WONG FU YING v. YUEN KING HAY AND OTHERS

HCA 2612/2014

[2025] HKCFI 5068

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2014年第2612號

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判 案 書

背景

1.  原告人黃富英（「黃女士」）在本案中提出對新界北丈量約分第89號314，312至313地段逆權侵佔的主張。

2.  第一被告人(「袁先生」)是新界北丈量約分第89號312-313地段的登記業主。

3.  第二及第三被告人是新界北丈量約分第89號314地段的聯權業主。法庭下達命令，批准本訴訟可在第二及第三被告人無遺產代理人情況下，繼續進行法律程序，而其後法庭作出的判決或命令，對第二及第三被告人的遺產有約束力。但第二及第三被告選擇不出席本次審訊。

4.  黃女士聲稱第四被告人就312-313地段而言是袁先生的代理人。2018年2月7日法庭批準黃女士終止對第四被告人之訴訟。

原告人的狀書案情

5.  1960年代，黃女士的大伯（黃妹）開始佔用及管有地段311、312的大部分、313及314的幾乎全部、316的大部分、322的部分、323和一塊政府土地（下稱「該佔用地段」）。在黃女士父親的協助下，黃妹在該佔用地段上經營養雞場。

6.  起初，他們用竹、木及磚包圍著該佔用地段，後來用鐵絲網代替。早在1973年12月之前，他們已經完成了地段311-314場地的清理工作；將地段323的大部分土地改建成了養鴨和養鵝的池塘；建造了構建物用作住宅、雞舍和飼料棚用途；並用鐵絲網圍欄圍起了該佔用地段。

7.  1960年代，黃女士的父親申請將該地方命名為上水料壆新村。該佔用地段上的住宅建築被定名為料壆新村18號。

8.  約1975或1976年，黃女士的父親、黃女士的二哥和黃女士搬入該佔用地段照顧黃妹並經營養雞場。搬入後，黃女士的父親在快景路旁的政府土地上豎起了鐵閘。

9.  黃妹隨後將雞場交給黃女士的父親。1979年黃妹去世，黃女士的父親繼續經營養鷄場及排他性地管有該佔用地段。同年黃女士的母親去世後，黃女士的大哥黃建榮及四妹黃富珍搬到該佔用地段居住。

10.  1980年代，黃女士的父親修葺及/或加固了鐵絲網圍欄。約1990年，黃女士的父親因瘟疫停止經營雞場，並在該佔用地段上種植果樹。

11.  黃女士於1984年結婚後搬離了該佔用地段。2008年，黃女士與丈夫分居後搬回該佔用地段居住。黃女士的父親於2009年去世，黃女士繼續佔用和管有該佔用地段。

12.  截至《申索書》日期(即2015年7月13日)，該佔用地段上有一棟黃女士居住的建築物，以及另外三棟用作浴室、廚房和倉庫的臨時建築物，這些建築物在佔用圖上被標識為「TS，臨時建築」。

13.  自1960年代以來，黃妹、黃女士的父親、和黃女士對該佔用地段的管有和佔用一直持續、且對全世界包括該佔用地段的登記業主作出具有排他性的管有和佔用。到1989年，或最遲到1993年12月，袁先生對312-313號地段的所有權已終絕及黃女士已取得地段312-314的管有業權。

地段314的業權

14.  黃女士指出，她大伯，父親和自己在地段314上建造了一棟可居住的建築物。這從衞星圖片中亦能見到。

15.  本席認為黃女士的證據在這方面可信。本席相信黃女士在314地段上已經行駛了有排他性的佔用權超過20年。她亦對該土地上的建築物作出了翻新和裝修。本席亦留意到並沒有人或任何證據顯示在黃女士佔用314地段期間，其他人可以自由進入314地段及其建築物。

16.  本席亦同時考慮到第二和第三被告並不就其物業作出主張和抗辯。其結果是有關的地段有可能淪為政府的物業。

17.  本席考慮並接納黃女士就地段314的証供。因此判黃女士擁有地段314的業權。

袁先生的狀書案情

18.  袁先生是地段312和313號的登記業主。這兩地段存在爭議。

19.  地段312和313在1960年代曾為耕地。1970年代至1991年間，312和313地段以每年100元的價格出租給一位名叫袁仁基的人。袁仁基佔用及管有地段312-313，並在其上搭建了臨時建築。重陽節期間，當袁先生及其親屬族人前往位於地段312-313附近的祖墳祭祖時，袁仁基會向袁先生支付租金。

20.  袁仁基於1991年或1992年左右將地段312和313交還給袁先生。當時，地段312和313已荒廢，地段313上的臨時建築也已拆除。

21.  在本案開始之前和之後，袁先生可以從快景路步行到312-313地段，沒有任何阻礙。在所有關鍵時刻，上述地段過去和現在均未曾被圍欄圍起來，更沒有被完全圍起來，並且可以不受任何阻礙地進入。

22.  袁先生否認黃妹和/或黃女士的父親曾在1990年之前曾佔用及管有312-313號地段全部或部分用作養雞場。

23.  袁先生亦指出如果黃沛在1990年之前確實佔用312號和313號地段作為養雞場，事實上是他於1990年亦已停止佔用312號和313號地段，此後也不再管有312號和313號地段。

24.  除312號地塊上有兩棵果樹外，袁先生不承認黃沛在312或313號地段上種植過任何果樹，即使這兩棵果樹是由黃沛種植的，也不構成管有或排他性管有312或313號地段。

25.  自1991年或1992年以來，地段312-313上沒有臨時建築物，地塊314上的四座臨時建築物，但到2008年已破舊不堪，無法居住。袁先生否認黃女士曾在這些建築物內居住過，更否認其對地段312和313有管有或排他性的管有。

26.  約於2005年，有人以黃沛的名義向水務署申請向料壆新村18號供水，該地址是位於地段312和313北側政府土地上的一座臨時建築物。袁先生否認該地址包括地段312和313。

黃女士的答覆書

27.  在所有關鍵時刻，該佔用地段上的所有建築物均由黃妹和/或黃女士的父親建造。

28.  約在1990年，黃女士的父親應政府要求拆除了位於地段312和313上的養雞場。

29.  在關鍵時刻，除了袁先生等人拆除了部分區域的時間，該佔用地段均被圍籬圍起來。

30.  黃女士的父親曾向政府申請向該佔用地段包括地段312、313和314的土地供水。

31.  自拆除地段312和313的養雞場之後，黃沛仍然繼續排他性地管有312和313地段。

32.  約在2014年12月，袁先生聲稱出租了地段319，並將地段312和313出售給一名名叫吳雪明的人，隨後非法侵入地段312、313和314，並曾打開了黃女士的房門和門鎖。

適用法律原則

33.  根據終審法院在Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai [1998] HKLRD 241 一案中所闡釋的法律原則，當中包括一名聲稱逆權管有土地的人必須證明：-

(1)  他實際上是管有該相關土地，以及他是懷着管有土地所需的意圖。

(2)  前者是他一直像業權擁有人般使用該相關土地，期間沒有其他人作出相同行為。

(3)  後者「懷着管有土地所需的意圖」，意指在合理可行和法律容許下，不讓任何人來管有該相關土地，包括業權擁有人。

(4)  對於佔用人在佔用期間，或在法律程序中，作出有利自己，而和逆權管有意圖相關的陳述，法庭會抱持懷疑的態度作出評估；相反，就着佔用人作出對自己不利的陳述，法庭會給予一定的比重。

34.  在 Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 一案中，詳述了除非有相反證據，否則法庭會假定業權擁有人懷着管有該相關土地的所需意圖。對於業權擁有人親自或由他人代為作出的行為，即使微不足道，都會被視為業權擁有人沒有中止管有土地的證據；反之，佔用人則須提出有說服力的證據(“compelling evidence”)，證明他不僅懷着管有土地所需的意圖，而且是透過言詞或行為把這意圖清楚地公開宣示。倘若佔用人的言行未能清楚地在人前展示這意圖，法庭將視他為欠缺管有土地所需的意圖。

35.  本席同意，本案的舉證責任在於黃女士，她必須提出有說服力的證據，證明她實際上是管有312和313地段，並懷着所需的管有意圖；反之，袁先生作為註冊業主並沒有反證責任。

事實上管有

36.  黃女士依賴以下三點作為她逆權侵佔的依據：

(1)  用圍欄/鐵絲網包圍整個該佔用地段。

(2)  1960年代至1990，她的大伯和父親在該佔用地段上經營養雞場。

(3)  自1991年起她的父親在該佔用地段種植果樹。

鐵絲網/圍欄包圍整個該佔用地段

37.  黃女士的案情是，早在1973年12月之前，她的大伯和她的父親就已經用鐵絲網圍住了該佔用地段，並且在1980年代，她的父親對鐵絲網圍欄進行了維修和/或加固。

38.  在沒有所有權的情況下聲稱對土地進行控制的人，在控制有效之前並不獲得管有權。參閱 Stephen Jourdan 所著的《逆權侵佔》（「該著作」），第二版（2011年），第7-25段。

“A person asserting control to land without title does not acquire possession until the control becomes effective.” See Stephen Jourdan on Adverse Possession) (“the Book”), 2^nd edition (2011) at §7-25.

39.  通常，在有爭議的土地上豎立足以阻止他人進入的圍欄，即構成明確的管有行為，因為它表明了豎立圍欄的人有權將他人排除在土地之外。顯然，在無法阻止任何人進入的圍欄上，不應給予任何比重。參閱「該著作」，第13-09段。

“Normally erecting a fence sufficient to exclude people from entering on the disputed land is an unequivocal act of possession, asserting as it does the right of the person putting it up to exclude others from the land. Clearly, little or no weight could be attached to a fence not capable of excluding anyone.” See the Book, at §13-09.

40.  本案中，本席認為黃女士是一個可靠的事實證人，但是事隔多年，有些事實黃女士記不清楚亦十分正常。本席主要以雙方專家同意的意見和衞星圖片為最主要的考慮證據。

(1)  黃女士大伯黄妹於1960年代開始佔用該佔用地段一事，黃女士坦承承認她沒有個人認知，而是聽父親說的。

(2)  父親告訴她1975年之前應該有木門和鎖，到了1975年，大門已經建好了。

(3)  她忘了圍欄是在1980年代那一年建造的，據稱是她的兩位兄長幫手建造的，她本人並不知情。

(4)  她所說的「從始至終」是指1980年代，但她沒有個人認知。

41.  雙方就對方專家證人的專家身份並無爭議。在《聯合專家報告》第8.1.3段中表示：自1973年以來，可觀察到一條人行道，作為穿過該佔用地段通往主幹道(快景路)的通道。自1990年以來，在同一地點，首次在該佔用地段的西北端觀察到一座閘，並確認該閘為侵佔圖上的「閘」。

42.  雙方專家同意：-

(1)  兩棵樹下和樹之間的任何空隙或縫隙都可能被樹冠覆蓋，因此從航拍照片上看不到。

(2)  黃女士知道，完全圍起來是逆權侵占的有力證據。如果航拍照片有證據證明圍欄把該佔用地段完全圍起來，專家會在他的專家報告中如此陳述。

(3)  雙方專家討論了圍欄有否完全圍該佔用地段的問題。雙方一致認為，無法透過航拍照片確定該佔用地段曾被圍欄完全圍起來。

43.  最重要的是，黃女士及其妹妹黃富珍亦同意在所有相關時刻該佔用地段沒有被圍欄或鐵絲網完全包圍以排除第三者進入。她們同意有些地方圍欄或鐵絲網壞了，外人是可以隨意進入的。

44.  本席認為最重要的是黃女士坦白確認除了她父親在Lot 314地段內的一塊4英尺x7英尺大小的土地上種植蔬菜外，他們沒有在其他地段上種植蔬菜。儘管原告說她從未見過其他人在312-313和316號地段上種植蔬菜，但在日期為1990年9月7日和1991年9月12日的航拍照片可見312-313地段有明顯一行一行的耕種痕跡(參閱聯合專家報告第7.3.1和第7.3.2段)。同樣地，在日期為1981年10月28日的航拍照片可見316地段有明顯一行一行的耕種痕跡(參閱聯合專家報告)。本席同意，這顯示除了黃女士的家人之外，還有其他人可以進入了312-313號和316號地段，而且亦確實進入該些地段並種植了蔬菜。這與袁先生關鍵時刻還有其他群體佔用該佔用地段的論點吻合。

45.  本席認為，事實上該佔用地段並沒有一直而且全面被鐵絲網/圍欄圍起來，亦無法阻止第三者進入。明顯地，在312，313地段上有其他人種植蔬菜。

46.  由於自1990年第三者在312-313號地段上已經展開耕種，黃女士和她的父親並不能被視為對312-313號地段擁有排他性的管有權。本席同意就算她們曾經擁有管有權，但在1990後，已經不再擁有了。

在該佔用地段上經營養雞場

47.  根據《聯合專家報告》，在1956年至1964年期間，該佔用地段是耕地。這很容易辨認。因此，本席同意黃女士的大伯不可能在1964年之前經營養雞場。

48.  黃女士和她妹妹都表示她們對「黃女士大伯1960年代開始佔用該佔用地段經營養雞場」並沒有個人認知，只是聽她們的父親說的。

49.  在Powell v McFarlane一案中，放牧牛羊吃草地裡生長的草被認為不構成管有權。這僅僅是非法佔有者從土地上獲取的眾多利潤之一。參閱「該著作」，第13-63段。

“In Powell v McFarlane, the grazing of cows and goats was held not to amount to possession. It was merely one of a number of profits taken by the squatter from the land.”: the Book at §13-63.

50.  黃女士的說法是她們養的是走地雞，晚上會收集回來，關在雞舍。應用Powell v McFarlane案例的原理，讓走地雞通處走、覓食和生蛋並不會令雞隻走過和覓食過的地方構成管有權。

51.  所以在312-313地段上建造雞舍是證明事實上管有的關鍵證據。1973年12月19日的航拍照片顯示，312-313地段上沒有任何建築物，所以並沒有經營養雞場雞舍的客觀証據。參閱《聯合專家報告》第7.3.1段和第7.3.2段。

52.  本席同意葉大律師的說法，1973年的航拍照片可以見到沒有經營養雞場的痕跡。如果之前黃女士的父親和大伯曾在該佔用地段經營養雞場，但1973年之前雞舍(如果有的話)都已經被拆除了。那麼他們便不再管有312-313地段，事實管有終止。時限要從312-313地段上重新建造雞舍計算。

53.  黃女士亦清楚說她在1976年去312號地段時看到有建築物。她說，該佔用地段的所有雞舍都在1990年拆除。當她被要求畫出該11間屋舍時，她只可以在314地段劃上四間屋舍，但她不能將其他屋舍畫出來。這是可以理解的。因為畢竟時間已經過了很久。

54.  根據《聯合專家報告》第7.3.1段，1980年在地段312發現了一個池塘和兩棟建築物。在2018年6月29日提交的專家報告第14.4段中，專家認為1990年的空拍照片顯示「地段312上的所有建築物均已被拆除」。至於地段313，根據《聯合專家報告》第7.3.2段，1975年建造的一棟建築物，但於1991年拆除。

55.  本席同意假設312-313號地段上的臨時建築物是由黃女士的父親和大伯建造作為雞舍用途的，312號和313號地段上的建築物分別僅存在了10年和16年，不足20年，不能構成逆權管有。

56.  至於養雞，黃女士的妹妹說她六歲(1972年)的時候在311-313號地段上已經見到地上有三尺高的小圍欄，用來把大雞和小雞分開的，她還在佔用圖上畫出小圍欄的位置。但專家報告第10.4段提到了1973年12月19日在拍攝的航拍照片，其中第10.14段指出「觀察到一線性特徵沿著314號地段西邊界延伸至313和312號地段南邊界。」此外，重要的是1973年的航拍照片顯示，312-313號地塊上沒有臨時建築。

57.  黃女士的妹妹在佔用圖上繪製的兩個圓形圍欄並未出現在1973航拍照片中。本席同意如果1973年清場之前有小圍欄存在的話，好明顯1973年在清場時間，312-313地段上是沒有養雞的設施。經營養雞場自此中斷。黃女士管有該佔用地段也都隨之已終止，如有後續逆權侵占行為，時限需要重新開始計算。

58.  「在許多案件中，如果擅自佔地者為了圈養動物而豎立圍欄，法院會裁定，圍欄的豎立並未表明其佔有意圖。…在SS Global Ltd v Sava 案中，御用大律師 Peter Leaver 表示：『…為了構成佔有的證據，圍欄的豎立必須是為了阻止人們進入土地，而不僅僅是為了圈養動物或防止它們走失。』」參閱「該著作」，第13-16段

“In a number of cases, where the squatter has erected a fence to keep animals in, the Courts have held that the erection of the fence did not manifest the intention to possess. …In SS Global Ltd v Sava, Peter Leaver QC said ‘… in order to be treated as evidence of possession, the erection of fences must be for the purpose of keeping people out of the land and not merely for the purpose of keeping animals in or preventing them from straying.’” : the Book at §13-16

59.  基上述原因，本席認為黃女士未能提供有說服力的證據證明她的大伯和父親曾在1990年之前連續多於20年佔用及管有312-313號地段全部或部分用作養雞場。

種植果樹

60.  原告黃女士的專家透過引用航拍照片確認：-

(1)  在日期為1980年4月18日的航拍照片312-313地段有機會有樹仔;

(2)  在日期為1982年12月29日的航拍照片312-313地段上看不到有樹;

(3)  在日期為1989年11月13日的航拍照片312地段上可能有三棵樹，313地段上看不到有樹;

(4)  在日期為1990年9月7日的航拍照片312地段上看到該三棵樹;

(5)  在日期為1991年9月12日的航拍照片312地段上看到該三棵樹，可能大棵咗;

(6)  在日期為1990年9月7日的航拍照片311地段上看到人為種樹的痕跡。

(7)  1989至1991年312-313地段沒有新種的樹;

(8)  在日期為1990年9月7日和1991年9月12日的航拍照片可見312-313地段有明顯一行一行的耕種痕跡。

61.  根據《聯合專家報告》第7.3.1段和第7.3.2段，312-313號地塊在1990年至1992年間為耕地。

62.  黃女士說，該佔用地段的所有雞舍都在1990年拆除。1991年，她「父親改為在該佔用地段種植果樹」。她說她會在312-313號地段行來行去、遛狗、放雜物和焚燒垃圾，沒有其他用途。本席同意這些瑣碎行為不足以構成管有。參閱：-

(1)  「在 Techild Ltd v Chamberlain 案中，…擅自佔地者擁有與爭議土地相鄰的房產，並允許其子女在該房產上玩耍，甚至放牧牲畜。上訴法院裁定，擅自佔地者從未管有該房產。」參閱「該著作」，第13-46段。

“In Techild Ltd v Chamberlain, ... the squatter, who owned the property adjoining the disputed land, had let her children play on it and had grazed ponies on it. The Court of Appeal held that the squatter had never been in possession.” : the Book at §13-46.

(2)  僅僅建造固定裝置並不構成佔有…在一小部分有爭議的土地上建造和使用焚化爐也並不構成佔有。參閱「該著作」，第13-57段。

“Merely erecting a fixture will not amount to possession ... Nor is erecting and using an incinerator on a small part of the disputed land sufficient.” : the Book at §13-57.

63.  黃女士的妹妹說，她父親非常愛她，所以她不需要幫忙餵雞捉雞等等。然而，她對植樹產生了興趣。她和父親在該佔用地段各處植樹，種植了100-200棵果樹。尤其是在312-313號地段，她們移植了50-60棵果樹，每棵果樹大約3英尺高。她說，她們於1991年「差唔多種晒」所有上述50-60棵果樹在312-313號地段。

64.  但是原告人的專家確認，如果在312-313號地段上種植了50-60棵每棵3英尺高的果樹，那麼從航拍照片中可以看到它們。然而，1989-1994年312-313地段上看不到有五至六十棵三呎高的樹。

65.  事實上從1989至2004年航拍照片可見312-313地段上沒有人為種樹的痕跡，也看不到有五至六十棵的樹。

66.  上訴庭在Gotland Enterprises Ltd v Kwok Chi Yau（未經彙報，CACV 260/2014, 2016年1月19日）第36段中指出，為確立實際管有，切勿忽略佔用的排他性。並非所有土地的使用或佔用都能滿足此要求。法官舉了在一塊空地上種植水果的例子。如果一個人只種植果樹，而不禁止他人進入該土地，那麼他只是使用該土地，而不是排他性地佔用該土地。這類似於在某些私人財產上留下一些物品（所有者可以自由採取措施移除這些物品，以減輕非法侵入），無論物品在那裡留下多久（且土地所有者沒有移除），都不構成逆權侵占。

67.  綜上分析，除了312號地段上有2-3棵果樹外，客觀証據並不能證明原告黃女士對在312或313地段上種的樹構成管有或排他性管有312或313號地段。

結論

68.  基於以上的情況及對事實証據的衡量，本席裁定：

(1)  針對第一被告人：

(a)  裁定原告人敗訴，第一被告人的反申索得直。

(b)  撤銷原告人對第一被告人的申索，原告人須將312-313號地段的空置管有權交給第一被告人。

(c)  解除2015年9月7日法庭簽發的禁制令。

(d)  裁定原告人須支付第一被告人於本案的訟費，如雙方未能同意金額，則交由法庭評定。第一被告人的訟費按法律援助處的規則評定。

(2)  針對第二第三被告人：

(a)  原告人得直。

(b)  宣佈原告人對地段314管有業權及即日起或為業權擁有人

(c)  裁定第二第三被告人須支付原告人於本案的訟費。如雙方未能同意金額，則交由法庭評定。

原告人： 無律師代表，親自出庭應訊。

第一被告人：由高覺輝律師行轉聘葉劍明大律師代表。

第二至第四被告人：無律師代表，缺席應訊。

HCA 2612/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2612 OF 2014

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____________

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DECISION
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Introduction

1.  This is an application of the plaintiff by her summons dated 8 January 2015 (“the Summons”) for injunctions to enjoin the defendants from interfering with his use and exclusive possession of certain lots of land in the New Territories to which she claims to have acquired possessory title.

2.  The properties in question are known as Lot Nos. 312, 313 and 314 in Demarcation District No. 89 (collectively “the Land”). The 1^st defendant is the registered owner of Lot Nos. 312 and 313 (“the Lots”) whereas the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants are the registered owners of Lot No.314. The plaintiff alleges that the 4^th defendant is the agent of the 1^st defendant in respect of the Lots.

3.  The plaintiff brought this action on 29 December 2014. Only the 1^st and 4^th defendants have filed their respective Acknowledgements of Service. They are jointly represented by Mr Ko.

Relevant legal principles

4.  There is no dispute about the applicable general principles. Mr Cheung refers to the well-known American Cyanamid principles. To start with, this court has to be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried. If there is, this court should proceed to consider the adequacy of damages as a remedy and where the balance of convenience lies.  

Plaintiff’s case

5.  The plaintiff’s case of adverse possession and the alleged misconduct of the defendants can be outlined below.

6.  In the 1960s, the late father (“the Father”) and the late uncle (“the Uncle”) of the plaintiff entered the Land and built certain structures thereon including 11 houses and storage houses thereon for the purpose of their chicken farming activities.

7.  In or about 1975, the plaintiff, her 2^nd brother, the Father and the Uncle resided on the Land and took part in chicken farming together. The Uncle withdrew from the business in 1976. He passed away in 1979 and so did the plaintiff’s mother. 

8.  Thereafter, the plaintiff’s eldest brother and youngest sister started residing on the Land.

9.  In 1984, the plaintiff moved out from the Land and had her matrimonial home elsewhere. The chicken farm on the Land remained in existence and the Father was in charge of the same.

10.  In late 1980s, both the sister and the eldest brother of the plaintiff left the Land. In 1990, the Father also ceased chicken farming due to the outbreak of avian flu. He however continued to occupy the Land and grow a variety of fruit trees thereon.

11.  The Father in or around 1996 asked the plaintiff to take care of the Land after a row with the plaintiffs’ 2^nd brother. The Father remained in possession of the Land until he passed away in 2009.

12.  In 2008, the plaintiff separated from her husband and resumed residence on the Land until now. She also takes care of the fruit trees there with the assistance of her sister every now and then.

13.  Throughout their exclusive possession of the Land, the Land have been enclosed first by the Uncle and later by the plaintiff and her family with wooden and bamboo poles and wire fence. There is also a metal gate erected by the Father.

14.  The plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession is supported by the following documents in which the Land was referred to as the material residential address:

(1) A purchase order dated 28 April 1986 issued to the Father in respect of funeral matters relating to his late mother.;

(2) The records kept by the Commissioner of Registration dated 3 June 1980 in respect of a wooden house on the Land showing that the plaintiff, her elder brother and her sister were its occupants;

(3) The marriage certificate of the plaintiff dated 10 July 1984 showing her then residential address on the Land. There, the occupation of the Father was stated to be a farm owner;

(4) The marriage certificates of the plaintiff’s eldest and 2^nd brothers issued in the 1980s showed similar information; 

(5) The birth certificate of the daughter of the plaintiff’s eldest brother dated 1 December 1986 showing the residential address of the plaintiff’s eldest brother;

(6) A letter issued by the Water Supplies Department dated 15 March 2005 to the Father;

(7) Four demand notes for rates and/or government rent all issued in 2009; and

(8) A letter issued by the CLP Power Hong Kong Limited dated 16 January 2014 to the plaintiff’s sister certifying that the Father was the registered account owner for the electricity supply in respect of the Land from 16 November 2003 to 27 July 2012.

15.  One independent witness’s evidence lends support to the plaintiff’s case. He is Mr Ng who is a 70-year-old villager residing at the village of Lo Wu Liu Pok San Tsuen (“the Village”). The Village includes the Land. He claims to know all the 10 odd families in the Village.

16.  According to Mr Ng, the Uncle had operated the chicken farm on the Land before he settled down in the Village in 1974. Shortly afterwards, the Father and the plaintiff also moved to the Land for dwelling too.

17.  Since 2014, the 1^st defendant together with some other persons also surnamed Yuen have made offers to lease Mr Ng their land on condition that he purchases from them the Lots. He has refused persistently knowing that they have long been occupied by the plaintiff.

18.  The plaintiff’s complaints about the wrongdoings of the 1^st and 4^th defendants consist of the following:

(1) A person named Yuen Wai Tin (“Yuen”) claiming to be acting for the landowner came to the Land with three other persons holding pipe ducts. They demanded the plaintiff and her sister to vacate the Land with threat of physical violence. The plaintiff summonsed the police.

(2) Yuen repeated his demand in the subsequent years. In early 2011, notices were posed on the front gate of the Land with the contacts of two persons including Yuen. The notices bore the name of 羅湖袁氏（土地）物業管理有限公司.

(3) In mid 2011, Yuen and other persons armed with wooden logs arrived at the Land and demanded demolition of the front gate of the Land. Again, the police was called.

(4) In early 2012, Yuen and his assistants made the demand again to the plaintiff at the Land. The plaintiff did not accede to their demand. A few days later, some of the dogs of the plaintiff died under suspicious circumstances.

(5) In December 2013, the CCTV camera installed at the front gate and the other CCTV camera installed at the dwelling house on the Land were damaged and the memory cards inside them went missing.

(6) Since early 2014, trespass against the Land has got rampant. The front gate was repeatedly criminally damaged by red paint and ultimately unlawfully removed in May.

(7) Notices were again posted on the Land in May and June 2014. They were purportedly issued by 香港羅湖袁氏（袓堂）物業管理有限公司.  Yuen is its assistant director and the 1^st defendant is its shareholder and director.

(8) In September 2014, two lychee trees planted inside the Land were chopped down and the wallpaper of the door of the plaintiff’s residence was damaged.

(9) In November 2014, heaps of rubbish and an abandoned sampan were found on the Land.

(10) In December 2014, the 1^st defendant and two other men armed with bamboo poles arrived at the Land and admitted to the plaintiff that he had committed other persons to damage the house of the plaintiff erected on the Land.

19.  羅湖袁氏（土地）物業管理有限公司 has turned out to be an unregistered company. The common shareholders and directors of 香港羅湖袁氏（袓堂）物業管理有限公司 and the 4^th defendant are Yuen Kwok Keung and Yuen Kit Chor.

1^st and 4^th defendants’ case

20.  The 1^st defendant himself filed an affirmation for both himself and the 4^th defendant. He tells a wholly different story about the use of the Land.

21.  In summary, the 1^st defendant claims to be an indigenous resident of the Village. The Land was located within the restricted area close to the border of the Mainland and Hong Kong and special permit was required for entry of the restricted area before 2012. He was the holder of such a permit.

22.  He claims that the Land used to be his family’s land and his great grandfather Mr Yun was the registered owner. He managed the Land and rented the Land to one Mr Yuen Yan Ki (“YK Yuen”) from the 1970s to 1991 or 1992 and YK Yuen erected a temporary structure on the Land.

23.  The 1^st defendant understands that YK Yuen sublet Lot No.314 to a family surnamed Wong for their chicken farming activities thereon.  He did not explain how this understanding came about nonetheless.

24.  YK Yuen returned the Land to the 1^st defendant in 1991 or 1992 after having received compensation from the Hong Kong Government. After he returned the Land to the 1^st defendant, 羅湖袁氏宗親會 (“the Association”) continues to collect rent from the Wong family until recently. Only a temporary structure on the Land was then found.

25.  The 1^st defendant stresses that throughout the years until now he has no difficulties in gaining access to the Land. He denies the existence of any fence.

26.  He further produces a letter issued in 2002 by the Rating and Valuation Department. It was in reply to his application for payment of the Government rent in respect of some lots of land in DD89 including the lots.

27.  As regards the alleged molestation, harassment and trespass taking place in the Land, the 1^st defendant simply makes a bare denial. He explains that he knows that the Association has recently asked the Wong family to pay rent in arrears.

28.  The reply affirmation of the plaintiff and the affirmation of Mr Ng have caused some quarrels. Mr Ko complains about the existence of some new allegations contained therein and asks this court to expunge such allegations. Mr Cheung insists that they are mere replies.

29.  Brushing aside the debate, it should suffice to take note of the plaintiff’s denial of any occupation/possession of the Land by YK Yuen and/or his tenants. The plaintiff further denies any rental demands a made by YK Yuen and/or the Association.   

30.  The plaintiff further exhibited some search records of the 4^th defendant, 羅湖袁氏（土地）物業管理有限公司, 羅湖袁氏（土地）物業管理有限公司. The 1^st and 4^th defendants’ evidence did not cover this information at all. Arguably they are public documents and not controversial in nature. They should cause the 1^st and 4^th defendants little prejudice. I cannot see how the 1^st and 4^th defendants object to any reference to these public documents.

Discussion

Serious question to be tried?

31.  I have to decide whether the plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession and her allegations of molestation, harassment and trespasses pose serious questions to be tried. I have little hesitation in concluding that there are.

32.  In the present application, I am not in a position to make any factual findings out of the conflicting affirmation evidence adduced by the parties. I should also take into account the fact that the present action is still in its infancy and there is every possibility that the parties’ respective cases are subject to further development and/or modification. That said, the burden of proof still rests on the plaintiff.

33.  As regards the plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession, the evidence of the plaintiff shows, to say the least, that it is arguable that she has acquired the possessory title of the Land by the factual possession by her family including the Uncle and the Father since the 1970s with the requisite animus possendi.

34.  Enclosure of the Land, if ultimately established should normally support a finding of the animus possendi: Cheung Chung Yan v Chan Man Kwong & Ors., unreported, CACV 268/2003, 12.2.2004.

35.  Nothing in the evidence of the 1^st and 4^th defendants can change my view that the plaintiff’s case is arguable. I should add that I do not find cogency in their evidence. Whether the Land and in particular the Lots had been occupied by the plaintiff for more than 20 years or by YL Yuen under a lease granted by the great grandfather of the 1^st defendant remains a live issue which can only be resolved at trial. 

36.  Mr Ko painstakingly takes me through the evidence of the plaintiff and submits that her evidence is not borne out by the aero-photographs. Mr Ko explains in detail his analysis of the plaintiff’s evidence at the hearing.  However, I am far from persuaded that the plaintiff does not even have an arguable case here. I do not think I can conclude that the plaintiff’s allegations of adverse possession must be rejected on the sole basis of what can and cannot be seen in the aero-photographs.

37.  On the other hand, I firmly believe that there is a prima facie case of the 1^st defendant’s molestation, harassment and trespasses. The 1^st defendant’s denial is very lame. I need to say no more than this.

38.  I raise doubt with Mr Cheung about the actual role played by the 4^th defendant. Apparently it did not issue the notices posted at the Land though its name is very similar to those two companies implicated. The only evidence of the 4^th defendant seems to be that in September 2014, its director Yuen Kit Chor (together with the 1^st defendant) went to visit Mr Ng to discuss sale of the Lots to her. Therefore, the 4^th defendant was the agent of the 1^st defendant in respect of the Lots. Yuen Kit Chor also gave him his name card.

39.  The plaintiff has made her complaints in a very precise manner. The 1^st defendant and the 4^th defendant are represented by the same firm of solicitors. The 1^st defendant filed an affirmation to make a bare denial only and he did not explain why the 4^th defendant was not involved in the dispute. He did not deny that the 4^th defendant was not his agent. The 4^th defendant itself did not find it necessary to make an affirmation to distance itself from the plaintiff’s serious allegations.

40.  In the premises, I accept Mr Cheung’s submission that there is also a serious question to be tried between the plaintiff and the 4^th defendant.

Balance of convenience

41.  The alleged conduct of the 1^st and 4^th defendants is very serious and can give rise to criminal liabilities. This court has no hesitation in calling a halt to such objectionable conduct.

42.  The plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of the Land is now being interfered with. Her continued occupation and further use of the Land may attract physical hazards. Damages cannot be an adequate remedy.

43.  On the other hand, the alleged prejudice on the 1^st and 4^th defendants is premised only upon his inability to deal with the Land in the meantime. They can be measured in monetary terms and cannot be said to be irreparable.

44.  The 1^st and 4^th defendants have been dispossessed, for whatever reason, the Land for decades. I am persuaded that to maintain the status quo, the plaintiff and any other occupants in the Land should be afforded protection against any unlawful activities.

45.  All in all, I believe that my discretion should be exercised in favour of the injunctions sought by the plaintiff.

Delay

46.  Mr Ko complains about the delay in making this application. He points to the plaintiff’s first allegation dating back to July 2010.

47.  The tort alleged by the plaintiff indeed has continued at least until December 2014. This application was taken out in January 2015. The 1^st and 4^th defendants do not suggest any prejudice they have suffered as a result of the inaction of the plaintiff. They cannot be heard to say that they were somehow encouraged by the plaintiff’s inaction to engage in objectionable activities to evict the plaintiff from the Land.

48.  I thus come to the conclusion that there is no culpable delay on the part of the plaintiff, which would disentitle her to the interlocutory relief sought.

New allegations in the reply affirmations

49.  As mentioned above, Mr Ko complains that there were new allegations contained in the reply affirmation of the plaintiff and the affirmation of Mr Ng.

50.  Mr Cheung prepared two tables setting out his response to this accusation. I accept his submission that the large majority of the plaintiff’s evidence is merely an elaboration of the plaintiff’s case in reply to the 1^st defendant’s allegation. As noted above, the various company search records, though being new matters, are not in dispute and cause no prejudice to the 1^st and 4^th defendants.

51.  Admittedly, the evidence of Mr Ng did contain some new allegations. However, given the entirely different story that the 1^st and 4^th defendants have said about the use of the Land, Mr Ng’s evidence can cause little prejudice to them. Mr Ng’s evidence merely reinforces the plaintiff’s case. I should make it clear that without such evidence, I would also come to the same conclusion that there is a serious question to be tried.

52.  In the premises, I see no utility in embarking on the tedious exercise to go through the two affirmations and expunge those new allegations, without which I would still grant the injunctions.

Conclusion and Order

53.  For the reasons given above, I accede to the plaintiff’s application and grant all the injunctions sought in the Summons.

54.  I also make a costs order nisi that costs of and occasioned by the Summons be the plaintiff’s costs in the cause. The plaintiff’s and the 1^st defendant’s respective own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

55.  Lastly, I thank Mr Cheung and Mr Ko for their helpful assistance in this matter.