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Civil Action2013

PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA, SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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  • CACV248/2014PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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103132-EN-2016-03-11

PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA, SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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HCA 865/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 865 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC Plaintiff

and

 WONG SIU WA, SAMMY1st Defendant
 PARIYA HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant

____________

Before: Hon G Lam J in Chambers
Date of Written Submissions: 21 January 2016
Date of Decision on Costs: 11 March 2016

____________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

____________________________

1. On 20 November 2015, for the reasons given in my decision on that date, in conjunction with which this decision should be read, I adjourned the plaintiff’s application for leave to re-amend its statement of claim. The plaintiff has since revised its proposed re-amendments to leave out the claim for a conspiracy involving Ms Fredy Bush.

2. By an order dated 17 December 2015, the plaintiff was given leave to amend as per the revised proposed re-amended statement of claim annexed to the letter of the plaintiff’s Solicitors to the court dated 9 December 2015.  By consent, the question of costs was left to be dealt with upon written submissions to be lodged. 

3. Both parties have since made submissions.  There can be no dispute that the costs of and occasioned by the re-amendment of the statement of claim should be to the defendants, and I so order.

4. The dispute concerns the costs of the defendants’ affirmation filed in opposition, the plaintiff’s reply affirmation and the hearing on 20 November 2015.  Having considered the submissions these costs should in my view be borne by the respective parties; in other words, there should be no order as to costs.

5. The outcome as matters stand is that the plaintiff has in effect withdrawn its application for leave to amend insofar as it consists of the addition of a claim for conspiracy involving Fredy Bush. However, the plaintiffs have expressly reserved the right to apply in future to re‑introduce that claim if so advised.  I decline to draw the inference suggested by the defendants that the plaintiff has no arguable basis in fact to plead that claim.  Nevertheless, the defendants have succeeded in the result in resisting the amendment in question.  It can be said that had the plaintiff not sought to add that claim in the first place much of the relevant costs would have been avoided.

6. But a substantial part of the hearing on 20 November 2015 concerned the form of the amendment and, as can be seen from my decision of 20 November 2015, the plaintiff prevailed on that issue except in relation to the phrase “In the event that” in paragraph 38 of the then draft pleading which I thought was confusing.  The defendants contend that they had in fact also raised the evidential argument prior to that hearing but in any event I did not consider that argument to have been clearly signalled in advance, hence the adjournment to allow the plaintiff to respond properly.

7. In these circumstances exercising my discretion broadly I think that a fair order is that the disputed part of the costs should lie where they fall.

8. There will therefore be an order that:

(1)  the costs of and occasioned by the re-amendment of the statement of claim be to the defendants in any event;

(2)  subject as aforesaid there be no order as to the costs of the plaintiff’s  application for leave to re-amend the statement of claim including the costs of the hearing on 20 November 2015 and the costs of the written submissions on costs.

 (Godfrey Lam)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Written Submissions by Mr Russell Coleman, SC, instructed by Mayer Brown JSM, for the plaintiff

Written Submissions by Mr Anson Wong, SC and Mr Gary C C Lam, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the 2nd defendant

101684-EN-2015-11-20

PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA, SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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HCA 865/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 865 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC Plaintiff

and

 WONG SIU WA, SAMMY1st Defendant
 PARIYA HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant

____________

Before: Hon G Lam J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 20 November 2015
Date of Decision: 20 November 2015

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1. The background to this matter has been set out in the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Decision dated 22 May 2015 and I shall not repeat it. While the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument of the appellant as it agreed with Deputy Judge Mayo that the amended statement of claim was defective, a draft re-amended statement of claim was placed before their Lordships which, I think it fair to say, the Court of Appeal thought was capable of remedying the defects in the pleading under attack at that stage.

2. They were persuaded, however, instead of giving leave to amend, to let the plaintiff apply to the Court of First Instance for leave to amend.  Accordingly, on 13 May 2015 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to the extent of substituting a stay of the action and giving leave to the plaintiff to apply to the Court of First Instance for leave to re-amend the statement of claim.

3. By summons dated 2 June 2015, the plaintiff seeks leave to re‑amend the statement of claim substantially in the form of the draft placed before the Court of Appeal.

4. The pleaded claims are based on fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy.  On behalf of the 2nd defendant, Mr Anson Wong, SC opposed leave in respect of part of the proposed amendment.  In particular, he submitted that the second sentence to the end of paragraph 38, the whole of paragraph 39, and the clause “If Fredy Bush was not aware that the Convey Holding Company had been stripped of its ownership in the Convey Companies,” in paragraph 40 should be disallowed.

5. Mr Coleman SC for the plaintiff referred me to the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Judgment (CACV 248/2014, 22 May 2015) at paragraph 16 where their Lordships said:

“For present purposes, we need not dwell on the judge’s reasoning or counsel submissions.  Suffice it to say, as we indicated in the course of the hearing, that the plaintiff’s pleaded case in the ASOC on both fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy is clearly defective.  In respect of fraudulent misrepresentation, the ASOC failed to provide the necessary factual context, in particular, the linkage between the 2007 Agreement and the 2008 Agreement on the one hand, and the Settlement Agreement on the other, to support the fraudulent misrepresentation complained of.  This also affected the claim on conspiracy which really stands on the fraudulent misrepresentation complained of.  However, these deficiencies can all be cured by amendments to be found in the RASOC : see paragraphs 27 to 33A on fraudulent misrepresentation and paragraphs 37 to 41 on conspiracy.  Specifically, the factual context in support of the fraudulent misrepresentation including the necessary linkage indicated above is now particularised in paragraph 27 (i)-(iii) of the RASOC.

...

In our view, both causes of action are capable of being salvaged by the proposed amendments in the RASOC.”

6. I think that the matter does not amount to res judicata as such. The Court of Appeal did not give leave to amend.  They did not determine the question with which this court is seised.

7. Nevertheless, their Lordships’ views obviously carry weight.  Mr Wong said that the ambit of the Court of Appeal’s observations related only to the grounds on which Deputy Judge Mayo struck out the pleading.  But that is not entirely clear, given that there was a respondent’s notice before the Court of Appeal and given that, as the transcript of the Court of Appeal hearing shows, the point taken about the wording of the paragraphs now in question was mentioned by Mr McCoy to the Court of Appeal.

8. Turning to the way in which these paragraphs are formulated, Mr Coleman has clarified that in paragraph 38 of the draft pleading, the plaintiff is alleging that Ms Fredy Bush was part of the conspiracy.  This I think has been the position given the last sentence of paragraph 38.  But to make the position clearer I think the words “In the event that” in paragraph 38 should be removed and Mr Coleman is content to accept that suggestion. 

9. On that basis it is clear that on the pleading, the plaintiff is alleging Bush was part of the conspiracy, but if she was not, then in any event the 1st and 2nd defendants were in a conspiracy.  The 2nd defendant has not sought to raise again the Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497 point namely that as a matter of law, the 1st defendant, being the 2nd defendant’s director, could not possibly be held to have conspired with the 2nd defendant.  So the defendants must in any event face the claim that they conspired together, even without any suggestion that Fredy Bush knew anything about it.  In my view, there is nothing impermissible or demurrable in the form of that pleading.

10. As the argument developed, however, it became apparent that even with that clarification to paragraph 38, Mr Wong still objected to the amendments on the basis that there was no evidential basis to allege a conspiracy involving Ms Bush.  He did not oppose the plea as such that 1st and 2nd defendants conspired together but he made the point that to raise the alternative plea that Bush was also involved, under Order 18 rule 12A there have to be reasonable grounds for doing so.  He even said that the pleader (not Mr Coleman) would have been acting in breach of his or her professional duties in pleading the allegation of a fraudulent conspiracy against Bush without proper basis.

11. I confessed that I had not fully understood the ambit of his argument from the written materials.  Nor did Mr Coleman anticipate it.  In this circumstances, to allow the amendments simply on the basis that the pleading as expressed is not demurrable would, as Mr Coleman accepted, permit the defendants subsequently to mount an application to strike out on the basis that the relevant paragraphs are frivolous and vexatious or doomed to fail.  That would generate further delay in a claim that has already lacked real progress because of arguments about pleadings.  Further, Mr Coleman indicated that he himself had not personally reviewed the evidence (presumably because he had not been instructed to do so) to satisfy himself that there is basis for the allegation made against Ms Bush.

12. It seems to me in this state of play, what I should do is, having given this ruling on the form of the pleading, to stand over the application for leave to amend so that the plaintiff could have an opportunity of responding to the objections based on lack of evidence, and then hear the parties again if there is a need to do so.

13. I will give the plaintiff leave to file a supplemental affidavit before the further hearing, if necessary.  I will give leave to the parties to fix a date now before me for the resumed hearing in case it is necessary with an estimate of half a day.

(Godfrey Lam)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Russell Coleman, SC, instructed by Mayer Brown JSM, for the plaintiff

The 1st defendant, represented by Fan Wong & Tso, did not appear

Mr Anson Wong, SC leading Mr Gary C C Lam, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the 2nd defendant

96238-EN-2014-12-12

PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA, SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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HCA 865/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 865 OF 2013

____________

BETWEEN

 PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC Plaintiff

and

 WONG SIU WA, SAMMY1st Defendant
 PARIYA HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant
____________
Before:  Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing:  8 December 2014
Date of Decision:  12 December 2014

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Introduction

1. This is the plaintiff’s appeal against Master Chow’s order made on 19 August 2014 in relation to the plaintiff’s application for specific discovery. The appeal is by rehearing of the plaintiff’s application for a further and better list of documents to be filed by the 1st defendant (“Wong”), and for specific discovery of 5 categories of documents identified in its summons of 8 May 2014 (“Summons”).

2. The principles for discovery are settled and I will not waste time to deal with these in detail.  Nor will I rehearse the arguments made by counsel.  In summary, the principles which I bear in mind are as follows. 

3. A party seeking an order for specific discovery must make out a prima facie case that a specified a document or class of documents exists; that the party against whom the discovery is sought has or had the documents in his possession, custody or control; that the documents sought relate to any matter in question in the action; and that discovery is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.  It is for the party resisting the order for discovery to show that discovery is not necessary.

4. Post CJR, the court should give effect to the underlying objectives of the rules and procedures when it exercises its powers under Order 24 and when it interprets the provisions of Order 24.  Accordingly, in deciding whether any document relates to a matter in question in the action, whether any document is or has been in the possession, custody or power of a party, and whether discovery of a document sought is necessary, the court should bear in mind the underlying objectives of cost-effectiveness, expeditious disposal of cases, proportionality, procedural economy and ensurance of fairness between the parties.  The court must take a proportionate approach, balancing the interests of the fair disposal of the cause or matter in accordance with the parties’ substantive rights against these objectives. 

5. Questions of relevance, necessity and proportionality should always be considered by reference to the issues for determination at trial.

6. Under Order 24, discovery is to be made by each party of documents “which are or have been in his possession, custody or power”, relating to “any matter in question” between the parties in the action.

7. Relevance is to be determined by reference to the pleadings (Re Estate of Ng Chan Wah [2003] HKEC 317).  On the other hand, the fact that an issue is raised in the pleadings is not determinative as to whether it relates to a matter in question.  Discovery is not required of documents which relate to irrelevant allegations in pleadings which, even if substantiated, could not affect the result of the action (Paul’s Model Art GMBH & Co v UT Limited CACV 139/2005, Allington Investments Corp & Others v First Pacific Bancshares Holdings Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 139). 

8. It is trite, that a party is not released from its duty to make discovery of a document simply because the party seeking discovery is already in possession of a copy of the document in question, or that it is aware of the existence and contents of the document.  Each party has the separate obligation to make discovery of all documents in its possession, custody or control which relate to any matter in question in the action.

The issues for determination at trial

9. The plaintiff instituted these proceedings as assignee of XSEL, a company in liquidation by order of the court of the Cayman Islands on 8 July 2011.  Under the terms of an agreement defined in the pleadings as the June 2007 Agreement, XSEL agreed to purchase from the 2nd defendant (“Company”) 100% of the shares of XFML, which in turn owned 3 advertising companies in Hong Kong (“Convey Companies”).  Wong is a party to the June 2007 Agreement, as he owned and controlled the Company at the material time, and he agreed to be bound by the covenants and warranties given to XSEL and contained in the June 2007 Agreement.

10. Under the terms of a December 2008 Agreement, XSEL agreed to transfer 85% of the issued share capital of XFML back to the Company for the sum of US$85 million.  By 2010, as a result of the transactions and obligations under the June 2007 Agreement and the December 2008 Agreement, a net debt in excess of US$50 million was claimed to be due from the defendants to XSEL (“Net Receivable”). 

11. Following a series of negotiations, the August 2010 Deed was executed between the parties, whereby XSEL agreed to release the defendants from the Net Receivable due and payable under the June 2007 Agreement and the December 2008 Agreement, in consideration of the Company transferring 34.5% of the issued share capital of XFML to XSEL, and XSEL agreeing to issue US$5 million worth of XSEL shares to the Company.

12. The claims made by the plaintiff in these proceedings are that the August 2010 Deed was induced by misrepresentations made fraudulently or recklessly by the defendants to XSEL, that the shares in XFML “were of the same value and conveyed the same ownership of the Convey Companies as they had in the earlier agreements” (“Representations”).  The plaintiff claims that these Representations were in fact false, in that Wong and the Company had already procured or caused XFML in early 2010 to transfer XFML’s only assets, namely the Convey Companies and the advertising business, to China Media Enterprises Limited (“China Media”).  The shares of XFML to be transferred under the August 2010 Deed by way of settlement of the Net Receivable were claimed to be worthless, by virtue of the disposal of XFML’s only assets.

13. In his Defence, Wong denies (inter alia) that the Net Receivable was US$50 million, claiming that it was US$30 million.  He claims that at the same time as the execution of the August 2010 Deed, XSEL had entered into an agreement with the Company, whereby it was to maintain its shareholding in XFML at the minimum level of 19.9% (“Anti-Dilution Agreement”). In particular, Wong claims that he was not aware of the details of the “restructuring” regarding the Convey Companies which XFML had entered into in 2010.

14. On the face of the pleadings as they currently stand, the issues for determination at the trial of these proceedings are: the meaning and effect of the August 2010 Deed; whether Wong and the Company had made representations to XSEL as to the value of the XFML shares to be transferred under the August 2010 Deed, or as to XFML’s ownership of the Convey Companies; whether Wong and the Company had knowledge of the transfer of the advertising business of the Convey Companies to China Media in January and February 2010 (“China Media Transfer”); and whether Wong’s interests or involvement in Sharp Gain Holdings Limited (“Sharp Gain”), which was the corporate director of XFML and the Convey Companies at the time of the China Media Transfer, demonstrates the defendants’ knowledge of the China Media Transfer.

The discovery sought

15. In relation to the 5 categories of documents sought to be disclosed (set out in the schedule attached hereto), I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of the existence of these documents, which are or were in the possession, custody or control of Wong. 

16. At the material time of the transactions which are the subject of these proceedings, Wong was the sole director of the Company, which is the party to the agreements referred to and defined in the pleadings, namely, the June 2007 Agreement, the December 2008 Agreement and the August 2010 Deed.  Wong himself does not dispute that he had a stakeholding interest in the Company between January 2007 to April 2010, that he was the Company’s business consultant and its sole director between January 2007 and April 2009, and that he had access to all the Company’s business documents at the time.  Nor does Wong dispute that he had conducted the negotiations between the Company, himself and XSEL relating to the June 2007 Agreement, the December 2008 Agreement and the August 2010 Deed.

17. As the sole director and person representing the Company at the material time, as well as being a party to the relevant agreements, it is more than highly likely that Wong would at the material time have been in possession of documents relating to the subject transactions, any correspondence at the material time of the negotiations, and the corporate documents including notes and minutes of board and shareholders meetings of the Company and of Sharp Gain - the latter being at the material time the corporate director of XFML which transferred the Convey Companies to China Media.  It is also claimed by the plaintiff that Wong was at all material times the principal and secretary of Sharp Gain.  Wong does not dispute that he was director of Sharp Gain until December 2009 and shareholder of Sharp Gain until April 2010.

18. Wong claims that he is not in possession of the documents sought to be disclosed.  From his Affirmation filed in opposition to the Summons, only the following facts could be ascertained in the context of his dealings with the documents:

(1) Upon the conclusion of the August 2010 Deed, Wong ceased to be the Company’s business consultant;

(2) By August 2010, he had handed over all corporate documents and all the Company’s papers in his possession to the Company, since which he ceased to have access to the Company’s documents;

(3) In line with his routine practice, he cleared his backlog of emails every now and then and had no “soft records” of them;

(4) Since his cessation as the Company’s consultant in August 2010, he ceased to have access to any of “the transfer documents of the Convey Companies” and had not kept any records;

(5) In December 2009 he resigned as director of Sharp Gain and in April 2010, he ceased to be a shareholder of Sharp Gain and turned over or otherwise disposed of all its records.

19. It was argued on Wong’s behalf that in his Affirmation, he had already deposed to his not being in possession of the documents, and that no further order should be made against him. 

20. The order which the court may make under Order 24 rule 7(1) is for a party to make an affidavit stating whether any document specified is, or has at any time been, in his possession, custody or power, “and if not then in his possession, custody or power when he parted with it and what has become of it”.

21. The standard form of affidavit to which Wong’s counsel referred, in support of his argument that adequate disclosure has been made, is a form of affidavit used to verify a party’s list of documents, when the court orders a verified list under Order 24 rule 3 (2).  The deponent accordingly simply confirms that the statements made in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the list of documents are true.  Paragraph 3 of a list of documents states that the party “has had, but has not now, in his possession, custody or power the documents relating to the matters in question” in the action as enumerated in schedule 2 of the list.  That standard form does not deal with an order for discovery made under Order 24 rule7 (1), whereby a party may be ordered to state by affidavit: “when he parted with” the document; and “what has become” of the document.

22. In this case, where I am satisfied of the existence of the relevant documents and that at the material time, the relevant documents had been in Wong’s possession, custody or power, Wong may be ordered to depose to facts which adequately and clearly explain when he had parted with the specified documents which had been in his possession, and what has become of such documents.  On the facts of this case, it is inadequate in my view for Wong simply to state that he had returned the documents “to the Company”.  He was the sole director of the Company at the time of his possession of the documents.  Without stating to whom of the Company he had “turned over” the documents, or how he had returned the documents, Wong has not in my view adequately explained “what has become” of the documents in question.

23. Mr Chan on behalf of Wong submitted that the court should imply from what Wong had stated in the Affirmation, that he had returned all the relevant documents to the office of the Company, wherever such office may be.  I fail to see how that can be implied from the facts deposed to by Wong in the Affirmation.  The history of Wong’s  negotiations, the nature of his involvement in the transactions, his capacity as shareholder, sole director and business consultant over the period of time from January 2007 to August 2010, all have to be borne in mind.  Without having stated to whom of the Company (be it a new director appointed of the Company, a corporate secretary or other individual who took over the control and running of the Company from Wong) he had handed over the relevant documents, Wong has not explained on affidavit what has become of the documents.  I do not agree with Mr Chan that it is harsh to require a party to depose to such matters.  The requirements of Order 24 r 7 are few, and simple to comply with.  A party should state facts as to what has become of the specified documents, not facts or circumstances from which it can be implied, or inferred by the party’s opponent and the court, what has become of the documents.

24. As to the question of relevance, I will deal with the 5 categories of documents sought, in turn. In this context, I bear in mind that the description of the documents to be disclosed must be certain and clear in ambit, and that all the documents in the class must be relevant.

25. For category 1, I am satisfied that the correspondence, emails and attachments exchanged among the parties in connection with the August 2010 Deed are relevant to the matters in question as to whether the Representations were made in the course of the negotiations.  Bearing in mind proportionality and that even if relevant, the documents sought should be necessary, I will not at this stage make any order for specific discovery of the correspondence relating to the June 2007 Agreement, or the December 2008 Agreement.  As for the Anti-Dilution Agreement, although it has been raised in the Defence, Wong has not pleaded any fact or matter relating to the Anti-Dilution Agreement which he alleges makes the plaintiff’s claim not maintainable.  I fail to see its relevance at this stage and as the pleadings now stand, and will not order discovery of the correspondence relating to the Anti-Dilution Agreement.

26. The plaintiff has agreed to delete “and/or any of the individuals employed by or acting on behalf of XSEL” and the words following “16 August 2010” in the category 1 description of documents.

27. For category 2, I am satisfied that “documents relating to the transactions between XFML and China Media referred to in paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim” are relevant to the questions of whether the Representations were false and fraudulent or reckless, as claimed by the plaintiff.

28. For category 3, the corporate documents for the Company are relevant to the issue of whether Wong was the directing mind and controller of the Company, whether Wong was the principal of the Company in entering into the relevant agreements, or was simply a party to the agreement to procure the Company’s performance as he claims.  In relation to the minutes of meetings and resolutions of the shareholders and directors of the Company, I will only order the discovery to extend to those relating to the January 2007 Agreement, the December 2008 Agreement and the August 2010 Deed. 

29. For category 4, the corporate documents for Sharp Gain are relevant to the question of Wong’s knowledge of the China Media Transfer, and whether the Representations were false and fraudulent or reckless. In relation to the minutes and resolutions, I will confine discovery to those relating to the August 2010 Deed, as Mr Lane for the plaintiff accepts.

30. For category 5, documents relating to the sale of the Convey Companies particularized in paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim are relevant to the question of Wong’s knowledge of the China Media Transfer, and whether the Representations were false and fraudulent or reckless.

31. Bearing in mind the time span covered, and the claims made in the proceedings, I am satisfied that the relevant documents sought are necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.

Orders made

32. I will grant the order in terms of paragraph 3 of the Summons, for Wong to make an affidavit within 14 days, stating whether any documents or class of documents specified or described in the schedule attached is or has at any time been in his possession, custody or power, stating when he parted with the specified documents in question, and what has become of them, as outlined in paragraph 23 above.  The description of the categories of documents is amended as set out in paragraphs 25 to 30 above.  For avoidance of doubt, the amendments are indicated in the schedule.

33. A further and better list of documents, as sought in paragraph 4 of the Summons, will not be necessary if Wong makes the affidavit ordered above.

34. I will make an order nisi that the costs of the appeal and the hearing below are to be paid by Wong to the plaintiff.

(Mimmie Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Lane, of Tanner De Witt, for the plaintiff

Mr Maurice Chan, instructed by Fan Wong & Tso, for the 1st defendant


Schedule

Category

Document/Class of Documents

Category 1

All correspondence, and in particular all emails and attachments, exchanged among the 1st and 2nd Defendants and/or Fredy Bush and/or Andrew Chang and/or John McLean and/or any other individuals employed by or acting on behalf of XSEL from 1 January 2007 to present day related in whole or in part to or in connection with the June 2007 Agreement, the December 2008 Agreement, the August 2010 Deed, the agreement made between XSEL and the 2nd Defendant to maintain XSEL’s shareholding in XFML at a minimum of 19.9% dated 16 August 2010 and any other of the agreements, facts or circumstances underlying this action;

Category 2

Documents relating to the transactions between XFML and China Media Enterprises Ltd referred to in paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim and, in particular documents that demonstrate that the 1st Defendant is or was the principal and signatory of Sharp Gain Holdings Limited;

Category 3

Corporate documents for the 2nd Defendant, Pariya Holdings Limited, of which the 1st Defendant was formerly a director, including but not limited to the register of directors and shareholders, book of share certificates, minutes of meetings and resolutions of the board of directors of Pariya Holdings Limited, and notes of all minutes and resolutions of shareholders of Pariya Holdings Limited / relating to the June 2007 Agreement, the December 2008 Agreement and the August 2010 Deed;

Category 4

Corporate documents for Sharp Gain Holdings Limited, of which the 1st Defendant is or was the principal and signatory, including but not limited to the register of directors and shareholders, book of share certificates, minutes of meetings and resolutions of the board of directors of Sharp Gain Holdings Limited and notes of all minutes and resolutions of shareholders of Sharp Gain Holdings Limited / relating to the August 2010 Deed; and

Category 5

Documents relating to the sale of the Convey Companies (as defined in    /particularized at paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim filed in this matter), including all correspondence, whether in hard copy or electronic format, all draft agreements, signed agreements and valuations of such companies.

95711-EN-2014-11-12

PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLC v. WONG SIU WA, SAMMY AND ANOTHER

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HCA 865/2013

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 865 OF 2013

______________________

BETWEEN

 PATRIARCH PARTNERS MEDIA HOLDINGS LLCPlaintiff
 

and

 
 WONG SIU WA, SAMMY1st Defendant
 PARIYA HOLDINGS LIMITED2nd Defendant

______________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Mayo in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 4 November 2014
Date of Decision: 12 November 2014

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

 

1. This is an application by D2 to strike out the plaintiff’s claim against them principally on the ground that the Amended Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action.

2. There is also an application to set aside the leave which was granted to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction of the Court.

3. The plaintiff brings this action as an assignee of certain legal claims formerly belonging to Xinhua Sports & Entertainment Ltd (XSEL).

4. D2, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands was at all material times owned and controlled by D1 who is a resident of Hong Kong.

5. In 2007 D2 owned 100% of the shares in Xinhua Finance Media (Convey) Ltd (XFML).

6. XFML owned 3 advertising companies trading in Hong Kong (the Convey Companies).

7. By an Agreement dated 29 June 2007 (the 2007 Agreement) D2 sold its 100% shareholding in XFML to XSEL.

8. Under the Agreement XSEL was required to pay an initial payment of US$33 million plus 2 further payments in 2007 and 2008 the amount of which would be determined by reference to the trading performance of the Convey Companies.

9. On 31 December 2008 a further Agreement was entered into by the said parties (the 2008 Agreement).  By this Agreement XSEL sold 85% of its shareholding in XFML to D2 for US$85,000 which was to be paid by 7 instalments.  XSEL retained the remaining 15% of the shares.

10. In 2010 various payment obligations under the 2007 and 2008 Agreements remained due and outstanding.

11. Negotiations were then undertaken by XSEL, D1 and D2 and pursuant to these an Agreement was entered into between XSEL, D1, D2 and XFML on the 16 August 2010 (the 2010 Deed).

12. By the Deed:

(1)  XSEL agreed to waive its claim against D2 under the 2008 Agreement.

(2)  D2 agreed to waive its claim against XSEL under the 2007 Agreement.

(3)  D2 agreed to transfer 34.5% of its shareholding in XFML to XSEL and XSEL agreed to issue shares with a market value of US$5 million to D2.

13. Prior to the 2010 Deed being entered into XFML with the knowledge of D1 and D2 transferred the Convey Companies to a Third Party China Media Enterprises Ltd (China Media) unbeknown to the plaintiff.

14. The plaintiff claims that there was an implied representation made by D1 or D2 by conduct or through omission that like the 2007 and 2008 Agreements the Convey Companies would also be transferred in accordance with the 2010 Deed and that the shares in XFML would be of a similar value.  It was further contended that without the value of the Convey Companies XFML had no value.

15. The formulation of this claim is contained in paras 27 to 29 of the Amended Statement of Claim.

“Breach of Warranty, Misrepresentation and Fraud

27 In offering to transfer XFML shares as consideration for the release of XSEL’s claims in the August 2010 Deed, the Defendants, by conduct and/or through their omission, expressly or impliedly represented to XSEL that such shares were of the same value and conveyed the same ownership of the Convey Companies as they had in the earlier agreements

28 XSEL relied upon such representations in entering into the August 2010 Deed, and agreed to accept the transfer of the additional XFML shares as consideration for the settlement of the net minimum US$50 million debt due from the Defendants in the belief that XFML was still the owner of the Convey Companies and the Convey advertising business.

29 XSEL would not have entered into the August 2010 Deed, and released Defendants from XSEL’s net minimum US$50 million claim, had it been aware that six months earlier (in January and February 2010) the 1st and 2nd Defendants had, in fact, secretly procured or caused XFML to transfer its only assets – the Convey Companies and the Convey advertising business – to China Media Enterprises Ltd, a third‑party company incorporated in the BVI (“China Media”).”

16. It will be noted that in paragraph 28 reference is made to XSEL placing reliance upon “such representations” which indicates that the claim which is being made by the plaintiff is for fraudulent misrepresentation.

17. Mr Anson Wong SC who represented D2 proceeded upon an analysis of what needs to be pleaded to make good a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.  He referred to 18 – 01 at p606 of Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings.

“1. Necessary elements of an action in deceit

In order to sustain the common law action of deceit, the following facts must be established, ie they must be pleaded and proved, namely:

(1) there must be a representation of fact made by words or by conduct and mere silence is not enough:

(2) the representation must be made with the knowledge that it is false, ie it must be willfully false or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true, or recklessly, ie without caring whether the representation is true or false (Derry v Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337 (Eng HL); see also Win Wave Industrial Ltd v Gosbon Industries Ltd [2009] 5 HKC 265 (DC));

(3) the representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the claimant, or by a class of persons which will include the claimant, in the manner which caused damage to him;

(4) it must be proved that the claimant acted upon the false statements; and

(5)  it must be proved that the claimant has sustained damage by doing so (see Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205 at 211 (Eng HL), (Viscount Maugham); see also Pine Enterprises Ltd v Lecture Kit Co Ltd (HCA 1221/2006; HCCW 593/2005) [2008] HKCFI 227 (CFI)).”

18. Mr Anson Wong argued that none of the required elements had been satisfactorily made good in the Amended Statement of Claim. 

19. Turning to the 1st element he argued that there was nothing in the Amended Statement of Claim to plead that D2 had a duty to make disclosure of the disposal of the Convey Companies or that XSEL had ever made any enquiries concerning this.  For authority he cited paragraph 16 – 02 of the 3rd Edition of Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non‑disclosure by John Cartwright:

“II. THE GENERAL RULE: NO LIABILITY FOR NON‑DISCLOSURE

The traditional starting‑point: no general pre‑contractual duty to disclose.  English law does not impose on parties who are negotiating for a contract a general obligation to disclose information: that is to say, the starting‑point is that each negotiating party may remain silent, even as to facts which he believes would be operative on the mind of the other.  This does not mean that no party ever has an obligation to disclose information: the circumstances in which the law does recognise a duty to disclose are discussed in Chapter 17.  But the burden is on the party who claims a remedy in consequence of the defendant’s failure to speak to show that there was, in the circumstances, a duty to disclose.”

20. The fact that on the pleaded case no express or implied representation was made effectively renders the remaining four elements redundant.

21. Mr Anson Wong submitted that as the case was presently pleaded it was manifest that no case was made out that there had been any fraudulent misrepresentation.

22. Mr Christopher Chain for the plaintiff (who was not the draftsman of the Amended Statement of Claim) took me through the notes in the White Book treating the subject matter of Order 18 of the Rules.

23. He emphasised the importance not striking out any pleading unless it would clearly be unarguable.  He further referred to the consequences of making such an order and in particular its finality.

24. However his main point was to criticise the approach adopted by Mr Anson Wong.  This being adopting a detailed and technical analysis of the particular wording of the various parts of the Amended Statement of Claim rather than viewing the situation in its overall context.

25. He argued that what was required was to look at the complaints contained in the pleading as a whole.

26. If this approach was adopted it was very clear that the defendants had grievously taken advantage of the plaintiff who as a result had suffered a serious determent to their interests.

27. While having some sympathy for this approach I regret that I am unable to accept that it is open to me to adopt it.

28. Order 18 lays down specific requirements such as the need to provide for all of the legal requirements for relief being sought and also drafting the pleading in such a way as to make it known to a defendant exactly what the case is that it has to meet so as to enable him or it to plead to it.

29. I have no doubt that the approach adopted by Mr Anson Wong was the correct one and that the requirements of the order and the case law relating to it must be complied with.

30. I propose dealing shortly with two other areas which were dealt with by Mr Anson Wong which also are relevant to the application.

31. Clause 7(2) of the 2010 Deed provides as follows:

“Entire Deed: This Deed constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject matter of this Deed and supersedes and extinguishes any representations, warranties, agreements, understandings and negotiations previously given or made other than those contained in this Deed. It is agreed that no party has entered into this Deed in reliance upon nay representation, warranty or undertaking of any other party which is not expressly set out or referred to in this Deed.”

32. The terms stated therein are unequivocal and effectively preclude any claim along the lines of the alleged misrepresentation having any chance of success.

33. The next matter dealt with by Mr Anson Wong was the question as to whether there had been a total failure of consideration in respect of the 2010 Deed.

34. This clearly was not the case as XSEL had the benefit of D2 waiving its claim against them under the 2007 Agreement.

35. Mr Anson Wong then turned to the paragraphs in the Amended Statement of Claim where it is alleged that D1, D2 and a Mr Fredy Bush conspired to use unlawful means to cause a loss to XSEL:

“Conspiracy

37. Further, and in the alternative, the 1st and 2nd Defendants together and/or with Fredy Bush, conspired to use unlawful means (namely fraudulent misrepresentation by omission, breach of directors’ fiduciary duties and fraud) intending to cause loss to XSEL.

38. As set forth above, Bush purported to execute the August 2010 Deed on behalf of XSEL. In the event that that, upon information and belief, Bush entered into the August 2010 Deed with knowledge that the Defendants had procured or caused XFML to transfer its only assets -- the Convey Companies and the Convey advertising business -- to China Media seven months earlier, Bush knew that the shares of XFML that XSEL was to receive pursuant to the August 2010 Deed were worthless.

39. In such case, the Defendants executed the August 2010 Deed as part of an unlawful agreement and conspiracy with Bush to defraud XSEL. For that reason as well, or in the alternative, the August 2010 Deed should be rescinded for fraud and want of consideration.

40. The Plaintiffs will rely upon the acts of each of the Defendants pleaded above at paragraphs 18 to 33 as overt acts done in pursuance of the said conspiracy.

41. Each of the acts specified in the preceding paragraph was done by the person or persons therein alleged on behalf of himself or themselves and his or their co‑conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Further, or in the alternative, the Defendants and/or with Fredy Bush were joint tortfeasors.

42.  By reason of the matter aforesaid, the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage.”

36. The fact that earlier in this Decision I have held that the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is not sustainable as pleaded means consequentially that this part of the Amended Statement of Claim must also be struck out.

37. In conclusion I order that the whole of the Amended Statement of Claim is to be struck out as against D2.

38. I also order that the service of the writ of summons herein out of the jurisdiction on D2 be set aside.

39. I also make an order nisi that D2 is to have their costs of this application and there be a certificate for two counsel.

(Simon Mayo)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Christopher Chain, instructed by Tanner De Witt, for the plaintiff

Mr Anson Wong, SC & Mr Gary CC Lam, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the 2nd defendant