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Matrimonial Causes2014

DX v. LN

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103766-EN-2016-04-14

DX v. LN

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FCMC No.7870 of 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO.7870 OF 2014

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BETWEEN  
 DXPetitioner
 and 
 LNRespondent
 and 
 LSC formerly known as KK1st Intervener
 KYMF2nd Intervener

----------------------------

Before : HH Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers.
Date of Hearing : 17th and 24th March 2016.
Date of Decision : 14th April 2016.

---------------------------

DECISION
(DISCHARGE PROHIBITION ORDER)

---------------------------

1.  On 21st September 2015 I handed down a judgment ordering the Respondent Husband to pay the Petitioner Wife HK$100,000 per month as maintenance pending suit for her and the 2 children of the family retrospectively from 1st May 2015, plus contribution to her legal costs in the sum of HK$1.2 million by 9 monthly instalments at HK$133,333 each until full payment.

2.  After initially making some payments the Husband has since fallen into arrears with the maintenance pending suit order for more than HK$1.4 million by 20th January 2016 for which the Wife has issued a judgment summons against him returnable on 9th May 2016.

3.  Shortly before issuing that judgment summons the Wife on 16th January 2016 on ex-parte basis also applied and obtained a prohibition order (“The Prohibition Order”) restraining the Husband from leaving the jurisdiction until the hearing of her judgment summons.

4.  The Prohibition Order has since been extended and re-applied with effect up to 14th April 2016. On 4th March 2016 the Husband took out a summons to discharge that Prohibition Order, which is the matter now before me, as he claimed to have to attend certain meeting(s) in Wuhan on behalf of his father’s business, and that in any event the Prohibition Order should not have been granted by the Court for various reasons including certain jurisdictional challenge and that the Wife had failed to comply with certain procedural requirements. His application was of course opposed by the Wife, but before proceeding to consider the Husband’s application and the parties’ arguments, it would be necessary to first set out some relevant background.    

The Background

5.  The detailed background of the parties’ failed marriage and their subsequent litigations in these proceedings can be found in any of my 3 earlier judgments on their disputes over the care and control of their 2 children, the Wife’s aforesaid application for maintenance pending suit, and an anti-suit injunction sought by her against both the Husband’s father the 1st Intervener herein, all in the course of 2015 and hence I do not propose to recite them here in details save for those which I consider essential and relevant to the matter now before me.

6.  Both parties were born and raised in Wuhan, PRC but have come to settle in Hong Kong where they got married in 2006 and that both of their children were also born here, although the Husband, now aged 38, essentially split his time between Hong Kong and Wuhan where he was being groomed to take over his father’s business in real estate and property development, while the Wife, now aged 31, was throughout the marriage a full-time homemaker and mother to their 2 children, both boys now aged 5 and 3 respectively.           

7.  Initially the couple stayed in Wuhan after the marriage, but later relocated to Hong Kong in 2010 after the Wife became pregnant with the elder boy and made their matrimonial home in a 2,100 sq ft apartment at the Harbourfront, Hung Hum, Kowloon purchased under the sole name of the Husband. It is not disputed that it was all funded by the Husband’s father of which the Wife believes to be a gift from him, but the case of both the Husband and his father is that it is held on trust by the former for the latter, as with several other properties in Wuhan also registered in the Husband’s name and with total worth in excess of HK$82 million.

8.  In about Christmas of 2012 when the Wife became suspicious that the Husband was having an affair with a woman in Wuhan, she suffered a emotional breakdown and sought support from her divorced mother in Wuhan during which she told the Husband’s father of his son’s affair. Eventually she returned to Hong Kong to attempt reconciliation with the Husband, but when it turned out unsuccessful, she withdrew some HK$3 million from the joint bank account and moved out of the former matrimonial home in early 2014 with the elder boy into a serviced apartment in the same neighbourhood, and launched these proceedings for divorce, custody and ancillary relief against the Husband,

9.  As noted above the first of the parties’ litigations started with their dispute over the care and control of their 2 children, which took place in early 2015 and after a 5-days trial I rejected the Husband’s case that he would stay fulltime in Hong Kong working on his father’s business only by telephone and internet, and with little travelling in order to take up full-time care of the children with the assistance of his mother and sister both of whom also gave evidence in his support, and made the order on 19th June 2015 in favour of the Wife and as a result both children have since been residing under her care in her rented serviced apartment.

10.  By then the Wife claimed to have exhausted all her means and in the absence of any regular financial support from the Husband other than the children’s school fees being paid by him directly and an interim monthly sum of HK$35,000 offered to her at that earlier trial, her application for maintenance pending suit plus legal costs contribution soon followed, in which she asked for HK$142,000 per month for herself and the children and HK$200,000 per month as contribution towards her legal costs in these proceedings, on the basis that the former sum represented the present urgent needs of both herself and the children commensurated with the high standard of living they used to enjoy during the marriage, and that the Husband had ample means and financial resources to do so, including from the rental income which he had been receiving from those properties in Wuhan in the total amount of at least HK$380,000 per month, and with unlimited funding and support from his parents in particularly his father who had been grooming his only son to take over his businesses.

11.  That application was opposed by the Husband who claimed to be earning a salary of only HK$15,000 per month working for his father and that it was his parents who had all along provided him with various privileges and resources to meet his expenses and those of his family, but that since January 2013 after the Wife told his father about his extra-marital affair, his father had allegedly cut off all his financial assistances including his use of those rental income from the properties in Wuhan, and that he had as a result been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his various expenses including his children’s school fees and the said interim maintenance of HK$35,000 for the Wife, as well as his own legal costs which had by then reached HK$3.4 million.

12.  I rejected this case of the Husband in my judgment of 21st September 2015, and it would be relevant to set out some of my findings and reasons in the context of the Husband’s present application matter now before me as follows:

“62. Given the Husband’s close relationship with his parents and their apparent complete trust on him with their financial affairs to the extent that one day he is to take over the father’s business, I can see why the Wife finds this allegation of the Husband that he has been cut off financially simply because of what she had told his father incredible, and that it would still be so even if he had never denied the extra-marital affair to his father, or that his father had chosen to believe his daughter-in-law over his own son.

63. Furthermore, it is relevant to note what the Husband’s sister said in her affirmation on 22nd July 2015 in support of his case as to how the father later became upset by the Wife’s action and decided not to help her anymore [A4/983§8]:

    “ … the Petitioner also alleges that my father said to her that he would pay her back for what she has spent in that period. I was present at the time of the said conversation between the petitioner and my father and I heard what my father said – our father said that he would agree to pay for the petitioner’s expenses for taking care of the children provided if and only if the petitioner and the children stay in Hong Kong, the Petitioner must not divorce the respondent and must take care of the children. However, the petitioner did not do so – she left Hong Kong and subsequently proceeded to divorce the Respondent. Our father is very angered by the Petitioner’s actions. I believe that if the Petitioner had stayed in Hong Kong with the children and had not divorced the Respondent, then our father would have continued to financially support the petitioner and the children, and indeed he had done so all along in the past, which is how the Respondent and his family survived. Our father has decided that he will no longer financially support the petitioner and the children, and indeed has also cut-off the respondent as well.”

64. If indeed the father subsequently became upset by the Wife’s actions in bringing divorce proceedings, one may ask why did he continue to cut off his financial support for his only son? As a matter of fact, the sister in her said affirmation also mentioned another reason for the father’s cutting off the husband, as told to her by her mother, that it was because the Wife had also told the father in about December 2012 or January 2013 that the Husband had lost HK$8 million gambling in Macau which made the father very angry, and that the Wife therefore asked the father to cut him off and stop letting him any access to money [A4/982§6].

65. Even leaving aside this evidence as told to the sister by the mother is clearly hearsay and so far not corroborated by either parents or even the husband himself, again this assertion that the father would take such drastic action against his own son solely on the basis of his daughter-in-law’s words is highly questionable, all the more so when the sister also stated in the same paragraph that up to the time of her affirmation and more than 2 years since the wife’s alleged conversation with the father, that she still did not know whether or not the Husband really did lose so much money in gambling as alleged, given the severity of the allegation and the amount of money involved as well as the sister’s proclaimed closeness to her brother and her involvement in almost every detail of his family as evidenced by her support to him throughout his earlier custody trial and her alleged payment of more than HK$3.4 million for his legal costs. It seems very odd to me for her not to have known by now whether or not the Husband did gamble away that kind of money.

66. It is in fact the Wife’s case, Ms Yip submits, that the Husband’s gambling habit has all along been well known to his family and that there is absolutely no sign of his parents being unhappy about it, as he has still gone about gambling in Macau as recently as early this year, when as noted above his credit card record revealed that he spent more than HK$400,000 in the casinos there on 2 separate occasions in February and April 2015.

67. Above all, this allegation of him being financially cut-off by his father since January 2013 which if true would surely have been a serious blow to the Husband both as to his finance and his relationship with his parents, or at least something so significant that it would have been at the forefront of his mind when he gave instructions to his lawyers for the preparation of his Form E in May 2014, yet not a single word about it was mentioned in that document or any of his subsequent affirmations filed for the custody trial until the Wife’s present application for maintenance pending suit, nor is there any sign of any such impact on his relationship with his parents when in fact both of them have shown full support to him in his earlier dispute with the Wife over their children.

…

71. The answer may well be found from the Husband’s said 5th Affirmation … in which he claimed that since January 2013 after being cut off by his father to have been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his expenses including more than HK$3.4 million in legal costs, and that it was his sister who has been paying the interim maintenance of HK$35,000 per month to the Wife on his behalf, but that since both the mother and sister are full-time housewives, which begs the obvious question of where did that kind of money, which must have accumulated very substantially over the past 2 years, come from if not from the father?

72. Furthermore, according to the Husband’s said affirmation, it was the father who had subsequently repaid RMB500,000 to the sister on his behalf for his legal costs [A4/899§16], while all the expenses for his trips to Macau as well as his overseas holidays with the children up to this year in 2015 were also paid directly by the father [A4/899§16], which seems to me a case of the father taking away his financial assistance with his right hand but giving it back with his left, and if the whole purpose of cutting off the Husband’s finance was to punish him for his extra-marital affair and/or so that he could not continue with such affair, then why at the same time allow the mother or the sister to provide the same financial assistance to him over the past 2 years? None of these make any logical sense to me but rather to support the Wife’s case that they were just part of the Husband’s attempts to mislead the court about his financial resources.”                  

13.  In the conclusion of that judgment and adopting a broad brush approach I made the order on the maintenance pending suit and costs contribution referred to in paragraph 1 above, of which the Husband has not taken any steps to appeal or vary but has so far paid, on his own admission, only 3 sums on separate occasions totalling HK$290,000, leaving outstanding a total sum of HK$1,439,431 at the time of the Wife’s application for the issue of a judgement summons and the 1st prohibition order in January 2016, or close to HK$1.9 million by the time of the Husband’s present application taken out on 4th March 2016.

14.  This is of course not the only remaining battle between the parties. In fact far from it as shortly after the maintenance pending suit hearing, the Husband applied and obtained an order by consent for his parents to be joined as interveners for the court to determine by way of preliminary issue the beneficial ownership of the former matrimonial home in Hong Kong and those other properties in Wuhan all registered in his sole name but which he claims to belong beneficially to his parents. As a result that preliminary issue has since been fixed for hearing for 5 days in August 2016.

15.  However on 29th October 2015 the Wife brought an anti-suit injunction against the Husband’s father the 1st Intervener to restrain him from continuing with certain PRC Action which he had earlier taken out in Wuhan against his son the Husband without any notice to the Wife for determination of the beneficial ownership of those properties in Wuhan and for those properties to be transferred to him. The Wife believed that it was the concerted efforts of father and son to pre-empt her case in the forthcoming trial of the preliminary issue in Hong Kong and accordingly sought the injunction.

16.  That application was opposed by the father and after hearing arguments from senior counsel for both sides this court on 30th November 2015 allowed the Wife’s application only in part by restraining the father from dealing with or disposing any of those Wuhan properties in which the PRC action may find or conclude in his favour pending the determination of the preliminary issue by this court.                                  

17.  It is against this background of the parties’ marriage and litigation that I now come to consider the Husband’s present application which was made according to him for an urgent need to travel to Wuhan before the end of March 2016 to attend certain meeting with PRC government officials in relation to his father’s business, and he offered an undertaking to the Court and to the Wife that he shall forthwith come to and enter into Hong Kong as soon as practicable should the Court order him to do so, and that the said Prohibition Order dated 15th January 2016, which has been extended or renewed up to 14th April 2016, should be discharged forthwith on the following grounds as set out in the Skeleton Submission of his counsel Mr Eugene Yim:

(1)  that the Court ought not to have granted a prohibition order when the Husband was already out of jurisdiction;

(2)  that there is no real risk that the Husband will not return for a substantial period of time;

(3)  that the Wife has failed to show that enforcement of the judgment will be impeded in the absence of the Husband;

(4)  that the Wife failed to serve the Prohibition Order immediately or at all.

18.  In addition and in the event that the Court is not persuaded to discharge the Prohibition Order on these grounds, the Husband offers to pose a surety in satisfaction of the Prohibition Order through the father-in-law of his sister with an undertaking to satisfy whatever judgment sum that he may be ordered to pay under the Wife’s judgment summons.

19.  Ms Anita Yip SC with Ms Lily Yu for the Wife however argue that the Husband’s jurisdictional challenge is unfounded, that the Wife had properly satisfied the service requirement in respect of the Prohibition Order on the Husband, that in the exercise of its discretion in both the making of the Prohibition Order or the discharge thereof, the Court should take into account all the circumstances of the case, that in the context of the said maintenance pending suit judgment, such discretion should be guided by its nature of providing provisions for the Wife and the children’s future ongoing reasonable needs, and that the Husband’s proposed security or surety is neither appropriate nor fit to warrant a discharge in the circumstances.    

20.  Given the various issues raised by the Husband’s application including what seems to be jurisdictional challenges in some of his grounds, it would be relevant to first set out the applicable legal principles.   

Applicable Legal Principles

21.  The jurisdiction of the Family Court to make a prohibition order is derived from Section 52E of the District Court Ordinance, Cap. 336 which provides as follows:

(1)The Court shall have jurisdiction to make an order prohibiting a person from leaving Hong Kong (a prohibition order) to facilitate the enforcement, securing or pursuance of –

(a)  a judgment against that person for the payment of a specified sum of money;

(b)  a judgment or order against that person –

(i)  for the payment of an amount to be assessed; or

(ii) requiring him to deliver any property or perform any other act; or

(c) a civil claim (other than a judgment) –

(i)     for the payment of money or damages; or

(ii) for the delivery of any property or the performance of any other act.

(2)  The Court shall not make an order under subsection (1)(b) unless it is satisfied that there is probable cause for believing that –

(a)  the person against whom the order is sought is about to leave Hong Kong; and

(b)  by reason of (a), satisfaction of the judgment or order is likely to be obstructed or delayed.

(3)  The Court shall not make an order under subsection (1)(c) unless it is satisfied that there is probable cause for believing that –

(a)  there is a good cause of action;

(b)  the person against whom the order is sought –

(i)   incurred the alleged liability, which is the subject of the claim, in Hong Kong while he was present in Hong Kong; or

(ii)  carries on business in Hong Kong; or

(iii) is ordinarily resident in Hong Kong;

(c)  that person is about to leave Hong Kong; and

(d)  by reason of paragraph (c), any judgment that may be given against that person is likely to be obstructed or delayed.

(4)

(a)   The Court may, on application, discharge a prohibition order, either absolutely or subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit.

(b)  The Court may make a prohibition order subject to such conditions as it thinks fit, including the condition that the order shall have no effect if the judgment debtor or person against whom the claim is made satisfies the judgment or the claim or provides such security as the Court may order.

(5)

(a)   An order under subsection (1) shall lapse –

(i)    on the expiry of one month but the Court may, on the application of the judgment creditor or claimant, extend or renew the order for a period which does not exceed, with the initial period of one month and any other period of extension or renewal, 3 months; and

(ii)on the service upon the Director of Immigration and the filing with the registrar of a notice by the judgment creditor or claimant advising that the order is no longer required.

(b)   The judgment creditor or claimant shall serve and file the notice mentioned in paragraph (a)(ii) as soon as reasonably possible after the order is no longer required. 

(6)  A copy of an order under subsection (1) and any other order ancillary thereto shall be served on the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Police and, if he can be found, the judgment debtor or person against whom the claim is made.

   …  

22.  As for the exercise of the jurisdiction to make or discharge a prohibition order, it is a matter of discretion, of which HH Judge To, as he then was, had these to say in Yue Wah Chuk Richard & Anor v Mckeon BredanHugh (unreported), DCCJ 7088/2003, 24 August 2004 at paragraph 45:

“The exercise of that jurisdiction is a matter of discretion: see Order 44A rule 3(1) of the Rules of the District Court. As with the exercise of any discretion, the Court must be guided by legal principles. Two principles which apply to all exercises of judicial discretion are, firstly, that the Court will not act arbitrarily and, secondly, that the court will not exercise its discretion in vain. The purpose of section 52E is not to punish a judgment debtor for having attracted a judgment debt but to facilitate satisfaction of the judgment. Where judgment for a sum certain has been obtained, the Court is not prohibited from making the order if the judgment debtor is not about to leave Hong Kong. But the Court will not exercise that discretion arbitrarily or unnecessarily. Thus before the discretion is exercised, the Court will consider three questions: (1) whether there is a real likelihood that the judgment debtor will leave Hong Kong; (2) whether there is a real risk that he will not return for a substantial period of time and (3) whether as a result of his absence enforcement of the judgment would be obstructed or delayed.”

23.  This statement of the Learned Judge has since been endorsed as the proper approach to exercising the Court’s discretion in relation to the making of prohibition orders: see Questnet Limited vKurt Georg Rocco Rinck & Anor (unreported), HCA 1475/2006, 22 February 2008. With these principles in mind, I shall now consider the Husband’s grounds for the discharge of the Prohibition Order in the same order as in Mr Yim’s Skeleton Submission.   

Prohibition Order Should Not Be Granted When Husband Was Already Out Of Jurisdiction

24.  Mr Yim submits that at the time when the application was initially made and subsequently extended for the first time, the Husband was already out of jurisdiction, of which the Wife was well aware, as evidenced by her 16th Affirmation filed on 3rd February 2016 when she stated in paragraph 11[B/49]:

“On 29th January 2016 (Friday), the Respondent did not show up as promised to pick up the children. After the weekend access, I was informed by the children that their father was not there for the whole of the weekend staying access. In view of that, I know that the Respondent has not come back to Hong Kong in the last weekend and has remained in Wuhan.”

25.  Mr Yim therefore argues that since the law requires the Court to consider, inter alia, whether there is a real likelihood that the judgment debtor will leave Hong Kong before the discretion to grant a prohibition order can be exercised, it therefore presupposes that the judgment debtor must be within Hong Kong at the time when the application for prohibition order is made, as otherwise there is no point requiring the Court to consider whether a person will leave Hong Kong if he/she has already done so. Since the Husband was already out of Hong Kong at the time when the Wife applied for the prohibition and when it was extended, Mr Yim submits that the Prohibition Order should not have been made and hence should now be discharged for wants of jurisdiction.

26.  Ms Yip for the Wife however argues that this jurisdictional challenge of the Husband is absolutely unfounded, as section 52E(1) clearly differentiates 3 categories of cases from (a) to (c) as noted above, the present case with the maintenance pending suit order for the Wife and children clearly falls within (a), i.e. post-judgment with a definite sum, and unlike the other 2 categories which impose a mandatory statutory requirement that “the person against whom the prohibition order is sought is about to leave Hong Kong”, there is no such requirement for the first category of cases which is the present case, as it was said in the Yue Wah Chuk case at paragraph 43:

“ … The section distinguishes between three categories of cases: a judgment for a specific sum of money, judgment on liability to be assessed or an order requiring certain acts to be performed and a civil claim other than a judgment. The limitation applicable to the second category of cases (i.e. sub-paragraph (1)(b)) is equally applicable to the third category but not to the first. For myself, I cannot see any justification for differential treatment between … But that is the law on the statute book.”

27.  Ms Yip therefore submits, for the first category of cases, i.e. post-judgment with a definite sum, of which the present is one, the exercise of the jurisdiction is entirely a matter of the Court’s discretion, as the Learned Judge stated in Yue Wah Chuk at paragraph 45 above that “the Court is not prohibited from making the order if the judgment debtor is not about to leave Hong Kong.”

28.  It follows, Ms Yip submits, the requirement that there is a real likelihood that the judgment debtor will leave Hong Kong only comes under the consideration of the Court when exercising its discretion.

29.  As set out above, it is plain that whole purpose of the prohibition order is to facilitate the enforcement of the judgment properly obtained by the applicant, and hence when the application was made, if the judgment debtor was already out of Hong Kong for the entire period of the prohibition order, its purpose will inevitably be rendered nil and pointless, and will fall away by itself without the need to take any further action in respect of that order, hence I do not believe that it was the intention of the legislation to require the applicant to ensure that the judgment debtor must be in Hong Kong when making the application, as even in cases like the present one when the parties were former spouses may no longer have any access to information of each other’s whereabouts and movement after the breakdown of their relationship, let alone those who may be wholly unrelated or were total strangers but for the legal issue between them, and at this day and age in Hong Kong where people can come and go on numerous occasions within the same day, it would simply be wholly impractical and too onerous a duty to be imposed on a person entitled to enforce a judgment properly obtained from the court.

30.  In my view what the applicant is required to do is to show on balance of probability and with good reason that there is a real likelihood that the judgment debtor will leave Hong Kong and not return to Hong Kong for a substantial period, and as a result enforcement of the judgment would be obstructed or delayed. In the present case there is no dispute that the Husband spends substantial periods of time in PRC and there is no fixed pattern or practice on his part when he will enter or leave Hong Kong, and according to the Wife the only means for her to learn about his presence in Hong Kong is simply by anticipation of his exercising his weekly access to the children who would normally be brought to the former matrimonial home where the paternal grandmother resides for that purpose, and the evidence is that there have been occasions when the Husband did not return to Hong Kong at all for his access, of which the Wife would only learn about afterwards from the children. In the circumstances it was in my view simply impossible for her to ensure the Husband’s presence in Hong Kong before making her application even if there was such a statutory requirement for her to do so, and which I have already found as above not to exist.        

No Real Risk of Husband Not Returning to Hong Kong

31.  Mr Yim submits for the Husband that it is clear from the authorities that the applicant for a prohibition order must be able to show upon cogent evidence that the alleged debtor will not return for a substantial period of time, but in the present case the Wife’s evidence shows the opposite when she clearly stated in her 15th Affirmation that the Husband “comes back to Hong Kong about once every 2 weeks, or even less, to have access to the children”.

32.  As a matter of fact, Mr Yim argues, the Husband has been attending personally on the weekend access to the children save for only 3 occasions, hence the Wife’s suggestion that he will not return to Hong Kong once he became aware of the enforcement proceedings against him is purely groundless speculation, as the Husband did come back to Hong Kong voluntarily on 15th February 2016 to exercise his access to the children despite knowing that the Wife had earlier already issued a judgment summons against him.

33.  Ms Yip on the other hand submits that the Husband’s reliance upon the fact that he did come back to Hong Kong voluntarily on that day is pointless, as he well knew that the hearing of the judgment summons was only scheduled some 3 months away in May 2016 and hence there would be no consequence for him entering Hong Kong on that occasion, but there is clearly a real risk that he would not attend that hearing in May 2016 due to his high-handed handling of the case and his cruel attitude towards the Wife and the children as follows:

(1)  Since the maintenance pending suit judgment, he had not only failed to pay the outstanding maintenance as ordered, he even failed to cause the derisory sum of HK$35,000 to be paid on time each month;

(2)  He even turned down the Wife’s most reasonable proposal made in August 2015 that she and the children be allowed to move back to the former matrimonial home to enable her to save more than HK$20,000 per month on renting her service apartment;

(3)  His delaying tactics with his payments to the Wife for the sole purpose of putting pressure on her by exhausting all her means for legal representation in these proceedings including the trial of the preliminary issue in August 2016 all point to a real risk that he would be absent from Hong Kong so as to avoid the hearing of the judgment summons and to pay the maintenance pending suit and costs contribution to her which would render her without any legal representation at the trial of the preliminary issue;

(4)  He has very limited connection with Hong Kong, as his family lives in Wuhan, as does his girlfriend, and so is his and his father’s business, and as founded by this Court at the earlier custody trial, he spent limited time only in Hong Kong;

(5)  The only reason that he has given that there would be no risk of him not returning to Hong Kong is his weekly access to the children, but the evidence reveal that he had skipped such access in the past, while that his persistent refusal to pay the maintenance pending suit to meet the children’s urgent needs just go to show how actually little they mean to him.                

34.  For all these reasons, Ms Yip submits, the Court must be able to see through the Husband’s tactic, i.e. by staying outside Hong Kong, he is beyond the reach of the jurisdiction and can as a result delay, defer and deny making any payments to the Wife and the children.

35.  As noted above in my maintenance pending suit judgment I found that the Husband had made various attempts to mislead the court of his financial means and that the Wife had good cause to suspect that his whole family had ganged up with him in these proceedings. Up to this date the Husband has yet to produce any further evidence to demonstrate that this court had unfairly or wrongly judged him as to his financial ability to pay the said maintenance pending suit or to throw any doubt thereon since that hearing, yet notwithstanding his alleged financial cut-off by his family, he has been able to somehow have all his own needs and expenses met without any difficulty, including incurring further legal costs in these proceedings to the tune of HK$500,000 and by placing some HK$400,000 on account with his solicitors while continuing to flout the said maintenance order.

36.  No doubt he would have been properly advised and is well aware that at the forthcoming judgment summons he will be subjected to serious examination under oath as to his means and may have to show cause why an order of commitment should not be made against him in the event of being found to have the means to pay the maintenance pending suit order: r 87(5)(c) of Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap 179. In the premises the Wife has every reason to fear that he would not want to face those consequences and hence a real risk of him not returning to Hong Kong should he be allowed to leave.                      

Failure to Show Enforcement Will Be Impeded In Husband’s Absence

37.  For this ground Mr Yim submits that as the law requires an applicant for prohibition order to show that as a result of the intended absence of the judgment debtor, enforcement of the judgment will be impeded in order to justify such an draconian order which has the effect of restricting the freedom of a person guaranteed by the Basic Law.

38.  However, Mr Yim submits, the fact that the outstanding sum under the maintenance pending suit judgment sought to be enforced is only about HK$1.4 million whereas according to the Wife’s case the Husband has beneficial interest in, amongst other assets, the former matrimonial home worth more than HK$35 million will in fact facilitate rather than impede her enforcement of the judgment, hence there is simply no justification for her to apply for the prohibition order in the first place or at all.

39.  On this point Mr Yim relies on the case of Munich Industrial Holding Ltd v Cheung Fai Ming T/A Hing YipIndustrial Co., HCA 7288 of 1996, 16 September 1996 (unrep.) where Keith J held at §3:

“I share Master Jones’ view that the prohibition order should be discharged. The debt was not a particularly large one, and care should be taken to ensure that the drastic remedy of preventing a defendant from leaving Hong Kong should not be disproportionate to what it is intended to achieve. That, I think, is what Master Jones had in mind when he described the remedy as a “stringent” one. Moreover, the Defendant claimed that he has business interests in China. Indeed, he told Master Jones on 30th August that in order to pay his debt to the Plaintiff he had to leave Hong Kong. There is no reason to doubt that. In those circumstances, to maintain the prohibition on the Defendant’s departure from Hong Kong would only serve to make it more difficult to pay off the judgment debt. As Master Jones said, a prohibition order is “justifiable only it is efficacious”.”

40.  Likewise in Shum Hing Wong T/A Ngan Bo Finance Co vCheng Chung Ching, DCCJ 16608/2000, 6 October 2003 (unrep), Mr Yim submits that it was also held by Master Yu at §27:

“The fact that the Defendant travel to and fro between Hong Kong and PRC could at the highest be interpreted as making execution more difficult for the Plaintiff (per Madam Justice Bokary in AVCO Financial Services (Asia)Ltd v Topma Electronic Ltd & Ors. [1999] 4 HKC 193, 195). There is no evidence from the Plaintiff that the enforcement of the judgment would be impeded in “some significant way”.”

41.  Ms Yip on the other hand argues that the Husband’s absence from Hong Kong would of course be of great significance to the Wife as it would directly lead to her inability to use the judgment summons procedure to compel payment which can be said to have been calculated to obstruct and delay the enforcement of the judgment, as it was so stated in Mujani v Bank of India [1989] 2 HKC 80 at 92G, and that apart from the judgment summons, there is no other meaningful enforcement measure against the Husband, given that he has no asset within the jurisdiction apart from the former matrimonial home.

42.  However, it is clear that the ownership of that property is under dispute and is the subject of the trial of the preliminary issue in August 2016, of which the Husband has insisted to have no beneficial interest as he is merely holding the property on trust for his father which is wholly aligned with the latter’s case, thus rendering that property not readily available to be realised to fulfil the judgment at all, or at least not in the event of his absence from the judgment summons until the conclusion of the trial of the preliminary issue and only if it ends in favour of the Wife, a situation certainly fall well within those regarded as obstructed or delayed in the enforcement of judgment as laid down in the Yue Wah Chuk’s case.         

Failure To Serve Prohibition Order Immediately

43.  As prohibition orders are normally granted on ex parte basis, and given its draconian nature, Mr Yim submits that the applicant for such an order is under a statutory duty to serve the same immediately, as held by the Court of Appeal in Auto Treasure Ltd (t/a Albert Jewellery Creation)v Pyramid International (a firm) & Others, CACV 24 of 1992, 22 May 1992 (unrep) when Kaplan J stated at p 6:

“ … A plaintiff who obtains a prohibition order is in my judgment under a duty to take reasonable step to serve it immediately. If he decides for whatever reason, that he does not wish to serve it immediately then he is under obligation to return to the ex-parte judge and inform him and explain why service is not to be effected immediately. This will entail giving the judge further information as to what has happened since he made the order and will assist him in deciding whether he is of the opinion that the order should stand or be discharged. The notion of a plaintiff keeping such a drastic order of this nature up his sleeve for some four days is quite unacceptable…”

44.  In the present case, Mr Yim submits, the Wife for some reasons best known to her chose not to serve the Prohibition Order of 15th January 2016 and extended on 5th February 2016 until 19th February 2016. In other words, it was not served at all with the initial order, and only 14 days later with the extended order, of which he argues as wholly unacceptable.

45.  Similarly, Mr Yim submits, after the Wife obtained the order further extended on 10th March 2016, again she chose not to serve it until 4 days later on 14th March 2016, and only after the Husband’s solicitors specifically and repeatedly asked about it.

46.  Furthermore, Mr Yim argues, it must be borne in mind that whilst the Husband was out of Hong Kong, he had all along been legally represented by his solicitors on whom the order could be easily served as there is no requirement for it to be personally served, and as with any application made on ex parte basis, the Wife owed a duty to serve the order immediately on any affected party, and hence there can be no excuse on her part for not serving the order on the Husband but instead chose to conceal it from him. On this ground alone, Mr Yim submits that the Prohibition Order and the two subsequent ones should be discharged forthwith.

47.  Worse still, Mr Yim submits, the non-service of the Prohibition Order was never brought to the attention of the Court when the Wife applied for its extension on 5th February 2016, and not until her most recent affirmation of 7th March 2016 when she only briefly mentioned it in paragraph 5 without drawing any attention to the Court of such legal requirement as to service.

48.  Ms Yip however argues that the alleged non-service of the initial prohibition order does not reflect the merits of the existing prohibition order freshly imposed and extended nor the merits of the Husband’s present discharge application, nor is there any non-disclosure as to the service of the initial prohibition order, as when the Wife applied for extension of the initial order, she clearly mentioned at paragraph 5 of her 16th Affirmation that she had not served the prohibition order or the judgment summons on the Husband.

49.  As for the alleged late service of the prohibition order extended by the Court on 10th March 2016 which was a Thursday, the Wife’s solicitors did not receive the notice from the Court until the following Monday on 14th March 2016 when it was then sealed and served on the Husband right after, hence there was no deliberate delay on her part that can be criticised.

50.  On this point Ms Yip refers to the case of Bunker HoldingsLtd v Asia Pacific Seafood Management Ltd & Ors [2005] 2 HKC 62 where the person against whom the prohibition order was made could not be found, Deputy High Court Judge Saunders, as he then was, held that it may not be necessary to serve at all when he said:

“19. The second basis on which discharge of the Order was sought was the non-service of the order. The Ordinance does not require personal service of the order and it would have been open to the sequestrators to have served the order by post. Miss Tong makes the point that if Mr Meerovitsch were absent from Hong Kong, and postal service was effected on his home, he may be informed of its existence and avoid returning to Hong Kong. There is merit in the argument, and the fact that the Ordinance requires service of the order only if the subject of the order can be found leads me to the view that if the subject cannot be found in Hong Kong there is no need to adopt some other form of service which might thereby warn him of the order and defeat its purpose.

20. Mr Chua argued that where a prohibition order is obtained Mr Meerovitsch was under a duty to take steps to serve it immediately. In support of the submission he relied upon dicta from Kaplan J in Auto-Treasure Ltd (t/aAlbert Jewellery Creation) v Pyramid International (a firm) & Ors (CACV 24/1992, 22 May 1992, unreported) in the following terms:

… (see above)

That is undoubtedly right, but it is a statement made in circumstances far removed from the present case. In Auto-Treasure, Kaplan J was dealing with a situation where, after the order had been made, the applicant for the order held negotiations with the subject of the order. The applicant did not immediately effect service of the order, ‘keeping it up his sleeve’ while he attempted to negotiate a resolution of the dispute. There was no suggestion that the subject could not be found. On failing to resolve the matter, he served the order. In an application by the subject to discharge the order, both the judge hearing the application and the Court of Appeal were concerned at this course of action. In the present case however a proper attempt to personally serve the order had been made immediately, and the sequestrators process server was told that it was not known when Mr Meerovitsch would return to Hong Kong. As soon as the sequestrators learned that Mr Meerovitsch had returned to Hong Kong and instructed solicitors they sought, through those solicitors, arrangements to effect service. Mr Meerovitsch did not disclose his whereabouts and refused to cooperate in service. In those circumstances, the sequestrators were not, as in Auto-Treasure, ‘keeping the order up their sleeve’, but had done all they could to effect personal service.

…

22. It can hardly lie in the mouth of Mr Meerovitsch to seek to discharge an order for want of service in these circumstances. It is not acceptable to argue that service has not been effected when a person travels widely out of Hong Kong and then declines to instruct solicitors to accept service on his behalf, and conceals that fact from the court. I accept now, that after I raised this matter in the course of the hearing on 13 August 2004, Mr Meerovitsch, no doubt following sensible advice from counsel, has given instructions to his solicitors, and service of both the Order and the notice of motion for committal have now been effected by service on the solicitors.

23. Four factors lead one to conclude that the fact that the order was not served personally immediately following it being made, is not a basis upon which I should discharge the Order. They are, first the absence of Mr meerovitsch from Hong Kong, second, the lack of knowledge on the part of the sequestrators as to when he might return, third, Mr Meerovitsch’s refusal to instruct solicitors to accept service on his behalf, and fourth, that as soon as they knew he was in Hong Kong, the sequestrators took immediate steps to effect service.”              

51.  Ms Yip submits that clearly the statement in Auto-Treasure should be read against the facts of each case, and that it does not set down a stubborn principle, rather it is a comment from the court unique to the facts in that case. Whereas in the present case, Ms Yip submits that:

(1)  the Wife’s solicitors obviously wanted to serve personally on the Husband of the prohibition order on 15th January 2016 upon the grant of the prohibition order when he was supposed to access the children but was absent, and was also absent on his next access until 15th February 2016 when he finally showed up for access that he could be served;  

(2)  as he does not normally reside in Hong Kong, it was therefore not possible for the Wife’s solicitors to attempt personal service on him except during his access to the children on weekends;

(3)  any service on his solicitors when the Husband was out of Hong Kong would defeat the purpose of the prohibition order;

(4)  this is exactly the case when the Husband could not be found and thus any service on him was not required.  

52.  I agree that the Wife had done what was required of her to serve the order on the Husband as soon as practicable and reasonable under the circumstances. The Ordinance does not require personal service or that service be effected within any stipulated days or period, and what is practical or reasonable depend on the particular facts of each case, and the circumstances of the present case are certainly very much different from the case of Auto-Treasure Ltd where that statement of Kaplan J was made in a situation that the applicant withheld service during negotiation with the subject of the order. There is no evidence of that sort of situation or any other situation in the present case to suggest that the Wife was deliberately ‘keeping the order up her sleeve’ other than to ensure that the Husband could be properly served while within the jurisdiction, which is the whole purpose of prohibition order.

53.  I agree with Ms Yip that one cannot emphasize enough that the exercise of the court’s power whether or not to discharge a prohibition order is plainly and entirely a matter of discretion, and that unlike the general civil cases relied on by the Husband, and with no disrespect to the importance or value of the judgment sums which the applicants in those civil cases tried to enforce by means of prohibition order, as pointed out by Ms Yip, the judgment in the present case is a maintenance pending suit judgment which means life and death for the Wife and her children, as they had all along been wholly dependent on the Husband without any other resources and must rely on the judgment to obtain payment from him to pay for food, housing and daily needs and expenses, and the fact that it was for the period pending the conclusion of the proceedings has the clear implication that it is urgent, while the legal costs contribution is intended not only for the Wife to continue to have proper legal representation in these proceedings which have been mostly driven by the Husband in practically every step of the litigation, but also to maintain for her a level playing field in no doubt more serious and costly battles to come.

54.  There can be no argument that prohibition orders are draconian orders as they have the effect of restricting the freedom of movement of the person subject to the order from leaving Hong Kong, which is a freedom guaranteed by our Basic Law, but in the exercise of the court’s discretion in balancing the restriction of that freedom of the Husband as against the Wife’s right and entitlement to enforce a judgment which the Husband has not taken any steps to appeal or vary, as well as the paramount interests of the children to be properly maintained by their parents including a roof over their head and food on the table, the court should not be distracted by any superfluous arguments on technicalities.                

55.  In the premises and for the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the restriction of the Husband’s movement is necessary and proportionate, and I therefore decline to discharge the Prohibition Order on those grounds of the Husband. I shall now turn to consider whether it should be discharged on his proposed security or surety.           .          

Husband’s Proposed Security/Surety

56.  Since the initial hearing of his application on 17th March 2016, the Husband has provided a surety to satisfy paragraph 2(ii) of the prohibition Order which states that the prohibition shall have no effect if the Husband ‘makes payment of a total sum of HK$1,438,331 as security or provides bail in that sum by a surety or sureties”.

57.  It comes in the form of an undertaking by a Mr Y set out in his affirmation filed on 21st March 2016. He is the father-in-law of the Husband’s sister and is in essence offering to pay the sum of HK$1,438,331 as specified in that Prohibition Order to court within 21 days when called upon by the court to do so, and to be forfeited by the court for use as the court may direct in the event of the Husband failing to return to Hong Kong when called upon by the court to do so but his surety is limited only up to 9th May 2016 which is the date of the judgment summons.

58.  In his affirmation Mr Y however gave no details of his occupation or financial means save for his interests as joint tenants with his wife in 2 properties in Hong Kong with copies of their land search record attached and his estimated value of HK$30 million for each.    

59.  This is not acceptable to the Wife as she is concerned about the time and costs involved in the realization process of the surety given the limited information on Mr Y and the fact that those 2 properties are co-owned by his wife and may be affected by hidden encumbrances. In all she does not believe that Mr Y is a sufficient or appropriate surety and should not be accepted by the court.

60.  For a person to be accepted by the court as appropriate surety he or she must of course first be properly screened essentially as to his/her financial ability to pay the judgment debt if and when called upon to do so. I agree that with the limited information provided by Mr Y of his means there is a risk that the Wife may have to put through unnecessary time and costs which she simply cannot afford. Above all, given the Husband’s undoubted importance to his father’s business and the wealth of his parents, I believe he is well capable of providing much better security or surety than Mr Y’s undertaking for the discharge of the Prohibition Order. As such I find his proposed surety not acceptable in the premises.  

61.  Which brings me back to the Husband’s alleged urgent need to leave Hong Kong to attend certain business meeting in Wuhan, of which the Wife has criticised, rightly in my view, as flimsy, un-particularized and without justification. The Husband at the subsequent hearing further clarified that the meeting(s) was to be with PRC government officials in relation to certain proposal to introduce community medical and elderly services in Wuhan with no exact date fixed but definitely within March 2016.

62.  By now this point may well be moot but as already indicated to the Husband at the hearing, given the nature and purpose of the meeting as disclosed, I find the need of his attending such meeting is far outweighed by the necessity to ensure his attendance for the judgment summons and the risks of him not returning to Hong Kong after the meeting and the resultant obstruction and/or delay to the enforcement of the judgment.         

Conclusion

63.  In conclusion and for all the reasons discussed above, the Husband’s Application to discharge the Prohibition Order is refused and dismissed, with costs to follow the event to the Wife to be taxed if not agreed and with certificate for counsel, which is an order nisi to be made absolute at the expiration of 14 days.

64.  At the hearing of his application I did indicate to the Husband that while his proposed surety through Mr Y was not acceptable to the Wife, and now also not by this court, there was nothing to prevent him from making further proposals with improved terms and conditions as security or surety for the discharge of the prohibition order, in particularly in view of his parents’ wealth and his purported importance to his father’s business. I still stand by that view.

65.  Lastly, it remains my gratitude to counsel for both sides for their most valuable assistance (as usual) rendered to this court throughout the hearing.  

( Bruno Chan )
District Judge

Ms Anita Yip SC and Ms Lily Yu instructed by M/S Chaine Chow and Barbara Hung for the Petitioner.

Mr Eugene Yim instructed by M/S Wat & Co for the Respondent.

102201-EN-2015-11-30

DX v. LN

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FCMC No.7870 of 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSE NO. 7870 OF 2014

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 DXPetitioner
 and 
 LNRespondent
 and 
 LSC formerly known as KK1st Intervener
 KYMF2nd Intervener

----------------------------

Before : HH Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers.
Date of Hearing : 29 October & 2 November 2015.
Date of Submission : 4 November 2015.
Date of Further Submission : 9 November 2015.
Date of Judgment : 30 November 2015.

---------------------------

JUDGMENT
(Anti-Suit Injunction)

---------------------------

1.   This is the Petitioner Wife’s application by a summons issued on 29th October 2015 for an anti-suit injunction against the Respondent Husband’s father, i.e. the 1st Intervener herein (“Father”) restraining him from continuing or pursuing a legal action (“PRC Action”) in Wuhan, PRC under the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court over certain landed properties in Wuhan held in the sole name of the Husband, and for both the Father and the Husband to forthwith provide full particulars of the said PRC Action.

2.   Prior to issuing that summons the Wife on that same day applied on ex-parte (on notice) to this court for the anti-suit injunction on urgent basis against the Father in relation to the said PRC Action when this court granted the injunction accordingly as an interim basis and directed that the matter be heard inter-parte 4 days later on 2nd November 2015.

3.   Both Husband and Father were essentially not opposed to the 2nd part of the application to provide the requested information, as the Father in fact did at the hearing on 2nd November 2015 produce some of the relevant documents, of which I should also note that the Wife obviously did not have any opportunity of going through them before the hearing, while for the Husband’s part it was just a matter of how much time he should be given to provide his documents, for which he was eventually ordered to do so within 3 days. 

4.   It is therefore the anti-suit injunction sought by the Wife against the Father in relation to the PRC Action that requires the court’s consideration and determination, which was admittedly commenced by the Father against the Husband earlier on 18th September 2015 in Wuhan but after he had joined in the parties’ divorce proceedings in respect of preliminary issue over the beneficial ownership of certain landed properties including those in Wuhan, and for which he had filed his affirmation on 12th October 2015 but never mentioned anything about the PRC Action.

5.   Before proceeding to consider this issue in details, it is important to first set out some background factual information relevant to the application.

Relevant Background

6.  Both Husband and Wife were born and raised in Wuhan, PRC before settling in Hong Kong where they subsequently married in 2006. They have 2 sons now aged 5 and 3 whose care and control have earlier been granted to the Wife after a trial, and with whom now reside in a rented apartment in the same neighbourhood of the parties’ former matrimonial home in the Husband’s sole name in Hung Hom, Kowloon.

7.  It was the Wife who petitioned for divorce on 21st February 2014 that commenced these proceedings, with the decree nisi being granted on 23rd September 2014 and the Wife’s ancillary relief application adjourned for FDR upon exchanging of the parties’ Form E.

8.  In his Form E the Husband disclosed to be the registered owner of those properties in Wuhan as well as the said former matrimonial home in Hong Kong the total value of which he put in excess of HK$82 million, but all of which he also claimed to be holding on trust for his father, which claim however was disputed by the Wife and hence on 18th August 2015 the Husband issued a summons seeking to join his parents in the ancillary relief proceedings for the purpose of determining the ownership of those properties under his name by way of preliminary issue as per the guidelines provided by the English case of TL v ML [2006] 1 FLR 1236 and adopted by our courts.

9.  In his said summons the Husband specifically prayed for the following:

     “2. There be determinations as to beneficial interest, ownership, source of funds or funding and/or indebtedness in respect of the following properties and assets, and the share(s), percentage(s) (if any) as between the Interveners, the petitioner and/or the respondent;

     3. The issues be tried as preliminary issues in advance of the Financial Dispute Resolution process and/or Final Ancillary Relief Trial”.

10.  As noted above this summons was not opposed by the Husband’s parents who were then at the hearing on 25th August 2015 already represented by their present solicitors, and on 12th October 2015 pursuant to the said order the Father filed his affirmation setting out various arrangements which he said to have made with the Husband in respect of those properties and claiming to be their beneficial owner with the Husband holding them on trust for him. The summons was then adjourned to 17th December 2015 for PTR in respect of the preliminary issue.

11.  I should also note that in addition to the hearing of that summons of the Husband, the Wife also on the same day sought maintenance pending suit for herself and the 2 children as well as legal costs contribution against the Husband, and after hearing argument from their counsel I handed down a judgment on 21st September 2015 ordering the Husband to pay the Wife HK$100,000 per month as interim maintenance for her and the children, and HK$133,333 per month for 9 months for her legal costs up to FDR hearing.    

The Application

12.  Against this backdrop, the Wife on 29th October 2015 brought her application now before me, first on ex-parte with notice, of which she described as urgent and that the anti-suit injunction which she sought against the Father was stated in the summons as follows:

“1. … the Intervener, whether by himself, his servants, agents or otherwise in his personal capacity or in the capacity of an officer, servant or agent of the Intervener be restrained from continuing pursuing proceeding or taking any further action in or with the action in Wuhan, PRC namely … under the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court.”

13.  Her reasons and evidence in support as set out in her 12th  affirmation are as follows:

“8. On or about 23rd October 2015, by a random search on the internet, it came to my attention that there was a hearing scheduled on 13th October 2015 in the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court whereby the Plaintiff is (Father) i.e. the Intervener in this case, and the Defendant is (Husband) (i.e. the Respondent) regarding matters on the disputes over the contract of sale and purchase of landed properties … The action number of the case is … (“the PRC Action”) …

9. I have no knowledge about the PRC Action and I immediately instructed my solicitors to write to the Respondent’s and the Intervener’s solicitors seeking full particulars of the PRC Action. I asked them to reply to my solicitors by 3 p.m. on 26th October 2015 failing which I shall consider taking further action in Court without further notice …

10. On 26th October 2015, I received a letter from the Respondent’s solicitors saying that they are taking their client’s instruction and should be able to give a substantive reply by 3 p.m. the next day, that is, by 27th October 2015 …

11. I have not received any reply from the Intervener on 26th October 2015.

12. On 27th October 2015, in purported compliance with their promise to give a substantive reply, the respondent’s solicitors said in their letter that the hearing on 13th October 2015 at the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court was about a claim initiated by the Respondent’s father claiming that various PRC landed properties under the respondent’s name in fact belong to his father. It was also confirmed that the respondent attended the said hearing.

…

18. Obviously, the Respondent and the Intervener deliberately hide the PRC Action from me. On one hand, the Intervener asked to join in to the Hong Kong divorce proceedings to determine the Issues (which include the PRC properties) on 18th August 2015 but on the other hand, there was already a hearing in Wuhan on 13th October 2015 regarding the PRC properties of the Respondent. Neither of them have informed me about the PRC Action and/or the hearing in Wuhan.

…

20. The Respondent’s landed properties in PRC forms a substantial part of the family assets. Information and documents of the PRC Action are vital for me to seek further advice and/or to take further action to preserve the family assets and to protect my interests in the ancillary relief claim against the Respondent.

21. Since there was already a hearing on 13th October 2015, I am deeply worried that a judgment could be entered anytime in absence of my knowledge.

22. It is crucial that the Intervener should refrain from taking any further action in the PRC proceedings and that I have all information and documents relating to the PRC Action as it concerns with the landed properties in PRC registered under the respondent’s name. I remind the Court it is my case that all the PRC landed properties registered in my husband’s name belong legally and beneficially to him. They are gifts from his father to him.

23. It is of utmost important that I can preserve the matrimonial assets in PRC (i.e. assets under the Respondent’s name in PRC) and prevent them from being disposed of before the preliminary issues trial and/or ancillary trial in Hong Kong.”

14.  Ms Anita Yip SC for the Wife now submits that it is clear from the Husband’s earlier summons joining his parents as the Interveners, their common case is that the Husband holds those properties on trust for the Father, as evidenced by the Father’s clearest terms in his said affirmation, but when the Wife accidentally discovered the PRC Action and asked the solicitors representing the Husband and the Father for explanation and particulars, the Father never responded while the Husband’s reply was only deliberate vague and evasive, which Ms Yip submits clearly show that father and son are now trying to take the matter in their own hands by instituting proceedings in China thereby usurping the Hong Kong court’s jurisdiction over the same PRC properties currently litigated in Hong Kong, and hence unless restrained, the Father may sprint to the finishing line before the hearing could take place in Hong Kong, and that the Wife’s claims over those PRC properties would be frustrated.

15.  The Father has not filed any evidence by affirmation in this application other then producing those documents relating to the PRC Action, but according to his counsel Mr Russell Coleman SC, the following are the Father’s instructions on his said action:

(1) the PRC Action relates to immovable properties situate in the PRC;

(2) it was commenced by the Father against the Husband on 18th  September 2015;

(3) the claim came about as a result of the Husband’s breaches of a nominee agreement, and his assertion of ownership rights over those properties, notwithstanding the Father had the evidence to prove that he was the sole financier and to show the contractual stipulations in place for the nominee arrangement;

(4) the litigation is compliant with the rule of in rem jurisdiction and the contractual stipulation between the parties;

(5) the Wuhan court has assumed jurisdiction over the case;

(6) the Wuhan court granted a freezing order over the properties including those belonging to both the Husband and Father by order of 29th September 2015 following an earlier hearing;

(7) the trial of the case has completed on 13th October 2015 and the basic facts have been ascertained;

(8) after the trial the Wife through lawyers raised objection to the Wuhan court and requested to be joined as a third party, though no formal application has been submitted;

(9) if a third party applies to be joined, the court hearing the case must conduct a hearing in accordance with the third party’s request;

(10) no notification has been given as to any new hearing, or when the awaited judgment after trial might be given.

16.  It is against these facts in relation with the PRC action, Mr Coleman submits, that the anti-suit injunction does not properly arise in the circumstances, as the Wife needs to show that Hong Kong is the natural forum as a pre-requisite to the court even being able to consider granting an anti-suit injunction, failing which it would be the end of her application, but even if she is able to do so, he submits that Hong Kong courts have no jurisdiction to determine disputes concerning title to or interests in immovable properties outside Hong Kong, as they are in the present case in Wuhan, PRC.

Anti-Suit Injunction

17.  While it is well established that Hong Kong courts have jurisdiction to restrain a party from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a foreign court, Mr Coleman submits that an injunction may be granted only if Hong Kong is the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute and the proceedings in the foreign court are vexatious or oppressive, and it would be useful to first refer to Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 14th edition as to the principles on the exercise of such jurisdiction at §12-069:

“The underlying principle is that the jurisdiction is exercised “where it is appropriate to avoid injustice”, or, as it was once put, where the foreign proceedings are “contrary to equity and good conscience”. Although it is possible to identify certain categories of cases in which the jurisdiction has been exercised “the width and flexibility of equity are not to be undermined by categorisation” … in the most recent authoritative formulation of the principles there is no indication that the exercise of the discretion is limited by the need to demonstrate a legal or equitable right not to be sued.

The English court may restrain proceedings brought abroad in breach of a contract not to sue, or in breach of a contract to be bound by the result of English proceedings, to sue only in England, or to submit disputes to arbitration. The court will also restrain proceedings which interfere with “the due process of the court”, or with the court’s jurisdiction to decide cases pending before it. Thus the court will enjoin proceedings taken abroad to recover foreign assets, whereby the party taking them will obtain an unfair advantage over other claimants in an English administration, or bankruptcy or winding up.

It is also clear that the court may restrain foreign proceedings which are “oppressive or vexatious” in the traditional sense. For some years it was not clear what effect the modern development of forum non conveniens principles in the staying of English actions was to have on the exercise of the jurisdiction to enjoin foreign proceedings. In Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd Lord Scarman (with whom all other members of the House concurred) said that it was no longer necessary to consider case law earlier than the developments in England since TheAtlantic Star and MacShannon v Rochware Glass Ltd. It was held that an injunction could be granted to restrain foreign proceedings in the circumstances in which a stay of English proceedings would be ordered: as the law then stood, that would mean that an injunction would be granted if the English court was an available forum in which justice could be done at substantially less inconvenience and expense, and the injunction would not deprive the plaintiff in the foreign proceedings of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage which would be available in the foreign jurisdiction.

In the Aérospatiale case, however, the Privy Council (speaking through Lord Goff of Chieveley) held that it was not right to treat the principles applicable in injunction cases as equivalent to those in forum non conveniens cases, as developed in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd. If the principles were the same, it would mean a party could be restrained from proceeding in a foreign court on the sole ground that England was the natural forum. This could not be right, because it would lead to the conclusion that, in a case where there was simply a difference of view between the English court and the foreign court as to which was the natural forum, the English court could arrogate to itself, by the grant of an injunction, the power to resolve the dispute: such a conclusion would “be inconsistent with comity” and “disrespect the fundamental requirement that an injunction will only be granted where the ends of justice so require.” The Privy Council held that where a remedy was available both in England and in the foreign court, the English court would in general only restrain the plaintiff from pursuing proceedings in the foreign court if the pursuit would be vexatious or oppressive. The English court must be the natural forum for the action, and it must take account of the injustice to the defendant if the plaintiff is allowed to pursue the foreign proceedings, and also the injustice to the plaintiff if he is not allowed to do so. The High Court of Australia, by contrast, has adopted a rather narrower definition, namely that “foreign proceedings are to be regarded as vexatious or oppressive only if there is nothing which can be gained by them over and above what may be gained in local proceedings, but it also characterised as oppressive proceedings which were instituted in one court after an action had been begun in another court and which appeared to be brought for the dominant purpose of preventing the first action from continuing.

In the result, an injunction may be granted if England is the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute and the proceedings in the foreign court are vexatious or oppressive. English courts have refrained from giving a comprehensive or limiting definition of these expressions; indeed, they have deliberately refrained from marking the outer extent of their power to act to restrain conduct which may give rise to injustice or, if the need for caution is given its due weight, serious injustice. It has been held that vexation or oppression may be indicated by the following: subjecting a party with no substantial connection with that jurisdiction; bad faith in the institution of the proceedings, or the institution of proceedings which are bound to fail; extreme inconvenience caused by the foreign proceedings; multiplicity of actions, especially where the foreign action might spawn further consequential litigation which might not be reconcilable with the foreign decision; bringing proceedings which interfere with or undermine the control of the English court of its own process; bringing proceedings which could and should have formed part of an English action brought earlier; bringing proceedings for no good reason in a court which will disregard an express choice of English law.

…

It was also indicated in Aérospatiale that before the English court was justified in granting an injunction to restrain vexatious or oppressive conduct, it was generally required that the court conclude that it provides the natural forum for the action. This was reiterated in Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel where it was said that this requirement – which was elevated to the status of a general rule requiring to be satisfied before the court may act – was necessary in order to respect the limits placed by comity upon the power of an English court to grant orders in relation to proceedings in foreign courts. In the absence of such a connection with England it will be a very rare case in which the English court would be justified in granting an injunction against a defendant whose conduct was oppressive or vexatious. In that case French aircraft manufacturers were refused an injunction restraining English defendants from pursuing proceedings in Texas arising out of an aircraft accident in India. Although the English court had in personam jurisdiction over the defendants, it was contrary to comity to restrain the Texas proceedings because the English forum did not have a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter.

18.  In the present case, Mr Coleman submits, it is not unusual for there to be two sets of proceedings in two jurisdictions, which means the court could – and in the current circumstances should – uphold and continue the Hong Kong proceedings whilst simultaneously refusing the Wife’s anti-suit injunction, and if it is said that the Father’s consent to join the Hong Kong proceedings means the question of forum need not be addressed in the Hong Kong proceedings, that cannot help the Wife on her application but rather that the question of whether Hong Kong is the natural forum simply has not yet been addressed, but that it must be addressed as part of her application now made and should fail.   

19.  On this issue Mr Coleman submits that it would be instructive to refer to the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Lam, as he then was, in the case of First Laser Ltd v Fujian Enterprises (Holding)Co Ltd (unreported), HCA 4414/2001, 12th December 2002, in which the Learned Judge was faced with the defendant’s application to stay the Hong Kong proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens whilst the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from continuing or prosecuting proceedings in Fujian, PRC when he referred to the principles of some of the cases cited above as follows:

“The anti-suit injunction

60. The applicable principles are set out in Societe Aérospatiale vLee Kui Jak [1987] 1 AC 871 and Airbus Industrie v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 … I would confine myself to the following citations. In Airbus Industrie v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 at p.133, Lord Goff said,

“The broad principle underlying the jurisdiction is that it is to be exercised when the ends of justice require it. Generally speaking, this may occur when the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive … But, as was stressed in the Aérospatiale case …, in exercising the jurisdiction regard must be had to comity, and so the jurisdiction is one which must be exercised with caution …”

61. In Amchem Products Inc. v Workers’ Compensation Board [1993] 102 DLR (4th) 96 at p.120-1, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Sopinka J said,

“The result of the application of these principles is that when a foreign court assumes jurisdiction on a basis that generally conforms to our rule of private international law relating to the forum non conveniens, that decision will be respected and a Canadian court will not purport to make the decision for the foreign court. The policy of our courts with respect to comity demands no less. If, however, a foreign court assumes jurisdiction on a basis that is inconsistent with our rules of private international law and an injustice results to a litigant or “would-be” litigant in our courts, then the assumption of jurisdiction is inequitable and the party invoking the foreign jurisdiction can be restrained.”

To similar effect is the judgment of Lord Goff in Aérospatiale at p.895E-G and Neill LJ in EI Dupont v Agnew [1988] 2 LI Rep 240 at p.249. In the latter case, Neill LJ concluded,

“… where there is a difference of view between the English court and the foreign court as to which is the natural forum, the English court will not arrogate to itself by the grant of an injunction the power to resolve that dispute.”

62. In Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107, Lord Hobhouse distinguished between applicants who had a contractual right to litigate in a particular forum and those who did not have that right. For the latter, His Lordship said at p.120 Para.29,

“Therefore, to summarise, the essential features which made it proper, under English law, for the [court to grant an anti-suit injunction in favour of those who did not have contracted right to litigate in England] are:

(a) the applicant is a party to existing legal proceedings in this country;

(b) the defendants have in bad faith commenced and propose to prosecute proceedings against the applicant in another jurisdiction for the purpose of frustrating or obstructing the proceedings in this country;

(c) the court considers that it is necessary in order to protect the legitimate interest of the applicant in the English proceedings to grant the applicant a restraining order against the defendants.”    

20.  Applying those principles, Deputy High Court Judge Lam refused the plaintiff’s application for anti-suit injunction when he stated:

“63. Ms Eu contended that the commencement and continuation of the PRC action by the 1st Defendant are oppressive. She referred to the fact that the PRC action was only commenced after the Plaintiff started the action in Hong Kong and the Defendants took out a summons for the stay of the Hong Kong action. She also highlighted the difficulties the Plaintiff might encounter with regard to the concept of trust under PRC law. She referred to the difference between Hong Kong law and PRC law in respect of the questions of authority and lack of approval from Fujian government. All these, she said, pointed to the conclusion that the PRC action was brought for the dominant and calculated purpose of depriving the plaintiff of its claims under Hong Kong law. To support her contention, she relied on the decision of the High Court of Australia in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia (1997) 189 CLR 345 at 401,

“Proceedings which are brought for the dominant purpose of preventing another party from pursuing remedies available in the courts of another country and not available in this country are “seriously and unfairly … prejudicial [and] damaging”. They are, thus, oppressive …”

64. The burden is on the Plaintiff to satisfy this court that an anti-suit injunction should be granted. Ms Eu’s submission was, in my view, based on two underlying premises,

(a) the claim of the Plaintiff based on trust should be governed by Hong Kong law;

(b) the PRC action would frustrate the Plaintiff’s action in Hong Kong.

65. On (b), I have already held that the action in Hong Kong should not be stayed. On (a), as discussed above, I do not think I can come to a final conclusion on the applicable law in respect of each and every relevant issue. In other words, I am not satisfied, on the material available, that all issues in the primary claim of the plaintiff must be governed by Hong Kong law. On the contrary, as presently advised, I am more inclined (though I still maintain an open mind if this matter shall come back to me later) to the view that at least in respect of some of the issues, they should be governed by PRC law, see discussions in the above section on applicable law.

66. Balanced against this, as I have said in the section dealing with the stay application, there are factors suggesting that the Fujian court could be at least as much a natural forum as the Hong Kong court in dealing with the disputes between the parties. My view is that neither forum can be said to be distinctly more appropriate than the other. Of course, the PRC action is much narrower in scope and I have considered the stay application by reference to the trial of the issues raised in the Hong Kong action instead of the PRC action. Whether the Fujian court would be the appropriate forum for the trial of the PRC action has been litigated in the mainland with the participation of the Plaintiff to the highest court there and the Supreme People’s Court has adjudicated on the matter. As Mr Chan pointed out, the approach adopted by the Supreme People’s Court in deciding the matter was very much akin to our concept of forum non conveniens. The dicta of Sopinka J cited in Paragraph 61 above is relevant.

67. I have also taken into account of the fact that the trial of the PRC action has taken place and the Plaintiff also took part in it. By comparison, the action in Hong Kong is only at its early stage. I am not aware of a case where anti-suit injunction has been granted in these circumstances and Ms Eu, despite her diligence and that of her juniors, has not been able to refer me to any. The progress of the proceedings in the foreign court must be a relevant factor. I should record that there is no suggestion by the Plaintiff that the proceedings in the Fujian court have been conducted unfairly against it.

68. Moreover, as pointed out in paragraph 56 above, the PRC action could be complimentary to the Hong Kong action.

69. On the whole, I am not satisfied that the PRC action was brought for the dominant purpose of preventing the Plaintiff from pursuing its claims in the Hong Kong action or frustrating the same. Notwithstanding the timing of the commencement of the PRC action, I am of the view that it was quite legitimate for the 1st Defendant to take the view the Fujian court was an appropriate forum and try to have the issues raised in the PRC action to be litigated there. Nor am I satisfied that it is necessary to grant an anti-suit injunction to protect the legitimate interest of the Plaintiff in the Hong Kong action. In short, I am not convinced that it is oppressive for the 1st Defendant to commence or continue with the PRC action and I do not think the ends of justice require an anti-suit injunction to be granted.

70. As observed by Le Pichon JA in Asha Harkishin Premisingh v Harkishin Isarsingh Premsingh, CACV 845 of 2000,

“ … the fact that the courts of country X have concluded that country X was the natural forum, does not entitle it on that ground alone to restrain a party from proceeding in the foreign court. It would be inconsistent with comity.”

71. For these reasons, the application for anti-suit injunction must be dismissed.”

21.  Mr Coleman submits that as the current circumstances of the present case are similar, it is not unusual for there to be two sets of proceedings in two jurisdictions, which means that the court could and should uphold and continue the Hong Kong proceedings whilst simultaneously refusing the Wife an anti-suit injunction, as otherwise it would not be consistent with comity, the elements of which as summarised in MCC Proceeds Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust [1999] CLC 417 at 421-424 include:

(1) to inform the court of the relevant contents of the foreign law, identifying statutes or other legislation and explaining where necessary the foreign court’s approach to their construction;

(2) to identity judgments or other authorities, explaining what status they have as sources of the foreign law;  and

(3) where there is no authority directly in point, to assist the English judge in making a finding as to what the court’s ruling would be if the issue was to arise for decision there.

22.  Mr Coleman therefore submits that as all parties in the present case assert that PRC law is applicable and have announced the intention to deploy expert opinion evidence as to such law, there is no better person to assist the Hong Kong in identifying the material PRC law and its meaning than the relevant court in the PRC which administers and rules on that law, and hence it is for the Wuhan court to rule on the dispute over those Wuhan properties in the PRC Action. 

23.  Mr Coleman further submits that in any event Hong Kong is not the natural forum for the resolution of the dispute between the Husband and the Father as to the true ownership of, and who should have title to those properties, as that question turns on the arrangements made in the PRC relating to immovable property in the PRC which will identify who should properly be regarded as having title to those immovable properties.

The Moçambique Rule

24.  Mr Coleman indeed questions whether the Hong Kong court even has jurisdiction to deal with that question, and submits that in affirming the Moçambique rule, Hong Kong courts generally have no jurisdiction to determine disputes concerning title to or interests in immovable property outside Hong Kong : Re Law Kin Man (unrep., HCMP 1711/1991, 13 June 1996 [1996] HKLY 1095).

25.  The Moçambique rule is a common law rule in private international law which renders action relating to title in foreign land, the right to possession of foreign land and trespass to foreign land un-justifiable in common law jurisdiction established in 1893 by the House of Lords decision in the case of British South Africa Co v Campanhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602.

26.  According to Johnston on The Conflict of Laws in Hong Kong, 2nd edition, at §4.039, while there is no direct authority in Hong Kong law for the Moçambique rule, the orthodox understanding, following the leading English and other Commonwealth authorities, is that Hong Kong courts have no jurisdiction to determine:

(1) disputes concerning title to or interests in immovable property outside Hong Kong;

(2) claims of trespass to immovable property outside Hong Kong and, semble, other claims of wrongdoing where the essence of the complaint is one of damages to, entry upon or occupation of such property, even though no dispute arises concerning title to or interests in such property.

27.  Given the lack of direct authority in Hong Kong for this historical rule notwithstanding Re Law Kin Man, it would be instructive to refer to Johnston as to the development of the law in relation to this rule in England and other Commonwealth jurisdictions over the intervening decades at §4.040:

“ … In 1893, the House of Lords established that English courts have no jurisdiction over claims of trespass to foreign land. Other Commonwealth courts have extended the jurisdictional bar to torts concerning foreign land other than trespass, and to any other proceedings for the determination of title to or interests in foreign immovables. In 1078, the House of Lords, whilst questioning the rationality of the Moçambique rule, decided that it was too long-established to overrule and, moreover, that it ought to be construed relatively widely so as to deny jurisdiction in a case where the tort claim was not framed in trespass and, more significantly, where no dispute as to title had been raised. The House of Lords refused, however, to extend the rule to goods. Subsequently, however, limb(2) of the rule as summarised above has been reversed in part by statute in England, so as to permit English courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims for trespass to, or any other tort affecting, immovable property outside the jurisdiction unless the proceedings are principally concerned with a question of the title to, or the right to possession of, that property. There has been no such statutory provision in Hong Kong.

28.  There are, however, exceptions from the Moçambique rule as set out in Johnston at §4.041:

“There are some potentially significant exceptions, or possible exceptions, from the “much criticised” Moçambique rule:

1. Where the claim is based upon apersonal obligation arising between the parties. Where the claim is based upon a contract, fraud, fiduciary relationship or other obligation which does not “depend for [its] existence on the law of the locus of the immovable property”, then the Moçambique rule does not bar the taking of jurisdiction. This principle, based on old English Chancery cases but applied in more recent times, permits the taking of jurisdiction and making of orders requiring steps to be taken in relation to foreign land where the claim is based on a personal obligation incurred by the defendant, arising from, for example, a breach of contract, fraud, trust or other equitable obligation. The jurisdiction to order ancillary relief following divorce also extends to foreign land. It has been said that the court will not take jurisdiction under this exception if the courts of the situs would prohibit enforcement or the forum court cannot effectively supervise execution. It is suggested, however, that these are matters of degree which are best regarded as going to the existence of the forum conveniens discretion and that if the Hong Kong court has effective personal jurisdiction over the defendant then the attitude of the foreign court ought not to be relevant. It should also be noted that Anton Piller orders (i.e. civil orders for the search of premises and seizure of evidence) may be made on this basis.

2. Administration cases. It appears that the rule has no application to questions arising in connection with the administration of estates or trusts …

3. Where the issue as title over foreign land only arises incidentally. In Moçambique itself, Lord Herschell said, in a much discussed dictum, that:

“It is quite true that in the exercise of the undoubted jurisdiction of the courts it may become necessary incidentally to investigate and determine the title to foreign lands, but it does not seem to me to follow that because such a question may incidentally arise and fall to be adjudicated upon the courts possess, or that it is expedient that they should exercise, jurisdiction to try an action founded on a disputed claim of title to foreign lands.”

It has been said in the English Court of Appeal that this means “that it is the action founded on a disputed claim of title to foreign lands over which an English court has no jurisdiction and that where no question of title arises, or only arises as a collateral incident of the trial of other issues there is nothing to exclude the jurisdiction”, and on that basis the court held that it had jurisdiction to allow a claim to recover rent under a lease of foreign land. The precise limits of the principle have not been explored in Hong Kong, and not fully explored elsewhere.

4. Waiver. Although it may be said that it is impossible to confer jurisdiction which the court does not have by way of agreement, waiver or estoppels, the applicability of that rule is somewhat questionable in the conflicts context and essentially depends on how one views the true nature of the rule. In the absence of any substantial reason to refuse to give effect to an agreement or waiver or estoppels, it is suggested that the court may take jurisdiction on such a basis where the facts justify it: indeed, the taking of jurisdiction in such circumstances may be regarded as falling within the exception based upon personal obligations discussed above.”  

29.  While the decision in British South Africa v Companhia deMoçambique was based exclusively on the historical development of the circumstances in which a court in England would take jurisdiction to hear any matter, as can be seen below it has been criticised that the exceptions to this rule are not very well defined, and that the rule itself has actually been abolished in some other jurisdictions of the common law such as New South Wales via its Jurisdiction of Courts (Foreign Land) Act 1989 (NSW).

30.  In 1978 in the case of Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Muftizade [1979] AC 508 when the House of Lords was asked to depart from the Moçambique rule, it was conceded by Lord Fraser that the result might be that the plaintiff would be left without a remedy, that it was difficult to justify the rule except on historical grounds, and that it was neither logical nor satisfactory in the result (pp. 543-544), but the House declined to overrule the 1893 decision and it is revealing to consider the reasons given by Lord Wilberforce cited in Johnston at §4.042:

“First, the rule is accepted, with differing degrees of force and emphasis in other jurisdictions of the common law …

Secondly the nature of the rule itself, involving, as it clearly must, possible conflict with foreign jurisdictions, and the possible entry into and involvement with political questions of some delicacy, does not favour revision (assuming such to be logically desirable) by judicial decision, but rather by legislation…

Thirdly, revision of the rule may necessitate consequential changes in the law. In order to prevent ‘forum shopping’ and overlapping, one such change would have to relate to ‘forum non conveniens’, a principle not yet fully developed in England… and, if English courts were to be given an extended jurisdiction, requiring legislative definition.

Fourthly, it cannot be said that since 1893 there has been such a change of circumstances as to justify this House in changing the rule…”

31.   How then would these objections apply to present-day Hong Kong law? Johnston made the following observations at §4.043:

“Applying these four objections to present-day Hong Kong law, it may be noted, with reference to the first point, that the rule has been qualified in, inter alia, England since 1978; with reference to the second and third points, that the doctrine of forum conveniens is now well established and, it is suggested, well able to cope with potential comity problems; cases concerning immovable property are not, it is suggested, in some uniquely difficult category requiring a blanket exclusionary rule. As to the fourth objection, the House of Lords in 1893 nor 1978 was, of course, considering circumstances in England, not Hong Kong; notwithstanding the Court of Final Appeal’s usual adherence even after 1997 to English authority, it is suggested that this may be one of those rare cases in which there is good reason to depart from English case law. That is certainly not to say that jurisdiction should be taken lightly in cases where the essential dispute concerns title to foreign land: that will often be a very powerful factor weighing in favour of exercising the discretion so as to decline to exercise Hong Kong jurisdiction. Nevertheless, rather than continue to approach the matter by way of technical and unsatisfactory exceptions, it seems best, as in virtually every other legal context, to approach the matter in a less legalistic manner, by the application of the doctrine of forum conveniens. To allow the matter to continue to be governed in Hong Kong by, in effect, the historical procedural distinction between “local” and “transitory” actions and venues would be as unattractive as what was described, in a different context, as “the forms of action successfully clanking their special chains.” Lord Mansfield’s view that there was no exclusionary rule seems much more attractive in modern times than its rejection by later English judges in the intervening years.”

32.   It seems to me that it has now been accepted that the conventional justification for the Moçambique rule is a practical one, for the reason that only the court of the situs can make an effective order or decree regarding foreign land, as it was not possible for an English court to enforce its decree as to title or possession of foreign land, therefore it ought not to embark upon a futile exercise. The justification for this principle has however been described as unconvincing, as can be seen below, that there has been greater readiness of courts to recognise judgments of foreign courts as reflected in the practice of private international law throughout the world since that 1893 decision, and that there is a growing belief that the rule no longer has any justification due to the recent development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens which provides a basis for a local court to decline jurisdiction where a foreign court is the more natural and appropriate forum, which has led to reform in jurisdictions such as UK where the rule was partially abrogated by s 30(1) of the Civil Jurisdictions and Judgments Act 1982, and abolished in New South Wales.

33.  In the New South WalesLaw Reform Commission Report 63(1988) – Jurisdiction of Local Courts Over Foreign Land which proposed reform to the Moçambique rule and which led to its eventual abrogation, it noted that in relation to the denial of jurisdiction in actions for damages for trespass or other torts concerning foreign land, the rule has evoked universal criticism throughout the common law world (para 6.1), and identified 4 heads under which criticisms of this part of the rule could be grouped, namely that the rule was an anachronism, having as its foundation the assumption that jurors must have personal knowledge of the facts in issue, with the rule remaining in effect long after the requirement had been dispensed with, that the law relating to jurisdiction has changed so much since the Moçambique rule that it was said in UK that it may be dangerous to rely on the case, and that the obsolescence of the historical underpinnings to the action have not been accepted as a basis for avoiding the rule in Australia, while some courts in the United States had regarded the limitations imposed by the rule as the product of ancient legal fictions which should not bind contemporary courts (paras 6.3 – 6.4).

34.  The second related head of criticism of the rule by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission was that it creates anomalies and arbitrary distinctions because it arose out of judicial development over centuries which did not always form a coherent whole, as pointed out by the Commission to proceedings between an original lessee and the assignee of the reversion constituting a transitory action, but proceedings between the original reversioner and the assignee of the lessee constituting a local action, and that anomalies were in fact admitted by Fry J in the Moçambique case that if a plaintiff brings an action for damages to foreign land, his chattels situate thereon, and his person. The court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate in relation to damage to chattels and person, but not to the land. Hence it noted that the distinction between local and transitory actions had been described as outmoded and analytically dubious and shrouded in mystery (paras 6.5-6.8).

35.  The third head of criticism was that the Moçambique rule may cause injustice by denying a person any effective remedy for a wrong done to property which he or she owns overseas, and that if the wrongdoer has no assets located in the country in which he or she committed the trespass or negligence then, although the courts of that country may assert jurisdiction over the wrongdoer, that exercise of jurisdiction may well not be recognised by the courts of the country in which the assets are located, and any judgment given cannot be satisfied, while the courts of the country in which the defendant’s assets are situated will not, however, themselves take jurisdiction to hear the action by reason of the rule (para 6.9).

36.  The fourth head of criticism was that the rule was illogical as, for example, the exception to the rule to enforce a contract or equity between litigants was justified on the basis that the court was only acting in personam; yet if jurisdiction were also extended to hear an action in tort for damage done to foreign land, any consequent judgment in the plaintiff’s favour would only operate on a personal level, being made against the defendant personally and satisfied out of such of his assets as are located within the country’s territory. The jurisdiction for the common law’s refusal to accept jurisdiction was, it noted, therefore difficult to maintain (para 6.10).    

37.  In so far as the Moçambique decision is authority for the proposition that a court in one country will not entertain an action to determine title to, or the right to possession of foreign land due to recognition of the lex situs only being capable of making an effective decree, the Commission noted that it had not been subject to much criticism either academic or judicial, but did not think this justify the present state of the law, and objected to the rule extending beyond the seeking of a decree regarding ownership of land, to a decree which was connected with foreign land but could be effected by an order binding the defendant personally, and not requiring execution against the foreign land (paras 6.11-6.13).

38.  It is in fact instructive to note the following criticisms of the rule as to title by the Commission as lacking clarity in the law as well as causing unnecessary expense and delay:

“A. Lack of Clarity in the Law

6.14 It has been explained above …, based on the decisions in Penn v Lord Baltimore and Lord Cranstownb v Johnston the court in its equitable jurisdiction has the power to make an order, directed to the defendant personally, the effect of which may well impinge on the title to, or right to possession of, foreign land. But it has also been pointed out that this exception to the Moçambique rule depends upon there being an “equity” between the litigants. The lack of clarity in the law arises from the fact that the circumstances for the fulfilment of this condition are difficult to determine. As dicey and Morris point out, if “A agrees to sell foreign land to B, and instead conveys the land to C, who has notice of the contract, C is [for those purposes] a stranger to the equity” and the equitable exception does not apply. However, “if a company creates an equitable charge on land in favour of debenture-holders, and sells the land to a purchaser subject to the mortgage lien or charge now subsisting, and the purchaser expressly undertakes to pay the debentures and interest, the court has jurisdiction to entertain an action by the debenture-holders against the purchaser”. The authors go on to observe that the distinction between those two situations is tenuous and difficult to reconcile with equitable doctrines of constructive notice.

6.15 A further example of lack of clarity in the law relates to the exception to the Moçambique rule created in relation to the administration of deceased estates …

6.16 A final example in this general category is the decision of Woodward J, in Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia … In that case, the Judge himself accepted that his conclusion was anomalous, because of the fact that the denial of jurisdiction depended on the way in which, and the party by whom, proceedings were instituted, and not on the nature or substance of the plaintiffs claim.

6.17 If the Moçambique rule were to be abolished in its entirety, the courts would no longer be required to come to somewhat artificial conclusions as to whether the plaintiff’s action fell on one side or the other of a “jurisdictional line”, but would need only to determine whether their court was the appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute, applying the notions of forum nonconveniens discussed below …

B. Unnecessary Expense and Delay

6.18 The principal situation in which the application of the Moçambique rule may lead to unnecessary expense and delay (and perhaps even to a denial of justice) relates to application for relief under the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) …”

39.  At the conclusion of the report the Commission made the following recommendations:

“8.1 It is recommended that the jurisdiction, not only of the Supreme Court of New South Wales but of all other courts in the State, be extended so that those courts have the power to hear and determine a matter, even though that matter relates to or may otherwise concern land outside the State.

8.2 The above recommendation is subject to the condition that courts in the State should exercise that jurisdiction only if the court is of the view, in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, that it is the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the matters in dispute.

8.3 It is further recommended that the Family Provision Act 1982 be amended so as to make it clear that, in an application under that Act, the court may have regard to land or other immovable property outside New South Wales owned by the deceased at the date of his or her death.”

40.  As noted above, following this report the Moçambique limitation to jurisdiction was removed by the Jurisdiction of Courts (Foreign Land) Act 1989 (NSW) which came into operation in 1990 in New South Wales.

41.  Despite being subject to much curial and academic criticisms the rule has remained in existence in various jurisdictions, mainly due to judicial adherence to stare decisis, and it must also be accepted, as pointed out in its report, the NSW Law Reform Commission never suggested that a court in New South Wales should determine matters which would entail it making orders as to the title to foreign land for reasons of convenience and comity.

42.  That point of comity, submitted by Mr Coleman for the Father, is obvious in the present case as no order of the Hong Kong court could possibly bindthe PRC or Wuhan land registry to replace the Husband’s name with that of the Father on the certificates of ownership of those properties, which is the relief sought by the Father in the PRC Action, except by order of the PRC court.

43.  That question of title to immovable property, Mr Coleman submits, is necessarily one of in rem jurisdiction, which is the basis on which the PRC Action proceeds as well as the freezing order by the PRC Court, there is therefore no question but that the Moçambique rule applies, and given the material obligation as to title is the personal obligation between Husband and Father in which the Wife has no role to play, it is submitted that she simply fails to fall within the 1st exception of the rule.

44.   Ms Yip however argues for the Wife that it is plainly wrong to say that Hong Kong court does not have jurisdiction to determine the disputes concerning title to or interest in those PRC properties which are all registered in the Husband’s name and against which the Wife has a legitimate claim in her ancillary relief application, as section 6 of Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (“MPPO”) expressly empowers the court to make a settlement of property order without any limitation as its jurisdiction to only deal with properties situated in Hong Kong.

45.   It is also trite, Ms Yip submits, that Hong Kong court exercises an in personam jurisdiction over the parties namely Husband, Wife and Father because there is an issue in the Wife’s ancillary relief claim as to whether those properties over which the court can exercise dispositive power under section 6 belong to the Husband or the Father, and where TL v ML supra specifically provided for the procedures to deal with this kind of dispute involving a party not privy to the marriage which does not alter the substantive jurisdiction.

46.   There is no question in my mind that, as pointed out by Mr Coleman, the TL v ML procedure is invoked because the subject-matter of the intervener proceedings is different from the subject-matter of the parties’ matrimonial proceedings, and that but for the convenience of adopting the TL v ML procedure in the parties’ matrimonial proceedings, the subject-matter of the intervener proceedings would certainly fall to be dealt with in wholly different proceedings, and that would indeed be in PRC for those properties in Wuhan, where the Father is clearly permanent resident and is in my view therefore entitled as of right to litigate his case over those properties in Wuhan.

47.   Ms Yip however argues that the Wife’s case clearly falls within the 1st exception of the Moçambique rule where her claim is based upon a personal obligation arising between the parties, and hence it is difficult to see why our Family Court’s in personam jurisdiction does not govern that personal obligation of the Husband.

48.   Ms Yip in fact further submits that the 3rd exception also applies where the issue as to title over foreign land only arises incidentally, as it was the Husband’s case first stated in his Form E that he acquired those properties subject to loans from the Father, and then he switched his case in his 6th Affirmation by claiming to hold those properties on trust for the Father, while the latter’s Skeleton Argument suggests what he sought in the PRC Action is a restitution/recovery of those properties for the Husband’s breach of his nominee’s obligation, hence on either of their case the alleged dispute as to the title over the properties only arises incidentally from the underlying dispute. None of the above claims over properties, Ms Yip therefore submits, invokes the in rem jurisdiction of the court, but instead the in personam jurisdiction.

49.  On that point Ms Yip relies on the European Convention case of Webb v Webb [1994] C-294/92, [1994] ECR 1-1717 where a son was the sole legal owner of land in France, the purchase price of which had been paid by his father who then sought a declaration from the English court that the son held the flat on trust for him and that he should convey the title to the flat to him. The son claimed that, by virtue of the Convention, the case could only be heard in France. The ECJ rejected his submission, holding that a Convention action for a declaration that a person holds immovable property as a trustee and for an order requiring that person to execute such documents as are required to vest legal ownership under the lex situs in the plaintiff does not involve rights in rem within the meaning of Article 16(1), and that it was irrelevant that the plaintiff wanted to obtain ownership of an immovable; what is important is whether rights in rem are the object of the proceedings. Since the plaintiff did not claim that he already enjoyed rights directly relating to the property which were enforceable as against the whole world, but sought only to assert rights against the defendant, it was held that the action was not a right in rem within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the 1968 Brussels Convention, but an action in personam.

50.  Similarly in the present case, the Father’s claim in the PRC Action against the Husband as stated in his Skeleton Argument came about as a result of the Husband’s breaches of certain personal obligations under a nominee agreement and the Father’s assertion of ownership rights over the Wuhan Properties, with the questions of nominee or equitable obligations and trust between them for determination by the PRC Court, which seems true to me an action involving rights in personam rather than in rem, thereby putting the Wife’s case within the exceptions from the Moçambique rule.

51.   In any event, Ms Yip argues, exception can in fact be found in this case, as a salient feature should be noted in First Laser that the plaintiff did take part in the Fujian action that was being complained of and there was no suggestion that the Fujian proceedings had been conducted unfairly against the plaintiff, which was one of the main reasons why the learned judge refused the application, but she submits is totally different from the present case where the Wife takes no part in the PRC Action, as she was deliberately kept in the dark from day one up until now.

52.   Henceforth, Ms Yip submits, without the anti-suit injunction, the Wife’s interest would be seriously jeopardised if a PRC judgment is obtained by the Father, as there is a real possibility that it may be recognised by the Hong Kong court which would no doubt prejudice the Wife, of which this court is bound to take into account when balancing the convenience of the matter.

53.   Ms Yip argues that as a result of their deliberate effort to conceal the PRC proceedings by the Father and Husband, together with the delay in providing full and frank disclosure by the Husband, and in the absence of any affidavit evidence from the Father, the Wife has little information of the nature and progress of the PRC proceedings in which she may not be allowed to join, nor the means to litigate in 2 fronts given the Husband’s failure to even comply with the earlier maintenance pending suit order.

54.   Furthermore, Ms Yip argues, neither the Father nor Husband has taken out any application to stay the Hong Kong proceedings on grounds that Hong Kong has no jurisdiction, and instead the Husband, armed with his non-disclosure of the PRC proceedings, actively applied to join his parents as interveners in these proceedings, while the Father, also armed with the non-disclosure of the PRC proceedings, agreed to be so joined to determine the preliminary issue of ownership over those properties, hence the clear inference, Ms Yip submits, must be that they wanted to expose the Wife to 2 fronts, which bears the greatest emotional and financial pressure on her which cannot be right or fair in the circumstances, and the balance of convenience must lie in her favour.   

55.   Of all the cases cited above where the issues were raised over forum non conveniens or jurisdiction and as a result anti-suit injunction was being sought, both the plaintiff and defendant were the same parties in the two sets of proceedings in the competing jurisdictions, and hence if the local court refused to grant the anti-suit injunction on question of forum or policy with respect to comity, the plaintiff could still rely on the foreign court to properly adjudicate and resolve the dispute unless its assumption of jurisdiction is said to be inequitable, or that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive, or that jurisdiction should be exercised when the ends of justice requires it : see Societe Aerospatiale above

56.   In the present case, the Wife was not a party to the PRC Action of which she had no prior knowledge or notice, and as asserted by the Father that it was a case which could be determined without her involvement at all, as made plain by the progress of the PRC Action, it begs the obvious question so central to the whole issue now before me: What exactly is the dispute between Father and Husband that was required to be determined by the PRC Court in the PRC Action?

57.   It is plain that their case over the Wuhan Properties is the same – that they all belong to the Father, as clearly evidenced by the Husband’s Form E and his subsequent various affirmations, as well as the Father’s only affirmation filed on 12th October 2015 after being joined as an intervener to the preliminary issue, in which he disclosed essentially the same arrangements he claimed to have made with the Husband over those properties but never any explanation or reason which led him to bring the PRC Action against his son, which justifies the Wife’s serious concern that the PRC Action would not be fought or defended by the Husband and that it would just be a formality for a judgment to be entered in favour of the Father by the PRC Court.

58.    The clear inference must therefore be that they wanted to use the PRC Action, not only to expose the Wife to two fronts as submitted by Ms Yip, but more precariously in that the Father would be in a position to dispose of the Wuhan properties beyond the reach of the Wife’s claims or whatever award she may obtain from this court in her ancillary relief application against the Husband, as it has all along been her grave suspicions that he and his family would gang up against her in the divorce proceedings, and with valid basis as I have found in my earlier judgment on her application for maintenance pending suit. That must in my view be the main thrust of her application for anti-suit injunction upon the underlying principle that jurisdiction should be exercised to avoid injustice, in this case to the Wife and the mother of 2 small children in her divorce proceedings.

59.   While Hong Kong courts may not appear to be the most natural or proper forum for the determination of title to those Wuhan properties as submitted by Mr Coleman, that issue had never been raised by either Father or Husband until this application, let alone to properly argue it, not to mention the fact that it was the Husband who applied to join the Father to this court for the determination of essentially the same subject-dispute in the PRC Action, and which as noted above was not opposed by the Father who appears to have submitted to this jurisdiction by filing his affirmation setting out his case. Which brings me back to essentially the same question as above: What is there for father and son to dispute about in the PRC Action, and after the interveners proceedings in this court, why brought similar action in PRC? There is simply no answer from either Father or Husband.

60.   Given the evidently close relationship between Father and Husband and the unquestioned supports, financial and otherwise, from both his mother and sister shown throughout these proceedings to fight the Wife in almost every step of the way as I have found in my earlier decisions on the respective hearings of custody and maintenance pending suit, the order for the latter of which the Husband has never complied with and, as I understand, that he has since withdrawn all financial support for the Wife as well as chosen to remain outside the jurisdiction, all of which just go to support the Wife’s argument that the PRC Action is part of the Husband’s concerted efforts with his family to put his assets beyond her claims.

Material Non-Disclosure

61.   As for the Father’s allegation of significant non-disclosure by the Wife when applying for the anti-suit injunction, as set out in Mr Coleman’s Skeleton Argument and namely (1) the extreme rarity of worldwide anti-enforcement injunction, (2) the effect of PRC judgment in Hong Kong proceedings, and (3) the Wife’s attempts or steps towards intervening as party to, or to obtain a stay of, the PRC Action, of which Mr Coleman submits that the Wife had failed to properly identify to the court the true effect of the injunction sought, or failed to raise all material matters to that effect including points which could be made in opposition to the application and its intended effect, such as information which would identify that the PRC Action is likely to achieve the opposite of the “purpose of frustrating or obstructing” the Hong Kong court.

62.   As for the last point on the Wife’s failure to tell the court that she had taken steps to join in or to obtain a stay of the PRC Action, Mr Coleman submits that this was highly material non-disclosure in circumstances where the law identifies that an application for an anti-suit injunction should usually first make an application for relief in the foreign action.

63.   For the first two non-disclosures on law, Ms Yip argues that at the time of her ex-parte application, the issue of enforcement of PRC judgment simply did not arise, as the Wife did not even know the progress of the PRC proceedings, she cannot be guilty of materially non-disclosing something she was not aware of, hence that allegation is entirely groundless.

64.   The Wife also denies the third allegation that she has failed to disclose her attempts to intervene as a party to, or to obtain a stay of, the PRC proceedings, as it is submitted that she has clearly in her 12th Affirmation disclosed that she had attempted to approach a PRC lawyer for assistance but has been unable to join in the proceedings, and hence she argues that there is no material non-disclosure on her part, or that any matters not disclosed are not material to the court’s consideration of her application.

65.   I agree that the first two points are directly relevant to comity of which submission could be made at the hearing of the application, and were indeed made, rather than in the Wife’s supportive affirmation which in the main dealt with evidence only. As for the third point, clearly the Wife’s failure or inability to join in or stay the PRC Action was the very reason for her application now before me, and I fail to see how that fact if not disclosed in her affirmation could be regarded as material non-disclosure, unlike a case when having joined in the PRC Action she chose not to disclose it in her present application which would certainly be said to be material non-disclosure.

Conclusion

66.  There is no question that the marital assets of the parties should be preserved pending the determination of their financial dispute, and that must include all those landed properties under the Husband’s sole name whether within or without the jurisdiction, for the purpose of not just to protect their right and interests over them but also their children’s needs to be met by those marital assets of their parents.   

67.  Given the background of these proceedings and the way the litigation has been conducted by the Husband and supported by his family, I agree that the Wife has every reason to be concerned by the outcome of the PRC Action which may leave her and the children in a seriously precarious position without any financial security under the circumstances and rendering any financial order granted by this court futile and meaningless, thereby defeating the underlying objective of achieving justice between the parties in their financial dispute or to safeguard their children’s welfare and interests.

68.  In the premises there is no doubt in my judgment that jurisdiction should be exercised in favour of the Wife’s anti-suit application to avoid any injustice which may result from the PRC Action, and in view of the many criticisms which have been levelled at a rule clearly based on historical procedural development of a decision made more than a century ago which has since been wholly or partially abrogated in other common law jurisdictions, and given the lack of direct authority of its application in Hong Kong and its questionable relevancy to our present-day law, I am inclined to echo Johnston’s observation that it would indeed be more attractive that there be no exclusionary rule at all, and thus leaving our courts the discretion as to whether jurisdiction should be exercised on the doctrine of forum conveniens.

69.  If there is indeed an issue on forum, it was not raised before and should be properly argued if necessary between Father and Wife, but there can be no dispute to the fact that the Father has already agreed to intervene in this court in the preliminary issue over those properties in dispute and has filed his affirmation evidence for that purpose, and hence can be said to have submitted to this jurisdiction in respect of the dispute over those properties.

70.  On the other hand and as noted above, I accept that it is the Father’s right as a Wuhan resident to litigate his dispute over those properties situate in Wuhan in the PRC Action, and given the current state of that action where the trial appears to have already taken place, and that with respect to the point of comity between the two jurisdictions, I do not propose to restrain the Father from continuing with the PRC Action for the determination as to title to those properties, but for all the reasons articulated above and in the underlying principle of doing what is just and practical to instead restrain him from dealing with or disposing of any of those properties in the event that the PRC Action concludes in his favour, pending the determination of the preliminary issue by this court.

71.  My order is therefore as follows:

(1) The 1st Intervener (Father) whether by himself, his servants, agents or otherwise in his personal capacity or in the capacity of an officer, servant or agent of the Intervener be restrained from dealing with or disposing any of those properties in which the PRC Action may find or conclude in his favour pending the determination of the preliminary issue by this court unless with leave;

(2) Costs reserved and to be dealt with at the preliminary issue trial;

(3) Liberty to apply. 

72.  Last by not least, I wish to express my gratitude to counsel for both sides for their valuable assistance rendered to this court on such short notice and difficult circumstances.    

( Bruno Chan )
District Judge

Ms Anita Yip SC with Ms Lily Yu instructed by M/S Chaine, Chow &

Barbara Hung for the Petitioner.

Ms Bonnie Leung of M/S Wat & Co for the Respondent.

Mr Russell Coleman SC instructed by M/S Withers for the Interveners.

100750-EN-2015-09-21

DX v. LN

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          FCMC No. 7870/2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 7870 OF 2014

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 DXPetitioner
 and 
 LNRespondent

----------------------------

Before : HH Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers.
Date of Hearing : 25 August 2015.
Date of Judgment : 21 September 2015.

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JUDGMENT
(Maintenance Pending Suit & Costs Provision)

----------------------------

1. This is the Petitioner Wife’s application by way of a summons issued on 22nd April 2015 for maintenance pending suit of HK$142,000 per month or such reasonable sum as the courts deems fit for herself and the 2 children of the family whose care and control have been granted to her after a 5-days trial earlier this year, and by a second summons issued 2 months later on 26th June 2015 for provision of her legal costs at HK$200,000 per month from the Respondent Husband pending the final determination of the question of ancillary relief, which now appears not to be anytime soon given that preliminary issue have just been raised over the beneficial ownership of various landed properties currently held in the Husband’s name but which he claims to be beneficially owned either by his father or by both of his parents.    

2. At the returned hearing of the Wife’s said summons for maintenance pending suit on 22nd April 2015 which had to be adjourned for argument, I made an order for the Husband to pay what he then offered of HK$35,000 per month as interim maintenance pending the determination of that application which is now before me, but which he now claims he cannot afford and proposes that amount be further reduced to HK$20,000 per month due to his deteriorating financial situation after allegedly being cut-off by his father financially whom he had always relied on but has since fallen out with him as a result of the breakdown of his marriage and the Wife’s present divorce proceedings.

3. This is of course not acceptable to the Wife who believes that the Husband has ample financial resources to meet her urgent needs, but that he and his family have now ganged up against her by presenting such false pictures of his financial situation to mislead the court and to defeat her financial claims against him.      

The Background

4. The background of the case had already been set out in my earlier judgment of 19th June 2015 on the trial of the care and control of the children, and I do not propose to recite them here save for those details especially financial aspects which are relevant to the matter now before me.

5. The Wife is now aged 30 and a full-time housewife, while the Husband aged 37 is a businessman working in his father’s business in Wuhan, which is where the parties were born and raised, with the Wife being the only child of her now divorced parents, and the Husband the only son with a younger sister of a rather well-off family with substantial business interests including real estate in Wuhan.

6. In 1995 the Husband and his family came to settle in Hong Kong, from where he then went to Australia for further studies before returning in 2003 to work in his father’s business, spending most of his time in Wuhan where he met the Wife who was then just fresh out of university, and subsequently married her on 27th November 2006 in Hong Kong.

7. After marriage the parties made their home initially in Wuhan where the Husband continued to work in his father’s business, of which it is not in dispute that he was being groomed to eventually take over, while the Wife never worked and was a full-time housewife.      

8. 0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:0cm'>8.     In about 2010 when the Wife became pregnant the parties relocated to Hong Kong where their elder son WL was subsequently born on 16th August 2010. The parties then made their home in a 2,100 sq ft property at Harbourfront, Hung Hum while the Husband would shuttle between Hong Kong and Wuhan for his father’s business. By then the Husband’s mother has also come to stay with the parties, while his sister who is married to a Hong Kong resident also lives with their own children in the same neighbourhood.      

9. On 22nd July 2012 the Wife gave birth to their younger son SF. By then the parties had 3 domestic helpers in their household with 2 of them to assist in the care of their children and the 3rd helper for the household chores, while the mother also from time to time helped out with the care of the children.   

10. In about Christmas 2012 the Wife suspected the Husband was having an affair with another woman in Wuhan and, after a heated confrontation with him, she suffered an emotional breakdown and left Hong Kong on 3rd January 2013 to return to her mother’s home in Wuhan where she met and told the Husband’s father of the extra-marital affair. On 10th January 2013 she returned to the former matrimonial home in Hong Kong when the parties appeared to have reconciled.

11. However, during their trip to Wuhan in early February 2013 for the Chinese New Year, the Wife became suspicious that the Husband was still carrying on with his extra-marital affair and therefore left Wuhan to return to Hong Kong by herself. A few days later she decided to separate from the Husband and moved out of the matrimonial home after removing her jewellery and some gold bars from the safe deposit box and withdrawing about HK$3.2 million in cash from her own bank accounts as well as their joint account to return to her mother’s home in Wuhan where she received treatments for emotion trauma.

12. For the following year or so the Wife return to Hong Kong on various occasions to stay or spend time with the children, and eventually in February 2014 she rented a 650 sq ft serviced apartment in Hung Hum near the former matrimonial home for herself and the elder boy WL as the younger boy SF was then still remaining in the former matrimonial home under the care of the Husband with the assistance of his mother.

13. On 21st February 2014 the Wife launched these proceedings against the Husband for divorce, custody care and control of their 2 children as well as general ancillary relief for herself and the children. While the Husband agreed that their marriage was indeed at an end, for which the decree nisi of divorce has since been granted, and that the parties should have joint custody of their children, the question of their care and control was strenuously contested, and as noted above after a 5-days trial the Wife was granted the care and control of both children on 19th June 2015, and as a result the younger boy SF has since August 2015 also come to reside with her and the elder boy WL at her rented apartment.

14. It was during that trial on 22nd April 2015 when the Wife claimed to have almost exhausted all her funds that she found it necessary to apply for maintenance pending suit, and that the Husband offered to pay HK$35,000 per month which the Wife found to be wholly inadequate but nevertheless accepted on interim basis pending determination of her maintenance pending application issued on the same day.

15. By then the parties had of course already filed their respective Form E back in May 2014, in which the Husband claimed to work as a consultant for a company in Wuhan presumably owned by his father and earning a monthly salary of only HK$15,000, with an even smaller monthly expenditure of HK$14,100 with virtually no household expenses and essentially just for his meals out of home and entertainments and holidays for himself and the children, while being the registered legal owner of the said matrimonial home at Harbourfront and several properties in Wuhan (“Wuhan Properties”) the total value of which he put at HK$82 million but which he also qualified as being held on trust for his fatehr, and with bank savings of almost HK$750,000 and personal items worth more than HK$3 million including 3 vehicles [A1/15 - 40].

16. In her Form E [A1/98 – 125] the Wife confirmed to be a housewife without any income or past employment experience, that she had about HK$1.2 million in savings left of the HK$3.2 million which she earlier withdrew in 2013, and a property in Wuhan worth about HK$1.7 million, but had a monthly expenditure as much as HK$140,000 for herself and the elder boy WL including rental of HK$19,200 for her current apartment. She also gave a detailed account of how she had spent the HK$3.2 million essentially on her living expenses over the past 2 years and her legal costs incurred in these proceedings, leaving her with only about a third of the money left at the time of her Form E.

17. In support of her present application for maintenance pending suit, the Wife filed her 8th Affirmation on 22nd April 2015 [A3/606] to update her cash position which she claimed to be virtually nil and that she has been relying on borrowed moneys from her relatives close to HK$1 million so far to meet her daily needs and those of the 2 children as well as her legal costs, and that she now has an urgent needs of HK$142,000 per month for her current living expenses pending the determination of her ancillary relief claims.

18.  0pt;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm; margin-left:0cm;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph; text-indent:0cm'>18.     Apparently for the same reasons the Wife issued another summons on 26th June 2015 for litigation costs allowance to be included as part of her maintenance pending suit application to be heard together, and in her 9th Affirmation [A3/666] in support she claimed to require HK$675,000 for counsel fees up to FDR hearing, plus solicitors’ costs which she claimed to have spent on average about HK$64,000 per month in the past.    

19. In response the Husband filed his 5th Affirmation of 22nd July 2015 [A4/896] in which he took issue with the Wife’s allegation that she has exhausted all her savings, and insisted that as he was merely earning a monthly salary of only HK$15,000, he was all along during the marriage largely relying on his father to support himself and the family in that all their daily expenses were met by the monthly rental income of more than RMB300,000 from the Wuhan Properties beneficially owned by his father, but that since January 2013 after the Wife told his father of his extra-marital affair, he was no longer authorized by his father to use the rental income, and with only about HK$320,000 left in his savings, he has in fact also been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his expenses including his legal costs which had been paid by his sister of more than HK$3.4 million. He concluded his said affirmation by praying that he be allowed to reduce his interim maintenance for the Wife from HK$35,000 to HK$20,000 per month in view of his present predicament.

20. About a month later on 18th August 2015 the Husband issued a summons to join his parents as parties to these proceedings for the sole purpose of determining the beneficial ownership of the former matrimonial home at Harbourfront and those Wuhan Properties as a preliminary issue before the Wife was to proceed with her ancillary relief application, as he now formally claims, as he did in his supportive 6th Affirmation of the same date, that these properties have all along been held by him on trust for his father and/or mother, which summons was returnable on the same date of the Wife’s maintenance pending suit application, and an order was therefore made by this court on that day without argument for the parents to be so joined with the usual directions to file their affirmations in due course.      

21. Meanwhile given the huge gulf between the parties as to their respective proposal the Wife’s maintenance pending suit application was argued before me on 25th August 2015 by Ms Anita Yip SC for the Wife and Mr Jeremy Chan for the Husband, and typical of applications of this sort there were no oral evidence from the parties and their arguments were essentially made on the basis of their affirmations before the court. 

22. Before proceeding to consider such arguments and affirmation evidence of the parties, however, it would be helpful to first set out the legal principles applicable to such application as follows.

Applicable Legal Principles

23. The power to order maintenance pending suit is set out in s 3 of Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (MPPO) whereby the court may order a party to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance and for such term beginning not earlier than the date of the presentation of the petition and ending on the date of the determination of the suit, as the court thinks reasonable.

24. It is clear that under this provision there is no power to make an order for an interim lump sum or an interim order for sale or transfer of property, but otherwise the court has an unfettered discretion in the matter subject to the result being reasonable: F v F (maintenance pending suit) (1983) 4 FLR 382.

25. As for the matters which the court should consider in assessing an application for maintenance pending suit, Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and FamilyMatters, 18th Edition, said these as follows:

“16.17. … There is no hard and fast rule, and no fixed proportion: each case depends on its own facts. It has been said that the approach to maintenance pending suit should be empirical, and that ‘in the ordinary sort of case the district judges who deal with these applications will have to take a broad view of means on the one hand and income on the other and come to a “rough and ready” conclusion’, or take a ‘broad brush’ approach. The overriding consideration is the actual needs of the parties pending suit. Although the provisions of s 25 of the MCA 1973 are expressed to arise only when the court is deciding whether to exercise its powers under s 23, 24 or 24A, the court may nonetheless have regard to the criteria listed in s 25 on an application for maintenance pending suit.

16.18. In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non disclosure. However it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay. The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties. Any under provision or over provision in the order for maintenance pending suit can always be corrected when the account comes to be taken at the substantive hearing when there every opportunity to do fairness by set-off…”

26. It is also noteworthy that the Wife in this case has based her reasonable needs on the high standard of living which she claims to have been provided by the Husband during the marriage, and that the Husband himself has in his Form E put the total value of those landed properties registered under his name including the former matrimonial home in excess of HK$80 million. While it remains to be seen whether or not this case would qualify as one of those big money cases specifically mentioned by Thorpe J, as he then was, in F v F (ancillary relief substantial assets), [1966] 2 FCR 307, [1995] 2 FLR 45, it would be helpful to refer to his guidance on the exercise of the court’s discretion in determining the wife’s reasonable needs on an interim basis according to standard of living in big money cases as follows

“I think that it is very important to recognise that in measuring affluence, extravagance and reasonable needs there are no absolutes. All these concepts are comparative … Thus, in determining the wife’s reasonable needs on an interim basis it is important as a matter of principle that the court should endeavour to determine reasonableness according to the standards of the ultra-rich and to avoid the risk of confining them by the application of scales that would seem generous to ordinary people. This I conclude that it would be wrong in principle to determine the application on some broad conclusion that if the wife cannot manage at the rate of a quarter of a million a year, she ought to be able to. I think that it is necessary to establish a yardstick that more nearly reflects the standard of living which has been the norm for the wife ever since marriage and for the husband for considerably longer.”      

27. As the Wife’s present application is not just for her own reasonable needs but also those of the 2 children of the family whose care and control has earlier been granted to her, it would also be relevant to note that s 5 of MPPO gives the court much wider powers in dealing with financial provision for children both in terms of both the time for making orders which is before (hence maintenance pending suit) or on granting the decree of divorce, and the range of orders that the court can make including periodical payment, secured periodical payment, as well as a lump sum for the benefit of the children or for the purpose of enabling any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred by or on behalf of the children before the making of the application, and that the court may exercise such orders from time to time, and to make further orders from time to time.      

28. Furthermore, when considering such application albeit interim on behalf of the children, s 7(2) of MPPO requires the court to exercise those powers as to place the children, so far as it is practicable and just to do so, in the financial position in which the children would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of the parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards them. This would in my view be particularly relevant when the court comes to consider the standard of living which the children used to be able to enjoy and the parties’ proposed financial provisions for them.

29. It is with these principles and guidance in mind that I shall now consider the evidence on the maintenance pending suit, which is as expected essentially from the parties’ relevant affirmations and other materials but without oral evidence, starting with the Wife’s stated needs for herself and the children.      

The Wife’s Needs

30. I propose to deal with the Wife’s needs in terms of living expenses for herself and the children first, with her legal costs provision separately later in this judgment, but whatever my observations and findings made in respect of the parties’ respective financial means and resources when considering the former shall of course also apply to the latter where relevant.

31. Firstly, it is not in dispute that the Wife was throughout the marriage a housewife wholly dependent on the Husband, but that since their separation no maintenance had been paid by him until the said sum of HK$35,000 offered in April 2015, presumably on the basis of her earlier withdrawal of HK$3.2 million. As noted in her Form E when she had only the elder son WL residing with her and under her care, the Wife put their then monthly expenses at just over HK$140,000 being HK$51,900 for her household expenses including HK$19,200 for renting her present apartment, HK$69,300 for her personal expenses, and HK$19,725 for WL’s expenses including his school fees of HK$4,775 which were all along being directly paid for by the Husband [A1/116 – 117].

32. In the same Form E the Wife put the total balance of her 4 disclosed bank accounts at about HK$394,000 but explained that in addition she also had about HK$820,000 left of the HK$3,230,000 which she withdrew in February 2013 and placed with her mother for safe keeping after meeting her living expenses from about February 2013 to May 2014 when she filed her Form E in the total sum of HK$1,308,000 as well as her legal costs [A1 : 109 – 110]. She disclosed no other assets of significant value save for some personal jewellery and an apartment in Wuhan worth about HK$1.7 million.        

33. More than a year down the road since and after a major trial over their children, it is the Wife’s case that she has now run out of all her cash and has to resort to borrowing from her relatives in total loans of some HK$875,000, and hence she requires urgent financial assistance from the Husband, as she explained in her 8th Affirmation [A3/606, 608 – 611] where she gave an itemised breakdown of her immediate needs for herself and the 2 children in paragraph 22 as follows [A3/612 – 614]:

General Household ExpensesHK$
Rent$19,200
Utilities$ 1,700
Food$19,200
Domestic Helper$10,000
Others$  158
 General Household Subtotal :   $56,258
Personal 
Meals out of home$16,000
Transportation$ 3,000
Clothing/Shoes$22,500
Personal Grooming$15,000
Entertainment/presents$ 1,000
Travelling/Holidays$ 2,000
Medical/Dental$ 500
Insurance$ 7,800
Others$ 800
 Personal Subtotal :  $68,600
Children 
School fees (paid directly by Husband)
School books and stationary $ 1,050
Transportation$ 1,180
Medical/Dental$ 2,500
Extra-Curricular Activities$ 2,908
Entertainment/presents$ 1,500
Clothing/Shoes$ 4,000
Travelling/Holidays$ 2,000
Lunches and Supplements$ 1,400
Others$  500
Children Expenses Subtotal : $17,158
 Total : $140,016

34. In support of such claim the Wife also made references to her various Answers to the Husband’s Questionnaire regarding these expenses in Bundle A1/267 – 275. In addition she claims to require a larger 3-bedrooms apartment of about 1,200 sq ft in the same neighbourhood to accommodate the 2 children at a higher rent of about HK$50,000 which would bring her total expenses to HK$172,800 per month, and which Ms Yip submits that the court should use a broad brush to round up to HK$200,000 as there is no reason why the Wife and the children should suffer a significant downgrade and to spend with great caution when it was never the case during the marriage, and that it is all the more so given the plain and clear inference which can be drawn from the evidence that the Husband has access to massive wealth.       

35. Mr Chan for the Husband however submits that, without prejudice to his case as noted above that he no longer has the ability to pay, in the absence of any concrete documentary evidence such as credit cards and bank records as the Wife was allegedly operating only in cash, whatever her actual spending would be matters within only her knowledge, but that she has grossly exaggerated her needs to almost twice as much as her actual spending over the past 2 years.

36. Firstly, Mr Chan submits, it is her own evidence in her said Form E [A1/110] that she spent HK$1,308,000 over the course of 16 months from February 2013 to May 2014 which averaged out to only HK$81,750 per month, and if one were to exclude the month of April 2013 during which her spending was exceptionally high at HK$120,000, then her monthly expenses would come down even further to just HK$79,200 on average.      

37. Elsewhere in her said Answers to his Questionnaire, Mr Chan submits that the figures given by the Wife also produce a much reduced average of her monthly expenses than her present claim, such as the HK$1 million which she claimed to have spent from February 2013 to February 2014 [A1/265] which comes to about HK$83,333 per month on average.

38. Furthermore, Mr Chan submits, in the same Answer the Wife also stated that from February 2013 to February 2014 during the period when she was staying in Wuhan, her average spending amounted to RMB70,000 per month, but as it also included RMB380,000 on hiring a private investigator which should not be treated as part of her living expenses, and hence her actual average expenses would be more like RMB30,000 to RMB40,000 per month, while her monthly average in Hong Kong from March to May in 2014 was actually only HK$60,000, hence the Husband believes that the Wife has grossly exaggerated her claim for HK$140,000 per month in her present application.

39. Mr Chan has cited further examples of what the Husband believes to be exaggerations of the Wife’s claim of HK$36,600 for spending on food including meals out of home which would average to more than HK$1,200 per day and which he argues as wholly excessive for an adult and 2 small children, and similarly it is unreasonable for her to lavish more than HK$38,000 per month on herself in clothing, handbags and other luxurious items at a time when her marriage is coming to an end and she is going through expensive litigation.

40. Based solely on these figures this argument of the Husband may well be valid, as even Ms Yip’s very helpful table in paragraph 72 of her Skeleton Submission which summarises the Wife’s total available cash after payments for her legal costs and private investigator with a balance of HK$2,637,077 to meet her living expenses over 31 months from February 2013 to August 2015 would average to just over HK$85,000, an amount more in the vicinity of the Husband’s figures and far less than her claim of HK$140,000 per month.

41. Ms Yip however submits that it would not be right to just rely on those figures as it is only fair that the court should also look at the parties’ standard of living during the marriage for the determination of maintenance pending suit on what should be the Wife’s reasonable living expenses, when she first in her Form E [A1/120] gave details of the family’s spending pattern during the marriage and later repeated again in her 9th Affirmation as follows [A3/607]:

“4. I am a full-time housewife. During the marriage, the Respondent has been responsible for all the expenses of the family, including expenses of the household, my personal expenses and the children’s expenses. I never had to worry about money.

5. To my understanding, the respondent has a monthly income of about RMB300,000 odd which he would use it for paying the expenses. There was always cash at home (i.e. cash in the range of HK$50,000 to $100,000 or occasionally HK$200,000) which I could freely take when I needed money. I would also use the cash at home for paying the helpers’ salaries and to give them money for buying food. In addition, the Respondent would pay me RMB40,000 each month by transferring the money into my bank account. I also have the use of his supplementary credit card, the limit of which was originally HK$300,000 and was subsequently increased to HK$1 million. I was not required to spend within a budget.

6. Whenever we went out for dinning, shopping or going on holidays, the Respondent would pay for the bills. The Respondent would also buy me handbags, shoes and clothings when we went shopping.”

42. All of these, Ms Yip submits, were however never disputed by the Husband in his subsequent affirmations, and hence it cannot be right for him to now levy severe criticism on her claimed needs. In any event she argues that the Wife has already produced all the documentary evidence that she could including some receipts to support her expenses in her various Answers to the Husband’s Questionnaires, and that a broad brush glance at her figures suggest that they are more than reasonable and cannot be trimmed given the evidence of her spending pattern during the marriage.

43. Indeed the Husband never in his 5th Affirmation, which he specifically stated was made in response to the Wife’s 8th and 9th Affirmations, nor in any of his other affirmations did he try to dispute or challenge her alleged spending pattern during the marriage, and which he could have easily verified one way or the other by producing past records of his own credit cards or of her supplementary cards but which he has chosen not to do so.

44. True or exaggerated, the spending pattern of the family during the marriage must inevitably depend on the Husband’s financial means and resources, albeit essentially at a broad brush glance at this stage but undeniably with abundant materials and information available as a result of extensive discoveries having already taken place between the parties, the evidence of which I propose to consider next.      

The Husband’s Ability to Pay

45. The Husband’s case is that essentially he had all along worked under his father who and his mother used to provide him with various privileges and resources to meet his expenses and those of his family, but that since January 2013 after the Wife had told his father about his extra-marital affair, his financial situation has since changed for the worse as he was no longer allowed to use any of the rental income derived from the Wuhan Properties of some RMB320,000 ( ̴ HK$380,000) per month, and as his monthly salary of HK$15,000 is far from sufficient to meet his needs, he has been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his expenses including the children’s school fees and interim maintenance.

46. In his said 5th Affirmation it is particularly noteworthy of what the Husband stated about his financial reliance on his parents especially his father as follows:

“(3) All along during marriage, the petitioner was well aware that I was largely relying on my father … to support myself, her and our children financially as I am only earning a monthly salary of about HK$15,000.00…the daily expenses of the Petitioner and I are paid for by the rental income derived from a property in Wuhan which is beneficially owned by my father. It is the Petitioner’s practice since 2013 to claim reimbursement of expenditures from my mother with receipts. My father would also assist my finance and arrange to transfer money to my bank accounts when I am in need.

(4) My mother … is a full-time housewife and she relies on my father to support her financially…

(5) The rental income for (4th floor of Wuhan Property) was deposited into my China Construction Bank account … The rental income for (3rd floor of Wuhan Property) was deposited into my HKB account …

(6) It was my father’s instructions to the tenants … that they should pay their rent directly to my said bank accounts. All the said rental income … is in fact beneficially owned by my father.

(7) Upon prior approval by my father, I would withdraw money from my said bank accounts to pay for the daily expenses of the Petitioner and I and the expenses of the family if necessary.

…

(10) However, since in or about January 2013, after the petitioner told my father about my extra-marital relationship as alleged by the petitioner, I was no longer authorized to use any of the rental income including the rental income for (3rd and 4th floor of the Wuhan Property). There is now shown and produced to me a table showing the rental income derived from (3rd and 4th floor of Wuhan Property) enclosing the relevant bank statements …

(11) To further update my current financial position, there is about a total sum of HK$321,483.56 in all my bank accounts according to the latest bank statements that I have …

(12) Apart from the shares that I hold under my HSBC investment account … of a value of HK$6,140.69 as of 16th May 2015, I also hold shares in trust of my aunt and her friend under my securities account at BOCOM International Securities Limited in the sum of about HK$100,000.00 and HK$1,000,000.00 respectively since in or about June 2015 …

…

(15) I have been relying on my mother … and my sister … to pay for my expenses since in or about January 2013. For details, please refer to my Answer to the Petitioner’s Questionnaire.

(16) My sister has already paid a total legal fee of HK$3,443,610.00 to my former solicitors Messrs. Cheung & Choy and the costs on account in the sum of HK$100,000.00 to my current solicitors Messrs. Wat & Co. since in or about March 2014. Out of the loan of RMB2,000,000.00 (HK$2,900,000.00) owed by me to (Sister), (Sister) has paid about a legal fee of HK$400,000.00 to my former solicitors Messrs. Cheung & Choy and my father have on behalf of me repaid her a total sum of about HK$500,000.00 in about 2013 or 2014. There was an additional loan in the total sum of HK$3,143,610.00 (being HK$3,443,610.00 and HK$100,000.00 less HK$400,000.00) owed by me to (Sister) pursuant to the said loan of RMB2,000,000.00 (HK$2,900,000.00) for payment of my legal fees. In early 2015, there was a further loan of about HK$500,000.00 owed by me to (Sister) for payment of my credit card bills. The said additional loan of HK$3,143,610.00 and the said further loan of HK$500,000.00 are repayable on demand and interest free …

(17) I can never pay the petitioner the requested maintenance pending suit in the sum of HK$142,000.00 per month without the financial support from my father. In fact, I have difficulty to pay the interim maintenance of HK$35,000.00 to the Petitioner. My sister … has been paying the HK$35,000.00 interim maintenance to the Petitioner for me since April 2015 …

(18) In paragraph 33 of the said 8th Affirmation of … the Petitioner says that I should have the ability to pay to her the requested maintenance pending suit in the sum of HK$142,000.00 per month partly because I have been travelling to Macau, taking the children to overseas holiday. I emphasize that all the expenses for such trips have been paid by my father using his own money.”      

47. As a result of being cut-off by his father, the Husband claims that his cash position has dropped more than half from some HK$749,000 at the time of his Form E to only about HK$321,000 at the time of his said 5th Affirmation, and hence he concluded in that affirmation that he can no longer pay the interim maintenance of HK$35,000 per month, that he has had to ask his sister to bear the same, and that it should be reduced to HK$20,000 per month as the best he can provide to the Wife at the moment [A4/903].

48. Pausing here first before moving on to the Wife’s arguments, 2 questions immediately arise from that conclusion of the Husband: With still some HK$321,000 in his savings in July 2015, and with all his expenses already paid for by his mother and sister with further financial assistances such as HK$500,000 from the sister for his legal costs in early 2015, what difficulty does he have with payment of the interim maintenance of HK$35,000 that he has had to ask his sister to pay on his behalf, and why is a reduced amount of HK$20,000 the best he can provide when he still has enough cash to pay HK$35,000 for a further 9 months without even taking into account of his monthly salary of HK$15,000? I am unable to find any answer to ether questions from his evidence.      

49. His case of financial difficulties is as noted above of course not acceptable to the Wife, and Ms Yip submits on her behalf that on the clear evidence before the court, the Husband is a man of independent means as the registered owners of various properties gifted to him by his father and/or his mother and with their substantial rentals as his monthly disposable incomes more than sufficient to meet her needs and of the children.

50. Firstly, Ms Yip points out, while the Husband may have claimed in his Form E that he only held the former matrimonial home and those Wuhan Properties on behalf of his father, he also stated to own their full beneficial interests at total net value of HK$82,700,000 [A1/19 – 23], and in the summary of Part 2 of his Form E, he put his total assets at HK$86,443,634.77, and that even after setting them off against his total liabilities which were essentially debts allegedly owed to his parents and sister, he still had a substantial net worth which he put at more than HK$37 million [A1/31].

51. Furthermore, Ms Yip submits that of these alleged debts which totalled RMB32,308,920 ( ̴ HK40 million), according to his Answer given to the Wife’s 1st Questionnaire, the Husband explained that RMB12,888,120 were loans from his parents for the acquisition of some of those Wuhan Properties, while the rest of almost RMB19.5 million were for the mortgage payments and other expenses [A2/409].     

52. All these, Ms Yip argues, contradict his own case that he is merely holding these properties for his father or parents, as otherwise he would not have stated in his Form E, which was prepared by his former solicitors, that his beneficial interests in them were valued at more than HK$82 million instead of nil if he was indeed just a trustee or nominee holder, nor would he have claimed to have borrow RMB32 million from his parents for their purchase. Hence, even on his own case, these properties actually belong to him.

53. However, when he filed his 6th Affirmation in support of his Joinder Application on 17th August 2015, Ms Yip argues that the Husband tried to change his case by alleging that these loans from his parents were actually not loans when he said this in §18:

“In my Answer to the Petitioner’s Questionnaire filed herein 18th November 2014, I said I have borrowed a total sum of RMB10,150,000.00 from my parents for the mortgage payments and my monthly expenses [Bundle A2/p.409). According to paragraph 1 of the (Borrow Note) dated 25th January 2013, prior to my repayment of the said sum of RMB10,150,000.00 my parents are entitled to all the interests including the value-added interests of the Hong Kong property purchased under my name … I now clarify and confirm that the said total sum of RMB10,150,000.00 is in fact not a loan by my parents to me and the said Hong Kong property refers to the Harbourfront Flat. The said (Borrow Note) was signed between my parents and me to evince in writing that they have paid a total sum of RMB10,150,000.00 for the mortgage loans and my monthly expenses and should be entitled to all the interests of the Harbourfront Flat despite that it is registered under my name and in view of my deteriorating relationship with the Petitioner since in or about January 2013. It has long been our intention that my parents should be entitled to all the interests of the Harbourfront Flat …”  

54. Ms Yip submits that plainly the Husband referred to that sum of RMB10 million odd as loans borrowed from his parents, and similarly with those other sums for the acquisition and mortgage payments of the Wuhan Properties, and that however they were dressed up by him and his parents in their 2 so-called loans agreements [A4/1150 & 1215] which she notes were both homemade after the Wife had gone to seek his father’s help in January 2013 over the Husband’s extra-marital affair, she submits that they do not in fact support his trust case.

55. Ms Yip further submits that another document produced by the Husband dated 31st March 2011 [A4/1191], shows that 2 of the Wuhan Properties were acquired in his name back in 2001 and 2002 with his father’s money is consistent with the fact that the father gifted them to his only son of the family, while those additional documents [A4/1211 – 1213] which claimed that some of the Wuhan Properties actually belong to the Husband while the others belong to his father, and that no mention was made as to the Harbourfront property, all of which she submits to be inconsistent with the 2 loans agreements, and that as a matter of law the alleged arrangement of loans and trust cannot co-exist.

56. That is another salient point, Ms Yip submits, if indeed the father was genuine or serious about his ownership in these properties, it strikes as very odd that he has so far not made any affirmation supporting the Husband’s case at all, which she can only conclude that all the evidence in fact support the Wife’s case there were never any loans nor trust over the acquisition of these properties which were all gifted by his parents to the Husband as their only son of their family, which is why all along he could use and spend their rental income in whatever ways he wanted without having to account to his parents or made any repayment to them after all these years.

57. It is of course not possible nor appropriate for me at this stage, in the absence of oral testimony or affirmations from the Husband’s parents, to make any factual findings as to what exactly these loans agreements and other documents produced by the Husband including those purportedly signed between his parents were about in relation to those properties which he claims to be held on trust for them, which is to be dealt with separately as a preliminary issue now that the parents have been joined for that purpose, but for the application now before me, it is the Wife’s case that there is in fact ample other evidence that the court can find that the Husband has the means and resources to meet her immediate needs without making any specific findings as to the ownership of these properties.       

58. Ms Yip submits that even on his own admitted case the Husband has always been well provided for by his parents to a limitless extent, and that there is no evidence to suggest that such financial support has ceased or will cease, nor is the court bound to accept his bare assertion that he has since January 2013 been cut off financially by his father, of which the Wife believes to have never actually happened, but rather just some excuse made up by the Husband along the way and as part of the scheme which he and his family have ganged up against her in these proceedings, and I can see why.

59. Firstly, Ms Yip argues, it is the Wife’s case that throughout the marriage the family could spend limitlessly, and that on top of the rental income from those Wuhan Properties of more than RMB300,000 per month which the family could use without any restriction, the Husband also had other sources of funds which enabled him to spend far beyond those rental income, such as his spending of HK$419,977.74 at Marina Bay Sands Hotel in Macau in August 2014 [A4/999/§32], and another sum of HK$414,000 at Galaxy Macau in April 2015 [A4/889] which the Wife believes were for his gambling habit, and his many other substantial spending on luxurious goods such as jewellery, watches and handbags as evidenced by his credit cards record and summarised in §55 of her Skeleton Submission.

60. In support Ms Yip points to what the Wife believes to be the Husband’s numerous material non-disclosure about his true resources, such as the list of transactions revealed from his various bank accounts records of very substantial deposits and withdrawals exhibited to his Form E [A1/228 – 231] which he mostly failed or refused to explain or clarify in his answer to her several questionnaires, or his failure to disclose his interests in his Form E of other assets held in his name or possession including car parking spaces #91 – 94 of those Wuhan Properties, 3 additional bank accounts with China Construction Bank, China Merchants Bank and China Minsheng Bank, the whereabouts of the sale proceeds in excess of HK$7.4 million of a property known as Tower 3 of Aria in Kowloon held in his sole name, or a securities account which he only claimed to be held on trust for his relatives at a much later stage without any documentary evidence and only when queried by her questionnaires, all of which Ms Yip submits as non-disclosure of the worst kind, and for which the court should draw adverse inference that he has ample financial resources of his own independent of his parents.        

61. Secondly, Ms Yip submits, the Husband’s allegation of being financially cut-off or withdrawn of authorisation to use the rental income by his father since January 2013 was incredible, as not only was there not supported by a single word from his father, it is in fact totally absurd to think that his father would actually do that, given the fact that the Husband had always denied that he was having any extra-marital affair at that time, a denial he has always maintained up to now and throughout the custody trial over the children of the family, during which he had also called his mother and sister to give evidence in support of his case, hence it is absurd for him to now ask the court to believe him that his father has stripped him of the right to use the rental income because the daughter-in-law told him something which his son has always denied and corroborated by the mother and sister.

62. Given the Husband’s close relationship with his parents and their apparent complete trust on him with their financial affairs to the extent that one day he is to take over the father’s business, I can see why the Wife finds this allegation of the Husband that he has been cut off financially simply because of what she had told his father incredible, and that it would still be so even if he had never denied the extra-marital affair to his father, or that his father had chosen to believe his daughter-in-law over his own son.

63. Furthermore, it is relevant to note what the Husband’s sister said in her affirmation on 22nd July 2015 in support of his case as to how the father later became upset by the Wife’s actions and decided not to help her anymore [A4/983§8]:

“ … the Petitioner also alleges that my father said to her that he would pay her back for what she has spent in that period. I was present at the time of the said conversation between the Petitioner and my father and I heard what my father said – our father said that he would agree to pay for the Petitioner’s expenses for taking of the children provided if and only if the Petitioner and the children stay in Hong Kong, the Petitioner must not divorce the Respondent and must take care of the children. However, the Petitioner did not do so – she left Hong Kong and subsequently proceeded to divorce the Respondent. Our father is very angered by the Petitioner’s actions. I believe that if the Petitioner had stayed in Hong Kong with the children and had not divorced the respondent, then our father would have continued to financially support the petitioner and the children, and indeed he had done so all along in the apst, which is how the Respondent and his family survived. Our father has decided that he will no longer financially support the Petitioner and the children, and indeed has also cut-off the respondent as well.”

64. If indeed the father subsequently became upset by the Wife’s actions in bringing divorce proceedings, one may ask why did he continue to cut off his financial support for his only son? As a matter of fact, the sister in her said affirmation also mentioned another reason for the father’s cutting off the Husband, as told to her by her mother, that it was because the Wife had also told the father in about December 2012 or January 2013 that the Husband had lost HK$8 million gambling in Macau which made the father very angry, and that the Wife therefore asked the father to cut him off and stop letting him any access to money [A4/982§6].

65. Even leaving aside this evidence as told to the sister by the mother is clearly hearsay and so far not corroborated by either parents or even the Husband himself, again this assertion that the father would take such drastic action against his own son solely on the basis of his daughter-in-law’s words is highly questionable, all the more so when the sister also stated in the same paragraph that up to the time of her affirmation and more than 2 years since the Wife’s alleged conversation with the father, that she still did not know whether or not the Husband really did lose so much money in gambling as alleged, given the severity of the allegation and the amount of money involved as well as the sister’s proclaimed closeness to her brother and her involvement in almost every detail of his family as evidenced by her support to him throughout his earlier custody trial and her alleged payment of more than HK$3.4 million for his legal costs, it seems very odd to me for her not to have known by now whether or not the Husband did gamble away that kind of money.

66. It is in fact the Wife’s case, Ms Yip submits, that the Husband’s gambling habit has all along been well known to his family and that there is absolutely no sign of his parents’ being unhappy about it, as he has still gone about gambling in Macau as recently as early this year, when as noted above his credit card record revealed that he spent more than HK$400,000 in the casinos there on 2 separate occasions in February and April 2015.    

67. Above all, this allegation of him being financially cut-off by his father since January 2013 which if true would surely have been a serious blow to the Husband both as to his finance and his relationship with his parents, or at least something so significant that it would have been at the forefront of his mind when he gave instructions to his lawyers for the preparation of his Form E in May 2014, yet not a single word about it was mentioned in that document or any of his subsequent affirmations filed for the custody trial until the Wife’s present application for maintenance pending suit, nor is there any sign of any such impact on his relationship with his parents when in fact both of them have shown full support to him in his earlier dispute with the Wife over their children.      

68. Ms Yip of course argues that in fact no such cut-off ever took place, as the evidence before the court in particularly the Husband’s bank records clearly show that the rental income had continued to go into his bank accounts since January 2013 as summarised in paragraph 49 of her Skeleton Submission.

69. Mr Chan submits for the Husband that initially indeed the rental income had to be deposited into his bank accounts as he was the registered owner and landlord of the tenancy agreements, but that since February 2013 the rental income passing through his hands was seriously reduced to less than half of previously, and since March 2014 when the Wife filed for divorce, he was financially cut-off totally by his father, whose staunch stance is in fact underlined by the Wife’s own analysis in her 10th Affirmation when after a few rounds of negotiation with the Father in 2013, she concluded that he cared about money more than anything else [A4/1001§46].

70. Mr Chan therefore submits, should an order for maintenance pending suit be made in favour of the Wife, the father will know for sure that the Husband would be paying money over to the Wife, and even more so the father would ensure that the Husband is not placed with such monies. But has that in fact been the case?

71. The answer may well be found from the Husband’s said 5th Affirmation already referred to above, in which he claimed that since January 2013 after being cut off by his father to have been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his expenses including more than HK$3.4 million in legal costs, and that it was his sister who has been paying the interim maintenance of HK$35,000 per month to the Wife on his behalf, but that since both the mother and sister are full-time housewives, which begs the obvious question of where did that kind of money, which must have accumulated very substantially over the past 2 years, come from if not from the father?

72. Furthermore, according to the Husband’s said affirmation, it was the father who had subsequently repaid RMB500,000 to the sister on his behalf for his legal costs [A4/899§16], while all the expenses for his trips to Macau as well as his overseas holidays with the children up to this year in 2015 were also paid directly by the father [A4/899§18], which seems to me a case of the father taking away his financial assistance with his right hand but giving it back with his left, and if the whole purpose of cutting off the Husbands finance was to punish him for his extra-marital affair and/or so that he could not continue with such affair, then why at the same time allow the mother or the sister to provide the same financial assistance to him over the past 2 years? None of these make any logical sense to me but rather to support the Wife’s case that they were just part of the Husband’s attempts to mislead the court about his financial resources.

73. If indeed the Husband as well as the Wife and their children were financially supported by third party such as his parents, the law in respect of which was laid down by the Court of Final Appeal in KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314 at 317 starting from §36 where Ma CJ stated:

“36.  In every case where third party assistance is involved, there are two critical evidential questions for the court to consider:

What is the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party to the husband or wife?

What is the likelihood of such financial assistance continuing in the foreseeable future?

37. It goes without saying that in the fact finding exercise, the court must look at the reality of the situation and have regard to matters of substance and not just form. In looking at reality, the court can take into account not only what a party actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him or her if a request for assistance were to be made. In O’D v O’D [1976] Fam 83, which involved the court taking into account the financial support given to the husband by his father, Ormrod LJ said at p.90D – E: “In making this assessment the Court is concerned with the reality of the husband’s resources, using that word in a broad sense to include not only what he is shown to have, but also what could reasonably be made available to him if he so wished”.

38.  In addition, in looking at what may occur in the foreseeable future, past conduct is often a useful guide: see SR v CR (Ancillary Relief: Family Trusts) [2009] 2 FLR 1083, at 1091 (para.27).

39.  Having ascertained the extent of the financial assistance provided by the third party and then finding on the evidence on a balance of probabilities that there is a likelihood of the continuation of such financial assistance in the foreseeable future, the court is then in a position in law first to take this into account in the identification of the financial resources of the parties and secondly, in determining the appropriate ancillary relief to be granted. This is an approach that is entirely consistent with the court’s duty under s.7(1) of the MPPO. Needless to say, the outcome in any given case is inevitably fact-sensitive.”

74. In the present case, while the Wife believes that the Husband is independently wealthy and disputes that he is financially dependent on his parents, it is clearly his own case that he and his family had all along been dependent on them including being allowed to make the Harbourfront Property their matrimonial home and to use the rental income of those Wuhan Properties to meet their living expenses, and that notwithstanding his allegation that he has since January 2013 been cut-off by his father, of which I have already expressed above serious doubts, but again even on his own case he has still been relying on his mother and sister to pay for his own living expenses and his substantial legal costs, while his travelling and holidays expenses with his children were also paid for by his father, hence it is clear to me that only the second question referred to by Ma CJ in KEWS above needs to be asked: What is the likelihood of such financial assistance continuing from the Husband’s family in the foreseeable future?

75. Given his clear case of necessity to rely on his parents due to his own limited income, and of his own evidence in the earlier custody trial that he proposed to become a stayed-home full-time father because his parents would continue to provide him with full financial support in the event of the children being granted to him after his divorce, all of which if true, one can only conclude that his parents were willing to do so for the most natural and simple reason that they love and care about him as their only son as well as his children as their grandsons, and that it was out of necessity because his monthly salary is simply insufficient to maintain himself and his children.

76. It follows that after his divorce and that he has been granted joint custody of his children with weekly and holidays staying access to them, would his parents then love him any less and therefore cease or withdraw all such financial assistance that they have been providing him all these years? I simply do not believe so.

77. I have earlier in this judgment already expressed my grave doubts over the allegation that his father would seriously cut him off simply because of being told by the Wife of his extra-marital affair, which doubts have been reinforced by all the evidence that were before me that such financial provision has in fact continued up to the presence albeit in various different forms or guises, and hence in the absence of any expressed desire or intention from his parents, in reality the likelihood that such financial assistance would suddenly cease or be withdrawn can safely be put down as virtually nil, and even if the parents were to do so tomorrow, I am unable to think of any valid reason why they would other than as suspected by the Wife to gang up against her in these proceedings which if true is certainly a conduct not acceptable by the court.       

78. While the Wife disputes that the Husband relies on his parents financially and insists that he is instead independently wealthy, and I can see why given the numerous and substantial transactions seen from his bank records and his credit cards spending referred to above, but even if it is indeed the case that his financial means are confined only to his stated monthly salary of HK$15,000 plus the use of the monthly rental from the Wuhan Properties of more than RMB300,000, which would give him a total sum close to HK$400,000 per month to meet the Wife’s present application, which brings me back to the question of what should be the reasonable needs of the Wife and the 2 children given the background of this family and the standard of living which they used to enjoy during the marriage.

79. As noted above the Wife has asked for more than HK$170,000 per month including renting a bigger apartment now that she has the care and control of both boys and needs more than one domestic helpers and to maintain that high standard of living as before, while the Husband argues that her spending pattern since their separation averaged only about half that amount and at most no more than HK$85,000 per month.

80. While it is clear to me that Wife has based her claim not just on necessity but also what should be reasonable given the Husband’s financial resources and the standard of living during the marriage, which as I have commented above that the past credit cards spending pattern of the parties when fully disclosed should be able to shed some light on, but until then and notwithstanding the Wife’s argument, this does not appear to me one of those “big-money cases” that their spending were unlimited, at least not on the evidence so far before me.

81. Henceforth, except for those “big money cases” where it is commonly accepted that whatever the standard of living during the marriage, the parties can afford to maintain it and should do so while going through litigation whether on voluntary basis or by way of maintenance pending suit, but for the majority of cases, of which I believe to include this case as well, in reality divorcing couple simply cannot afford to maintain the same standard of living for the reason that upon separation there would be 2 households and hence 2 sets of almost every item of expenses to meet instead of one during the marriage, and more significantly because of the litigation very often 2 sets of legal costs as well which very often, as in the present case, simply dwarf the former items, with the couple’s income remaining as before and that whatever other financial resources such as savings would dwindle fast to exhaustion. This is simply the unfortunate reality.

82. No doubt the Wife may very well feel unfairly treated, and I agree she has every right to do so, as there is clear evidence that the Husband had continued to indulge himself say at the casinos in Macau as recently as in early 2015, while she is expected to skim on her normal spending on herself and the children, but the reality is that at this stage of the proceedings when it is quite apparent that its end is nowhere near, I believe that she should exercise caution with her spending when it is simply not practical if impossible to make any long term planning for her future, at least not until the Husband’s true financial means have been properly identified and ascertained, which perhaps explains why she had in fact been spending much less than her proposed sum at only between HK$80,000 and HK$85,000 per month as submitted by Mr Chan for the Husband.

83. In the premises I find the Wife’s proposal to require HK$50,000 to rent a bigger apartment for the children somewhat premature at this stage, while it also appears to me simply not sensible budgeting to maintain the same standard of her past personal spending such as more than HK$53,000 on meals out of home, personal clothing and grooming per month when engaging a hostile and protracted litigation, clearly not at her instigation but seemingly fast becoming out of control and no doubt worrying to all concerned with the resultant escalating legal costs. In the premises and by taking a broad brush approach I find a monthly sum of HK$100,000 more reasonable and sensible to cater for the interim needs of the Wife and the children to be dated back to 1st day of the month following her application, i.e. May 2015 pending the final determination of the question of ancillary relief or until further order and without prejudice to the parties’ right for proper adjustment at that hearing.        

Legal Costs Provision

84. The Wife asks for a monthly provision at HK$200,000 per month made up of HK$120,000 for 2 counsel and HK$85,000 as costs of solicitors in light of the upcoming discovery and joinder application, the latter of which will inevitably lead to another major battle over the beneficial ownership of those properties held in the Husband’s name but which he claims are on trust for his parents by way of preliminary issue, to be followed by another full-blown trial on her ancillary relief application in view of the Husband’s hostile stance and attitude adopted throughout these proceedings.

85. Mr Chan submits for the Husband, without accepting that he has the ability to pay any costs provision to the Wife, that the Curry test is applicable, which requires the Wife to show that she has no assets or none that can reasonably be deployed, that she can provide no security for borrowing or obtaining legal service subject to a charge on such security, and that she cannot obtain legal aid, of which he argues that, as noted above, it is her own evidence that she has been borrowing from her relatives and friends to meet her living expenses, hence there is no reason why she cannot do so with her legal costs.

86. As I have already found above, I am satisfied on the affirmation evidence before me that the Wife has by now exhausted all her cash that she brought with her when she separated from the Husband during which there was never any maintenance from him either for herself or the elder boy until the recent interim maintenance of HK$35,000 per month, and while she may still have a property in Wuhan, it is simply not practical or reasonable for her to have to liquidate or deploy it as security for borrowing for her legal costs, while it is not in dispute that she is not eligible for legal aid.        

87. More relevantly, Mr Chan submits, legal costs are not incurred each and every month and hence the court should not order a ‘fixed monthly sum’, and that it does not encourage efficient and timely litigation, as otherwise protraction would be rewarded as the longer things are dragged on the more would be paid over as the months go on.

88. Mr Chan therefore submits that if the court is to accede to this application of the Wife, it would be much more sensible and fair to consider a fixed amount broken up into monthly instalments, but of which he argues that the Wife’s suggested figures of HK$725,000 for a senior and a junior counsel for 6 months until FDR and costs of solicitors at HK$85,000 per month as excessive and unreasonable in the circumstances when the Husband is not so represented.

89. I agree that costs provision should be based on one properly estimated lump sum inclusive of both counsel fees and solicitors costs the payment of which if not in one go should be by instalments on monthly or other basis, and that at this stage it should be catered for up to FDR hearing including the possible trial of the preliminary issue involving third parties, but given the time taken for the interveners and the parties to plead their respective case, to be followed by the discovery process and then trial no doubt subject to counsel diary, 6 months seem to me unrealistic and probably at least 9 months if not more, and no doubt the situation can be reviewed again if necessary.

90. As for the Wife’s request for provision for 2 counsel, there is no question that the Husband was so represented during the custody trial, and while he may now be represented only by Mr Chan in this application, he did not say that he will continue to do so, and that in any event given the complexity of the forthcoming preliminary issue involving several properties and that his parents who have now been joined as interveners with what the Wife believes as unlimited resources for their legal team and undoubtedly on the same side with the Husband against her, I accept that in the circumstances and at this stage her request for 2 counsel cannot be said to be unreasonable or unnecessary.

91. On this issue it would perhaps be relevant for me to just refer to what Holman J stated in A v A (Maintenance Pending Suit: Payment ofLegal Fees) [2001] 1 WLR 605 at 614E relied on by the Wife:

“This wife has always been dependent on her husband. She is locked into a bitter struggle with him, whose outcome is of intense importance to her. She has an acute need for good legal representation and in circumstances in which her lawyers do not always have to be desperately economising relative to the husband. He himself is spending huge sums on the litigation. He can, in my judgment, afford to pay the sums I have ordered and it is reasonable that I should require him to do so.

In Sears Tooth v Payne Hicks Beach [1997] 2 FLR 116, 118-119 Wilson J referred to:

“a grave and widespread problem encountered increasingly in the Family Division: namely, how can a spouse, usually a wife, who is ineligible for legal aid but who has negligible capital, secure legal advice and representation in order to pursue her rights against her husband, particularly one who is rich, litigious or obstructive or whose financial circumstances are complex or unclear?”

In my judgment, in an appropriate case, maintenance pending suit provides a partial answer and, for the reasons I have now given, I made the order in the present case. I add that, since I made the order, the House of Lords has given its judgment in White v White [2000] 3 WLR 1571. That did not, of course, impact at all on my decision which I had reached and announced several days earlier, nor on my reasons for it. However, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stressed, in relation to the substantive outcome, that there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles. In my view, that substantive approach may be illusory if a wife is unable to vindicate it due to the difference in their roles, and its discriminatory effect upon their income and capital and upon a wife’s ability to match the legal representation of her husband. The changing climate for the outcome of matrimonial litigation, which the House of Lords has clearly heralded, further fortifies me in my view as to financing its interlocutory stages”

92. I respectfully agree with that statement, and it goes without saying that the concepts of fairness and rejection of discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles so underpinning the White v White line of cases from UK have since been fully endorsed by our courts, and not just in the exercise of s 7 of MPPO for the outcome of final ancillary relief litigation but also at its interlocutory stages such as maintenance pending suit applications as in the present case.

93. Accordingly, the Husband’s suggested HK$300,000 certainly appears to me wholly inadequate, and I find that the Wife’s figures more accurate and realistic, and I propose to round them down to a total sum of HK$1.2 million payable by 9 equal monthly instalments at HK$133,333 each subject to future review where necessary.    

Conclusion

94. In the premises and accordingly I order that the Husband do pay to the Wife a monthly sum of HK$233,333 as maintenance pending suit for her and the 2 children of the family and inclusive of her costs provision for 9 months, which sum is to be dated back to 1st May 2015 and until further order.

95. For the question of costs, given the outcome of my decision including the costs provision, I propose to reserve it pending the final determination of the ancillary relief application or at some later stage where appropriate.

96. Last but not least, I wish to express my gratitude to both Ms Yip and Mr Chan for their most valuation assistance rendered throughout the hearing.

 ( Bruno Chan )
 District Judge

Ms Anita Yip SC instructed by M/S Chaine, Chow & Barbara Hung for the Petitioner.

Mr Jeremy Chan instructed by M/S Wat & Co for the Respondent.

99319-EN-2015-06-19

DX v. LN

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FCMC No.7870 of 2014

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSE NO. 7870 OF 2014

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 DXPetitioner
 and
 LNRespondent

----------------------------

Before : HH Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers.
Date of Hearing : 20 – 23 January, 3 March and 22 April 2015.
Date of Judgment : 19 June 2015.

--------------------------

Judgment
(Care and Control of Children)

--------------------------

1.   This is a dispute between the parties over the question of care and control of their 2 children, both sons now aged 2 and 4 years, upon the dissolution of their 6 years marriage. The elder son WL has since early 2014 been residing with the Petitioner Mother when she moved out of the former matrimonial home, while the younger son SF has remained in the former matrimonial home with the Respondent Father and assisted by the paternal grandmother and 3 domestic helpers. 

2.   The parties are agreed on joint custody of the children, and are also on common ground that the 2 brothers should grow up together and hence no split order for their care and control should be made, as each seeks the care and control of both children.

Background

3.  The Mother is aged 30 and a full-time housewife, while the Father aged 37 is a businessman working in his father’s business in Wuhan, China. Both were born and raised in Wuhan, with the Mother being the only child of her divorced parents, while the Father is the only son with a younger sister from a well-off family with substantial business interests in Wuhan. 

4.  In 1995 the Father and his family came to settle in Hong Kong, from where he then went to Australia for further studies before returning in 2003 to starting working in his father’s business in Wuhan. It was there when he met the Mother who was just fresh out of university in Wuhan, and they subsequently registered their marriage on 27th November 2006 in Hong Kong.

5.  After the marriage the parties made their home initially in Wuhan until about 2010 when the Mother became pregnant with the elder child and moved to Hong Kong where she subsequently gave birth to WL on 16th August 2010 and became a full-time housewife in a property at Harbourfront, Hung Hum purchased in the Father’s name, while the Father would shuttle between Hong Kong and Wuhan to deal with his father’s business.     

6.  On 22nd July 2012 the Mother gave birth to the younger child SF. By then the parties had hired 3 domestic helpers for their household with 2 of them to assist in the care of the 2 children while the 3rd helper was mainly responsible for the household chores.

7.  One day during Christmas of 2012 while the Father was in Hong Kong, the Mother discovered certain text messages in his mobile phone that led her to suspect that he was having an extra-marital affair with the woman mentioned in those messages. After a confrontation with the Father the Mother left Hong Kong by herself on 3rd January 2013 for Wuhan and told her in-laws about the Father’s affair. She returned to the matrimonial home in Hong Kong on 10th January 2013 and the parties appeared to have reconciled.

8.  In February 2013 the parties with their children went to Wuhan for Chinese New Year during which the Mother however again became suspicious that the Father was still carrying on his extra-marital affair. As a result she left Wuhan by herself on 13th February 2013 to return to Hong Kong. After a few days she decided to separate from the Father, and therefore packed some of her belongings including some jewelleries from their safe deposit box and withdrew HK$590,000 from the bank account before returning to her own home in Wuhan.

9.  In late February 2013 the Father brought the elder boy WL back to Hong Kong for school, while the younger boy SF stayed with the Mother in Wuhan, In about April 2013 through the intervention of the paternal grandfather the Mother agreed to return with SF to the matrimonial home in Hong Kong.

10.  Sadly the parties’ relationship did not improve as the Mother suspected that the Father was still seeing his girlfriend in Wuhan, and as her emotional and physical conditions deteriorated, she left Hong Kong by herself in about June 2013 for Wuhan where she stayed for treatments and recuperation, returning to Hong Kong on occasions for short stay only to see the children who were then being looked after by the domestic helpers and the paternal grandmother who had come to assist and stayed in the parties’ matrimonial home in Hong Kong.

11.  In about mid-January 2014 the Mother returned to the matrimonial home in Hong Kong and stayed with the elder boy WL while the younger boy SF had been taken by the paternal grandmother to Wuhan for holiday. About a week later the Mother brought WL to Wuhan to join the Father and SF for the Chinese New Year, during which the parties had another fall out and the Father later left with SF to return to the matrimonial home in Hong Kong where SF resumed his pre-nursery class at York International Kindergarten at Kowloon Tong.

12.  On 15th February 2014 the Mother also brought WL back to Hong Kong but only to stay in a service apartment in the same vicinity of the matrimonial home and returned WL to his kindergarten class at the same York International. One week later on 21st February 2014 the Mother filed for divorce in these proceedings based on the Father’s unreasonable behaviour and also sought custody care and control of both children as well as general ancillary relief.

13.  On 26th February 2014 the Mother issued a summons for interim custody care and control of the children and also for an order that they be prohibited from being removed from this jurisdiction unless with leave of the court.

14.  That summons was opposed by the Father who also sought custody care and control of both children, hence it was adjourned at the hearing on 25th March 2014 for a social investigation report, but the parties were able to agree on interim access for the Mother to have SF on every Saturday from 10 am to 7 pm while the Father was to have WL on every Sunday for the same hours.

15.  The report which was submitted on 3rd June 2014 recommended the parties to be given joint custody of both children, with care and control of WL to the Mother while the Father was to have care and control of SF, with weekly access including staying access to the other parent, essentially preserving the status quo of the children.

16.  As noted above this proposal of split care and control of the children was not agreeable to either party, who then attended a CDR hearing on 8th September 2014 but when that issue still remained unresolved, directions were given for the matter to proceed to trial and that an updated social investigation report be submitted.

17.  That report dated 15th December 2014 and prepared by a different officer as the first one had since been posted elsewhere however arrived at a different conclusion recommending care and control of both children be to the Mother. As this was obviously not agreeable to the Father, the trial therefore proceeded to its full course during which the Mother was represented by Ms Anita Yip SC and the Father by Mr Paul Shieh SC with Ms Rachael Siu, and in addition to the parties both the maternal and paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt as well as the two Social Work Officers who prepared the reports also attended court to give evidence. Before proceeding to consider them in detail, I should first set out the applicable legal principles, of which in the main there seems to be little controversy.

Legal Principles

18.  The general principles to be applied by the court in determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a minor child of the family are set out in s 3(1)(a) of Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap. 13 (“GMO”) in that the court:

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to –

(A) the wishes of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practical to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii)    shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father …

19.  The words “best interests”, which have only since 2012 replaced the word “welfare” in that Ordinance, are in fact synonymous with each other, as explained in Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and FamilyMatters, 18th edition, Chap 36.14:

“The word ‘welfare’ must be taken in its widest sense. It has been said that the welfare of the child is not to be measured by money only or by physical comfort only; the moral and religious welfare of the child must be considered as well as his physical well-being; nor can the ties of affection be disregarded. ‘Welfare’ and ‘best interests’ are synonymous.”

20.  In UK where the same welfare and now best interests principles apply to children matters and from which our s 3(1)(a) were derived, their courts are required to have regard to the matters specified in their Children Act 1989 which have come to be known as ‘the welfare checklist’, which consists of the following:

(a) the ascertainable wishes and feeling of the child (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;

(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristic of his which the court considers relevant;

(e) any harm he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(g) the range of powers available to the court under the 1989 Act in the proceedings in question.

21.  While we do not have either Children Act or similar welfare checklist, both our courts and practitioners in this field have found many of the matters mentioned in the UK checklist relevant and helpful in arriving at what are the best interests of the child concerned, which have in fact been recommended by the Law Reform Commission for our legislation, although I should also note from Rayden supra (Chap 36.17) that while there is a duty in UK to have regard to the checklist, judges are entitled to have it assumed in their favour that they will do so without subjecting them to the laborious necessity of expressly relating their findings in every case to its specific provisions one by one, and that the items mentioned in the checklist are not exhaustive of the matters to which the court may have regard.

22.  It is therefore with these principles in mind that I shall now proceed to consider the relevant matters referred to above and their evidence in my determination of what would be the best interests of these 2 very young boys regarding their care and control arrangement in the event of their parents’ divorce, starting with the 2 social investigation reports.

Social Investigation Reports

23.  As noted above the 1st report by Social Work Officer Mr Wan [B1/142 – 151] recommended joint custody to the parties but with split care and control of the 2 children, essentially for the current care arrangement to continue which is not agreeable to both parents, whereas the 2nd report by Social Work Officer Mr Kwok made some 6 months later [B1/412 – 420] came down in favour of the Mother in respect of care and control of both children.

24.  It seems to me that Officer Wan arrived at his said recommendation in the 1st report primarily on the basis that as both children had been under proper care under their current arrangement, he believed that it would be in their best interests that their status quo be preserved, as he explained at the conclusion of his report [B1/150]:

“38. Both the parents request to claim the custody of the children. On one hand, the petitioner claims that she is all along the main carer of two sons and she can be full-time to continue her care for them. She also enlists the assistance from her mother to support her. On the other hand, the respondent living with his parents is confident to take well care of WL and SF with the assistance of his mother and three domestic helpers. Both parents recognize the importance of co-parenting to the development of two sons. They hope the sons to be loved by both parents even though they are divorced.

…

     40. From the perspective of the development of a young child, the attachment to parent is one of crucial factors requires to address. WL has stronger attachment to the Petitioner but he is more relaxed in front of the respondent. SF is closely attached to both parents and can become cheerful when he is relaxed. The Respondent seems to have more support in child care while the petitioner as a full-time housewife is more available to take care of the sons. Both parents can address to the emotional needs of children and can handle when they appear moody. Though the siblings live apart, they are still under normal development without significant influence for the time being. Taking the benefit of stability of caring environment into consideration, the disturbance to the routine development of WL and SF will be less if they remain in status quo...”

25.  It is however also plain from the report that as the children were found to have maintained close attachment to both of their parents, neither parties were agreeable to the siblings being split up in their future care arrangement, yet Officer Wan appeared to me to have ignored the benefit of the siblings growing up together or at least failed to place sufficient weight of that benefit in arriving at his recommendation.    

26.  In the 2nd report the balance was tilted in favour of the Mother for care and control of both children as Officer Kwok agreed that the siblings should not be separated and provided the following reasons at the conclusion of his report [B1/419]:

“30. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent were loving and caring parents. They were ready to shoulder up the child care responsibility to provide good nurture to the children. Demonstrating their readiness, capability and availability in child care, they each considered themselves as the more suitable main care giver to them and would like the care and control of both children be granted to them. On one hand, the Petitioner was a full time housewife. She had shown her commitment and efforts in taking care of the children’s growth and development. On the other hand, the Respondent also showed commitment to have active involvement in child care. His resourceful background made him available to become care giver of the children. Nevertheless, as a non-working full time mother, the balance was titled in her favour in looking after their physical and emotional needs, especially at the tender age of the children-in-question.

31. While considering the care and control to the petitioner, the access arrangement was viewed equally important. To maintain the father-sons relationship, access arrangement, including staying access, was supported to facilitate the bonding between the father and the sons which was beneficial to the sons’ development. Besides, the respondent should have chance in taking part in their school and social life …”      

27.  As noted these recommendations are not acceptable to the Father as he does not believe that it would be in the best interests of the children for the Mother to be given their care and control for various reasons detailed in his 2nd Affirmation of 7th August 2014 [B1/176 – 195], which can be summarised as follows:

(a) that the children have not been well looked after by the Mother who was not even their primary carer during the marriage;

(b) that the Mother is jealous, suspicious, impatient, materialistic, and emotionally unstable, and has abandoned the children in the past, hence she cannot be trusted to be given their care and control;

(c) that the Mother has been alienating the children from their father and/or his family;

(d) that by comparison the Father would be able to provide better care for the children and with better support network.

28.  In support of his case the Father seems to have relied on evidence of events allegedly occurred during various stages or periods, namely during the marriage (item (a)), arising from the breakdown of relationship (item (b)), and since the parties’ separation (items (c) & (d)), of which I shall now consider starting with the item (a).

Was Mother the Primary Carer?

29.  This issue of the Mother not being the primary carer was in fact first raised in the Father’s 1st Affirmation when he stated in §33 that “it is not true that the petitioner is the primary carer for the children. She entrusted the children with the maids … my mother and my younger sister. My younger sister has been arranging the school and daily activities for WL and SF” [B1/64].

30.  In addition there is the evidence from the paternal grandmother on how she and the domestic helpers were involved in the care of the children when the Mother would sleep until very late around noon, leaving the children to their care in particularly the feeding and dressing of the elder boy WL every morning as well as taking him to school [B1/277 – 282].

31.  There is also the affirmation of the Father’s younger sister (paternal aunt) citing in particularly the incident when the younger boy SF was hospitalised in July 2013 for allergy problem and that it was the helper who stayed with him while the Mother did not spend much time in the hospital {B1/284, 289}.  

32.  However, in his 2nd and main affirmation in support of his application for care and control of the children, this appeared no longer to be the issue as the Father did not raise it again, at least not so specifically. At any rate as pointed out by Ms Yip in her closing submission, that statement that the Mother was not the primary carer was at the trial retracted by the Father on cross-examination, while the paternal aunt also conceded that she did later learn that the Mother had in fact stayed over with SF in the hospital every night during his stay for his allergy problem.

33.  Given the wealth involved in this marriage and the fact that the paternal grandmother did stay with the parties in their matrimonial home in Hong Kong and at some stage the paternal aunt as well, and had had the service of several domestic helpers, it is hardly surprising or unusual that some of these 3rd parties may have assisted in the care of the children, as submitted by Ms Yip for the Mother, that it is in fact both necessary and practical for her to delegate some of the work to others, but as a full-time housewife and mother she has always looked after all aspects of the children as their primary carer, as she detailed in her 5th Affirmation [B1/162, 163 – 166].

34.  If indeed that was the case, I agree that the fact that she may have delegated part of her work to others cannot be the reason or basis for claiming that the Mother was not the primary carer, in particularly when the Father during cross-examination did not dispute that she did do the following for the children during the marriage as evidenced, for example, by their text messages and photographs exhibited to the Mother’s 6th Affirmation [B1/318, 365 – 393]:

(a) cooked for them;

(b) arranged their activities;

(c) bathed them;

(d) cared for them when they were sick;

(e) cut their hair;

(f) arranged and prepared the elder son for school interview;

35.  In the premises I am satisfied that the Mother was indeed the primary carer of both children during the marriage. By not pursuing that issue does not of course necessarily follow that the Father would accept that the Mother has been a good carer or is fit to have the care and control of the children upon their divorce, as it is his case that she is not, which is the next issue.            

Was Mother A Good Carer?

36.  I should first point out that both social investigation reports have found the Mother, and for that the Father as well, to be a good parent to the children and is able to meet both their physical and emotional needs, as reflected in the reported observations of their satisfactory development both at home and at school, in particularly WL who has been under the Mother’s sole care since early 2014.

37.  In his 2nd affirmation the Father’s criticisms of the Mother’s care of the children appeared to be confined mainly to his observation of unexplained scars and wounds as well as legs full of bugs and mosquitoes bites on WL during access [B1/180 – 181] which caused him to question the Mother’s ability to provide adequate care for the children.

38.  Other than a few snapshots of some mosquitoes bites there is however no evidence of any serious wounds on WL that should cause any real concern in my view. The reality is that children do bump their head or fall while running and hurt themselves in accidents while growing up, in particularly with active boys during plays at school, and there is simply no evidence before the court to justify the Father’s concern over the Mother’s parental ability because of a few mosquito bites or bruises on these two children.

39.  In fact, the evidence appears to show the contrary when the Father’s many text messages exchanged with the Mother during the marriage and exhibited to their various affirmations actually show his appreciation and confidence on the Mother’s care for their 2 children, such as those referred to on page 5 of Ms Yip’s closing submission and in the trial bundles [B1/376, C1/199].

40.  While that may be his view of the Mother at that time, the Father now claims that he has reasons to be concerned about the Mother’s ability or dedication to care for the children, some of which as noted above allegedly arose from the time of the breakdown of their relationship in late 2012 and early 2013 namely the Mother’s focus on materialistic matters, her history of leaving the children and her mental breakdown.

Mother’s Focus on Materialistic Matters

41.   This alleged behaviour of the Mother actually arose first from her own affirmation, her 1st one filed on 25th February 2014 when she admitted that upon discovering the Father’s alleged affair with another woman, she decided to separate from him and therefore removed her belongings including some jewelleries and withdrew HK$590,000 from the bank account for her future living expenses [B1/10, 13 §15 – 17].

42.   While the Father did in his affirmation in reply point out that in addition the Mother also removed some of his “luxurious watches” which she had later returned, and some gold bars B1/56, 60], it was clearly an one-off situation and for financial necessity which was in my view quite understandable under the circumstances, yet this is what Mr Shieh has submitted for the Father in his closing submission:

“26. In January 2013 the Petitioner left the two children in the hands of the Respondent, his mother, his sister and the three maids in Hong Kong while she went back to Wuhan on her own to complain to the Respondent’s father that she suspected he was having an affair. She left the sons for one week in this incident … The Petitioner asked the Respondent’s parents to cut his source of finance in order to keep him home. The Respondent’s parents did so and so the Respondent had no money to pay the Petitioner as he did previously …

27. Shortly thereafter, the Petitioner came back to Hong Kong while the family was in Wuhan to take the valuables from the safe in Harbourfront property and emptied the bank account (HK$590,000).

28. In April 2013, the petitioner came back to Hong Kong with the Respondent’s father and stated that the paternal grandfather “would pay her [me] back for what she has [I have spent] in that period”.

29. These episodes showed that the Petitioner was materialistic minded. At most critical junctures, she focused on money or materialistic assets – cutting off the Respondent’s source of funds to keep him home and grabbing assets for herself irrespective of ownership or entitlement. Such acts cannot be explained or justified by reference to a “spur of the moment” impulse. When she described returning to Hong Kong with the Respondent ‘s father the one thing she chose to highlight in her affirmation was his promise to pay her back. The above show that her values and priorities were all wrong.”

43.   That was however not even the Father’s complaint in either his 1st or 2nd Affirmation, as there was never any evidence to suggest that the Mother had indulged in extravagant spending or materialistic needs during the marriage, and by seizing upon that occasion to make that submission seems to me stretching it too far and is evidentially unsustainable. In fact the same can also be said about next 2 complaints about the Mother’s behaviour arisen from the same occasion.

Mother’s Leaving the Children and Mental Breakdown

44.   It is Mr Shieh’s submission that during the year of 2013, as admitted by the Mother, her physical and mental conditions were unstable and that she was too depressed, and that apart from this history of her mental breakdown, her poor relationship with the paternal family members as revealed in some of her text messages which show that she has been verging on being paranoid even before December 2012, and given the history of her mental breakdown and leaving the family, her paranoid tendency and her focus on materialistic matters, there is a real likelihood that if she encounters some other downturns in life, she would have another breakdown and leave the sons again, or put her own financial and/ or interest ahead of the children. 

45.   In her 1st Affirmation of 25th February 2014 [B1/10 – 24] the Mother sought to explain what happened to her upon discovering the Father’s alleged affair:

“12. I was devastated over the Respondent’s infidelity and I was very lost after discovering the matter, especially the attitude the Respondent handled it.

13. I went back to Wuhan on or about 3rd January 2013. I told the Respondent’s parents about the respondent’s girlfriend.

…

22. Since the end of December 2012 after I discovered the Respondent’s extra marital affairs, I have lost about 30 lbs in less than 3 months. I was too depressed that I suffered from hair loss, I could not sleep at night and I cried from time to time. My emotion was very unstable that I sometimes could not control myself but even cried when WL was present.

…

25. I was in a very bad condition both physically and mentally. Frankly, I could not even look after myself properly and I knew that I was not in a good condition to take care of my children. I have therefore decided to go back to Wuhan, where I could take a good rest and my mother could also look after me as a desperately needed the support of my family in Wuhan. I am determined to treat my health and my lower back pain properly otherwise I would not be able to take care of my children. I did not want to scare WL as I could not carry him and I did not want to let him see me cry.

26. I went back to Wuhan in about mid June 2013 to treat my health problems, including seeing Chinese doctors and to have acupuncture treatments. I intended that to be a short term stay in Wuhan and I would definitely return to Hong Kong when I recovered. The children were taken care of by the 3 domestic helpers at home; the Respondent’s mother would also go to Hong Kong sometimes to look after them. I have also maintained contact with the domestic maids by messaging them (whatsapp) during the time I was in Wuhan to make sure that the children are alright and are well taken care of.”

46.  It is hence not disputed that in addition to what Ms Yip claims to be the Mother’s short sojourn away from home for Wuhan in early 2013 shortly after discovering the Father’s alleged affair, the Mother did leave home again in June of the same year to stay with her family in Wuhan for some 6 months until January 2014 for the reasons referred to above, and it is against this background, Ms Yip submits, that it is not difficult to envision a wife and mother who was worn and torn both physically and emotionally without any family support in Hong Kong, but it was never her intention to just walk out and never to return to the children, as she did subsequently return upon having recovered from the ordeal, so much so that as the case developed during oral evidence, Ms Yip submits, that the Father had by and large abandoned his case that the Mother had deserted the children. 

47.  As submitted by Ms Yip, the Father had never attempted to even deny his extra-marital affair in any of his affirmations or his on-going relationship with the same girlfriend, and I agree that that his attempt at the trial to suggest that he was yet involved in this relationship when confronted by the Mother in the Christmas of 2012 sounds not just feeble and hollow but also shows his stubborn refusal to accept responsibility or his inability to engage upon self-reflection on what had been done to his wife’s emotion and their marriage as a result, and worse still for him now to use her emotion breakdown to criticise and question her parental ability which is in my view not only wholly unacceptable but also reflects poorly on his personality as well as his sense of fairness or responsibility.

48.  I have the same problem with Mr Shieh’s submission that the Mother has been verging on being paranoid even before Christmas 2012 relying mainly on certain text messages sent by her to the Father during the marriage as detailed in paragraph 10 of his closing submission of what appear to be various negative comments of some of his family members. However, what were never referred to are the Father’s responses to those messages which appear to me invariably his unquestioned support and encouragement to the Mother [B1/367, 376], and while the evidence of both the paternal grandmother and aunt did paint a less than harmonious relationship with the Mother, there is simply no evidence, medical or otherwise to suggest that she has been suffering from such a mental health condition of paranoia.

49.  Similarly, in the absence of any evidence that the Mother had suffered emotional breakdown on other occasions during the marriage or that such breakdown had been chronic or regular, it is in my judgment again stretching it too far for such submission to be made that there has been a ‘history of mental breakdown’ of the Mother which is clearly unsustainable.

50.  While I agree that the Mother’s departure in June 2013 may appear excessive as far as the children were concerned even for good or valid reasons given her circumstances, one cannot help but ask this: Would it have been more appropriate for her to take the children out of their school with her to Wuhan instead of leaving them in the care of their father and paternal grandmother and went off by herself while she tried to heal herself? In my experience in this court many mothers in such situation would have taken the children with them, no doubt with their own good reasons, but this mother did not do so and as a result the children’s daily life and education had not been disrupted. In my view her decision to go off by herself under the circumstances of her difficult situation does not deserve any criticism, and certainly not from the Father of all people whose extra-marital affair was clearly the cause for such decision.

51.  In the premises and for the reasons aforesaid, and having heard the Social Work Officers both of whom having found no concern at all of the Mother’s mental state, and having seen and heard the Mother whose devotion to her children I have no reason to doubt, and who impressed to be calm, balanced and composed throughout the trial, I believe that she has now got over whatever emotional problems that she had in the past, and I agree with Ms Yip that her run-away was one-off, temporary and historical, and that the Father’s suggestion of a repeat is fanciful and wholly unrealistic.

Parental Alienation

52.  It is the Father’s case that both he and his family members including the paternal grandmother have since the parties’ separation heard from the children in particularly the elder child WL about the Mother badmouthing their father as a bad person in front of them [B1/179 - 180, B2/453 – 455], and of a song sung by WL with lyrics of “hating father” which he believes to have been taught by the Mother as evidence of the Mother alienating the children from him given her blaming him for the failure of their marriage and her poor relationship with his family.

53.  This is of course denied by the Mother and with just the words of the Father and his family members against hers, it essentially boils down to whether all the other evidence is consistent with the Mother engaging upon such alienation, of which Ms Yip submits on the basis of the following that they are not:      

(a) that the Mother never raised a hue when the Father was late after access;

(b) that the Mother would always agree to the Father’s request for extra accesses such as to take WL for ice-skating lesions or to stay overnight at the Father’s place when the paternal grandfather was visiting;

(c) that the Mother did not blame the paternal grandmother when WL was injured whilst under her care;

(d) that the Mother did express her gratitude to the paternal grandmother for looking after the children during her absence;

(e) that the Mother was grateful to the paternal aunt for assisting in taking care of WL when she went out with the Father;

(f) that the Mother even agreed that in the event of care and control of the children being granted to her, that staying access of the children can take place with the Father’s close family members such as the paternal grandmother even though the Father may not be in Hong Kong.       

54.  Ms Yip therefore submits that one cannot see how these acts are consistent with a mother who is alienating her children from their father and his family, and that more tellingly there is no record at all of alienation in either Social Investigation Reports, of which the Father agreed that he would not have missed it, hence its absence in either reports glaringly suggests that alienation never existed, and his such complaint is just completely baseless.  

55.  Even if what the Father has said about WL are true and accurate, it seems to me that his case of the Mother’s parental alienation rested essentially on the implication of the boy living with her and on her alleged poor relationship with the paternal family, but the former has ignored the possibility of the boy just picking up such phrases or song elsewhere such as at his school, while the latter appears more one-sided from the paternal family rather than from the Mother, as reflected by the many criticisms levelled against her in the affirmations and evidence of the paternal grandmother and aunt, such as the aunt’s allegation of her spending little time with the younger boy SF in the hospital in July 2013 for allergy which was clearly not true and ill-founded.         

56.  Above all, this reliance by the Father of the Mother’s alleged poor relationship with his family to support of his case again seems to me contradictory or at least inconsistent with some of his text messages to her in which he appeared to be on her side and was supportive of her such as those referred to above. Ultimately the facts and evidence before me are simply not consistent with a case of parental alienation, nor is it supported by the observed close relationship of WL with his father, and I am not convinced at all that this mother would do something like that. In the premises I find this allegation of the Father unsubstantiated or unjustified.

Mother’s Lack of Support Network

57.  It is submitted on behalf of the Father that it would not be an easy task for the Mother to take care of the 2 children by herself in Hong Kong without family support except perhaps her mother who is however a heavy smoker and drinker, and had told him that she used to hit her former husband causing injuries, that she hates children because they are noisy and troublesome, and that she still goes out with different men from time to time, hence with such lifestyle and values she could hardly be trusted with the care of the children.

58.  The maternal grandmother in her evidence denied ever telling the Father that she hates children or is prone to using violence or that she is a drinker, although she did admit to being a smoker in the past but has already quit that habit. It is of course not easy to revolve who was telling the truth as it was again just a case of his words against hers, but as pointed out by Ms Yip, if indeed the Father had such serious concerns over the maternal grandmother’s lifestyle and values which may impact on his children, why did he not raise them with either Social Work Officers save for his concern expressed in the 1st report that the grandmother would be intrusive in the care of the children [B1/146 §22]?

59.  While her role in the past may obviously have been quite limited, but having seen and heard the maternal grandmother in evidence, I have no doubt that she is genuinely ready and willing to support the Mother in her care of the children.          

60.  I shall next consider the Father’s own case for care and control of the children, starting with the most controversial one about his availability to be their primary carer.      

Father’s Availability to the Children

61.    In his said 2nd Affirmation filed in support of his application for care and control of the children, the Father proposed to stay fulltime in Hong Kong as their primary carer, and that from February 2014 he had started to hand over his work to other staff of his father’s company in Wuhan so as to gradually increase the time that he could stay in Hong Kong with the children, and where he will work instead of in Wuhan for his father’s company [B1/192].  

62.  It is also the Father’s proposal that the paternal grandmother will continue to assist him in his care of the children, as she had done since their birth and to whom they are very attached. This he claims will also enable them to see and play with their cousins, i.e. the 2 children of his sister on daily basis as they live in the same neighbourhood and that one of them attends the same school of the 2 boys.

63.  The Mother however seriously doubts that the Father will indeed make himself available to care for the children, as his travel records show that he simply cannot afford to do so, or at least to provide the children the quality and quantity of time which she is able to do, notwithstanding that even after knowing that she had taken issue with his availability for the children, the fact is that he still spent only half of his time away from Hong Kong in most of 2014.

64.  According to the monthly charts prepared by the Mother of his days in Hong Kong from January 2012 to November 2014 [C1/204 – 238] based on the statements of his travel records [C1/133 – 134], the Father only spent a total of 45 days in Hong Kong in 2013, and while that figure did improve substantially to 165 days in 2014, as noted by the Mother it still represented no more than half of that year.

65.  Furthermore, Ms Yip submits, that during those days when he was not in Hong Kong the Father had missed most of his access time to the elder boy WL on Sundays in 2014 as tabulated in §130 of her closing submission, of which the Mother argues as inexcusable given the fact that flights between Wuhan and Hong Kong are frequent and only takes less than 2 hours.

66.  For the same reason, Ms Yip submits, the Father also failed to spend much time with the younger boy SF in 2014 either as he was not in Hong Kong half of the time, and that what he had told Officer Wan in §15 of the 1st Social Investigation Report that he had since February 2014 stayed in Hong Kong without travel to Wuhan in order to look after SF turns out to be untrue, as the tabulation in §132 of Ms Yip’s closing submission shows that the Father was in fact in Hong Kong for only 8 days in February, 14 days in March, 15 days in April, and 12 days in May up to the time when the report was submitted, meaning that either his work still required him to spend much time away from Hong Kong, or that he has other reasons to be away.

67.  Ms Yip also points out that as late as December 2014 the Father’s avowed position to the 2nd Social Work Officer remained that he was just a consultant of his father’s business and hence he would station and work from home in Hong Kong through telephone and internet, and that he would only need to travel to Wuhan 2 or 3 days each month at most according to §4 of the 2nd report [B1/413], which she submits is totally inconsistent with his evidence in court when he admitted that he had also travelled to Shenzhen and Macau on various occasions allegedly not only to seek new business opportunities but also to attend weddings of friends and other social occasions.

68.  All these travelling of the Father just show, Ms Yip submits, that he did not think it through carefully about his plan to become a full-time carer of his children, that it is fickle, jury-rigged and inadequate, and that there is no reason why the court should just accept his words and entrust the children in his care when there was no history at all of him practising this role, when the evidence abundantly suggests that he was and will have to be away from his children for various reasons such as working, entertaining, socializing and dating.

69.  In fact, Ms Yip submits, the Father’s plan to become a fulltime carer was litigation-driven tactic crafted in the middle of cross-examination to boost his own case, as the Mother believes that it is impossible for him to work from home in Hong Kong, as the evidence of his involvement in his father’s company in Wuhan in the past clearly suggests he has been groomed to take over the business being the only son and adult male descendant of his family, and that on his own admission he is still in the learning process of doing business for the purpose of succeeding his father’s business.

70.  I agree with these submissions. While it is not entirely clear about the nature of the business that the Father has been involved in Wuhan other than it is quite wide ranging and substantial, the very fact that he had spent so much time away from Hong Kong in the past on business just show that what he is now proposing to do the same but instead only through telephone and internet at home and without travelling out of Hong Kong is to me wholly unrealistic and highly unlikely if not downright impossible.    

71.  In the premises the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is, as submitted by Ms Yip, that the Father will have to continue to work in Wuhan with a view to eventually succeeding his father’s business, that he could not even trim his travelling which has been extensive geographically and time-wise, and that they are not just work-related, as he has admitted to have entertained friends from time to time in Shenzhen and Macau, as well as spending time with his girlfriend in Wuhan. Of the latter the Mother believes there are other implications which may reflect on the Father’s parental fitness.

Father’s Extra-Marital Affair

72.  Ms Yip has described the Father’s evidence about his extra-marital affair as deliberate untruth and shows a flaw in his character that may have implication on his parental ability, which was first raised in the Mother’s said 1st Affirmation when she described the events which eventually led to the breakdown of the marriage, but to which the Father never made any reply in any affirmation and even denied it in the 1st Social Investigation Report, and only at the trial when he tried to explain away the various evidence of such affair with audacious lies or excuses which Ms Yip submits just go to show that he is immature and with inclination to engage in a process of denial and prone to avoid responsibility, and has been increasingly overcome by his prejudice against the Mother.

73.  In stark contrast, Ms Yip submits and I agree, the Mother presents as open-minded, gentle, and balanced, and has shown to be able to get over the failure of her marriage, whereas the Father has been unable to do so and instead seeks comfort in finding faults on the Mother by picking on minor and ambiguous incidents to convince himself that she was not a good mother and to justify his extra-marital affair. All these show that, Ms Yip validly argues, the Father is emotionally weak and unable to handle stress, and will inevitably rely on others such as his mother and helpers to take care of the children especially when things get tough or difficult, which is the next issue.

Father’s Support Nertwork & Reliance of Others

74.  There is no question about the Father’s obvious stronger support network with 3 domestic helpers and the paternal grandmother who had resided with the parties during their marriage and participated in the daily care of the children, as well as the paternal aunt who has her own family living in the same neighbourhood with 2 children of similar age as cousins to the 2 boys to play with and to go to the same school.

75.  Ms Yip however argues that it is for this reason and from the evidence before the court that the children will be looked after by the Mother herself if she has their care and control, and that there is no question that they will still be able to enjoy the companionship of the paternal family on weekends including their cousins whom they see everyday at school, whereas if care and control goes to the Father, they will no doubt be left in the hands of the paternal grandmother and the helpers, as even the Father himself has admitted in the 1st Social Investigation Report that childcare duty mainly depended on the domestic helpers and that he and the Mother only sometimes assisted [B1/143 §7], and that in his own testimony he thinks it is the duty and responsibility of his mother and sister to take care of his children after the divorce.

76.  From the details given by the paternal grandmother in her affirmation [B1/277 – 282] of how she had assisted in the care of the children since their birth and that she would continue to do so for the Father should he be granted their care and control, one can see why there is concern on the part of the Mother that the Father would indeed leave the children in the care of his mother and the helpers, and hence of the doubts over his proclaimed desire to become a full-time parent and the feasibility for him to just work at home on his father’s business without travelling out of Hong Kong in future, I agree that such concern of the Mother is both real and justified.

Preference for Mother

77.  Even assuming that the Father would indeed quit working in his family business to stay full-time in Hong Kong to be a fulltime parent to the children, Ms Yip submits that at their very age it would still be in their best interests to be taken care of by their mother unless this is unsuitable for some compelling reasons, as Roger VP put it the Court of Appeal decision of R v Y CACV 193 of 2010:

“10. This court was reminded of a large number of decisions which have stressed the importance of the mother in the life of a young child. In this respect I would simply refer to the case of Brixey v Lynas [1996] 2 FLR 499. It is unnecessary to cite from the speech of Lord Jauncey; it is sufficient to say that what he said there was clearly based on practical experience and the realities of life and is not a matter of prejudice or discrimination.”

78.  That case of Brixey v Lynas concerned a 4-year-old girl whose custody was first granted to the father notwithstanding that she was found to be happy and well looked after by the mother, as it was concluded that the child’s best interest to become part of the father’s family with all the advantages of comfort, education and a strong and stable moral framework. On appeal by the mother it was held that the lower court erred in failing to take into account the advantages of maternal care for a very young child and of maintaining the status quo which had successfully existed since the child’s birth. The father’s appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed and at p504B of the judgment Lord Jauncey said:

“ … Butler-Sloss LJ with her great experience of family cases accepts that it is natural for young children to be with their mothers and in the above message in Re A which is particularly relevant to this case she points to the difficulty of displacing an unbroken relationship between a mother and a very young child unless the mother is unsuitable to have care.

The paramount consideration in any dispute as to custody is the welfare of the child … To determine what is in the best interests of a very young child regard must necessarily be had to its relationship with the mother with whom it is living. To suggest that any recognition of the natural mother’s natural ability to look after a very young child amounts to sexual discrimination is absurd. Nature has endowed men and women with very different attributes and it so happens that mothers are generally better fitted than fathers to provide for the needs of very young children. This is no more discriminatory than the fact that only women can give birth. Every case must be considered on its own facts. There will be other cases where the child is older and the matter is finely balanced. However, here the child is very young, has never been separated from its mother or half-sister for any significant length of time and it is not suggested that the mother is unsuitable to care for her. In that situation the advantage of continued care with the mother without disturbance of the status quo must be an important factor to be taken into account.”   

79.  In the case of Aslam v Ali CACV 144 of 2003 where the Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision which awarded the custody care and control of three children aged 8, 5 and 4 respectively to the father which was the status quo, Roger VP again emphasized the important role of a mother in looking after young children at §36 of his judgment:

 “ … There can be no doubt that the role of a mother in looking after young children is particularly important. The 2 boys are, in my view, still very young. Sumayyah is only a little older, but being a girl, also needs a mother’s attention …”

80.  Mr Shieh submits that there is no immutable or rigid rule that this must be the case, that time spent with the child prior to the proceedings and the degree of attachment are important matters that must be considered, and that the Father in this case is not the normal type of working father but rather working in his own family’s business with great flexibility in terms of time and delegation to others that he can become be a fulltime father to his children, and hence he submits that there should be no preference of the mother over the father in this case.

81.  With respect I find this submission missing the points about the particular advantage of a suitable mother to care for her very young children so articulated in those cases cited above, that even if the Father is indeed able to be a full-time parent as he so proclaimed, of which I have already expressed my grave reservations, that it would still not be good enough reason to displace the Mother as the primary carer of the children in the circumstances of this case.

Status Quo

82.  This one last point raised by the Father essentially concerns the younger child SF who has not lived with the Mother since early 2014, and hence Mr Shieh submits that it would be undesirable to uproot him from his father and his familiar home, whereas if WL is to live with the Father, he will merely be returning to the same familiar home.

83.  There is no question of the importance of status quo as a relevant factor to be taken into account by the court, and it can be safely be assumed that when the 2nd Social Work Officer recommended care and control of SF be given to the Mother, he must have taken into consideration that factor and any possible impact it may have on SF. Given the undisputed close relationship he has with his mother despite having lived apart from her most of the time since 2014, I believe that whatever possible adjustment problem that he may have should be easily overcome and readily displaced by being returned to the primary care of his own mother and the companionship of his elder brother, which was after all, as I have found, the status quo of the children’s care before the breakdown of their parents’ marriage..

Conclusion

84.  As pointed out by Ms Yip, there are no perfect parents, as the parents in this case are plainly not, but having been satisfied as above that the Mother has been the primary carer of both children since their birth and that as a full-time housewife she will be ready and able to devote her time and attention to care for them after the divorce, and who has the unchallenged support of at least the 2nd Social Work Officer, the ultimate question for me must be whether it would be in their best interests for these two very small children to be placed in the care of the Father who had had little participation in their daily care in the past due to his heavy business involvement in Wuhan that had kept him away from Hong Kong most of the time, essentially just on his assurance that he can and will become their full-time carer in Hong Kong by working only at home through telephone and computer without having to travel to Wuhan to tend to his father’s business or to see his girlfriend or entertaining his friends.

85.  This is of course not to suggest that any parent must forgo or give up all his or her own personal obligations or activities in order to do a good job as primary carer of his or her children, and I have no doubt in this case of the Father’s love or concern for his 2 children, or of his abundant support network in assistance from his mother, sister and domestic helpers or his financial means to make any necessary financial provisions for his children, but I am simply not convinced at all that he would indeed do as he claims, or able to adhere to his proclaimed commitments to be a full-time parent in Hong Kong in the circumstances of his case as the only son of his family groomed to take over his father’s businesses in China and with a girlfriend residing in Wuhan. It would indeed be naïve to believe that he would not end up delegating the primary care of his children to the paternal grandmother or his helpers, as he had to the Mother in the past.

86.  Henceforth the answer to that question posted above must in the premises and for all the reasons aforesaid be a resounding ‘no’, as it is clearly in my judgment that it would be in their best interests for the care and control of both children to be vested with the Mother, and I so order accordingly, and subject to any agreement which the parties may have regarding the Father’s access over the forthcoming summer holiday of the children, that the younger child SF shall be handed over to the Mother’s care upon the completion of his current school term, whereupon I agree that the Father should have the kind of access to both children along the line of the current arrangement between the parties. I would also expect him to hold proper discussion with the Mother as to his financial provision for her and the children consequential to the orders that I have now made, albeit on interim basis and of that I mean including the use of domestic helper for her household given the kind of lifestyle she and the children used to enjoy during the marriage.

87.  Lastly, as to the question of costs, I shall wait to hear from the parties as to whether it be dealt with on paper by written submission or that a hearing be fixed to hear argument. It remains of course my gratitude to counsels for both sides for their valuable assistance rendered to this court throughout the trial.

( Bruno Chan )
District Judge

Ms Anita Yip SC instructed by M/S Chaine, Chow & Barbara Hung for the Petitioner.

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Ms Rachael Siu instructed by M/S Cheung & Choy for the Respondent.