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Civil Action2013

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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90720-EN-2013-12-18

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED (永利豐集團有限公司)4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
 VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED (浚域有限公司)6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED (御首有限公司)7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED (凱譽企業有限公司)10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (天豐國際集團有限公司)11th Defendant
____________
Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Decision: 18 December 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

APPLICATION

1.  I shall use the same abbreviations in my decision on 1 November 2013.  In that decision, I ordered costs on a nisi basis, in favour of D1, D3-D7 (“collectively the defendants”) with certificates for 2 counsel, after dismissal of TGH’s application for a Mareva injunction.  The defendants seek variation of the costs order for a higher scale of indemnity basis.  The written submissions have been considered.

2.  In the following analyses, I shall refer to TGH as the paying party although it should be remembered that TEC should also be liable together with TGH for the period in which TEC was the 1st plaintiff before its withdrawal. 

LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR GRANT OF INDEMNITY COSTS

3.  The principles governing the award of costs on indemnity basis have been set out by the Court of Final Appeal in Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (2004) HKCFAR 114, at 123-124:

“(i) The court has a broad discretion to determine how costs shall be paid and whether indemnity costs should be ordered under Order 62, rule 28(3) and section 52A of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4.

(ii) The successful party should show, in order to obtain an order for costs on an indemnity basis, that the case has some "special or unusual feature" (Overseas Trust Bank Ltd v. Coopers and Lybrand [1991] 1 HKLR 177 at 182J, per Godfrey J; Sung Foo Kee Ltd v. Pak Lik Co. (A firm) [1996] 3 HKC 570 at 575C-D).

(iii) The courts have rejected the proposition that an award of indemnity costs will only be made where a case has been brought with an ulterior motive or for an improper purpose or where there is some deception or underhand conduct on the part of the losing party.

(iv) The courts have emphasized the undesirability of attempting to define the circumstances in which orders for indemnity costs are to be made. It has been said that the discretion is not to be fettered or circumscribed beyond the requirement that taxation on an indemnity basis must be “appropriate”.

(v) While the grounds upon which costs are awarded must be connected with the case. This may extend to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties' conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, but no further.

4.  At first instance [2004] 1 HKLRD 127, Chu J also stated as follows:

“12. In my view, the very fact that costs are not imposed by way of punishment suggests that the circumstances justifying the award of indemnity costs are not limited to the conduct of the litigation. In Choy Yee Chun v. Bond Star Development Ltd[1997] HKLRD 1327, the appellant argued that the judge erred in taking into account events prior to the institution of the proceedings in making an indemnity costs order. Stock J (as he then was) in rejecting that argument, referred to the judgment of Buckley LJ in Scherer v. Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615 at p.619, which said that while "the grounds upon which costs are awarded must be connected with the case, this may extend to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties' conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, but no further" : at 1338G-H.

13. Further, given the underlying rationale is to indemnify the successful party, it will be open to the court to use the indemnity costs award to achieve a fairer result for the successful party. In Petrotrade Inc. v. Texaco Ltd[2002] 1 WLR 947, Lord Woolf MR pointed out that an award of costs on standard basis will almost invariably mean that a successful party has to pay part of his costs out of his own pocket, and that an indemnity costs order would avoid that element of unfairness: see also McPhilemy v. Times Newspapers Ltd (Costs)[2002] 1 WLR 934 at p.943D-F. Although PetrotradeInc. v. Texaco Ltdand McPhilemyv. Times Newspapers Ltd (Costs) are cases on Part 36 offer under the English CPR, the discussions on the nature of indemnity costs order and the use of it to redress elements of unfairness inherent in the legal process are of general application.”

5.  I have considered the various examples in the authorities referred to me by counsel on both sides when the court imposed indemnity costs.  Of importance was the instance where an unfounded claim of fraud has been held to be a special feature such as to justify an order for costs on indemnity basis: Hobbins v Royal Skandia Life Assurance and anor [2012] 1 HKLRD 977, per Reyes J at paras 140-142.

GROUNDS FOR THE DEFENDANTS’ APPLICATION

6.  The defendants have put forth 3 grounds in support of their applications:

A. TGH’s refusal to discontinue its application for Mareva injunction after the court’s refusal to grant an interim injunction at the first inter partes hearing (“the 1stMareva decision).

B. TGH’s failure to show a good arguable case against any of the defendants and lack of cogency of evidence for an allegation of fraud at the substantive hearing (“the 2nd Mareva decision”);

C. TGH’s inordinate delay before withdrawing the Mareva application against D3 (Yuanzhi) and D4 (Winful).

A. TGH’s refusal to discontinue its application for Mareva injunction after the 1st Mareva decision

7.  TGH had failed in the Mareva application at the ex parte stage.  At the 1stinter partes hearing of the Mareva application, this court dismissed the application on the grounds of:

(i) Lack of urgency (para 31 of the 1stMareva decision);

(ii) TGH’s abuse of the court process as against Yuanzhi and Winful (paras 29, 31 and 39);

(iii) TGH’s lack of a good arguable case (para 43);

(iv) TGH’s material non-disclosures (paras 44-52).

8.  Mr Zimmern acting on behalf of the defendants submits that, at the latest, by the time of the 1stMareva decision, it should have been abundantly clear to TGH that it had no merit in its Mareva application.  Hence, TGH should not have proceeded further with it.

9.  Further, on 25 April 2013, the defendants through their solicitors (save for Yuanzhi who was unrepresented at the time) sent a letter to the plaintiffs’ solicitors in which the plaintiffs were invited to, amongst others, agree to the dismissal of the Mareva application but the plaintiffs refused.

10.  Without disrespect to Mr Zimmern, insofar as merits (para 7(iii) above) were concerned, the reasons for finding lack of good arguable case in the 1st and 2ndMareva decisions respectively were quite different because of some change in the plaintiffs’ evidentiary basis. 

11.  In the 1stMareva decision,, this court did not grant the interim injunction on the ground that to impose one hastily on the evidence of Lau without affording an opportunity for the defendants to file their evidence was not fair (para 34 of the 1stMareva decision).  There were inadequacies in the plaintiffs’ case looking at the endorsement of claim and the evidence, amongst which were the lack of a pleaded case on who the parties to the conspiracy to defraud were, lack of foundation for a cause of action for breach of contract and that the cause of action on knowing receipt and dishonest assistance was not based on evidence but “supposition” (para 35 of the 1stMareva decision).  There were also difficulties in respect of the causes of action against other individual defendants (para 37-38, 41-42).  In fairness to the plaintiffs, they did drop their claims against D8-D11 after the 1st Mareva decision. 

12.  In the 2ndMareva decision, many of the reasons in the preceding paragraph no longer applied with the filing of the statement of claim.  This time the lack of good arguable case was premised largely on lack of creditability in Lau’s evidence.

13.  Insofar as para 7(i) was concerned, it was relevant to the ex parte and 1stinter partes hearing only.  It had no impact on the issue of merits.

14.  Insofar as paragraph 7(ii) was concerned, it was relevant to merits as against Yuanzhi and Winful and this will be further dealt with under issue (C) below. 

15.  With regard to para 7(iv), by the time of the substantive hearing, TGH had not argued against the fortification of the undertaking in damages.  It was not relevant to the merits of the arguable case.

16.  Ground A is not substantiated, save in relation to Yuanzhi and Winful.

B.  TGH’s failure to show a good arguable case against any of the defendants and lack of cogency of evidence for an allegation of fraud

17.  TGH’s application was dismissed in the 2nd Mareva decision after a substantive hearing on the grounds of:

(i) Lack of credible evidence from Lau (paras 65-77);

(ii) Lack of a good arguable case against Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful, and only serious issues to be tried were found as against D5-D7 (para 77 & 82); and

(iii) Balance of convenience was in favour of D5 (paras 97 & 102).

18.  It is of importance not to lose sight of how this court came to the view of lack of a good arguable case.  Reliance on a convicted fraudster (Lau) to establish one’s case is not, on its own, fatal, although there are great risks involved.  Much depends on whether there is independent, weighty evidence to support the fraudster’s assertions. The supporting affidavit of Lau did provide evidence of fraud, although there was a mismatch in his affidavit and the statement of claim filed afterwards.  This court nevertheless accepted that the statement of claim was capable of being read in the way advanced by TGH’s counsel (para 49 of the 2nd Mareva decision).  The question of Lau’s credibility aside, there was sufficient evidence from Lau’s supporting affidavit to support the pleaded case (para 50).

19.  After the 1st Mareva decision, TGH was let down by Lau who declined to provide an affidavit in reply on its behalf.  Despite that, TGH was able to establish what would have been a good arguable case on the merits against Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful, from 2 out of 3 pieces of evidence (ie the REPO transactions and Everlong transaction) which came to light after the ex parte hearing (para 64 of the 2nd Mareva decision).  There was also a finding of risk of dissipation of assets in the light of Lee’s earlier lies (paras 86, 87, 91 and 93 of the 2nd Mareva decision).

20.  The balance was tipped against the granting of a Mareva injunction because of (a) the failure of Lee to provide an affidavit in reply, (b) his withdrawal of the police report against Lau in respect of the Everlong transaction, and (c) his failure to disclaim the contents of his own Confession Statements or his previous affirmations (paras 77 & 96).  Although items (b) and (c) concerned matters in existence before Lau filed his first affidavit in support dated 9 April 2013, item (a) was not something within the expectation of TGH in view of its settlement agreement with Lau. 

21.  In my view, this was not an entirely unfounded case of fraud.  Nor was it an opportunistic move or tactical interlocutory “nuclear weapon” (to use Mr Zimmern’s description) on the part of TGH to take out this Mareva application, and to pursue it after 2 failed attempts.  TGH had been let down by its own witness.  It had changed its evidentiary course since commencement of the Mareva application.  It was as a result of the court’s weighing of the evidence that it was found that a good arguable case was not made out.  TGH (or its legal advisers) might have been a little too confident of their case but that was far from saying that they had abused the process in proceeding after the 1st Mareva decision.  These views applied to Lee, and D5-7 whose defence was partly dependent on whether a good arguable case was established against Lee. 

22.  Mr Zimmern draws to my attention that the REPO and Everlong transactions only accounted for approximately US$1.1m, compared to the total claim of US$36m.   He submits that such circumstances went beyond what could commonly be described as “ordinary hostile litigation”.  With respect, I do not see how the quantum of the claim had lengthened the substantive hearing of the Mareva application. 

23.  Considering all circumstances surrounding the pursuit of the Mareva injunction, I am not satisfied that there were unusual or special circumstances to arouse the court’s indignation.  It is not appropriate to penalize TGH with indemnity costs as against Lee, D5-D7.

C.  TGH’s inordinate delay before withdrawing the Mareva application against D3 (Yuanzhi) and D4 (Winful)

24.  D3 and D4 stood in a totally different position.  In the 1st Mareva decision, I stated that asking for another Mareva injunction against Yuanzhi and Winful was a clear abuse of process in view of the existence of the Mareva injunction against them in the 2011 Action. 

25.  An additional Mareva injunction in the present action would not have added protection to TGH but had wasted the costs of Yuanzhi and Winful.  In addition, it had created a juridical disadvantage to Yuanzhi in that it was left unrepresented during most part of the pre-hearing stage of the Mareva application until its withdrawal (para 29 of the 1stMareva decision).

26.  However, TGH had not withdrawn its Mareva application against Yuanzhi and Winful until 5 working days before the substantive hearing.  In their written submission, Messrs Jones Day acting on behalf of TGH has completely failed to address this delay in withdrawal.

27.  I am of the view that the plaintiff’s abuse of process was clearly a “special feature” that warranted imposition of costs on indemnity basis as against Yuanzhi and Winful and I so order.

CONCLUSION

28.  I summarize my order as follows:

(1) As regards D1, D5-D7, the order nisi in their favour with certificate for 2 counsel is made absolute without variation.  The costs shall be taxed forthwith in the absence of agreement on quantum.  Cost of the summons to vary the costs order shall be to TGH to be taxed at the same time and set off against costs payable to D1, D5-D7.

(2) As regards D3 and D4, the order nisi is varied so that costs in their favour with certificates for 2 counsel shall be taxed forthwith on indemnity basis in the absence of agreement on quantum.  Costs of the summons to vary the costs order shall also be to D3 and D4 on indemnity basis to be taxed at the same time.

29.  The fees of Mr Barrie Barlow SC and Mr Zimmern shall be apportioned equally among the defendants whom they represented at different stages.

30.  I thank the lawyers for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Jones Day for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co for the 1st, 4th‑7th defendants

Eversheds for the 3rd defendant

90703-EN-2013-12-17

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 454 OF 2013

_____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 nd 
 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED(源智國貿易有限公司)3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED(永利豐集團有限公司)4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED5th Defendant
 VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED (浚域有限公司)6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED(御首有限公司)7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED(凱譽企業有限公司)10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (天豐國際集團有限公司)11th Defendant
____________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Lok in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 12 November 2013
Date of Decision: 17 December 2013

___________________

DECISION

___________________

1.  This is an application by the 1st, 3rd to 7th defendants to strike out the Statement of Claim and to dismiss the 2nd plaintiff’s claim against them.

Background

2.  There used to be two plaintiffs in this action.  The former 1st plaintiff, Taihan Electric Wire Company Limited (“TEC”), is a Korean listed corporation specialising in manufacturing and supplying various types of cables, including a specialised type of cable used for electrical wire and communication applications known as SCR Copper Rods (“Copper Rods”).  The former 2nd plaintiff, Taihan Global Holdings Ltd (“TGH”), is a wholly owned subsidiary of TEC in Hong Kong.  Since November 2008, it has managed the sales business of the TEC group in Hong Kong and Southern China. TGH is now the only remaining plaintiff in this action.

3.  TGH had engaged one Mr Lau Siu Ming (“Lau”) as its agent to promote the sale of Copper Rods in the Pearl River Delta market. It is the plaintiffs’ case that Lau was involved in a sophisticated fraud perpetrated against TGH, and Lau had misappropriated a substantial amount of the plaintiffs’ Copper Rods and the proceeds of sale thereof for his own benefit.

4.  In September 2011, TGH commenced High Court Action No 1687 of 2011 against Lau as the 1st defendant to claim for, inter alia, damages and account for sums received resulting from the alleged wrongful conduct of Lau (“the 2011 Action”).

5.  The 3rd defendant herein, Yuanzhi International Trading Company Limited (“Yuanzhi”), is a company in Hong Kong owned by Lau and the 1st defendant herein, Mr Lee Chi Yuen Arctic (“Lee”), each holding 50% of the shareholding.  The 4th defendant herein, Winful Holding Limited (“Winful”), is a company in Hong Kong with 60% of its shareholding owned by Lee.  Lee is one of the three directors of Winful.

6.  In the 2011 Action, TGH claims that Lau had, through Yuanzhi and Winful, received some of the proceeds of sale of the Copper Rods supplied by TGH and so they are liable to repay the sums received to TGH. Yuanzhi and Winful were therefore joined as the 2nd and the 3rd defendants in the 2011 Action.

7.  On 6 October 2011, TGH obtained a Mareva injunction against Lau, Yuanzhi and Winful in the 2011 Action which remains in force today.

8.  In respect of the alleged fraudulent scheme, Lau was charged with 3 counts of using a copy of a false instrument with a view to deceive TEC or TGH.  On 5 October 2012, he was acquitted after trial.

9.  After the criminal trial, TGH settled the case with Lau in respect of the claim in the 2011 Action.  Pursuant to the settlement agreement, TGH entered judgment against Lau on 22 May 2013. However, TGH agreed not to enforce the judgment provided that Lau would offer assistance to TGH about the investigation of the fraudulent scheme.

10.  As a result of the information provided by Lau, TEC and TGH on 14 March 2013 commenced the present proceedings (“the Present Action”) against 11 defendants including, inter alia:

(i) Lee as the 1st defendant;

(ii) Lee’s wife as the 2nd defendant;

(iii) Yuanzhi as the 3rd defendant;

(iv) Winful as the 4th defendant;

(v) the 5th defendant which is a company controlled by Lee; and

(vi) the 6th and 7th defendants which are two companies controlled by Lee’s wife.

11.  The plaintiffs applied for ex parte Mareva injunction against the defendants but it was dismissed by Anthony Chan J on 9 April 2013.  The writ was served on the defendants on 9 April 2013.  On 15 April 2013, the plaintiffs made another ex parte on notice application for a Mareva injunction but the same was dismissed by Au-Yeung J.  TGH then made an inter parte application for a Mareva injunction which was again dismissed by Au-Yeung J on 1 November 2013.

12.  On 29 April 2013, some of the defendants in the Present Action took out a summons to strike out the Statement of Claim (“the Summons”). After the issuance of the Summons, the plaintiff filed two Notices of Discontinuance dated 21 June 2013 with the effect that only TGH and the 1st, 3rd to 7th defendants remain as the parties to the proceedings.

13.  Mr Barlow, SC, counsel for the remaining defendants, now seeks to strike out the Statement of Claim in the Present Action on the grounds that:

(i) the Present Action is an abuse of the court’s process, vexatious and embarrassing because it is a parallel concurrent action to the 2011 Action; and

(ii) the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and is embarrassing, in particular in respect of the claims against the 5th to 7th defendants.

14.  I will deal with these grounds in turn.

Multiplicity of proceedings and abuse of process

15.  Mr Barlow submits that it is prima facie an abuse of the court’s process to bring two actions based upon the same facts involving the same, or substantially the same, parties if both cases could have been, and therefore should have been, brought within one action.  In support of his submission, Mr Barlow relies on the dicta of Kay LJ in Poulett v Hill [1893] 1 Ch 277 and the dicta of Sir John Donaldson MR and Griffiths LJ in Buckland v Palmer [1984] 1 WLR 1109.  In the latter case, Sir John Donaldson MR said the following (at p 1114H):

“Whilst I dislike procedural technicality … … in reality there are wider issues involved. The public interest in avoiding any possibility of two courts reaching inconsistent decisions on the same issue is undoubted and this alone would suggest that two actions based upon the same cause of action should never be allowed. Equally clear is the public interest in there being finality in litigation and in protecting citizens from being ‘vexed’ more than once by what is really the same claim. Against this must be set the public interest in seeing that justice is done. … … These competing public interests will be differently reconciled on the differing facts of particular cases and this is best achieved if we hold, on principle and on the authorities to which I have referred, that (1) it is an abuse of the process of the court to bring two actions in respect of the same cause of action but (2) where there has been no judgment in the first action, that action can, in appropriate circumstances, be revived and amended so as to enable there to be an adjudication upon the whole of the plaintiff’s claim.”

16.  Mr Barlow submits that the same principle should apply, a fortiori, after the implementation of the CJR.  With the underlying objectives, there is now a duty on the parties to litigate in an efficient, cost-effective, procedurally proportionate and economic manner.  According to Mr Barlow, TGH should have amended the claim in the 2011 Action to include the new claims against Lee and the related parties.  Multiplicity of proceedings would only increase the costs of litigation and result in further delay in the adjudication of the disputes.  In such circumstances, the institution of the Present Action is an abuse of the process of the court.

17.  It may be an abuse of procedure to litigate matters which have, or could have, been decided in earlier proceedings.  The basic rule is that, where a matter becomes the subject of adjudication, the court requires the parties to put forward their whole case and will not, except under special circumstances, permit them later to reopen matters which might have been brought forward as part of already concluded litigation.  Res judicata for this purpose is not confined to issues which the court was actually asked to decide in the original litigation, it also covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the original litigation and so clearly could have been raised then that, it would be an abuse of process to allow new proceedings to be started in respect of them.  This principle is sometimes referred to as “res judicata in the wider sense”. The rule aims to achieve finality in litigation so that a party shall not be twice vexed in the same matter.  Similarly, a party in a subsequent action can apply to have that second action struck out against him as an abuse of process, where it could have properly been joined into the original action but was not. But the basic rule must be applied with caution.  It does not necessarily follow that, because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings, the raising of it subsequently constitutes an abuse.  The crucial question is whether in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it an issue which could have been raised before.  The basic rule assumes that the court has made a final determination on an issue in the earlier proceedings, and different considerations may apply if that is not the case (see: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014, §18/19/11).

18.  In the affirmations, TGH has explained why it had not sued Lee and the related parties in 2011.  When TGH was by then investigating the whereabouts of the proceeds of sale of TGH’s Copper Rods, Lee denied any involvement and shifted the blame to Lau, who absconded shortly before the commencement of the 2011 Action.  On 22nd January 2013, TGH entered into a settlement agreement with Lau.  As a result of the evidence provided by Lau under the settlement agreement, TGH knew about the involvement of Lee in the alleged fraud, and it therefore commenced the Present Action against Lee and the related parties in 2013.  There is no basis for me to query the genuineness of such explanation.

19.  Considering the background of this claim, it is clearly not a case of abuse of process.  Except for Yuanzhi and Winful, the parties in the 2011 Action and the Present Action are different.  As there has been no final adjudication of the issues in the earlier proceedings, I am not aware of any legal requirement that a plaintiff cannot bring a new action against some new parties even though the issues in the two actions may be related.  In fact, the law may sometimes require a plaintiff to institute a new action, because the amendment of the claim in the earlier proceedings to join new parties may deprive such new parties to rely on some of the defences such as limitation (see: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2014, §15/6/3).  This is also why the procedures provide for consolidation of different actions, so that same or similar issues in different actions can be determined at the same time.

20.  There is also no issue of res judicata in the wider sense.  First, there is no final adjudication of the issues in the earlier action.  Second, TGH did not know the full involvement of Lee in the alleged fraud back in 2011, and so it provides a justification as to why TGH had not sued Lee and the related parties in the 2011 Action.  Third, allowing TGH to bring the Present Action does not offend the rationale for the rule against re-litigation, ie the aims to avoid inconsistent findings of fact and to achieve finality in litigation so that a party shall not be twice vexed in the same matter.

21.  Despite that, it is clearly an abuse of process to join Yuanzhi and Winful in the Present Action.  In fact, Au-Yeung J made the same observation in §39 of her Reasons for Decision dated 15 April 2013 refusing the plaintiffs’ ex parte on notice application for a Mareva injunction:

“With regard to Yuanzhi and Winful, who are parties to the 2011 action, the immediate question that springs to mind is why they are joined in the present action. A Mareva injunction is already in place against them. Here Mr Barlow SC points out that there is a complete duplication of action and an abuse of process. Yuanzhi and Winful have already pleaded to [TGH’s] case, engaged in multiple interlocutory hearings and Lee has filed 14 affirmations. It is an abuse of court process to sue them here, especially both actions are premised on similar facts.”

22.  It is trite law that a plaintiff cannot bring two claims against the same defendant for the same cause of action.  Although TGH seeks to justify the institution of the Present Action by saying that the claims against Yuanzhi and Winful in the two actions do cover different periods of time (the 2011 Action relates to the period between June to September 2011, whereas the Present Action relates to the period from 2008 onwards), it cannot alter the fact that the complaints and the causes of action in the two actions are the same.  It is certainly embarrassing for these defendants to defend two same actions against them, and I would have no hesitation in striking out the claims against Yuanzhi and Winful in the Present Action.

23.  Mr Barlow has relied on the underlying objectives introduced by the CJR in support of the striking out application. Despite his able submission, I do not accept that these underlying objectives have changed the law about re-litigation and multiplicity of proceedings.  From the case-management point of view, it is certainly desirable for the 2011 Action and the Present Action to be consolidated or to be heard together. However since there is no such application before me, these matters will have to be dealt with in some other time.

Reasonable causes of action and defects in the pleading

24.  I then turn to the second ground for the striking out application, which relates to whether the Statement of Claim discloses any reasonable cause of action against the remaining defendants and whether there is any defect in the pleading.

25.  The main attack about the pleading relates to the claims against the 5th to 7th defendants.  According to Mr Barlow, the 5th to 7th defendants are not the subject of any identifiable or meaningful claim.  The 6th and 7th defendants are companies controlled by Lee’s wife, but TGH has already discontinued the claim against Lee’s wife in this action.  The 5th defendant is a company controlled by Lee, who used it as a successor trading company to Winful since Winful’s business was destroyed by the Mareva injunction granted in the 2011 Action.

26.  Relying on the case of Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture [1979] Ch 250, Mr Barlow argues that, in order for TGH to succeed in the claims against the 5th to 7th defendants, TGH has to plead that there was dishonest assistance in Lau’s or Lee’s breaches of trust.  Dishonestly, which is an element of knowing assistance, has not been pleaded in the Statement of Claim and so the claims against these defendants must fail.

27.  On the other hand, Mr Hughes, counsel for TGH, submits that TGH is not relying on the claim for knowing assistance against the 5th to 7th defendants.  According to him, TGH’s case against these defendants is summarised in §47(vi) of the Decision of Au-Yeung J dated 1 November 2013:

“D5 to D7 were nominee companies holding assets. [TGH] is seeking proprietary remedy against them. [TGH’s counsel] submits that once TGH establishes that its money has been paid into these companies, the burden will be on D5 to D7 to show that they were bona fide purchasers of the relevant property for value without notice: Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, at 108F-109E. TGH does not run a case of dishonest assistance against D5 to D7 and it is not necessary to prove that they had knowledge of TGH’s equity: Chan Chun Chung v PBM (Hong Kong) Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 178 at para 14.”

28.  In Foskett v McKeown, supra, a number of purchasers entrusted a sum of money to M and an associate for a property development scheme in Portugal.  The scheme was never carried out.  M, in breach of trust, used some of the purchasers’ money to pay the annual premiums of a life insurance policy.  M later committed suicide, and the purchasers brought an action claiming the proceeds of the policy.

29.  The House of Lords held that the remedy claimed by the purchasers was a proprietary remedy, and the purchasers were able to follow their money into the policy when the premiums were paid and from there into the hand of the trustees when the death benefit was paid to them.  Since the beneficiaries of the policy were volunteers and had not themselves contributed to the premiums, the purchasers were entitled to a share in the policy proceeds proportionate to the premiums paid out of the trust money.

30.  In Chan Chun Chung, supra, T, an employee, stole large sums from the plaintiff.  T and TP entered into an agreement and acquired all the shares in a company, C.  C’s sole asset was a flat, which was purchased by T and TP and financed by a bank mortgage with the balance financed by the use of the misappropriated funds.  After the completion of the flat purchase, T and TP assigned the shares of C to the 1st defendant and his wife at a gross under-value.  The Court of Final Appeal affirmed the decisions of the lower courts that the plaintiff was entitled to trace into the net proceeds of sale of the shares.

31.  According to the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal, unless the 1st defendant and his wife were bona fide purchasers for value of the shares in C without notice of the underlying equity in favour of the plaintiff, they would have acquired C subject to the plaintiff’s equity.  The burden of proof fell on the defendants to show that the 1st defendant and his wife were bona fide purchasers for value without notice and this was not discharged, and that was why the plaintiff was able to trace the misappropriated funds into the proceeds of sale of the shares of C.  In §19 of the judgment, Litton NPJ went on and said that, not only were the 1st defendant and his wife not bona fide purchasers for value without notice, they were not purchasers at all and they remained the nominees for T in respect of the shares.

32.  In the Present Action, TGH claims that Lee had transferred the misappropriated funds to the 5th to 7th defendants for the purchase of various properties.  Since they are not bona fide purchasers for value, they hold the properties as nominees for Lee, and TGH is entitled to trace the misappropriated funds from the sale of the Copper Rods into these properties.

33.  Based on the said authorities cited by Mr Hughes and the allegations advanced by TGH, I agree that that TGH would have a reasonable cause of action against each of the 5th to 7th defendants and so the claims against them should not be struck out.  Despite that, the case as now pleaded is embarrassing.

34.  As mentioned above, a victim whose properties have been misappropriated by a constructive trustee can bring two kinds of claim against a related third party who received the misappropriated money.  The first one is knowing assistance in the breach of trust.  For such kind of claim, a plaintiff has to give particulars of dishonesty and knowing assistance as stated in Belmont Finance, supra.  The second kind of claim is a proprietary claim based on tracing.  For such claim, the plaintiff has to plead that: (i) he is the owner of the misappropriated funds and not just that it was the “expectation and impression” of the plaintiff that he would receive the funds; and (ii) the third party is not a bona fide purchaser for value in respect of the sums received (with full particulars given), and so such third party is holding the sums received as a nominee for the constructive trustee.

35.  In the existing Statement of Claim, it is not clear whether TGH is relying on the first or the second kind of claim or both. Although it is pleaded that Lee’s wife was a housewife with no substantial income, TGH has not specified which cause of action it seeks to rely upon.  In particular, it has not been pleaded that the 5th to 7th defendants are volunteers in respect of the sums received from Lee or that they were holding the subject properties as nominees for Lee.  This would cause embarrassment to the 5th to 7th defendants as they do not know precisely the nature of the claim that they have to defend.  In my judgment, if TGH seeks to rely on the second kind of claim, it has to be pleaded clearly in the Statement of Claim.  For these reasons, the pleading has to be amended.

36.  Mr Barlow has also made some other complaints about the pleading.  Now with the claims against Yuanzhi and Wilful already struck out, I only need to focus on the claim pleaded against Lee.

37.  In §§38 to 46 of the Decision of Ay-Yeung J dated 1 November 2013, the learned judge had summarised Mr Barlow’s complaints about the existing pleading.  I do not want to repeat the same allegations here.

38.  In the hearing of the inter parte Mareva injunction before Au-Yeung J, TGH had clarified its case against Lee (see: §47 of the Decision of Au-Yeung J dated 1 November 2013).  According to TGH, Lee and Lau were its agents in respect of the sales business and they received the sales proceeds on behalf of TGH.  They therefore held the sales proceeds as trustee for TGH.  By misappropriating the sales proceeds, Lee was in breach of his duty as trustee, and further or in the alternative, Lee had dishonestly assisted Lau in the breach of trust.

39.  Au-Yeung J made the following observations about the existing pleading (see: §49 of the Decision):

“I have to say that there is much room for improvement of the statement of claim. What TGH is purporting to do is to sweep every purchaser of its goods under the umbrella of Lee and Lau’s agency so that all proceeds of sale should go to TGH as principal. This is despite the fact the pleader himself used distinct terms for agent, sub-agent, traders and end-customers. At this stage, I can only say that the statement of claim is capable being read in the way advanced by [TGH’s counsel]. The bone of contention lies in whether Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful acted as agents or were trading as principals. This is a matter of fact and law that cannot be resolved in an interlocutory application like this. Paragraphs 50 to 52 of the statement of claim did plead dishonest assistance [in respect of the claims against Lee, Lau Yuanzhi and Wilfil]. I do not think it can be said that reading the statement of claim with the evidence, there is no sustainable cause of action … …”

40.  I agree entirely with such observations.  Although there is some confusion in the pleading itself, in particular about the role of Yuanzhi and Winful in the alleged fraudulent scheme, the pleading is capable of being read in the way as advanced by TGH.  As this is not a clear and obvious case for the striking out of the claim against Lee, I refuse to do so here.

41.  Further, it is alleged that Lee had transferred the misappropriated funds to the 5th and 7th defendants for the purchase of various properties pleaded in the Statement of Claim. Subject to the appropriate amendment of the Statement of Claim as mentioned above, TGH does have reasonable causes of action against the 5th to 7th defendants.

42.  For the above reasons, I make the following order:

(i) the Statement of Claim against Yuanzhi and Winful be struck out and the claims against these defendants be dismissed; and

(ii) subject to the aforesaid, leave be granted to TGH to amend the Statement of Claim and TGH do file and serve the Amended Statement of Claim within 21 days.

43.  I also make the following order nisi:

(i) TGH do pay to Yuanzhi and Winful the costs of the action including the costs of the Summons; and

(ii) TGH do pay to the 5th to 7th defendants the costs of the Summons; and

(iii) there be no order as to costs of the Summons as between TGH and Lee.

44.  The order nisi shall be made absolute 14 days after the date of the handing down of this Judgment.

(David Lok)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Sebastian Hughes, instructed by Jones Day, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Barrie Barlow, SC and Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co, for the 1st, 4th to 7th defendants

Mr Barrie Barlow, SC and Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Eversheds, for the 3rd defendant

89964-EN-2013-11-01

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(永利豐集團有限公司)
4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
 VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED
(浚域有限公司)
6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED
(御首有限公司)
7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED
(凱譽企業有限公司)
10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(天豐國際集團有限公司)
11th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 4 September 2013
Date of Decision: 1 November 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  The remaining parties to this case are P2 (“TGH”), D1 (“Lee”), D3 (“Yuanzhi”), D4 (“Winful”), D5 (Lee’s company), D6 and D7 (both being companies of Mrs Lee, the former D2).

2.  TGH relies on Lau, a self-confessed fraudster and co-conspirator of Lee, to found this case.  TGH has failed twice, on ex parte and ex parte on notice bases, in its application for an interim Mareva injunction.  This is the inter parte hearing of the application for injunction against D1, D5 to D7 only.  D1, D5 to D7 will be collectively called “the defendants”.

THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE

3.  The former P1 (“TEC”) is a Korean manufacturer of copper rods and TGH is its wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary.  In November 2008, TGH took over from TEC a majority of TEC’s sales business in Hong Kong and Southern China (“the Sales Business”).

4.  Lee is a director and shareholder of Yuanzhi and Winful.  He had full control of their bank accounts.  He is also the sole director and shareholder of D5.   D6 and D7 are property holding companies.

5.  Lau was a sales agent appointed by TGH under a contract of employment.  He had full responsibility in finding customers and was in complete control of sales documentation. 

6.  Yuanzhi was wholly owned by Lee since incorporation until 31 March 2010, and thereafter by Lee and Lau in equal shares.  Winful was controlled and run by Lee.

7.  Lau and Lee started off running the agency business through one Smart Resources.  They subsequently moved the agency business to Yuanzhi and Winful.

8.  Yuanzhi and Winful were said to have “acted as” sales and/or collecting agents for the Sales Business (paras 3.2 and 4.2 soc). It was the “expectation and impression” of TEC and TGH that payments received by Smart Resources, Yuanzhi and Winful (“the Pass Through Sale Proceeds”) would be paid over to TEC/TGH immediately subject to deduction of commission (para 21.3 soc).

9.  TGH would supply copper rods to Hong Kong based on estimates prepared by Lau each month.  In the meantime, Lau would search for customers.  When customers were found, Lau would request TGH to release the stored copper rods.  The end customers would arrange for shipment by L/C (with TEC/TGH as beneficiary) or T/T.  Lau would prepare Monthly Payment Records for TGH (para 22 soc).

10.  TGH pleaded that by reason of the arrangement, it was to be inferred that each of Lee, Smart Resources, Yuanzhi and Winful was appointed as a sales agent of TEC, since November 2008, of TGH (but not Smart Resources) (para 34 soc).

11.  Further or alternatively, each of Lee, Smart Resources, Yuanzhi and Winful was appointed a “sub-agent” of TEC/TGH “in privity of contract with [TEC/TGH] on terms that they would share the commission with Lau” (para 35 soc).

12.  Further, each of Lee, Lau, Smart Resources, Yuanzhi and Winful “stood in a position of an agent and/or fiduciary in respect of [TEC/TGH]” (para 36 soc).

13.  Each of Lee, Lau, Yuanzhi and Winful were trustees of the Pass Through Sales Proceeds in their control or under their names from time to time (para 37 soc).

14.  Lee and Lau took advantage of the 21-day free storage period of the container yard in Hong Kong to try and find end-customers.  Lee and Lau then diverted part of the sale proceeds to their own money making venture and shared the profits.  They also took advantage of the 30-60 day credit period given by TGH to end-customers to delay payments to TGH and disguise their misappropriation of money.

15.  Lau was said to have provided false information in the Monthly Payment Records so as to give the false impression that the shipments were sold and paid for within 30-45 days of shipment.  This included assigning payments made by end customers for the shipment of the present month to settle the outstanding receivables for the previous month (para 43 soc).

16.  Because of its own defective system of recording sales by reference to shipment instead of to specific customers, TGH was unaware of the misappropriation. 

17.  The scheme worked well when the sales increased significantly.  In 2009, in order to obtain significant cash flow to meet the drop in demand and prices, a cargo finance arrangement (“the REPO arrangement”) was made between Winful and SBP but Lau left the details to Lee.  What happened was that SBP would hold the copper rods that Winful purchased from TGH/TEC Leadings as security. TGH would be paid partly by SBP and partly by Winful.    

18.  By March 2010, TEC/TGH had started to ship copper rods directly to customers and required the agents to pay TEC/TGH directly.  The cash flow for Yuanzhi and Winful significantly reduced.  Winful entered into further mortgages with SBP to maintain the cash flow.

19.  The relationship between Lau and Lee fell apart towards the end of 2010.  Lau claims to be concerned that Lee was taking too much money.  Lau also felt that Lee was using the money for his own benefit instead of for both of them.

20.  In September 2011, the representatives of TGH and TEC came to Hong Kong to discuss with Lau their concerns over the proceeds of sale but Lau became uncontactable. 

21.  By October 2011 the fraud was exposed as the significant reduction in supply from Korea created cash flow problem for the cover-up.  TGH claims to have suffered loss of about US$36m.

22.  TGH instituted HCA 1687/2011 (“the 2011 Action”) on 4 October 2011 against Lau, Yuanzhi, Winful and one Kar Yue (a trucking company engaged by Lau).  There is an existing Mareva injunction against those defendants.

23.  Lau was prosecuted on 3 counts of using a copy of a false instrument but was acquitted on 5 October 2012.  On 22 January 2013, Lau entered into a settlement agreement with TEC/TGH (“the Settlement Agreement”) whereunder he admitted liability and agreed to entry of judgment against him in the 2011 Action.  The plaintiffs agreed not to enforce the judgment in exchange for Lau’s assistance in the present case. 

24.  The plaintiffs issued a writ on 14 March 2013 to sue the defendants in conspiracy to defraud and to injure, constructive trust on the grounds of knowing receipt and dishonest assistance, conversion of property and breach of contract.  D5, D6 and D7 are said to be nominee companies incorporated for the primary purpose of hiding proceeds of fraud and are holding properties on trust for TGH. 

25.  Four days after the writ was issued, 4 properties (belonging to Lee, D6 and D5 respectively) were mortgaged.

26.  TGH seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from disposing of assets up to US$36m (about HK$285m).

THE DEFENDANTS’ GROUNDS IN OPPOSITION

27.  The defendants contend that the statement of claim is not sustainable.  The loss to TGH arose, not from the wrongdoings of the defendants, but of the TGH group.  That was with the aid of Lau and other individuals (including Oh, HK Lee, Seol and Ahn) in the Overseas Sales Team (“the OST”) of the TGH group.  It was Lau who manipulated the copper rods transactions with the consent and active participation of the OST in order to cover up the loss of the TGH group.    Lee was not involved in Yuanzhi.  He just followed Lau’s instructions.  Winful was Lee’s own trading company but it was Lau who handle copper rod trading.

28.  The defendants say that Lau and Oh are not reliable.  It would have been impossible for anyone to have committed the fraud as alleged to the tune of US$36m through the fraudulent scheme in the shortness of time.  The latest allegations have been reverse-engineered to construct a fictitious claim against the defendants.  TEC/TGH themselves are investigated by law enforcement agencies for serious crimes in Korea.  The present claim might be a cover up of their own unlawful behaviour and/or to recoup a loss that they themselves created.

THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

29.  There is no dispute on principles.  To obtain a Mareva injunction, the plaintiffs must show a good arguable case on the merits; real risk of dissipation of assets in such a way that a future judgment would go unsatisfied; and that it is just and convenient to grant the injunction: Akai Holdings Ltd v Ho [2009] HKCU 172 at para 35.

30.  A good arguable case is one which is more than barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers would have a better than 50 per cent chance of success: Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG (‘The Niedersachsen’) [1983] 2 LLoyd's LR 600, at 605.

31.  There is no requirement to prove nefarious intent per se.  “The test is whether, on the assumption that the plaintiff has shown at least a ‘good arguable case’, the court concludes, on the whole of the evidence then before it, that the refusal of a Mareva injunction would involve a real risk that a judgment or award in favour of the plaintiff would remain unsatisfied.” see Kerr LJ in The Niedersachsen, at 617. 

32.  Evidence of an unacceptably low standard of commercial morality or questionable integrity, particularly in connection with the transaction in question and after disputes have arisen, will entitle the court to conclude that there is a sufficient risk to justify a Mareva injunction: Honsaico Trading Co v Hong Yiah Seng Co Ltd, [1990] 1 HKLR 235 at para 24; Standard Chartered Securities v Lai Arthur & ors [1993] 1 HKC 375, at 394.

33.  When considering whether there was unacceptably low commercial morality upon which to infer a real risk of dissipation of assets, the Court should scrutinize the evidence with care and should not too readily infer such a risk from the defendant’s conduct or commercial morality: Honour Resources (International) Co Ltd v Savvy Resources Ltd [2010] 4 HKC 50, at 57.

34.  Dishonesty is not essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction and there is no need to show an intention to dissipate assets.  But if there is a good arguable case in support of an allegation that the defendant has acted fraudulently or dishonestly (eg being implicated in an ingenious scheme for the misappropriation of funds belonging to the plaintiff), or has acted unconscionably, then it is unnecessary for there to be any further specific evidence on risk of dissipation for the court to be entitled to take the view that there is a sufficient risk to justify granting Mareva relief.  Once this is shown, the limit of the Mareva relief will take into account claims for which the plaintiff has a good arguable case, including those which do not involve such an allegation.  The fact that a defendant is experienced in intricate, sophisticated, international transactions involving movements of large sums of money may also indicate that there is a real risk of dissipation. Akai Holdings, at para 53; Gee, Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief (4th ed) 198.

GOOD ARGUABLE CASE ON THE MERITS

35.  I will first deal with the defendants’ attack on the statement of claim before analyzing the evidence. 

Whether the statement of claim is sustainable

36.  Mr Barlow SC draws to my attention that the statement of claim was filed after filing of evidence in the injunction application was closed.  The statement of claim no longer pleads fraud or conspiracy, which were the core allegations in TGH’s affidavit evidence.  Instead, the causes of action were (as against Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful) in dishonest assistance in breach of trust and breach of contract; (as against D5-D7) in constructive trust.

37.  Mr Barlow SC submits that there is a mismatch between the affirmation evidence and the statement of claim.  He relies on a passage in the case of Tam Chi Kok cited in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013, Vol 1, para 18/19/10, page 422:

“[This] is a case where a plaintiff commences an action when he does not know how to formulate his case. In other words, he sues before he knows what to sue, or before he can make up his mind as to the subject matter of his complaint. In this regard, the plaintiff must be equated with his counsel and solicitors. In other words, in the present case, the four Children commenced the present action before they and their legal advisers were ad idem and thus knew what they wanted to sue about, and of course it is the function of a statement to set out precisely what a plaintiff wishes to sue and ask the court to grant him relief about.”

38.  Without disrespect to the pleader, there is some truth in Mr Barlow SC’s complaint.

39.  First, the cause of action for breach of contract against the defendant is unsustainable.  The only pleaded contract was one of employment between TGH and Lau which Lau did not dispute and under which no relief is claimed.

40.  Secondly, (unlike Lau) Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful were not agents by express appointment but they only “acted as” agents through the “Sales Business” and by inference.  The plea that they were “sub-agents” does not particularize the circumstances giving rise to the appointment arose and the terms thereof.

41.  Thirdly, Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful’s status as agents did not sit in well with other parts of the statement of claim.  TGH allegedly gave Lau complete control and to sell to one Eco (run by one Alex Yip), a trader of copper rods.  Smart Resources was a trader doing the same as Eco.  So was Yuanzhi and Winful.  It appeared to be a case of trading on a principal to principal basis and TGH would have known from the Monthly Reports that the goods were sold to Yuanzhi and Winful on that basis.  TGH, however, carved out Smart Resources.   

42.  Fourthly, the statement of claim also negates agency as TEC/TGH were aware that the agency business was run jointly by Lau and Lee in 2007 and approved of the arrangement.  TEC/TGH also approved of Lee incorporating Yuanzhi and Winful and using them to carry out the agency business, taking over from Smart Resources.  (See para 30 and 31 soc.)

43.  Fifthly, it was incomprehensible why TGH’s only had an “expectation and impression”, as opposed to a legal right, that the Pass Through Sale Proceeds would be paid over to it.  That really raised a question of who the principal legally entitled to receive the money was – TGH or Smart Resources, Winful or Yuanzhi?  If it were the 3 companies, TGH would have a claim in contract but not trust.

44.  Sixthly, the question continues as to how “an expectation and impression” could be elevated into a case of constructive trust.

45.  Seventhly, there was no sufficient plea of dishonesty and knowing assistance in Lau’s breach of trust within the statement of claim. 

46.  Eighthly, in respect of D5 or D7, it was not pleaded that they had taken anything belonging to TGH.

47.  At this hearing, Mr Manzoni SC makes clear that:

(i)   His case was based on Lee and Lau being agents and that they received sales proceeds on behalf of TGH. There was no written agreement.

(ii)   Smart Resources was carved out because TGH were then not aware of its misappropriation.

(iii)   It was not TGH’s case that there was principal to principal type of trading between it and Yuanzhi or Winful. 

(iv)   Under paragraph 32 of the statement of claim, if Lee and Lau were sales agents, then the sale proceeds "are to be regarded to be received" by them through Yuanzhi and Winful. If, on the other hand, Yuanzhi and Winful were themselves agents, they would be regarded as receiving proceeds on their own behalf qua agent and needed to account to TGH. 

(v)   TGH has pleaded a case of Lee's dishonesty, breach of fiduciary duties and dishonest assistance.

(vi)   D5 to D7 were nominee companies holding assets.  P2 is seeking proprietary remedy against them. Mr Manzoni SC  submits that once TGH establishes that its money has been paid into these companies, the burden will be on D5 to D7 to show that they were bona fide purchasers of the relevant property for value without notice: Foskett v. McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102, at 108F – 109E. TGH does not run a case of dishonest assistance against D5 to D7 and it is not necessary to prove that they had knowledge of TGH’s equity: Chan Chun Chung v. PBM (Hong Kong) Ltd (2004) 7 HKCFAR 178 at para 14.

48.  There is an application to strike out the statement of claim to be heard on 12 November 2013 by another judge.  I make no comment on it as the focus of arguments before me is not based on Order 18, rule 19.  Rather, my duty is to consider whether the statement of claim and the evidence constitute sufficient bases to show a good arguable case. 

49.  I have to say that there is much room for improvement of the statement of claim.  What TGH is purporting to do is to sweep every purchaser of its goods under the umbrella of Lee and Lau’s agency so that all proceeds of sale should go to TGH as principal.  This is despite the fact the pleader himself used distinct terms for agent, sub-agent, trader and end-customers.  At this stage, I can only say that the statement of claim is capable being read in the way advanced by Mr Manzoni SC.  The bone of contention lies in whether Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful acted as agents or were trading as principals.  That is a matter of fact and law that cannot be resolved in an interlocutory application like this.  Paragraphs 50 to 52 of the statement of claim did plead dishonest assistance.  I do not think it can be said that reading the statement of claim with the evidence, there is no sustainable cause of action and hence no prospective judgment to which a Mareva injunction may possibly attach.  The defendants’ first line of contention fails.

Analyses of the evidence to see if there is a good arguable case

50.  There is a mismatch in the evidence and the statement of claim, which was filed subsequently.  However, the question of Lau’s credibility aside, there is sufficient evidence from Lau’s affidavit in this Action to support the pleaded case.

51.  To counter the grounds in opposition, Mr Manzoni SC puts forth 3 pieces of evidence which came to light since the ex parte hearings which, he submits, turn a good arguable case into a strong case.  They are (i) a REPO transaction; (ii) what is known as the Everlong transaction; and (iii) the defendants’ failure to make complete disclosure of bank documents pursuant to my order dated 5 July 2013.

The REPO transaction

52.  According to Lee, upon receipt of money under the REPO arrangement, Winful would, in accordance with Lau’s instructions, instruct SBP to remit the money to one of TGH’s accounts as payment for the copper rods.  An aggregate sum of US$54.78m has been paid to TGH according to the summary of 59 REPO transactions[1]. A sum of US$793,000 was, however, missing in between items 34 and 35.   

53.  The US$793,000 concerned goods sold to SBP under the REPO arrangement but TGH has never received payment.  Lee claimed that the sum was never due to be paid to TGH. Rather, Lee said that US$750,350 was applied to satisfy an earlier loan Winful had made to TGH on Lau’s instruction.  The loan was effected by way of payment pursuant to a letter of credit, which Lau had instructed Winful to obtain from the Bank of China. 

54.  On the face of documents, the letter of credit appeared to be issued for an ordinary trading transaction.  Goods were delivered, as evidenced by a bill of lading.    The letter of credit had been drawn upon by the beneficiary TGH.  There was no loan. 

55.  Mr Manzoni SC’s submission on this REPO transaction is supported by bank documents obtained pursuant to the disclosure order.  It shows that Lee was trying to hide the fact of receipt of the US$793,000 from TGH.  It also supports, so Mr Manzoni SC submits, TGH’s case on the REPO transactions – that Lee and Lau’s scheme had difficulty in cash flow, so they used the REPO arrangement to generate cash to pay back TGH to keep the scheme running.   

The Everlong transaction

56.  Yuanzhi received US$381,644 from a customer Everlong and paid it out to Winful, who then, paid it out on the same day to an unknown destination.  These were confirmed by an outgoing chats advice, a consignee invoice of Kar Yue showing delivery to Everlong and bank statements obtained from the defendants. 

57.  The money was not received by TGH or SBP.  Apart from a denial that the money was not due and payable to TGH, Lau could offer no other explanation in the light of the objective evidence.  His denial had no weight when his case was that he was not in control but that Lau was. 

Incomplete disclosure of bank documents

58.  TGH also relies on incomplete disclosure of bank documents in breach of this court’s order dated 5 July 2013.  An example is that the statements for Yuanzhi’s US dollar account at HSBC for November 2009 to December 2010 are missing.  Mr Manzoni SC submits that those “missing” statements of this active account must have contained evidence of the money stolen under the fraud. 

59.  Mr Rhoda, solicitor for the defendants has denied the non-disclosure.  He explained, on instructions, that there was no account activity for those 13 months and monthly statements were not issued.  The closing balance appearing on the last statement for October 2009 matched the opening balance for January 2011.

60.  Mr Manzoni SC accepts, rightly in my view, that at this stage he is unable to go behind Mr Rhoda’s explanation.  He describes that this was Lee’s “catch-me-if-you-can” attitude. Unfortunately, this is not something I can place weight on at this stage. Still less can I place weight on alleged non-disclosure of an account in breach of the disclosure order in the 2011 Action. 

 Other defences

61.  It is said that Lee was not involved in Yuanzhi or Winful.

62.  Yuanzhi was incorporated on 9 October 2007. In Lee’s own words, it was intended to be a joint business venture with Lau to engage, inter-alia, in the trading of copper rods which Lau would procure from TEC and other suppliers.  The undisputed facts are that Lee was the sole director and shareholder of Yuanzhi.  Yuanzhi rented Lee's apartment in Shenzhen as its office. It would be unusual if Lee would have just incorporated this company for Lau’s use.  Upon Lau becoming a 50% shareholder, it was also unusual that Lee continued to remain in sole control of the bank accounts.   Added to these is Oh’s evidence that during his business trips to the Mainland with Lau, the sales staff of Yuanzhi reported directly to Lee and only followed clerical instructions given by Lau.  These facts refute any suggestion that Lee was not involved in Yuanzhi.

63.  With regard to Winful, it was incorporated in May 2007, with a different business from that of Yuanzhi.  Lee was the major shareholder and one of the three directors.  Lau had never been a shareholder or director. Winful had a limited copper aspect and it was operated by Lau.       I find it difficult to accept that Lee would have entered into the REPO arrangement involving tonnes of copper rods worth millions of dollars for no apparent benefit to Winful, and did it solely on the ground of goodwill.              

64.  If matters had stopped there, TGH has shown a good arguable case on the merits against Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful even only based on the REPO transaction and Everlong transaction.  The questions to be tried include: whether Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful were agents of TGH, whether there had been misappropriation of proceeds belonging to TGH, whether Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful had knowingly assisted in breach of trust.  There was, however, no question to be tried on contract as against these 3 defendants. 

Credibility of Lau

65.  Lau, on whom TG places heavy reliance, is a self-confessed fraudster. He has explained how his Christian faith has caused him to turn himself in to TGH.  That may not be surprising for someone turning a new leaf who tries to reduce the damage to victims of his fraud.  But there are other matters that have a negative impact on his credibility.

66.  Firstly, Mr Barlow SC informs this court that Lau has been prosecuted but Lee has not.  He has been acquitted but that was because the prosecution witnesses were not believed or were found wanting that the case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Lau has elected not to give evidence in the criminal trial. 

67.  Secondly, Lee has asserted on affirmation that what Lau had been doing was with the knowledge and consent of TEC.  Lee even exhibited Lau’s Confession Statements.  Whilst Mr Oh has in his reply affirmation purported to deny Lee’s allegations, Lau has conspicuously declined to file an affidavit in reply.  That was despite a term in the Settlement Agreement that Lau would “cooperate fully to assist the plaintiffs with their efforts to recover losses they have suffered due to the fraud that is at the heart of this application and the proceedings against the defendants”: Georgiou-1st, para 6.  (TGH also expressed uncertainty as to whether Lau would give evidence at the trial.  However, injunctions are often granted well before a trial is in sight.  I therefore place little weight on this uncertainty.)

68.  The Confession Statements are not something relevant only to the 2011 Action.  They are detailed statements, prepared, signed and revised by Lau in 2012 contain supporting documents.  I highlight some important allegations of Lau as follows:

(i)   TEC lost big money in overseas investment projects. Winful set up the REPO arrangement with the knowledge and full authority of HK Lee and the OST.  It was to aid in boosting sales and getting in money quickly for TEC.

(ii)   In August 2010, pursuant to an order of the OST, Lau allocated a lot of cargoes and payment to TEC Leadings who had financial difficulties. It created a cargo shortage problem for clients who paid by letter of credit.  Lau therefore had to buy back SBP warehoused cargo using Yuanzhi's money. But cargo was delivered to TEC/TGH’s clients. When those clients received goods, L/C payments would be opened to TEC/TGH but TEC/TGH did not paid back Yuanzhi.

(iii)   The funding settlement between TGH and Yuanzhi for SBP warehoused cargo used a cargo exchange system. For example Yuanzhi bought SBP cargo through Winful. Clients would pay back Yuanzhi or if TGH did not pay back Yuanzhi, Lau would arrange for TGH’s cargo to be delivered to Yuanzhi in settlement.   

(iv)   Enormous funds had been paid by SBP to the TEC group for covering their loss in local/overseas investment.  OST has ordered Lau to allocate payment from TGH’s clients to TEC first, and then pay TGH later.  That was why payment period got longer, from 30 to 60 days.  

(v)   Oh told Lau that the fund allocation to TEC Leadings was a serious illegal act. 

(vi)   TEC/TGH worked together with Seda Line (a shipping forwarder of TEC, not a real ocean carrier) to set up an abnormal cargo release system without presenting a full set of 3/3 bills of lading to clients. Clients would be given 2/3 sets for bank negotiation whilst TEC/TGH held rights over the cargo by retaining 1/3 sets.  This meant that clients did not have full cargo rights even though L/C payments were effected.  TEC/TGH ordered Lau to release cargo through Seda Line.  Clients never obtained the full set of bills of lading but could get the cargo.  So, according to Lau, the original bill of lading would be fraud documents in order to receive quick payments from banks opening L/Cs. 

(vii)        Winful was a buyer from TGH and not an agent.  The warehouse cargo handling was not handled by Yuanzhi.

(viii)      In September 2011, the OST requested Lau to create fake customers outstanding payment tables, fake sales documents for hiding about US$30m or more outstanding payments for their roll over use. For fear that he would be asked to prepare fake debts settlement plan, Lau went into hiding and declined to meet Oh in September 2011. 

69.  Thirdly, the defendants have compiled a table showing the key inconsistencies in Lau’s affidavits filed in both Actions.  To highlight a few significant matters:

(i)   In the 2011 Action, Lau explained the misappropriation of TGH’s proceeds through a complex cargo allocation scheme.  There was no mention of a scheme of diversion of sale proceeds.  Lee was never implicated, unlike the present Action where he was said to be an agent diverting proceeds of sale with Lau for their own benefit.

(ii)   In the 2011 Action, TEC/TGH asserted that Yuanzhi had not purchased any copper rods from the plaintiffs since the commencement of 2011.   However, in the present action, TEC pleaded that Yuanzhi and Winful acted as its sales agents and received sales proceeds from end customers.

(iii)   In the 2011 Action, Lau was said to have provided many instructions as to payments in and out of the accounts. This contradicted Lau's assertion in the present action that the bank accounts were fully controlled by Lee.

(iv)   In the 2011 action, Lau asserted that TEC must have known where the copper rods were actually delivered and to whom. They knew and were in fact familiar with the owners of these customers. Yet in their present action, it was stated that TEC never raised query as to whom the cargo would be delivered and almost always authorized the release solely on Lau's request.

70.  Given the inconsistencies in Lau’s affidavit evidence, he must have perjured himself in some aspects.  Lau has not identified which part of the version in the 2011 Action was untrue and how he could have come up with the details in that untrue version. 

71.  I remind myself, of course, that the 2011 Action was targeted at Lau who was then believed to be the culprit.  As admitted by TGH, it did not possess enough information to claim against Lee in 2011.  TGH’s case changed as a result of Lau’s change.  Judging from the evidence so far, Lau and Lee had once been on good terms. It was understandable that Lau did not implicate Lee in the 2011 Action.

72.  Fourthly, Mr Barlow SC relies on the inconsistencies between a table prepared by Oh and that prepared by Lau in terms of monthly shipping quantities and sale proceeds between October 2008 and September 2011.  At this stage, it is impossible to go into the underlying documents in support of these tables.  The table appears to be for different purposes: Oh’s to show sales, receipt and receivables; Law’s to show volume of sales.  In any case, these tables do not affect my overall view of this application.

73.  Fifthly, Mr Barlow SC points out that there is no causal connection between the alleged missing US$36 million and the defendants. Nor is there any documentary evidence to show that the money belonging to TGH was diverted from either Yuanzhi or Winful.   It is part of TGH’s case that not all shipments were paid through Yuanzhi or Winful and that many payments were made directly to TGH. The lack of evidence of a causal connection is even more striking given that the bank accounts of these companies have been disclosed and inspected TGH. These bank accounts do not reveal any evidence of any alleged diversion of TGH’s money or even any money movements of the kind alleged by TGH.  

74.  Mr Barlow SC might be right.  However, at this stage, the court will not go into detailed examination of the bank statements.  This aspect does not affect my decision on the overall merits of this application anyway.

75.  The court of course does not need to resolve the inconsistencies in Lau’s evidence at this stage.   What is troubling is that Lau has never disclaimed the contents of his Confession Statements or his previous affirmations.  His failure to file an affidavit in reply starkly poses the question as to why he would have done so, risking the breach of the Settlement Agreement?  Was it because there were some unlawful acts of TEC/TGH that he wanted to hide?  Paragraph 68(iii) as to the allocation of goods and payment to TEC’s group may undermine TGH’s case on the REPO transaction referred to above and give weight to the “loan” that Lee alluded to.  Oh’s mere denial on affidavit on behalf of TGH does not dispel my doubts.

76.  Further, Lee's 2nd affirmation mentioned that on 27 October 2012, Lau had filed a police report alleging that Lee had misappropriated US$381,644.34 from Yuanzhi's HSBC account (808-649412-274). However, that complaint was withdrawn on 19 November 2012.  Lau’s failure to explain the withdrawal of the complaint undermines TGH’s case on the Everlong transaction.

77.  In summary, the failure of Lau to file a reply affidavit and withdrawal of Lau’s report to the police create doubt in my mind as to the truthfulness and strength of TGH’s case.  The Confession Statements, if true, would mean that TGH had been involved in unlawful conduct in allocating funds or unlawfully collecting payment under letters of credit.  It suffered loss for reasons unconnected to Lee or Lau.  There is no reason why the court should lend its assistance to such a plaintiff.  I am of the view that TGH has not shown a good arguable case to justify the grant of a draconian relief against Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful. 

Case against D5 to D7

78.  TGH pleaded that D5 to D7 are liable to deliver up all properties in their names or possession derived directly or indirectly from the misappropriated funds.  It was to be inferred that since 2007, income derived from misappropriated funds represented Lee’s only source of income.  Mrs Lee was a housewife without substantive income on her own.  In the premises, D5 to D7 hold the properties and proceeds of sale on constructive trust for TGH.  (paras 58-61 soc)

79.  Lee had incorporated D5 on 15 October 2010 immediately before its purchase of a property.  The office used by Winful and owned by Lee was sold at the same time on 19 October 2010.  Likewise, D6 and D7 were incorporated immediately before purchase of properties in March and August 2012 respectively. 

80.  Mr Manzoni SC submits that the timing of the purchase of properties and incorporation of companies provide strong evidence to demonstrate that those entities were incorporated to try to cover up money taken by Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful under the fraud. 

81.  To say that Lee could not have the money himself to buy those properties is to ignore Lee’s past employment and his commission income from sale of the copper rods.   

82.  I note there is no averment about D5 to D7’s trading of TGH’s copper rods or receiving its sales proceeds. TGH is not running a case of knowledge of fraudulent scheme or knowing assistance in breach of trust against them.  The evidence is only sufficient to show serious issues to be tried against D5 to D7.

RISK OF DISSIPATION OF ASSETS

83.  In case I am wrong on my conclusion of there being no good arguable case, I proceed to consider the risk of dissipation of assets. 

84.  If TGH’s case is accepted, there is evidence of Lee’s concealment of misappropriation of TGH’s sale proceeds.  He denied his misappropriation despite proof from banking documents.  He displayed dishonesty in international transactions involving movements of large sums of money and cargoes.  Such dishonesty is sufficient for the court to find a risk of dissipation of assets.

85.  Mr Manzoni submits that Lee lied about not having a relationship with SBP until 2009.  I am not satisfied that Lee had lied in that respect.  On a proper reading of SBP’s email dated 19 August 2013, Lee had only set up a trade financing account with SBP in 2007 but there was no real business until 2009 when the REPO arrangement was made. 

86.  However, Lee has lied that apart from 2 insurance policies, Winful had no assets of an individual value of HK$50,000 or more.  In fact, Winful had other bank accounts with SBP with a balance of US$6m on 4 October 2011, which increased to US$7.39m on 14 October 2011.  Winful also held a bank account with SBP with a balance of US$12,620 between 16 September and 17 November 2011. 

87.  In addition, there was an actual disposal of Lee’s Sheung Wan office on 12 December 2012 to an unrelated party.  There was Lau’s hearsay evidence as to disposal of Lee’s property in Shenzhen and Macau.

88.  Moreover, mortgages have been taken out 4 days after the failed ex parte injunction application in favour of one Full Faith Asia Inc (“Full Faith”), which was incorporated in the Republic of Vanuatu.  The mortgage was for general banking facilities repayable on demand.  The mortgage deeds were on virtually identical terms with no indication of what the credit facilities were.   

89.  Lee explained that the loans from Full Faith was to counter the cash flow problems caused by the Mareva injunction in the 2011 Action.  The loans were arranged in January, not in the 4 days since issue of the writ.  Mr Mui (director and sole shareholder of Full Faith) has affirmed to the circumstances for setting up Full Faith (a special purpose vehicle) and the credit facility to Lee in the amount of US$6.7m, of which US$5.5m.  The actual advance of US$5.5m has been fully documented.

90.  I accept the explanation given by Lee – that he and other defendants were not aware of the writ until service on 9 April 2013, weeks after the mortgages have been arranged for. 

91.  However, as Mr Manzoni SC pointed out, the defendants have failed to provide copies of land searches which would have assisted in proving the assertions.  In addition, the amounts which Mr Mui purportedly advanced to Lee were made to a New Voyager Investment Holding Pte Ltd instead of to D5 for no apparent reason.  There was no information as to who the shareholders and directors of New Voyager were.  These throw in doubt the purpose of the loan from Mr Mui.

92.  I have considered that litigation has started since 2011.  In the 2011 Action, the plaintiffs alleged that Yuanzhi and Winful were corporate vehicles used by Lau and/or Lee to divert the copper rods and proceeds of sale.  Lee was said to have full knowledge of Lau’s breach.  Lee’s knowledge was in turn imputed to Winful.  Lee has filed some 14 affirmations and hence fully aware of the progress of the 2011 Action.  Lee would have expected that at some stage the plaintiffs would make him a defendant and freeze his assets.  Yet Lee has made limited disposal  in the meantime.  Instead, he resumed his career of trading in metals, despite the ruining of Winful.  He was creating (through D5) further assets within the jurisdiction. 

93.  If Lee has divested proceeds of sale whilst running Yuanzhi and Winful, one cannot exclude the possibility that he will divest the mortgage monies through D5’s business.  Considering all the circumstances, there is in my view risk of dissipation of assets. 

BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE

94.  Mr Barlow SC complains about the delay in taking out this injunction against Lee.  In Dorshare Ltd v Shun Pong Ltd HCA1823/2012, 4 January 2013,at para 13-16, Mr Justice Anthony Chan explained why delay can be fatal to an application for injunctive relief:

(i)   Delay reflects the lack of irreparable damage.  In King Fung Vacuum Ltd v Toto Toys Ltd [2006] 2 HKLRD 785, para 20, it was said that “promptly” in the circumstances of interlocutory injunctions has been commonly understood to be a period of 6 weeks or so of unexplained delay and 3 months with an explanation given for the delay in making application for an injunction.

(ii)   Delay may cause prejudice to the person who will be affected by the injunction: Wong Chung Ming Development Fund Co Ltd v Profit Surplus Ltd [2009] 3 HKC 19, para 30.

(iii)   Delay can render it unreasonable or unjust to grant an interlocutory injunction.

(iv)   Unexplained inordinate delay can constitute an abuse of process.

95.  I do not blame TGH for its “delay” of about 1 ½ years since September 2011.  A responsible litigant has to secure sufficient evidence before seeking a Mareva injunction.  Until his acquittal, Lau had been prevented from speaking to TEC/TGH who were witnesses for the prosecution.  TGH has acted promptly in entering into the Settlement Agreement within 3 months of Lau’s acquittal.  The writ in this Action was filed in another 2 months’ time.  There was no inordinate delay on the part of TGH.    

96.  I have alluded to the doubts created as a result of Lau’s failure to file an affidavit in reply.  On that ground alone, the balance will be tipped against the granting of a Mareva injunction.

97.  In relation to D5, Mr Barlow SC draws to my attention that the Mareva injunction in the 2011 Action has ruined Winful’s business by destroying its access to credit facilities.  Any injunction against D5 may have similar effect.   This would be doubly cruel to Lee who has tried to rebuild his business.  I agree. 

98.  Mareva injunctions put the recipient party in a seriously disadvantaged position right from the start, from which it may never recover. It is therefore essential for the court to carefully and critically scrutinize the materials placed before it before making such an order. Stone J in Deiulemar Shipping SpA v Transfield ER Futures Ltd [2011] 1 HKLRD 75, at paras 54-55; followed in Eastman Chemical Ltd v Heyro Chemical Co Ltd (No 2) [2012] 3 HKLRD 307, at para 26. 

99.  It is not every risk of a judgment being unsatisfied which can justify Mareva relief: Gee, Commercial Injunctions (5th ed), para 12.037.

“12.037 A defendant may be faced with insolvency if the claimant’s claim succeeds. However, regardless of whether this is so, in the meantime the defendant is entitled to carry on business, and it would be contrary to principle for Mareva relief to be granted for the purpose either of preventing the defendant from doing so, or preserving some assets for the claimant in case he succeeds at trial. …

Because Mareva relief pre-judgment is not granted for the purpose of interfering with ordinary business transactions it follows that even if there is some element of speculative risk in such a transaction the court will still not interfere with it.”

100.  These authorities are applicable to D5.

101.  Insofar as D6 and D7 are concerned, there will not be much convenience caused by an injunction to these property holding companies.

102.  Balancing all parties’ interest, I would not have imposed a Mareva injunction against D5 even if there is a good arguable case.

FORTIFICATION OF UNDERTAKING AS TO DAMAGES

103.  Lau is unable to state the quantum of loss except to say that it was over US$30m.  Oh estimated the loss suffered by TGH to be in the sum of US$36.97m, equivalent to HK$288m, roughly equally to the sales in July and August 2011.  In the draft injunction order, TGH limits its claim to HK$285m. The different between Lau and Oh is substantial.

104.  TGH is a shell company.  Its parent company (TEC), has its financial ability questioned by auditors in its latest available financial statements and its affairs are currently investigated by the Korean police.  Deputy Judge Lok doubted in the 2011 Action the ability of TEC/TGH   to make good the potentially substantial loss of US$8.5m to US$11.5m to Winful by the ex parte injunction.  He ordered TEC/TGH to fortify its undertaking further by increasing the sum from HK$200,000 to US$3m. (See the decision in HCA 1687 of 2011, at para 14-16, 19, 20 and 22.)

105.  If an injunction is granted, it is appropriate to order fortification, given the amount to be frozen and the potential ruin to D5.  It is not uncommon in an injunction for the court to impose fortification for eg a reasonable sum that represents the costs for arranging alternative funds for running a business. 

106.  Mr Manzoni SC makes reference to Akai Holdings wherethe injunction for US$500m was requested for but Stone J granted it for US$200m.  The amount for fortification at the interim stage was HK$50m but it was not adjusted when the injunction was imposed.  He submits that 1% of HK$285m will be the costs of obtaining a bank guarantee and suggest HK$25m for fortification.  

107.  In Akai Holdings, there were bona fide liquidators involved.  Here, to impose fortification at HK$25m is woefully inadequate.  Lee has demonstrated the difficulty in borrowing funds from financial institutions such that he has to turn to a personal friend Mr Mui to lend him US$6.7m. 

108.  Taking all circumstances into account, if I were to grant a Mareva injunction, there should be a fortification in a sum of US$8m.

CONCLUSION

109.  I am not satisfied that a good arguable case has been made out, without Lau’s evidence in reply.  There are inconsistencies in his Confession Statements and affirmations in 2011 Action.  Even if there is a good arguable case, the balance of convenience is against making an injunction, and the potential damage to D5’s business.  I dismiss TGH’s application.

COSTS

110.  Costs of this application as between TGH and the remaining defendants should, on a nisi basis, be borne by TGH, with certificates for 2 counsel.

111.  I thank counsel for their able assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Charles Manzoni, SC leading Mr Sebastian Hughes, instructed by Jones Day, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Barrie Barlow, SC leading Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co for the 1st, 5th - 7th defendants


[1] B7/41/2917-2918

89513-EN-2013-10-08

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(永利豐集團有限公司)
4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
 VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED
(浚域有限公司)
6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED
(御首有限公司)
7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED
(凱譽企業有限公司)
10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(天豐國際集團有限公司)
11th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 29 August 2013
Date of Decision: 8 October 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  This is an application by the 1st, and 4th to 7th defendants (collectively "the defendants") for an order that the plaintiffs do produce the settlement agreement made between the plaintiffs and a non-party, Mr Lau Siu Ming (“Mr Lau”).

The relevant court rules

2.  This application is taken out under Order 24, rule 10 of the Rules of the High Court, which provides that any party to a cause or matter shall be entitled at any time to serve a notice on any other party in whose affidavits reference is made to any document, requiring him to produce that document for the inspection of the party giving the notice and to permit him to take copies.

3.  O 24 r 11(1) provides that if the respondent to the notice under rule 10(1) objects to production, the court may, subject to rule 13(1) and on the application of the party entitled to inspection, make an order for production of the documents in question for inspection, and in such manner, as it thinks fit.

4.  No order for the production of any documents for inspection or to the Court or for the supply of a copy of any document shall be made unless the Court is of opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs: rule 13(1).

5.  There are two separate stages to be considered. 

“First, the party who has referred to the document in a pleading or affidavit bears the burden of showing good cause why an order for production should not be made. As a matter of practicality, at that stage, the fact of reference to a document in a pleading or affidavit will make it difficult for the referring party to contend that the document does not exist and it may also make it difficult for him to contend that it is not relevant. However, that is not the end of the inquiry as there is not then a presumptive rule in favour of an order for production and the referring party may be able to show, for example, that the document is privileged from production. In any event, under O.24 r.13 there remains, secondly, and independent of the first stage, a burden on the applicant for an order for production to show the court that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.” Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Ltd (in liquidation) v Olivia Lee Sin Mei, HCMP 2192/2012, 8 May 2013, at para 35, per Fok JA.

6.  A party cannot use or rely upon the probative value of a document, yet deny the other party of the same forensic advantage: Zida Technologies v Tiga Technologies [2001] 3 HKLRD 698, 716E, per Deputy Judge McCoy SC.

7.  The respondent may rely on privilege to refuse production.  However, if he has deployed the contents of a confidential document, any privilege is waived: Matthews and Malek, Disclosure (4th ed), paras 16.21 and 16.22:

“The general rule is that:

‘Where a person is deploying in court material which would otherwise be privileged, the opposite party and the court must have the opportunity of satisfying themselves that what the party has chosen to release from privilege represents the whole of the material relevant to the issue in question. To allow an individual item to be plucked out of context would be to risk injustice through its real weight or meaning being misunderstood.’

The key word is “deploying”. A mere reference to a privileged document in an affidavit does not of itself amount to a waiver of privilege and this is so even if the document referred to is being relied on for some purpose, for reliance in itself is not the test. Instead, the test is whether the contents of the document are being relied on, rather than its effect.”

See also Goldlion Properties Ltd v Regent National Enterprises Ltd [2006] 1 HKLRD 793.

8.  The court even has power to order disclosure of a settlement agreement involving the plaintiff and an ex-defendant.  Relevance is not sufficient but the guiding principle is one of justice as regards the trial.  If without the material the applicants have a reasonable apprehension that they might not have a fair trial that should outweigh any questions of confidentiality. The confidentiality could be preserved by appropriate means but ultimately if that was not effective then the disclosure must nevertheless be ordered: Cadogan Petroleum Plc v Mark Tolley [2009] EWHC 3291.

9.  Where the court is minded to make an order for production, it may impose conditions.  For example, it may afford the other party to the settlement agreement an opportunity to make representations: Akai Holdings Ltd v Ernst & Young, HCCL 29/2004, 17 July 2009, Stone J, para 81.

10.  The court may limit the production to only such parts of the settlement agreement as are necessary for the applicants to be able to conduct their defences fairly at the trial.  It may restrict disclosure only to the court and certain specified persons within the applicant’s team.  It may require an undertaking to be given by any person inspecting the document that he will not disclose the information to any other person.  See Cadogan Petroleum Plc v Mark Tolley [2010] EWHC 1107, paras 6 and 7; Akai Holdings, at para 81.

The background

11.  The facts have been set out in my decision dated 15 April 2013.  So far as relevant, they are set out below.  The 1st plaintiff is a Korean manufacturer of copper rods and 2nd plaintiff (TGH) is its wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary which managed the sales business of the 1st plaintiff in Hong Kong and Southern China.  Between 2008 and 2011 a fraud was perpetrated by Mr Lau, the 1st defendant (“Mr Lee”), 3rd defendant (“Yuanzhi”) and 4th defendant (“Winful”) on the plaintiffs, resulting in loss to the plaintiffs of about US$36m.  The 2nd to 10th defendants were said to be persons or entities holding properties acquired with proceeds of sale belonging to the plaintiffs.

12.  Yuanzhi and Winful acted as sales agents for the plaintiffs.  Having received the proceeds of sale (which allegedly belonged to the plaintiffs), Mr Lau and Mr Lee diverted part of the money to their own money making venture and shared the profits.  The relationship between Mr Lau and Mr Lee fell apart towards the end of 2010.  By October 2011 the fraud was exposed.

13.  In September 2011, the plaintiffs’ representatives came to Hong Kong to discuss with Mr Lau their concerns over the proceeds of sale but Mr Lau became uncontactable.  Relying on Mr Lee’s version of fraud, the 2nd plaintiff instituted HCA 1687 of 2011 (“the Existing Proceedings”) against Mr Lau and others. 

14.  Meanwhile, Mr Lau was prosecuted.  After his acquittal in 2012, Mr Lau entered into the subject settlement agreement whereby he admitted liability, agreed to entry of judgment against him in the Existing Proceedings, and provided assistance to the plaintiffs to prosecute the present action, which effectively pointed to Mr Lee as the chief fraudster.  An application has been taken out for a Mareva injunction against Mr Lau, amongst others, which was heard on 4 September 2013 but judgment is pending.

15.  The affirmations that gave rise to this application were filed by the plaintiffs in support of that application for a Mareva injunction.  The parts of the affirmations material to this application were as follows:

(i)   Paragraph 5 of the affirmation of Mr Philip Loukis Georgiou sworn on 13 March 2013 and filed on 7th May 2013 which stated:

“A privileged and confidential settlement agreement was reached between TGH and Mr Lau on 22 January 2013 …” (“the 1st passage”)

(ii)   Paragraph 28 of the affirmation of Mr Oh Dong Jin sworn and filed on 9 April 2013, which stated:

“In January 2013 Mr Lau agreed to judgment being entered against him in the Existing Proceedings and TGH agreed not to commence enforcement proceedings on condition that Mr Lau provides full assistance to the Plaintiffs … If Mr Lau breaches the terms of our settlement, our enforcement proceedings will be of little benefit to TGH ...” (“the 2nd passage”)

(iii)   Paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Mr Lau sworn and filed on 9 April 2013 which stated:

“… A settlement has been reached between myself and the 2nd Plaintiff in the Existing Proceedings pursuant to which I have agreed to a judgment being entered against me for loss and damage suffered by TGH.” (“the 3rd passage”)

16.  The defendants sought production of the settlement agreement claiming that privilege had been waived; that the plaintiffs had relied on the settlement agreement to lay their claim against the defendants.  The defendants submit that it was necessary for fairly disposing of the action that the basis of Mr Lau’s provision of evidence was provided.  The settlement agreement was also highly relevant to Mr Lau’s credibility and his motive in assisting the plaintiffs in this action.

17.  The plaintiffs oppose the application on the following grounds:

A.      That there has been no deployment of the contents of the settlement agreement;

B.      That this was a last minute application for production;

C.      That the settlement agreement was not necessary for the fair disposal of the Mareva injunction application;

D.      That production was not necessary to obtain a fair disposal of the action at trial.

18.  The 3rd defendant’s stance is neutral.

A.  No deployment of the contents of the settlement agreement

19.  Mr Hughes, counsel for the plaintiffs, submitted that the plaintiffs were not relying on the contents of the settlement agreement at all, but have merely referred to its existence.  I agree with respect to the 1st passage.  However, the 2nd and 3rd passages, clearly made reference to the contents of the agreement and the parties’ agreement not to enforce judgment subject to a condition. 

20.  Further, it must not be forgotten that at the ex parte stage, the plaintiffs have handed up a copy of the settlement agreement to Anthony Chan J.  

21.  Clearly, the plaintiffs have deployed the contents of the settlement agreement.  They have even referred to the without prejudice negotiations between them and Mr Lau: see paragraphs 25 to 29 of Mr Oh’s affidavit. The purpose was clear.  As admitted by the plaintiffs in Mr Oh’s affidavit, although the plaintiffs had suspicions about Mr Lee’s possible involvement in the fraud, without Mr Lau’s evidence, there was insufficient evidence at that time to sue Mr Lee as a defendant.  The plaintiffs wanted to impress upon the court the reason why Mr Lau (a defendant in the Existing Proceedings and co-conspirator of Mr Lee) turned round to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs and that Mr Lau ought to be believed.

22.  The first ground of objection fails.

B.  Last minute application for production

23.  This application was taken out on 26 August 2013, 9 days before the hearing of the Mareva injunction on 4 September 2013. That was despite the fact that the 3 relevant affidavits have been filed and served in April and May this year.

24.  A late application of this sort would not meet with approval of the court. It was an attack on the court's diary. It diverted the attention of counsel from preparation for the main hearing of the Mareva injunction. No explanation has been provided by the defendants for their late application.  Partly on the ground of lateness, I have on the day of hearing declined to order production of the settlement agreement insofar as it concerned the hearing of the Mareva injunction.   However, I have reserved my ruling on whether or not production should be ordered for the purpose of the further conduct of this action.

25.  This ground in opposition is partly made out.

C.  Settlement agreement not necessary for the fair disposal of the Mareva injunction application

26.  Mr Lau's credibility has always been in doubt since taking out of the Mareva injunction application. There was no reason why the defendants had to defer making this application until shortly before hearing of the injunction. In any case, the court will not be engaged in findings of credibility of a deponent in an injunction application save in the clearest cases. The court is rather more concerned with whether or not there is a serious issue to be tried and dissipation of assets.  In the course of its consideration, the court will certainly consider why a party changed its case and whether its deponent’s version can be relied on.

27.  The defendants have been able to prepare their affirmations in opposition to the Mareva injunction application without the need to have sight of the settlement agreement. The sheer lateness of this application was sufficient to demonstrate that the settlement agreement was not necessary for the fair disposal of the Mareva injunction application.

28.  This ground in opposition has been made out.

D.  Production not necessary to obtain a fair disposal of the action at trial

29.  Although this application was made in the context of an interlocutory injunction, the court is not barred from considering whether the settlement agreement is necessary for the fair disposal of the action under Order 24, rule 13: Moulin Eyecare, at paras 68-69, per Fok JA.

30.  The plaintiffs have not contended that the settlement agreement was not relevant to the action.  For my part, I am of the view that it is relevant to the credibility of Mr Lau on which (at least as presently appears) the plaintiffs’ case rests heavily.  It may also be relevant in other aspects such as contribution of Lau in terms of liability and damages.  It will be necessary for the fair conduct of the defence.

31.  This ground in opposition fails.

Conditions for disclosure

32.  The settlement agreement ought to be produced.  However, the pleadings have not yet been closed and exchange of lists of documents has not even begun. It is premature at this stage to order inspection of the settlement agreement.  It will not be fair to the plaintiffs to have them produce a confidential document if this action will not move beyond the Mareva injunction.

33.  I therefore make an order that the settlement agreement is to be produced only after exchange of lists of documents when the time for inspection comes.  Before inspection, Mr Lau should be given an opportunity of making representations in support of or in opposition to production and the terms to be imposed for disclosure.  The parties are at liberty to work out the terms that preserve confidentiality.

Conclusion and costs

34.  I find that the settlement agreement is relevant and necessary for the fair disposal of the action but not the Mareva injunction.  The plaintiffs have deployed the contents of the settlement agreement and they ought to produce it at the time of inspection of documents.  Mr Lau should be given an opportunity to make representation before production.  The parties are at liberty to apply with regards to the terms of the production.

35.  I make an order nisi that the 1st, 3rd, 4th to 7th defendants’ costs of this summons should be borne by the plaintiffs.

36.  I make an order nisi that there shall be summary assessment of costs on 8 November 2013 at 4:30 pm on the papers without attendance.  The defendants shall file and serve their statement of costs by 22 October 2013.  The plaintiffs shall file and serve their grounds in opposition by 6 November 2013.

37.  I thank counsel and Mr Leung for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Sebastian Hughes, instructed by Jones Day, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co, for the 1st, 4th‑7th defendants

Mr William Leung, instructed by Eversheds, for the 3rd defendant

89051-EN-2013-09-10

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 

and

 
 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(永利豐集團有限公司)
4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED
(浚域有限公司)
6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED
(御首有限公司)
7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED
(凱譽企業有限公司)
10th Defendant
SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(天豐國際集團有限公司)
11th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 29 August 2013
Date of Decision: 29 August 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 10 September 2013

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

______________________________

 

1.  This is an application by the 1st, 4th to 7th defendants (collectively “the defendants”) for an order requiring the deponent of the 2nd plaintiff (“TGH”) to attend court for the purpose of cross-examination at the hearing of the TGH’s application for a Mareva injunction.

The legal principles

2.  The jurisdiction to order cross-examination on affidavit is a matter of discretion which is unfettered.  The test is: “Would the making of an order result in justice being achieved; conversely, if an order were not made, would there be injustice?”  See Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd & anr [2002] 2 HKLRD 832 at para 14, Ma J (as he then was); Grand Empire Holdings Ltd v Marco International (HK) Ltd, unrep., HCA 14891/1999, 7 December 1999 at para 2, Burrell J.

3.  As accepted by the plaintiff, ordering a pre-judgment cross-examination on affidavit is rare, and requires good and sufficient reason for the application in all the circumstances: Wenta Seng Yuen v Pak Yiu Yuen [1984] HKLR 431 per Fuad JA at 436E-H.

4.  What constitutes good and sufficient reason must be considered in the “light of the purpose of the proceedings” for which such need is said to have arisen: Andrew Wykes Waters v Malahon Credit Co Ltd, unrep., HCSD 24/2001, 27 February 2003, Deputy Judge To (as he then was), paras 9 and 11 upheld on appeal CACV44/2003, unrep., 8 October 2003.

5.  In the context of an injunction, the discretion to order cross-examination is to make the injunction more effective, not to enable material to be obtained with a view to impugning the defendant’s credit, for issuing contempt proceedings against him for breach of the injunction or for eliciting material to be used against the defendant at trial.  Where the cross-examination would deal with the same issues as those at trial, exceptional circumstances had to be shown: Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd & anr.

6.  The power to order cross-examination of a deponent is more often exercised where a final order is to be made or where the substantive relief sought has an element of finality.  For example:

(i)  Where there is an issue as to the motive or truthfulness of the account of a deponent: Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 308 per Lord Greene MR.

(ii)  In an application for ancillary relief whereunder the husband deposed to the fact that he was unable to produce the accounts of his partnership: Wenta Sung Yuen v Park Yiu Yuen.  Hunter JA made clear that it was essential to acknowledge that matrimonial proceedings for financial relief are rather different from the ordinary run of cases.

(iii)  Where a defendant’s affirmation has failed to comply with a disclosure order made under a Mareva injunction: Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd.

(iv)  In an application to set aside a statutory demand: In Andrew Wykes Waters v Malahon Credit Co Ltd, the court observed that it was never the function of the court to conduct a mini trial on affidavit and make findings of fact.  All that it had to do was to consider all the evidence and see if the applicant has raised a genuine triable issue that the debt is disputed on substantial as opposed to trivial or frivolous grounds. To allow cross-examination will be to take an inquiry to a depth which is unnecessary and would only add to unnecessary costs.

(v)    In an application for appointment of provisional liquidators arising out of the wife’s attempt to enforce judgment obtained against the husband in matrimonial proceedings for ancillary relief.  Dianoor International Ltd v Aiyer Vembu Subramaniam, unrep., HCA 806/2008, 29 September 2010 at paras 18-20.

7.  The court may consider the delay and expense that will arise as a result of the need to cross-examine a deponent. 

Background

8.  The facts of this case have been set out in my decision dated 15 April 2013 when I dismissed an application for an interim injunction sought ex parte on notice.  Just to recap, between 2008 and 2011 fraud was perpetrated on the plaintiff (TGH, P2 in the present case), resulting in loss to them of about US$36m.  TGH commenced action in 2011 (the 2011 action) against, amongst others, Lau, relying on the assistance of the 1st defendant (“Lee”) in the present case.  An injunction was sought against Lau, in which application Lau has filed various affirmations.  After Lau was acquitted of criminal charges, he entered into a settlement agreement with TGH, whereby TGH agreed not to enforce the judgment entered against Lau in return for his giving evidence in favour of TGH.

9.  By this action (“the 2013 action”), the plaintiffs (now only TGH) sues various defendants (including Lee[1]) in conspiracy to defraud and to injure, constructive trust on the grounds of knowing receipt and dishonest assistance, conversion of property and breach of contract.  TGH only proceeds against the 1st, 3rd-7th defendants now.  TGH relies on the evidence of Lau this time.  The 2011 action and injunction exist in parallel.  The loss of the plaintiffs in both actions are similar.

The grounds for the defendants’ application

10.  Mr Zimmern submits that the circumstances of the present case are unusual, if not exceptional.  The grounds for the application are that:

(i)     Lau is the person providing the plaintiffs with the evidence to found the 2013 action and to seek to raise a good arguable case in the Mareva application.

(ii)    Yet Lau is a self-confessed fraudster who has lied under oath. Within the 2013 action, Lau’s affidavits completely contradicted the evidence he gave under oath in the 2011 action. There can be little doubt that he has lied on oath in either action.

(iii)   Further, Lau might have been financially motivated to give evidence in this case, in view of his contractual obligation under the settlement agreement.

(iv)    It now appears that Lau may not be willing to provide an affirmation in reply or give evidence at the trial.

11.  The defendants therefore seek leave to cross-examine Lau at the hearing for a Mareva injunction on 4 September 2013 (“the hearing”).

12.  The 2013 action is subject to a strike out application for abuse of process that is set down to be heard in November this year. 

Application of the legal principles

13.   To order cross-examination for the purpose of ground (i) is to seek to cross-examine Lau on the merits of the claim, the same issues as those at trial: Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd & anr.

14.  To order cross-examination for the purpose of ground (ii) is to discredit Lau, potentially to lay the foundation for perjury or to elicit material to be used against TGH at the trial: Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd & anr.

15.  To order cross-examination for the purpose of ground (iii) is to question the deponent’s motive: Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd.  In cases involving fraud, conspiracy, and dishonest assistance, someone’s motives and good faith will always be questioned.  I agree with Mr Hughes, counsel for the plaintiff, that ReSmith v Fawcett is not an authority for the proposition that where a party is seeking an interlocutory injunction, a deponent should be ordered to attend for cross examination simply because the other party has questioned the motive or good faith of the deponent.

16.  To order cross-examination for the purpose of ground (iv) is unnecessary. If Lau refuses to provide an affidavit in reply, it means that the plaintiff may not be able to contradict the version put forth by the defendant or fail to show a good arguable case.  The indication that Lau will not give evidence at the trial is something further into the future.  It does not affect the situation at the hearing that the plaintiff would seek an interim injunction based on the facts then known to the court.

17.  At the hearing, all that is required is for the plaintiff to show a good arguable case under American Cyanamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396.  A court acts on affidavit evidence alone even though there may be cross-allegations or the affidavit evidence is sometimes conflicting.  The court does not have to make positive findings of facts.  This must be the position given that an application for an injunction most often happens at the early stage of an action when discovery is not complete and pleadings may even need to be amended at a later stage. 

18.  The hearing is for interlocutory relief, which is not a final order by nature.  None of the grounds put forward constitute special circumstances that would justify departure from the general rule that an injunction hearing is based on affidavit evidence.  There is no risk of injustice if Lau is not cross-examined on his affidavits.

Delay

19.  This is almost a last minute application made 9 days before the hearing, which has been set down for one day.  There was no estimation from the defendants’ side on how long the cross-examination will take.  I doubted if the hearing time would have been sufficient just for the legal arguments.  (Note: this doubt was proved to be well-founded as it turned out that the hearing before me on 4 September overran until 5:30 pm.)

20.  That aside, there was no reason why this application should not be made earlier:

(i)     The defendant has had Lau’s affirmations since March and April 2013;  Lau’s questionable motive, if any, would have been apparent from his very first affirmation;

(ii)    The substantive hearing of the plaintiff’s summons for injunction has been fixed since 15 May 2013;

(iii)   The plaintiff’s skeleton submission was due to be filed and served on the day after (30 August) the hearing of this summons for cross-examination.

21.  A late application of this sort is unwarranted.  It diverts counsel’s attention away from his preparation for hearing of the injunction.  It does not reflect proper management of a summons.  Such an application should be dismissed by its sheer lateness in filing.

22.  I dismiss the application for cross-examination of Lau.  On a nisi basis, costs should be to the plaintiff to be summarily assessed on the papers on 30 September 2013.  No attendance is required. The plaintiff shall file and serve its statement of costs by 17 September 2013.  The 1st and 4th to 7th defendants shall file and serve their grounds in opposition by 24 September 2013.

23.  I thank Mr Hughes and Mr Zimmern for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Sebastian Hughes, instructed by Jones Day, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co, for the 1st, 4th‑7th defendants

Mr William Leung, instructed by Eversheds, for the 3rd defendant



[1]   The 1st plaintiff has withdrawn from the 2013 Action.  The 2nd plaintiff has withdrawn its case against the 2nd and 8th to 11th defendants.

87934-EN-2013-07-05

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED 1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED 
 (永利豐集團有限公司)4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
 VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED
(浚域有限公司)
6th Defendant
 FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED
(御首有限公司)
7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED
(凱譽企業有限公司)
10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (天豐國際集團有限公司)11th Defendant
____________
Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 3 July 2013
Date of Decision: 5 July 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

1.  P2 seeks an order against D1 (Lee), D3 (Yuanzhi) and D4 (Winful) (collectively “the defendants”) for them to produce documents referred to in Lee’s affirmation for inspection.

The legal principles

2.  The principles are not in dispute.  Under Order 24, rule 10(1),

“Any party to a cause or matter shall be entitled at any time to serve a notice on any other party in whose pleadings, affidavits or witness statements reference is made to any document requiring him to produce that document for the inspection of the party giving the notice and to permit him to take copies thereof.”

3.  If the other party objects to the production, then, subject to rule 13(1), the court may make an order for production of the documents in question for inspection.  Rule 13(1) provides that,

“No order for the production of any documents for inspection or to the Court or for the supply of a copy of any documents shall be made under any of the foregoing rules unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.”

4.  A recent Court of Appeal decision propounding the tests to be applied is in Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Limited (in Liquidation) v Olivia Lee Sin Mei HCMP 2192/2012 (unrep), 8 May 2013, Fok JA:

“31. I have set out above the rules of Court relevant to the present appeal. It is clear from those rules and from the authorities that have considered them (or the precursors to those rules) that there is a distinction between discovery of documents in an action in general and an application for production of documents referred to in pleadings or affidavits: see, in this respect, Quilter v Heatly per Lindley LJ at p. 49 and Shun Kai Finance Co Ltd v Japan Leasing (HK) Ltd per Rogers VP at pp. 523J-525B.

32. In the latter situation, where a party has referred to a document in his pleading or affidavit, the opposite party has a prima facie entitlement to see it, “unless good cause to the contrary is shewn” (per Jessel MR in Quilter v Heady at p. 48), or “unless there is some sufficient ground for refusing production” (ibid per Lindley LJ at p. 50), or “unless he can shew good cause why he should not” produce it (ibid per Bowen LJ at p. 51).

33. Nevertheless, it is clear from the rules that any order for production for inspection under 0.24 r.11 is expressly “subject to rule 13(1)” and that latter rule plainly places, on an applicant for an order for production, a burden to demonstrate to the court that “the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs”.

34. In Dynamic Way, Godfrey VP expressed the position thus (at p. 142B-D):

“We are concerned here with a document referred to in an affirmation, that is to say, the list of purchase orders mentioned in para 36. Although, prima facie, the party against whom it was sought to be used had a right to inspect this document and take copies of it, the court will not order production of the document for inspection unless the court is of the opinion that such an order is necessary either ‘for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs ’; see 0 24 r 13 of the Rules of the High Court. ”

35.     There are thus two separate stages to be considered, although in practice these will usually be examined together. First, the party who has referred to the document in a pleading or affidavit bears the burden of showing good cause why an order for production should not be made. As a matter of practicality, at that stage, the fact of reference to a document in a pleading or affidavit will make it difficult for the referring party to contend that the document does not exist and it may also make it difficult for him to contend that it is not relevant. However, that is not the end of the inquiry as there is not then a presumptive rule in favour of an order for production and the referring party may be able to show, for example, that the document is privileged from production. In any event, under 0.24 r.13 there remains, secondly, and independent of the first stage, a burden on the applicant for an order for production to show the court that the order is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.”

5.  Mr Zimmern, counsel for the defendants, with whom I agree, adds that, first and foremost, an applicant has to demonstrate that “a reference has been made any documents” in the affidavit so as to invoke the court’s jurisdiction under rule 10(1).

The factual background

6.  The facts to this case have been set out in my decision dated 15 April 2013 (“the Decision”).  I just highlight some of the salient facts for the purpose of this summons.

7.  It is P2’s case that one Mr Lau Siu Ming (Lau) and Lee were its sales agents earning commission.  Yuanzhi and Winful were vehicles set up in 2007 to sell copper rods and collect the proceeds on behalf of the P2.  With regard to Yuanzhi, Lee was the sole director and shareholder from its incorporation until 31 March 2010.  Thereafter, Lau and Lee had each been its director and 50% shareholder.  With regard to Winful, Lee had been its director and shareholder since incorporation.  Lee was the sole signatory of the bank accounts of Yuanzhi and Winful.

8.  It is P2’s case that Lau and Lee had dishonestly misappropriated proceeds for investment for their own profits, and that Yuanzhi and Winful had transferred monies out other than to P2.  P2’s current estimation of loss is about US$37m.  P2 relies on, among others, on constructive trust, breach of agency/fiduciary duties and dishonest assistance to found its claim.

9.  P2 settled with Lau and had obtained judgment against him in the 2011 Action.  It now relies on the affidavit of Lau, a self-confessed fraudster and conspirator of Lee, to seek an injunction against the defendants.

10.  The papers for the injunction application (which were quite substantial) were not served on Lee until 2 clear days and the skeleton submission 1 clear day before the day for call over (“the April hearing”) of the injunction summons.

11.  The defendants prepared Lee’s affirmation (“the Affirmation”) in opposition to injunction application in great rush and served it on P2 at the April hearing.  As it had not yet made its way into the evidence, I had declined to rely on it at the April hearing (paragraphs 30 and 53 of the Decision).

12.  The defendants’ case on affirmation is that any alleged loss of P2 was caused by its own speculative activities with the aid of Lau.  Lau was the mastermind manipulating the supplies of copper rods. He was in full control of Yuanzhi. Lee wrongly trusted Lau and lent him the credit facility of Winful for some “REPO arrangements” for financing P2’s financial needs.  Lau has now turned round to implicate Lee in exchange for P2’s promise not to enforce the judgment against Lau. 

13.  The subject matter of this is paragraph 17 (“Paragraph 17”)  of the Affirmation which stated as follows:

“The plaintiffs have changed their case in this new Action, and now heavily rely on the assertion of Lau that I had conspired with him to carry out various activities.  It is worthy to note, however, that other than his bare allegations, Lau has not provided any evidence or documents to support his allegations.  I intend to provide the Court in due course with full sets of accounting and bank documentsto prove that the assertions of Lau are entirely bare and groundless.”  (underline and emphasis added; words in italics shall be referred to as “the qualifying words” below)

14.  Subsequent to the April hearing, Lee has filed a further affirmation containing, amongst others, the following information:

(i)      That he had “reviewed Yuanzhi’s bank records and confirmed that no payment of US$700,000 has ever been received by Yuanzhi from Lau.  This is yet another one of Lau’s fabrications…[1]” He produced 6 months’ bank statements in respect of 3 of Yuanzhi accounts in support of his averment.  

(ii)     To disprove Lau’s assertion that he and Lee conspired to enter into unauthorized REPO transactions, to generate funds to conceal an alleged shortfall created by the diversion of sales proceeds out of Yuanzhi, and that only the first REPO Agreement was approved, Lau exhibited 59 sale and purchase agreements (“REPO Agreements”) executed by Winful and Standard Bank Plc.

15.  P2 then issued the present summons seeking an order for inspection and copying of all bank statements of the defendants from the opening of the bank accounts to the date of the Affirmation.

16.  Yuanzhi is unrepresented in the present hearing.  Lee and Winful put forth the following grounds of objection:

A. The documents sought by P2 are not documents referred to in Paragraph 17 (“the reference point”); in any event relevant bank statements had been provided by D1 to P2.

B. The documents sought are not relied on by Lee save to the extent of those already disclosed by Lee, so there is no unfairness to P2 if they are not produced (“the reliance point”).

C. The order sought is unnecessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs (“the necessity point”).

17.  There is no dispute that “bank statements” form a category of “bank documents”. 

The reference point

18.  Under rule 10(1), the document referred to in the affidavit need not be individually listed or specified but must be alluded to instead of being left to be inferred: Zida Technologies Ltd v Tiga Technologies Ltd [2001] 3 HKLRD 698 at 714C.

“Documents need not be identified or individually described – a general reference will suffice, as this is a compendious way of referring to a number of documents: Smith v Harris (1883) 48 LT 869 … approved in Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari … But a direct allusion to the document is required; where a document is not specifically mentioned its existence is prohibited from being inferred.”

19.  Moreover, the reference must be to a document, as opposed to a dealing/transaction: Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 2) [1990] WLR 731.

20.  The task of the court must always be to extract the fair meaning of the words used in their context.  Dubai Bank Ltd at 740B.

21.  The Affirmation was produced in a rush.  A further affirmation to expand on Paragraph 17 was anticipated.

22.  Mr Zimmern submits that Paragraph 17 meant that only those documents that would disprove Lau’s assertions would be provided in full (as opposed to in part, in the form of extracts).  The defendants have already produced “a full set of the available bank documents” pertinent to the defence case. He submits that P2 is effectively asking this court to ignore the qualifying words.  It is not for P2 to decide what other documents the defendants should rely on to disprove Lau’s assertions and seek discovery in this manner.

23.  Paragraph 17 has not identified the account holder, or delineated the period covered by the term “bank documents”.  However, in my view, the qualifying words merely revealed the purpose of using those documents but do not undermine the fact that there has been a reference to bank document generally within the meaning of Order 24, rule 10(1).

24.  The purpose of the affidavit, in the litigation, is not the relevant test: Zida Technologies,at 713.

25.  Moreover, in the light of the “review” done by Lee referred to in paragraph 14(i) above, clearly, the “bank documents” covered more than the 6 months’ statements already produced.

26.  On a fair reading, Lee has in Paragraph 17 made a general or compendious reference to bank documents including the documents now sought by P2.

The reliance point

27.  It is true that the defendants placed no reliance on the documents sought (other than those already produced).  Nor did the court rely on the Affirmation at the April hearing.

28.  Nevertheless, reliance is not the right test for rule 10(1), but service is.  In Zida Technologies, at 713, it is stated that,

“35. … An affidavit which has not been filed, but a copy of which has been furnished to the opposite party, is within the rule: Re Arbitration between Fenner and Lord [1897] 1 QB 667 (CA). Lord Esher MR stating at p.669:

The party on whose behalf the affidavit was made is no doubt not obliged to use it on the hearing of the motion, but he has procured it to be sworn in the matter and has shown it to his opponent.”

The reliance point is unsustainable.

The necessity point

29.  Rule 10(1) does not apply only to fair disposal of the main action but also to disposal of proceedings at various stages, in the present case, the injunction application: Zida Technologies, at 715A.

30.  In determining the question of necessity for production, the court relies on the issues disclosed in the pleadings and other related documents: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013, Vol 1, para 24/13/1.

31.  Mr Zimmern points out that P2 has failed to identify issues in the statement of claim or other related documents, disposal of which requires production of the documents sought.  There is no dispute that funds were transferred in and out of the accounts of Yuanzhi and Winful.  The issue, he submits, was whether Lee had the instructions of Lau to make the transfers.  The documents sought would not be necessary for fair disposal of this issue.  The request for all bank statements for all bank accounts is wholly out of proportion, is a fishing expedition by P2 and an attempt to obtain premature discovery of an extremely wide category of documents.

32.  Mr Hughes for P2 submits, and I agree, that the documents sought are directly relevant and essential to establish that the defendants have fraudulently misappropriated money from P2.  Yuanzhi and Winful were vehicles set up for sale of P2’s copper rods and collect proceeds.  There can be nothing more relevant than bank statements of the alleged fraudsters, which may disclose the source and destination of the funds, and the scale of the fraud. The fact that the defendants only use the bank documents for a limited purpose cannot bar P2 from using them to verify or destroy the defendants’ case, or support its own case.

33.  I am satisfied that the documents sought are necessary for the fair disposal of the injunction application and is not a pre-mature application for discovery.

34.  One can also safely assume that the injunction application will be vigourously contested.  Production of the documents sought in good time before the hearing will ensure that the hearing will progress as set down without ambush, further delay and resultant costs. 

35.  Mr Zimmern also complains that the documents sought are vastly different from and much wider than what was actually referred to in Paragraph 17 as P2 seeks:

“full sets of bank statements for all of [D1, D3 and D4’s] bank accounts from the date of opening the accounts until … 21 June 2013.”

Mr Zimmern’s point is that the Affirmation was made in April.  Lee could not possibly have referred to a bank statement in May/June which did not exist at the time.

36.  Without disrespect, I see no substance in that complaint.  The court can always limit the scope of discovery as the circumstances warrant.  The period of disclosure can be cut down to the period up to the date of the Affirmation, ie 12 April 2013.  The bank accounts are limited to those already identified in the draft order, as I have seen nothing from P2 to justify disclosure of all of Lee’s accounts (including eg his personal accounts).

Conclusion

37.  I am satisfied that Lee has made reference to the documents sought in his Affirmation.  The defendants have failed to show good cause why an order for production should not be made.  The documents sought are necessary for the fair disposal of the injunction application and for saving costs.

38.  Lee has been in control of the accounts of Yuanzhi and Winful.  If for whatever reason the 2 companies are unable to produce the bank statements, Lee shall provide those documents on their behalf.  I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft order.

Costs

39.  The defendants have contested the application but lost.  However, the actual utility of the documents sought is unknown.  Considering the circumstances, I exercise my discretion to make an order for P2’s costs to be in the cause of the injunction application.

40.  I will add that discretion has not been properly exercised by the parties in deciding what documents to be put into the hearing bundles.  In this case, contents of the bank statements already produced by the defendants are not relevant and not referred to in the submissions at all.  The importance with the bank statements in this summons lies only in the account numbers and the period for which the defendants have already made disclosure.  A table, instead of copies of the bank statements, would have sufficed.

41.  The bundles will be returned to P2, the bulk of which can be reused for the injunction hearing.  Only costs for photocopying the summons and related affidavits for this hearing will be allowed.

42.  I have considered the costs statements of both sides, which are not far apart in terms of quantum.  The matter is not complicated.  There is no justification for an hourly rate beyond the usual rates for the fee earners.

43.  I make an order nisi that P2’ costs summarily assessed at $50,000 shall be in the cause of the injunction application.

44.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Sebastian Hughes, instructed by Jones Day, for the 2nd plaintiff

Mr Richard Zimmern, instructed by Smyth & Co, for the 1st and 4th ‑7th defendants

The 3rd defendant, was not represented and did not appear



[1] Para 52 of the 2nd affirmation of Lee

86639-EN-2013-04-15

TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE CO LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC AND OTHERS

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HCA 454/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 454 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 TAIHAN ELECTRIC WIRE COMPANY LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 TAIHAN GLOBAL HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Plaintiff

and

 LEE CHI YUEN ARCTIC (李志源)1st Defendant
 LEE TSZ HUNG AMME (李紫紅)2nd Defendant
 YUANZHI INTERNATIONAL TRADING 
 COMPANY LIMITED (源智國際貿易有限公司) 3rd Defendant
 WINFUL HOLDINGS LIMITED
(永利豐集團有限公司)
4th Defendant
 WIN SEASON DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 5th Defendant
VICTORY LEGEND CORPORATION LIMITED
(浚域有限公司)
6th Defendant
FIRST SHINE CORPORATION LIMITED
(御首有限公司)
7th Defendant
 LO YING KING (羅英瓊)8th Defendant
 YUEN KWOK YAN (袁國欣)9th Defendant
 WIN STEP ENTERPRISE LIMITED 
 (凱譽企業有限公司)10th Defendant
 SKY GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (天豐國際集團有限公司)11th Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 12 April 2013
Date of Decision: 12 April 2013
Date of Reasons for Decision: 15 April 2013

__________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

__________________________

 

1.  The plaintiffs seek an interim Mareva injunction pending full argument on the summons. I have dismissed the application after hearing on Friday. Here are my reasons.

THE APPLICATION

2.  Between 2008 and 2011 a fraud was perpetrated on the plaintiffs, resulting in loss to them of about US$36m.  The plaintiffs issued a writ on 14 March 2013 to sue the various defendants in conspiracy to defraud and to injure, constructive trust on the grounds of knowing receipt and dishonest assistance, conversion of property and breach of contract.  The application for an injunction was first made ex parte, which was dismissed, and then pursued in this inter parte hearing.  The plaintiffs claim that there was urgency in this application because of acts of dissipation after the writ was issued.

THE BACKGROUND

3.  P1 is a Korean manufacturer of copper rods and P2 is its wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary which managed the sales business of P1 in Hong Kong and Southern China.

4.  D1 (“Lee”) is a director and shareholder of D3 (“Yuanzhi”) and D4 (“Winful”) which were sales agents for copper rods manufactured by P1.  Lee had full control of the bank accounts of Yuanzhi and Winful.  He is also the sole director and shareholder of D5.

5.  D2 (“Mrs Lee”) is a housewife and wife of Lee.  She is the sole shareholder of D6 and sole director of D7.

6.  D8 is employed as the accounting assistant of Yuanzhi and Winful and the sole director and shareholder of D10.

7.  D9 is the acquaintance of Lee and the sole director and shareholder of D11.

8.  Lau used to be a sales agent held in high regard by the plaintiffs.  He had the full responsibility of finding end customers and he was in complete control of sales contracts, cargoes, delivery documents and invoices for end customers.  He was a 50% shareholder of Yuanzhi.

9.  Yuanzhi and Winful acted as sales agents for the plaintiffs.  They obtained copper rods from the plaintiffs and took advantage of the 21-day free storage period of the container yard in Hong Kong to try and find end-customers. Having received the proceeds of sale (which really belonged to the plaintiffs), Lau and Lee diverted part of the money to their own money making venture.  They would share the profits.  They also took advantage of the 30-60 day credit period given by the plaintiffs to end-customers to delay payments to the plaintiffs and disguise their misappropriation of money.

10.  The scheme worked well when the sales increased significantly in between 2007 and 2010.  In 2009, Yuanzhi and Winful had twice relied on mortgages of cargoes to obtain significant cash flow to meet the drop in demand and prices.

11.  By March 2010, the plaintiffs had started to ship copper rods directly to customers and required the agents to pay the plaintiffs directly.  The cash flow for Yuanzhi and Winful significantly reduced. 

12.  The relationship between Lau and Lee fell apart towards the end of 2010.  Lau claims to be concerned that Lee was taking too much money, and not accounting to Lau.

13.  The plaintiffs had not discovered the fraud because of their own system of recording sales by reference to shipment instead of to specific customers.  In 2011 there was significant reduction in supply from Korea, which created cash flow problem for the cover-up.   

14.  In September 2011, the plaintiffs’ representatives came to Hong Kong to discuss with Lau their concerns over the proceeds of sale but Lau became uncontactable.  Relying on Lee’s version of fraud, P2  instituted HCA 1687 of 2011 (“the 2011 action”) on 4 October 2011 against Lau, Yuanzhi, Winful and one Kar Yue (Fu Hing) Trading Co Ltd (a trucking company engaged by Lau).  P2 obtained a Mareva injunction against Lau, Yuanzhi and Winful and a disclosure order against Kar Yue.

15.  Meanwhile, Lau was prosecuted for using a copy of a false instrument in the District Court but was acquitted on 5 October 2012.  Until then, Lau was prohibited by the police from speaking to the plaintiffs who were witnesses for the prosecution.  After his acquittal, Lau entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs whereby he admitted liability, agreed to entry of judgment against him in the 2011 action, and provided assistance to the plaintiffs to prosecute the present action which implicates Lee and others as co-conspirators. 

16.  The plaintiffs say that trading in copper rods is a low margin business.  Yet Lee has been able, within a short time since 2007 to amass an inexplicable amount of money allowing him to purchase properties with a total acquisition price of about HK$50.4m.  D5, D6 and D7 are said to be companies incorporated shortly before purchase of the properties under their respective names.  There were for the primary purpose of laundering money taken by Lee from Yuanzhi and Winful which should have been paid to the plaintiffs for copper rods.  D8 and D9 are said to have personally received and procured their respective company, D10[1] and D11, to receive money misappropriated under the scheme and to hold properties.

17.  The defendants own various bank accounts and insurance policies, disclosed pursuant to the order in the 2011 action, with an aggregate balance of about HK$20m.  The defendants have also trading margin accounts with unknown balances.

THE PRINCIPLES

18.  There is no dispute on principles.  To obtain a Mareva injunction, the plaintiffs must show a good arguable case on the merits; real risk of dissipation of assets in such a way that a future judgment would go unsatisfied and that it is just and convenient to grant the injunction: Akai Holdings Ltd v Ho Wing On Christopher [2009] HKCU 172 at para 35.

19.  Evidence of an unacceptably low standard of commercial morality or questionable integrity, will entitle the court to conclude that there is a sufficient risk to justify a Mareva injunction: Honsaico Trading Co v Hong Yiah Seng Co Ltd, [1990] 1 HKLR 235 at para 24; Standard Chartered Securities v Lai Arthur & ors [1993] 1 HKC 375, at para 45.

20.  Where a good arguable case is established on a claim for fraud or dishonesty, the court may be more willing to infer a real risk of dissipation: Akai Holdings,para 53.

21.  Since the plaintiffs are seeking an interim injunction even before the defendants have the opportunity to file evidence, the plaintiffs have to demonstrate urgency.  I will deal with this point first.

URGENCY

22.  The plaintiffs accept that they have delayed in taking out this action notwithstanding knowledge of Lee’s involvement in the fraud 1½ years ago.  Their ex parte application on 14 March 2013 for a Mareva injunction in the present case was not granted by Mr. Justice Anthony Chan.  However, they say that there has since been dissipation of assets 4 days thereafter, in that 2 properties belonging to Lee, 1 held by D6 (Mrs Lee’s company) and 1 held by Mrs Lee, have been mortgaged to one Full Faith Asia Inc which was incorporated in the Republic of Vanuatu for general banking facilities repayable on demand.  The mortgage deeds were on virtually identical terms with no indication of what the credit facilities were.  The office used by Winful and used by Lee was sold on 19 October 2010.

23.  Mr Manzoni SC submits that the timing of the purchase of properties and incorporation of companies provide strong evidence to demonstrate that those entities were incorporated to try to cover up money taken by Lee, Yuanzhi and Winful under the fraud.  He submits that the risk of dissipation is heightened by the fact that Lau’s solicitors in the 2011 action came off the record on 25 January 2013 and by the commencement of the present action. 

24.  In my view, it can hardly be said that there was urgency.  By virtue of the pleadings and the fact that Lee has filed 14 affirmations in the 2011 action, Lee obviously would have known that at some stage, the plaintiffs would make him a defendant and freeze his companies at some stage.  Yet, there has been delay by the plaintiff for 1½ years before the present writ was issued. The alleged sudden “dissipation” of assets appears unreal. 

25.  Not only that, the plaintiffs, though aware of the alleged dissipation, has chosen to state in Mr Georgiou’s affidavit that,

“Given the elapsed time, and the fact that several of the assets that are the subject of this application area real estate assets (and therefore cannot be readily dissipated) or are otherwise covered by an existing Mareva injunction … the plaintiffs considered it appropriate in these circumstances to proceed with this application inter partes to ensure that this Honourable Court has the opportunity to receive written or oral submission from all concerned parties before rendering any interim or final relief.”

26.  The plaintiffs’ move in this hearing in seeking an interim injunction is not in compliance with that position on affidavit.  The defendants have been ambushed with this application and face 2 versions of the plaintiffs (advanced with the assistance of Lau and Lee respectively) and has had no opportunity of contradicting the plaintiffs.

27.  Significantly, there is also an element of abuse of process.  Mr Barlow SC draws to my attention that the facts in the 2011 action are a complete overlap with the present action. Mr Manzoni SC does not seriously dispute this but he says that the plaintiffs went against the wrong person, Lau, in the 2011 action and now turn their attention towards Lee.

28.  With respect, that begs the question as to why the plaintiffs have not brought Lee into the 2011 action by way of amendment and sought a Mareva injunction against Lee there.

29.  Likewise, asking for another Mareva injunction against Yuanzhi and Winful here is a clear abuse of process.  Moreover, instituting an action against Winful in this action created a juridical disadvantage to it.  Winful is owned by Lau and Lee in equal shares.  As a result of Lau’s failure to cooperate, Winful is unrepresented at this hearing, whereas it has been properly defending in the 2011 action.  Mr Barlow SC informs me that a director of Winful is present at this hearing to speak so that Winful will not fall into default.  There is all the more reason not to impose an injunction without letting Winful sort out its representation.

30.  Mr Barlow SC is instructed that there was no dissipation.  The 4 mortgages were made because the reputation of Winful was damaged as a result of the injunction granted in the 2011 action and it had to turn to other sources of finance.  For present purposes, I shall disregard this information which has not yet found its way into the evidence.

31.  I find there to be abuse of process and no urgency to justify the grant of an interim injunction.

32.  If I am wrong, I have proceeded to consider whether the principles for granting a Mareva injunction have been met.

GOOD ARGUABLE CASE ON THE MERITS

33.  I accept for present purposes that if Lau is to be believed there is a serious question to be tried as to the fraud and who should be held responsible for it.  There is also evidence of low standards of commercial morality on the part of Lee.   However, I entertain doubts as to whether or not there is evidence in support of the causes of action against each defendant.

34.  For a start, the court is asked to act on the evidence of Lau, a confessed fraudster.  He has been prosecuted but Lee has not.  He has been acquitted but Mr Barlow SC informs this court that it was because the prosecution witnesses were not believed or were found wanting that the case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.  Lau has elected not to give evidence in the criminal trial.  To impose a Mareva injunction hastily on the evidence of Lau without affording an opportunity for Lee and other defendants to file evidence and state their case is not fair.

35.  Further, there has been no statement of claim despite lapse of 4 weeks since the writ was filed.  Looking at the endorsement of claim and the evidence:

(i)      There is no pleaded case on who the parties to the conspiracy to defraud/to injure were.

(ii)     Two causes of action are in breach of contract or procuring breach of contract but the only contract was between Lau (who is not a party here) and P2. 

(iii)    The causes of action in conversion and misappropriation of money have been pleaded in the 2011 action but Lau is not a defendant here.

(iv)    The causes of action in constructive trust based on knowing receipt and dishonest assistance are not based on evidence but “supposition” mentioned in the course of submission of Mr Manzoni SC.

36.  I now look at the causes of action against individual defendants.  Insofar as Lee and his holding companies (D5 and D7) are concerned, it is said that the properties were purchased with proceeds of sale of the goods because Lee could not have the money himself to buy those properties, notwithstanding that he ran Yuanzhi and Winful.  This contradicts Lau’s version that he did not know that Lee was in fact using the misappropriated money to buy properties; he thought that Lee was only using the money to do other businesses.

37.  Insofar as Mrs Lee and her company (D6) are concerned, I query in what way she could be connected to the proceeds of the sale and hence the fraud.  Mr Manzoni SC said that the properties were initially bought in the name of Lee and his wife.  It is a “supposition” that the proceeds of sale of the goods had gone to the wife.  She must have known that the money used for the purchase of properties was derived from a fraudulent scheme. 

38.  With respect to Mr Manzoni SC, it is trite law that fraud is not to be lightly raised and has to be pleaded with particularity.  The supposition is not enough to show an arguable case of fraud against her, especially since the first property was purchased in 2006, before the fraudulent scheme even started.   Dishonesty, which is an element of knowing assistance, has not been demonstrated against her.

39.  With regard to Yuanzhi and Winful, who are parties to the 2011 action, the immediate question that springs to mind is why they are joined in the present action.  A Mareva injunction is already in place against them.  Here, Mr Barlow SC points out that there is a complete duplication of action and an abuse of process.  Yuanzhi and Winful have already pleaded to P2’s case, engaged in multiple interlocutory hearings and Lee has filed 14 affirmations.  It is an abuse of court process to sue them here, especially both actions are premised on similar facts.

40.  To this, the plaintiffs stated in the affidavit of Mr Georgiou (solicitor for the plaintiffs) that the plaintiffs will undertake to stay the 2011 action.  However, the application for a stay has been rejected by a master in a case management conference already.  Moreover, the 2011 action has a counterclaim by Winful.  Accordingly, the assertion that there would be a stay is most misleading to this court.

41.  D8 is said to be the accounting assistant of Yuanzhi and Winful.  It is said that as accounting assistant, she only received a small salary.  She assisted Lee in laundering money.  She let Mr Lee use her company (D10) to hold a property.  D9 is said to be a sales manager in an iron and steel trading company.  He holds a property in the name of D11.

42.  According to Lau, he learnt from D9 that Lee had been paying D8 and D9 for their assistance in the laundering exercise.  No particulars of this conversation and the assistance have been given in  Lau’s affidavit.  Such tenuous evidence from a fraudster is not sufficient to show an arguable case of conspiracy, fraud, knowing receipt and dishonest assistance.

43.  For lack of a good arguable case alone, I would not have granted the interim injunction.  However, this is not the end of the matter. 

MATERIAL NON-DISCLOSURE

44.  There are aspects of material non-disclosure in the plaintiffs’ case which should not be overlooked.

(i)      Failure to disclose the existence of a failed ex parte application in the present case;

(ii)     Failure to disclose the court’s doubt in the 2011 action as to the financial ability of P1 as a going concern. 

(iii)    Failure to disclose the impact of the injunction imposed in the 2011 action on the business of Winful.

(i)  Non-disclosure of a failed ex parte application in the present case

45.  With regard to (i), I discovered the transcribed decision of Mr Justice Anthony Chan in the court’s correspondence file.  The decision succinctly stated the reasons for refusal which I agree.  (I am not at liberty to state them here as the judgment was marked “not open to the public”).  It should have been put into the weighing scales before this court.

46.  The ex parte order was not drawn up. I am told that the defendants have not been served with the affidavits and skeleton submission in support of the ex parte application, nor the decision.  The plaintiffs’ explanation was that the learned judge had returned the affidavits to them after the ex parte hearing. 

47.  With respect, the affidavits must have been returned for filing purpose.  Even if not, there was no reason why their existence and the skeleton submission were not drawn to the defendants’ attention.  The plaintiffs should seek directions from the learned judge to clarify what should be done with the affidavits.

(ii)  Failure to disclose the court’s doubt as to the financial ability of the plaintiffs

48.  P1 has no business or assets in Hong Kong.  Although it is listed in Korea, its ability to continue in trade has been questioned by auditors in its latest available financial statements.

49.  P2 is a shell company and the only plaintiff in the 2011 action.  Deputy Judge Lok (whose judgment was not disclosed by the plaintiffs to me) doubted in the 2011 Action the ability of P2 to make good the potentially substantial loss to Winful by the ex parte injunction. 

50.  The plaintiffs declined to state a sum to fortify their undertaking as to damages in return for the defendants’ undertaking not to dispose of assets until the inter parte hearing. These non-disclosures are thus material as they throw in doubt on the ability of the plaintiffs to honour its undertaking in damages in the present case.

(iii)  Non-disclosure of the impact of the injunction imposed in the 2011 action on the business of Winful

51.  In the 2011 action, Deputy Judge Lok found that the ex parteMareva injunction has ruined Winful’s business and caused loss to it in the sum of US$8.5 to US$11.5m and that P2 appeared to be unable to pay them.  Deputy Judge Lok ordered P2 to fortify its undertaking further by increasing the sum from HK$200,000 to US$3m.  (See the judgment in HCA 1687 of 2011, at para 14-16, 19, 20 and 22.)

52.  This non-disclosure is material in that it may affect this court’s exercise of discretion over whether to grant the interim injunction and what fortification to ask for from the plaintiffs. 

53.  Mr Barlow SC informs the court that Lee has to start another business – D5 in the present action – to trade in copper and copper futures because of the damage to Winful.  If an injunction is granted here, it will destroy D5, as it had destroyed D3 in the 2011 action.  For present purposes, I do not need to rely on this piece of information which has not yet found its way into the evidence.

CONCLUSION

54.  For all the above reasons, I decline to grant the interim injunction sought on an urgent basis. 

55.  I order, nisi, that the plaintiffs do pay the defendants’ costs of this hearing, with certificates for 2 counsel (Mr Barlow SC and Mr Hung) for the present hearing.  Given the ambush on the defendants to face the present summons it was well justified to have Mr Hung (counsel for the defendants in the 2011 action) to assist Mr Barlow SC.  They together with Mr Ho have come up with a very succinct and useful set of skeleton submission for this hearing.

56.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Charles Manzoni, SC, instructed by Jones Day, for the plaintiffs

Mr Barrie Barlow, SC leading Mr Andy Hung and Mr Wycliffe Ho, instructed by Y T Szeto & Co for the 1st, 2nd and 4th-11th defendants

The 3rd defendant was not represented and did not appear


[1] Incorporated one month after the 2011 action was commenced.