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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2014

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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[2020] HKCFI 1350-EN-2020-06-26

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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HCAL 49/2014

[2020] HKCFI 1350

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 49 OF 2014

________________________

BETWEEN

 DESIGNING HONG KONG LIMITEDApplicant
 and 
 THE TOWN PLANNING BOARDRespondent
 and 
 HO LOYIntended Applicant

________________________

Before: Hon Au JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) in Chambers
Date of Decision on Costs: 26 June 2020

____________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

____________________________

1.  This is an application by Ms Ho Loy to vary the costs order nisi I made on 12 February 2019.  This decision should be read together with the Joinder Decision (as defined at [2] below) and, unless otherwise stated, adopts the abbreviations used in the Joinder Decision.

2.  The matter arises in the following way.

3.  On 30 November 2018, this court handed down its decision (“the Joinder Decision”) refusing Ms Ho’s summons to join as an applicant in this judicial review proceedings with costs.  Ms Ho was then legally aided for the joinder application.

4.  By a summons dated 14 December 2018 (“the Leave to Appeal Summons”), Ms Ho sought leave from this court to appeal the Joinder Decision to the Court of Appeal.

5.  By way of its letter dated 8 January 2018, after refusing Ms Ho’s application for an interim stay of the Joinder Decision, the court directed the TPB to file its written statement in opposition of the Leave to Appeal Summons by 8 February 2019.

6.  As the events transpired, on 22 January 2019 Ms Ho’s legal aid application was refused, and on 4 February 2019, Ms Ho was informed by TPB’s letter the decision (“the CEIC Decision”) of the Chief Executive in Council (“CEIC”) made on 22 January 2019 to approve the Draft OZP.

7.  After seeking legal advice, on 8 February 2019, Ms Ho issued a summons to apply to withdraw her Leave to Appeal Summons.  This was so since, as a matter of law, the CEIC’s Decision has rendered the judicial review academic in seeking to challenge the TPB’s decision relating to the Draft OZP.

8.  On 12 February 2019, this court granted the application to withdraw the Leave to Appeal Summons and made an order nisi that Ms Ho should bear the costs of the Leave to Appeal Summons, to be taxed if not agreed.

9.  This is Ms Ho’s application[1] to vary the costs order nisi to the extent that there should be no order as to costs.  I have directed that the application be disposed of on paper and the parties have duly lodged their written submissions[2].

10.  This is my decision on the costs variation application.

11.  Ms Ho’s principal submissions in support of the contention that there should be no order as to costs are these:

(1)  Ms Ho’s joinder application is effectively one that falls within a public interest litigation[3]. She seeks to continue to pursue the judicial review which has an important public interest in it.  She also would not have any personal gain from the litigation itself.  In that respect, the Leave to Appeal Summons is only part and parcel of her effort to seek to continue the public interest litigation. In the premises, there should be no order as to costs even though she has to withdraw the Leave to Appeal Summons.

(2)  Further, for saving costs and time, Ms Ho has acted promptly and responsibly to withdraw the Leave to Appeal Summons once she was notified by the TPB about the CEIC’s Decision.

(3)  In this respect, the TPB should have informed Ms Ho earlier about its submission of the Draft OZP to the CEIC for approval to save costs and time.  However, the TPB did not do so.

(4)  Finally, Ms Ho is without means and thus unable to satisfy any costs order made.  The costs order therefore will not serve any useful purpose and thus should not be made.

12.  In opposition, Mr Jenkin Suen for the TPB in essence submits as follows:

(1)  The public interest litigation argument is groundless as her Leave to Appeal Summons is without any merit.  This is so as the refusal of joinder is an exercise of the court’s discretion.  The court of appeal will only interfere that exercise if it can be shown that the decision is wrong in principle or plainly wrong.

(2)  However, this court effectively refused the joinder on the basis that Ms Ho’s inexcusable lengthy delay in seeking to join in this judicial review outweighed any public interest in the proceedings.  It is clear that that decision did not commit any error in principle nor is it plainly wrong.  The Leave to Appeal Summons thus had no merits at all.  The question of public interest litigation is therefore not even engaged.

(3)  Further, as a matter of principle, impecuniosity cannot be an excuse to deprive a successful respondent of a costs order in its favour.  The recoverability of costs order is never a relevant consideration of the court in making (or not making) a costs order.  To the contrary, compensatory costs have long served to give litigants pause for thought before embarking on ill-conceived or unmeritorious litigation.

(4)  Finally, Ms Ho herself should have known that the TPB would submit the Draft OZP to the CEIC for approval.  This is particularly so after her interim stay application was refused by the court.

13.  With respect to Mr Suen, I am persuaded that the costs order nisi should be varied.  My reasons are as follows.

14.  First, costs is always a matter of wide discretion of the court to be exercised in accordance with principles.  The general principles are that, as a starting position, costs should follow the event. While departures from the general rule will be approached with due circumspection, the court in the post-CJR era is more readily prepared to depart from the general rule after taking into account all relevant factors to arrive at a fair and just costs order in the circumstances of each case.  Such departures also do not necessarily require showing that the failed grounds were raised unreasonably or improperly[4].

15.  In particular, under Order 62, rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court, the court should have regard to the circumstances set out therein and the underlying objectives of the CJR as set out in Order 1A, rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court.  Relevant for the present purpose, the court should take into account:

(1)  The underlying objectives to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings and to ensure fairness between the parties (under Order 1A, rules 1(c) and (d)); and

(2)  The conduct of the parties, including the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue (under Order 62, rules 5(1)(e) and (2)(b)).

16.  For considering costs relating to the Leave to Appeal Summons, in my view, the following conduct of the parties is relevant.

17.  It is well established that the approval of the Draft OZP by the CEIC will render the present judicial review proceedings academic[5].  On the other hand, it is only within the TPB’s own knowledge as to whether and when the Draft OZP had in fact been submitted for approval.  In the premises, it would only be fair and reasonable for the TPB to inform Ms Ho promptly that it had submitted the Draft OZP to the CEIC for approval so as to enable Ms Ho to consider whether to withdraw the Leave to Appeal Summons at an earlier stage so as to save costs and time.  The fact that Ms Ho was only informed of the CEIC’s Decision on 4 February 2019 has therefore contributed to the fact that the TPB had to incur costs for preparing the written statement in opposing the Leave to Appeal Summons[6]. On the other hand, I accept that Ms Ho had acted promptly and reasonably by applying to withdraw the Leave to Appeal Summons on 8 February 2019, ie, four days after receiving the TPB’s letter notifying her of the CEIC’s Decision.

18.  Second, the Leave to Appeal Summons has not been determined substantively and Ms Ho has withdrawn it only on the basis that the underlying judicial review has become academic because of the subsequent CEIC Decision.  In the premises, notwithstanding Mr Suen’s above submissions, adopting a broad approach and without entering into an overly detailed forensic analysis[7], I would not say at this stage that the Leave to Appeal Summons is so hopeless that it is bound to fail.

19.  Having regard to the above, and taking the matter in the round, I agree that a fair and just costs order for the Leave to Appeal Summons should be no order as to costs.

20.  I must however mention two more things:

(1)  In coming to this conclusion, I have not taken into consideration Ms Ho’s impecuniosity as I agree with Mr Suen that this is an irrelevant factor.

(2)  I am also not convinced by Ms Ho’s public interest litigation submission.  In the Joinder Decision, I have made a costs order against Ms Ho to bear the costs upon dismissing her joinder application. There is no reason why the Leave to Appeal Summons, which seeks leave to appeal against the Joinder Decision, should by itself attract no order as to costs on the basis of public interest litigation had it failed on merits.

21.  For the above reasons, I will vary the costs order nisi to that there be no order as to costs of the Leave to Appeal Summons.  As to the costs of this variation application, I will order that it should be in the cause of the Leave to Appeal Summons, meaning that there should also be no order as to costs.

 (Thomas Au)
 Justice of Appeal
sitting as an additional judge of
the Court of First Instance

Daly & Associates, on pro bono basis, for the intended applicant

Mr Jenkin Suen, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent



[1]  By way of summons dated 11 March 2019.

[2]  Ms Ho’s submissions are dated respectively 29 March and 12 April 2019 and the TPB’s submission is dated 4 April 2019.

[3]  See: Chu Hoi Dick v Secretary for Home Affairs (No 2) [2007] 4 HKC 428 at [29]-[30].

[4]  See: Lo Yuk Sui v Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd[2019] HKCA 1345 at [17] - [18] per Lam VP; Jonnex International Ltd v Town Planning Board[2018] HKCFI 836 at [4] per Au J; The Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong v Town Planning Board [2016] 2 HKLRD 642 at [6]; Pfeiffer GmbH v Cheung Hay Kit trading as Sun Wai Construction (CACV 245/2013, 29 October 2014, Kwan and Barma JJA, Poon J) at [20]; Fairbo Investment Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) (HCAL 35/2012, 27 January 2015, Au J) at [7].

[5]  See Kwan Kong Co Ltd v Town Planning Board [1996] 2 HKLRD 363 and also paragraph 3(2) of the TPB’s written submissions.

[6]  See paragraph 20b of Ms Ho’s written submissions relating to some of the items of costs stated in the Department of Justice’s Statement of Costs received by her pro bono solicitors, Daly & Associates, on 26 February 2019.  This court has not seen a copy of it.

[7]  Cf: MAM v Administrator, Duty Lawyer Service [2015] 5 HKC 487 at [15] - [18] per Au J.

[2018] HKCFI 2641-EN-2018-11-30

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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HCAL 49/2014

[2018] HKCFI 2641

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 49 OF 2014

_______________

BETWEEN
 DESIGNING HONG KONG LIMITEDApplicant
and
 THE TOWN PLANNING BOARDRespondent

_______________

Before:Hon Au J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:25 October 2018
Date of Decision:30 November 2018

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This is an application by Madam Ho Loy to join as an applicant in these proceedings.

2.  This judicial review was commenced more than four years ago in May 2014 by the applicant Designing Hong Kong Ltd (“Designing Hong Kong”) to challenge the decision (“the Decision”) of the Town Planning Board (“the TPB”) made in February 2014 not to amend the Draft Outline Zone Plan No S/H24/8 (“the Draft OZP”) in relation to a 150-metre strip of land along the north shore of the Hong Kong Island (“the Site”).  The Site has been marked for the planned Central Military Dock.

3.  This court granted leave to Designing Hong Kong to apply for judicial review on 21 July 2014.  Upon granting leave, the court also ordered an interim stay of the submission of the Draft Plan to the Chief Executive in Council for approval.

4.  From the time after leave was granted to May this year, the judicial review has not progressed because the parties were involved in Designing Hong Kong’s application for a protective costs order (“PCO”).

5.  Designing Hong Kong’s PCO application was however refused by the courts:

(1)   By a judgment handed down on 30 April 2015 (“the CFI Judgment”), this court refused the application.  Designing Hong Kong appealed the refusal to the Court of Appeal.

(2)   By a judgment handed down on 16 February 2017 (“the CA Judgment”), the Court of Appeal dismissed Designing Hong Kong’s appeal and upheld the refusal to grant the PCO.  Designing Hong Kong appealed the CA Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

(3)   By a judgment dated 15 May 2018 (“the CFA Judgment”), the Court of Final Appeal also dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal to grant the PCO.

6.  It should be noted that in support of the PCO application, Designing Hong Kong has filed evidence to confirm under oath that (a) other than Designing Hong Kong itself, there were no other individuals and organisations which had intended or had the resources to bring a judicial review against the Decision, (b) if the PCO was not granted to it, it would not and did not have the means to continue the judicial review to an end.  In the evidence,[1] it was specifically mentioned that Madam Ho did not “feel able” to bring the judicial review since she was “already involved in other substantial litigation (including facing a criminal charge).”  She also said she did not have “the legal assistance she would need either to draw the papers to initiate a judicial review or to support an application for legal aid to enable her to do so”.

7.  Upon the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Final Appeal, Madam Ho however then applied for legal aid on 21 May 2018 (that is about a week after the handing down of the CFA Judgment) to join as an applicant in this judicial review.  When the TPB refused to consent to the joinder, Madam Ho issued the summons for joinder on 20 July 2018.

8.  After the joinder summons was taken out by Madam Ho, Designing Hong Kong agreed to the making of a consent order dated 30 August 2018 ordering that Designing Hong Kong do cease to be a party to the judicial review and, subject to the dismissal of the summons by the court upon determination, leave be granted to it to discontinue this judicial review.

B.    THIS JOINDER APPLICATION

9.  There is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction to order a joinder in judicial review.  In the context of the usual 3-month time limit for commencing leave for judicial review and the obvious lateness in this application in this case, it is also common ground that, analogous to an application for extension of time to commence a judicial review,[2] the court should consider the following discretionary factors in determining this application:

(1)   Length of delay

(2)   Explanation for the delay

(3)   Merits of the substantive application

(4)   Prejudice

(5)   Question of public importance.

10.  I will therefore look at these factors in turn as follows.

B1.   Length of delay

11.  There is no question that there is a significant delay of some four years in this application.  This is a substantial delay, in particular in light of the three months’ time limit imposed under our rules.

12.  In this respect, accepting that four years is a very long period, Mr Pao SC for Madam Ho has however urged this court to view this length of delay in the particular context that the four years were indeed spent on Designing Hong Kong’s PCO application.  In gist, the delay is not an unreasonable or improper one, and effectively has nothing to do with Madam Ho. In particular, says Mr Pao, Madam Ho indeed acted promptly to apply for legal aid and seek to join in this judicial review after the handing down of the CFA Judgment.

13.  I am unable to agree.  It must be firmly borne in mind that it is always open to Madam Ho to apply for judicial review herself or join in these proceedings much earlier, in particular after the PCO application was first dismissed by this court in April 2015.  Madam Ho is no stranger to judicial review applications and she must be fully aware of the 3-month time limit imposed by the law to apply for judicial review.

14.  In the premises, one must turn to look at Madam Ho’s explanations, if any, for the delay.

B2.   Explanation for the delay

15.  Madam Ho has filed an affirmation in support of this joinder application.  In relation to the delay, all that Madam Ho has offered in evidence is at paragraphs 5 - 9, and 16 as follows:

“5. Firstly, I have had a keen interest in having the Issue under Challenge reviewed by the Court.

6. The Issue under Challenge will affect the public’s right to use and enjoy the Central Harbourfront. Being a Hong Kong permanent resident, I verily believe that it is in my interest to have an impartial body, i.e. the Court, to determine the Issue under Challenge.

7. Secondly, I was involved in these proceedings in a capacity other than as an Applicant.

8. On 12 March 2014, I attended a meeting of the Central Harbourfront Concern Group (‘CHCG’) to discuss the Issue under Challenge. During the meeting, we discussed the possibility of my launching the judicial review in these proceedings but I was not able to do so because I was occupied with other substantial litigation at the time and I was unable to obtain legal assistance to seek legal aid or apply for relief from the Court. Now produced and shown to me marked exhibit ‘HL-1’ is a copy of the Seventh Affirmation of Paulus Johannes Zimmerman dated 22 October 2016 under CACV 184/2015, where the deponent discussed my participation in the said meeting at paragraphs 5 to 7.

9. Although I was not able to launch the judicial review, I tried to support the judicial review by seeking funds from the public for the current Applicant for the purpose of these proceedings. Now produced and shown to me marked exhibit ‘HL-2’ is a copy of the letter from Mr. Martin Turner, Chairman of the Hong Kong Cycling Alliance dated 14 June 2018 in relation to my fundraising efforts for the current Applicant.

…

Necessity of my application to be joined as an Applicant

16. Following the publication of the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in FACV 4/2018 (15 May 2018), I learnt that the current Applicant intends to withdraw from and/or discontinue these proceedings due to the absence of a PCO. I made inquiries with my current solicitors and counsel, seeking preliminary advice on the status of these proceedings. I was advised by my solicitors and verily believe that without an Applicant, these proceedings will be discontinued. In order to ensure that the Issue under Challenge will be effectually and completely determined by the Court, I sought and obtained their pro bono assistance to make an application for legal aid to make an application to be joined as an Applicant in these proceedings.”

16.  As pointed out by Mr Mok SC for the TPB, there are effectively no explanations made by Madam Ho as to why she did not consider making an application earlier during the course of these four years.  Worse still, Madam Ho’s evidence is indeed that:

(1)   She made a conscious decision on her own for her own reasons not to apply for judicial review to challenge the Decision even before Designing Hong Kong had commenced this judicial review.  This decision was made as early as March 2014 (ie, only a month after the Decision) and well before Designing Hong Kong took out this judicial review.[3]

(2)   She was fully aware of Designing Hong Kong’s judicial review as she sought help raising funding for it.[4]

17.  In the premises, I agree with Mr Mok that Madam Ho cannot be better off by riding on Designing Hong Kog’s present judicial review:

(1)   On her own case, regardless of whether Designing Hong Kong had commenced this judicial review or not, she would not have applied for judicial review herself in 2014.  As mentioned above, it is indeed Designing Hong Kong’s evidence that it had to apply for judicial review because no one else (including Madam Ho) would be prepared to do so to challenge the Decision.

(2)   Further, other than providing for reasons for not commencing proceedings in March 2014, she has not provided explanations as to why she did not come forward to apply for substitution during 2014 to 2018. This is particularly telling as, while fully aware of the existence of Designing Hong Kong’s present judicial review, it is not her evidence that she is not aware of the refusal of Designing Hong Kong’s PCO application in April 2015 and May 2017 respectively by this court and the Court of Appeal.  In the premises, one can take it that Madam Ho simply does not have any explanations, let alone valid and reasonable explanations, as to why she did not come forward to apply for substitution earlier during 2014 to 2018.

18.  In the premises, there are no satisfactory explanations for the significant delay.

19.  The lack of a satisfactory explanation together with the significant delay in this case must weigh heavily against granting the joinder application.

B3.   Merits of the judicial review

20.  I have granted leave to apply for judicial review on the grounds as set out in the Amended Form 86.  On that basis, I accept that at the leave stage where the TPB has not filed its substance evidence, the judicial review is reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success.

21.  But as Kwan JA observed in AW at paragraphs 33 and 35, in an application for extension of time for delay, the court is entitled to delve more deeply into merits than that at an ex parte leave stage to determine whether the indulgence sought should be granted.

22.  In the present case, I would not say the merits of this judicial are so strong that it should overwhelm the significant delay in the present application, coupled with the lack of any satisfactory explanations for the delay, in favour of granting the application.  In particular, it is trite that merits is by no means the sole criterion in determining whether extension of time should be granted.[5]

B4.   Prejudice

23.  Under this Mr Pao submits that the respondent suffers no prejudice if the joinder application is allowed.  Unlike an entirely fresh application for judicial review out of time, there is already on foot Designing Hong Kong’s judicial review, and the Decision has since 2014 been subject to a challenge.  Allowing Madam Ho to join as an applicant replacing Designing Hong Kong is effectively no different from Designing Hong Kong continuing the judicial review.  This would be the same as if (a) Designing Hong Kong decided to continue to participate in this judicial review without a PCO, or (b) Designing Hong Kong was successful in obtaining a PCO in the CFA.

24.  With respect, I accept Mr Mok’s submissions that this is misconceived.

25.  First, it would be an abuse of process if Designing Hong Kong were allowed to retract from its professed stance that it could not (and would not) continue with the judicial review in the absence of PCO.[6]  In any event, as a matter of fact, Designing Hong Kong has decided not to continue with the judicial review.

26.  Second, I am also satisfied, as submitted by the TPB, that there is prejudice caused to good administration if the joinder application is allowed at this stage after a four-year delay:

(1)   As a result of the judicial review, the court ordered an interim stay of the submission of the Draft OZP to the Chief Executive in Council since 23 July 2014.  This has resulted in a delay of over four years in handing over the Site to the Hong Kong Garrison for military use after the requisite legislative procedure.[7] Such delay of the handover and the use of the Site as the Central Military Dock must, on any count, be detrimental to good administration.

(2)   Madam Ho’s belated joinder application would significantly prolong the judicial review since other representers or commenters could also make similar joinder application, whether at this point or some time in future.  This would be prejudicial to good administration and governance for the judicial review proceedings and add uncertainties to the plan-making process.

(3)   The above delay begs the question as to when Madam Ho was in a position to come forward to apply for substitution of Designing Hong Kong.  As submitted, Madam Ho has adduced no evidence in this respect.  It is obvious that if Madam Ho came forward earlier, the TPB would not have incurred substantial costs and time in dealing with Designing Hong Kong’s PCO application and appeals, and the judicial review would have been resolved much quicker.  To allow Madam Ho to be belatedly joined in these circumstances would thus occasion material prejudice to the TPB and the public interest at large.

(4)   Finally, the TPB had incurred substantial costs in defending the PCO application and appeals on the basis that, unless a PCO is granted, the judicial review will be discontinued.  The picture as presented by Designing Hong Kong (with Madam Ho’s support) was that, despite the widely publicized proceedings, nobody (including Madam Ho) had come forward to offer to replace Designing Hong Kong.  If this had not been the case (as presented by Designing Hong Kong), such that someone else (particularly Madam Ho) would have come forward, the TPB would not have been put to the time and considerable expense of having to fight Designing Hong Kong’s PCO application all the way to the CFA.  In this respect, it must be noted that Designing Hong Kong would not have been in a position to (or continue to) apply for a PCO if there is another person (such as Madam Ho) who has applied for judicial review or to join in this judicial review.

B5.   Question of general public importance

27.  This is as I see it the fundamental point relied on by Mr Pao in support of this joinder application.  Leading counsel submits that the courts at all levels have consistently accepted in the PCO application that this judicial review is a public interest litigation, in that it raises issues of general public importance, and that these issues should be resolved by the court.[8]

28.  It is not disputed that the existence of questions of general public importance or matters of public interest can often constitute good reasons for an extension of time and are relevant in the present circumstances:  Fordham QC, Judicial Review Handbook (6th edn) at paragraph 26.3.9; Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (5th edn) at paragraph 9-040; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482 at 1485G; R (on the application of the Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2010] EWHC 2550 at paragraphs 126 - 127.

29.  However, it must also be noted that this is but one of the factors that the court should take into account in considering whether to grant an extension of time (or, as in the present case, to allow joinder out of time).  Depending on the circumstances of each case, this factor may be a very important factor, but the court still has to engage in a balancing exercise by weighing all the factors to decide whether or not to grant an extension of time.  The court must also respect and have regard to the statutory time limit imposed, for obvious good reasons in public law, in making an application for judicial review expeditiously.

30.  In the present case, given the very significant delay of some four years in the application coupled with the absence of any satisfactory explanations for the delay, and the prejudice caused to good administration, I do not think the fact that this judicial review raises questions of public importance alone would amount to such “good reason” to overbear these other factors in favour of granting the joinder now.

C.   CONCLUSION

31.  For all the above reasons, having taken into account all the relevant factors into consideration, Madam Ho has failed to satisfy me that there is good reason for me to exercise the discretion to allow her to join as an applicant in this judicial review.[9]

32.  I would therefore dismiss her joinder application with costs to the TPB, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.  Madam Ho’s own costs be taxed in accordance with legal aid taxation.

 
 

 (Thomas Au)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

   

Mr Jin Pao SC, leading Mr Wilson Leung, instructed by Daly, & Associates, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for Ms Ho Loy

Mr Johnny Mok SC, leading Mr Jenkin Suen, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent



[1] See: 7th Affirmation of Paulus Johannes Zimmerman, at paragraphs 5 - 15.

[2] See: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393 approving Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1.

[3] See: Affirmation of Madam Ho, at paragraph 8.

[4] See: Affirmation of Madam Ho, at paragraph 9.

[5] See: AW, supra, paragraphs 27(iii) and 35.

[6] See: Affirmation of Woo Jacinta Kit Ching, at paragraph 30.

[7] See: Affirmation of Woo Jacinta Kit Ching, at paragraphs 21 - 22.

[8] See: CFA Judgment, at paragraph 46; CFI Judgment, at paragraphs 54 and 55.

[9] Mr Mok has also made submissions saying that Madam Ho lacks sufficient identity of interest to apply for joinder, as she cannot demonstrate she has any interest in or related to the original applicant, Designing Hong Kong.  In support, Mr Mok relies on a number of authorities to say as a matter of principle, the court in deciding whether to allow substitution in public law cases should also take into account whether the situation is far from being a case of a stranger who has failed to apply in time seeking to take opportunistic advantage of someone else’s claim, or whether on the evidence the substitution party has some sufficient interest between the party and the original claimant: R (SDR) v Bristol City Council [2012] EWHC 859 (Admin); River Thames Society v First Secretary of State [2006] EWHC 2829 (Admin); R v Gloucestershire County Council, ex p Barry [1996] 4 All ER 421 (CA) at 423d-f; R (On the application of Beeson) v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWCA Civ 1812; Chee Fei Ming v Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene [2014] 5 HKLRD 771 at paragraph 7.  I do not find it necessary to decide on this point, as I am of the clear view that the joinder application should be refused by looking at those factors I have addressed in the Decision.

99697-EN-2015-07-31

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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HCAL 49/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 49 OF 2014

_______________

BETWEEN  
 DESIGNING HONG KONG LIMITEDApplicant

and

 THE TOWN PLANNING BOARDRespondent

_______________

Before: Hon Au J in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions: 12 May, 2 June and 12 June 2015
Date of Decision on Costs: 31 July 2015

_______________

DECISION ON COSTS
_______________

 

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  On 30 April 2015, I handed down judgment (“the Judgment”) refusing the applicant’s application for a protective costs order (“PCO”). I also ordered on a nisi basis that costs of the PCO application be to the respondent to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel (“the costs order nisi”).

2.  This is now the applicant’s application by summons dated 14 May 2015 seeking to vary the costs order nisi.  In the summons, the applicant now asks to provide that the applicant be protected against the costs of the respondent in its PCO application, or alternatively there be no order as to costs.

3.  The application is opposed by the respondent (the Board).

4.  By consent, this variation application is to be dealt with on papers and by written submissions.  The parties have since provided their respective written submissions.

5.  This decision should be read together with the Judgment, and for convenience, the abbreviations used in the Judgment would be adopted in this decision unless otherwise stated.

B. THIS APPLICATION

B1. The Judgment

6.  In summary, in the Judgment, this court adopted the Corner House principles as the principles (as further explained in the Judgment) applicable to a PCO application in Hong Kong.[1] In applying those principles, I came to the view that, on the totality of the evidence, including the lack of any evidence showing the financial abilities of the shareholders and directors of the applicant corporation, the court was not satisfied that (a) the applicant was genuinely not in a position to bear the costs of the respondent if it fails in the judicial review; and (b) it was reasonable for it to probably withdraw from the judicial review if no PCO is granted.  In the premises, I refused the application as it would not be fair and just in all the circumstances of the case to depart from the general starting position of costs follow the event and grant the PCO.[2]

7.  The applicant has thus lost in his PCO application and hence the costs order nisi.

B2. Costs of a PCO application

8.  As a starting position, there are no reasons in my view why an applicant for a PCO should not in principle be liable for costs if he loses the application, as in any other applications.  The English Court of Appeal in Corner House held similarly the same view.  As observed by Lord Philips MR (as he then was) at paragraphs 78 to 79 in relation to the costs position of PCO applications:

“78 We consider that a PCO should in normal circumstances be sought on the face of the initiating claim form, with the application supported by the requisite evidence, which should include a schedule of the claimant’s future costs of and incidental to the full judicial review application. If the defendant wishes to resist the making of the PCO, or any of the sums set out in the claimant’s schedule, it should set out its reasons in the acknowledgment of service filed pursuant to CPR r 54.8. The claimant will of course be liable for the court fee(s) for pursuing the claim,and it will also be liable for the defendant’s costs incurred in a successful resistance to an application for a PCO: compare R (Mount Cook Land Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 at [76(1)]. The costs incurred in resisting a PCO should have regard to the overriding objective in the peculiar circumstances of such an application, and recoverability will depend on the normal tests of proportionality and, where appropriate, necessity. We would not normally expect a defendant to be able to demonstrate that proportionate costs exceeded£1,000. These liabilities should provide an appropriate financial disincentive for those who believe that they can apply for a PCO as a matter of course or that contesting a PCO may be a profitable exercise. So long as the initial liability is reasonably foreseeable, we see no reason why the court should handle an application for a PCO at no financial risk to the claimant at all.

79 The judge will then consider whether to make the PCO on the papers and if so, in what terms, and the size of the cap he should place on the claimant’s recoverable costs, when he considers whether to grant permission to proceed. If he refuses to grant the PCO and the claimant requests that his decision is reconsidered at a hearing, the hearing should be limited to an hour and the claimant will face a liability for costs if the PCO is again refused. The considerations as to costs which we have set out in para 78 above will also apply at this stage: we would not expect a respondent to be able to demonstrate that proportionate costs exceeded £2,500. Although CPR r 54.13 does not in terms apply to the making of a PCO, the defendant will have had the opportunity of providing reasoned written argument before the order is made, and by analogy with CPR r 52.9(2) the court should not set a PCO aside unless there is a compelling reason for doing so. The PCO made by the judge on paper will provide its beneficiary with costs protection if any such application is made. An unmeritorious application to set aside a PCO should be met with an order for indemnity costs, to which any cap impose by the PCO should not apply. Once the judge has made an order which includes the caps on costs to which we have referred, this will be an order to which anyone subsequently concerned with the assessment of costs will be bound to give effect: see CPR r 44.5(2).” (emphasis added)

9.  There is therefore no question that a PCO applicant should normally be exempted from costs liability.  Quite to the contrary, an applicant, including the present one, should reasonably expect that there would be the usual costs liability if he or she fails in a contested application.

10.  The caveat in Lord Philips MR’s observations is that the amount of costs recoverable should be subject to the normal test tobe proportionate to the circumstances (including the procedures adopted) of that case.  This is similar to the requirement now provided under Order 62, rule 5(1)(aa) of the Rules of High Court that the court should in the taxation exercise in Hong Kong take into account the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A, rule 1.[3] Insofar as to the actual amount of costs that was usually expected to be incurred in resisting a PCO application as mentioned in these passages, when making these comments, the learned Master of Rolls obviously had in his mind the general fees level in England as at that time, which is likely to be different from that in Hong Kong.  One cannot simply import these figures directly to Hong Kong.  These observations by Lord Philips MR even taken together cannot be regarded as a proposition that the costs recoverable in an unsuccessful PCO application should generally be limited and to those figures.

11.  Bearing these observations in mind, I now look at the present application to vary the costs order nisi.

12.  I can dispose quickly of the applicant’s first contention that there should effectively be a PCO to protect its costs position (either completely or with limit) in the PCO application.

13.  Given that I have dismissed its application for PCO for the substantive judicial review for the reasons set out in the Judgment (and summarised above), I see no reason or logic as a matter of principle as to why the applicant should however be entitled to a PCO for the PCO application itself.  As mentioned above, and as observed by Lord Philips MR, it is expected that an applicant is to bear the cost of an unsuccessful PCO application.

14.  In relation to the quantum of costs, the applicant says the amount of costs incurred by the Board in opposing the PCO application is likely to be significant (given the involvement of leading and junior counsel and the complexity of the submissions).  Mr Kat SC (leading Mr Marwah) for the applicant submits that the applicant’s liability in costs should however be significantly limited.  In support of this submission, leading counsel seeks to lay blame on both the court’s directions and the respondent’s position to deal with its PCO application by way of a full oral hearing, together with the participation of the amici.  Leading counsel said they had in the beginning invited the court to deal with it on papers (purportedly in line with the now established practice in the English courts).  Had the court adopted their invitation (submitted Mr Kat), the PCO application could have been dealt with more economically and the applicant’s exposure to costs would have been much limited.

15.  With respect, I cannot accept the applicant’s submissions. Given that this was the first PCO application that required the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong to fully and properly consider the principles applicable, and that it was to be opposed by the Board, it was eminently justified for the court to direct a full oral hearing with the participation of the amici to assist it in dealing with the application.  The applicant’s submissions that the PCO application proper should well be disposed of on papers also flies in its face when it was its own submissions in seeking leave to appeal the Judgment that the PCO application required a full consideration by the Court of Appeal given that it was the first time such an application was fully considered by the courts in Hong Kong (see the court’s decision dated 28 July 2015 granting leave to appeal, at paragraphs 12 - 13).  There are no merits in these submissions.

16.  I would therefore not make any PCO in relation to the costs of the PCO application itself.

17.  This takes me to the applicant’s alternative position that there should be no order as to costs.

18.  The principal bases of the submissions are that the PCO application itself helps to clarify the law in relation to that (and thus serves the public interest) and that the applicant itself has no personal gain from it.  This is particularly so as PCO itself is a subject matter of public interest.  It would therefore be just not to require the applicant to bear the costs of the respondent, which comes out from the public purse in any event.  In support, the applicant borrows the observations made by Lam J (as the learned VP then was) in Chu Hoi Dick v Secretary for Home Affairs (No 2) [2007] 4 HKC 428[4] that the court would make no order as to costs in an unsuccessful judicial review if the action is a public interest litigation and that the applicant has no personal benefit in pursuing it.

19.  I am unable to accept these submissions too.  The PCO application itself is obviously to benefit the applicant itself financially. The fact that the judicial review itself does not benefit the applicant personally (as accepted by this court in the Judgment) does not mean that the PCO application itself similarly does not benefit the applicant.  The PCO application is seeking in advance to relieve the applicant itself from personally liable for costs of the judicial review even if it fails, which costs in the usual course of events would have to be borne by the applicant.  This is for the personal benefit of the applicant.

20.  For the same reason, the subject matter under the PCO application per se is not a matter of public interest.  The subject matter is only whether to relieve in advance the applicant itself from costs liability.  Put it in another other way, even without a PCO application, the applicant could well have pursued the judicial review (which this court has accepted it to be a public interest litigation and for no personal benefit of the applicant), and then seeks no order as to costs if it fails in the judicial review under the principles laid down in Chu Hoi Dick.  The PCO application is thus advanced and made solely for the benefit the applicant itself.  The fact that incidentally this application is the first time where the court in Hong Kong has to consider the principles comprehensively does not then render the subject matter under the PCO application a matter advanced for public interest.  Quite to the contrary, as I mentioned above, to facilitate this variation application, it is now the applicant’s submissions that the PCO application should have been dealt with simply on papers and should not have called for the assistance of an amicus.  One cannot see how these submissions of the applicant sit consistently with the contention that the PCO application itself was advanced in public interest to clarify the law relevant to PCO determination.

21.  I am of course conscious of this court’s own decision to grant leave to appeal on the basis of interests of justice by reference to the fact that the appeal would raise questions of law relating to PCO applications for the first time which is in the public interest to be tested at the earliest occasion by the court of appeal.  That however is in the context of whether leave to appeal should be granted.  That involves a different consideration from that for the purpose of costs as to whether it is primarily for the personal benefit of the applicant to pursue the PCO application.

22.  Finally, the applicant submits that even if it has to bear the costs of the PCO application, the quantum of costs should be significantly limited as it has effectively won most of the issues raised in contention but lost the application only on the point of financial position of its directors and shareholders.

23.  I am equally not convinced by these submissions.  The ultimate question in the PCO application is whether the applicant can satisfy the court on the evidence that in all the circumstances of the present case, the court should depart from the general costs position and grant the PCO.  The burden is on the applicant to so satisfy the court.  Whether it has failed on one or a number of the bases to convince the court to exercise the discretion in its favour, it has failed in substance in its application.

24.  The court should generally not decide costs in accordance to a score sheet on how many issues had gone one way or the other.  This is of course subject to the consideration where the winning party has improperly or unreasonably raised arguments or issues which have unreasonably and significantly wasted the court’s time and costs.  In which case, the court can exercise its discretion to disallow those costs or even order the winning party to bear those parts of the costs to achieve a just and fair costs position in all the circumstances (see: Hong Kong White Book 2015, paragraph 62/3/3).

25.  This is however not the present case.  In my view, there are no contested issues in which the Board has lost in arguments that could be regarded as points that had been improperly raised or taken.

26.  In the premises, I think it is only fair and just in all the circumstances to order that the applicant shall bear the costs of the PCO application, to be taxed if not agreed.  As I said above, the taxation exercise should of course take into account, among others, the underlying objectives provided under Order 1A, rule 1.

C. CONCLUSION

27.  For the above reasons, I reject the applicant’s costs variation application.  The costs order nisi is hereby made absolute.

28.  The applicant shall also bear the costs of this application to be taxed if not agreed, with no order as to costs.

(Thomas Au)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Nigel Kat SC and Mr Azan Marwah, instructed by Boase, Cohen & Collins, for the applicant

Mr Johnny Mok SC and Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent


[1]  See paragraphs 13 - 47 of the Judgment.

[2]  See paragraphs 57 - 79 of the Judgment.

[3]  These objectives are, among others, to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings.

[4]  As recently endorsed by the Court of Final Appeal in Leung Kwok Hung v the President of the Legislative Council (No 2) (2014) 17 HKCFAR 841.

99626-EN-2015-07-28

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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HCAL 49/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 49 OF 2014

_______________

BETWEEN
 DESIGNING HONG KONG LIMITEDApplicant
and
 THE TOWN PLANNING BOARDRespondent

_______________

Before: Hon Au J in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions: 26 May, 9 June and 18 June 2015
Date of Decision on Leave to Appeal: 28 July 2015

_____________________________________

DECISION ON LEAVE TO APPEAL

_____________________________________

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  On 30 April 2015, I handed down judgment (“the Judgment”) refusing the applicant’s application for a protective costs order (“PCO”).

2.  This is now the applicant’s application by summons dated 14  May 2015 seeking leave to appeal the Judgment to the Court of Appeal.

3.  In that summons, the applicant also seeks leave to appeal against this court’s refusal at the hearing of the PCO application on 16 December 2014 to allow the 3rd affirmation and the last sentence of the 12th paragraph of the 4th affirmation of Mr Zimmerman filed on behalf of the applicant in the PCO application (“the Evidence Decision”).  The applicant subsequently recognises that it is out of time in seeking leave to appeal against that decision.  The applicant is late in this part of the application as it understood that the court in refusing this evidence at the hearing indicated that it would set out its reasons for doing so in the judgment of the PCO application.  The applicant therefore had waited for the handing down of the Judgment to consider whether to appeal against that refusal.  When the Judgment was handed down, however, no reasons were included in it in relation to the Evidence Decision, and hence this part of the application for leave to appeal.  The applicant now accepts that this court has no jurisdiction to grant any extension of time for it to seek leave to appeal and is contented to pursue that part of the application at the Court of Appeal.  I am therefore no longer concerned with this part of the application for leave to appeal against the Evidence Decision.  I will therefore say nothing more about this part of the application save that, as it happened at the hearing, it is clear that I refused to admit that evidence on the basis that it was irrelevant to the PCO application.

4.  Thus, this court is now concerned only with the application for leave to appeal against the Judgment.

5.  By consent, this leave to appeal application is to be dealt with on papers and by written submissions.  The parties have since provided their respective written submissions.

6.  This decision should be read together with the Judgment, and for convenience, the abbreviations used in the Judgment would be adopted in this decision unless otherwise stated.

B.  THIS LEAVE TO APPEAL APPLICATION

B1.  The Judgment

7.  In summary, in the Judgment, this court adopted the Corner House principles as the principles (as further explained in the Judgment) applicable to a PCO application in Hong Kong.[1] In applying those principles, I came to the view that, on the totality of the evidence, including the lack of any evidence showing the financial abilities of the shareholders and directors of the applicant corporation, the court was not satisfied that (a) the applicant was genuinely not in a position to bear the costs of the respondent if it fails in the judicial review; and (b) it was reasonable for it to probably withdraw from the judicial review if no PCO is granted.  In the premises, I refused the application as it would not be fair and just in all the circumstances of the case to depart from the general starting position of costs follow the event and grant the PCO.[2]

B2.  The proposed grounds of appeal

8.  In the draft Amended Notice of Appeal, the applicant raises effectively the following grounds of appeal:

(1)  Ground 1(1): in applying the Corner House principles flexibly, the court misdirected itself in not applying the principles in accordance with the “overriding purpose” of the jurisdiction of the PCO to ensure (a) the underlying objective of giving the public wide access to justice, including in planning and environmental cases in particular; and (b) protecting the public interest in full and effective representation on both sides where points of genuine and significant public interest are raised.

(2)  Ground 1(2): The Corner House principle at paragraph 74(2) (ie, “if those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono this will be likely to enhance the merits of the application for a PCO”) is not good law in England or Hong Kong and the court is not required to and should not take into account whether the applicant is or will be represented pro bono.  As a matter of principle, the lawyers should not be required to subsidise the administration of justice in a case of genuine significant public importance.

(3)  Ground 2: This court erred in the application of the principle in Corner House paragraph 74(1)(iv) (“having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent(s) and to the amount of costs that are likely to be involved it is fair and just to make the order”) in that this court (a) treated financial resources as a condition; (b) extended it to cover the financial resources of directors and shareholders of the applicant; (c) rejected the applicant’s evidence on financial ability as insufficient; and (d) failed to consider the financial resources of the respondent.

(4)  Ground 3: The court erred in holding that Corner House simpliciter (as opposed to the version advocated by the applicant) is a proportionate restriction to the right of access to court enshrined in Article 35 of the Basic Law and Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.

B3.  The test in granting leave to appeal

9.  It is common ground that leave to appeal should only be granted if:

(1)  the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(2)  there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

See: section 14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4).

10.  The applicant relies on both limbs to support its application for leave to appeal.

11.  I will deal with them in the order as it is submitted by the applicant.

B4.    Interests of justice

12.  The applicant submits that leave should be granted in the interests of justice in this case for it to be heard by the Court of Appeal.

13.  I agree that the leave should be granted to the applicant to have the appeal heard by the Court of Appeal for the following reasons of interests of justice:

(1)  Given that this is the first time where the Court of First Instance is required to more comprehensively consider the basis upon which a PCO may be made or refused, the questions arising are thus generally of general public interest as this court recognised at paragraph 8 of the Judgment, and by calling upon an amicus to assist it in the resolution of the issues arising therefrom.

(2)  The court’s actual decision turns on the substantive point of law on whether the court can as a matter of principle take into account the financial position of the directors and shareholders of a corporate applicant.  A point which the contentions of the applicant and the amicus departed (see paragraphs 59 and 61 of the Judgment).  This is a point which also appears not to have been properly and fully considered by authorities.

(3)  This point would have an impact on future PCO applications brought by corporate applicant.  As submitted by the applicant, the Judgment on this point may have a wider impact on potential corporate applicants for judicial reviews (which are of a public litigation in nature) where they are or backed by voluntary organisations, charities and other NGOs and pressure groups.  It therefore is in the public interest to have this aspect of the Judgment tested in the Court of Appeal at the earliest occasion.

(4)  Similarly, the questions of (a) whether the Corner House principles per se sufficiently cover the question of the right to access to court in the context of the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights as held in the Judgment;[3] and (b) how the “overriding purposes” should guide the exercise of discretion in the present circumstances in deciding whether to grant a PCO are also raised for the first time and should also be tested in the Court of Appeal at the earliest opportunity.

14.  For these reasons, I would grant leave to appeal the Judgment to the Court of Appeal on Grounds 1(1), 2, and 3.

15.  However, I would not grant leave to appeal on Ground 1(2) as this point (to challenge the applicability of Corner House paragraph 74(2)) is simply not open to the applicant to take on appeal since (a) the applicant itself effectively advocated this as good law before this court in its skeleton at paragraphs 40 and 88(6); and (b) in any event, the Judgment is not decided on this point.

B5.  Merits of the appeal

16.  Under this limb, leave to appeal should not be granted unless the applicant can show that its prospect of succeeding in the intended appeal are reasonable and more than “not fanciful”, without having to be “probable”: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 per Le Pichon JA at paragraph 17.

17.  Given that I have decided to grant leave to appeal on the basis of interests of justice, I should refrain from saying much about the merits of the grounds of appeal as they would be argued in full before the Court of Appeal.  Suffice for me to say that I would not grant leave to appeal on the basis of the merits of the intended appeal under Grounds 1(1), 2, and 3.  Nothing the applicant has submitted in this application convinces me that I have arguably erred in any principles or in law in the exercise of discretion as contested under these grounds.

18.  Nevertheless, it may perhaps be necessary for me to briefly say something about the applicant’s contention under Ground 1(1) that in refusing the PCO application in the present case, the court had failed to have regard to the “overriding purposes”.  The court of course was aware of the “overriding purposes” as submitted by the applicant at paragraphs 41 - 47 of its skeleton submissions for the hearing in December 2014 and at the hearing itself.  It must be however noted that, when exercising the court’s discretion, these “overriding purposes” on the questions of access to justice and having full and proper representation are and should be considered in the context of a PCO application as to whether these elements are being restricted by reason of the applicant’s fear of costs.  In the present case, when exercising the court’s discretion, these considerations must thus be looked at against the court’s conclusion on the basis of the evidence that it was not satisfied that (a) the applicant is genuinely unable to bear the costs of the respondent if it fails in this judicial review; and (b) it is reasonable for the applicant to probably withdraw the judicial review. As such, I do not think there are any arguable merits in the contention that the court had erred in misdirecting itself in the said exercise of discretion.

19.  Insofar as Ground 1(2) is concerned, I will simply repeat paragraph 15 above and similarly will not grant leave to appeal on this ground on the basis of arguable merits.

C.  CONCLUSION

20.  I would grant leave to appeal on the Grounds 1(1), 2, and 3 as set out in the draft Amended Notice of Appeal on basis that it would in the interests of justice to have the appeal heard by the Court of Appeal.  I would however not grant leave to appeal on Ground 1(2).

21.  I will further extend the stay of the substantive application of the judicial review until the final determination of the appeal or further order.

22.  Finally, I will order on a nisi basis that costs of this leave application be in the cause of the intended appeal, with certificate for two counsel.[4]  This order shall become absolute 14 days after today.

(Thomas Au)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Nigel Kat SC and Mr Azan Marwah, instructed by Boase, Cohen & Collins, for the applicant

Mr Johnny Mok SC and Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent


[1]  See paragraphs 13 - 47 of the Judgment.

[2]  See paragraphs 57 - 79 of the Judgment.

[3]  See paragraphs 72 - 77 of the Judgment.

[4]  It must however be noted that counsel and the solicitors are acting pro bono for the applicant.

98224-EN-2015-04-30

DESIGNING HONG KONG LTD v. THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD

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HCAL 49/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 49 OF 2014

_______________

 

IN THE MATTER OF an Application by Designing Hong Kong Limited for leave to apply for judicial review pursuant to Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131)

_______________

BETWEEN

 DESIGNING HONG KONG LIMITEDApplicant

and

 THE TOWN PLANNING BOARDRespondent
_______________
Before:  Hon Au J in Chambers
Dates of Hearing:  16 and 17 December 2014
Date of Judgment:  30 April 2015

_______________

JUDGMENT
_______________

A.  INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the respondent’s decision (“the Decision”) not to amend the relevant Amended Draft Outline Zoning Plan (“ADOZP”) of the Central District.

2. In issue under the ADOZP is a 150‑metre strip of land along the north shore of the Hong Kong Island (“the Site”) which has been marked for the planned Central Military Dock.  The Site is situated along Victoria Harbour within the new Central Harbourfront Promenade.

3. In the ADOZP, it is proposed to re‑zone the Site from “Open Space” to “Other Specified Uses” annotated “Military Use (1)” (“OU(MU1)”).  The applicant together with many other representators objected to the proposed re‑zoning. They say, among others, the re‑zoning would interfere and restrict Hong Kong residents’ right to enjoy the Site to (as they would be able to do so under the original “Open Space” zoning) walk along the Central Harbourfront uninterrupted.  The applicant, together with those other representators, asked the Town Planning Board (“the Board”), the respondent, to amend the ADOZP by zoning the Site back to “Open Space” from the proposed “OU(MU1)”.

4. By way of the Decision, the Board rejected those representations and refused to amend the ADOZP.

5. The applicant applied for leave to judicially review the Decision in May 2014.  This court granted leave in July 2014 after hearing submissions from parties.

6. This is now the applicant’s application for a protective costs order (“PCO”) as set out in the Amended Form 86.  In the PCO application, the applicant asks for an order:

(1) Protecting the applicant from all costs of the respondent in the interlocutory applications and the substantive proceedings herein.

(2) Alternatively limiting the costs that may be awarded to the respondent to HK$10,000 and limiting the cost that may be awarded to the applicant to the reasonable costs of a solicitor and junior counsel or such sum as the court may think fit.

7. The Board (represented by Mr Mok SC leading Ms Eva Sit) opposes the application.

8. As this is the first time the Court of First Instance has to deal with a proper application for a PCO and look at the principles applicable thereto, the court has invited the assistance of Mr Stewart Wong SC (leading Ms Bonnie Cheng) as amicus curiae.  The amicus has made very comprehensive submissions (both written and oral) and the court is most grateful to their valuable and able assistance.

9. Similarly, at the invitation of the court, the Director of Legal Aid has appeared also at the hearing to assist the court on the question of the non‑availability of legal aid to corporate litigants under the legal aid scheme in Hong Kong.  The Director has also filed an affirmation for that purpose.  Again the court is most grateful to the Director’s assistance.

10. Before I look at the merits of the present PCO application, it is pertinent to deal with the applicable principles first.

B.  THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

11. A PCO (sometimes also known as pre‑emptive costs order) is in the nature of an order that is made before the conclusion of the proceedings which directs as to the costs order that will be made against the applicant no matter what the outcome of the case is.  Although the court has a wide discretion in ordering the terms of the PCO that would cater for the circumstances of each case, it is generally called protective costs order as usually incorporated in the order is a term that the applicant would not be liable to pay the respondent’s costs (or that his liability to costs is limited) even if the applicant turns out to be unsuccessful in the proceedings.

12. I should first start with those principles which parties in the present case agree to be applicable to a PCO application.

13. First, there is no dispute that the court has jurisdiction to make a PCO, which jurisdiction comes from the statutory discretion vested in the court to make costs order at any stage of the proceedings which is fair and just in all the circumstances.  See: section 5A(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) (“HCO”), Order 62 rule 3(3) of the Rules of High Court (Cap 4A); Chan Wai Yip Albert v Secretary for Justice (unreported, HCAL 36/2005, 19 May 2005) at paragraphs 23‑32 per Hartmann J (as the learned NPJ then was); 姚寶昌對統計處處長, (unreported, CACV 87/2013, Lam VP and Cheung JA, 14 October 2014) at paragraphs 3‑4.

14. Second, it is also accepted that the governing general principles laid down by the English Court of Appeal in R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 1 WLR 2600 at paragraph 74 in relation to the factors that the court should take into account in deciding whether to make a PCO are equally applicable in Hong Kong.

15. The Corner House principles and factors are:

(1) A PCO may be made at any stage of the proceedings, on such conditions as the court thinks fit, provided that the court is satisfied that:

(a) the issues raised are of general public importance;

(b) the public interest requires that those issues should be resolved;

(c) the applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case;

(d) having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent and to the amount of costs that are likely to be involved, it is fair and just to make the order; and

(e) if the order is not made, the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings and will be acting reasonably in so doing.

(2) If those acting for the applicant are doing pro bono this will be likely to enhance the merits of the application for a PCO.

(3) It is for the court, in its discretion, to decide whether it is fair and just to make the order in light of the consideration set out above.

16. Third, the twin criteria in Corner House principle (1)(a) and (b) above, which are commonly now often referred to as the “public interest litigation” factors are the overarching requirements that an applicant must meet before the court would consider whether to grant a PCO or not after taking into consideration the other relevant factors set out in Corner House.

17. After setting out the above principles which are not in dispute, I now move on to discuss those aspects of these principles which are disputed.

18. The first aspect relates to the question of what can be regarded as public interest litigation.

19. In relation to this question, Lam J (as the learned VP then was), after reviewing a line of authorities, including Corner House, has formulated in Chu Hoi Dick v Secretary for Home Affairs (No 2) [2007] 4 HKC 428at paragraph 29 the relevant guiding criteria for identifying a public interest challenge.

20. These criteria are:

(1) A litigant has properly brought proceedings to seek guidance from the court on a point of general public importance so that the litigation is for the benefit of the community as a whole to warrant the costs of the litigation to be borne by the public purse as costs incidental to good public administration.

(2) The judicial decision has contributed to the proper understanding of the law in question.

(3) The litigant has no private gain in the outcome.

21. These criteria have been recently endorsed by the Court of Final Appeal in Leung Kowk Hung v The President of the Legislative Council (unreported, FACV 1/2014, 5 December 2014, Ma CJ, Ribeiro, Tang and Fok PJJ, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ) (“Leung Kwok Hung (CFA)”) at paragraph 17(10).

22. In Chu Hoi Dick, the applicant failed in her judicial review, and Lam J was considering the question of whether he should, in departure from the usual starting position of costs following the event, make no order as to costs in light of the applicant’s argument that the judicial review was a public interest litigation.  Although Chu Hoi Dick concerns a consideration made at the conclusion of the litigation, as submitted by the amicus Mr Wong, there is nothing in principle to render the learned judge’s analysis on the question of what amounts to public interest litigation not equally applicable to a consideration made at any stage before that.  Quite to the contrary, as a matter of principle and logic, the same analysis should apply, as whether a litigation can be regarded (for the purpose of considering costs) as a public interest litigation must involve the same considerations at any stage of the proceedings, as the crucial question is what is the nature of the matter litigated and issues involved therein.  The parties have also not contended otherwise.

23. In the premises, Lam J’s said criteria in identifying a public interest litigation, which have been endorsed and approved by the Court of Final Appeal, are bidding on this court and applicable in considering a PCO application.

24. In looking at these criteria, what divides the parties at the hearing is whether (as contended by the Board), for a matter to fall within the first and second criteria, the issues required for determination must involve a question of law where the relevant legal principles involved have either not been settled or are very much in dispute.  This is so as (Mr Mok for the Board submits) Lam J has made it clear in the second criteria that the judicial decision on the relevant issues litigated must be one that “contribute[s] to the proper understanding of the law in question”. Thus (continues Mr Mok), if the legal principles or questions involved in the litigation is one which have been well settled, and the issues raised in that context is the application of the well settled legal principles to a particular set of facts (even if those facts involve a subject matter that is of general public concern), the judicial decision of those issues would not contribute to any better understanding of the question of law, as the “law” is clear even before the litigation.

25. With respect to Mr Mok, I do not agree with his submissions.  In my view, that is too narrow a construction of Lam J’s formulation of the criteria.

26. In arriving at these criteria, Lam J at paragraph 18 has specifically explained that the meaning of “the proper understanding of the law” includes not just points of statutory construction or development of the common law principles, but also the application of the law to the facts of a case.  As the learned judge emphasised, in some cases “how the law is to be applied to a particular factual matrix can contribute to the proper understanding of the law” and “in broad sense, the application of the law to the facts of a case is itself a question of law”.

27. Thus, in laying down the criterion of contribution to the proper understanding of the law, Lam J is clearly not limiting himself to issues where the legal principles have not been settled and thus need further development or clarification, as he has made it clear that the proper understanding of the law does not only include questions concerning the development of the common law principle or statutory construction.  In that context, the learned judge clearly also has in mind that the criterion should cover a question of how the relevant law (whether or not the relevant legal principles in that law are settled ones) is applied to a particular sets of fact (being itself also a question of law).

28. This is also consistent with the general context as to why public interest litigation may (as a triggering requirement) justify a departure from the usual starting position of costs following the event: it is that the court recognises that there are matters which by themselves are of such general public importance that it is in the general public’s interest to have them judicially resolved.  It would therefore not in the interest of the public to allow these issues not to be resolved because the applicant is reasonably not in a position to pursue the judicial review because of his fear or inability to bear the costs of the respondent if he loses the application.  It is then seen as fair and just in those circumstances to have the costs burden left with the public authority as “an incident to good administration”.[1]  Thus, in this context of focusing on the importance of public interest in general, it is difficult to see as a matter of principle why such public interest litigations would only be limited to question of law concerning legal principles that cannot be regarded as settled.

29. Corner House itself is perhaps a good example where public interest litigation concerns not only with issues involving unsettled or difficult legal principles.  In that case, the applicant sought to challenge the decision of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to amend the relevant procedures for the Export Credits Guarantee Department (“ECGD”) and its standard form relating to bribery, corruption and money laundering for business entities carrying on international trade.  The challenge was premised on procedural unfairness in that the Secretary had failed to consult the applicant, which was an educational and research organisation with a special interest in the role of export credit agencies in the prevention of corruption and bribery in international business transactions.

30. The legal principles governing procedural unfairness in public law cannot be said to be unsettled.  However, in allowing the appeal against the first instance judge’s refusal to grant the PCO, the Court of Appeal held[2] that the judicial review was one which raised issues of general public importance that were in the public interest to see it to be resolved by court.  This was so as (a) they related to the way in which major British companies, supported by credit guarantees backed by the taxpayers in accordance with a statutory scheme, did business abroad; (b) obtaining contracts by bribery was an evil which offends against public policy, and when taxpayers interests were involved, questions of whether these companies were required (by the procedures set out in the standard forms) to provide details of money paid to middleman was a matter of general public importance; and (c) the unfairness challenge based on the complaint that the failure to consult the applicant was in breach of ECGD’s own published consultation policy (which stated to the effect that it would consult appropriate stakeholders).

31. The decision in Corner House thus shows that the question of public interest litigation cannot be limited to only question of law involving unsettled or difficult legal principles.  As demonstrated above, and as observed by Lam J in Chu Hoi Dick, it could also include questions of law concerning the application of the relevant law (even if one with generally settled principles) to the particular circumstances of the case, in particular where the underlying subject matter is something of general public importance (such as the one identified in Corner House).

32. I therefore conclude that under the criteria expounded in Chu Hoi Dick, the second requirement that the judicial decision required to be made in the litigation should contribute to “the proper understanding of the law in question” is not limited to only resolution of issues that involve difficult or unsettled legal principles.

33. At this juncture, it is perhaps convenient for me to mention two matters that also arise from these criteria.

34. The first is that in considering the question of whether it is in the public interest to have the issues resolved, it must also involve the consideration as to the merits of the applicant’s judicial review.  As said by Lam J (in adopting the observations in Corner House), in considering the question of whether “the litigation is for the benefit of the community as a whole to warrant the costs of the litigation to be borne by the public purse as costs”, the court should take into account the merits of the applicant’s grounds of judicial review, and the test is that those grounds are at the minimum properly arguable with a realistic prospect of success.  This test has later been accepted and approved in Chan Noi Heung v Chief Executive in Council [2009] 3 HKLRD 362 at paragraph 12(3) per Ma CJHC (as the learned CJ then was).  It is common ground now that the test is the same as the one required for the grant of leave to apply for judicial review, that is, whether the judicial review grounds are reasonably arguable with a realistic prospect of success.[3]

35. Second, it relates to what the meaning of “general public importance” entails in this inquiry.

36. In this respect, it must be noted that there is no absolute standard by which to define what amounts to an issue of general public importance.  The question is ultimately a matter of degree to which the requirement may be satisfied.  It is an objective exercise where the court would pay regard to the qualitative significance of the issues at stake.  See: R (Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2009] 1 WLR 1436 at paragraph 24, per Waller LJ, and paragraph 75, per Smith LJ; Chu Hoi Dick, supra, at paragraph 26.

37. Moreover, the word “general” does not necessarily mean that the subject issue must be of interest to all the public nationally or would directly affect all of them.  The requirement may still be satisfied by different sizes or extents of the group or section of the public that could be affected by it.  Obviously, the larger the group or section of the public that is to be affected by the determination of the issue, the more likely that it will satisfy the meaning of general public importance. Again, this is a matter of degree for the court to evaluate and assess in the circumstances of each case.  As observed by Waller LJ in Compton, supra, at paragraph 24:

“… I do not read the word ‘general’ as meaning that it must be of interest to all the public nationally. On the other had I would accept that a local group may be so small that issues in which they alone might be interested would not be issues of ‘general public importance’. It is a question of degree and a question which the Corner House case would expect judges to be able to resolve.”

38. Similarly, Smith LJ in Compton said these at paragraph 77:

“77 During the hearing, there was some discussion about the meaning of the word ‘general’ in the context of ‘general public importance’. As Buxton LJ says, it must add something to mere ‘public importance’. In some cases, the answer is easy. For example, if the case will clarify the true construction of a statutory provision which applies to and potentially affects the whole population, the issues are of general public importance. But if the issue is of public importance and affects only a section of the population, it does not in my view follow that it is not of general public importance, although it will not be in the first rank of general public importance. Mr Havers for the PCT accepted that a local issue might be sufficiently “general” to be of general public importance but submitted that one could not decide whether it was so merely by taking a headcount of the numbers of people who would be affected by the decision of the court. He may be right although he did not explain how the general importance of a local issue was to be assessed. It seems to me that a case may raise issues of general public importance even though only a small group of people will be directly affected by the decision. A much larger section of the public may be indirectly affected by the outcome. Because it is impossible to define what amounts to an issue of general public importance, the question of importance must be left to the evaluation of the judge without restrictive rules as to what is important and what is general.”

39. As also helpfully pointed out by the amicus, although it is neither possible nor appropriate to define in absolute terms what amounts to an issue of general public importance, the authorities so far have shown that the following considerations would help to identify its scope for the purpose of considering whether to make a PCO:

(1) The courts have stressed that not all public law challenges, even if constitutional issues of importance are raised, bring with them an automatic protection against adverse costs orders.  Each case will depend on its own circumstances: see Scott v Government of the HKSAR[4]at paragraph 18 per Hartmann J.

(2) The Court of Final Appeal has confirmed that the starting point in civil litigation, even that involving the public interest, is that costs follow the event: Leung Kwok Hung (CFA) at paragraph 17(8). Thus, the “public interest” element is in itself insufficient.

(3) In Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, Kirby J also suggested at paragraph 138 that merely resolving a question of law in not enough as “[i]n one sense, all litigation, in so far as it elucidates the law, is in the public interest”.  Picking up on this, Hartmann J in Leung Kwok Hung (CFI) also observed at paragraph 25 that “[p]ublic interest litigation, as Kirby J noted in Oshlack v Richmond River Council, does not grant an immunity from costs or a ‘free kick’ in litigation”.  Similarly, in The Democratic Party v The Secretary for Justice,[5] Hartmann J said at paragraph 22 that “the fact that a ruling of importance arises out of litigation cannot of itself be determinative”.  Further, public interest litigation “should not be confused with the fact that the decision would provide some guidance for future actions and decisions”, given that in our legal system, “every judicial decision is a precedent and can provide some guidance for future actions and decisions”.  See also Clark v Bar Council[6] at paragraph 38 per Le Pichon JA.

(4) The abovejudicial statements underline the need for the issues involved to be “of real public concern”,[7] and for their resolution by the courts to be “a significant contribution to a point of general public importance”.[8]

(5) The courts have also emphasised their proper role and function in this exercise.  In particular, they have made it clear that they are not a forum for:

(i) debate on legislative changes: Chu Hoi Dick, at paragraph 43; and

(ii) resolution of political or social disputes: Leung Hon Wai v Director of Environmental Protection,[9] at paragraph 11.

40. Finally, Mr Mok for the Board submits that the following principles can be derived from Corner House and Chu Hoi Dick which govern the court’s consideration of whether to make a PCO:

(1) The starting point is that even in public law litigation, costs should follow the event.

(2) Where a public interest challenge is made, this can be a factor in displacing the general rule.

(3) Nevertheless, the court must be satisfied, firstly, that the applicant has properly brought proceedings to seek guidance from the court on a point of general public importance, so that the litigation is for the benefit of the community as a whole to warrant the costs of the litigation be borne by the public purse as costs incidental to good public administration.

(i) The dispute is not confined to points of statutory construction or development of common law principles; application of the law to the facts of a case, where that contributes to the proper understanding of the law, can also satisfy this criterion: see Chu Hoi Dick at paragraph 18; 姚寶昌(supra): “例如澄清某些重要會影響整體社會利益的法律議題”.

(ii) The court must have regard to the merits of the challenge, and there must be a real prospect of success: see Chu Hoi Dick paragraphs 21 and 23.  At the leave stage the grant of leave on the Po Fun Chan test may well be sufficient, though not necessarily conclusive: see Chan Noi Heung paragraph 12(3)‑(5).

(iii) The court must also consider the utility of litigating the matter in a court of law as opposed to ventilation of the objection by other channels.  It must be borne in mind that the court is concerned with the legality of administrative decision in judicial review, and is not a forum for debating the political or social judgment embodied in an administrative decision: see Chu Hoi Dick paragraphs 20‑21.

(iv) The above are to be objectively assessed, having regard to the interest of the community as a whole: see Chu Hoi Dick 437D.

(4) Secondly, the judicial decision will likely contribute to the proper understanding of the law in question.

(5) Thirdly, the litigant has no private gain in the outcome.

(6) Even if the above are satisfied, the court must also have regard to other relevant factors, such as (i) the conduct of the litigant (Chu Hoi Dick paragraph 30); (ii) the financial means of the parties and the likely costs involved (Chan Noi Heung paragraph 21; Corner House condition (iv)); and (iii) whether the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings and be reasonable in so doing in the event that no PCO is made (Corner House condition (v)).

41. Mr Mok then further contends that these principles do not only give guidance as to the exercise of a judicial discretion, but “delimit” the court’s jurisdiction to make a PCO and “must be followed if the judge is to have jurisdiction to make a PCO at all”.

42. With respect, I do not accept these submissions.

43. I agree with the amicus’submissions that other than the overarching twin criteria of public interest litigation, the other factors (namely, the merits of the applicant’s case, the existence or otherwise of a private interest, the relative financial resources of the applicant and respondent, the reasonableness of the applicant in probably withdrawing the case if no PCO is granted), are all matters that the court could take into account in its exercise of discretion to decide whether it is just and fair to depart from the usual costs follow the event position and make a PCO.  The court should adopt a flexible approach in considering these other factors and guidelines.

44. This is so as:

(1) As mentioned above, the court’s jurisdiction to make a PCO is founded on section 52A of the HCO and Order 62 rule 3(2). It is a discretion vested in the courts by statute.

(2) Those principles as summarised by Mr Mok are all judicially devised guidelines or principles, and cannot be said to have the effect of delimiting or defining the statutory jurisdiction conferred on the courts. These are only factors which guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in an application for a form of costs which it has jurisdiction to make in the first place.  As observed by Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Oshlack, supra, at paragraph 35:

“In the administration of the discretion conferred by these provisions upon courts of general jurisdiction, practices or guidelines have developed. Observations by Brennan J in Norbis v Norbis are in point. His Honour said:

‘It is one thing to say that principles may be expressed to guide the exercise of a discretion; it is another thing to say that the principles may harden into legal rules which would confine the discretion more narrowly than the Parliament intended. The width of a statutory discretion is determined by the statute; it cannot be narrowed by a legal rule devised by the court to control its exercise.’

…”

(3) Similarly, it has been repeatedly observed by the courts in England and Australia that the principles laid down in Corner House should not be read and treated as if they were statutory provisions.  A flexible approach should be adopted to the exercise of judicial discretion in the granting of PCOs to decide whether it is just and fair after taking into account all the circumstances of the case.  See: Compton, supra, at paragraphs 23 (per Waller LJ) and 87 (per Smith LJ); R (Buglife) v Thurrock Thames Gateway [2009] 1 Costs LR 80 (CA) at paragraphs 19‑20; Baker v Hinton Organics [2010] 1 Costs LR 1 (CA) at paragraph 40; Delta Electricity v Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc (2010) 176 LGERA 424 at paragraph 96.

(4) Lam J also expressed a similar sentiment in adopting a flexible approach in Chu Hoi Dick at paragraph 30 as follows:

“I should also mention that the public interest element is only one of the factors that is relevant for the exercise of the discretion as to costs. Even if all these criteria are satisfied, the court must also have regard to other relevant factors such as the conduct of the litigants in the proceedings in coming to a final decision on what is just in the circumstances. It is ultimately a matter of discretion, hence the use of the word ‘occasionally’ in the dicta of Kirby J [in Oshlack]”

45. Having disposed of Mr Mok’s above contention, it may also be convenient at this point to mention one more matter.  As pointed out by the amicus, there may be a concern as to whether, even if an applicant is able to meet all the principles set out in Corner House, there is still an additional requirement of “exceptionality” which seems to have been suggested by Dyson J in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Child Poverty Action Group [1999] 1 WLR 347 at paragraph 355F.  This apparent requirement of exceptionality was picked up in Corner House.  Referring to Dyson J’s remark that “the jurisdiction to make a PCO should be exercised only in the most exceptional circumstances”, the Court of Appeal in Corner House said at paragraph 72 that they agreed with that statement.

46. However, I again agree with Mr Wong’s submissions that there is no additional requirement of “exceptionality” on top of those factors set out in the Corner House principles.  This is because the authorities, including Corner House itself, show that there is no such additional requirement and exceptionality is likely to be met in a case where the court finds that those governing principles are satisfied:

(1) In Corner House, the court was of the view at paragraph 144 that it was an exceptional case where a PCO should be made after it was satisfied that all the governing principles had been satisfied:

“… we considered that the public interest required that these issues should be litigated, and since Corner House had no private interest in the outcome of the case, and since our fourth and fifth principles … were both satisfied, we considered in the exercise of our discretion that it was appropriate to permit Corner House to proceed with the benefit of a PCO, and that this was one of those exceptional cases in which such an order should be made.”

(2) In Compton, supra, Waller LJ also observed at paragraph 24 that “exceptionality” was not seen in the Corner House case as some additional criterion to the principles set out in paragraph 74 therein, but as a prediction as to the effect of applying those principles. See also similar observations by Smith LJ at paragraph 82, and Bean J in R (British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 250 (Admin) at paragraph 10.

47. The Board also does not appear to contend otherwise that there is an additional requirement of “exceptionality” on top of the guiding principles set out at paragraph 74 in Corner House and agrees that it is only an effect of meeting those governing principles.[10]

48. Bearing the above principles in mind, I now turn to look at the present application for PCO.

C.  APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE PRESENT CASE

C1.  The applicant and its judicial review

49. The applicant is a local, non‑profit organisation limited by guarantee.  It has currently three founder directors, namely, Mr Markus Shaw, Mr Peter HY Wong and Mr Johannes Zimmerman (who is also the current Chief Executive Officer).  It was formed in 2007 in response to the plans announced by the Government for the Tamar Site and the Central Wanchai Waterfront reclamation.  The applicant’s stated aim is to increase public awareness and to improve Hong Kong’s collective ability to plan and deliver a sustainable and “beautiful” city.  It advocates the adoption of sustainability, quality of life and good design as core values in planning and development.

50. Pursuant to the applicant’s above stated aim, it is currently engaged in a number of on‑going projects concerning the planning development of various sites and areas over Hong Kong.

51. As mentioned above, the applicant, among other representators, objected to the ADOZP, and attended the Board’s hearing to make representations.  The Board by the Decision refused to accept those objections.

52. In this judicial review, the applicant challenged the Decision on a number of grounds.  In summary, the applicant says:

(1) the Board erred in law in disregarding its own statutory duty under section 3(1) of the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131) (“the TPO”) in upholding the ADOZP which is contrary to its own declared planning intention (“Ground 1”);

(2) the Decision is irrational in the public law sense (“Ground 2”);

(3) the Board failed to take into account to relevant matters such as its own declared policy to protect the Harbourfront, ensure public access thereto and maintain visual access to the harbour, the Planning department’s own report made in 2011 prescribing public “Open Space” land use for the Site, the views and recommendations of the Harbourfront Commission and the Administration’s public commitment to effectively keep the Site open for public use (“Ground 3(a)”);

(4) the Board mistook or ignored an established and relevant fact that if the Site was to be closed for military use, there would not be a continuous pedestrian connection along the waterfront (“Ground 3(b)”);

(5) in its reasons, the Board misapplied the public law principle of “consistency” by saying that the proposed zoning of the Site was consistent with the existing military exclusive “Military Use” zoning of the PLA headquarters sited nearby in Admiralty (“Ground 3(c)”);

(6) the Board failed to give effect to the applicant’s legitimate expectation that it would take into account the relevant matters identified under Ground 3(a) (“Ground 4”); and

(7) the Board abdicated its duty under section 3(1) of the TPO in not to amend the ADOZP so as to impose any development restriction on the Site other than height restriction (“Ground 5”).

53. Having set out the above, I now move on to consider the applicant’s PCO application under the Corner House principles.

C2.  Principle (1)(i) and (ii): whether the issues raised are of general public importance and the public interest requires that those issues should be resolved

54. Applying the criteria set out in Chu Hoi Dick as also explained above, I accept that the issues raised in the present case are of general public importance and it is in the public interest to have them resolved.  My reasons are as follows:

(1) The subject matter underlying the challenge is whether the Site along the Harbourfront can continue to be used as an open space by the public in general to walk along the Harbourfront Promenade uninterrupted.  This must be a matter that the public in general or at least potentially a reasonably large section of it would have interest in.  This is particularly so when the evidence as it now stands shows that both the Administration and the Board had previously and publicly indicated that the Site would be kept open for public use.  I fully understand the Board’s position that by zoning it for “Military Use”, and given the undertaking from the PLA, the public would still generally be able to walk through the Site when the military pier intended to be constructed over the Site is not in use.  That however is subject to debate in this judicial review as to whether the Board is correct and entitled to take that into account, and this is also a matter the resolution of which concerns the public generally or a relatively significant section of it.  The underlying matter is thus to me of general public importance and concern.

(2) Moreover, I believe the resolution of at least some of the issues would also contribute to the better understanding of the law by seeking to apply some perhaps well established principles of law (such as that the relevant authority must in making a decision act within the boundary of the duty vested in it by the statue, and the relevant authority must take into account relevant matters and not take into account irrelevant matters in making its decision) to the facts of the present case.  For example, under Ground 1, it would help to further clarify and identify the scope of the law in planning and public law context as to whether (as a matter of statutory or common duty), and if so how, the Board should take into account its previously made planning intention in making planning decision.  Similarly, the resolution of the issue raising under Ground 3(a) would further the understanding of and identify the scope of the law in planning and public law context as to whether, and if so how, the Board should take into account of matters (as a matter of relevance) such as its own planning policy, the Administration’s publicly made planning related statement and a related Commission’s recommendations.

(3) As such, and coupled with the general public’s concern of the underlying subject matter, it should be in the interest of the public to have these issues resolved by the court, which would also help further clarifying the scope and duty of the Board generally in making planning decisions.

55. The applicant has therefore shown that at least some of issues raised in the judicial review are of general public importance, and public interest requires that they should be resolved.

C3.  Principle 1(iii): the applicant has no private interest

56. Mr Mok fairly accepts for the present purpose that the applicant has no private gain or interest (other than that as a member of the public) from the outcome of this judicial review.  I also agree.

C4.  Principle 1(iv): having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent and to the amount of costs that are likely to be involved, it is fair and just to make the order

57. Under this consideration, the applicant has filed affirmations made by Mr Zimmerman to the following effect:

(1) Its current bank account balance as at 30 June 2014 was only $170,094.74.  The applicant was expected to have a negative net income that would result in it exhausting its cash by 31 December 2014.  It does not carry on any profit‑making business and has no assets of any real value against which it might be able to obtain funds by way of loan.

(2) The applicant’s directors have already dug into their personal resources to fund its activities and Mr Zimmerman “do not believe they would be willing or able to fund this action further”. Further, Mr Zimmerman had reported the status of the case to the Board of Directors and asked for their personal and financial support for the applicant’s costs.  They had also been informed of the applicant’s exposure to costs of the respondent should it lose the judicial review.  The other directors have told him that they were not in a position to provide additional funds to the applicant to pursue this case or expose themselves to an open commitment to the Government’s costs.

(3) It is difficult to raise money from outside sources, whether corporate bodies or the general public at large, as there are many environmental and civic causes which are continuously calling upon them for support.  The applicant had at the commencement of the judicial review raised sponsorship of HK$50,000 through other concern groups, and Mr Zimmerman does not “believe” that the applicant or he himself would be able to raise more than this amount to pay legal costs and the applicant’s own legal costs for this project.

(4) Given the applicant’s limited resources, the applicant has obtained pro bono services from solicitors and counsel, who have agreed to act up to the decision of the PCO.

(5) In his 1st affirmation at paragraph 19, Mr Zimmerman deposes that if a PCO order is not made to protect the applicant from exposure to costs, the applicant will abandon the proceedings.  In his second affirmation at paragraph 6, Mr Zimmerman further deposes that if no PCO is made, the applicant “would be unable to continue these proceedings.  It will notbe able to meet its own costs, much less the costs of the Respondents from its own resources…”.

58. Mr Mok submits that this is clearly inadequate evidence to show that the applicant is unable to afford costs to proceed with the judicial review.  This is so as there is no evidence whatsoever to show the applicant’s founder directors’ personal financial circumstances and, in light of those circumstances, why they could not “fund” the applicant for this judicial review.  The lack of such evidence is further underlined by the fact that the residential address of these directors shown on the documents filed with the Companies Registry shows that they are residing at relatively prestigious addresses.  If the directors are financially resourceful persons, it must thus be relevant under this consideration as to whether it is reasonable for them not to financially support the applicant to pursue this judicial review, and whether it is then fair to require the public purse to shoulder the costs.  This is particularly so when these are the founder directors of the applicant and the judicial review is, in their own case, instigated to further the applicant’s founding stated aims.  As the applicant was set up by them as a non‑profit making organisation and thus has no independent source of income, they should know very well that they may well be required to fund its operations to pursue and further the stated aims.

59. Mr Kat (together with Mr Marwah) for the applicant submits that as matter of principle, the court should not look behind the corporate applicant as to the financial position or resources of the shareholders or directors.

60. With respect to Mr Kat, I disagree.

61. As rightly submitted by the amicus, as a matter of principle, the court should not be confined to considering the financial means of a corporate applicant alone, when its resourceful (if shown) shareholders and directors may hide behind an impecunious corporate (for which legal aid is unavailable but may, subject to the presence of other factors, be granted a PCO).  Given that legal aid could not be provided to corporate litigants under the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91),[11] if Mr Kat’s submissions are correct, it would become easy for any resourceful litigants (who would not be able to obtain legal aid given their financial position) to simply set up a corporate vehicle to pursue a public interest litigation in order to obtain a PCO.  That cannot be right as a matter of principle.  As a matter of public interest, PCO is to be granted to litigants (provided they also satisfy the other relevant principles) who are genuinely unable to bear the costs of the respondent.  That should not be extended to self or artificially created situation of inability to bear costs.

62. Hence, as a matter of principle, the court must be able to look at a corporate applicant’s sources of fund, including its immediate shareholders and directors, to satisfy itself that the applicant is genuinely unable to bear the costs of the respondent and therefore has to reasonably withdraw the litigation due to its fear for costs liability.

63. To support his submissions that the court should not look at “the backers” behind a PCO applicant on the question of financial resources, Mr Kat relies on the decision of Haddon Cave J in R (Plantagenet Alliance) v SSJ and Leicester University [2013] EWHC 3164 (Admin) at paragraphs 45 and 46 as follows:

“45. … Mr Clarke also submitted that, in any event, it would be inappropriate to require a party seeking a PCO to disclose financial information about its supporters. He submitted that this would impose a ‘novel and seriously detrimental restriction’ on the ability of campaign groups to seek orders of this nature, and may well discourage individuals from supporting campaign groups at all because of the risk that their means will be scrutinised by the Courts by a party resisting such an application.

46. I do not accept Miss Proops’ submission that a PCO is inappropriate because the Claimant ‘could and should’ have raised funds from the public. This is speculative and runs contrary to the evidence that the fund-raising position has not improved. Nor do I accept her submission that PCOs should not be granted unless applicants prove they have taken ‘diligent steps’ to obtain probono legal representation in the first place. If lawyers are prepared to act free of charge in particular cases all well and good; but it cannot be a sine qua non to the grant of a PCO that applicants are required to prove that they have trawled the legal market for pro bono representation. This would be contrary to the principle of free choice of representation.” (emphasis added by Mr Kat)

64. I do not think Plantagenet assists Mr Kat.

65. In that case, Plantagenet had only a sole director and shareholder, Mr Nicolay. He had filed evidence not only about the company’s financial position but also his own financial information.  This is set out at paragraph 42 of the judgment as follows:

“… [Mr Nicolay’s] evidence as to financial means was clear and was as follows (paragraph 37 [of his witness statement]):

‘I do not personally have funds to finance this litigation personally. I work primarily as a self-employed gardener, and have no realisable assets, savings or other capital. Nor am I aware of any other person who has the funds to finance this litigation. Accordingly, in the event that a [PCO] is not granted, neither the Company nor the individuals which it represents will be in a position to continue with this claim, and the issue will not be considered by the Court.’”(emphasis added)

66. The respondent in that case apparently did not challenge this evidence.  Haddon Cave J accepted that and made express reference to the evidence of Mr Nicolay’s own financial position at paragraph 44 before arriving at his observations at paragraphs 45 and 46 quoted above.  The learned judge said this at paragraph 44:

“There were no reasons on the papers to doubt Mr Nicolay’s evidence as to either his own personal circumstances or as to the Claimant’s cash‑flow or fund‑raising situation or as to his knowledge of the non‑availability of funds of others to finance the litigation. Absent any such countervailing evidence, in my judgment, there was no reason not to take Mr Nicolay’s evidence at face value. He is a self‑employed gardener without the means himself.” (emphasis added)

67. In the premises, this case shows and supports that for a corporate applicant, it is legitimate and proper for the court to look at the financial means of not only the company itself but also its directors and shareholders, as well as the ability of the company to raise funds from other sources.  It is then a matter of the quality of the evidence as to whether the court would accept it.  This is effectively what Haddon Cave J was observing at paragraphs 45 and 46. The learned judge is clearly not saying that, as a matter of principle, the court should not and cannot look at the financial position of a corporate applicant’s directors and shareholders to assess whether the applicant cannot genuinely afford costs.

68. In the present case, the applicant has given evidence why it has not been able to raise funds from other sources.  However, other than an assertion of Mr Zimmerman’s belief that he and the other founder directors would not be willing or able to dig further into their own pockets to fund this particular judicial review, there is no evidence (as in the case of Plantagenet) as to their personal financial means and position.  As such, the court is simply unable to assess whether there are legitimate or reasonable bases as to why they are unable or not willing to fund the litigation.  This in my view is insufficient to satisfy the court that the applicant is genuinely not in a position to bear the costs of the respondent.  Moreover, with the lack of this evidence, it would not be fair and just to require the respondent to bear the costs. In this respect, I accept the submissions made by Mr Mok as summarised at paragraph 58 above.

69. In the premises, I am not satisfied that, having regard to the financial position of the applicant and the Board, it is just and fair to make a PCO.

C5.  Principle (v): reasonable for the applicant to probably withdraw the judicial review

70. Given my above conclusion that the applicant has failed to show with sufficient evidence that it is genuinely not in a position to bear costs, it follows that it is not reasonable for it to probably withdraw the judicial review if no PCO is granted.

71. The applicant has therefore also not been able to satisfy this principle.

C6.  Right to access to court

72. Finally, Mr Kat submits that, in the circumstances of this case, the absence of a PCO protecting the applicant against the Government’s costs will debar it from exercising its right to access to justice under Article 35 of the Basic Law and Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights.

73. Mr Kat accepts that the right is subject to reasonable and proportionate restriction. However, he submits that the circumstances of the present case render it a disproportionate restriction if a PCO is not granted.

74. I am unable to accept these submissions.

75. As submitted by the amicus, it is clear from the authorities that PCOs are aimed to protect, and facilitate the exercise of, applicants’ right of access to court in an appropriate case.[12]  It is however one thing to say that PCOs serve to protect and facilitate the exercise of the right of access to court, yet quite another to contend that the refusal to grant a PCO ipso facto violates the said right.

76. In that context of right of access of court considered under the effect of costs, the courts have developed and adopted the Corner House principles to govern how the court should exercise its discretion in granting a PCO.  In other words, those principles as guidelines represent what the courts have already accepted as a proportionate response under the statutory discretion vested in the court on how that right may be restricted in the context of costs.

77. Thus, if an applicant, as in the present case, is refused a PCO after applying those principles, there is no question in my view that his right of access to court has been disproportionately restricted.

78. The applicant’s above contention must therefore be rejected.

D.  CONCLUSION

79. As explained above, the applicant has not shown that (a) it is genuinely not in a position to bear the costs of the respondent if it fails; and (b) it is reasonable for it to probably withdraw from the judicial review if no PCO is granted.  I am not satisfied that it is fair and just in all the circumstances to depart from the general starting position of costs follow the event and grant the PCO.  I would therefore refuse the application.  As such, it is also unnecessary and inappropriate for me to determine what should be the proper terms and form of the PCO to be granted.

80. There are apparently no reasons why costs should not follow the event in this application.  I therefore make an order nisi that costs of this application be to the Board to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for two counsel.

81. Lastly, I thank counsel for their helpful submissions.  In particular, I would like to again express my gratitude to the amicus and the Director of Legal Aid for their valuable assistance.

(Thomas Au)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Nigel Kat and Mr Azan Marwah, instructed by Boase, Cohen & Collins, for the applicant

Mr Johnny Mok SC, leading Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Department of Justice, for the respondent

Mr Chris YT Chong (Deputy Director of Legal Aid), for Director of Legal Aid

Mr Stewart Wong SC, leading Ms Bonnie Cheng, as amicus curiae



[1] See Leung Kwok Hung v The President of the Legislative Council (unreported, HCAL 87/2006, 27 April 2007, Hartmann J) (“Leung Kwok Hung (CFI)”) at paragraphs 20‑24.

[2] See paragraphs 137‑140.

[3]Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at paragraphs 14‑17 per Li CJ.

[4] [2004] 2 HKLRD 989.

[5] Unreported, HCAL 84/2006, 28 December 2007.

[6] [2011] 3 HKLRD 122.

[7]Leung Kwok Hung (CFI) at paragraph 37, per Hartmann J.

[8]Chu Hoi Dick at paragraph 46, per Lam J.

[9] Unreported, HCAL 49/2012, 26 November 2013, Au J.

[10] See paragraph 6(4) of Mr Mok’s skeleton submissions.

[11] As, to reflect the legislative intention, the relevant definition of “person” in the Ordinance to whom legal aid may be granted excludes a body of persons corporate or unincorporated.

[12] See for example, Corner House, at paragraph 6; British Columbia v Okanagan Indian Band [2003] 3 SCR 371 at paragraph 31; Leung Kwok Hung (CFA), at paragraph 13; Corona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 170 LGERA 22 at paragraphs 16 and 23.