMR Macao
 

 
1,000,000(k)4,434,049
4 January 2012Transfer to Wellrun CKW HKD Savings Account
 

 
4,000,000(l)434,049
7 February 2012Professional fee
 

 
150
 
433,899
21 February 2012Transfer from Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account14,999,997(m)
 

 
15,433,896
22 February 2012Transfer to CMR Macao
 

 
15,000,000(n)433,896
29 February 2012Bank Interest233(o)
 

 
434,129
28 March 2012Transfer from CMR Macao15,999,997(p)
 

 
16,434,126
29 March 2012Transfer from Huan Bao Steel Ltd.4,000,000(q)
 

 
20,434,126
29 March 2012Transfer to Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd
 

 
20,000,000(r)434,126
17 May 2012Transfer from Huan Bao Steel Ltd.8,700,000(s)
 

 
9,134,126
17 May 2012Transfer from Huan Bao Steel Ltd.2,299,997(t)
 

 
11,434,123
18 May 2012Transfer to Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account
 

 
11,000,019(u)434,104

47. It is the defendants’ explanation that part of the US$38,709,674 (Item (a)), was applied towards capital injections for Chung Shing PRC. 

48. Item (e) US$19,005,000, which originated from Item (a) was the most straight forward.  It was transferred to Chung Shing on 14 July 2011: see para 30, Yuen’s 1st report.

49. Item (l) was paid into the 13th defendant’s Citic Ka Wah HK passbook account and its use was explained in section E.2.5.4 of Yuen’s 1st report. 

50. According to Yuen’s 1st report, Item (j) US$15 million was the source of funds for Items (q), (s) and (t).  Item (k) US$1 million formed part of Item (p) US$15,999,997, which together with Item (q) represented the US$20,000,000, ie Item (r), which was injected into Chung Shing as capital.  US$15 million of Item (p) was obtained by the creation of the money market loan no 113400: para 38, Yuen’s 1st report.  This part relating to the 113400 loan is actually very complicated.

51. First, a money market loan of US$15 million (no 113400) was created on 21 February 2012: see February 2012 Sarasin USD account statement, p 78, the two rows bearing reference nos 383469284 and 383520884.  This loan was transferred into the 13th defendant’s Citic Ka Wah USD passbook account on 21 February 2012, ie Item (m) US$14,999,997 (US$15 million less charges) on table 7.  Item (m) was transferred to become Item (n) US$15 million.  Item (n) US$15 million plus Item (k) US$1 million became Item (p) US$15,999,997.

52. Item (p) US$15,999,997 plus Item (q) US$4,000,000 which according to Mr Yuen, also came from Item (j), together formed US$20 million (Item (r)) which went into Chung Shing as capital on 29 March 2012.

53. Items (s) and (t) US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 were likewise sourced from Item (j) US$15 million: table 11. Items (s) and (t) were the funds for Item (u) which went to pay down the money market loan no 113400 on 18 May 2012: see the May 2012 Sarasin USD account statement.

54. Although extremely complicated, that explains why (but not that it is accepted), in the 2nd supplemental report para 32(c), Item (u) US$11 million was described as the loan proceeds which funded the payment of Item (r) on 29 March 2012.  This is because Item (m), which became Item (n) US$15 million plus Item (k) US$1 million to form Item (p) US$15,999,997, was in fact sourced from the 113400 loan paid down by Item (u) US$11 million on 18 May 2012.

55. Thus, from the accountant’s point of view, they were simply different descriptions by the accountant of the same amount of US$11 million.

56. In fact, the accountant’s basis that this US$11 million formed part of the monies set out in table 22 was because, as can be seen from table 7, it originated from items (s) and (t), which in turn came from Item (j) that was sourced from the sale proceeds of US$38,709.674.

57. Having said all this, I hasten to emphasise that the above was the reading of Yuen’s 1st report’s explanation of the application of this US$11 million.  This is not the end of the matter. I have the following observations to make.

58. First, Ms Chan emphatically submitted at the hearing that there was blatant non‑compliance of the Unless Order in that a full explanation of the whereabouts of the proceeds was not given.  She instanced the example that the money market loan no 132077 might not be the same as no 113400.  I have dealt with this above.

59. But I think, by extension, Ms Chan’s complaint is equally applicable to some of the sums listed in table 7. For example, how can one be sure that the US$1 million at (Item k) was the same US$1 million which formed part of (Item p)?  Likewise, how can one be sure that the US$15 million at Item (j) was the source for items (q), (s) and (t)?  After all, even though the amounts were similar, the proceeds did stay in Huan Bao’s account for a few months before they went back into the 13th defendant’s account. 

60. Ms Chan once said by way of a general comment that to fully comply with the Unless Order, the defendants should have produced fund flow charts for each relevant sum of the proceeds.  I take it to mean that for example, in respect of the US$1 million at Item (k), that there should be a fund flow reconstruction diagram which shows exhaustively its usage and application.  Similarly, for the US$15 million, Item (j), there should be another fund flow reconstruction account of the same nature which tells what had happened to this US$15 million in the relevant Huan Bao account.

61. In my view, the failure to explain the whereabouts of the US$15 million (Item j) alone constitutes a breach of the Unless Order.  The Unless Order requires the defendants to give a complete and proper disclosure of “what has become of the monies received by the 13th defendant ...”: para 1(c).

62. Plainly, this US$15 million (Item j) was, according to the defendants’ own accountant report, part of the US$38,709,674 (Item a) which represented monies received by the 13th defendant. Mr Yuen said this amount was the source of the funds in Items (q), (s) and (t).  But this is the accountant’s own words of the flow.  What is crucial and required under the Unless Order is that there should be first, a full explanation; and second, supported by all documents.  Fundamentally, I cannot see how, in the absence of documents relating to Item (j), such as the accounts, ledgers and bank statements of Huan Bao, that Mr Yuen could conclude that Item (j) was the source of funds for Items (q), (s) and (t). 

63. I note from Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1streport, that the defendants had only produced the bank statements of Huan Bao Steel’s DBS HKD account: see Item 16 of Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report.  At para 35 of Yuen’s 1st report, he said:

“35. According to the Confirmation for Outward Chats dated 3 January 2012 issued by CBI to Huan Bao Steel (‘Huan Bao’) (Appendix – 36), Wellrun remitted US$15,000,000 (Table 7 Item (j)) to Huan Baos’ account numbered 53293149418 in Bank of Communications Company Limited (‘Huan Bao BOCOM Account’). Nevertheless, it is noted that US$4,000,000 (Table 7 Item (q)), US$8,700,000 (Table 7 Item (s)) and US$2,299,997, net of bank charges of US$3 (Table 7 Item (t)) were remitted from Huan Bao to Wellrun CKW USD Savings Account on 29 March 2012, 17 May 2012 and 17 May 2012 respectively which together make a total of US$14,999,997.”

64. The Huan Bao BOCOM account statements for the relevant which would show the deposit of US$15 million and its subsequent movements have never been produced.  This is a clear breach of para 1(d) of the Unless Order.  Without the production of the BOCOM statements, or the Huan Bao ledgers of the relevant period, it is unknown whether this enormous sum of US$15 million has been applied for some other use or has acquired some other assets which the defendants were under a duty to disclose.  There is no evidence that the defendants were not in possession of the documents evidencing the movements of this US$15 million. 

65. The same applies to US$1 million, Item (k). It was transferred into CRM Macao on 4 January 2012.  It was then said by the accountant that this amount, together with the money market loan no 113400, formed Item (p) US$15,999,997 on 28 March 2012: see para 48, Yuen’s 1st report.  There was a lapse of three months between the two transfers.  This US$1 million originated from the sale proceeds but there is no evidence at all showing what happened to this US$1 million after it was paid into the CMR Macao.  Indeed, Mr Yuen said at para 40 that “The additional US$1,000,000 is believed to be sourced from US$1,000,000 (Table 7 Item (k)) previously transferred to CMR Macao from Wellrun USD Savings Account. …” 

66. I am aware that the defendants might not have in their possession documents belonging to the 2nd plaintiff. However, there is nothing to prevent them from asking or making an application for the provision of the relevant documents, or going back to Chow J for directions or make an application for relief from sanction.  None of that has been done.  

67. It is further noted that no documents at all in relation to Items (q), (s) and (t) US$4,000,000, US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 were produced.  At para 36 of Yuen’s 1st report, he said: 

“36. Out of the sum of US$14,999,997, US$4,000,000 was transferred to Chung Shing on 29 March 2012 while US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 were transferred to Wellrun’s Sarasin USD current account numbered 8.00188.8.4000 (‘Wellrun Sarasin USD Current Account’) on 18 May 2012 as set out in Table 10 below.”

68. No documents were produced.  In the absence of the relevant documents, how can Mr Yuen conclude that these three big sums were sourced from Item (j)?  The obligation to give a full explanation of US$4,000,000, US$8,700,000 and US$2,299,997 is absolute.  It is the defendants’ own case these sums came from Item (j) US$15 million which in turn was sourced from Item (a).  Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the defendants did not have the relevant documents to show the flow of items (q), (s) and (t). 

69. The failure to give a full explanation of Items (q), (s) and (t) and non‑production of documents in relation thereto constitute breaches of paras 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order. 

70. I am aware it was accepted by the plaintiffs themselves that no tracing was required: para 33, Decision of Chow J. However, the defendants were alive to the fact that the money flow was circular and extremely complicated.  Given the complexity, tracing was inevitable in order to comply with the court order.  Indeed, most parts of the accountant report were about tracing.

71. The fact that the defendants fully understood what was required of the Unless Order could be seen by the detailed tracing of the US$4,000,000 (Item (l)) in section E.2.5.4 of Yuen’s 1st report.

72. The situation is compounded by the lack of full explanation.  For example, why was it necessary to transfer part of the proceeds to Huan Bao, then back to the 13th defendant before injecting into Chung Shing?  Why was it necessary to create a money market loan to fund the capital injection before part of the sale proceeds were used to repay part of the money market loan?  These remain unanswered and the defendants are in breach of the Unless Order. 

73. I am also aware that the parties have not made direct submissions to these observations of the court.  It might be suggested by the defendants that they ought to be given an opportunity to specifically deal with these observations.

74. I disagree.  The defendants were at all times most ably represented by leading counsel and solicitors.  They knew full well it was their obligation to comply fully and properly with each term of the Unless Order.  They had been given a number of opportunities[12] to make good their own disclosure. 

75. More importantly, this is not a matter of submissions.  This is a factual matter.  If they had not provided a complete disclosure of what had happened to Items (j) and (k) with documentary evidence; and had not provided documents evidencing that Items (q), (s) and (t) sourced from Item (j), they had not fully explained the application of the US$11 million and are in breach of the Unless Order. 

76. There is no unfairness to the defendants. They could apply for relief from sanction if they faced any difficulty about disclosure.  They had practically done this once before A Chan J when they applied for leave to file more reports to tackle the plaintiffs’ complaints in relation to the HK$53 million odd.  After all, this is an Unless Order, the final chance the court gave to the defendants, subject only to relief from sanction if an application has been made.  I am of the view that it is wrong and unfair to the plaintiffs if the defendants were given another chance to explain. 

77. Moreover, the aforesaid analysis was certainly covered by the wider and general submission of Ms Chan that the court should not assume that one sum which has gone at a particular point of time into a particular account of the defendants was the same sum which was paid out later, even though they looked similar or was of the exact amount.  Ms Chan has helpfully drawn my attention to the fact that the defendants had many accounts which were in turn divided into various sub‑accounts.  There were many sums which were of the same or very similar amounts going in and out and travelling between the defendants’ various accounts.  The burden of showing a complete picture of the fund flow falls squarely on the defendants. 

78. Admittedly, the defendants had neither produced the general ledgers: Items 19 and 20, Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report, which were in their possession and which had been given to Mr Yuen.  The general ledgers of the 13th defendant definitely formed part of the documents in support of the movements of funds in table 7.  Its non‑production constitutes a breach of para 1(d).

79. I find that the complaint that the defendants had not given a full explanation of the US$11 million established.

80. Ms Chan reminded me that she only needs to show one breach.  This must be correct.  But in deference to counsel’s very helpful submissions, I shall go on to discuss the other complaints raised by the plaintiffs.

(b) Explanation for US$27.7 million

81. The defendants’ explanation can be found at paragraphs 60 to 69 of Yuen’s 1st report.

82. In short, the statement of the 13th defendant’s USD current account for the month of May 2011 shows that the balance was zero as at 30 April 2011.  On 4 May 2011, a new money market loan of US$27,700,264.37 (ref 44803) was created. 

83. HK$300 million (equivalent to US$38,594,144), which represented about half of the sale proceeds of the 60 million shares, was credited into this Sarasin USD current account on 6 May 2011, thereby depressing the US$27.7 million money market loan to a positive balance of US$10,883,592.04. 

84. Tracking the May 2011 statement of this account, on 31 May 2011, the sum of HK$33,590,000 or US$4,318,146.76 was paid into this USD current account.  It does not seem to be disputed that this US$4.3 million odd represented the 2010 final dividend of the 1st plaintiff. After the payment in of this amount, the balance was increased to a positive figure of US$15,175,888.  Later on 7 June 2011, US$42 million was withdrawn from this account, paid into the 13th defendant’s ICBC Guangdong account, before it was finally paid to Goldman Properties Limited (former name of Chung Shing Hong Kong) on 27 June 2011 for capital injection into Chung Shing PRC.

85. There does not appear to be much contention about the movements of this US$27.7 million.  The major dispute seems to be the different descriptions by Mr Yuen of the use of this amount. 

86. In Yuen’s 1st report, he concluded at para 69 as follows:

“69. In summary, the Sales Proceeds of HK$300,000,000, equivalent to approximately US$38,594,144 was used for the repayment of money market loan with transaction reference number 44803 of US$27,710,552 including interest and payment of loan interests totaling US$27,920 for the three money market loans with transaction reference numbers 46694, 48072 and 49862, leaving a balance of US$10,855,672 on 30 May 2011. The aggregate balance of the US$10,848,787 (US$10,855,672 plus interest income of US$2,069 and minus interest for money market loan with transaction reference number 51446 of US$8,954) and the 2010 Final Dividend received from CMR of US$4,318,147 formed part of the US$42,000,000 transferred to Chung Shing on 7 June 2011[13].”

87. The plaintiffs argued that the accountant changed his view, quoting footnote 6 in his 2nd supplemental report as follows:

“ I stated in paragraph 69 of the 2014 Report that the amount of US$38,594,144 was used for repayment of money market loan no 44803 of US$27,710,552, leaving a balance of US$10,856,572. However, if one considers the Sarasin Portfolio Account for the months May and June 2011, as the outstanding money market loan before and after receiving US$38,594,144 and US$4,318,147 from the Sarasin HKD Current Account remains at the same level of approximately US$27 million, I now take the view that US$42,000,065 transferred from the Sarasin USD Current Account to Chung Shing through the Wellrun’s ICBC USD Account was sourced from the aforesaid transfers of US$38,594,144 and US$4,318,147 from Sarasin HKD Current Account [D4C/69-70].”

88. Mr Mok submits that this is a different interpretation and not a change of course.

89. I agree.  Looking through the bank statements[14], it is clear that the HK$300 million was applied towards repayment of the US$27.7 million, leaving the positive balance of US$10.855 million odd which was then mingled with US$4.318 million and formed part of the US$42 million that went into Chung Shing Hong Kong.

90. Plainly, when Mr Yuen made a remark at footnote 6, he was just supplying an alternative interpretation of the same set of figures on the same set of bank statements. 

91. The fact that the accountant had a different interpretation or analysis towards the application of the fund does not mean there was lack of disclosure.  As submitted by Mr Mok, the different interpretation by the same accountant does not detract from the fact that an explanation had been given in relation to the usage, application, and what had become of the US$27.7 million.

92. Unlike the US$11million which was sourced from a sum originated from the proceeds but which had gone into another account for a few months, the flow of this US$27.7 million was relatively straight forward and the entire history of its flow could be seen from the produced bank statements. 

93. I find that the defendants have given an explanation of this US$27.7 million.

(c) The other sums

94. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants made any submission on the relatively small sum of US$2,143,869.  I shall take it that there is no issue on this amount.

95. Next was the amount HK$31,190,000.  There is no dispute that this amount represented the 2009 final dividend paid by the 1st plaintiff. According to Yuen’s 1st report, this sum was paid on 8 June 2010 into the 13th defendant’s Sarasin HKD account to partially settle a loan of HK$70,763,584.  Mr Mok said although he did not have to[15], he produced a schedule which shows the purchases of securities by the use of the HK$70 million odd loan, which was subsequently partially repaid by the HK$31,190,000 cash dividend.

96. Ms Chan made no submission on the sum of HK$31,190,000.  I shall take it that there was no more complaint about the disclosure of this amount.

97. Finally, as regards the HK$53,143,869 which was the 2010 final dividend, the flow of its use has been explained in Yuen’s 1st report: see paras 89 to 97 Yuen’s 1st report.  In short, the sum eventually broke up into three sums of HK$30 million, HK$10 million and HK$11 million and they were transferred from the 13th defendant’s Citibank HKD account to its securities account with BOCI Securities Ltd.  Leave was granted by A Chan J on 10 June 2015 for the defendants to answer the plaintiffs’ criticisms and the further explanation can be found at paras 8 to 60 of Yuen’s 1st supplemental report.

98. In her reply, Ms Chan made no further submission on this sum save reiterating the fact that the obligation to comply with disclosure was personal to the defendants and they should not delegate the job to the accountant which in itself constituted a breach of the express terms of the Unless Order. 

99. With respect, I disagree.  I think it was appropriate for the defendants to instruct an account to detail the fund flows in order to give an explanation of the whereabouts and what has become of the proceeds, as mandated by Chow J.  As can be seen, the exercise was very complicated involving tracing of the relevant sums from its origin to its ultimate destination.

The 3rd ground: failure to provide all documents

100. It is the plaintiffs’ case that the defendants kept detailed records of how the proceeds were used, transferred and spent. Examples of payment vouchers cited by Ms Chan suggest that expenses involving small sums of HK$70,000 odd and HK$29,000 odd were vouchered. Purchases were receipted.

101. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had not produced all the payment vouchers, receipts, general ledgers and supporting documents in respect of the use of the monies under para 1(c) of the Unless Order, thereby violating para 1(d).

102. The defendants in response said all documents mean all documents evidencing the disclosures required under the Order, but not all documents of the defendants.  This is correct. 

103. They also criticize the plaintiffs of being vague and unspecific of what documents were missing.

104. But what is not in dispute is that the defendants had supplied to Mr Yuen the general ledgers of the 13th defendant and those of Asia Huan Bao: see Items 19 and 20 of Appendix 1, Yuen’s 1st report.  As said above, in relation to the US$11 million, I noticed that only the vouchers, bank statements and bank passbooks were produced.  The general ledgers were not. 

105. At the hearing, the defendants submitted that they were prepared to disclose the documents listed under Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report which would include the general ledgers in Items 19 and 20.  They said it would be totally disproportionate to strike out their Defence and judgment entered for a relatively insignificant non-compliant aspect of the Unless Order.

106. As said during the hearing, para 1(d) of the Unless Order demands disclosure of all documents, not all relevant documents. It is obvious that the defendants have not fully complied with para 1(d) by the non-disclosure of the general ledgers. 

107. Having identified a breach, what follows next is whether the court nevertheless retains a discretion to grant relief in the circumstances or as Ms Chan suggests, that no discretion arises and the sanction automatically takes effect upon non-compliance.

108. This will be discussed below.

The 4th ground: failure to disclose interests in Asia Steel Building

109. The plaintiffs said that in breach of para 1(a) of the Unless Order, the defendants have failed to disclose the 1st defendant’s interest in Asia Steel Properties, GAS Property and the Asia Steel Building.  Asia Steel Properties is a Hong Kong company which wholly owns GAS which in turn owns the Asia Steel Building[16].

110. It is the plaintiffs’ case that by a sale and purchase agreement dated 13 October 2010, the 1st defendant purportedly sold his shares in Asia Steel Properties to his mother‑in‑law, Madam Qin, at a consideration of RMB60 million which he received by two instalments on 28 February 2011 and 2 March 2011.  Through the sale of the shares in Asia Steel Properties, the ownership of GAS and hence the entire Asia Steel Building became vested in his mother‑in‑law.

111. The plaintiffs contend that the sale was false.  In support, they said that in the 1st plaintiff’s annual reports for years ended 31 December 2011 and 31 December 2012, ie after the alleged sale, it was still stated that the GAS was a company indirectly owned and controlled by Mr Chun.  Secondly, they said that the sale and purchase agreement is not evidence of the sale of shares in contravention of section 66 of the Companies Ordinance which ordains a proper instrument of transfer to be delivered to the company.  A proper instrument of transfer is one that would attract stamp duty[17] and may include the sale and purchase agreement[18].  In the present case, the sale and purchase agreement which was produced was not stamped, nor did the defendants produce any other properly stamped instruments of transfer such as bought and sold notes.  The plaintiffs said all this supports their contention that the sale was false.

112. Mr Mok submits that the 1st defendant had already explained at para 57 of his 14th affirmation that in relation to the annual reports for the fiscal year 2011, the “erroneous description is probably an oversight.”  He further submits that a sale and purchase agreement is itself clear evidence of the passing of beneficial ownership[19], not to mention that the defendants had produced other evidence such as the receipts of RMB60 million from Madam Qin and the annual returns filed with the Company Registry.

113. As regards the lack of a stamped instrument of transfer, he submits and it is in fact the plaintiffs’ own case that a proper instrument of transfer under section 66 is an instrument is one that would attract stamp duty, and not a properly stamped instrument.  An unstamped instrument is inadmissible in court[20] but that does not mean the transaction is void.

114. I do not think I need to decide on these contentions although I think Mr Mok must be right that the failure to stamp an instrument renders it inadmissible in court but does not void the transfer of the shares. 

115. It is not necessary to resolve these disputes now because what is in issue is whether or not the defendants had failed to comply with para 1(a) of the Unless Order to disclose assets “whether in their own name or not”.  Plainly, what the plaintiffs now seek to do is to ask the Court to decide, at this stage and based on affidavit evidence only, that the shares in Asia Steel Properties, which the defendants said have been sold to a third party, Ms Qin, still remain the defendants’ assets.  This is clearly an ownership issue.

116. Ms Chan argues she is not asking the court to determine ownership, she is merely asking the court to consider the evidence and form its own view that the defendants’ remain the owners, which the court is entitled to do.  With respect, I do not see the distinction.  The exercise is to decide whether the 1st defendant is the owner — albeit not in his own name — of the shares.  Of course the court is entitled to consider the evidence and form its own view.  The court will not accept bare assertions of non‑ownership.  But at the same time, unless the court forms the view that the evidence of the defendants is impossible of proof or totally incredible, the proper approach is not to determine the issue on affidavit evidence and proceed to trial.  Mr Mok has cited authorities in support of his proposition[21] to which I agree.  In the present case, although there is evidence which goes to contradict the defendants’ credibility, I frankly do not find their case to be so incredible that I can dismiss it as fanciful and form the view, at this stage, that they are the true owners of the assets, which in turn leads to the conclusion that they have breached the Unless Order. 

117. I also agree with Mr Mok that resolving the issue of ownership is unnecessary at this stage.  The order for disclosure is one in aid of the Mareva injunctions.  Its purpose is to identify and preserve the assets so as to avoid the assets being put beyond the reach of the plaintiffs pending judgment.  Regardless of the 1st defendant’s case, the plaintiffs have already extended the Mareva injunctions to cover the assets including those presently in dispute, namely, the Asia Steel companies: see the order of DHCJ Geiser of 7 August 2013.

118. I find no substance in this ground of complaint.

The 5th ground: failure to disclose interests in Chung Shing group

119. In similar veins to the fourth ground, the plaintiffs suggest that despite the Deed of Gift dated 29 August 2012, the defendants remained the true owners of Chung Shing Hong Kong and hence the Chung Shing PRC companies.

120. The background is that there was only one share in Chung Shing Hong Kong.  Chung Shing Hong Kong holds the Chung Shing PRC companies.  The one share in Chung Shing Hong Kong was gifted by the 13th defendant to Chung Shing Singapore, which is wholly owned by Chung Shing Belize, and in turn beneficially owned by his three daughters[22]. By making a gift of the one share in Chung Shing Hong Kong, the daughters became owners of the Chung Shing PRC companies with capital injections of about US$82 million[23].

121. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had failed to make disclosure of their interests of the Chung Shing PRC companies. Again, they said the defendants remained the true beneficial owners.  The plaintiffs attempted to make good their submission with reference to suspicious circumstances.

122. For instance, they pointed to the fact that even after the gift was made, in October 2012 and March 2013, the defendants were still seeking professional advice on the set up of a trust for the benefit of the three daughters which involved the injection into the trust of the Chung Shing Hong Kong share.  Moreover, evidence suggests that the 1st defendant continued to be heavily involved in the business of the Chung Shing PRC companies after the gift was made, at least until he resigned in July 2013. Even after his resignation, he appeared to be controlling the companies through close relatives who appeared to be his nominees.  The plaintiffs submit all these are indicators that the defendants remained beneficial owners of the Chung Shing group.  Hence, it constitutes a breach of their disclosure obligations under the Unless Order.

123. Without disrespect to counsel for the plaintiffs and without going through each and every fact advanced to support the assertion that the defendants were the ultimate beneficial owners, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to resolve this issue at this stage.

124. It is unnecessary because apart from the fact that the plaintiffs have extended their Mareva injunctions to cover the Chung Shing group of companies[24], I was told that they have actually started a separate action against the daughters and had obtained, inter alia, an order for disclosures relating to the companies[25]. There seems no reason why the plaintiffs cannot seek further disclosure from the daughters who are purported owners of the PRC companies.

125. It is inappropriate because as previously said when dealing with the sale to Ms Qin, the issue is whether the defendants had breached the Unless Order by failing to disclose assets “whether in their own name or not”.  No matter how Ms Chan puts it and how forceful some of the pointers of ownership there may be, this is in essence an ownership issue which cannot and should not be disposed of on affidavit evidence at this stage.

126. Accordingly, I do not find this ground of complaint established.

The 6th ground: failure to explain US$82 million injected into Chung Shing PRC

127. This is a similar and ancillary complaint to the fifth ground.  In short, the plaintiffs submit that the defendants had failed to provide a full explanation of the whereabouts of the US$82 million injected into the Chung Shing PRC companies.  The plaintiffs submit that the 1st defendant should be able to provide a full explanation on what happened to the capital injections at least up to the time of disposition of the share in Chung Shing Hong Kong, ie 29 August 2012.  In fact, the plaintiffs said he did not resign as director until July 2013 and even after the resignation the companies remained under the control of his close relatives and so he should be able to obtain the information and documents from his close relatives.

128. All this was denied by the defendants who said that after the disposition and resignation, he no longer had ownership nor control over the companies, and he does not have the information and documents in his possession or custody. 

129. Again, I think now is not the time to resolve these hotly contested factual disputes which boil down to whether or not the 1st defendant retains control over the companies even though he was no longer owner, director and legal representative.  I have read the 1st defendant’s affidavit evidence[26] in this regard and the evidence does not appear to be entirely fanciful and utterly incredible to me. 

130. Accordingly, I find that the complaint under this ground has not been made out either.

CONCLUSION ON BREACH OF THE UNLESS ORDER

131. I find that the defendants have not given a full explanation of the US$11 million and supplied documents in relation thereto and are in breach of paras 1(c) and (d) of the Unless Order.

132. They admitted they have not supplied Items 19 and 20 of Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report and are in breach of para 1(d) of the Unless Order.

133. Before turning to the consequences, I shall discuss the applicable legal principles first.

The legal principles

134. Post‑CJR, the situation governing a default of compliance with an Unless Order is clearly stated in Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas [2007] 1 WLR 1864:

“28. The starting point in the present case must be the terms of the Rules themselves. Rule 3.1(3)(b) expressly gives the court the power when making an order to specify the consequences of failure to comply with its terms and rule 3.8(1)[27] expressly provides that where a party has failed to comply with an order any sanction imposed by the order has effect unless the party in default applies for and obtains relief from the sanction. This makes it clear, in my view, that no further order is required to render the sanction effective; on the contrary, the onus is on the defaulting party to take steps to obtain relief. …

29. … If it is thought that the party seeking to take advantage of the default must apply to the court in order to render the sanction effective, in my view that is wrong. The sanction takes effect without further order and the statement of case is struck out; … If, however, the party seeking to take advantage of the failure to comply wishes to obtain judgment in his favour, he must, except in those cases covered by rule 3.5(2), make an application to the court to enable it to determine whether he is entitled to judgment as a result and, if so, in what form. In such cases the operation of the sanction does not lie in the discretion of the court; only if there is an application under rule 3.8 is the court required to consider whether, in all the circumstances, it is just to make an order granting relief from the consequences that would otherwise follow.

30. The scheme of the rules relating to conditional orders is in my view both clear and salutary I its effect, namely, that such orders mean what they say, that the consequences of non-compliance take effect in accordance with the terms of the order, but that the court has ample power to do justice under rule 3.8 on the application of the party in default, or, in an exceptional case, acting on its own initiative.

…

34. In my view it should now be clearly recognized that the sanction embodied in an ‘unless’ order in traditional form takes effect without the need for any further order if the party to whom it is addressed fails to comply with it in any material respect.  This has a number of consequences, to three of which I think it is worth drawing particular attention.  The first is that it is unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, for a party who seeks to rely on non-compliance with an order of that kind to make an application to the court for the sanction to be imposed or, as the judge put it, ‘activated’.  The sanction prescribed by the order takes effect automatically as a result of the failure to comply with its terms. … Unless the party in default has applied for relief, or the court itself decides for some exceptional reason that it should act of its own initiative, the question whether the sanction ought to apply does not arise.  It must be assumed that at the time of making the order the court considered all the relevant factors and reached the decision that the sanction should take effect in the event of default.  If it is thought that the court should not have made an order in those terms in the first place, the right course is to challenge it on appeal, but it may often be better to make all reasonable efforts to comply and to seek relief in the event of default.”

135. The Court of Appeal in Hong Kong, Daimler AG v Leiduck [2012] 3 HKLRD 119 followed Marcan Shipping: see paras 47 and 48: 

“47. Mr Wong submitted, in reliance on Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas [2007] 1 WLR 1864, paras 28 – 36, that, under the new procedural regime, it is not for the party seeking to take advantage of a default to apply to the Court in order to render a sanction for that default effective. Instead, the sanction takes effect immediately and it is for the party in default to apply for relief from the sanction. Only if there is an application for relief from the sanction is the Court required to consider whether, in all the circumstances, it is just to make an order granting relief from the consequences that would otherwise follow.

48. We would accept those submissions as an accurate summary of the effect of O. 2 r. 4 and O. 2 r. 5.”

136. It is, however, worth noting what was also said in the following paragraphs:

“65. It is true that the effect of the failure to comply with the Unless Order on the defendants is that there has been delay since 4 January 2011 and the defendants have had to argue, successfully, that four of the answers to the interrogatories are insufficient (O.2 r. 5(1)(i)). On the other hand, the delay can be compensated in costs and the insufficiency of the four answers in question can be addressed by this Court requiring the plaintiff to provide further answers to those interrogatories without the invocation of LPP. Mr Wong acknowledged that the Court had jurisdiction to adopt this course, although he urged the Court not to exercise its discretion in this manner: indeed he submitted, in reliance on Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas at paras 30 and 34, that the Court should only act on its own initiative to grant relief in an exceptional case.

66. However, the use of this alternative is, in our opinion, in keeping with the spirit of CJR under which the Court will generally use striking-out as a remedy of last resort and is encouraged to consider other measures that may be more appropriate to be taken: see Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd (in liq) v Yip Kwong Robert [2012] 1 HKLRD 589 at paras 33 and 75(1). Mr Wong rightly noted that Wing Fai Construction is a case involving the Court considering whether to impose a strike-out sanction, whereas in the present case the striking-out has already taken effect. We recognize the distinction between these two situations but we consider that the observations of the Chief Justice are of application in circumstances such as the present. If the plaintiff is ordered to provide further answers subject to the sanction of striking-out under the Unless Order, we consider that this will provide some mitigation of the effect on the defendants of the plaintiff’s failure to comply in the first place.

67. For the above reasons, it follows that we would exercise the discretion afresh and grant the plaintiff relief from the sanction of the Unless Order subject to terms.”

137. Thus, the position appears to be this.  Post‑CJR, no application is needed to activate the sanction.  The sanction under an unless order takes effect automatically upon default unless the party in breach has made an application for relief, in which case, the considerations under Order 2, rule 5 shall apply[28]. It is only necessary for the party seeking to take advantage of the default to make an application for judgment.  However, the court could, in exceptional circumstances act on its own initiative to grant relief from sanction even though there had been a breach of the Unless Order and the sanction has already taken effect[29].

138. In my view, if the defendants had only breached their obligation to supply Items 19 and 20 of Appendix 1 of Yuen’s 1st report, ie the general ledgers, I would have granted an extension for them to comply with the Unless Order, in similar fashion as the Court of Appeal did in Daimler v Leiduck.  The omission would not constitute failure to comply with the Unless Order in any material respect: Marcan Shipping, para 34.  I would agree with Mr Mok that to strike out the Defence would be entirely disproportionate, and is not “in keeping with the spirit of CJR under which the Court will generally use striking‑out as a remedy of last resort and is encouraged to consider other measures that may be more appropriate to be taken”: para 66, Daimler.

139. However, this was not the only breach.  The failure to give a full explanation of the US$11 million was obvious, serious and significant.  The circumstances of the breach were not exceptional as to justify relief. 

140. As a matter of fact, it is common ground that there is no application for relief from sanction.  The factors under Order 2, rule 5 do not arise for consideration.

141. It follows that the sanction of strike‑out of the Defence automatically takes effect.

JUDGMENT ENTERED?

142. Without disrespect to counsel’s helpful submissions made here, this can be dealt with shortly. 

143. I agree with Mr Mok that the plaintiffs would still need to prove their case against the 2nd defendant and they will have to prove the fraud against the 2nd defendant to establish liability. 

144. Ms Chan said the plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd defendant for breach of fiduciary duty is separate and distinct from the 1st defendant.  That may be so.  But the facts and matters relied upon to establish liability must be the same.  No matter how Ms Chan puts it, it cannot be discounted that injustice might be meted out to the defendants if judgment having entered against them now, the plaintiffs later failed to prove their case against the 2nd defendant.

145. Moreover, judgment for fraud should not be entered lightly without a trial. 

146. Accordingly, I decline to enter judgment against the defendants.

COSTS

147. There is no reason why the defendants should not pay the plaintiffs’ costs with certificate for counsel, on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.

ENDNOTE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

148. It is surprising that given the resources available, that the plaintiffs have not seen fit to instruct an accountant to deal with the reports filed by the defendants.  The contents of the accountant’s reports are very difficult and the analyses not easy to understand, especially when it concerns the tracking of the funds and the circular flow of the monies.  The court’s task would have been a lot easier if assisted by accountants on both sides.  I also make a remark that many of the plaintiffs’ affirmations are repetitive, unnecessarily lengthy and contain submissions which ought not form part of the affirmations. 

149. That having said, I am indebted to leading counsel, counsel and solicitors of both teams for their high quality submissions without which this judgment would not have been possible.

(Anita Yip SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Linda Chan SC and Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells,for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

  Mr Johnny Mok SC, Mr Alexander Tang and Mr Val Chow, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants 



[1] The 1st plaintiff had since been wound up: see Reasons for Decision, Harris J of 9 March 2015.

[2] See footnote 4.

[3] ie 1 December 2014

[4] 30 July 2013 was the date of the original Mareva injunction granted by Tong J.  He restrained the 1st defendant from dealing with or diminishing assets of up to HK$1.68 billion.  This was subsequently (a) amended by the order of DHCJ Geiser of 7 August 2013 to cover the assets of the 13th defendant after it has been joined as a defendant; and (b) re-amended by the order of Ng J of 3 June 2014 to cover, inter alia, further assets said to have been disposed by the 1st and 13th defendants, in particular, those assets which the 1st defendant had sold to his mother-in-law, and which the 13th defendant had gifted to the three daughters of the 1st defendant: see Schedule 5 of the order of Ng J. 

[5] Para 30 of the plaintiffs’ submissions dated 5 June 2015 concerns the sum of HK$53,143,868.96.

[6] Para 15(2) of D1’s 17th Affirmation.

[7] This sum was the total of HK$636,000,000 and HK$170,461,770 under para 1(c) of the Unless Order.

[8] Annexed hereto and marked Appendix “A”.

[9] Para 13 of Yuen’s 1st report stated the charges to be HK$22,722,178 which the plaintiffs have not challenged in the written submission nor at the hearing.

[10] Annexed hereto marked “B”.

[11] Refer to Appendix “C” for the vouchers and the 13th defendant’s Citic Ka Wah Bank passbook statements

[12] Including the opportunity given by the order of A Chan J dated 10 June 2015.

[13] This reference was obviously wrong as the document shows that on 7 June 2011, US$42 million was transferred into D13’s ICBC Guangdong account, and it was subsequently on 27 June 2011, that the entire sum was paid to Goldman Properties Limited, the former name of Chung Shing.  But no issue turns on that error.

[14] See Appendix D

[15] I disagree the defendants did not have to produce evidence in relation to the HK$70 million loan.  If the $31,190,000 cash dividend, which they had an obligation to explain, was used to partially settle the said loan, of course, it is incumbent upon the defendants, in their attempt to give a complete explanation, to tell why the loan was incurred in the first place.  The loan could have been used to acquire an asset which needed to be repaid by the proceeds. 

[16] The chart produced by Ms Chan and Ms Sit is attached as Appendix E.

[17] Re Paradise Motor [1968] 2 All ER 625.

[18] Section 2(1) Stamp Duty Ordinance: “an instrument of transfer” means “an instrument by means of which any Hong Kong stock is transferred, and includes a letter of renunciation”.

[19]Okachi (Hong Kong) Co Ltd v Nominee (Holidings) Ltd [2007] 1 HKLRD 55 at 78 per Cheung JA

[20] Section 15, Stamp Duty Ordinance

[21]Wenlock v Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238.  In SCF Finance Co v Masri [1985] 1 WLR 876, the court orders the issue of true ownership to be tried between the plaintiff and the third party.  See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2015) para 29/1/78.  In Standard Chartered Securities Ltd v Lai Arthur [1993] 1 HKC 375 it was said that substantive questions of true beneficial ownership are generally unsuitable to be determined at the interlocutory stage.

[22] Ms Chan and Ms Sit have again produced a diagram showing the structure of the Chung Shing group which is Appendix F here. 

 

[24] See the Order of Ng J of 3 June 2014.

[25] See Reasons for Decision of B Chu J dated 17 August 2015.

[26] D1’s 14 Affirmation, para 21; 15th Affirmation para 22, 17th Affirmation paras 35 to 36 and 51; exhibit JCCW-53.

[27] Similar to Order 2, rule 4, RHC.

[28] It is common ground that no application for relief has been made in the present case.

[29] I only wish to add that Marcan Shipping is an English case and rule 3.3(1) of their CPR provides “Court’s power to make order of its own initiative - Except where a rule or other enactment provides otherwise, the court may exercise its power on an application or of its own initiative …”: see para 15 Marcan Shipping.  No provision similar to rule 3.3(1) exists under the Hong Kong rules.  Furthermore, in Daimler’s case, it was acknowledged by counsel that the court had the jurisdiction to grant relief on its own initiative.  In other words, there was no argument but simply an acknowledgment by counsel in that case that the court could act on its own motion to grant relief even though the sanction had already taken effect.  It also seems to be accepted that the discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.  My humble view is that the absence of a similar rule 3.3(1) of the English CPR is neither here nor there.  It does not mean that the court is disentitled to act on its own initiative in appropriate cases which is in keeping with the spirit under the CJR: para 66 Daimler.  The acknowledgment by learned counsel in the Daimler’s case reinforces the existence of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to avoid meting out injustice in exceptional circumstances. 

100073-EN-2015-08-21

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) <br>LTD (In Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

________________________

BETWEEN  
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS)
LIMITED (In Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL
OFFSHORE) LIMITED (In Liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 and
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING
COMPANY LIMITED
5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING
LIMITED
8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING
LIMITED
9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL
LOGISTICS LTD
12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
 CHUN HEI MAN1st Respondent
 CHUN SIN WA2nd Respondent
 CHUN KA MAN3rd Respondent

_______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 17 August 2015
Date of Decision: 17 August 2015
Date of Reasons for Decision: 21 August 2015

___________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

___________________________________

Introduction

1.  There were two summonses before this court:

(i) A summons issued on 2 June 2015 by the provisional liquidators (“PLs”) of the two plaintiff companies for essentially (a) a Mareva injunction freezing the shareholdings of the 1st to the 3rd respondents, namely daughters of the 1st defendant (“Daughters”), in Chung Shing Finance Holding Limited (incorporated in Belize) (“Chung Shing Belize”) and assets of a number of subsidiary companies in Hong Kong, PRC and Singapore, and (b) ancillary disclosure order (“Disclosure Order”) in relation to 2 specific sums injected into 2 of those subsidiary companies (“PLs’ Summons”);

(ii) A summons issued by the Daughters on 31 July 2015 seeking: (a) leave to transfer the legal title of their shares in Chung Shing Belize to one Fung Kwok Leung/Andy Fung (“Fung”) to hold as trustee for the Daughters and to exercise all rights and powers as shareholder of Chung Shing Belize subject to all orders made by and undertakings made to the court, and (b) for Fung to be joined in the present action as respondent in replacement of the Daughters OR as 4th respondent in addition to the Daughters (“Rs’ Summons”).

2.  At the previous hearing before Ng J, the Daughters had already given an undertaking in terms of above (a) of PLs’ Summons.

3.  Senior Counsel Ms Linda Chan appeared for the PLs at the hearing before this court, and Counsel Mr Martin Wong appeared for the Daughters.

4.  At the hearing, I declined to grant the orders sought in the Rs’ Summons.  There was no real opposition to the Disclosure Order of PLs’ Summons, and I made an order in terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of PLs’ Summons, save that I allowed the Daughters until 5 pm on 31 August 2015 to comply with Paragraph 2 and 5 pm on 7 September 2015 for paragraph 3.

5.  I ordered costs of both PLs’ Summons and Rs’ Summons be to the PLs, to be by way of summary assessment, the PLs to lodge their statement of costs within 7 days, and the Daughters to lodge their list of objections within 7 days thereafter, with time to run during the summer vacation.

6.  I give my brief reasons hereinafter for dismissing Rs’ Summons.

Reasons

7.  The relevant background of this action had been set out in the Decision of A Chow J dated 17 November 2014 for which I will adopt and will not repeat here.  I only add the following.

8.  Massive frauds were said to have been committed by D1 (former Chairman, CEO and majority shareholder) against P1, a Hong Kong listed company and P2 (P1’s main operating subsidiary in Macau), and that such frauds were uncovered by the Securities and Futures Commission 2012.  As a result, P1 and P2 had been wound up by the court on public interest grounds and the PLs were appointed.

9.  In brief, it was the case of the PLs in the present action that fictitious transactions were conducted by the former management of P1 and P2 through two “round robin” schemes, one between 2007-2009 and a further one between 2012-2013, with various companies named as D3-D10 in the action.

10.  D1 is the sole shareholder and sole director of D13, a BVI company and D13 is the registered holder of some 52.1% of the issued share capital of P1.  

11.  PLs obtained Mareva injunctions against D1/D13 to the extent of some HK$1.68 billion at the commencement of the present action, and those injunctions imposed ancillary disclosure orders on D1/D13 which they were said to have repeatedly failed to comply.  This had led to a number of orders and unless orders made against D1/D13 for which this court is not at this moment concerned with.

12.  It was the PLs’ case that they had found evidence showing there was good reason to believe that 13 companies in the Chung Shing group of companies, as shown in the Appendix, being #1-13 in Schedule 5 to the Mareva injunctions, including the Companies[1], in fact belonged to and/or were substantively controlled by D1.  I understand that it was on the basis of such evidence that Ng J had extended the Mareva injunctions against D1/D13 to expressly include, among others, the Companies.

13.  D1 had, however, denied that he had any information concerning the Companies.  It was PLs’ case that D1/D13’s failure to disclose had resulted that to date, 2 years after the grant of the Mareva injunctions and one year after the extension to cover the Companies, the whereabouts of a sum of US$82m and the assets of the Companies had remained unclear.  The said sum of US $82m was said to be a loan to Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Ltd (“Chung Shing HK”) which in turn, was said to have injected the loan into 2 PRC sub-subsidiaries in the above mentioned Appendix.

14.  The Daughters are the only shareholders of Chung Shing Belize which wholly own the rest of the Companies[2].

15.  There was no challenge that this court has jurisdiction to make the Disclosure Order, and as I have mentioned earlier, there was no opposition to the court making the Disclosure Order.  In any event, I find it was both necessary and appropriate for this court to make the Disclosure Order against the Daughters.

16.  As for Rs’ Summons, this was issued under Order 15 rule (6) of the RHC and/or inherent jurisdiction of the court.

17.  The eldest daughter Ms HM Chun had made an affirmation in support of Rs’ Summons on behalf of her siblings. 

18.  The Daughters are aged respectively 20, 18 and 17 and they are all full time students studying in England.  Ms Chun had said that the Daughters’ shareholdings in Chung Shing Belize were something they did not even know until about June this year, and that it was a “secret gift” from their father, namely D1. They were further told by D1 that the business of Chung Shing Belize and its subsidiaries in PRC were managed by a Mr Li Jinquan (“Li”), the sole director of Chung Shing Belize.

19.  Ms Chun had said that the Daughters were not capable to deal with the Disclosure Order and the potential follow ups because being students, they had no commercial or financial know-how or experience.

20.  Ms Chun had further said that the Daughters had been advised that it would be much more effective and meaningful to have a professional accountant, namely Fung, to handle the proceedings and all that might follow on their behalf.  Ms Chun had also said that the Daughters had written to Li, and that Li had replied favourably to their letter, expressing his understanding of the situation and willingness to work with Fung.

21.  Mr Wong submitted that Rs’s Summons was to provide a sensible and realistic solution to problems the Disclosure Order would otherwise cause.

22.  Mr Wong had also submitted that at no times did the Daughter manage the affairs of Chung Shing Belize or any of its subsidiaries, or exercised any shareholder rights or powers.

23.  Fung had filed an affirmation in support of Rs’ Summons but he only mentioned his own professional qualifications and experience.  PLs’ solicitors had on 6 August 2015 wrote to Rs’ solicitors, and among other things, pointing out that it was highly unusual that a professional accountant would be prepared to take on potentially very serious  personal consequences of any failure to comply with the court’s orders or undertakings, and PLs’ solicitors had asked for whether there had been any connection or prior dealings between Fung and the Chun family, and companies including Chung Shing Belize and/or its direct/indirect subsidiaries.

24.  There was no reply to the above letter.  So far, there was no evidence that Fung was related to Chung Shing Belize or any of its subsidiaries, or that he had ever managed the affairs of Chung Shing Belize or any of its subsidiaries previously, and in this respect, he would appear to be in the same position as the Daughters.

25.  It was argued by Mr Wong that it would be utterly unrealistic for the Daughters to come to grasp the finances of all those companies and to respond meaningfully and astutely to the Disclosure Order, and it was also unrealistic for them to spend the time and effort required to deal with the Disclosure Order, when they had to study abroad.

26.  In my view, there was no reason why the Daughters could not simply instruct a professional accountant, such as Fung, to deal with the Disclosure Order.  This would be the same as instructing a firm of solicitors to deal with legal matters.  I am not convinced that they would need to transfer the “legal title” of their shares to Fung as trustee for them in order for Fung to deal with the Disclosure Order.

27.  Mr Wong had also argued that the Daughters came into the scene innocently or ignorantly as they did not know they had been given the shares in Chung Shing Belize by their father.  There was no evidence to contradict this, but as I had commented during the hearing if the Daughters did not wish to accept the gift, they could disclaim it or give it back to their father, but if they decided to accept the gift, then they would have to accept it subject to all duties, liabilities and/or encumbrances which came with it.

28.  There was no evidence that Li would not be willing to work with the Daughters.  There was no reason why the Daughters, being the sole owners of the Companies would not be able to procure Li to co-operate with PLs and to provide disclosure.  If Li were to refuse to obey the direction given to him by the Daughters, the Daughters would have the power to remove Li as director and to appoint new ones who would comply with their direction. 

29.  The Daughters are represented by solicitors, and their physical absence from Hong Kong will not prevent them from discharging disclosure obligations through their solicitors or any directors or staff of the Companies, or professionals, such as Fung, whom they may wish to instruct to assist them.  There was no sufficient evidence of any hardship to the Daughters if the Disclosure Order was to be made against them as they would be assisted by their legal advisers.

30.  Ms Chan had described Rs’ Summons an “extraordinary” application and was in effect a retraction of the undertakings the Daughter had previously given to Ng J and to “immunize” the Daughters from consequences for any (anticipated) breach of undertakings and disclosure orders.

31.  It was clear that the purpose of Rs’ Summons was really to shield the Daughter, so that they would not have to bear the bull brunt of the Disclosure Order and any ancillary disclosure orders. 

32.  Mr Wong conceded that he was unable to produce any legal authority to support his arguments.  

33.  Having considered both Counsel’s submissions and the circumstances of this case, I saw no legal basis nor any ground for leave to be granted for the Daughters to transfer the legal title of their shares in Chung Shing Belize to Fung as trustee.  I was also not satisfied that Fung should be a person to be joined under Order 15 rule 6(2), whether as a respondent to replace the Daughters or in addition as the 4th respondent in this action.

34.  For all the above reasons, I declined to grant the orders sought in Rs’ Summons and dismissed the same.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge for the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Linda Chan SC, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Martin Wong, instructed by Chong & Partners, for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents


[1] see Schedule 5, A2/2/51-52, and the Companies which are #1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 in Schedule 5.

[2] Save for Zhongkin Goldman (Tianjin) Equity Investment Manadement Co Ltd

97137-EN-2015-02-12

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in Provisional Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

_____________________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(in Provisional Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(in Provisional Liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 

and

 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

_____________________

Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 12 February 2015
Date of Decision: 12 February 2015

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

 

Applications

1.  I have before me two summonses, one issued by the 1st and 13th defendants on 1 December 2014 seeking leave to appeal against my earlier decision dated 17 November 2014 (“the decision”) granting an unless order against them and dismissing the 1st defendant’s summons dated 24 June 2014 (“the Variation Summons”), and the other issued by the 1st defendant also on 1 December 2014 seeking to vary the costs order nisi that I made in respect of the Variation Summons.

2.  The background facts of this matter are set out in the decision and I shall not repeat them here.

Application for leave to appeal

3.  Three grounds are relied upon by Mr Bernard Man (for the 1st and 13th defendants) in support of the application for leave to appeal.

4.  First, it is said that there was no serious, contumelious or contumacious breach of the order of L Chan J made herein on 9 April 2014 (“the Chan Order”) by the 1st and 13th defendants.  In particular, it is argued that the 1st and 13th defendants were not required, under the Chan Order, to conduct any tracing exercise.  However, in finding that the 1st and 13th defendants had failed to fully or properly complied with the Chan Order, I did not do so by asking whether they had traced the monies referred to in paragraph 1(c) of that order.  Instead, I proceeded on the basis of what I considered to be the plain meaning and effect of the Chan Order, in particular the requirement on them to (i) provide a full explanation as to what had become of the monies and, in the event that any part of those monies had been used, spent or disposed of, providing full particulars of the circumstances in which the monies had been so used, spent or disposed of, and (ii) produce all documents which evidenced their explanation.  I also found it to be clear on the evidence that the 1st and 13th defendants had consciously decided not to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order.

5.  Second, it is said that the Chan Order was insufficiently clear.  Mr Man argues that a point of principle is engaged here, namely, that where an order is not clear it would be wrong in principle to make an unless order for a failure to comply with the order, and relied on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Raja v van Hoogstraten [2004] 2 All ER 793 in support of this proposition.  In the decision, I expressed the view that the Chan Order seemed to me to be reasonably clear and was well capable of being understood and complied with by the 1st and 13th defendants.  I remain of that view.  I should add that, in a case where a judge has reduced his reasons for making a decision into writing (as L Chan J did in this case), it would only be in a most exceptional case that recourse may be had to what passed between counsel and the judge in order to construe the order eventually made by the judge.  Further, I am given to understand that the 1st and 13th defendants have never sought to appeal against the Chan Order.

6.  Ultimately, whether to make an unless order involves an exercise of discretion.

7.  Third, it is said that the application to vary the injunction to allow for a loan should have been granted.  As explained in the decision, I considered that there was no basis, on any view of the matter, for me to vary the injunction. The 1st defendant had in fact already obtained the loan of HK$5,000,000 from Wing On Finance Company Limited by the time that he took out the Variation Summons.  Thus, in relation to that loan, what the 1st defendant was asking the court to do under his summons was not to vary the mareva injunction to enable the loan to be obtained and used to settle legal costs and disbursements incurred by the 1st and 13th defendants in these and other related legal proceedings, but to sanction, retrospectively, what the 1st defendant had already done, or to provide confirmation or comfort that what he had done was not in breach of the injunction order.  I see no reason why the court should make such order.

8.  The principles for granting leave to appeal are well established, and it is not necessary for me to recite them.  I do not consider that the 1st and 13th defendants have demonstrated that they have a reasonable prospect of success in the proposed appeal.

Application to vary costs order nisi

9.  Costs are generally in the discretion of the court.  It is not suggested that I have acted contrary to any principle in ordering that there be no order as to the costs of the Variation Summons.  If the 1st defendant’s argument regarding the effect of the injunction order is correct, the Variation Summons was unnecessary.  If his argument is incorrect, I would not have made any variation.  I am satisfied that the costs order that I made is fair in all the circumstances.

10.  In conclusion, I dismiss the 1st and 13th defendants’ two summonses with costs to the plaintiffs.

 (Anderson Chow)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Bernard Man, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st & 13th defendants

96165-EN-2014-12-08

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN  
 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
 (in Provisional Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
(in Provisional Liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Chung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 18 November 2014
Date of Decision on Costs: 8 December 2014

___________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

___________________________

Introduction

1.  Shortly before the hearing, the parties agreed that the Mareva injunction against the 1st and 13th defendants (collectively “the defendants”) was to continue until the determination of this action or further order.

2.  The only dispute remaining is the costs of the application for the said injunction (“the injunction application”).  On the plaintiffs’ part, they argue that they should have those costs.  On the defendants’ part, they argue that those costs should be in the cause of this action (alternatively, should be reserved), save that they should have the costs of the hearing before me.

Background

3.  The background leading to the injunction application has been helpfully set out in a decision handed down on 17 November 2014.  I will gratefully quote from it:

“The 1st plaintiff is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of business in Hong Kong. It was listed on the main board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in June 2009. The 2nd plaintiff, a company incorporated in the Macau Special Administrative Region, was one of the 1st plaintiff’s principal operating subsidiaries. The main business of the 1st plaintiff and its subsidiaries is the trading of scrap metal and production of scrap metal products.

The 1st defendant was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the 1st plaintiff. He is also the sole shareholder of the 13th defendant, which is the registered owner of 52.1% of the issued share capital of the 1st plaintiff.

In December 2009, the Securities and Futures Commission (‘the SFC’) commenced investigations into the affairs of the 1st plaintiff.

Trading in the shares of the 1st plaintiff has been suspended since 28 January 2013.

On 26 July 2013, the SFC presented a petition for the winding up of the 1st plaintiff pursuant to section 212 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap 579. On the same date, upon the application of the SFC, the court appointed Mr Cosimo Borrelli and Ms Chi Lai Man Jocelyn (‘the Provisional Liquidators’) as provisional liquidators for the 1st plaintiff.

On 30 July 2013, Tong J granted a worldwide Mareva injunction against (inter alia) the 1st defendant restraining him from in any way disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of his assets up to the value of HK$1,682,198,420.

The order imposing the worldwide Mareva injunction on the 1st defendant also required him to inform the plaintiffs in writing within 48 hours of service of the order on him of all his assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in his own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets, and to confirm such information in an affidavit to be served on the plaintiffs’ solicitors within five days after the date of service of the order on him.

On 31 July 2013, the writ herein was issued.

On 7 August 2013, the plaintiffs amended the writ to join the 13th defendant. On the same date, Deputy High Court Judge Geiser granted a worldwide Mareva injunction against the 13th defendant in terms similar to those against the 1st defendant. The 13th defendant was also required to make disclosure of any asset of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more within 48 hours of service of the order on it, and to confirm such information in an affidavit within five days after service of the order on it.

In what follows, the orders of Tong J and Deputy High Court Judge Geiser (as amended on various occasions) against the 1st and 13th defendants respectively will collectively be referred to as ‘the Mareva Injunctions’.

On 8 August 2013, the 2nd plaintiff was put into provisional liquidation, and Mr Cosimo Borrelli and Ms Chi Lai Man Jocelyn were also appointed as provisional liquidators for the 2nd plaintiff”.

(para 2 to 12 thereof). The decision then summarized the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims as follows:

“On 4 October 2013, the plaintiffs filed the statement of claim herein. For the present purposes, it is not necessary for me to set out in detail the plaintiffs’ allegations raised in the statement of claim which are of considerable complexity. In essence, what is being alleged is that the 1st defendant was engaged in large scale frauds and dissipation of the plaintiffs’ funds through a series of fictitious transactions and ‘round robin’ circulation of funds involving various other defendants in this action. The total value of the claims in this action is estimated to exceed HK$5 billion. Obviously, it is not the court’s function in the present applications to determine the validity of the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims against (inter alia) the 1st and 13th defendants, save to point out that various judges presumably took the view that the plaintiffs had established a ‘good arguable case’ on the evidence before granting or continuing the Mareva Injunctions against them” (para 18 thereof).

This costs application

4.  The reason put forth by the plaintiffs in support of their stance is this.  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2015, Vol 1, para 29/1/55 observes:

“… It has for many years, been the normal practice for a successful plaintiff granted an interlocutory injunction to be granted his costs in the cause and for a successful defendant to be granted his costs in the cause. But the rationale of that practice is perhaps not clear and the courts are showing a greater willingness to depart from it … ”.

5.  In Korea Exchange Bank, Hong Kong Branch and Another v SSCP Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd and 4 Others HCA 146/2013 (26 June 2013), the court (referring to King Fung Vacuum Ltd v Toto Toys Ltd [2006] 2 HKLRD 785, at para 27) regarded the above as “the traditional order” (para 11 thereof).  The court there also said:

“It is not necessarily the case that costs should be in the cause. The court is entitled to look at the merits of the injunction at the time of its application” (apparently relying on an observation to that effect in Mendlowitz & Associates Inc v Winner International Group Ltd & another, HCA 574/2009 (14 May 2010), para 28) (para 12 thereof).

6.  Other cases relied on by the plaintiffs include:

(a) Bushbury Land Rover Ltd v Bushbury Ltd [1997] FSR 709 (interlocutory injunction for passing-off refused on ground of balance of convenience and costs ordered against the applicant);

(b) Cheung Sai Lun v Lau Tai Chin Francis and Another HCCW 677/2004 (19 September 2007) (ex parte injunction continued on inter partes application; costs of the ex parte application were ordered against the respondent but with no order as to costs for the inter partes application).

7.  Based on the above, the plaintiffs seek the costs of the injunction application against the defendants.  They contend that those costs are in essence the costs thrown away by the defendants’ failure (or at least their undue delay) to withdraw their earlier objection to the injunction application.

8.  The defendants disagree with that way of looking at what has happened.  They contend that, as stated in para 2 above, those costs should be in the cause (alternatively, be reserved) because (so they say) they have been acting reasonably, proportionately and efficiently by:

(1) focusing on only one out of several issues in the injunction application;

(2) agreeing subsequently to the continuation of the Mareva injunction. 

They further argue that a respondent to an interlocutory injunction who has unsuccessfully opposed it can expect an order of costs to be in the cause of the action; the defendants should not be penalized for having acted even more reasonably and proportionately as set out in sub-para (1) and (2) above.

9.  The last-mentioned argument should be qualified in the light of the authorities referred to above.  In other words, costs may not be in the cause of the action by reason of matters such as:

(a) the merits of the application for injunction (for example, the application is totally baseless) (the King Fung VacuumLtd decision; the Mendlowitz& Associates Inc decision; the Bushbury Land RoverLtd decision);

(b) the reasonableness of a party’s conduct in the litigation (a party having acted improperly may face an order for costs against it in any event) (the King Fung VacuumLtd decision; the Cheung Sai Lun decision).

Because of sub-para (a) and (b) above, it is necessary to have regard to what was in dispute in the injunction application when deciding its costs.

10.  The plaintiffs’ case in the injunction application was that the defendants tried to conceal their assets by causing their interests in substantial companies to be held through nominee companies. For this reason, the injunction application was to cover 22 companies and a commercial property in Guangzhou.

11.  In response, the defendants admit that they have interests in four of the said companies.  Further, they assert that:

(1) the transfer of US$82 million was in fact a genuine transaction;

(2) their apparent connections with the other of the said companies was due to (i) business management transition needs, and/or (ii) misunderstanding caused by faulty documentation

(in view of these matters, they considered it more sensible not to oppose the injunction application).  The above assertions are disputed by the plaintiffs.  

12.  The difficulty with assessing the merit of the injunction application in the context of this action is, as observed in the decision of 17 November 2014, the plaintiffs’ claims “are of considerable complexity”.  It is therefore unsuitable at this stage to come to a conclusion over this aspect other than to observe that a good arguable case has clearly been established.

13.  On the other hand, an application for interlocutory injunction has “a life of its own”.  As has been observed in the BushburyLand Rover Ltd decision:

“… [there is a] clear distinction between entitlement to interlocutory relief and final judgment which … the criteria on which the court should exercise its discretion whether to grant the former. The fact that a plaintiff may succeed ultimately does not demonstrate that he should have been granted interlocutory relief when the merits of the matter were still unresolved and the court was balancing convenience. Final judgment provides no hindsight, tipping the earlier balance one way or the other” (p 712 thereof).

Conclusion

14.  The plaintiffs have obtained substantially what they sought in the injunction application; however, that “success” has to be judged in the light of the relatively light burden they bear in an application of this kind.  In these circumstances, the appropriate costs order should be that the costs of the injunction application should be the plaintiffs’ costs in the cause.

15.  Having so concluded, as can be seen from para 2, 7 and 8 above, neither party has prevailed in the outcome of the costs application to the extent that the costs of the hearing (whether the hearing be regarded as that of the injunction application, or that for costs) should be treated differently from the earlier costs of the injunction application.  The costs of the hearing before me should thus be made part of the costs of the injunction application (see para 14 above).

(Andrew Chung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Bernard Man & Mr Val Chow, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co, for the 1st & 13th defendants

95785-EN-2014-11-17

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION)1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION)2nd Plaintiff
 

and

 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 23 October 2014
Date of Decision: 17 November 2014

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

 

Application

1. I have before me two applications:

(1) the 1st defendant’s summons dated 24 June 2014 (“the Variation Summons”) seeking a variation of the Re‑Amended Order of Tong J dated 30 July 2013 (as amended by the Order of Deputy High Court Judge Geiser dated 7 August 2013 and as re‑amended by the Order of Ng J dated 3 June 2014[1]) (“the Re‑Amended Injunction Order”);

(2) the plaintiffs’ summons dated 4 July 2014 (“the Unless Order Summons”) seeking an order that unless the 1st and 13th defendants shall, by 4 pm on the 5th day following the date of the order to be made hereunder, each serve an affidavit or affirmation in full and proper compliance with a previous order of L Chan J dated 9 April 2014 (“the Chan Order”), the defence of the 1st and 13th defendants be struck out and the plaintiffs be at liberty to enter judgment with costs against them in this action.

Background leading to the two applications

2. The 1st plaintiff is a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of business in Hong Kong.  It was listed on the main board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in June 2009.  The 2nd plaintiff, a company incorporated in the Macau Special Administrative Region, was one of the 1st plaintiff’s principal operating subsidiaries.  The main business of the 1st plaintiff and its subsidiaries is the trading of scrap metal and production of scrap metal products.

3. The 1st defendant was the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the 1st plaintiff.  He is also the sole shareholder of the 13th defendant, which is the registered owner of 52.1% of the issued share capital of the 1st plaintiff.

4. In December 2009, the Securities and Futures Commission (“the SFC”) commenced investigations into the affairs of the 1st plaintiff.

5. Trading in the shares of the 1st plaintiff has been suspended since 28 January 2013.

6. On 26 July 2013, the SFC presented a petition for the winding up of the 1st plaintiff pursuant to section 212 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap 579.  On the same date, upon the application of the SFC, the court appointed Mr Cosimo Borrelli and Ms Chi Lai Man Jocelyn (“the Provisional Liquidators”) as provisional liquidators for the 1st plaintiff.

7. On 30 July 2013, Tong J granted a worldwide Mareva injunction against (inter alia) the 1st defendant restraining him from in any way disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of his assets up to the value of HK$1,682,198,420.

8. The order imposing the worldwide Mareva injunction on the 1st defendant also required him to inform the plaintiffs in writing within 48 hours of service of the order on him of all his assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in his own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets, and to confirm such information in an affidavit to be served on the plaintiffs’ solicitors within five days after the date of service of the order on him.

9. On 31 July 2013, the writ herein was issued.

10. On 7 August 2013, the plaintiffs amended the writ to join the 13th defendant.  On the same date, Deputy High Court Judge Geiser granted a worldwide Mareva injunction against the 13th defendant in terms similar to those against the 1st defendant. The 13th defendant was also required to make disclosure of any asset of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more within 48 hours of service of the order on it, and to confirm such information in an affidavit within five days after service of the order on it.

11. In what follows, the orders of Tong J and Deputy High Court Judge Geiser (as amended on various occasions) against the 1st and 13th defendants respectively will collectively be referred to as “the Mareva Injunctions”.

12. On 8 August 2013, the 2nd plaintiff was put into provisional liquidation, and Mr Cosimo Borrelli and Ms Chi Lai Man Jocelyn were also appointed as provisional liquidators for the 2nd plaintiff.

13. On 23 August 2013, the 1st defendant made a statement of assets for the 13th defendant, which was verified by his affirmation filed on 2 September 2013.

14. On 27 August 2013, the 1st defendant made a statement of assets for himself, which was verified by his affirmation filed on 27 August 2013.

15. On 29 August 2013, the 1st defendant made a supplemental statement of his assets.

16. On 10 September 2013, the 1st defendant made a further supplemental statement of his assets, which was verified by his affirmation filed on 17 September 2013.

17. On 18 September 2013, the 1st defendant made a supplemental statement of assets for the 13th defendant, which was verified by his affirmation filed on 25 September 2013.

18. On 4 October 2013, the plaintiffs filed the statement of claim herein.  For the present purposes, it is not necessary for me to set out in detail the plaintiffs’ allegations raised in the statement of claim which are of considerable complexity.  In essence, what is being alleged is that the 1st defendant was engaged in large scale frauds and dissipation of the plaintiffs’ funds through a series of fictitious transactions and “round robin” circulation of funds involving various other defendants in this action.  The total value of the claims in this action is estimated to exceed HK$5 billion.  Obviously, it is not the court’s function in the present applications to determine the validity of the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims against (inter alia) the 1st and 13th defendants, save to point out that various judges presumably took the view that the plaintiffs had established a “good arguable case” on the evidence before granting or continuing the Mareva Injunctions against them[2].

19. On 28 February 2014, Mr Recorder Houghton SC dismissed the 1st and 13th defendants’ application for variation of the Mareva Injunctions to increase the limit for their living and legal expenses, on the ground that they had failed to demonstrate that there were no other viable sources of funding for those expenses.

20. On 25 March 2014, the plaintiffs applied for an “unless” order to compel the 1st and 13th defendants to comply with the disclosure obligations under the Mareva Injunctions.  This application came before L Chan J on 9 April 2014.  As mentioned at paragraph 4 of L Chan J’s decision dated 9 April 2014 (“the Decision”), in the five statements of assets made by or on behalf of the 1st and 13th defendants:

(1)    The 1st defendant disclosed that he himself had assets totalling HK$17,814,201.94 with HK$6 million in cash, HK$7,097,017 in shares and options of the 1st plaintiff, and HK$4,717,184 in listed shares of other companies, insurance company and MPF.

(2)    The 13th defendant disclosed that it had assets totalling HK$651,854,831 with HK$562,686,149 in shares of the 1st plaintiff, HK$84,253,352 in other listed shares and HK$4,915,330 in cash.

(3)    Leaving aside the value of the shares and options of the 1st plaintiff which the 1st and 13th defendants had been holding since the initial public offering of the 1st plaintiff’s shares, their total assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more came to about HK$99,886,000.

21. This figure was to be considered in the light of the facts, as mentioned at paragraph 3 of the Decision, that:

(i) the 1st and 13th defendants had received total cash dividends of about HK$147.2 million from the 1st plaintiff between 2010 and 2012;

(ii) the 13th defendant received HK$636 million in cash from the disposal of 60 million shares of the 1st plaintiff on 27 April 2011; and

(iii) the 1st defendant also received HK$39,720,416 in cash by way of salaries, allowances and bonuses from the end of 2009 to 30 June 2013,

making a total of about HK$822,900,000.

22. At that stage, the 1st defendant’s explanation for the shortfall was that the proceeds or dividends received by the 1st and 13th defendants that were not represented by the assets as disclosed in the five statements of assets had been “used, spent or disposed of”, without a word on how they had been used, spent or disposed of (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Decision).  L Chan J was obviously not impressed by this explanation, and considered that a further disclosure order was “amply justified” (see paragraph 17 of the Decision). The learned judge was, however, inclined to give the 1st and 13th defendants one more opportunity before considering whether an “unless” order was appropriate, there being a dispute on whether the court had jurisdiction and whether it was right in the circumstances to grant an “unless” order (see paragraph 18 of the Decision).

23. In the end, L Chan J made the following order on 9 April 2014 (ie the Chan Order):

“The 1st and 13th Defendants shall, by 4 p.m., on the 7th working day following the date of this order, each serve an affidavit or affirmation on the Plaintiff’s solicitors:

(a) providing full and proper disclosure of all their respective assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more, whether in or outside Hong Kong, whether in their own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of such assets;

(b) in the event that any assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more have been disposed of, encumbered or otherwise dealt with between 30 July 2013 and the date on which the said affidavit or affirmation is sworn, providing a full explanation as to what has become of the proceeds and the value thereof;

(c) providing a full explanation as to what has become of the monies received by the 13th defendant amounting to approximately HK$636,000,000 received by the 13th Defendant in respect of its disposal of 60,000,000 shares in [the 1st plaintiff] on 27 April 2011 and approximately HK$147,155,803 received by the 13th Defendant in respect of various cash dividends declared and paid by the 1st plaintiff … and, in the event that any part of those monies have been used, spent or disposed of, providing full particulars of the circumstances;

(d)  exhibiting all documents which evidence the matters set out in paragraphs 1(a) to (c) above.”

24. In compliance, or purported compliance, with the Chan Order, the 1st defendant made an affirmation which was filed on 22 April 2014 (“Chun 10th”).

25. On 24 June 2014, the 1st defendant took out the Variation Summons seeking a variation of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order so that he may be allowed, expressly, to:

“(1)  use the HK$5 million loan facility which the 1st Defendant obtained from Wing On Finance Company Limited on 4 April 2014 (the “Loan Facility”) to pay the legal expenses of himself and the 13th Defendant in these proceedings, HCCW 210/2013, and SFC and police investigations;

(2)  obtain further loans from banks and/or other financial institutions to pay the legal expenses of himself and the 13th Defendant in these proceedings, HCCW 210/2013, and SFC and police investigations provided that:

 (i)  such loans are not secured against any of the assets which are the subject of the Re-Amended Injunction Order against the 1st Defendant or the Amended Order of Deputy High Court Judge Geiser dated 7 August 2013 (as amended by the Order of Mr Justice Ng dated 4 June 2014) against the 13th Defendant;

 (ii)  all proceeds of such loans are to be paid directly by the lender to the solicitors of the 1st and 13th Defendants:

 (a)  for the purpose of settling legal costs and disbursements (including counsel’s fees) incurred by the 1st and 13th Defendants in these proceedings, HCCW 210/2013, and SFC and police investigations; and/or

 (b)  as costs on account to settle legal costs and disbursements (including counsel’s fees) to be incurred by the 1st and 13th Defendants in these proceedings, HCCW 210/2013, and SFC and police investigations.”

26. The Variation Summons was supported by the 1st defendant’s 12th affirmation filed on 24 June 2014 (“Chun 12th”).  In that affirmation, the 1st defendant stated, inter alia, the following:

(1) On 4 April 2014, he managed to obtain an unsecured and non‑assignable loan facility in the sum of HK$5,000,000 from Wing On Finance Company Limited (“Wing On”).

(2) Up to that date, he had given instructions to draw down an aggregate sum of HK$3,845,343 from the Loan Facility which sum had been paid directly by Wing On to the previous solicitors of himself and the 13th defendant (namely, Hastings) and their solicitors in HCCW 2010/2013 (namely, Li & Partners) for the purpose of settling their legal fees and disbursements.

(3) He had been advised by Hastings and verily believed that the Loan Facility was not in breach of the injunction orders which the court had granted against him and the 13th defendant because the loan was not secured against any of the assets of himself or the 13th defendant, and as long as all amounts drawn down were paid directly to their solicitors to settle legal fees and disbursements without going through them.

(4) Nevertheless, for the avoidance of doubt or future argument, he had been advised by his current solicitors (namely, Anthony Siu & Co) that he should notify the plaintiffs of the Loan Facility and ask them to confirm that they would not take issue with it, and to request the plaintiffs that they would not take any objection to further unsecured loans being taken out by him or the 13th defendant for the purpose of funding their legal costs in these proceedings and HCCW 210/2003.

(5) As at the date of Chun 12th, no confirmation had been received from Hogan Lovells (the plaintiffs’ solicitors), despite Anthony Siu & Co’s letters to Hogan Lovells dated 5 June 2014 and 13 June 2014 respectively.

27. The plaintiffs considered that the 1st and 13th defendants’ disclosure of assets in purported compliance with the Chan Order was untruthful and incomplete in several material respects and took out the Unless Order Summons on 4 July 2014 to compel them to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order.

28. In opposition to the Variation Summons, Mr Borrelli filed his 9th affidavit on 28 July 2914 (“Borrelli 9th”), and the 1st defendant filed his 13th affirmation on 22 August 2014 (“Chun 13th”) in reply.  The following matters (amongst others) were raised in Borrelli 9th:

(1) Notwithstanding the fact that the Loan Facility was taken out on 4 April 2014 and sums totalling HK$3,845,343 appeared to have been drawn down on various dates between 4 April 2014 and 13 May 2014, the plaintiffs were not informed of those matters until 5 June 2014.

(2) At a hearing of the Variation Summons and the Unless Order Summons on 11 July 2014 before Deputy High Court Judge Wilson Chan, counsel for the 1st defendant informed the court that the 1st defendant “does not intend to breach the injunction by using assets covered by the injunction to repay the loan”.  Mr Borrelli said that this reinforced the plaintiffs’ belief that there were undisclosed assets available to the 1st and 13th defendants with which they had been paying his legal expenses.  Mr Borrelli pointed out that the 1st defendant had so far engaged at least three solicitors firm, three senior counsel and six junior counsel in these proceedings and other related proceedings to represent him and the 13th defendant and the legal costs incurred must have well exceeded HK$3,845,343 said to have been drawn down from the Loan Facility.

(3) Mr Borrelli said that it was highly unusual for Wing On to have provided the unsecured Loan Facility to the 1st defendant in circumstances where his assets up to HK$1,682,198,420 remained frozen (assuming that the 1st defendant had informed Wing On of the Mareva injunction against him).  In this regard, it may be noted that in Chun 13th, the 1st defendant confirmed that the Loan Facility was unsecured, and stated that no security or other guarantee had been provided by himself or any other parties in respect of the facility.

(4) Mr Borrelli further pointed to various terms of the Loan Facility which he regarded as being unusual and suggested to him that either the Loan Facility was not made at arm’s length and/or that the 1st and 13th defendants had substantial assets held by other persons or entities which they had not disclosed.  The 1st defendant’s answers to Mr Borrelli’s points are set out in Chun 13th.

(5) Mr Borrelli also contended that the Loan Facility and any further loans envisaged by the Variation Summons amounted, prima facie, to dissipation and/or disposal of the 1st defendant’s assets in breach of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order.

29. The 1st defendant provided some further information regarding his and the 13th defendant’s assets in an affirmation filed on 26 August 2014 (“Chun 14th”) in response to the 7th affidavit of Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Borrelli 7th”), which was made in support of the plaintiffs’ application to extend the Mareva Injunctions to cover 22 companies and a property known as Asia Steel Building in Guangzhou, PRC.

30. In response to the Unless Order Summons, the 1st defendant filed his 15th affirmation on 27 August 2014 (“Chun 15th”).

31. Mr Cosimo Borrelli responded to Chun 15th by his 10th affidavit (“Borrelli 10th”) filed on 24 September 2014.

32. To complete the picture, I should mention that the 1st defendant filed a further affirmation on 20 October 2014 (“Chun 16th”), shortly before the present hearing.  Mr Borrelli responded to Chun 16th by his 11th affidavit (“Borrelli 11th”) filed on 22 October 2014.

The Unless Order Summons

33. It is accepted by Mr Russell Coleman SC (appearing together with Ms Eva Sit for the plaintiffs) that the 1st and 13th defendants are not required to do any “tracing” exercise in respect of the sums of HK$636,000,000 and HK$147,155,803 received by the 13th defendant referred to in sub‑paragraph (c) of the Chan Order.  Nevertheless, they had been expressly ordered to:

(1) provide a “full explanation” as to what has become of those monies; and

(2) in the event that any part of those monies have been used, spent or disposed of, provide “full particulars of the circumstances” in which the monies have been so used, spent or disposed of.

34. In judging whether there has been a proper and sufficient compliance by the 1st and 13th defendants with the Chan Order, while it would not be appropriate for me to conduct a mini‑trial on affidavit evidence, I believe that I am entitled to consider whether the 1st and 13th defendants’ explanation is on its face credible and consistent with contemporaneous documents and/or their previous statements.

35. As earlier mentioned, the 1st defendant filed Chun 10th in compliance, or purported compliance, with the Chan Order.  In that affirmation, the 1st defendant stated, inter alia, that that:

(1) the 13th defendant received the net sum of HK$613,277,842  from the sale of 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff on or about 3 May 2011 (see paragraph 14 of Chun 10th).

(2) the 13th defendant received the total amount of HK$170,461,770.68[3] by way of cash dividends from the 1st plaintiff between 2010 and 2011 (see paragraphs 9 to 13 of Chun 10th); and

(3) the sum of HK$53,143,868.96 (being part of the said amount of HK$170,461,770.68) was deposited into the 13th defendant’s account with Citibank numbered “697277” (“the Citibank Account”) on or about 30 May 2011 “to be used in stock investment” (see paragraph 11(1) of Chun 10th).

36. In relation to the aforesaid sale proceeds of HK$613,277,842, the 1st defendant’s explanation of how they had been used, spent or disposed of was, in summary, as follows:

(1) Between 27 June 2011 and 20 March 2012, the 13th defendant lent the total sum of approximately US$82 million (equivalent to about HK$639.6 million at the exchange rate of US$1 to HK$7.8) (“the Loan”) to a wholly owned subsidiary called Chung Shing Finance (Holdings) Limited (“Chung Shing HK”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong.

(2) The sum of US$82 million came from the aforesaid sale proceeds in the amount of HK$613,277,842 together with the 13th defendant’s other existing monies.

(3) The US$82 million received by Chung Shing HK was subsequently injected into two PRC subsidiaries of Chung Shing HK as their registered capitals.

(4) In or about August 2012, the 1st defendant decided to gift the 13th defendant’s entire interest in Chung Shing HK and the Loan to his three daughters.  The gift was effected by:

(i) a deed of gift in favour of a company called Chung Shing Investment Pte Ltd (“Chung Shing Singapore”) dated 29 August 2012; and

(ii) an instrument of transfer and bought and sold notes dated 4 September 2012 whereby the 13th defendant’s entirely shareholding interest in Chung Shing HK was transferred to Chung Shing Singapore.

(5) Chung Shing Singapore was solely owned by Chung Shing Finance Holding Limited (“Chung Shing Belize”), a company incorporated in Belize.

(6) The ultimate beneficial and legal owners of Chung Shing Belize were the 1st defendant’s three daughters.

37. In relation to the amount of HK$53,143,868.96 deposited into the Citibank Account on or about 30 May 2011, the 1st defendant further disclosed in Chun 10th and Chun 15th the following:

(1) Out of the said amount of HK$53,143,868.96, the 13th defendant transferred the sum of HK$51,000,000 from the Citibank Account to its securities account with BOCI Securities Limited (“the BOCI Securities Account”) in three tranches of HK$30,000,00 (5 March 2013), HK$10,000,000 (12 April 2013) and HK$11,000,00 (10 May 2013) respectively.

(2) The amount of HK$51,000,000 transferred to the BOCI Securities Account was used to off‑set losses incurred by the 13th defendant in securities trading between February 2012 and May 2013.

38. Lastly, the 1st defendant stated in Chun 10th that the 13th defendant had used HK$5,896,161.51 to increase its shareholding in the 1st plaintiff in October 2011.

39. It is the plaintiffs’ case that there are glaring gaps and discrepancies in the disclosure given by the 1st defendant in Chun 10th, and those deficiencies are plainly intentional and have not been addressed or cured by Chun 15th or 16th.

40. In his written skeleton argument dated 20 October 2014, Mr Coleman set out the plaintiffs’ complaints under six broad grounds in paragraphs 33 to 38 thereof (which were said to be “the more salient examples” of the 1st and 13th defendant’s deficiencies in disclosure or “only some of the deficiencies”).  At the hearing, Mr Coleman concentrated on the following matters only.

41. First, in relation to the 1st defendant’s explanation that the sale proceeds of 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff received by the 13th defendant had been loaned to Chung Shing HK and then injected into two PRC subsidiaries of Chung Shing HK as their registered capitals, the ledgers of the 13th defendant clearly show that upon receipt of the sum of HK$613,277,822 on 3 May 2011, about half (HK$300 million) was immediately transferred to the 2nd plaintiff on the following day (4 May 2011).  Further, on the basis of the Provisional Liquidators’ investigation, the HK$300 million was later used to fund the payment of dividends by the 1st plaintiff on 30 May 2011 (see paragraph 19 of Borrelli 10th).  The 1st defendant has not dealt with this allegation in Chun 16th, which was filed in response to allegations raised in Borrelli 10th.

42. It seems clear that the 1st defendant’s explanation regarding the use of the sale proceeds of 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff received by the 13th defendant is inconsistent with the accounts kept by the 1st plaintiff (at a time when it was under the 1st defendant’s control) and also the result of the Provisional Liquidators’ investigation (which has not been disputed on the evidence).

43. Second, Mr Coleman criticised the failure of the 1st and 13th defendants to produce the relevant capital verification reports of the two PRC subsidiaries of Chung Shing HK which it was said would show the dates on which the alleged capital injections took place.  What the 1st defendant had produced in Chun 10th were four bank withdrawal slips showing the transfer of the total amount of approximately US$82 million by the 13th defendant to Chung Shing HK.  Under sub‑paragraph (d) of the Chan Order, the 1st and 13th defendants were required to “exhibit all documents” which evidenced what had become of (inter alia) the sale proceeds of 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff received by the 13th defendant.  It seems to me that the relevant capital verification reports, or some other documents evidencing the alleged capital injections, ought to have been produced.

44. Third, in relation to the 1st defendant’s explanation that out of the sum of HK$53,143,868.96 deposited into the Citibank Account on 30 May 2011, the sum of HK$51,000,000 was transferred to the BOCI Securities Account and used to off‑set losses incurred by the 13th defendant in securities trading between February 2012 and May 2013, it is apparent from the bank statements of the Citibank Account produced by the 1st defendant that, as a matter of fact, on the same date of the deposit:

(1) HK$20,588,228.02 was withdrawn from the Citibank Account to repay a “margin demand loan”; and

(2) HK$20,000,000 was transferred to an entity called “FCC Wellrun Ltd”.

45. It would appear therefore that the explanation given by the 1st defendant regarding the use of the sum of HK$53,143,868.96 deposited into the Citibank account on 30 May 2011 is incorrect.

46. The 1st defendant sought to explain this discrepancy in Chun 16th. The 1st defendant accepted that the said sum of HK$20,588,228.02 was used to repay the principal of a margin loan which had previously been obtained to finance the purchase of 300,000 shares of China Mobile Ltd (Stock Code: 941), and that the said sum of HK$20,000,000 was transferred to the 13th defendant’s commodities/futures account with another member of the Citigroup (namely, Citigroup Global Markets Inc) for the purpose funding investment in various commodities, futures and securities.  The 1st defendant said that when the securities, commodities and futures were sold, the proceeds would be credited back into the Citibank Account or other accounts held by the 13th defendant with Citibank.  Apparently, there were many transactions carried out in various accounts for the sale or purchase of securities, commodities and futures.  In any event, according to the 1st defendant, the sum of HK$51,000,000 transferred to the BOCI Securities Account “originated from the HK$53,143,868.96 deposited into the [Citibank Account] on or about 30 May 2011 and/or investment gains deriving from the said sum” (see paragraph 13 of Chun 16th).

47. If this further explanation by the 1st Defendant in Chun 16th regarding the use of the said sum of HK$53,143,868.96 deposited into the Citibank account on 30 May 2011 is correct, it seems to me clear that the picture painted by him in Chun 10th and Chun 15th is incomplete and misleading, and cannot be regarded as a “full explanation” providing “full particulars of the circumstances” in which the said sum was used, spent or disposed of, as required by sub‑paragraph (c) of the Chan Order.  Also, the 1st and 13th defendants have failed to exhibit all documents which evidence what has become of the sum of HK$53,143,868.96, being part of the cash dividends received by the 13th defendant between 2010 and 2011, as required by sub‑paragraph (d) of the Chan Order.

48. Fourth, according to the 1st defendant’s own evidence in Chun 10th, the 13th defendant had received the total amount of approximately HK$783 million from (i) the sale proceeds of 60 million shares in the 1st plaintiff on or about 3 May 2011, and (ii) the cash dividends from the 1st plaintiff between 2010 and 2011.  However, he referred to only three transactions in Chun 10th which had cost the 13th defendant some HK$696 million, namely:

(i) US$82 million (equivalent to about HK$639.6 million) loaned to Chung Shing HK;

(ii) HK$51 million transferred to the BOCI Securities Account to off‑set losses incurred in securities trading; and

(iii) HK$5.89 million used to increase its shareholding in the 1st plaintiff. 

There was thus still a shortfall of about HK$87 million which remained unaccounted for.

49. In all, I am satisfied that the 1st and 13th defendants have failed to fully and properly complied with the Chan Order.  In reaching this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to rely on other criticisms raised in Mr Coleman’s written skeleton argument which he did not develop in oral submissions.

50. Having reached the above conclusion, the next question which I turn to is whether I should make an “unless” order as sought by the plaintiffs, ie unless the 1st and 13th defendants do fully and properly comply with the Chan Order within a specified period, their defence be struck out and the plaintiffs be at liberty to enter judgment against them with costs in this action.

51. It is not in dispute that the court has jurisdiction to make an “unless” order to ensure compliance with disclosure orders in aid of Mareva injunctions: see JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2013] 2 All ER 414 at paragraphs 146, 149, 165, 183‑188, per Rix LJ.  In relation to the exercise of such jurisdiction, the following was said by Rix LJ at paragraph 188:

“The authorities demonstrate that it is vital for the court, in the interests of justice, to have effective powers, and effective sanctions. Without these, it would be possible for a defendant (or, in a different situation, a claimant) to flout the orders of the court, which are the court’s considered means by which to keep the scales of justice for the parties even. If once it became known that the court was unable or unwilling to maintain the effectiveness of its orders, then it would lose all control over litigation of this kind, with terrible consequences for the administration of justice. Those wrongly accused of fraud would be relieved of a certain amount of inconvenience, but fraudsters would rejoice and hitch a free ride to interminable litigation on the back of ill-gotten gains.”

52. As submitted by Mr Coleman, freezing orders are critical weapons in the court’s armoury against fraud, securing the preservation of assets which might otherwise be wrongly dissipated pending judgment, and in appropriate cases, the preservation of evidence, including documentation, and the provision of information to trace the proceeds of fraud: CIBC Mellon Trust Company v Stolzenberg [2003] EWHC 13 at paragraph 103, per Etherton J.  Further, compliance with orders of the court goes to the essence of the rule of law that parties subject to the court’s jurisdiction should comply with court orders.  The gravity of the matter of non‑compliance will increase where the non‑compliance results from a conscious decision: see CIBC Mellon Trust Company v Stolzenberg [2004] EWCA Civ 827 at paragraph 167, per Arden LJ.

53. On the other hand, Mr Benjamin Yu SC (appearing together with Mr Bernard Man for the 1st and 13th defendants) submitted that while the court has jurisdiction to make an “unless” order in such circumstances, this is not to be contemplated lightly in view of the draconian nature of the order.  He submitted that the court should take into account whether a pre‑existing order has been clearly and obviously breached, and whether the breach is contumelious or contumacious.  He also criticised the Chan Order as being “hopelessly vague” and said that it does not specifically provide for “exactly what it is that D1 and D13 are to do”. Finally, he pointed out that the claim against the 1st and 13th defendants is vast and hotly contested, and thus it would be wholly unjust that the 1st and 13th defendants should face the possibility of judgment being entered against them without any trial.

54. In relation to the above points made by Mr Yu, my views are as follows:

(1)    As for the draconian nature of the order sought, I repeated paragraphs 51 and 52 above.

(2)    As for the question of whether the Chan Order has been clearly and obviously breached, and whether the breach is contumelious or contumacious, I consider it to be clear on the evidence that the 1st and 13th defendants have consciously decided not to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order.  Even after three affirmations filed by the 1st defendant subsequent to the date of the Chan Order (ie Chun 10th, Chun 15th and Chun 16th), there are still glaring gaps and discrepancies in the disclosure given by the 1st and 13th defendants in purported compliance with the Chan Order. The failure to comply with the Chan Order must also be seen in the light of the five statements of assets previously made by or on behalf of the 1st and 13th defendants in purported compliance with the disclosure obligations under the Mareva Injunctions, which L Chan J plainly considered to be insufficient.  It must also be borne in mind that the orders requiring on them to make full disclosure of their assets were made as long ago as July/August 2013.

(3)    As for the criticism that the Chan Order is “hopelessly vague” and does not specifically provide for “exactly what it is that D1 and D13 are to do”, I do not agree with this criticism.  The Chan Order seems to me to be reasonably clear and is well capable of being understood and complied with by the 1st and 13th defendants.

(4)    Lastly, as for the suggestion that it would be wholly unjust that the 1st and 13th defendants should face the possibility of judgment being entered against them without any trial, it seems to me that it is well within their ability to fully and properly comply with the Chan Order thereby avoiding the prospect of judgment being entered against them without trial.

55. In passing, I note that at page 59 of the transcript of the hearing before L Chan J on 9 April 2014, the learned judge expressed the view, in the course of an exchange with Mr Dobby of Hogan Lovells on the issue of costs, that an application for an “unless” order might be justified “if the next batch of disclosure should be lamentably incomplete”.  In my view, that indeed is the position.

56. In all the circumstances, I consider it just, appropriate and proportionate to make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Unless Order Summons, save that I would allow the 1st and 13th defendants 14 days, instead of five days, to make the affidavit or affirmation referred to in paragraph 1 of the Unless Order Summons.  Also, the reference to the sum of “HK$147,155,803” in paragraph 1c should be changed to “HK$170,461,770.68” in view of the 1st defendant’s own evidence in Chun 10th.

The Variation Summons

57. Notwithstanding the extensive legal submissions which have been raised by the parties in respect of this summons, I can deal with it relatively shortly.

58. In essence, Mr Yu’s argument is that, upon the true construction of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order, there is no restriction on the 1st defendant taking loans from third parties, provided that (i) such loans are not secured against any of the assets which are subject to the Mareva Injunctions, and (ii) all proceeds of such loans are paid directly by the lenders to the solicitors, or former solicitors, of the 1st and 13th defendants to settle legal costs and disbursements incurred by them in these and other related legal proceedings.  This is because such transactions would not involve any removal, dealing with, or disposition, diminution in the value or use of, the 1st defendant’s assets within the meaning of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order.

59. On the other hand, Mr Coleman argues that such transactions would result in a reduction of the net asset (or net asset position) of the 1st defendant, and therefore would be caught by the Re‑Amended Injunction Order.  According to Mr Coleman, the creation of a new liability by the 1st defendant would constitute a breach of the order.

60. If Mr Yu is right in his contention, there would be no basis, or reason, for me to “vary” the Re‑Amended Injunction Order so as to permit what is in law already permissible (subject to the discussion below regarding the payment of the proceeds of loan to solicitors as “costs on account” to settle legal costs and disbursements “to be incurred”).

61. On the other hand, if Mr Coleman is right in his contention, and having regard to my conclusion that the 1st and 13th defendants have not fully and properly complied with the Chan Order relating to the disclosure of their assets, I would decline to exercise my discretion to vary the Re‑Amended Injunction Order as sought by the 1st defendant, for the same reason that Mr Recorder Houghton SC refused to vary the Mareva Injunctions to increase the limit for the living and legal expenses of the 1st and 13th defendants, namely, that they had failed to demonstrate that there were no other viable sources of funding for those expenses.

62. I should add that, if a variation of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order is needed, I would not in any event be disposed to vary the Re‑Amended Injunction Order with “retrospective” effect so as to sanction a loan which the 1st defendant has already obtained and partly used.  It seems to me that the requisite variation should, generally, be sought and obtained prior to the taking of the loan if a variation is indeed required.

63. It follows that, on any view of the matter, I should decline to make the order sought by the 1st defendant and should dismiss the Variation Summons.

64. Nevertheless, in view of the extensive submissions which have been made by counsel, I shall deal the issue identified in paragraphs 58 and 59 above briefly.

65. First, as a starting point, it may be noted that both counsel’s submissions proceed on the basis of the true “construction” of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order, which follows the standard or usual form of Mareva injunction in general use in the Hong Kong courts.

66. Second, it appears not to be in dispute that, at least in theory, it is open to the court to make an order which expressly permits, or prohibits, the obtaining of loans by the defendant to be paid directly by the lender to the defendant’s solicitors to pay legal fees and disbursements already incurred.

67. Third, it is accepted by Mr Yu that if the loan proceeds are first paid to the defendant who then pay them to his solicitors, the loan proceeds in the hands of the defendant would be subject to the restraint imposed by the Mareva injunction.  See JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 10) [2014] 1 WLR 1414 at paragraph 101, per Rimer LJ, where it was said:

“Money actually advanced to Mr Ablyazov under any of the loan agreements, or to a third party to be held to his order, would of course be an ‘asset’ of his to which … the freezing order would apply”.

68. Fourth, it follows from the above that if the loans proceeds are paid by the lender directly to the 1st and 13th defendants’ solicitors “as costs on account” to settle legal costs and disbursements “to be incurred” by the 1st and 13th defendants in these and other related legal proceedings, as envisaged in paragraph 1(2)(ii)(b) of the Variation Summons, the moneys received and held by the solicitors would be an asset of the 1st defendant which would be subject to the restraint imposed by the Re‑Amended Injunction Order.

69. Fifth, I am unable to accept Mr Coleman’s submission that the effect of a Mareva injunction, in its standard or usual form, is apt or sufficient to prohibit the defendant from increasing, or incurring new, liabilities.  Neither can I accept his submission that the position is to be looked at by asking whether the effect of the transaction will lead to a reduction of the net asset (or net asset position) of the defendant.  If Mr Coleman’s submission is correct, there could be problems with a solicitor giving legal advice or providing legal assistance to the defendant without costs on account but expecting, or hoping, that he will be paid in future after the final disposal of the proceedings against the defendant.

70. The proposition that a Mareva injunction in its standard or usual form does not prohibit the defendant from incurring new liabilities without more is well supported by authorities, including:

(1)    Gee QC, Commercial Injunctions, 5th Edn, paragraph 19.022:

“However, a freezing injunction does not prevent the defendant from incurring new liabilities, and accordingly the defendant is free to write cheques to be debited to an account in overdraft, or to use a credit card, thereby committing the credit card company to pay the supplier.”

(2)    In the Matter of Cantor Index Ltd v Alan John Lister [2002] CP Rep 25, per Neuberger J (as he then was):

“[The Freezing Order] provide that the defendant should not ‘dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of his assets’. For a debtor to increase his indebtedness by borrowing from an existing creditor or even to create an indebtedness by borrowing from a new creditor, at least where the creditor is not secured on any of the debtor’s assets, does not to my mind, as a matter of ordinary language, involve disposing of or dealing with or diminishing the value of any of the debtor’s assets. I accept that it results in a diminution of the debtor’s net asset position, but that is not what paragraphs 1(1) and 1(2) of the Freezing Order refer to.”

(3)    Anglo Eastern Trust Ltd v Kermanshahghi [2002] EWHC 1702 (Ch), per Neuberger J (as he then was):

“If the legal expenses are being met by Alcole by way of direct payment to the solicitors, albeit that it is by way of a loan to the defendant, I do not think the payment of money involves: ‘diminish[ing] the value of any of [the defendant’s] asset.’ That is because, while the loan may involve diminishing the defendant’s net asset value, there is no specific asset one can identify which is diminished in value. If the loan was secured on property then the value of the defendant’s equity in the property would be diminished as the loan increased. That is not the position here.”

(4)    Lastly, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hickey [1999] FCA 259, per Carr J:

“… when the respondents drew cash or paid expenses by debiting such amounts to the Visa Account they did not deal with or dispose of their assets or property within the meaning of the Mareva injunction. Throughout the relevant period that account was in debit. The respondents simply caused pre-existing indebtedness to be increased.”

71. Sixth, the most controversial issue is whether the defendant, by instructing the lender to pay the loan proceeds directly to his solicitors to settle legal costs and disbursements already incurred, should be treated as disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of an “asset”, namely, the contractual right to draw down under a loan agreement, for the purpose of a Mareva injection in its standard or usual form.  The English Court of Appeal in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 10) [2014] 1 WLR 1414 held unanimously that:

(i) although there might be no fundamental objection of principle to the recognition of choses in action such as a borrower’s right to draw down under a loan agreement from qualifying as an “asset” for the purpose of a freezing order, such orders had to be construed strictly and, in determining their ordinary meaning, account should be taken of their background, context and purpose;

(ii) the wording of the freezing order (in the usual form) did not identify all choses in action as falling within the scope of the term “asset” with as much precision as was reasonably practicable;

(iii) if the order was to treat the right to draw down a loan agreement as an “asset”, despite its unamenability to enforcement and the inability to place a value on it, then additional words were needed; and

(iv) the contractual right to draw down under the loan agreement did not quality as an “asset” and thus in exercising that facility the defendant did not “dispose of” or “deal with” his assets for the purpose of the freezing order: see paragraphs 34 to 39 and 72 to 78 per Beatson LJ, paragraph 97 per Floyd LJ, and paragraphs 101 to 103 per Rimer LJ.

72. In his judgment, Beatson LJ first identified the three principles in play as to the approach of the court to freezing orders and the tension between these principles, stating as follows:

“[34] (a) The enforcement principle: The first and primary principle is that the purpose of a freezing order is to stop the injuncted Defendant dissipating or disposing of property which could be the subject of enforcement if the Claimant goes on to win the case it has brought, and not to give the Claimant security for his claim...

[36] (b) The principle of flexibility: The second principle is that the jurisdiction to make a freezing order should be exercised in a flexible and adaptable manner so as to be able to deal with new situations and new ways used by sophisticated and wily operators to make themselves immune to the courts' orders or deliberately to thwart the effective enforcement of those orders…

[37] (c) Strict construction: The third principle follows from the ‘fundamental requirement of an injunction directed to an individual that it shall be certain’…

[38] (d) The tension: There is tension between the first two principles and the third because a strict construction of the order may leave it open to an unscrupulous and determined Defendant to potentially reduce the amount that will be available to the Claimant at the conclusion of the proceedings. Another way of characterising the tension is that giving primacy to the purpose of the order or to the need for flexibility when construing it may involve not giving it a strict construction.

[39] A third way of characterising the tension is that a strict, literal and legalistic construction of terms such as ‘asset’ in a freezing order that does not take account of the purpose of such orders may have the result that conduct which will not reduce the amount available to the Claimant at the conclusion of the proceedings will nevertheless breach the order. It would do so even though it is outwith the enforcement principle which is the, or at least the primary, purpose of a freezing order. The thrust of Mr Matthews' submissions is that treating all choses in action as assets for the purpose of a freezing order has this effect. In other cases a strict and uniform construction, which gives primacy to the enforcement principle, may mean that conduct which will indirectly reduce the amount that will be available to the Claimant at the conclusion of the proceedings by increasing the claims against the Defendant's assets and thus affecting the Defendant's net asset position will not breach the order. It could thus be said to give insufficient weight to the need for flexibility inherent in the second principle…”

73. In relation to the construction of the freezing order before him, in particular on whether a contractual right to draw down under a loan agreement should be regarded as an “asset” for the purpose of the freezing order, Beatson LJ stated as follows:

“[64] I start with two general propositions about the approach to the construction of a freezing order. The first is that the words of the order must be given their ordinary meaning, and the background, context, and purpose of the order are relevant in determining that ordinary meaning…

[65] It must be remembered that an order is not a contract and (save where the order is a consent order) the principles used in the construction of a contract cannot, as Hildyard J recently stated in Group Seven Ltd v Allied Investment Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 1509 (Ch) at 75, be applied without modification. Because third parties have to be able to rely on the order and to take it at face value, lest they expose themselves to liability, the apparent meaning of words or phrases used should not be qualified by reference to facts which are not common knowledge…

[66] The second general proposition is the third of the principles I set out at 37 above. It is that freezing orders should be strictly construed. As with any order with a penal sanction for breach, such orders must set out clearly what the Defendant must do or not do…

[72] I agree with the judge (judgment, 75) that a man who is entitled to borrow and does so ‘is not ordinarily to be described as disposing of or dealing with an asset’. As Sir Roy Goode has stated, albeit in the context of s 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986, ‘[i]f there is one thing that is still clear in the increasingly complex financial scene . . . it is that a liability is not an asset and that an increase in a liability is not by itself a disposition of an asset’: Principles of Corporate Law, 4th ed, (2011) at 13-133. I also agree with the judge that, while in construing a legal document such as the order the court needs to have regard to the legal meaning where technical legal terminology is used to describe particular concepts, here the terms used - ‘assets’, ‘dispose of’, ‘deal with’, and ‘diminish the value of’ are not specifically legal terminology.

[73] At this stage it is important to recall the need for freezing orders to be strictly construed and the statement of Robert Goff J in Searose Ltd v Seatrain UK Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 806, [1981] 1 WLR 894 at 897, [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 556. He stated that ‘any asset in respect of which an order for a Mareva injunction is sought should be identified with as much precision as is reasonably practicable’. The term ‘choses in action’ was not used in the order and, as the judge stated, the terms ‘dispose of’ and ‘deal with’ suggest some form of transfer or agreement to transfer. The terms used do not naturally convey the exercise of a right to borrow, that is to either receive or cause a third party to receive money in exchange for the generation of a debt. I do not consider that it can be said that the wording has identified all choses in action as falling within the scope of the term ‘asset’ with as much precision as was reasonably practicable.

[74] I am fortified in my conclusion because of the understanding over a decade which those who obtain freezing orders and those who are restrained by them and advise such persons have gained as a result of the decisions in Cantor Index Ltd v Lister and the Anglo Eastern Trust case (and see also the commentary referred to at 88 below). That understanding is that a person who increases his or her indebtedness without providing security is not caught by a standard form freezing order…

[75] ... I have concluded that, in determining the meaning of the term ‘assets’ in a freezing order, account should be taken, as part of the background and context of such orders, of their purpose, in the way that anyone construing any document should take account of the background of it. Where the words used clearly and unequivocally lead to the conclusion that the term ‘asset’ includes that which cannot be the subject of execution, effect must be given to the words. Where they do not, the purpose of such orders will be a significant factor in determining the meaning of the term ‘asset’ in this context, and a pointer against including the particular right under consideration.

[84] Essentially, the Bank’s case is that a bright line is required, which includes all choses in action within the ambit of the term ‘asset’, primarily to remove difficulties of proof against a Defendant who the Claimant has shown poses a risk of dissipating assets. But, while it is open to a Claimant to do this by using clear and unequivocal language, the principle that these orders should be construed strictly means that the Claimant, who has control of the form of the order when he seeks it, but who has not used such language, cannot rely on the court giving the terms of the order a broad meaning. At the interlocutory stage, notwithstanding the demonstrated risk posed by the Defendant, fairness to the Defendant against which no judgment has yet been entered requires the Defendant to know where he, she or it stands, and only clear and unequivocal language strictly construed enables this. Similarly, it is important for a third party who deals with the injuncted Defendant to know whether or not a transaction is in breach of the freezing order: Z Ltd v A-Z [1982] QB 558 at 574, 575 and 582, [1982] 1 All ER 556, [1982] 2 WLR 288 per Lord Denning MR and Eveleigh LJ.

[90] … in the light of the background understanding of the purpose of such orders, the authorities on the point, and the guidance on which practitioners have relied, I have also reached the conclusion that, if the order is to treat rights of this sort as ‘assets’ despite their unamenability to enforcement and the inability to place a value on them, additional words are needed.”

74. Floyd LJ and Rimer LJ delivered short concurring judgments agreeing with the analysis of Beatson LJ.

75. The decision of the English Court of Appeal in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 10) is directly on point here.  Nevertheless, Mr Coleman submits that the analysis of the English Court of Appeal is flawed and it should not be followed.  I am further told that leave to appeal has already been granted by the UK Supreme Court and the appeal is due to be heard in March 2015.

76. I do not share Mr Coleman’s view that the analysis of the English Court of Appeal in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (No 10) is flawed, and I am not convinced that I should not follow it if it were necessary for me to reach a conclusion on this matter in order to dispose of the Variation Summons.  In particular, given the well established proposition that a Mareva injunction does not prohibit a defendant subject to the restraint from increasing or creating new liabilities, it seems to me that it would not be right to seek to get around this position by resorting to fine legal concepts.  If it is thought appropriate to prohibit the defendant from increasing or creating new liabilities, it would be far preferable to do so in express terms leaving no room for doubt.

77. It follows that, on the current state of the authorities, I do not consider that the 1st defendant acted in breach of the Re‑Amended Injunction Order by taking the Loan Facility or giving instructions to draw down under that facility such that the loan proceeds were paid by Wing On directly to the solicitors or former solicitors of the 1st and 13th defendants to settle legal costs and disbursements which had already been incurred.  I do not, however, consider it appropriate for me to express any further view regarding future loan transactions which may, or may not, be entered into by the 1st defendant the full terms of which are not before the court.

Disposition

78. I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Unless Order Summons, save that (i) the reference to the “5th day” in paragraph 1 be changed to the “14th day”, and (ii) the reference to the sum of “HK$147,155,803” in paragraph 1c be changed to “HK$170,461,770.68”.  I also make a costs order nisi that the 1st and 13th defendants shall pay the plaintiffs’ costs of that application to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.

79. I dismiss the Variation Summons.  On the question of costs, I have largely accepted Mr Yu’s submissions, but I do not consider that his client is entitled to any relief under that summons.  I make a costs order nisi that there be no order as to the costs of that application.

80. Lastly, I wish to thank counsel for their assistance rendered to the court.

(Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Coleman SC and Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Benjamin Yu SC and Mr Bernard Man, instructed by Anthony Siu, for the 1st and 13th defendants



[1] The Variation Summons refers to the Order of Ng J as being dated 4 June 2014.  The order was in fact made on 3 June 2014 but sealed on 4 June 2014.

[2] The Mareva injunctions against the 2nd, 10th and 11th defendants were either not continued or discharged by Mr Recorder Pow SC by his order dated 9 August 2013.

[3] In sub-paragraph (c) of the Chan Order, the total amount of cash dividends received by the 13th defendant from the 1st plaintiff (as described at paragraph 58 of the Third Affidavit of Cosimo Borrelli dated 26 October 2013) was stated to be HK$147,155,803.

94180-EN-2014-07-31

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in Provisional Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

_______________________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(in Provisional Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 

and

 
 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING5th Defendant
 COMPANY LIMITED 
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALKLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCKING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

_______________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Saunders in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 29 July 2014
Date of Decision: 29 July 2014
Date of Reasons for Decision: 31 July 2014

________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________________

 

The application

1.  On 25 June 2014, on application by summons (the sanctions summons) by the plaintiffs (collectively “China Metal”) I made an order striking out the defence and counterclaim of the 5th defendant (“Cheung Fat”), and an order that Cheung Fat be debarred from defending the proceedings.

2.  Cheung Fat had countered China Metal’s application with an application to strike out certain paragraphs of the statement of claim, and certain paragraphs of China Metal’s reply that related to Cheung Fat (“the strikeout summons”), on the grounds that those paragraphs disclosed no reasonable cause of action against Cheung Fat, and alternatively that the allegations made against Cheung Fat in those paragraphs were frivolous and vexatious, and amounted to an abuse of process of the court.

3.  I made an order dismissing the strikeout summons.

4.  I made a costs order nisi in favour of China Metal that Cheung Fat must pay China Metal’s costs on both summonses, on an indemnity basis.  No application was made to vary the costs order which was to become absolute on 9 July 2014.

5.  There has been no application for leave to appeal by Cheung Fat against its defence being struck out or the order debarring it from defending the proceedings.

6.  On 9 July 2014, Cheung Fat filed a summons seeking leave to appeal my decision to dismiss the strikeout summons, and for leave to appeal the costs order.  I heard counsel on the application for leave to appeal on 29 July 2014, and refused to leave, with reasons to follow.  These are my reasons.

The grounds of appeal proposed by Cheung Fat

7.  The grounds upon which it is said leave should be given to appeal the dismissal of the strikeout summons by Cheung Fat are twofold. 

8.  First, it is said that in the course of the hearing on 17 June 2014, counsel for Cheung Fat informed the court that he would be making substantive arguments to the court to the point that a plea of fraud and forgery made against Cheung Fat was grossly lacking in particulars.  It would be necessary, counsel said, for directions to be given on the strikeout summons.  Notwithstanding that information the strikeout summons was dismissed out of hand, thereby denying Cheung Fat the right to be heard as a matter of procedural fairness.

9.  Second, it is argued that in any event, the plea of fraud and forgery by China Metal is not supported by adequate particulars, and was accordingly frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the procedure of the court, and should be struck out.

The test to be applied

10.  Mr Hui relies upon Wing Fai Construction Company Ltd (in Compulsory Liquidation) (unreported, 8 December 2009, HCCW 735/2002) and says that the test for granting leave is that an appeal must have a reasonable prospect of success: see ss 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4 (“HCO”). 

11.  Mr Hui says this means that an applicant is required to show more than just an arguable case, but an appeal that has merits and ought to be heard, although he does not have to demonstrate that the appeal will probably succeed.  Further, leave to appeal should be granted if it is in the interests of justice to do so: see s 14AA(4)(b) of the HCO.

12.  Ms Sit relies upon SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 per Le Pichon JA at §17:

“Leave to appeal is not lightly granted. …. The section requires that the court be satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard before granting leave. Reasonable prospects of success involves the notion that the prospect of succeeding must be ‘reasonable’ and therefore more than ‘fanciful’, without having to be ‘probable’.”

13.  There is no real dispute between counsel as to the test to be applied, although they rely upon different authorities.

China Metal’s argument

14.  Ms Sit makes three points:

(1) She says that the debarring order means that the proposed appeal is futile.  Her submission is that as Cheung Fat is debarred from defending the proceedings, it is barred from taking any step in the proceedings which, if successful, would dispose of China Metal’s claims, in whole or in part.  Such a step is an application for leave to appeal the dismissal of the strikeout summons.

(2) She says that there is no basis for Cheung Fat’s allegation that it had no opportunity to be heard before the strikeout summons was dismissed.

(3) She says that in any event, there is no substance to Cheung Fat’s allegation that the pleading is deficient.

Discussion

15.  Mr Hui sought to argue that while the debarring order prevented Cheung Fat from raising a positive defence at a trial, nevertheless Cheung Fat was still entitled to pursue procedural steps, and even at trial to test the credibility of witnesses or the accuracy of documents.  Mr Hui was unable to cite any authority for this proposition, and said that that issue alone, the extent to which a debarring order might operate, was a matter which ought to go before the Court of Appeal.

16.  The submission made by Mr Hui is quite untenable.  It would mean that a defendant, as this defendant is, seriously in default in procedural steps in the action, could continue to raise procedural barriers to a plaintiff, unreasonably delaying the timely dispatch of the action, being only required to remain silent and inactive when the matter ultimately came on for trial.  To so hold would entirely defeat the purpose of an unless order that has the consequence of debarring a defendant from defending.

17.  Ms Sit referred me to the decision in Maes Finance Ltd v Shriskantharaja & Anor (unreported, 18 March 1998, CA, UK).  In that case the second defendant had failed to comply with four orders for discovery, and finally, on 12 November 1996, an unless order was made that she must produce the documents within 14 days, or be debarred altogether from defending the action.  The court correctly identified that the debarring order took effect without any further order of the court upon the second defendant’s failure to disclose the documents.  Judgment was entered following formal proof by affidavit and the second defendant appealed that order, first to the High Court.  When the matter came before the Court of Appeal, Hutchison LJ, in whose judgment Thorpe LJ agreed, said this:

“What is plain in my judgment is that so long as the second defendant remained debarred from defending, that is to say, so long as the order of 12 November 1996 remains in force, there was no effective action which is the second defendant could take. This appeal, as constituted, was bound to fail.”

18.  I respectfully agree with Court of Appeal.  It is plain from the decision that once an order of debarring a defendant from defending proceedings has been made it is no longer open to that defendant to take any step in the course of defending the proceedings.  Mr Hui was unable to persuade me to hold against the proposition that a summons to strike out proceedings under Order 18, rule 19, is a step taken in the course of defending the proceedings.  Thus, Cheung Fat is not, by reason of the debarring order, permitted to pursue the strikeout summons.

19.  I recognise that in Maes Finance the order was an order “debarring the second defendant altogether from defending the action”, (my emphasis), where is the order made in the present case is simply an order debarring Cheung Fat from defending the action.  I am satisfied that the word “altogether” adds nothing to the scope of the debarring order.

20.  I accept Ms Sit’s submission that the debarring order means that any appeal against the decision on the strikeout summons is futile. Even if I was wrong to deal with the strikeout summons in the manner in which I did, and it was restored, Cheung Fat could not proceed in the face of the debarring order.

21.  In so holding I am conscious of the fact that it is not open to China Metal simply to proceed to enter either judgment by default or to apply for summary judgment.  A judgment by default will not be open, because Cheung Fat is not in default of giving notice of intention to defend.  As an issue of forgery or fraud has been raised (albeit, as will be seen, in China Metal’s Reply), summary judgment will not be open: see Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co v Harmutty & Ors [2009] 3 HKLRD 94 CA.  It will be necessary for China Metal, in due course, to prove its claim against Cheung Fat, although that proof may only need to be a formal proof.

22.  It is of note that the Court of Appeal in Maes Finance left open the opportunity to the 2nd defendant to take steps to challenge the debarring order (even though the 2nd defendant was by that time technically out of time to challenge the debarring order).  It must be right that a debarring order itself can be subject to appeal if appropriate grounds can be established entitling the party subject to the debarring order to leave to appeal. 

23.  But in the absence of an appeal against that order, the order debarring Cheung Fat from defending must itself operate to debar it from seeking leave to appeal any other, quite separate, orders that may have been made.  It is significant that it is not the debarring order made on China Metal’s application, but a quite separate order, made on Cheung Fat’s application, for which leave to appeal is sought.

24.  Ms Sit’s first submission alone is sufficient to dispose of the application for leave to appeal.  I shall deal with the other grounds out of courtesy to Mr Hui’s argument.

Failure to allow Cheung Fat to be heard

25.  The decision in respect of which leave to appeal is sought was a decision made as a result of the exercise of the court’s discretion.  It is trite law that it is only where a decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible and is in fact plainly wrong that an appeal court will interfere in the exercise of discretion: see e.g. RK v YS (unreported, 1 November 2012, HCMP 1969/2012, CA, per Kwan JA).

26.  Cheung Fat’s strikeout summons was based upon two grounds.  The first was that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed by the statement of claim.  The second was that the allegations in the statement of claim, being lacking in particulars, were frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. 

27.  The strikeout summons was filed on 12 June 2014, at the same time as an affidavit, described in my decision of 25 June 2014 as Ou 3rd, was filed.  The strikeout summons was listed for hearing on the same day as China Metal’s sanctions summons.  The strikeout summons was marked for 15 minutes.

28.  I accept Ms Sit’s submission that it does not necessarily follow that the first hearing of a summons, even one marked for only 15 minutes, is merely a directions hearing, and that the substantive hearing will necessarily be deferred for a later hearing. 

29.  She correctly says that the ethos of CJR, underscored by the express duty of the court to actively manage cases and decide promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly dispose summarily of others; see Order 1A, rule 4(2)(c) of the Rules of the High Court, entitles the court in appropriate situations to deal with issues summarily, particularly interlocutory issues.

30.  It is not necessary for me to set out here the sorry tale of extensive procedural delay on the part of Cheung Fat in this action.  The procedural history is set out at §§14‑43 of my decision of 25 June 2014.  It is now argued that the hearing of the strikeout summons on 17 June 2014, should have been treated as a directions hearing, thereby enabling Cheung Fat to file appropriate affidavits in support of the contention that the allegations in the statement of claim were frivolous and vexatious and amounted to an abuse of process. 

31.  The statement of claim is dated 4 October 2013.  There is no evidence before me as to the date of service, but Cheung Fat had been able to file a defence and counterclaim as long ago as 20 December 2013.  But it waited until 9 June 2014 to file the strikeout summons.

32.  Cheung Fat has had nearly 6 months in which to prepare the strikeout summons and any affidavits that might be needed in support, There was simply no need to give any further time to the hearing of the summons.  Three affirmations had been filed by Mr Ou over that 6 month period, and any one of them could have contained any information that was intended to be relied upon in support of the strikeout application.

33.  In the whole of the circumstances I am driven to the conclusion that the late filing of the strikeout application, unsupported by any affirmation, accompanied by a desire to delay the hearing of the strikeout summons for the filing of yet more affirmations, was yet another carefully considered step in the process by which Cheung Fat intended to further delay the progress of these proceedings.

34.  In those circumstances I am satisfied that it cannot be contended that the exercise of the discretion undertaken by the court in managing the proceedings and summarily disposing of the strikeout application can be argued to be so wrong that it might meet the test set out in §25 above.

Is China Metal’s plea arguably deficient

35.  The argument advanced is that China Metal’s plea of fraud and forgery is not supported by adequate particulars and evidence.  Mr Hui correctly sets out in his skeleton the principles laid down by Lord Millett in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England(No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at §§183‑190. 

36.  However, in fact, the plea in the statement of claim is not one of fraud and forgery against Cheung Fat, a fact that was accepted by Mr Hui in oral submissions.  Instead, China Metal’s claim against Cheung Fat is based upon receipt of money by Cheung Fat, knowing of the 1st defendant’s (Mr Chan’s) breach of fiduciary duty. 

37.  The case pleaded against Mr Chan is that he procured Central Steel to pay large sums to Cheung Fat without any genuine or commercial purpose to the benefit of China Metal.  The plea is one of breach of fiduciary duty, not a plea of forgery or fraud. 

38.  Cheung Fat does not dispute that it was in beneficial receipt of the sums so paid.  If Cheung Fat had sufficient knowledge of the facts surrounding the misapplication of China Metal’s property, to be inferred, Ms Sit submits, by reason of the matters pleaded in the statement of claim, section C, then Cheung Fat would be liable for knowing receipt.  I accept Ms Sit’s submission that all the necessary constituents of the cause of action against Cheung Fat have been pleaded.

39.  There was no plea by China Metal in the statement of claim of fraud or forgery.  The issue of fraud or forgery is an issue that was raised by Cheung Fat’s allegation in the defence that the transactions were genuine.  That necessitated a Reply by China Metal, and in that Reply (§§24‑26) China Metal set out the particulars, identifying invoices relied upon by Cheung Fat, as false.

40.  I accept Ms Sit’s submission that the issue of fraud or forgery concerning the agreements and invoices relied upon by Cheung Fat arises only from the defence and counterclaim filed by Cheung Fat, and that the Reply by China Metal is sufficiently clear and has a proper factual basis.

41.  I am accordingly satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of an appeal against the dismissal of the strikeout application.  Even if Cheung Fat were not barred from defending, I would have declined leave to appeal against the dismissal of the strikeout application.

The costs order on the dismissal of the strikeout summons

42.  Mr Hui accepted that if there was no basis upon which leave to appeal the dismissal of the strikeout summons could be given, then there was no basis upon which he could argue that the indemnity costs order nisi made could be challenged.  The order is accordingly made absolute.

Costs

43.  I heard counsel as to costs.  Mr Hui sought to argue that the debarring point was an obscure point which was not obvious and hence the application was made.  I reject that proposition.  It was immediately plain to me as soon as I received the summons for leave to appeal that the order debarring Cheung Fat from defending the proceedings would stand in its way. Quite sensibly, Ms Sit made it her best and first point. 

44.  Cheung Fat, having been debarred from defending, ought not to have made this application.  It was doomed to failure from the start.  This is not the ordinary situation of an unsuccessful application which would attract costs on a party and party basis. 

45.  There will be an order absolute that Cheung Fat must pay China Metal’s costs of the application for leave to appeal on an indemnity basis.

(John Saunders)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr John Hui, instructed by Laracy & Co, for the 5th defendant

93703-EN-2014-06-25

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

_______________________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED
(in Provisional Liquidation)
1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALKLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCKING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant
_______________________________
Before:Deputy High Court Judge Saunders in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 17 June 2014
Date of Decision: 25 June 2014

_______________________

D E C I S I O N

_______________________

The applications

1. The plaintiffs (collectively China Metal) seek an order striking out the defence and counterclaim of the 5th defendant (Cheung Fat) and judgment against Cheung Fat, for non‑compliance with an unless order made following two disclosure orders made in conjunction with a Mareva injunction (the sanction summons). 

2. Cheung Fat counters that summons with an application for relief from sanction under Order 2, rule 4 of the Rules of the High Court, in the event of being found in breach of a subsequent disclosure order which encompassed the first disclosure orders and extended them, (the relief summons).  Cheung Fat, by a second summons, (the strikeout summons) seeks an order that the statement of claim, in so far as certain paragraphs concern or relate to it, be struck out on the grounds that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against Cheung Fat.  In the alternative it is argued that, as against Cheung Fat, the allegations are frivolous and vexatious, and amount to an abuse of process of the court.  The strikeout summons further seeks the discharge or variation of the disclosure order.

The factual allegations

3. In order to properly understand the circumstances in which these applications must be considered I now summarise the principle facts alleged by China Metal, and Cheung Fat’s response to those facts.

4. The 1st plaintiff (China Metal Recycling) is a Cayman Islands company that is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. According to its 2009 annual report HK$1,695 million was raised by the public offering of its shares.  The 2010 report showed that the issue of a further 90 million new shares in the company raised a further HK$691 million. A total of HK$2,386 million had been raised from the public by the promoters of this company.

5. The 2nd plaintiff (Central Steel) is a wholly owned subsidiary of China Metal, and is incorporated in Macau SAR.

6. In January 2013, at its own request, trading in China Metal Recycling shares was suspended.  On 26 July 2013, upon a petition presented by the Securities in Futures Commission (SFC) provisional liquidators were appointed in respect of both plaintiffs.

7. The 1st defendant (Mr Chun) was at all material times the Chairman of the Board of Directors of China Metal Recycling and its chief executive officer.

8. Cheung Fat is a Hong Kong company wholly owned by a Ms Zhong Liue who is resident in Guangzhou, PRC.  Cheung Fat admits in its defence that it is a supplier of scrap metal to Central Steel and says that the scrap metal supply business was mainly handled and conducted by Ms Zhong and a Mr Frank Lv.

9. The statement of claim alleges that between 30 June 2013 and 29 July 2013, immediately prior to the appointment of the provisional liquidators, Mr Chun authorised the remittance of payments totalling HK$1,215 million to Cheung Fat without supporting documents or legitimate commercial purposes.  It is alleged that these payments were made by Mr Chun in breach of his fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs and that the payments were not for any genuine or legitimate commercial purpose or for the benefit of the plaintiffs. 

10. In its defence, filed on 20 December 2013, Cheung Fat admits that between 30 June 2013 and 29 July 2013, Central Steel paid a total sum of RMB782,300,000 and US$7,100,000 (HK$1,033 million) to Cheung Fat.  It denies that the payments were without legitimate commercial purpose and says that they were made pursuant to a series of scrap metal contracts between Cheung Fat and Central Steel, details of which are set out in a schedule to the Defence.  The schedule comprises brief details showing the date on which amounts were paid to Cheung Fat by Central Steel, the amount, the currency, the contract numbers, the date of invoices, the amount invoiced, the invoice number, and the invoiced currency.

11. The evidence from the China Metal will be that the contract numbers set out in schedule were not numbers that had ever been issued or used by either of the plaintiffs.  China Metal will say that any documentation that purports to support the information in the schedule is false or a forgery.

12. In China Metal’s Reply, it is said that Cheung Fat’s 2011/2012 Hong Kong Profits Tax Return form dated 28 August 2012, signed by Ms Zhong on behalf of Cheung Fat, stated that Cheung Fat was then a dormant company.  Cheung Fat has not filed a rejoinder denying this fact.

13. In simple terms, the case for the plaintiffs is that Mr Chun stripped the public company of a very substantial sum of money by the use of forged or false documentation including contracts, invoices, packing lists, and shipping documents.  The plaintiffs say, which is denied that, through a web of individuals and entities, Mr Chun is closely connected with Cheung Fat.

The procedural history

14. In order to properly understand the nature of the alleged non‑compliance with the disclosure order it is necessary to set out the procedural history.

15. On 30 July 2013, the Mareva injunction and first disclosure order was made by Tong J.  The restriction on the disposal of assets was in respect of some HK$1,682 million.  The order contained the following disclosure provisions:

2.1 The 1st to 12th Defendants must inform the Plaintiffs in writing, within 48 hours of service of the order of all their assets of an individual value of $50,000 or more, whether inside or outside Hong Kong, whether in its own name or not, and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets.

2.2 In particular (Cheung Fat) must inform the Plaintiffs in writing within 48 hours of service of this order on it of the current location of all portions of the sums totalling HK$680,299,270 which was received by (Cheung Fat) in its bank account held with the Bank of China (Guangzhou Branch) and Industrial Commercial Bank of China (Guangzhou Branch) between 15 July 2013 and 26 July 2013.”

16. On 31 July 2013, the orders were served on Cheung Fat.

17. On 23 August 2013, Cheung Fat filed an acknowledgement of service of the writ through its solicitors.

18. On 29 August 2013, China Metal’s solicitors complained by letter to Cheung Fat’s solicitors of the failure to comply with the disclosure obligations, and demanded compliance forthwith.

19. On 2 September 2013, Cheung Fat’s solicitors replied stating that they were taking instructions.

20. On 4 October 2013, the statement of claim was filed.

21. On 13 December 2013, Anthony Chan J granted disclosure orders against Cheung Fat’s bankers pursuant to section 21 Evidence Ordinance.  The bank accounts listed were those at HSBC, Bank of China Hong Kong, and Bank of China Ltd, Guangzhou KFC Branch (BoC (G)).

22. On 20 December 2013, Cheung Fat filed its defence and counterclaim.

23. On 5 March 2014, eight months after the Mareva injunction and the first disclosure order were made, China Metal filed a summons for a further disclosure order against Cheung Fat, and an unless order if the original and further disclosure orders were not complied with (the unless order summons).  The application for further disclosure repeated the first disclosure requirements set out in §15 above and added the following requirement:

“In the event that any assets or any part of the sums had been disposed of, incumbent or otherwise dealt with between 30 July 2013 and the date on which the said affidavit or affirmation is sworn, providing full particulars of the circumstances in which such dealings took place (including without limitation the identities and contact details of the transferor/charger and it transferee/chargee of all such assets, the date of each transfer/charge, the consideration paid in respect of such transfer/charge and its current whereabouts, and the reason(s) underlying the making of each transfer/charge);”

24. On the same day, China Metal’s solicitors informed Cheung Fat’s solicitors that they intended to seek the unless order at a hearing on 13 March 2014.

25. On 13 March 2014, the unless order summons came before DHCJ Tam SC.  The summons did not proceed to resolution on that day.  Instead, leave was given to Cheung Fat to file opposition evidence within 10 days, on the basis that Cheung Fat was in the process of seeking to comply with the first disclosure order.

26. On 14 March 2014, China Metal’s solicitors wrote to Cheung Fat’s solicitors seeking a clear indication as to when Cheung Fat would comply with the first disclosure order.

27. On 17 March 2014, Cheung Fat’s solicitors replied stating their client would require a further six weeks to comply.  No explanation was offered by Cheung Fat as to why, after over eight months since the first disclosure order was originally made, a further six weeks was still required.

28. On 24 March 2014, the 1st affirmation (Ou 1st) of a Mr Ou Yongzhao (Mr Ou) was filed by Cheung Fat.  In that affidavit Mr Ou said that he was “a manager in the Administrative Department of Zhongshan City Cheung Fat Metal Recycling Company Limited” and that  he was authorised by Cheung Fat to make the information.  The precise relationship between that company and Cheung Fat was not set out.  There was no explanation as to why the affirmation should not have been made by either Ms Zhong or Mr Lv, who, according to the defence, “mainly handled and conducted” Cheung Fat’s scrap metal supply business”[1].

29. The affirmation made no disclosure in accordance with the requirements of the first disclosure order other than asserting that the monies received by Cheung Fat from China Metal were all normal transaction payments, and commenting upon what Cheung Fat perceived as the difficulties it faced in complying with the disclosure requirement.  Mr Ou said that Cheung Fat would use its best endeavours to solve issues of human resources and costs so as to be able to comply with the disclosure obligation as quickly as possible.

30. On 1 April 2014, Cheung Fat issued a summons to discharge the first disclosure order.  That application was made 9 months after the making of the first disclosure order.

31. On 7 April 2014, the substantive hearing of the unless order summons took place before Judge Tam SC.  Following protracted argument, the judge exercised her discretion to make the unless order, allowing until the close of business on 14 April 2014, for compliance, in default of which the sanction would be for the defence and counterclaim to be struck out.  The judge ordered further disclosure, (the second disclosure order), to be made within the same time limit, increasing the amount in the §2.2 of the order to HK$1,682,198,420 (see §15 above).

32. The judge was satisfied that there had been non‑compliance with the first disclosure order.  She said:

“In particular, I am conscious of the fact that the compliance for the existing disclosure orders have been outstanding for over 8 months, with no apparent attempt made to comply with them, nor any legitimate excuse, nor any genuine steps to take legal advice on whether and how to comply with them. I am driven to conclude from the evidence and the objective facts that non-compliance was deliberate, contumelious and without due cause.”

33. It is to be noted that that finding was made notwithstanding Ou 1st that had been filed for Cheung Fat.  It follows that the judge was not satisfied with the extent of the disclosure contained in Ou 1st.  No challenge by way of appeal was made against that finding, or against the second disclosure order.

34. On 9 April 2014, Cheung Fat’s summons to discharge the first disclosure order was withdrawn.

35. On 14 April 2014, the last day for compliance with the second disclosure orders made on the unless summons, Cheung Fat filed a second affirmation by Mr Ou (Ou 2nd) in purported compliance with the orders made on the unless summons.  That affirmation showed that on Friday, 11 April 2014, letters, addressed to Cheung Fat’s bankers, were signed.  The letters, for the first time, requested copies of bank statements of all accounts maintained with the banks covering the period since July 2013, and authorising Cheung Fat’s solicitors to collect the statements.  On Monday, 14 April 2014, the last day for complying with the disclosure orders made on the unless summons, the solicitors sent the request for copies of the bank statements to the relevant banks.  There was no explanation as to why the bank statements had not been requested immediately after the making of the first disclosure order nine months earlier.

36. The affirmation further exhibited a letter addressed to Cheung Fat’s suppliers, who were unidentified, informing them that Cheung Fat was required by the Mareva injunction and disclosure order to disclose information relating to commercial transactions with the suppliers. Although there was nothing in the letter to which the suppliers might be required to respond, the letter sought a prompt response from the suppliers.

37. On 30 April 2014, the sanction summons, now before me, was filed.  The sanction summons was listed to be heard on 28 May 2014.  On the same day, China Metal’s solicitors wrote to Cheung Fat’s solicitors setting out what they considered to be material deficiencies in the disclosure contained in Ou 2nd.  There has been no response to that letter.

38. On 23 May 2014, China Metal’s counsel’s skeleton argument for the sanction summons was filed.  On that day, the Court notified the parties that the hearing of the sanction summons, which was fixed before L Chan J on 28 May 2014, was vacated by the judge because the 30 minutes that had been allocated was not sufficient time in which the matter could be properly heard.  The parties were asked to refix the hearing date.

39. On 26 May 2014, the solicitors for China Metal informed Cheung Fat’s solicitors that they would attend the Deputy Clerk of Court (Civil) on 29 May 2014, to refix the hearing.

40. On 28 May 2014, Cheung Fat’s solicitors wrote to the solicitors for China Metal, copying the letter to the court, with proposed directions for the sanction summons and seeking time to file evidence in opposition.

41. On 29 May 2014, by letter, China Metal’s solicitors rejected the proposed directions.  The directions sought would have permitted Cheung Fat 28 days to file affirmations in opposition, a further 14 days for China Metal to reply, and that the sanction summons be fixed, in accordance with counsel’s diaries, not earlier than 23 July 2014.  If acceded to by China Metal, the hearing of the sanction summons, and potentially the time available for compliance with the disclosure summons would have been extended, having regard to the requirement to follow counsel’s diaries, for at least a year from the making of the first disclosure order, and the time for compliance with the second disclosure order, from 7 days to over three months, if not longer.  It is not surprising at all that China Metal rejected the proposed directions.  Cheung Fat made no attempt at all to seek such directions from the court.

42. On 30 May 2014, the hearing of the sanction summons was fixed to be heard by me on 17 June 2014.

43. On 12 June 2014, five days, (two working days) before the hearing of the sanction summons, Cheung Fat filed a third affirmation by Mr Ou, (Ou 3rd), made on that day, in purported compliance with the disclosure order.  At the same time, the relief summons and the strikeout summons were filed by Cheung Fat.  In the strikeout summons an order was also sought reducing the amount frozen by the Mareva injunction to HK$138 million and the discharge of the first disclosure order.  Discharge of the second disclosure obligation pursuant to the unless order made by Judge Tam SC was also sought.

The state of play on 17 June 2014

44. Ms Sit was quite entitled to summarise the extent of the time taken by Cheung Fat to purport to comply with the disclosure orders in the following way:

- over 10 months since the service of the Mareva injunction and disclosure orders;

- 15 weeks since the unless order summons was filed;

- 10 weeks since the unless order was made;

- 9 weeks since purported compliance in Ou 2nd;

- 7 weeks since the filing of the striking out summons and the China Metal's solicitors statement to Cheung Fat’s solicitors of the areas in which the disclosure had been inadequate; and

- 2.5 weeks since the hearing date for the strikeout summons was refixed.

These periods must be viewed in the light of the fact that the original requirement to make disclosure was within 48 hours of the service of the order (31 July 2013), and the requirement of the unless order made on 7 April 2014, which was to make disclosure within 7 days, by 14 April 2014.

The standard of disclosure required

45. The first issue that must be determined is whether or not Cheung Fat is in non-compliance with the unless order. 

46. First, the order must be clear.  There was no suggestion that the order was not in any way clear.

47. The second issue that arises is the extent, or standard, with which the order must be complied.  Ms Sit argued that the standard by which disclosure must be judged in the circumstances of a disclosure order coupled with a Mareva injunction was much higher than that required for discovery of documents.  Mr Hui sought to apply the same standard in this case as applies in discovery of documents.

48. In relation to discovery of documents the standard required has been set out in Realkredit Danmark A/S (a body corporate) & Ors v York Montague Ltd & Ors (Unreported, [1998] All ER (D) 638), by Tuckey LJ, after first dealing with the need for precision in the order, in the following terms:

“There was nothing unclear about the order made in this case, in that it required service of a list of documents. But a list was served so, prima facie, the order was complied with. Interestingly there is no reported case of an action being struck out as a result of the list being incomplete. But there is in the much litigated field of Further and Better Particulars where, in Reiss v Woolf [1952] 2 QB 557, pages 559-560, the Court of Appeal approved a passage from the judgment of Devlin J who said:

‘So construed, ‘default’ refers to default on the delivery of the document within the specified time.  I do not, of course, mean that any document with writing on it will do.  It must be a document made in good faith and which can fairly be entitled ‘particulars’.  It must not be illusory; ... That is the test, in my judgment, and not as the plaintiff contends, whether each demand for particulars has been substantially met.’”

49. Tuckey LJ went on to say that a party dissatisfied with a list, even a list supplied consequent upon an unless order, would ventilate his complaints within the context of an application for further and better list, or an affidavit verifying the list or specific discovery.  Ms Sit reminded me that these powers in respect of discovery contained in O. 24, where there is an inadequate list, have no equivalent in respect of the requirement for disclosure under a disclosure order contained within a Mareva injunction. Consequently, she argued, a much higher threshold must be imposed upon a party required to make disclosure.  I note that, in a similar vein, the power to strikeout proceedings under  O. 18 r. 19, where pleadings may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of an action or are otherwise an abuse of the process of court, provides the Court with a remedy is a party considers that the other party is in default of an order for further and better particulars.  That remedy is similar to the remedy in O. 24.

50. I accept that submission.  The whole purpose of Mareva injunctions and consequent disclosure orders is to protect and secure assets in order to ensure that a judgment obtained in litigation will not go unsatisfied.  That is quite a different situation from the discovery situation where the purpose of discovery is to ensure that each party is properly informed of the documents the other party may have in relation to the case and to assist the court in resolving issues at trial.  It is quite different from the requirement for proper pleadings which are necessary in order that a party may know the case it must face: see Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering Wheelock Marden & Co Ltd [1994] 2 HKC 264 at 269.

51. If there is to be compliance with a Mareva order disclosure provision it must be a virtually complete compliance.  In the event that there is any limitation in the compliance that limitation must be properly and satisfactorily explained to the court in order that the court may be sure that that limitation arises for genuine reasons.  It is appropriate to apply Tuckey JA’s expression: the disclosure must be made in good faith and disclosure of an extent that can fairly be judged to be full disclosure.  It must not be illusory.

Has there been non-compliance

52. It is not open to Cheung Fat to contend that Ou 1st constitutes compliance with either disclosure order.  Ou 1st has been found not to constitute compliance.

53. In respect of Ou 2nd and Ou 3rd, a number of complaints can be raised.  These include the following:

54. The whole of the relevant bank statements have still not been disclosed.  In respect of its bank accounts, which are alleged to be Cheung Fat’s only assets, only selected details are given based upon Mr Ou’s recollection and selected bank statements.

55. Mr Ou says there are only a very small quantity of bank statements in Cheung Fats possession.  It was not until 14 April 2014, the date for compliance with the unless order, that the banks were formally requested to supply copies of the bank statements.  It is no answer to the requirement of disclosure to say, after such a long period, that Cheung Fat does not have the statements.

56. In Ou 3rd, bank statements obtained from HSBC and the Bank of East Asia (BEA) were finally disclosed.  The BEA statements were provided to Cheung Fat on 23 April 2014, but were not disclosed until 12 June 2014 in Ou 3rd.  The HSBC statements were provided on 10 June 2014, and again not disclosed until 12 June 2014.

57. In Ou 3rd it is asserted that a request for bank statements from BoC (G) was sent to Bank of China Hong Kong who directed that it was to be referred to BoC (G).  I was told from the bar, without any evidence whatsoever to support the assertion, that the Bank of China Hong Kong have informed Cheung Fat’s solicitors that BoC (G) takes the view that it does not have to comply with an order from a Hong Kong court.

58. Notwithstanding Cheung Fat’s admission that it had received very substantial sums from Central Steel over a very short period in the middle of 2013, no attempt is made to provide company books of account recording the receipt of those sums or how they were dealt with.  It is simply incredible that a company receiving such very substantial sums of money would not have proper books of account to record the passage of funds that it has handled.  It is remarkable that a company whose most recent tax return indicates that it is a “dormant company” should, in the space of just one month, have conducted transactions entitling it to payments in excess of HK$1 billion. If it were dormant, then the books would have to be reconstituted only in respect of the very short period during which the payments were apparently received and then distributed.

59. The mere assertion that the funds received have been used to pay suppliers is plainly an insufficient answer to the disclosure requirement.  I have no doubt at all that Cheung Fat would be endeavouring to operate its business on a profitable basis, and consequently the whole of the funds received from China Metal is highly unlikely to have gone to suppliers.  At the very least, Cheung Fat has failed in its obligation to disclose what has happened to that portion of received funds which have not been used to pay suppliers.

The issue of confidentiality:

60. An essential part of the disclosure orders was the tracing requirement set out in §23 above.  The extent of the requirement for tracing was extended in the second disclosure order.

61. In Ou 2nd Cheung Fat adopts the position that it is unable to make disclosure in respect of the monies received from China Metal because those monies were used for payment for goods to suppliers, and that Cheung Fat owes a duty of confidentiality to those suppliers.  In Ou 3rd it is asserted that the suppliers have not responded to signify their agreement to disclosure.  Concern is expressed that China Metal will harass the suppliers by unreasonable and oppressive means.

62. Mr Hui did not cite any authority for the proposition that in the ordinary course of business of a usual sale and purchase, a purchaser of goods owes a duty of confidentiality of the identity of the supplier of those goods.  It is right of course that the list of suppliers will be confidential to Cheung Fat, but that is no answer to the requirement that the list should be disclosed.  No documentation, not even an invoice from a supplier, was produced demonstrating the existence of any sort of confidentiality agreement between parties.

63. In the absence of any evidence of any agreement as to confidentiality between Cheung Fat and its suppliers, confidentiality is no basis upon which to refuse disclosure.  Even if there was a confidentiality agreement, that would not save Cheung Fat from the disclosure requirement.  Mr Hui did not attempt to suggest that a confidentiality requirement would override court ordered disclosure.  Finally, any concern that Cheung Fat might have about China Metal’s use of the information is properly protected by the implied undertaking that documents provided during disclosure cannot be used for any other purpose.

Conclusion as to compliance with the unless order

64. Although a list of documents on discovery which might be subject to substantial criticism as to adequacy still constitutes a list and therefore potentially an answer to an unless order, the same cannot be said of the three Ou affirmations in answer to the disclosure requirements.

65. Ou 1st was plainly late, and Cheung Fat did not even attempt to suggest that it might have met the disclosure obligations.  Ou 2nd was filed at the last minute, and again, Cheung Fat does not attempt to suggest that it might have met the disclosure obligation.  If it had, there would have been no need to file Ou 3rd, which goes some way to meeting the disclosure obligation.  In Ou 3rd, partial disclosure is made, but the essential bank statements, into which the funds were received by Cheung Fat, the BoC (G) account, remain undisclosed.  In that affirmation a deliberate decision not to disclose on the basis of confidentiality is asserted.

66. Cheung Fat has had 10 months in which to either obtain the bank statements from BoC (G), or to produce its company books, or if the books are missing to have accountants reconstruct them.  The only explanation offered for the absence of the bank statements, which were only sought from the bank on the last day for compliance with the unless order, is an unsubstantiated assertion from the bar that BoC (G) does not consider itself bound by a Hong Kong court order.  The fallacy of the assertion lies in the fact that it is not a court order that requires BoC (G) to produce a statements, but an instruction from its own client.  No proper explanation is offered as to why the bank should not observe an instruction from its own client.

67. In any event, BoC (G) is a branch of a Hong Kong bank, and that bank, being a Hong Kong bank, in Hong Kong, must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts.  BoC Hong Kong cannot hide from the consequences of a court order or the instruction of its client on the basis that its subsidiary branch is not resident in Hong Kong.

68. Cheung Fat has had more than enough time to seek from BoC (G) the relevant statements.  If faced with a refusal based upon the assertion that BoC (G) is not bound by the Hong Kong order, has had more than enough time to take steps in Hong Kong against the Hong Kong parent company of the bank holding the statements to compel production of the statements.

69. I have rejected confidentiality as a basis for non-compliance with the disclosure orders.  In this case it is plain that Cheung Fat has made a considered and deliberate decision to rely upon confidentiality is a reason for nondisclosure.

70. In Realkredit, Tuckey JA said:

“Both counsel conceded, rightly in my judgment, that a court could infer the lack of good faith where it was obvious from patent deficiencies in the list that who had been prepared in apparent but not real compliance with the obligation to give discovery.”

71. I am satisfied from the procedural history of this matter, and from the contents, or rather the lack of content, of Mr Ou’s affirmations that Cheung Fat has set out, in bad faith, deliberately and cynically to frustrate the Mareva injunction disclosure orders and to avoid disclosing the required information.  The deficiencies in this disclosure are monumental.  A patently false explanation is offered for the failure to disclose the most important of the relevant bank accounts.  The contention that the documents required to make disclosure are confidential is quite unsupported by any evidence.  When faced with the sanctions summons, directions were sought solely for the purpose of further delaying the requirement to meet the order.

72. I am satisfied that no real or proper attempt has been made by Cheung Fat to meet the disclosure obligation.  It cannot even be argued that there has been substantial compliance with the disclosure obligation.

Does the disclosure by the bankers save the day?

73. As is seen from the chronology, on 13 October 2013, in the presence of Cheung Fat’s solicitors, Anthony Chan J granted disclosure orders against Cheung Fat’s bankers.  Those disclosure orders have successfully provided China Metal with some of the relevant bank statements.  Mr Hui sought to argue that that disclosure met Cheung Fat’s obligations.

74. The fact that China Metal has obtained those bank statements does not, in my view, assist Cheung Fat. 

75. First, the obligation is on Cheung Fat to make the disclosure.  If it happens that by some other means, the beneficiary of the disclosure order learns some of the information required to be disclosed, that cannot discharge the obligation to make disclosure.  It may be that the mere making of disclosure pursuant to the order against the party, might constitute powerful evidence which may be deployed against that party at trial.  It may be that the information obtained from some other source will permit a serious attack on the credibility of the disclosing party if the disclosure may be shown to be false or incomplete.

76. Second, even if all of the bank statements had been supplied under the bankers disclosure they would not, alone, be sufficient to meet the tracing provisions because while the bank statements might disclose money passing out of the accounts the statements would not necessarily disclose to which other accounts or persons the money was paid.

77. In any event, in the absence of the BoC (G) bank statements, the orders against the bankers have not succeeded in providing China Metal with all of the information it was entitled to receive from Cheung Fat by way of disclosure.  The disclosure remains seriously incomplete.

Relief from the consequence of breach of the unless order

78. The law is clear that where a party fails to comply with an order, any sanction for failure to comply imposed by the order takes effect: O.2, r. 4; see also Daimler AG v Leiduck [2012] HKLRD 119 (CA) at §44, and Marcan Shipping (London) Ltd v Kefalas & Anor [2007] 1 WLR 1864 CA.  The consequence is that on 14 April 2014, the sanction took effect, and unless Cheung Fat obtains relief from the sanction under Order 2, rule 4, the sanction has effect.  That order requires that relief be obtained within 14 days of the failure.

79. Mr Hui, in my view incorrectly, described the summons seeking relief as being a summons “to oppose” China Metal’s judgment application.  It is not an opposition summons.  It is an application for relief from a sanction that had taken effect.

80. The unless order required that disclosure be made by 14 April 2014.  I have found that that disclosure was not made and that consequently Cheung Fat was in breach of the order.  The failure does not occur upon a finding by the court that there has been a failure.  The finding merely recognises the situation as it was on 14 April 2014.  Cheung Fat was in breach of the order of 40 in April 2040.

81. The decision not to make full disclosure based upon the confidentiality contention was plainly a considered and deliberate decision.  It was a decision not to make full disclosure.  Where a party knows that the disclosure will not meet the requirements of an unless order it is incumbent upon that party to immediately apply for relief, and obtain that relief before it is in default of the order.  A party cannot and should not wait and see whether or not steps are taken to enforce the sanction contained in the unless order and only then seek relief. 

82. Under O. 2, r. 4, the relief must be sought and obtained within 14 days of the failure.  Accordingly, relief from the consequences of the breach of the unless order had to be sought and obtained on before 28 April 2014.  It was not until 12 June 2014, six weeks after the breach, and only five days before the hearing of the sanctions summons, that the relief summons was filed.  This is yet a further example of the attempts by Cheung Fat to continually stretch the time within which it must take any steps.

83. No application for an extension of time to seek relief was sought by Cheung Fat, either by way of summons, or orally at the hearing.  The application for relief is out of time. But the substance of the application is of greater significance, and, although it is open to me to refuse relief simply because of the delay, I do not decide the matter on time point.

84. The basis for granting relief from sanctions

85. In determining whether or not court should grant relief from sanctions the court must, pursuant to O. 4 r 5, consider all the circumstances including the ten matters set out in that rule.  It is proper also to have regard the following seven matters set out in Hytec Information Systems Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1666 (CA):

- An unless order was an order of last resort, not made unless there was a history of failure to comply with other orders.  It was the party’s last chance to put its case in order.

- Because it was the last chance, a failure to comply would ordinarily result in sanctions being imposed.

- The sanction was a necessary forensic weapon which the broader interests of the administration of justice required to be deployed unless the most compelling arguments were advanced to exhilarate the failure.

- It seemed axiomatic that if a party intentionally flouted the order he could expect no mercy.

- A sufficient exoneration will almost invariably require that he satisfied the court that something beyond his control had caused the failure.

- The judge would exercise his judicial discretion whether to excuse the failure in the circumstances of each case on its own merits, at the core of which was service to justice.

- The interest of justice required that justice should be shown to the injured party for procedural inefficiencies causing the twin scourges of delay and wasted costs.  The public administration of justice to contain those blights also weighed heavily.  Any injustice to the defaulting party, though never to be ignored, came a long way behind the other two.

86. This is a prime example of an unless order being an order of last resort.  There was a demonstrable history of failure to comply with the orders and it must have been clear to Cheung Fat that this was its last chance.  Ordinarily, the sanction would be imposed.

87. It cannot be said that the arguments advanced to exonerate the failure are in any way compelling.  The importance of a Mareva injunction and associated disclosure orders as a means by which the court may protect funds to ensure that a judgment is met cannot be overstated.  I have found in this respect of that disclosure orders fall within a quite different category than discovery where specific provisions exist to assist incomplete disclosure.

88. I have found that the failure to make disclosure was in bad faith, and undertaking deliberately and cynically to frustrate the Mareva injunction disclosure orders. This was an intentional flouting of the orders.

89. It cannot be said that the failure of Cheung Fat to properly maintain its books is a matter beyond its control which might excuse the failure to disclose.  The suggestion that the company’s books of account have not been properly maintained and that Cheung Fat is thereby frustrated in making proper disclosure did not arise until Ou 3rd. If the statement is true, the fact of incomplete books must have been known to Ms Zhong right back in July 2013, when the disclosure orders were first served.  Up until Ou 3rd, the excuse being offered was simply that full sets of the bank statements were not available.  There has been more than enough time not only to get full sets of the bank statements from all banks, but also to reconstruct the books of account.

90. In the exercise of my discretion I have regard to all of the foregoing factors in determining whether I should excuse the failure in the circumstances of this case.  I have had particular regard to the purpose of Mareva injunctions and their associated disclosure orders.  I have weighed carefully any injustice that might flow to Cheung Fat against the interests of justice requiring that justice should be shown to China Metal for the procedural inefficiencies on the part of Cheung Fat which have caused delay and wasted costs.

91. Weighing all of these matters, I am satisfied that this is a plain case where relief should not be granted.  Relief is accordingly refused.

92. The strike out summons

93. Although the rule (O. 18, r. 19) specifically states that an application to strike out may be made at any stage of the proceedings the application should always be made promptly and as a rule before the pleadings are closed: Hong Kong Practice 18/19/3.  This application is made after the close of pleadings (O. 18, r. 20: 14 days after service of the reply on 14 February 2014; thus 28 February 2014), and cannot by any means be said to have been made promptly.

94. Ms Sit correctly reminded me that no evidence is admissible on an application to strike out upon the ground that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed.  On this aspect of the application the allegations in the statement of claim are assumed to be true, and an assessment is made as to whether a cause of action is disclosed. 

95. I have not the slightest doubt that the allegations in this statement of claim against both Mr Chun and Cheung Fat disclose proper causes of action.

96. Although the strikeout summons was set down to be heard before me, Mr Hui elected, as I understood him, not to address me on how the statement of claim might constitute circumstances that were either frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the procedure of the court. He preferred to say that the summons should be adjourned for further directions.  There is simply no need for further directions.  There was nothing whatsoever in Mr Ou’s three affirmations, or on the face of the statement of claim, from which it might be said that there was any evidence to suggest that the proceedings fell into any of those three categories.

97. Mr Hui did not pursue the application in the strikeout summons to vary the amount frozen by the Mareva injunction.

98. The strikeout summons is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.

Conclusion on the sanction summons

99. I am satisfied that non-compliance with the unless order has been established and that there is no basis upon which I should grant relief against sanction.  There will accordingly be an order that the defence and counterclaim of Cheung Fat be struck out, and Cheung Fat be debarred from defending the proceedings.

Should judgment be entered?

100. The sanction summons sought not only that the defence be struck out, but also that judgment be entered against Cheung Fat.

101. No matter how Ms Sit tried to express it, it was quite plain that the case against Cheung Fat is entirely dependent upon the establishment by China Metal of its case against Mr Chun, namely that the transactions between Central Steel and Cheung Fat were false and fictitious.  This dependency gives rise to two issues.

102. First, despite the evidence presently available, I cannot discount the remote possibility that Mr Chun might be successful in resisting the claim.  If he were successful in resisting the claim, then any judgment against Cheung Fat would likely also have to go.  In those circumstances I consider that the formal entry of judgment should wait until the trial has taken place and the claim against Mr Chun properly proved.

103. Second, a claim that is based upon an allegation that transactions are false and fictitious is in effect a claim based on an allegation of fraud.  I have had regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Co Ltd v Harmutty Ltd [2009] 3 HKLRD 94.  Where an allegation of fraud remains outstanding, as it does here, I am of the view that the court should not, except in the plainest of cases, enter a judgment against a defendant where the establishment of that fraud is essential to the proof against that defendant, without a trial and appropriate proof of the allegation.  This is not such a plain case.

104. I accordingly decline to enter judgment against Cheung Fat.

Costs:

105. There will be an order nisi that Cheung Fat must pay China Metal’s costs of the sanction summons, the relief summons and the strike out summons on an indemnity basis.

(John Saunders)
Deputy Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr John Hui, instructed by Laracy & Co, for the 5th defendant



[1] See Defence §8(d).

92518-EN-2014-04-09

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (Provisional Liquidators Appointed) v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (Provisional Liquidators Appointed)1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 (Provisional Liquidators Appointed) 

and

 CHUN CHI WAI1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (HK) MATERIAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon L Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 9 April 2014
Date of Decision: 9 April 2014

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  This is an application for an unless order of disclosure of assets in aid of a Mareva injunction. The Mareva injunction was granted on 30 July 2013 with a limit of HK$1,682,198,420 against all 12 defendants in the action. The 13th defendant, a BVI company, was added later. It is and was wholly owned and controlled by the 1st defendant. The Mareva injunction contains a disclosure order requiring all defendants to disclose, within 48 hours, their assets of individual value of HK$50,000 or more.

2.  The 1st plaintiff was a listed company and the 1st defendant its chairman and CEO.  The trading of the 1st plaintiff’s shares was suspended on 28 January 2013.  On that date, the market capitalisation of the 1st plaintiff was at some HK$11 billion.  The 1st plaintiff was wound up by the petition of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) presented on 26 January 2013.  The petition was the result of a lengthy investigation by the SFC on the affairs of the 1st plaintiff.

3.  The 2nd plaintiff is the 1st plaintiff’s associate company in Macau.  The 1st and 13th defendants (“the defendants”) had received a total of cash dividends from the 1st plaintiff at about 147.2 million between 2010 and 2012.  The 13th defendant received HK$636 million cash on 27 April 2011 for the disposal of 60 million shares of the 1st plaintiff. The 1st defendant also received HK$39,720,416 cash for salaries, allowances and bonuses from the end of 2009 to 30 June 2013.  The total sum received by the defendants is about HK$822,900,000.

4.  Pursuant to the disclosure order in the Mareva injunction, the 1st defendant made, for himself and the 13th defendant, a total of five statements of assets.  He disclosed that he himself had assets totalling $17,814,201.94 with HK$6 million in cash, HK$7,097,017 in shares and options of the 1st plaintiff, and HK$4,717,184 in listed shares of other companies, insurance policy and MPF.  He also disclosed that the 13th defendant had assets totalling HK$651,854,831 with HK$562,686,149 as the value of the 1st plaintiff’s shares, HK$84,253,352 the value of other listed shares, and HK$4,915,330 cash.  Putting aside the value of the 1st plaintiff’s shares and options which the 1st and 3rd defendants have been holding since the IPO of the 1st plaintiff, the total assets of individual value of HK$50,000 or more of the defendants is at about HK$99,886,000.

5.  The 1st defendant explained that the proceeds or dividends received by the defendants that are not represented by the assets disclosed in the five statements of assets have been “used, spent or disposed of” and the defendants no longer have any interest in them. 

6.  In the light of the HK$822,900,000 received by the defendants since the end of 2009, this disclosure of assets at HK$99,886,000 is incredible.  That means the defendants had “used, spent or disposed of” about HK$200 million per year, or over half a million a day, every day, since the end of 2009 to July 2013, but without acquiring anything valued at HK$50,000 or more.  There is also not a word by the defendants on how such moneys were “used, spent or disposed of”.

7.  Despite repeated demands by the plaintiffs, the defendants maintained their stance and made no more disclosure.  Hence the plaintiffs seek this further order of disclosure and ask for it to be an unless order with the sanction of striking-out of the defence and entering of judgment. 

8.  I will also mention that recently the defendants applied for variation of the Mareva injunction for them to spend legal and living expenses.  Mr Recorder Houghton, SC decided the application on 28 February 2014 against them.  The learned recorder said, at paragraph 42 of the reasons for decision, that the 1st defendant was required to satisfy the court that he had no alternative source of funds for his living and legal expenses if he wished the court to vary the injunction order, but he had signally failed to do so. 

9.  The defendants oppose this application.  The first ground is that I should not rely on the decision of Recorder Houghton as that was for a different application requiring different considerations.  This is obviously correct. 

10.  The second ground of opposition is that this court has no jurisdiction to order further disclosure in order to police the defendants’ existing disclosure, hoping to find out whether the defendants had dissipated or concealed their assets. 

11.  Mr Cheuk, counsel for the defendants, relied on Bekhor & Co. Ltd. v Bilton [1981] 12B 923, where the English Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to make a disclosure order to establish if the defendant had dissipated or concealed his assets, or in other words, to police the Mareva injunction.  Mr Cheuk further relied on RACP Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited v Li Xiaobo, CACV 139/2007, where the Hong Kong Court of Appeal approved of Bekhor v Bilton.

12.  However, the facts of the RACP case are very much different.  The plaintiff there sued the defendant for damages for deceit or, alternatively, for breach of a stock purchase agreement.  The plaintiff bought the shares of a mainland company from the defendant but afterwards claimed that the defendant had overstated the receivables of the company.  The claim was not for rescission of the stock purchase agreement or restitution of the share purchase price.  There was also no proprietary claim or trading remedy.

13.  The plaintiff obtained a Mareva injunction followed by a disclosure of assets order some three weeks later.  The disclosure order was complied with by the defendant.  The plaintiff, through an earlier ex parte order, inspected some of the defendant’s bank statements in Hong Kong and learned that the defendant had transferred US$5 million of the sale proceeds to a bank account in Canada and another US$5 million of such proceeds to another bank account in the mainland shortly after the sale of the shares of the company to the plaintiff. 

14.  The plaintiff then, in the guise of a breach of the Mareva injunction by the defendant (when in fact there was none), sought an order requiring the defendant to disclose the details of payments made by the defendant from the two recipient bank accounts abovementioned.  The purpose of the order was, as stated in a supporting affirmation of the plaintiff, to understand how the defendant had dissipated or concealed his assets and for tracing the sale proceeds paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.  It was against those facts that the Court of Appeal said that a disclosure order was not for use in finding out whether the defendant had dissipated or concealed his assets, or to police the Mareva injunction.

15.  However, Ms Sit, counsel for the plaintiffs, has made it clear that the plaintiffs are not seeking a tracing order but to seek disclosure of the whereabouts of the defendant’s assets since 30 July 2013, when the Mareva injunction coupled with the disclosure of assets order was granted, until now.  Miss Sit referred to JSC BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov & 6 others [2012] EWHC 455(Comm), where Teare J, when dealing with the plaintiff’s application for a further disclosure of assets order in aid of a freezing order, said in paragraphs 26 and 32 to 34 of his judgment as follows:

“26. I shall next deal with the disclosure order. There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction to make the disclosure order. Disclosure of assets is a necessary adjunct of a freezing order to make such order effective. The dispute is whether such an order should be made when an order for disclosure for assets has already been made.

…

32. When sentencing Mr Ablyazov for contempt I observed, based upon my findings in my judgment on the contempt application, that he had determined not to disclose all of his assets, to lie about his ownership of assets and to deal with his assets in breach of the freezing order. As Mr Smith has observed, the history of this litigation has revealed grounds to believe that Mr Ablyazov owns companies which he has not disclosed. …

33. These matters in combination seem to me to provide ample justification for ordering Mr Ablyazov again to file an affidavit of his assets.

34.  It is true that Mr Ablyazov can himself choose to purge his contempt and amplify the list of assets he has already disclosed.  However, in the particular circumstances of this case, summarised in the last paragraph, it remains appropriate to order Mr Ablyazov to swear a further affidavit of his assets, rather than let him do so only if he chooses to do so.”

16.  This judgment was affirmed by the English Court of Appeal.  The English Court of Appeal also discussed about Bekhor v Bilton at paragraphs 125 to 128 of its judgment, reported at [2012] EWCA Civ 1411 as follows:

“125. A J Bekhor & Co Ltd v. Bilton [1981] 1 QB 923 (CA) brings us into the (early) era of the Mareva injunction. That was the authority which cemented the power to make disclosure orders in support of a Mareva injunction, pursuant to what is now section 37 of the 1981 Act. …

126. However, the court split on whether the power had been properly exercised in that case, where the judge had gone beyond the order of an affidavit of assets, and had ordered discovery of documents and interrogatories pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court. The majority (Stephenson and Ackner LJJ) held that the power had not been properly exercised: for the particular orders made seemed designed more to reveal the extent of breaches of the Mareva order committed in the past than to protect the function of that order for the future; moreover, the difficulties which had been experienced could have been addressed in other ways, such as by an application to cross-examine the defendant, or by removing the permission that had been granted to remove £1,250 per month out of the jurisdiction for living expenses (at 944G-955D, per Ackner LJ). …

127. Mr Béar relied on this authority in support of his submissions. However, the dissent of Griffiths LJ reveals, particularly as time has gone on, how narrow the area of disagreement perhaps was; or alternatively, how the development of this jurisprudence would suggest that the decision reflects a somewhat sceptical, but now outdated, attitude to the newly discovered power of the Mareva injunction. Griffiths LJ said (at 950):

‘The judge was clearly dealing with a very evasive litigant… The judge was, in my opinion, fully justified in taking the view that the defendant's affidavits were so unsatisfactory that he was entitled to refuse to accept their contents at their face value and to order the defendant to make a full disclosure of his financial position… It is true that the judge might have used other measures to put pressure on the defendant to induce him to reveal the true state of his finances…

I agree that the power to order discovery in support of a Mareva injunction should be sparingly exercised and if too readily resorted to could easily become a most oppressive procedure.

I am sure that the judges in the commercial court have this well in mind. There should be no question of an order for discovery becoming a usual part of the Mareva relief…".

128.  However, as will appear below, orders for the disclosure of assets at any rate by way of affidavit have become a standard feature of the freezing order.  …”

17.  I agree with the approach of Teare J.  I think a further disclosure order on the facts of this case is amply justified, subject to amending paragraph 1(b) of the order to the disclosure of what has become of the proceeds of assets of individual value at HK$50,000 or more but which had been disposed of, encumbered or otherwise dealt with since 30 July 2013, when the Mareva injunction was granted.  Without the amendment, this part of the order may appear to be a tracing order.

18.  Both Ms Sit and Mr Cheuk have submitted on whether I have the jurisdiction and if it is right for me to sanction this disclosure order by an unless order.  However, bearing in mind that the present order has a new and specific requirement of disclosure in relation to the dividends and sale of share proceeds received by the defendants and an unless order has serious consequences (with the claim against the defendants at HK$357.4 million plus damages to be assessed), I am inclined to give the defendants one more opportunity before considering whether an unless order is appropriate.

19.  I therefore make an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the summons with paragraph 1(b) amended as above-mentioned,

(Submission on costs)

20.  Costs of the application be to the plaintiffs.

(Louis Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the plaintiffs

Mr Calvin Cheuk, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants

92552-EN-2014-04-07

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD (in Provisional Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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91957-EN-2014-02-28

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (In Provisional Liquidation) AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

________________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED (In Provisional Liquidation) 1st Plaintiff
 CENTRAL STEEL (MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 and
 CHUN CHI WAI 1st Defendant
 LAI WUN YIN 2nd Defendant
 LANE TONE (H.K.) MATERIAL LIMITED 3rd Defendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP 4th Defendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED 5th Defendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO 6th Defendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED 7th Defendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 8th Defendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED 10th Defendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD 11th Defendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD 12th Defendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13th Defendant

________________

Before: Mr Recorder Houghton SC inChambers
Date of Hearing: 28 January 2014
Date of Judgment: 28 February 2014

___________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

___________________________________

 

1. The primary application for consideration by the Court is the application made by each of the 1st and 13th defendants for variations of the Mareva Injunction Orders made against them on 30th July 2013 (1st defendant; referred to below as “Mr Chun”) and 7th August 2013 (13th defendant; referred to below as “Wellrun”) respectively. The first of these Orders extended to 12 defendants, but has since been discharged as against the 2nd, 11th and 12th defendants. The 2nd defendant is the wife of Mr Chun and therefore, for a period of time, both were subject to the same Injunction Order. Wellrun is the corporate vehicle through which Mr Chun holds his shareholding in the 1st plaintiff.

2. Procedural summonses were also before the court by which leave to adduce further evidence (the 5th affidavit of Mr Borelli) was sought by the plaintiffs, and in addition, leave to amend Mr Chun’s summons to vary the Injunction Order (to provide for an overdue tax payment) was sought by Mr Chun.  These summonses were disposed of by agreement between the parties such that leave was given for the additional affidavit evidence from Mr Borrelli to be admitted, subject to the admission of a responsive affirmation from Mr Chun (his 8th affirmation) served immediately prior to the hearing.  Leave to amend Mr Chun’s summons was also granted.

3. Mr Chun and Wellrun were jointly represented at the hearing before me by Mr Charles Manzoni SC leading Mr Calvin Cheuk, and for the purposes of this judgment, Mr Chun and Wellrun will be referred to collectively as “the Defendants”.  Mr Russell Coleman SC, leading Ms Eva Sit represented the plaintiffs.

Background

4. The 1st plaintiff is a listed Hong Kong company, and the 2nd plaintiff is an associated company incorporated in Macau.  In essence the group to which the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs belong is engaged in the scrap metal business. Mr Chun was the chairman and CEO of the 1st plaintiff until 26th July, 2013 when a winding up petition was presented by the SFC in respect of the 1st plaintiff. Presentation of that petition appears to have been the result of an investigation into the affairs of the 1st plaintiff’s group of companies (“the Group”), which investigation was particularly focused on the affairs of the Group in the second half of 2009.  The presentation of that petition resulted in the appointment of joint and several provisional liquidators, one of whom is Mr Borrelli.

5. The SFC’s concerns as to the conduct of the business affairs of the Group, including the 1st plaintiff, include a concern that the financial well-being of the 1st plaintiff has been overstated in both the prospectus which was published for use in an initial public offering of shares, and in the 2009 annual report.  Those documents are said to have inflated the size of the 1st plaintiff’s business and the revenue generated from that business.  It is alleged that a number of fictitious transactions have been created and relied on to create a false picture of the 1st plaintiff’s financial position.

6. It is also alleged that funds have been circulated (on a “round robin”) among companies within the Group and certain customers of the group, again resulting in a false representation of the 1st plaintiff’s financial situation.

7. There are other allegations of falsification of documents and transactions, all of which, allegedly, were intended to mislead regarding 1st plaintiff’s position at or about the time of the initial public offering.  It is not necessary for the purposes of the applications before me to consider those allegations.  Whether the various allegations are or are not well founded (and Mr Chun is adamant in his affirmations that they are not), is a matter for another day.  It appears to be undisputed that the Group is a very substantial one indeed, employing thousands of people and having a substantial asset base in China.  The 1st plaintiff itself, as at the date of the suspension in trading of its shares, had a market capitalisation in the order of HK$11 billion, and substantial sums in bank deposits.

8. The Provisional Liquidators, having been appointed on 26th July 2013, moved rapidly and applied to the court, ex parte, for injunctive relief on 30th July, 2013.  At that stage the application was made against the first 12 defendants, with Wellrun being added in a separate application shortly thereafter.  Injunction Orders were issued against all 13 defendants.

9. Four of the defendants have not taken any part in the proceedings and default judgment has been entered against these parties. Certain of these defendants are the parties who are alleged to have received very substantial payments from the 1st plaintiff, either for no consideration, or in respect alleged transactions for which no records can be found.

10. The matter came before Mr Recorder Pow SC on 9th August 2013.  Continuation of the Injunction Orders was not opposed by some defendants, including Mr Chun, but the learned Recorder heard the plaintiffs’ application for the continuation of the injunctive orders against the 2nd defendant (an application which was opposed), and heard the 11th and 12th defendants’ applications for a discharge of the orders against them.  The Recorder refused to continue the injunction against the 2nd defendant and discharged the injunction against the 11th and 12th defendants.

11. For present purposes it suffices to say that his conclusion was that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a good arguable case against the 2nd defendant.  Moreover he was of the view that there was no evidence that the 2nd defendant either was, or was likely to dissipate her assets.

12. So far as the 11th and 12th defendants were concerned, the judge’s conclusions were much the same, in that he was not satisfied that the evidence placed before the ex parte judge (and before him) was sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a good arguable case against those defendants.  He recorded in his judgment that counsel for the plaintiffs had acknowledged that there was no evidence implicating the defendants in the allegedly fictitious transactions or the alleged round robin schemes.  Furthermore the Recorder did not accept that there was either evidence of an actual risk of dissipation, or evidence upon which such a risk could reasonably be inferred.  The judge was implicitly critical of some of the evidence of Mr Borrelli as being no more than “bare assertion”.

13. The evidence has developed considerably since that date, with, among others, five affidavits now having been filed by Mr Borelli and no less than eight affirmations by Mr Chun.

14. In addition to the early concerns as to the affairs of the plaintiffs, the Provisional Liquidators say that further matters have been uncovered since their appointment, which have given rise to further concerns, and some of the substantial claims which are pleaded in the underlying proceedings.  The complaints overall were summarised in submissions in three groups; allegedly fictitious transactions in 2007-2009; fictitious transactions in 2012 involving D5 and D10; and various very substantial transactions in 2013 comprising, in part at least, allegedly doubtful transactions under which substantial payments have been made by the 1st plaintiff, but in respect of which no relevant records exist in the plaintiffs’ offices in Hong Kong. 

15. According to Mr Chun, that may be because the relevant records are likely to be in China, not in Hong Kong; in other words, the Provisional Liquidators may be looking in the wrong place.  Although it appears such documents would be, properly speaking under the control of the Provisional Liquidators, in his 8th affirmation he referred to having asked his staff in China to look for relevant documents, and some were exhibited to that affirmation.

16. Mr Chun also makes the point (in his 7th affirmation) that very many of the transactions about which complaint was originally made by the Provisional Liquidators are transactions which have been independently scrutinised by banks, lawyers, and accountants for the purposes of the due diligence exercise required for the listing of the 1st plaintiff, without any alarm having been raised.

17. In his 3rd affidavit, Mr Borrelli summarised the sums of money said to have been received by Mr Chun and, in particular, Wellrun (the latter being treated as the “alter ego” of the former). As summarised in submissions, these parties firstly received cash dividends of approximately HK$147 million; secondly, on 27th April 2011 Wellrun sold shares in the 1st plaintiff and received payment in return of HK$636 million; and thirdly, since the end of 2009 Mr Chun has received close to HK$40 million in director’s fees, salaries allowances and bonuses.

18. The current assets disclosed by Mr Chun and Wellrun are to a much lower value however; in the order of HK$40 million.

Relevant Principles

19. There was no real dispute between the parties as to the principles, which were summarised by counsel for the Defendants in their written skeleton in the following way:

“In the case of an ‘ordinary’ Mareva injunction, where there is no proprietary claim asserted against the enjoined assets, the court should consider whether the defendant has shown by sufficient evidence that: (1) he does not have other assets available to meet the payments; and (2) the purpose of the application is not an attempt to dissipate the assets (which prima facie are the defendants) to frustrate the enforcement of judgments by the plaintiff.”

20. These propositions were based upon the judgment of Au J in Wharf Limited v Lau Yuen How [2010] 1 HKLRD 783.

21. There was some debate between the parties as to whether the injunctions in the present case are proprietary in nature.  However, it is not necessary for me to decide that question, and I have proceeded on an assumed basis that the injunctions are to be subject to the same considerations as regards the variation applications as would be the case for an “ordinary” Mareva injunction.

22. The Defendants remind me that in such a case the enjoined assets are the Defendants’ assets and that it is not intended by the imposition of an Injunction Order of this type to prevent the injuncted defendant from paying his debts as they fall due, or from continuing with his usual manner of living (see for example PCW Ltd v Dixon [1983] 2 All ER 158 at 162).

23. Nor is an Injunction Order made intending either to provide priority to the claimant plaintiff, or to punish the defendant for the misdeeds which are alleged against him.  Such an Injunction Order is simply to prevent assets which would otherwise be available to satisfy a judgment, if one is ultimately obtained, from being dissipated such that the plaintiff is cheated out of his claim.  By and large, continuation of an existing lifestyle, and the payment of legal costs incurred by the defendant in defending himself from the claims made against him are not ordinarily matters that could amount to dissipation of assets.

Disclosure of Assets

24. In the present case the Orders that were made by the court required the Defendants to give disclosure of assets, and a number of affidavits have been made in response to that requirement.  Affidavits have also been made by some of the other defendants, including the 2nd defendant.

25. The assets revealed by that exercise are said to be centrally relevant to the issue of any variation to the Injunction Order as regards Mr Chun, or Wellrun.  For the plaintiff, Mr Coleman SC submits that the court is “duty bound” to have regard to the adequacy of the Defendants’ disclosure of assets on such an application.  In the present case it is submitted that the disclosure by the Defendants is palpably inadequate such that the logical inference to be drawn is that there has been non-compliance with the disclosure obligation regarding current assets.

26. There is no dispute that the court is entitled to expect a defendant seeking variation of an existing Mareva injunction to adduce credible evidence as to his other assets before the court may be satisfied that it is just that he should be able to use the frozen assets.  See generally Stephen Gee; Commercial Injunctions (5th edition) paragraph 20.054, which includes the following:

“Because the real risk of dissipation has already been established by the evidence, judges are entitled to have a ‘very healthy scepticism’ about assertions made by the party against whom the Mareva injunction has been granted, and this should be borne in mind in deciding whether further evidence should be required. If, in addition, the defendant has been less than frank in his dealings with the court or the claimant over legal or living expenses, this would tend to reinforce the case for putting in place a regime requiring the defendant to adduce evidence showing a complete picture each time he requires further funds, thus enabling the court to police the payments.”

27. Mr Manzoni SC submits that the plaintiffs are reading too much into the Orders that were made.  There was no requirement in those Orders that the Defendants give what is said to amount to tracing discovery in regard to assets.  All that was required was a statement of what the assets now are, not a historical statement of account.  Mr Manzoni SC submits that there has been, albeit via several affirmations, compliance with the disclosure orders.

28. It is not necessary for me to form any view on the adequacy of the Defendants’ disclosure (although as appears below, significant queries are raised as to its completeness).  The evidential and persuasive burden lies firmly on the Defendants to provide sufficient evidence of their assets.  See Trustor AB v Smallbone (Unrep.) (19 January 1999; Court of Appeal; Peter Gibson and Tuckey LJJ.)

The Applications

29. The sums enjoined by the Injunction Order are, by any standards extremely substantial.  That reflects the amount of the plaintiff’s claims, and has the result that almost any variation, viewed in the context of the amount enjoined, is of relatively little significance in terms of the extent to which theplaintiff’s claims are in fact protected, as regards potential enforcement, from dissipation.

30. Nevertheless the amounts sought to be released from the strictures of the Injunction Order are far from trivial themselves.  There are, in effect, three groups of items, being firstly, provision for living expenses (of Mr Chun) which for present purposes includes his tax bill; secondly, provision for legal expenses (Mr Chun and Wellrun); and thirdly a reduction in the gross amount enjoined (Wellrun).  There are, therefore, effectively two types of application, variations to make allowance for matters which are allowed for in the usual case (living and legal expenses) and a variation to bring the Injunction Order against Wellrun in line with what is said to be Wellrun’s maximum liability under the claims made.

Living and Legal Expenses

31. So far as the Mr Chun’s living expenses are concerned, Mr Manzoni SC complains about the lack of any provision for such expenses in the original Injunction Order.  He acknowledges, very fairly, that this was potentially an oversight since the Order was obtained by the plaintiffs only a few days after the appointment of the Provisional Liquidators, and which was made against 12 defendants the majority of whom were corporate bodies.  Nevertheless he submits, and it is not really disputed, that it is axiomatic that there should, ordinarily, be provision for such living expenses in any Injunction Order of this nature.

32. Mr Manzoni SC developed a theme in his oral submissions to the effect that the plaintiffs had “overreached” in the injunction application, through submissions which built upon the rapidity with which the Injunction Order had been sought following the appointment of the Provisional Liquidators, and which highlighted the fact that the injunction had been discharged against D2, D11 and D12 by Mr Recorder Pow SC due to the lack of any good arguable case against those defendants.

33. It was suggested by counsel that the approach adopted by the plaintiffs’ was tantamount to an abuse of the process by, in effect, attempting to impose illegitimate pressure on the Defendants, in particular at the stage at which both Mr Chun and the 2nd defendant (husband‑and‑wife) were subject to the same Injunction Order, but without any provision made for living expenses.  It may be noted that both were subject to the Injunction Order only for about 10 days.

34. That “overreaching” extended to the (separate) Injunction Order sought and obtained against Wellrun on the basis, it was submitted, of bare assertions of participation as a dishonest assister in the allegedly illicit dealings with the plaintiff.

35. As far as the quantum of this element is concerned, in keeping with the “scale” of the case the living expenses sought are substantial.  The range of matters is not unusual, encompassing rental and household expenses, travelling, food and entertainment, support for Mr Chun’s three daughters, and insurance.  The amount proposed to be allowed by way of variation, on a monthly basis, is HK$540,000.00.  The basis for the calculation is given by Mr Chun in his 5th affirmation to which he has exhibited bank and credit card statements said to evidence his personal responsibility for certain of those expenses. 

36. The relevant starting point for a consideration of this variation is not whether the amount is reasonable however, nor is it a matter of how weak or strong the plaintiffs’ case is.  The injunction has been granted and (in this case) continued.  The plaintiffs have already established both a good arguable case and a risk of dissipation sufficiently to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to grant the injunction.  There is no application before me to discharge the injunction.  Evidence, when available, suggesting that a plaintiffs’ case may be less robust than at first appeared at the ex‑parte stage is not irrelevant, but if not deployed to seek the setting aside of the injunction, then at best it is merely a factor in the exercise of discretion as to the extent to which a variation should be made, not whether a variation should be made.  The primary question at this stage is whether the discretion of the court can be invoked at all to vary the injunction which exists.

37. As set out above, what this means in summary is; has the defendant, firstly, satisfied the court that the variation is for a proper purpose, and is not a form of dissipation of the enjoined assets, and secondly, has the defendant demonstrated that the variation should be made because, evidence shows, it is required to be made for him to meet the relevant expenses, no other source being reasonably available.

38. Without deciding the point, and leaving the amount to one side, I would be prepared to proceed on the basis that the Defendants have met the first of these hurdles.  Living and legal expenses are not, on the face of things “dissipation” where the lifestyle is a habitual one and the legal expenses reasonable.

39. However Mr Chun and Wellrun have not, in my view, come close to clearing the second hurdle, and demonstrating that there are no other viable sources of funding for these expenses.

40. The undisputed evidence is, put simply that approximately HK$800 million went into the Defendants’ pocket over the last three years or so, of which, the court has been told, about HK$40 million was turned into other assets, or remains in bank accounts.

41. Mr Coleman SC submitted that it was not practically possible to dispose of HK$750 million or so in about three years; HK$250 million per year; without either acquiring something of value or at least being able to identify where it went.  Mr Chun simply says that it has been “used, spent, or otherwise disposed of…” in his 7th affirmation.

42. Mr Chun was not required by the disclosure orders to account for his spending over the last few years.  He is required however to satisfy the court that he has no alternative source of funds for his living and legal expenses if he wishes the court to vary the existing Injunction Order.  He has signally failed to do so.

43. The position is precisely the same in regard to legal expenses, for both Mr Chun and Wellrun.

44. It was submitted by Mr Manzoni SC that, irrespective of this, a variation was plainly necessary in respect of living and legal expenses simply because the amount enjoined (HK$1.7 billion in very round numbers) was considerably more than the combined total of the disclosed assets ($680 million) and the primary sums alleged not to have been accounted for (HK$750 million) meaning, in other words, that the entirety of Mr Chun’s and Wellrun’s assets, were on any view, enjoined, leaving no other funds for living expenses.

45. I accept that the logic of this demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances a variation to allow living expenses would be necessary.  I do not accept that logic as showing that the burden of showing an absence of other available funds has been met.

The Reduction in the Amount Enjoined

46. In money terms this is the largest element of the application.  Wellrun is subject to a restriction on any disposal of assets in the (rounded out) amount of HK$1.6 billion.  Wellrun is therefore subject to the same enjoined amount as Mr Chun.  Counsel submits, and it is not disputed, that this sum was determined based on two components, the first being the July 2013 payments which were in the order of HK$1 billion, and secondly dividend payments in 2009, 2010, and 2011 of approximately HK$673 million.

47. However, it is submitted that the plaintiff’s case in respect of Wellrun is not premised on the July 2013 payments.  The allegations made against Wellrun relate only to the dividend payments and, it is submitted, therefore the bulk of the restriction has no basis whatsoever, and should be removed.

48. Moreover the amount of those dividend payments referred to are dividends paid out to all shareholders, not just Wellrun.  It is submitted that, on the evidence, Wellrun received only approximately HK$300 million in dividend payments.  Accordingly, the sum enjoined should therefore be reduced to that figure.

49. The pleaded claim made against Wellrun is indeed, primarily, but not solely in respect of the sum of HK$357 million odd received as cash and scrip dividends and which, it is said, Wellrun (and/or Mr Chun) hold as constructive trustee.  Wellrun is alleged to have acted on behalf of Mr Chun (who is the sole director and shareholder of Wellrun) both in some of the impugned transactions, and in the dealing with monies said to have been wrongfully extracted from the plaintiffs.  Wellrun is alleged also to have dishonestly assisted Mr Chun in the IPO, and dishonestly concealed Mr Chun’s breaches of duty as director of the 1st plaintiff. In addition to the specific assertions in relation to the dividends therefore, the plaintiffs also claim equitable damages against Wellrun.  In the circumstances it seems to me that it would be artificial to draw a distinction between the position of Wellrun and that of Mr Chun so far as the strictures of the Injunction Order are concerned.  In my judgment the circumstances require the sum enjoined to be the same in respect of Wellrun as it is in respect of Mr Chun.

50. Accordingly I am not persuaded that the Defendants are entitled to any of the variations to the Injunction Orders which are sought.  The summonses are to be dismissed.  The costs would appear inevitably to belong to the plaintiffs in such circumstances however I make this part of the order on a “nisi” basis.

(Anthony Houghton, SC)
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Russell Coleman SC leading Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Charles Manzoni SC leading Mr Calvin Cheuk, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st and 13th defendants

88615-EN-2013-08-15

CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LTD AND ANOTHER v. CHUN CHI WAI AND OTHERS<br>

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HCA 1412/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1412 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 CHINA METAL RECYCLING (HOLDINGS) LIMITED 1stPlaintiff
 (In Provisional Liquidation) CENTRAL STEEL
(MACAO COMMERCIAL OFFSHORE) LIMITED
2nd Plaintiff
 and
 CHUN CHI WAI1stDefendant
 LAI WUN YIN2ndDefendant
 LANE TONE(H.K.)MATERIAL LIMITED3rdDefendant
 JASON METAL RECYCLE CORP4thDefendant
 CHEUNG FAT METAL
RECYCLING COMPANY LIMITED
5thDefendant
 QI LE METAL RECYCLING CO6thDefendant
 METALLURGICAL INDUSTRY LIMITED7thDefendant
 HOI CHEUNG METAL RECYCLING LIMITED8thDefendant
 CHAK KWAN METAL RECYCLING LIMITED9thDefendant
 PACIFIC METAL RECYCLE LIMITED10thDefendant
 HEALTHY WORLD TRADING LTD11thDefendant
 GOLD DRAGON INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS LTD12thDefendant
 WELLRUN LIMITED13thDefendant

____________

Before: Mr Recorder Pow, SC in Chambers (Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing: 9 August 2013
Date of Reasons: 15 August 2013

_______________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_______________

 

I.Background

1.  On 30 July 2013, the plaintiffs (acting through their provisional liquidators) obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction against the 1st to 12 defendants.  On 9 August 2013, which was the inter partes return date for the continuation of the ex parte injunctive orders, only the 2nd, 11th and 12th defendants appeared and opposed to continuation. The 11th and 12th defendants also issued summonses to seek the discharge of the original ex parte injunction.  After a full day’s hearing, I ordered that:-

(1) the plaintiffs’ application for continuation of the injunctive orders against the 2nd defendant be refused;

(2) the ex parte injunctive orders against the 11th and 12th defendants be discharged;

(3) the plaintiffs’ application for a re-grant of injunctive orders against the 11th and 12th defendants be refused;[1]

(4) leave to appeal against my orders set out in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above be refused; and

(5) upon parties’ consent, there be an interim injunctive order against the 11th and 12th defendants as per a draft order agreed between the plaintiffs and the 11th and 12th defendants[2].

2.  I now give my detail reasons.

3.  The 1st plaintiff is a company listed in the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  It has been suspended from trading since 28 January 2013. It is the holding company of a group of companies called the China Metal Group (“the Group”) including the 2nd plaintiff which is a company incorporated in Macao.  The 2nd plaintiff is supposedly the sourcing arm of the Group. The Group claims to be engaged in scrap metal business which includes the production of recycled scrap metal products and the resale of scrap metal.

4.  The 1st defendant is the Chairman and CEO of the 1st plaintiff. The 2nd defendant is his wife. She is also a non-executive director of the 1st plaintiff. According to Macao company registry records recently filed in the evidence of the plaintiffs, the 2nd plaintiff was established in Macao on 31 March 2005. At the beginning, the management was stated to be constituted by 2 “Administrators": the 1st defendant and one Mr Tsui Cham To.  Mr Tsui ceased to be an administrator on 17 July 2007. His role was taken up by the 2nd defendant. She was one of the two administrators until she resigned on 14 April 2010. Since then, the 1st defendant became its sole administrator until 31 December 2012 when he was replaced by another gentleman named Wang Yuzhang as the sole administrator.

5.  On 22 December 2009, the Commission commenced an investigation against the affairs of the Group pursuant to section 182 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”). The investigation targeted on affairs of the Group conducted during or aground the period from 10 June 2009 to 17 November 2009.

6.  In short, the investigation conducted by the Commission revealed, amongst other things, that:-

(1) the financial position of the 1st plaintiff was overstated in the prospectus used in its IPO and its annual report for 2009.  It was achieved by inflating the size of its business and the amount of revenue generated by the 2nd plaintiff.  A portion of the 2nd plaintiff’s “purchases” from its three major suppliers for the financial years of 2007, 2008 and 2009 were fictitious (“the fictitious transactions point”);

(2) there was a circulation of 2nd plaintiff’s funds:  first from the 2nd plaintiff to its suppliers; then from suppliers to customers; and from customers back to the 2nd plaintiff (“the round robin point”);

(3) a number of entities were established by persons connected with the 1st defendant. They purported to be independent suppliers and customers that transacted with the 2nd plaintiff in doubtful transactions;

(4) transaction documents include bills of lading which appeared to contain false information regarding the location and movement of vessels; and

(5) there is evidence of exaggeration of the financial position of the 1st plaintiff after the IPO which involved suspicious documents containing false information of vessel movements. There were also mismatches in customs declarations, reference numbers and container codes.

7.  On 26 July 2013, upon the presentation of a winding-up Petition by the SFC in HCCW 210/2013, the Court appointed Mr Cosimo Borrelli (“Borrelli”) and Ms Chi Lai Man Jocelyn (“Jocelyn”) as joint and several provisional liquidators of the 1st plaintiff. On the same day, they were also appointed as directors of the 2nd plaintiff at the instance of the sole shareholder of the 2nd plaintiff.  As mentioned earlier, in a matter of 4 days, Borrelli and Jocelyn caused the plaintiffs to instigate the present proceedings and obtained ex parte injunctive orders against the 1st to 12th defendants. The 3rd to 10th defendants are all corporate entities. The 13th defendant, also a corporate entity, was shortly thereafter added as a defendant and ex parte injunctive orders were also obtained against it.  This judgment however does not concern the plaintiffs’ case against the 13th defendant because the inter partes return date is yet to come.

8.  As acknowledged by Mr Lam, counsel for the plaintiffs, the ex parte application before Tong J was presented solely as an application for a Mareva injunction. It was not presented as an application for an interim injunction for the protection of proprietary claims. Mr Lam further acknowledged, quite fairly in my view, that the Indorsement on Writ was drafted too widely.  It was an array of causes of actions with a view to prevent possible “omissions” rather than through a thoughtful process with a view to elucidation. 

9.  In the first affidavit of Borrelli (the main supporting evidence for the ex parte application), he referred to the following evidential basis for the application:-

(1)   The evidence available to SFC suggested fictitious transactions between the 2nd plaintiff and 3 of the defendants between 2007 and 2009. They are the 3rd to 5th defendants[3] (“the fictitious transactions issue”);

(2)   Analysis conducted by a forensic account engaged by SFC suggested that there was a “round robin of funds” in 2008 between the 2nd plaintiff; the 3rd to 5th defendants (as purported suppliers) and the 6th and 7th defendants (as purported customers) (“the round robin issue”); and

(3)   As a result of the inflation of the Group’s revenue, the 1st defendant as beneficial owner of a majority shareholding in the Group had thereby obtained very substantial dividends from the Group (“the dividend issue”).

10.  As summarized in the plaintiffs’ Skeleton Arguments presented to the ex parte judge, the plaintiffs’ case was that the 1st defendant was the directing mind behind the fictitious transactions and the round robin scheme and that each of the remaining defendants were incorporated, created or directed by him to participate in such a scheme[4].

11.  In order to demonstrate the existence of a “good arguable case”, the plaintiffs’ Skeleton Arguments stated as follows:-

“25.  By way of brief summary, the Plaintiffs claim that they suffered substantial loss and damage of hundreds of millions of US dollars as a result of a fraudulent scheme operated by the 1st Defendant as the directing mind or “puppet master”, which involved various false transactions and operating and implementing false trading schemes.

26. As a result, the Plaintiffs claims, inter alia, that the other Defendants:-

26.1 constituted alter egos, puppets and/or creatures of the 1st Defendant;

26.2 caused the Plaintiffs to enter into fraudulent transactions;

26.3 received assets of the Plaintiff knowing the transactions were carried out as part of a fraudulent scheme; and

26.4 knowingly or dishonestly assisted in each other’s breaches of trust, duty of care and/or skill.”

12.  Having set out the plaintiffs’ case on “good arguable case”, the Skeleton Argument subsequently dealt with the issue of “risk of dissipation” and in the course stated the followings:-

“46. The evidence of a real risk of dissipation is addressed at paragraphs 32 to 41 of Borrelli 1[5].

47. He identifies, at paragraphs 33 to 36, a series of payments in the period from 10 to 28 July 2013 (“the July 2013 Payments”), which appear to have no commercial purpose and have caused the Plaintiffs to suffer a substantial loss of HK$1,009,298,420, specifically:

47.1 the payment of HK$680,299,270 from the 2nd Plaintiff to the 5th Defendant, in a series of seven installments paid over the period 10 to 26 July 2013;

47.2 the payment of HK$239,231,600 from the 2nd Plaintiff to the 10th Defendant in a series of four installments over the period 15 to 16 July 2013;

47.3 the payment of HK$73,053,237 from the 2nd Plaintiff to the 11th Defendant, in a series of three installments paid on 22 July 2013; and

47.4 the payment of HK$16,714,313 from the 2nd Plaintiff to the 12th Defendant on 24 July 2013.

48. There is no apparent commercial purpose or legitimate explanation for the July 2013 Payments.  It is of obvious and significant concern that all of the July 2013 Payments were made to entities that appear to be the creatures of the 1st Defendant or, at the very least, to related parties.  The very recent timing of the payments, which were made immediately before the appointment of the Provisional Liquidators, is also a matter of substantial concern to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, it is submitted that the July 2013 Payments represent a clear and unjustified dissipation of the 1st Plaintiff’s assets.” [emphasis added]

13.  Consistent with what was presented in the Skeleton Arguments, the evidence concerning the July 2013 Payments was presented under the issue of “risk of dissipation” in the 1st Affidavit of Borrelli[6]. Mr Lam acknowledged at the hearing that there was no evidence implicating the involvement of the 2nd defendant in the July 2013 Payments.  She did not receive any of the July 2013 Payments.  In relation to the payments received by the 11th and 12th defendants respectively, Borrelli said as follows:-

“35(c) the remittance of HK$73,053,237.00 from [2nd plaintiff] to [11th defendant] in a series of 3 installments paid over the period 19 July 2013 to 22 July 2013, a company (as per its most recent annual return):-

(i) wholly owned by Sze Wing Sheun;

(ii) with Sze Wing Sheun as the sole director;

(iii) with Xie Mei Jing as the appointed company
secretary; and

(iv) with the registered address of Room 1321, Leighton Centre, 77 Leighton Road, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong;

35(d) the remittance of HK$16,714,313.00 from [the 2nd plaintiff] to [12th defendant] on 24 July 2013, a company (as per its most recent annual return):

(i) wholly owned by Lin Yuanxiao;

(ii) with Lin Zhiqian as the sole director;

(iii) with Xie Mei Jing as the appointed company secretary; and

(iv) with the registered address of Room 1321, Leighton Centre, 77 Leighton Road, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong; …

37. Although the Provisional Liquidators are still investigating the July 2013 Payments, the work of the Provisional Liquidators to date indicated that appears to be no commercial justification for the payments. The Provisional Liquidators are also seriously concerned about these payments for the following reasons:-

(i) the timing of the payments which were just prior to the appointment of the Provisional Liquidators;

(ii) the substantial amount of the payments, totaling over HK$1 billion;

(iii) the fact that the payments have been made to the entities detailed by the SFC as being at the heart of the misconduct described by the SFC;

(iv) where [the 1st defendant] was one of the signatories on each of the authorization forms for each of the July 2013 Payments.” [emphasis added]

14.  I should immediately point out that paragraph 37(iii) of the above quote was factually wrong as acknowledged by Mr Lam.  There is no evidence that the 11th and 12th defendants had been in any way involved in the fictitious transactions issue and the round robin issue.  Mr Lam also acknowledged that paragraph 48 of the Skeleton Arguments was also erroneous in that there is no evidence that the 11th and 12 defendants are the creatures of the 1st defendant or parties related to him.  In particular, there is no evidence that Mr Sze Wing Shuen, Mr/Ms Xie Mei Jing, and Mr Lin Zhiqian are in any way connected to the 1st defendant or other corporate defendants which have been implicated in the fictitious transactions issue or the round robin issue.  Whilst the 11th and 12th defendants share the same registered office, which is that of a corporate secretarial services company, Mr Lam acknowledged that there is no evidence that the 11th and 12th defendants do not maintain a respective place of business or that they do not carry out genuine business activities.

15.  To complete the picture, I should also mention the evidence of Jocelyn in her Affirmation filed 7 August 2013.  At a section entitled “Continuing Investigations by the Provisional Liquidators”, she stated:-

“46. As noted in paragraphs 23 to 24 of the First Affirmation of Chi Lai Man Jocelyn which was filed in HCCW 210 of 2013, the Provisional Liquidators’ investigations in respect of the Group remain at a very preliminary stage. The Provisional Liquidators’ initial findings are that:-

(a) there is a substantial segregation of information and duties amongst the offices and employees of the Group from which it appears that no employee or management team seems to have a full understanding of the operations and financial status of the Group…”

16.  It was in the light of the above background that I was called upon to deal with the 2nd defendant’s opposition against continuation of the ex parte injunction orders and the applications of the 11th and 12th defendants for the discharge of the ex parte injunction orders.  The broad grounds of the 2nd defendant’s opposition and those of the discharge applications by 11th and 12th defendants were essentially the same, namely, that the materials presented to the ex parte judge disclosed no “good arguable case” and no “risk of dissipation” vis-à-vis the respective 2nd, 11th and 12th defendants.

II.The 2nd defendant

17.  At the hearing, I first sought clarification from Mr Lam as to what causes of action he relied upon in the plaintiffs’ application for continuation of the injunctive orders against the 2nd defendant. Mr Lam stated as follows:-

(1) fraudulent breach of fiduciary duties in relation to the 1st plaintiff (as a non-executive director) and in relation to the 2nd plaintiff (as an administrator until 14 February 2010);


(2) dishonest assistance in relation to July 2013 payments and the fictitious transactions in so far as they related to the 5th defendant; and

(3) Conspiracy with the 2nd plaintiff, the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th to 10th defendants in fictitious transactions (both in the round robin issue and the July 2013 payments issue).

18.  Firstly, in relation to the allegation that the 2nd defendant was involved in the July 2013 payments, Mr Lam acknowledged that there is no evidence of the 2nd defendant receiving any part of the July 2013 payments.  The allegation against her was solely based on her connection with the 5th defendant which was one of the parties receiving part of the July 2013 payments.

19.  Similarly, on the fictitious transactions issue and the round robin issue, the allegation against the 2nd defendant was based on:-

(i) she being a non-executive director of the 1st plaintiff;

(ii) she being one of the 2 administrators of the 2nd plaintiff between 17 July 2007 and 14 April 2010;

(iii) her connection with the 5th defendant “Cheung Fat” as per paragraph 45 of SFC’s Petition in HCCW 210/2013 which read:-

“[the 5th defendant] was incorporated in October 2007 through CPK Secretarial Company Limited…Its sole shareholder and sole director is Ms. Zhong Liue (鍾柳娥). A DBS bank cheque was issued by Worldwide International Inspection Ltd., a company incorporated in the BVI, for payment of the incorporation of [the 5th defendant]. The signatories of the current account of Worldwide Inspection were [the 1st defendant] and [the 2nd defendant] (non-executive director of [the 1st plaintiff] and wife of [the 1st defendant]. [The 2nd defendant] was the sole director and sole shareholder of Worldwide Inspection in the DBS account opening documents…”

20.  In relation to the 2nd defendant’s involvement in the affairs of the 1st plaintiff, Mr Lam added that she was described, in the prospectus as a co-founder of the Group with her husband. Counsel for the 2nd defendant, Mr Joffe submitted that it was neither here nor there. The important point was that at the material times, the 2nd defendant was merely a non-executive director of the 1st plaintiff and that there was no evidence from the plaintiffs to demonstrate that she had been in any way involved in the day-to-day operation of the 1st plaintiff.  In fact, in the same prospectus, it was mentioned that the 2nd defendant’s involvement in several companies within the Group (including the 2nd plaintiff) was “non-executive capacity”. 

21.  As for the 5th defendant, it was incorporated in 2007. Mr Joffe submitted that the signing of a cheque of Worldwide Inspection to pay for the incorporation charges of the 5th defendant was not evidence of the 2nd defendant’s participation in the subsequent activities of the 5th defendant. Mr Lam acknowledged that there was no evidence of the 2nd defendant being involved in the payments made between the 2nd plaintiff and the 5th defendant, such as the signing of cheques.  There was simply no evidence to infer that the 2nd defendant knew that the 5th defendant was being used for any fraudulent purpose.  It was not in dispute that the shareholders of the 5th defendant underwent successive changes. Eventually, a company named Huan Bao Steel became the sole shareholder of the 5th defendant. The 2nd defendant is also the sole shareholder of Huan Bao Steel.  There was however no suggestion that Huan Bao Steel has in any way been connected with the fraudulent schemes perpetrated by the 1st defendant.  Mr Lam does not suggest that the 2nd defendant had been a director or officer of the 5th defendant at any time.  I accepted Mr Joffe’s submission that the evidence of signing a cheque to pay for one’s incorporation fees was not a badge of fraud.  Inference of participation in fraud must not be lightly drawn. In dealing with a Mareva injunction application, it is essential for the court to carefully and critically scrutinize the materials placed before it (see Dieulemar Shipping SpA v. Transfield ER Futures Ltd.[7]). There must be solid and cogent evidential basis (see also Dallah Albaraka (Ireland) v. Symphony Gem Nv.[8] ). 

22.  In relation to the 2nd defendant’s role as an administrator of the 2nd plaintiff between 17 July 2007 and 14 April 2010, it is firstly important to note that it was not the plaintiffs’ case that all commercial transactions conducted by the 2nd plaintiff were fictitious.  The plaintiffs’ case was that the volume of business/revenue was inflated.  Secondly, the fraudulent scheme involved the 2nd plaintiff making payments to suppliers pursuant to allegedly fictitious transactions.  It was thus pertinent to note Mr Lam’s acknowledgment that there was no evidence of the 2nd defendant being involved in any payment made by the 2nd plaintiff. Mr Lam did not even suggest that the 2nd defendant was a signatory to any bank account of the 2nd plaintiff.  That was wholly consistent with her description in the prospectus, namely that her involvement with the 2nd plaintiff was “non-executive capacity”.  

23.  In the premises, I accepted Mr Joffe’s submission that there was no evidence on which one could draw an inference that the 2nd defendant knew of and/or participated in the fictitious transactions or the round robin scheme.  Neither was there any evidence to infer that the 2nd defendant had knowledge or and/or participated in the July 2013 Payments between the 5th defendant and the 2nd plaintiff.  By the time of those payments to the 5th defendant, the 2nd defendant had long ceased to be an administrator of the 2nd plaintiff.  As observed before, there was simply no evidence of the 2nd defendant’s involvement in the affairs of the 5th defendant since its incorporation.  For the same reasons, there was no basis to suggest that the 2nd defendant was in fraudulent breach of fiduciary duties in relation to the plaintiffs. The last allegation of “conspiracy” had not even been included in the widely drafted Indorsement on Writ. There was no evidence of any connection between the 2nd defendant; the 3rd and 4th defendants; and the 6th to 10th defendants.  Mr Lam simply could not show me any cogent evidential basis for such an extravagant claim. 

24.  In the circumstances, I was satisfied that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a good arguable case vis-à-vis the 2nd defendant. On this ground alone, I should have refused to continue the draconian injunctive orders against her.  I further noted that there was simply no evidence that the 2nd defendant had been in the process of or was likely dissipating her assets. She is living in Hong Kong with her three children. Having found that there was no evidence of her involvement in the fraudulent scheme, there was no basis to suggest that she had exhibited “low commercial morality” from which a risk of dissipation can be inferred. I will also refuse to continue the injunctive orders against her on this additional basis.  I accordingly ordered that the plaintiff’s summons for continuation of the ex parte injunction orders against the 2nd defendant be dismissed. I also ordered the plaintiffs to pay for the 2nd defendant costs of resisting the summons which should include the costs of making disclosures pursuant to the ex parte order. Such costs should be taxed if not agreed and payable forthwith. There should also be a certificate for two counsels.

III.The 11th and 12th defendants

25.  At the hearing, when I asked Mr Lam what were the causes of action now relied upon by the plaintiffs against the 11th and 12th defendants, he stated that they were:-

(1) knowing receipt in breach of trust in relation to the respective remittances admittedly received by the 11th and 12th defendants; and

(2) alternatively, on money had and received in relation to those remittances.

26.  Mr Mok SC (senior counsel for the 11th defendant) and MrLeong SC (senior counsel for the 12th defendant) reminded me that before the ex parte judge, the plaintiffs presented their case very differently.  The case that the 11th and 12th defendants were called upon to meet was as set out in the plaintiffs’ Skeleton Arguments quoted in paragraph 11 above.  It could readily be seen that paragraphs 26.1 and 26.2 of the Skeleton Argument were not sustainable for the reasons set out in paragraph 14 above. Paragraphs 26.3 and 26.4 were referable to the transactions under the “fictitious transactions and round robin issues”.  As mentioned in paragraph 12 above, the July 2013 Payments were mentioned quite separately as being relevant to the issue of “risk of dissipation”.  Having accepted that there was no evidence of the 11th and 12th defendants’ involvement in the fictitious transactions issue and the round robin issue, Mr Lam accepted that the case of “knowing receipt in breach of trust” could not be built on that basis.

27.  Mr Lam however submitted that the 11th and 12th defendants had not disputed their respective receipt of funds from the 2nd plaintiff under the remittance advices exhibited in the 1st Affidavit of Borrelli[9].  Mr Lam relied on the principle of Seldon v Davidson[10]. He submitted that the burden shifted onto the 11th and 12th defendants to explain why the sums admittedly received by them were not liable to be returned to the 2nd plaintiff. He then submitted that the 11th and 12th defendants failed to do so in their affirmations.  He therefore submitted that at the very least, the plaintiffs had established a case on money had and received.

28.  I will first deal with the state of the evidence concerning these remittances.  There were 3 remittance advices exhibited in the 1st Affidavit of Borrelli which related to the 11th defendant. They amounted to US$9,417,596 (HK$73,053,237).  All these remittance advices referred, on their face, to a contract numbered HWSC2013090. In relation to the 12th defendant, the remittance advice of US$2,154,712 (HK$16,714,313) referred to a contract numbered GDS2012087. When I enquired from Mr Lam whether there was evidence about these specific contracts, Mr Lam took instructions from his instructing solicitors[11] and told me from counsel’s bench that the Provisional Liquidators had looked for them and could not find them.  Mr Mok and Mr Leong objected and submitted that I should not accept evidence given from counsel’s bench.  They referred me to various passages in the affidavit/affirmation of Borelli and Jocelyn which I had already set out in paragraphs 13 and 15 above. They pointed out that the ex parte application was made barely 4 days after the Provisional Liquidators were appointed. Investigation into the affairs of the Group was admittedly still at a very preliminary stage and very little assistance was obtainable from the Group’s employees.  They also pointed out that when Mr Borrelli mentioned about the remittances in his affidavit, he clearly was not aware of the significance of the contract numbers, their importance was only apparent when questions were put by me to Mr Lam at the hearing.  If Mr Borrelli were aware of the references to the respective contracts in the remittance advices, and that he had undertaken a meaningful search for these contracts in vain, he would have mentioned that as a basis for saying that “there appears to be no commercial justification for the payments”. He would most probably have described the remittances as “not substantiated by any underlying transactions and documents” or words to similar effect. In a nutshell, Mr Mok and Mr Leong submitted that Mr Borrelli’s aforesaid statement was a bare assertion not backed by evidence.  No evidential value could be attached to such an alleged “appearance” of no commercial justification because it all depended on whether and if so what investigative steps had been undertaken.  They also submitted that the alleged “appearance” was contrary to documentary evidence.  On any fair reading of the remittance advices, they actually “appeared” on their faces to relate to certain commercial contracts. Unless there was evidence indicating the said contracts to be fictitious, there was indeed an “appearance of commercial justification”.

29.  Mr Lam submitted that the Provisional Liquidators had gone on oath to state that there was an appearance of no commercial justification and I could act on that evidence. With respect, the statement of Mr Borrelli was in the nature of a conclusion. To be precise, it was a conclusion reached at a preliminary stage of investigation. In order to afford any weight to such a conclusion, I must first assess the steps taken by the Provisional Liquidators before arriving at that conclusion. Admittedly, the investigation was rather preliminary and ongoing even by 7 August 2013. Employees of the Group seemed unable to provide much assistance. There was no evidence of the Provisional Liquidators being aware of the contract references and hence directed their search accordingly. No details of the investigative steps undertaken were given.  In the end, I agreed with MrMok and Mr Leong that I could not place any appreciable weight on such a bare assertion.

30.  Mr Lam then submitted that I could draw adverse inference from the fact that the 11th and 12th defendants did not assert and provide evidence in their affirmations to establish the commercial basis for the remittances. This submission was made on the basis that relying on Seldon vDavidson, the burden was squarely on the 11th and 12th defendants. I accepted the submissions of Mr Mok and Mr Leong that in the circumstances of this case, the burden of proof never shifted onto their respective clients.  First of all, the Seldon vDavidson principle would only apply in the absence of any “suggestion” that there was consideration backing the payments. In fact, in the judgment of Willmer LJ in Seldon v Davidson[12], his Lordship referred to “absence of circumstance” as justifying a prima facie recoverability of an admitted payment. In El Vince Ltd. v Wu Wen Sheng[13], the fact that the defendant pleaded the received sum as a part repayment of an earlier loan to the plaintiff was already sufficient to render the burden of proof remaining on the plaintiff.  Mr Leong also referred me to the dictum of Poon J in Big Island Construction (HK) Ltd. v Wu Yi Development Co. Ltd.[14] which I fully agree.  Mr Leong also referred me to the recent decision of the CFA in Lui Fai Yeung v Chui Kin Man[15] . After referring to the principle of Seldon v Davidson, Tang PJ said[16] that “I believe the proper inference to draw depends on the circumstances of the particular case and not on who has the burden of proof”.

31.  In the present case, the remittance advices, on their faces, already suggested that the payments were made pursuant to certain commercial contracts. Unless there was credible evidence to the contrary, it would seem that the remittances related to specific commercial transactions. As mentioned earlier, Mr Lam acknowledged that there was no evidence that the 11th and 12th defendants did not maintain a respective place of business or that they did not carry out genuine business activities.  Against that, it had not been suggested by the plaintiffs that by July 2013, the 2nd plaintiff had already ceased its business activities such that any transactions conducted in July 2013 could only have been questionable.

32.  Secondly, Mr Mok was correct in submitting that the goal post had been shifted by the plaintiffs only at the inter partes hearing when I questioned Mr Lam on what causes of action were actually being pursued against the 11th and 12th defendants.  The affirmations filed by Mr Sze Wing Sheun and Madam Xie Mei Jing both on 7 August 2013 dealt with the case made by the plaintiffs against the 11th and 12th defendants as per the affidavit of Borrelli and the Skeleton Arguments presented before the ex parte judge.  Mr Lam acknowledged that the application before the ex parte judge was solely a Mareva injunction based on the causes of action identified in paragraph 26 of the Skeleton Arguments. He acknowledged that the proprietary claims of knowing receipt and/or money had and received in relation to the remittances now sought to be pursued against the 11th and 12th defendants were only raised at the inter parteshearing.  Although he pointed out that “money had and received” was mentioned in the admittedly too widely drafted Indorsement on Writ, it was in my view clear that money had and received was not a case presented to the ex parte judge at all. Similarly, as far as knowing receipt was concerned, the case before the ex parte Judge was in relation to the funds involved in the fictitious transactions and round robin issues.  In fact, references to the July 2013 Payments in the Skeleton Arguments and in the first Affidavit of Borrelli were made in the context of “risk of dissipation” rather than on “good arguable case”. Mr Mok and Mr Leong submitted that it was a serious allegation to suggest that the 11th and 12th defendants were involved in fictitious contracts.  If such allegation should be made, it should be made clearly and distinctly. It should also be backed by cogent evidence.  They submitted that on the evidence, such an allegation just could not be responsibly made by the Provisional Liquidators. In the circumstances, I agreed with Mr Mok and Mr Leong that I could not draw any adverse inference from the fact that the 11th and 12th defendants did not specifically deposed to the 2 contracts underlying the remittances.   

33.  In the circumstances, I concluded that based on the evidence presented before the ex parte judge, the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a good arguable case on the causes of actions relied upon and set out in paragraph 26 of the Skeleton Arguments.  On this ground alone, the ex parte Mareva Injunction together with its ancillary orders must be discharged.  Furthermore, before the ex parte judge, the case of “risk of dissipation” against the 11th and 12th defendants was solely based on alleged “low commercial morality”.  I had rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments on the “lack of commercial justification” point in relation to the July 2013 Payments.  Mr Lam had acknowledged that there was no evidence implicating the 11th and 12th defendants in the fictitious transactions and round robin schemes. I was mindful of the warnings against too loosely inferring a risk of dissipation from allegedly low commercial morality as explained in Eastman Chemical Ltd. v Heyro Chemical Co. Ltd. (No. 2)[17]. There was simply no evidence in this case to suggest any lacking in commercial morality on the part of the 11th and 12th defendants.  There was also no evidence on actual risk of dissipation by 11th and 12th defendants of their assets.  Hence, I also discharged the ex parte injunction orders against the 11th and 12th defendants basing on this additional ground.

IV.Re-grant?

34.   Consequent upon my aforesaid orders, Mr Lam applied for a re-grant of injunctive orders against the 11th and 12th defendants. The application was based on the same materials but in the nature of interim preservation of the subject matters of the plaintiffs’ “proprietary claims” in relation to the remittances. Mr Lam would limit his application to the amounts of the remittances received by the 11th and 12th defendants respectively.  Mr Lam argued that in relation to this application, the threshold was lower. The plaintiffs merely had to establish “serious questions to be tried” as opposed to “good arguable case”.  He relied on Lewin on Trust[18]which stated:-

“To obtain an interim injunction to preserve trust assets, a beneficiary has to show that there is a series question to be tried as to whether they are trust assets and are in jeopardy. The burden of proof is not as high as it is in the case of a freezing order, where claimant has to show a “good arguable case”. This is the only practical difference between the two forms of injunction and it would there seem that the procedure involved, and the duty of fair presentation owed to the court, are the same when obtaining either form of injunction.”

35.  Mr Mok submitted that a claim for money had and received is not a claim based on trust. I was again referred to the Big Island case[19] for the proposition that money had and received was grounded in “unjust enrichment”. That was of course correct but it did not provide a complete answer. Assuming the contracts referred to in the remittance advices were fictitious, then it could be argued that the 11th and 12th defendants would have knowledge that the remittances were paid out of the 2nd plaintiff in breach of trust, namely, when the 1st defendant signed the respective remittance advices, he was using company funds not for the benefit of the company.  In that case, the receipt of the remittances could amount to knowing receipt of trust moneys.  Hence, the crux of the matter remained as whether the evidence established a “serious question to be tried” in respect of the existence / absence of commercial basis for the remittances.

36.  On the other hand, Mr Leong referred me to footnote 35 in Lewin on Trust. After referring to Derby & Co. Ltd. Weldon[20] , the learned author wrote:  “Note the comment that the difference is incapable of definition. The cogency of the proof needs to be weighed against the severity of the order sought, and a freezing injunction, affecting the trustee’s own asset, is more draconian. ”.  Although it would be difficult to define the difference between the “serious question to be tried test” and the “good arguable case test”, I had to recognize that there should be some difference in degree.  The logic behind the difference is as stated in Lewin on Trust, namely, that a Mareva injunction affects a person’s freedom in dealing with his own assets. It is thus more draconian.  However, it is also draconian to seek to restrain a defendant from dealing with certain assets in his possession and control simply because the plaintiff asserts (before a trial could take place) that the assets are trust properties. Before granting such a relief, the court should also closely scrutinize the plaintiff’s assertion. The court must look for the existence or otherwise of factual and evidential basis for such an assertion. One does not get an interim injunction by merely raising a “question to be tried”.  There must be a “serious question to be tried”.  In other words, the plaintiff must satisfy the court with sufficient facts and evidence such that the court can conclude that justice demands the grant of such injunctive relief. In my judgment, my decision has to be grounded on my assessment on the cogency of the evidence presented before me rather than dwelling into the semantic differences between the two tests.

37.  As explained earlier, on the face of the documents, ie the remittance advices, they referred to specific contracts. There was no evidence to suggest that these contracts were fictitious or less than genuine. Mr Borrelli’s statement was no more than a bare assertion. There was no evidence that the 11th and 12th defendants were not companies conducting genuine businesses. There was no evidence of any link or connection between them and the 1st defendant (the alleged frauster).  In fact there was no evidence that they were linked to any of the defendants.  There was no evidence that in July 2013, the 2nd plaintiff could not have been conducting some genuine business transactions. Whilst payments by the 2nd plaintiff to other defendants implicated in the fictitious transactions issue and the round robin issue would justifiably raise one’s eyebrow, the same could not be said about the 11th and 12th defendants.  The fact that various payments (including those to the 11th and 12th defendants) were made in July 2013 was neither here nor there.  As Mr Leong pointed out, the application for appointment of Provisional Liquidators was made ex parte. In any event, the 1st defendant knew that the Group was investigated by SFC since 2009. Mr Lam stressed that the remittance advices were all signed by the 1st defendant. In my view, this was yet another neutral point because the 1st defendant was the CEO of the Group and obviously a signatory of the 2nd plaintiff’s bank account. All payment documents, whether they related to genuine or fictitious transactions of the 2nd plaintiff would have to be signed by him.  In the end, I concluded that the evidence so far presented by the plaintiffs failed to establish a serious question to be tried in relation to the two causes of action now pursued against the 11th and 12th defendants. I accordingly dismissed the application for re-grant.

V.Leave to appeal

38.  Mr Lam orally applied for leave to appeal against my decisions. He argued that the admitted receipt of the remittance; paragraph 37 of Borrelli’s Affidavit; and the absence of explanation from the 11th and 12th defendants constituted a “good arguable case” or at least a “serious question to be tried”. He argued that I erred in law in not so finding.  Mr Mok and Mr Leong argued that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success in relation to the proposed ground of appeal.  The proposed ground sought to question the propriety of my assessment on the cogency and weight of the evidence. For the reasons explained in the course of my treatment of the evidence, I was unable to see a reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal.  I accordingly refused to grant leave to appeal.

(Jason Pow, SC)
Recorder of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Douglas Lam, instructed by Hogan Lovells, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiff

The 1st defendant was not represented and did not appear

Mr Victor Joffe, instructed by Li & Partners for the 2nd defendant

The 3rd defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 4th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 5th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 6th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 7th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 8th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 9th defendant was not represented and did not appear

The 10th defendant was not represented and did not appear

Mr Johnny Mok SC, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co for the 11th defendant

Mr Alan Leong SC, instructed by Anthony Siu & Co for the 12th defendant

The 13rd defendant was not represented and did not appear



[1] I also ordered the continuation of the ex parte injunctive orders against the remaining defendants which did not appear on 9 August 2013 and which did not put forward any opposition.

[2] This order was necessitated because the plaintiffs indicated their intention to appeal against my orders vis-à-vis the 11th and 12th defendants.  The consent order was agreed upon by the parties with the view to not rendering the said intended appeal nugatory.

[3] The 5th defendant is called “Cheung Fat” whose participation will be looked at more closely when I examine the plaintiffs’ case against the 2nd defendant.

[4] See paragraph 17

[5]This was a reference to the first affidavit of Borrelli

[6] See paragraphs 32 to 41

[7] [2011] 1 HKLRD 75, at paragraphs 54-55

[8] [2005] 3 HKLRD 703, paragraphs 56 to 60

[9] Hearing Bundle pages 162, 171, 173 and 175

[10] [1968] 1 WLR 1083 approved in Mak Ka Hing v Pang Ming Chung [2011] 1 HKLRD 347

[11] There appeared no communication with Mr Borrelli, the deponent.

[12] At page 1088

[13] [2011] 4 HKLRD 541

[14] Unreported HCA 1957/2005 etc. , delivered on 28/7/2011 at paragraph 34.

[15] FACV No. 16 of 2011, delivered on  21 December 2012

[16] At paragraph 16

[17] [2012] 3 HKLRD 307

[18] 18th edition, paragraphs 38-09

[19] See paragraphs 122 to 126

[20] [1990] Ch 48 at 57, per Parker LJ