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Miscellaneous Proceedings2014

DCB v. AB

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[2018] HKCFI 717-EN-2018-04-09

DCB v. AB

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HCMP 2173/2014

[2018] HKCFI 717

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2173 OF 2014

_______________________

  IN THE MATTER OF an application to make IMB-B also known as IMB, a girl born on 15th day of May 2013, a ward of court
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

______________________

BETWEEN
 DCBPlaintiff
 and
 ABDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 28 March 2018
Date of Decision: 9 April 2018

_______________________

D E C I S I O N
(Variation + Undertaking)

________________________

1.  The background and history of these wardship proceedings have been set out in several previous judgments/decisions and will not be repeated here.  

2.  At present, there are two applications before this Court, namely (i) a summons filed by the Father on 1 December 2017, essentially seeking an immediate variation downwards of the interim maintenance order which this Court made on 22 July 2016 (“Interim Maintenance Order”), and (ii) a summons issued by the Mother on 6 February 2018 for the Father to pay the outstanding school fees and expenses for the ward L pursuant to his undertaking set out in the Interim Maintenance Order.

3.  Both parents are now acting in person.  Although the Official Solicitor acts for L in the Mother’s relocation application, the Official Solicitor has obtained leave from this Court to be absent at the hearing of the present two summonses.

The Father’s summons

4.  The ground for the Father’s immediate variation downward is that, as alleged by him, the Mother’s updated Form E shows that she has a “materially higher” personal income than previously stated, and that her Form E also shows spousal income of $60,000, resulting a total household income of $116,000.

5.  It turns out what the Father did was adding up all the credits in the Mother’s bank account for 12 months, as seen in the bank statements produced by the Mother in her Form E, and claimed that the Mother’s average gross income was SG$9,757 per month, or approximately HK$54,641.

6.  Further, the Father alleged that the Mother’s husband B owns a company and that the Mother has failed to disclose the assets of B’s company, and the Mother has also failed to disclose the value of her own business of a psychologist practice.

7.  Since issuing his summons, the Father had served a questionnaire on the Mother, in which the Mother had explained:

(i)   The amount of average monthly income of approximately HK$36,000 disclosed by her in her Form E of 26 June 2017 was calculated based on adding up the amounts paid by her clients, or credits into her bank account between June 2016-May 2017 and deducting her clinic expenses and then divided by 12;

(ii)   Her psychologist practice is that of a sole proprietorship with no assets and therefore the value is the income the Mother produces;

(iii)   The Mother has disclosed a copy of her husband B’s payslip which was SG$11,000 and disclosed a copy of his bank statement.

8.  First of all, I do not see how the Mother’s husband’s/B’s income or assets is relevant at this stage. B is not the father of L and is under no legal liability to contribute towards L’s expenses.  The most that can be said is that B may be contributing towards the Mother’s rental and/or household expenses in Singapore, thereby reducing her own expenses.  Since L is not residing in Singapore, whatever B’s contribution towards the Mother’s general expenses in Singapore, if any, does not affect L or the Father’s liability towards L.  Further, there is no issue in the present application in relation to the Mother’s ability to contribute towards her share of L’s expenses.

9.  There was no sufficient evidence to show that the Mother’s average income net of her clinic expenses was not what was disclosed by her in the Form E.

10.  Further, as seen in this Court’s judgment on the Interim Maintenance Order, the approach this Court took on a broad brush basis was that the parties should contribute towards the interim maintenance of L in the proportion of their respective income, net of tax and that in addition the Father should pay for L’s medical and school expenses.  The value of the Mother’s psychologist practice is of no relevance at this stage.  She is the sole practitioner and she is not selling her practice.

11.  Anyway, in my view, the Father’s grounds for his variation application are totally misconceived.

12.  At the time of the Interim Maintenance Order, I found L’s interim financial needs to be HK$28,000 per month, less school fees and medical expenses.  I found the Father’s income, net of tax, to be HK$133,000 per month, and the Mother’s income, net of tax, to be HK$28,000 and on this basis, the Father’s and the Mother’s contribution should be 83% being the Father’s and 17% being the Mother’s.  This was in addition to the Father’s undertaking to pay for L’s medical expenses and nursery school expenses in Hong Kong, if and when applicable.  Thus under the Interim Maintenance Order, the Father has been ordered to pay HK$17,740 per month as interim maintenance plus his undertakings.

13.  The Father has disclosed a monthly income of HK$192,800 in his Form E of 26 June 2017 and tax of HK$24,353, which means his net income in June 2017 was at least HK$168,447, which is HK$35,447 per month higher than his net of tax income at the time of the Interim Maintenance Order.

14.  On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the Mother’s income as at June 2017 was on average HK$36,000, and net of tax of HK$1,000, was about HK$35,000.

15.  The Father’s general and personal expenses were about HK$142,232 at the time of the Interim Maintenance Order, at the old rent.  In June 2017, with his rent at HK$ 26,000, and a young baby son, his expenses, excluding the Interim Maintenance of HK$17,740 per month and the tax, was only HK$112,510 per month.

16.  There is no issue about the Father not being able to pay the amounts ordered under the Interim Maintenance Order, in addition to his undertakings, nor can the Court see any evidence that he is not able to pay.

17.  Having considered the Father’s present income and expenses, I am of the view that the Father has not made out any ground for any immediate variation downward of the Interim Maintenance Order.

18.  So far as the final maintenance for L is, in light of the Mother’s application for relocation, the matter of L’s final maintenance can only be decided when the Mother’s relocation application has been determined.

The Mother’s summons 

19.  The Interim Maintenance Order contains an undertaking by the Father that he will be responsible for payment of L’s nursey school expenses if and when applicable.

20.  L is now almost 5 years old.  The parties have joint custody of L.  On 16 May 2017, this Court ordered that the Mother is to have L’s sole care and control and the access arrangements have been set out by this Court.

21.  Since then, the Mother has continued her practice in Singapore and has been commuting between Hong Kong and Singapore.  When she has to be in Singapore, her husband B will come up to Hong Kong to take care of L.  So far, according to the Social Welfare Report, the access arrangements have been working out smoothly.

22.  In August 2017, the Mother enrolled L in a kindergarten in Mui Wo on Lantau.  Since then, despite numerous letters and correspondence, the Father has failed to comply with his undertaking to this Court and has failed to pay any of L’s nursey fees and school expenses.

23.  Finally, the Mother issued her summons seeking a sum of HK$52,450, for school fees and expenses for the period from August 2017 until February 2018.

24.  At the 1st hearing on 27 February 2018, the Father sought leave to apply for the transcript of the hearing on 15 July 2016, saying that he did not realise what an undertaking was.

25.  The Father has received tertiary education, and there is no sufficient evidence as to why he would not understand what an “undertaking” mean or the effect of an undertaking.  The undertakings are clearly stated in the order of the Interim Maintenance Order, and this was in July 2016.  If the Father had not understood the meaning or effect of the undertakings, he had had ample time to consult a lawyer, which he had done in the past, and if it was not his intention to undertake or agree to pay L’s medical expenses (by claiming reimbursement from his medical policy) or to pay the nursery fees, he should have immediately made an application to this Court.  Nothing was done by him.

26.  The Father had quoted two sentences from the transcript of the hearing on 15 July 2016.  However, they were not complete.  What he said was set out below:

“Mr Bryant: So my understanding of … and again, the costs, we don’t have any school costs in Hong Kong. It would be minimal. I think K1 runs at about HK$1,500 a month on Peng Chau, which is quite good. In Discovery Bay, if you went to the top Montessori pre-school, it’s 7,000 a month and so the maximum we would have schooling would be – would be 7,000; the minimum would be 1,500 which again, I would be – happily to pick up, as I already pick up the medical and other expenses[1].”

“Mr Bryant: Yes, Yes, so – and those are fairly accurate numbers and again I’ve put in school fees as if she went to school on Peng Chau. Obviously that would increase if she went to Discovery Bay[2].”

27.  It is clear from the above, whether, undertaking or not, the Father has agreed to pay for L’s nursery school fees.  What he said was the amount he put in his then Form E was as if L went to school on Peng Chau, but his agreement was not limited to that he would pay only if L were to go to school on Peng Chau.  In any event, he never filed any application to vary or clarify his undertaking/agreement.

28.  In his affirmation of 16 March 2018 filed in opposition to the Mother’s summons, he complained that he did not consent or agree to D’s action to unilaterally relocate L to a new school, and alleged that the Mother was in breach of the joint custody order. He said “without this breach there would be no change of schools and no additional costs”.

29.  The Father is fully aware throughout that the Mother does not live on Peng Chau and has no intention of so doing.  The Mother and L have been living in Leyburn Villas in Cheung Sha on Lantau and that is where they are now living.  At the trial in December 2016, the Mother indicated that for the schooling arrangements for L, her primary preference at that time if L were to remain in Hong Kong was Lantau International School, but she is open to consider schools in Central if the Father has other preferences.

30.  The Father was also aware at the trial in December 2016 that since the Mother and L would not be living on Peng Chau, it was the Mother’s plan to enrol L into a new school if the Mother were to be granted sole care and control.

31.  More importantly, L has been enrolled at her present school in August 2017 for the 2017/2018 term.  The Father has been fully aware of the arrangement since August 2017.  Any alleged “breach” has been accepted by the Father.  In fact, according to the Mother, the Father has attended many school events.  There was never any application by the Father to vary L’s schooling arrangement nor has he come up with any proposal for another school for L elsewhere, other than Peng Chau which is not realistic nor practical for L. 

32.  Having considered all the above, the Father has not made out any grounds in opposing the Mother’s application.

33.  The amount outstanding as at the hearing was HK$60,630.  In view of the fact that the Father has been away, I will give him 14 days to pay.  Normally, a judgment debt will carry judgment interest (currently at 8% per annum) and I see no reason as to why the amount should not carry such interest after 14 days.

Order 

34.  My order is therefore:

(i)   The Father’s summons issued on 1 December 2017 for immediate variation downward of the Interim Maintenance Order is dismissed;

(ii)   As for the Mother’s summons issued on 6 February 2018, the Father shall pay the Mother the sum of HK$60,630 being L’s school expenses up to and including March 2018, within 14 days from today.  Thereafter, the sum, or any unpaid balance, will carry interest at judgment rate, which is currently 8% per annum until full payment.

35.  As for costs, as the Mother is the successful party, the Father has to pay the Mother’s costs of and incidental to the two summonses.

Further Observations

36.  The hearing date on 28 March 2018 for the two summonses was fixed in the presence of the Father on 27 February 2018.  On 9 March 2018, he sent a letter to inform the Court that he needed to leave Hong Kong on 27 March 2018 for 5 days travel to the United States, and sought an adjournment or the matter be dealt with on paper.  There was no reason provided by him as to why he needed to leave Hong Kong on 27 March 2018, whether it was for business/work, or for his own pleasure or for any other reason.  There was also no evidence as to when the trip was booked.

37.  This Court directed on 12 March 2018 that the Father should provide evidence of having to leave Hong Kong on 27 March 2018.  There was no response from the Father.  Thereafter, this Court further directed on 15 March 2018, amongst other things, that unless he was to produce to the Court sufficient evidence on or before 26 March 2018 that he received notice to travel from his employer after 8 January 2018, the hearing on 28 March 2018 would stand.  There was again no response to this direction.  The Father simply did not turn up at the hearing on 28 March 2018.

38.  The above in fact would have justified this Court in dismissing his summons outright at the hearing. Unless there is a reasonable explanation from the Father, this Court will regard his attitude as one of disrespect to the Court.

39.  The Father is also reminded to seek legal advice as soon as possible on the consequences of failing to comply with this order, namely the steps the Mother may take to enforce payment, in the event if he fails to comply with this order within the time stipulated.

  

  

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

The plaintiff was not represented and did not appear

The defendant appeared in person

Attendance of the Official Solicitor was excused



[1] At A-E, pg 46 of transcript

[2] At F-G, pg 50 of transcript

[2018] HKCFI 162-EN-2018-01-22

DCB v. AB

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HCMP 2173/2014

[2018] HKCFI 162

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2173 OF 2014

_______________________

  IN THE MATTER OF an application to make IMB-B also known as IMB, a girl born on 15th day of May 2013, a ward of court
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

______________________

BETWEEN
 DCBPlaintiff
 and
 ABDefendant


Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 8 January 2018
Date of Ruling: 22 January 2018

_______________

R U L I N G

_______________

1.  The background of theses wardship proceedings have been set out previously in this Court’s judgment of 16 May 2017 (“Judgment”), which was handed down after a trial in relation the Father’s and the Mother’s respective applications for care and control of the ward L, and also for the Mother’s application for leave to permanently remove L back to Singapore.

2.  Pursuant to the Judgment, I granted L’s sole care and control to the Mother, but dismissed her application for removal.  I ordered L to remain a ward of this court, and made orders in relation to the Father’s access (“16.05.17 Order”).

3.  On 1 December 2017, the Father in these proceedings issued a summons, seeking clarification of the 16.05.17 Order, and seeking essentially an order that while the Mother is outside of Hong Kong that L will reside with the Father.

4.  After the 16.05.17 Order, the Mother has married Mr O.  The Mother has now made a new application for removal.

5.  According to the Father, after the 16.05.17 Order, the Mother was out of Hong Kong from 22 – 29 October 2017, and again from 24 November – 1 December 2017, during which periods she had arranged for Mr O to be with L in Hong Kong .

6.  The Father’s summons was issued without any supporting affirmation.

7.  At the hearing on 8 January 2017, I indicated that it was not this Court’s intention at the time of making the 16.05.17 Order that L would reside with the other parent when one parent was outside Hong Kong for work/business reasons, nor was such an order sought at the trial by either parent. 

8.  In fact, I understand that there had been occasions that while the Father himself was away, during his access period/s, and L was cared for by her stepmother Ms S.  The Mother did not voice any objection to that arrangement.

9.  Under the 16.05.17 Order, the Mother has L’s sole care and control.  At present, L has her home with her mother and her step father Mr O at Leyburn Villas on Lantau Island.  L also has a home with her father and her stepmother and her now one year old half brother M, on Peng Chau. 

10.  Under arrangement of the Mother, L commenced attending a kindergarten in Mui Wo on Lantau in August 2017 from 9 am to 4:30 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

11.  I have called for an urgent report on this issue, and according to the social welfare officer, Ms Leung, the access arrangements were running smoothly, and that when the Mother had to work in Singapore, Mr O would assist in caring for L in Hong Kong, and when the Father had to attend work or work outside Hong Kong, Ms S would assist in caring for L.  L was reported to be under proper care so far and Ms Leung suggests to maintain the status quo.

12.  Mr Ted Lee, of the Official Solicitor’s office also filed a short report on this matter.  Mr Lee was of the view that there is no valid ground in the Father’s application, and shared the observation by Ms Leung, and considered it reasonable and appropriate to maintain the status quo.

13.  Although at the hearing, the Father was granted leave to file a supporting affirmation, he did not in the end file one to say why the arrangements in the 16.05.17 Order should be varied to allow L residing with him whenever the Mother is not in Hong Kong.  Thus, no grounds had been put forward by him.  The Mother had filed an affirmation to oppose the application, but as the Mother was only given leave to file an affirmation in reply to the Father’s, there was no need for her to file hers when the Father did not file his.

14.  Having considered Ms Leung’s report and Mr Lee’s report, I find there is no reason to disturb the present access arrangements, particularly when L is attending kindergarten on Lantau on Mondays – Fridays, and the present access arrangements are working smoothly. Further, having considered the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that it is in the best interest of L not to vary the present access/residential arrangements during the period whenever one parent is away.  I therefore dismiss the Father’s summons.

15.  I have indicated at the hearing, the parents remain joint custodians of L, and will remind them that one parent should give the other parent advance notice of his/her absence from Hong Kong.

16.  As for costs, the Father said he was seeking a clarification of the Court’s order, and in the end did not file any further affirmation in support.  As I have said, there was no need for the Mother to file hers.  Having considered the circumstances, I will make no order as to costs for this application. 

  

  

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

   

The plaintiff appeared in person

The defendant appeared in person

Mr T Lee of the Official Solicitor, for the ward

112565-EN-2017-11-17

DCB v. AB

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HCMP 2173/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2173 OF 2014

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER OF an application to make IMB-B also known as IMB, a girl born on 15th day of May 2013, a ward of court
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

_______________________

BETWEEN  
 DCBPlaintiff
 and 
 ABDefendant

_______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 14 August 2017
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 18 September 2017
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions: 29 September 2017
Date of Defendant’s Reply Submissions: 27 October 2017
Date of Decision: 17 November 2017

________________

D E C I S I O N

(On Costs (2))

________________

Introduction

1.  This Court handed down a judgment in these wardship proceedings in relation to the interim maintenance for the ward L on 22 July 2016 (“22.07.16 Judgment”) and costs were reserved. 

2.  Since the interim maintenance application, there was a trial in December 2016 in relation to L’s care and control and the Mother’s application for relocation of L and this Court later handed down a judgment on 16 May 2017 (“16.05.17Judgment”).

3.  The order made by this court in the 16.05.17 Judgment was to the following effect:

(i) The 19.05.15 Custody Order be varied to the extent that the Mother be granted L’s sole care and control with defined access set out in the order;

(ii) The Mother’s application for permanent removal of L to Singapore be dismissed;

(iii) The two week arrangement do continue until the Mother returns to Hong Kong;

(iv) L shall remain a ward of this court until further order.

4.  Essentially, the Mother was the successful party in relation to (i) but the unsuccessful party in (ii).  Subsequent thereto, a decision on costs was handed down by this Court on 28 July 2017 (“28.07.17 Decision”) where no order as to costs was made.

5.  The present decision is to deal with those reserved costs in relation to the Mother’s interim maintenance application.

6.  Save otherwise indicated, in this decision, I shall follow the same abbreviations in the 22.07.16 Judgment and the 28.07.17 Judgment.

General Principles

7.  Generally speaking, costs are in the unfettered discretion of the court.  As seen in Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court, costs normally follow the event.  

8.  Mr Cheng, Counsel for the Father, had referred the Court to two Court of Appeal judgements.  The first one was HK and BD, CACV 252/2009 & CACV 71/2010, (unrep) Reasons for Judgment dated 15 October 2010 where it was said that:

“In family matters, as in all civil proceedings, the basic principles are that costs are in the discretion of the court but that costs should follow the event except when it appears to the court that, in the circumstances of the case, some other order should be made. In family matters, because of their particular dynamics, the exercise of discretion is broader-based than in other civil proceedings. However, as was observed by Nurler-Sloss LJ in Gojkovic v Gojkovic [1992] Fam 40, there still remains the necessity for some starting point. That starting-point, as we have indicated is that costs prima facie follow the event[1].”

9.  The other case referred to by Mr Cheng was QMY and GSS (No 2) [2016] 1 HKLRD 433 (CA), which concerned maintenance proceedings for a child and the Court of Appeal had expressed the view that it was an appropriate case for not making any order as to costs of the appeal and the costs below as the proceedings were brought for the benefit of the child, and there was no winner or loser amongst the parents in matters concerning the welfare of the child, and the appeal was resolved by a point raised by the Court.

10.  The facts in QMY were not set out in the Reasons for the costs order, and the brief reasons given were those set out above.  In any event, it was said that the appeal was resolved by a point raised by the Court of Appeal and seemingly not by the parties, and no doubt this was taken into account by the Court of Appeal when making no order as to costs.

11.  Notwithstanding Gojkovic was decided some 25 years ago, what was quoted in HK and BD is still generally applicable in family cases.   Each case will of course depend on its own facts, and it is trite that in family cases, the court’s discretion on costs is broader based than that in other civil cases. 

12.  Further, as set out in the 28.07.17 Decision, since the Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong, Order 62 rule 5 (1) now also sets out special matters which the court shall take into account to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances.  Such special matters include the conduct of all the parties, and whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful.

13.  As further seen in the 28.07.17 Judgment[2], it has been long been recognized, and also set out by our Court of Appeal in TPL and WYY, CACV 47/2014 and CACV 61/2014, Judgment dated 15 December 2014, the general practice in applications to do with children, the usual order should be no order as to costs.  However, as pointed out by Yuen JA in TPL, the general practice is not a rigid rule and accordingly, the courts have said that this approach to costs does not apply in exceptional circumstances, such as where the conduct of one party has been reprehensible or the party’s stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable[3]. 

14.  In any event, as seen in TPL and the line of cases referred to in the 28.07.17 Judgment, the usual order of no order as to costs is normally applied in relation to applications concerning care and access arrangements of children, rather than financial applications.  

15.  In KWKM v KSW CACV 432/2016, [2007] HKCA, (unrep) 15 June 2007, the successful litigant, namely the petitioner/wife, was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent/husband, the unsuccessful litigant, and she appealed.  The wife had made an application for interim maintenance for the parties’ 13 year old son and initially sought HK$6,000-$6,200 a month which was later revised to $4,265 a month.  The father had throughout been willing to pay $3,000 a month and was subsequently ordered to pay $3,380 a month.  There was no Calderbank offer made by the father.  Yuen JA in her judgment applied the principles set out in In re Elgindata Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207, and allowed the appeal as the wife was the successful litigant although the eventual order of $3,380 was some way from the sum claimed by her, she obtained an order more than the amount of $3,000 which the father was willing to pay. 

16.  Mr Cheng, on behalf of the Father, referred this Court to an earlier judgment of mine in LCTK and TV v TKKP FCMC 173/2009 (unrep) Judgment dated 25 June 2010, wherein an order was made for the interim maintenance for a child on application by her mother and the father was ordered to pay 50% of all the mother’s costs of the application, on the basis that the mother’s claims were largely unsubstantiated even though initiating the proceedings almost a year ago, and that although the mother was not awarded the sum she sought, the proposals of the father were also too low, and that the mother had no choice but to issue an application for interim maintenance in order to obtain the order.

17.  As seen from the above cases which concerned interim maintenance applications or financial applications for the benefit of a child, and depending on the circumstances of each case, the approach is still generally a successful party will be awarded his/her costs.

The present case

18.  I now turn to consider the facts of the present case.  At the time of the hearing of the interim maintenance, the Father was acting in person.  The background was set out in the 22.07.16 Judgment and also the 16.05.17 Judgement and will not be repeated here.  Suffice to say, the Mother returned with L from Singapore to Hong Kong on 8 March 2016, after being ordered by the Singapore Court to do so, and about 8 days later, on 16 March 2016, the Mother issued a summons, seeking among other things, interim maintenance for L.

19.  The Mother’s solicitors had lodged a bundle of relevant correspondence between the parties concerning L’s interim maintenance (“Correspondence Bundle”).  To summarise, the chronology in relation to the issue of L’s interim maintenance was as follows:

(i) On 8 January 2016, on the basis he had been granted sole care and control, the Father issued a summons seeking, among other things, maintenance from the Mother in the sum of HK$4,000 per month upon L’s return to Hong Kong, which was later adjourned to a direction hearing after L’s return;

(ii) After the Mother and L returned to Hong Kong on 8 March 2016, as mentioned earlier, she issued a summons on 16 March 2016 seeking, among other things, interim maintenance for L, and she was seeking a sum of not less than HK$5,000 per month and an interim allowance of HK$20,000 for accommodation based on the then Interim Access Order;

(iii) On 23 March 2016, the Mother through her solicitors proposed an interim sum of HK$20,000 or the Father to provide suitable accommodation for L, and a sum of HK$5,000 per month for L;

(iv) There being no response from the Father, on 27 April 2016, the Mother’s solicitors wrote again and repeated the Mother’s above proposal;

(v) There was a direction hearing on 5 May 2016, but no offer of financial payment was made by the Father for the benefit of L at that hearing, nor did the Father withdraw his summons for L’s maintenance against the Mother;

(vi) On 17 May 2016, the Mother’s solicitors wrote again pointing out, among other things, that if the Father failed to agree to or make a reasonable offer of financial provision for L, they would pursue the summons they issued on 17 May 2016 for periodical payments for L;

(vii) On the same day, 17 May 2016, the Mother’s solicitors further sent a Calderbank letter, or a letter marked “without prejudice save as to costs” and set out the Mother’s proposal of HK$20,000 per month for L, being HK$15,000 per month for accommodation and HK$5,000 per month for L’s living costs on the basis that L was spending two weeks each month with the Mother in Hong Kong and education costs were to be in addition;

(viii) Then on 14 July 2016, the day before the hearing for interim maintenance, the Mother’s solicitors sent a further letter to propose settlement, namely that the Father was to pay a sum of HK$86,000 for L’s expenses from March to July 2016, and from 1 August 2016, the Father to pay HK$24,000 per month for L’s maintenance.

20.  It was not disputed that the parties were attending mediation during which the matter of L’s maintenance was raised, but as these discussions were without prejudice, they had not been disclosed, save that the Father alleged that he had sent a letter to the Mother’s solicitors on 14 July 2016 offering HK$17,000 per month for L (“Disputed 14.07.16 Letter”).

21.  The Mother’s then solicitors (prior to the Mother’s legal aid certificate being discharged) denied having ever received the Disputed 14.07.16 Letter, and queried its authenticity.  They further objected to it being included in the Correspondence Bundle.  The Father was unable to produce a fax log report of the Disputed 14.07.16 Letter which he claimed he had faxed to the Mother’s solicitors on 14 July 2016. 

22.  At the interim maintenance hearing on 15 July 2016, the Father did not give any indication that he had altered his position from one of seeking a sum of HK$4,000 for L’s maintenance from the Mother, to one offering to pay HK$17,000 per month to the Mother for L’s maintenance.

23.  In any event, the Disputed 14.07.16 Letter, if indeed sent, was only sent at the eleventh hour, and would not have prevented the hearing on 15 July 2016 taking place.  The Disputed 14.07.16 Letter made no mention of L’s medical and education costs, nor made any proposals for reimbursement of L’s expenses from 8 March 2016 to July 2016.

24.  This Court in the end ordered the Father to pay interim maintenance for L in the sum of HK$17,740 per month, on top of the Father’s undertaking to arrange for L’s medical expenses to be paid/reimbursed and also to be responsible for L’s nursery school expenses in Hong Kong.  In addition, the Father was to pay HK$58,590 for L’s maintenance from 8 March 2016 until 13 July 2016.

25.  The award the Mother in the end obtained from the Court was clearly more or better than what the Father was offering in the Disputed 14.07.16 Letter, if it was indeed sent.

26.  The Father complained that the Mother proposed a less compromising offer on 14 July 2016, and she must have appreciated that there was even a slimmer change of settlement by increasing the offer right before the hearing.  Even so, the offer made by the Mother on 17 May 2016 was clearly marked “without prejudice save as to costs”, and the Father was clearly warned about costs.  The Father had had an opportunity and plenty of time to respond and to seek legal advice and to make a reasonable offer, but there was no evidence that he did. 

27.  The Father did not respond in writing at all until the alleged Disputed 14.07.16 Letter.  Nor did he withdraw his own application for L’s maintenance from the Mother.  As stated in the 22.07.16 Judgment, the Father’s approach towards the interim maintenance application was totally misconceived, in that he was under the impression that because he was granted sole care and control of L, the Mother had to pay him for maintenance for L, or that the Mother should not be entitled to maintenance for L when she was exercising access rights, and/or because she had “abducted” L previously. 

28.  As further stated in the 22.07.16 Judgment, based on the difference between their respective after tax income, this Court was of the view that the parties should contribute and share L’s interim needs of HK$28,000 per month in the proportion of about 83% (being the Father’s) and 17% (being the Mother’s). 

29.  The Father’s after tax income was almost 5 times that of the Mother’s.  The Mother had to come to the Court in order to obtain an award for the benefit of L.  There were no voluntary payments made by the Father for the benefit of L prior to the award made by this Court.

30.  Having considered the circumstances of this case, the Mother is clearly the successful party, and I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.

Order

31.  I therefore order the Father to pay the Mother’s costs of and incidental to her application for L’s interim maintenance under her summons of 16 March 2016 including the present costs argument, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.  The Mother’s own costs be taxed under Legal Aid Regulations, where applicable.

  

  

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

  

Mr Ken Cheng, instructed by SM & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Robin Egerton, instructed by Tanner De Witt, for the defendant



[1] At para 78

[2] At para 10

[3] At paras 14.1-14.5

110732-EN-2017-07-28

DCB v. AB

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HCMP 2173/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2173 OF 2014

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER OF an application to make IMB-B also known as IMB, a girl born on 15th day of May 2013, a ward of court
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

______________________

BETWEEN

 DCBPlaintiff
 and 
 ABDefendant

______________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearings:  14-16, 19 December 2016
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 6 June 2017
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions: 27 June 2017
Date of Defendant’s Reply Submissions:  11 July 2017
Date of Decision:  28 July 2017

________________

D E C I S I O N
(On Costs)

  ________________

Introduction

1.  This court handed down a judgment in these wardship proceedings on 16 May 2017, in relation to the ward L’s care and control, relocation and whether L should be dewarded (“Judgment”).

2.  Save otherwise indicated, in this decision, I shall follow the same abbreviations in the Judgment.

3.  The order made by this court was to the following effect:

(i) The 19.05.15 Custody Order be varied to the extent that the Mother be granted L’s sole care and control with defined access set out in the order;

(ii) The Mother’s application for permanent removal of L to Singapore be dismissed;

(iii) The two week arrangement do continue until the Mother returns to Hong Kong;

(iv) L shall remain a ward of this court until further order.

(“16.05.17 Order”)

4.  The court further made directions in the 16.05.17 Order in relation to the lodging of submissions on costs, which is to be dealt with on paper.

5.  The Mother continues to be under legal aid and her Counsel Mr Egerton has lodged submissions on her behalf.  The Father was acting in person at the trial, and is now legally represented.  His Counsel Mr Ken Cheng has lodged submissions on his behalf.

6.  As a start, the directions this court made in the 16.05.17 Order were only in relation to the costs of the trial which led to the Judgment.  It is not clear why written submissions on costs were made in relation to the Interim Maintenance application.  The matter of costs in relation to that application was reserved in the Interim Maintenance Order, and there had been no directions made in relation to that matter, and indeed the parties’ updated Form Es were only exchanged on 26 June 2017, well after the 16.05.17 Order.  Further, I am of the view that there should be also an agreed bundle of correspondence separately lodged, containing correspondence, if any, over any proposals and counter proposals over interim maintenance.  I accept Mr Cheng’s submission that those costs reserved should be dealt with separately.

7.  In this decision, I will only consider the costs of the trial which led to the Judgment and the 16.05.17 Order.  I will make directions as to those reserved costs in the Interim Maintenance Order at the forthcoming direction hearing on 14 August 2017 in relation to L’s financial provision.

General Principles

8.  Generally speaking, costs are in the unfettered discretion of the court.  As seen in Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court, costs normally follow the event.  Order 62 rule 5 (1) now also sets out special matters which the court shall take into account to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances.  Such special matters include the conduct of all the parties, and whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful.

9.  In relation to “conduct of the parties”, Order 62 rule 5(2) further sets out such conduct :-

“(a) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;

  (b) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue;

  (c) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and

  (d) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.”

10.  It has however been long been recognized, and also set out by our Court of Appeal in TPL and WYY,CACV 47/2014 and CACV 61/2014, Judgment 15.12.14[1], the general practice in applications to do with children, the usual order should be no order as to costs.  However, as pointed out by Yuen JA, the general practice is not a rigid rule and accordingly, the courts have said that this approach to costs does not apply in exceptional circumstances, such as where the conduct of one party has been reprehensible or the party’s stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable[2].

11.  In Re LB (Wardship : Costs), HCMP 813 of 2011, judgment dated 21 October 2011, Jeremy Poon J, as he then was, held that exceptionally, the court would depart from the general practice and make a costs order, having regard to relevant circumstances including whether[3]:

(a) a party had a proper interest in participating in the proceedings;

(b) a party had acted bona fide in the best interests of the child;

(c) a party had any ulterior motive for participating in the proceedings;

(d) it was necessary to invoke the court’s wardship proceedings;

(e) a party had been guilty of unreasonable conduct in relation to the conduct of the proceedings[4].

12.  As said by Yuen JA in TPL, in considering whether the exception applies in a particular case, the court should not be too quick to label a parent’s conduct as “unreasonable”, as seen in the passage quoted from R v R(Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95, and one must not confuse unreasonableness in relation to the child-because one might say that we are expected to be unreasonable in our attitudes to our children-and unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation[5].

13.  As submitted by Mr Egerton, there is a distinction between a party “behaving unreasonably”, which would warrant a costs order; and a party “running a hopeless case”, which would not warrant a costs order[6].

14.  In Re T (care proceedings: serious allegations not proved) [2012] UKSC 36, the UK Supreme Court summarised the judgment of Re J (Costs of Fact-Finding Hearing) [2010] 1 FLR 1893, and supports that when the issue has been one of pure fact-finding, and the question of costs is ring-fenced and that accordingly the case for a costs order is strong[7].

15.  In Re J, most of the mother’s allegations were held to be established and Wilson LJ in the Court of Appeal ordered the father to pay two thirds of the mother’s costs of the hearing, representing the costs incurred by the mother which is wholly referable to her allegations against the father[8].

16.  With the above principles and practice in mind, I turn to the present case.

The Mother’s ground for seeking costs against the Father

17.  The Mother seeks an order that the Father pays half of the costs of her application for care and control and relocation.

18.  Mr Cheng however submitted on behalf of the Father that there should be no order as to costs.

19.  The Mother’s main ground for seeking costs against the Father was that his litigation conduct was unreasonable.  In particular, Mr Egerton pointed out that the Father’s litigation conduct was unreasonable because:

(i) He reported the Mother to the Legal Aid Department no doubt with intent to deprive her of legal representation;

(ii) He made serious and unsubstantiated complaints of ‘bias’ against Miss Tsang, the Court appointed Social Welfare Officer which not only were unwarranted but also significantly prolonged the trial thereby increasing the Mother’s legal costs and unnecessarily utilised the Court’s resources;

(iii) He made unsubstantiated allegations against the Mother which required detailed responses in the Mother’s written evidence, thereby increasing her costs, but yet did not cross examine her:

(a) Contempt of court

(b) Conviction of child abduction

(c) Non factual statement

(d) Erroneous statements

(e) Perjured testimony

(f) Deceit

(g) Accusation of mental problems and attempted suicide

(h) Parental alienation and denying access

(i) Fraud

(j) Misrepresentation of facts and abuse of the legal system

Discussion

20.  First of all, I have to point out that the Father was the one who was granted sole care and control after the Mother’s non compliance of the Interim Access Order and failure to participate in the Hong Kong Proceedings.  The Mother was applying for a variation of the provisions in the 19.05.15 Custody Order.  It was thus not unreasonable for the Father to seek to maintain the then order in his favour. He did not have a hopeless case.

21.  As pointed out by Mr Egerton, it is not the Mother’s case that the Father’s stance was reprehensible or unreasonable.  The Mother’s complaint is only in relation to the Father’s litigation conduct being unreasonable.

22.  The Father had complained to the Director of Legal Aid over the Mother being granted legal aid, and I understand his complaints were in relation to whether the Mother had made an accurate declaration of her means.  Obviously, had the Director come to such a view, the Mother’s application would be revoked. As it turned out, it would appear that the Director did not find his complaints justified, and although the Mother’s legal aid was discharged, shortly thereafter, it was restored.  The short-lived discharge was after the trial and did not really have a significant impact on the progress of these proceedings.

23.  The findings of this court indicated that the Father’s complaints of social welfare officer Miss Tsang being biased and that her investigation was flawed were unsubstantiated.  However, the perception of a parent that a social welfare officer, whose recommendation is not in his/her favour, is biased or has not taken into account certain matters, is not uncommon.  I am unable to say the Father’s conduct was reprehensible or unreasonable by reason of his complaints or cross examination of Miss Tsang.

24.  Mr Egerton complained that the Father’s cross examination of Miss Tsang prolonged the trial.  The Father was unrepresented.  I accept that that there were repetitive questions by the Father, but there were few objections to those questions.

25.  As pointed out by Mr Cheng, the Mother did not succeed in her relocation application, and she had called her parents mainly to support her removal application.  Much can be said at least for this application, there should be no order as to costs.

26.  I have found in the Judgment that the Father’s choice of language in his affirmations was “inflammatory, emotive and quite unnecessary”.  Some of his allegations were very serious, and Mr Egerton submitted that this had led to the Mother having to file lengthy affirmations in reply.  The Mother had filed a total of 5 affirmations, but some of the evidence was in support of her own applications.  Although additional costs were incurred in the preparation of some of her affirmations, in the end, the Father did not cross examine her, and her evidence was not put under scrutiny. This no doubt was a relief for the Mother, and in any event much court time and also costs were saved.

27.  The parties did attempt mediation but there was no evidence that the mediation attempts were not successful by reason of the Father’s attitude.

28.  As I have said, the Father did not have a hopeless case, and it was necessary at the time for him to invoke the court’s wardship proceedings in order to try to bring L back to Hong Kong.  He had no ulterior motive and although the language he used in his affirmations and his criticisms of the Mother indicated he is an emotive person, it could not be said that he had conducted the litigation in relation to L’s care and control in a way other than bona fide in the best interests of L.

29.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I am unable to say the Father’s litigation conduct in relation to L’s care and control was reprehensible, or beyond the band of what was reasonable.  Bearing in mind L is still young, and the parties will need to continue to communicate over her welfare for years to come, I have come to the view that it is in L’s best interest that there should be no order as to costs, including any reserved costs, save those already ordered, if any.  The Mother’s own costs are to be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge for the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Ken Cheng, instructed by SM & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Robin Egerton, instructed by Tanner De Witt, for the defendant, on instructions of Director of Legal Aid



[1] At paras 14.1-14.5

[2] See para 15.1, at pg 10

[3]Re LB (Wardship: Costs) [2012] 1 HKLRD 266 [paragraph 24]

[4]Hong Kong Family Court Practice [paragraph 5.535], citing at note 841, FHY v S (Costs: Children's Case) [2006] HKFLR 453 [paragraph 9]

[5] See para 15.2, pg 11

[6]Family Law and Practice in Hong Kong [§11.119 at 412]

[7] Rayden [§51.11 at K-202, citing Re T [paragraph 19-22]]

[8] Rayden [§51.11 at K-202, citing Re T [paragraph 19-22]]

109860-EN-2017-05-16

DCB v. AB

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105277-EN-2016-07-22

DCB v. AB

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HCMP 2173/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2173 OF 2014

______________________

  IN THE MATTER OF an application to make IMB-B also known as IMB, a girl born on 15th day of May 2013, a ward of court
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

______________________

    BETWEEN

 DCBPlaintiff
 and 
 ABDefendant

______________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 15 July 2016
Date of Judgment: 22 July 2016

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Introduction

1. These wardship proceedings were issued by the plaintiff father (“F”) in August 2014, after the defendant mother (“M”) took their daughter (“L”) to Singapore two months earlier without his consent.

2. M and L eventually returned to Hong Kong on about 8 March 2016 after being ordered by the Singapore Court to do so, and the present applications concern maintenance for L, pending the hearing of M’s application for permanent removal/relocation of L from Hong Kong to Singapore.

Background

3. F and M met in March 2010.  They soon developed a relationship and cohabited from about June 2012.  L was born in May 2013 out of their cohabitation, and is now 3 years old.

4. The parties’ relationship broke down after having an argument on the scheduled date of their wedding on 21 June 2014, and the wedding had to be cancelled.

5. On 23 June 2014, M took L and left Hong Kong and went to Singapore where her family lives.  According to F, he was at first informed by M that she and L would return on about 6 July 2014, but they failed to do so.  This then led to F issuing the present proceedings.

6. In the originating summons, F sought orders including the following:

(i) L be made a ward of this court;

(ii) All of the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if the L were legitimate, under section 3 (1)(d) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13;

(iii) F to have custody, care and control of the L;

(iv) M do return L to Hong Kong forthwith.

7. F had upon issue of these proceedings immediate applied for interim access, and an order was made by Au Yeung J on 12 September 2014, for F to have interim access to L for 2 weeks every 4 weeks in Hong Kong until further order (“Interim Access Order”).  Under the Interim Access Order, F was to fund the expenses for collecting L from Singapore and sending her back to Singapore to M.

8. Subsequently on 16 October 2014, F was granted by this court all of the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if L were born legitimate, with reasons handed down the following day. On the same day, this court further ordered that the Interim Access Order to continue until further order.

9. After F issued the wardship proceedings in Hong Kong, M also issued proceedings in Singapore, seeking among other things, sole custody of and maintenance for L.  There were thus parallel proceedings in both Hong Kong and Singapore.

10. M had initially instructed solicitors in the Hong Kong proceedings, but before the hearing on 16 October 2014, she filed a notice to act in person and did not appear. 

11. Eventually, on 18 February 2015, the Singapore Court granted a stay of the Singapore proceedings, and M’s application for leave to appeal was subsequently dismissed on 30 September 2015.

12. In the meantime, and notwithstanding the stay of the Singapore proceedings, M failed to take part in the Hong Kong proceedings, nor did she comply with the Interim Access Order.  F decided to also act in person and issued a summons on 2 March 2015 seeking interim custody, care and control of L.  On 19 March 2015, this court ordered that F be granted interim custody, care and control and that D was ordered to return L to Hong Kong for the purpose of carrying out the terms of the Interim Access Order.  This court further directed that F’s originating summons be set down for a substantive hearing on 19 May 2015.

13. M continued to ignore the Hong Kong proceedings and the orders made herein.  As a result, in her absence, this court made an order on 19 May 2015 for the parties to have joint custody of L, with care and control to F, and that M was to have access to L for 2 weeks in every 4 weeks, and that M was to return L to Hong Kong (“19.05.15 Order”).  The question of financial provision for L was further adjourned to a direction hearing on 8 July 2015, which was later adjourned sine die with liberty to restore. 

14. F had further decided to issue proceedings in Singapore under section 8 of the Singapore International Abduction of Children Act, which I understand incorporates provisions of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Children Abduction, for the return of L to Hong Kong.

15. On 30 December 2016, District Judge Jen Koh of Singapore ordered that upon F’s and M’s respective undertakings as set out in the order and subject to such undertakings being carried out by both parties, L was ordered to be returned to her place of habitual residence which was Hong Kong before 31 January 2016[1].  F was to undertake to apply for a mirror order in Hong Kong to incorporate all the undertakings prior to M returning to Hong Kong with L.  On 6 January 2016, M filed an appeal against Judge Koh’s order of 30 December 2015.

16. On 8 January 2016, F issued a summons and applied to this court for the undertakings given by him and M to the Singapore Court be incorporated in a mirror order and further sought, among other orders, maintenance from M in the sum of HK$4,000 upon L’s return to Hong Kong, and orders regarding a parenting plan for L[2].

17. The undertakings were incorporated in this court’s order of 14 January 2016, whereas the other orders sought in F’s summons were adjourned to a further direction hearing on 3 March 2016, after L’s return[3].

18. M applied for legal aid in Hong Kong and filed an application on 1 March 2016 to vary the 19.05.15 Order.

19. M’s appeal against the return order of 30 December 2015 was dismissed by Judicial Commissioner Debbie Ong on 7 March 2016, and parties’ undertakings given under the order of 30 December 2015 were superseded. 

20. As mentioned earlier, M finally returned with L to Hong Kong on about 8 March 2016.

21. M issued a summons on 16 March 2016, seeking leave to relocate L from Hong Kong back to Singapore. 

22. M also issued another summons on the same day, seeking care and control of L, with defined and staying access to F, and interim financial maintenance for L of not less than HK$5,000 per month, and based on the Interim Access Order, an interim allowance of HK$20,000 for the benefit of L, and this was followed by a further summons issued by M on 16 May 2016 for F to make a periodical payment towards the maintenance, advancement and/or benefit of L.

23. I understand that M’s application was for interim maintenance pending the determination of M’s application for L’s relocation, which has been set down for a substantive hearing for 5 days commencing 14 December 2016. 

24. For the purpose of the present application, the parties have agreed to adopt an average exchange rate of 1 SGD to HKD 5.5 for past 12 months. 

The Legal Principles

25. The general legal principles have been set out in this court’s judgment in LCTK & Anor v TKKP, [2010] HKCU 1644, FCMC 173/2009, unreported, 25 June 2010, as referred to by Mr Egerton, Counsel for M.

26. The court will have to adopt a broad brush approach in an interim application and what matters is the immediate and reasonable financial needs of a child.

F’s approach

27. F appeared to be under the impression that because he was granted sole care and control, M had to pay him for support in raising L, or that M should not be entitled to maintenance for L when she was only exercising access rights[4].  He seemed also to be under the impression that a parent who had abducted a child should not be subsequently granted financial support[5].

28. First of all, M was seeking maintenance or financial orders for the benefit of L, and not for the benefit of herself. Secondly, the underlying objective of the 1980 Hague Convention is for the taking/abducting parent to return the child to the state of the child’s habitual residence and for the court in the state of the child’s habitual residence to make appropriate orders in relation to the child, including custody/access/financial orders.  After the return of an abducted child to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong court will upon application of either parent make orders regard custody and access of and maintenance for the child in the normal way, under the applicable legislation, and in the present case, under section 10 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13.  In doing so, the court will take into consideration the child’s best interests and shall give due consideration to the views of the child having regard to the age and understanding of the child and any material information contained in a social welfare report[6].  The court also has the power to vary any orders previously made[7].

29. I would also add that in Hong Kong, the law in relation to children is about to be changed with the new proposed “Children Proceedings (Parental Responsibility) Bill”, which if passed by the Legislative Council, is likely to come into effect early next year.  Under this new Bill, terminologies such as “custody and/or “care and control”, with their connotations of ownership of a child, will be swept away and replaced by a new “child arrangements order”.  As set out in the Foreword in the Consultation Paper to the Bill[8], in recent years, the courts have recognised the importance of maintaining the direct involvement of both parents in the child’s life as far as possible, and more orders for joint custody are now being made.  Under these orders, although one parent may have daily care and control of the child, both parents continue to be actively involved in the child’s life and in making major decisions affecting the child. 

30. Whatever the terminologies, the practical arrangement regarding L is that since her return to Hong Kong, she has been spending two weeks every 4 weeks with her father, and the other two weeks with her mother, and thus for those two weeks when L is with M in Hong Kong, M will incur expenses for the benefit of L.

31. In light of the above, F’s approach towards the present applications are totally misconceived.

L’s financial needs

During the 2 weeks L is with F

32. The 19.05.15 Order was made in M’s absence, and when she was refusing to return with L to Hong Kong. M is now applying to vary that order and to seek care and control of L, and a relocation order.  As I have said, the present practical arrangements are that L spends 2 weeks with each of her parents.

33. Prior to the breakdown of their relationship, F and M, and L, were living on Peng Chau Island.  F has continued to live there with his current wife, as F has since M’s departure married someone else in February 2015. 

34. For the two weeks L spends with F, according to F’s Form E filed in April 2016, L’s expenses are about HK$5,240 per month, inclusive of her school expenses.  As L has not been enrolled in any nursery school in Hong Kong, her expenses are about HK$ 4,000 per month when she is with F.  F said this amount had not taken into account for L’s share of rent and general expenses totaling about HK$71,800, with his rent having just been increased by HK$2,000 to HK$26,000 per month.

35. F had filed his 1st Form E earlier in June 2015[9].  By comparison, it seems his expenses under the “General” were much higher at that time, due mainly to a high amount for food expenses.  In any event, F is still in the same premises and there is no evidence from him that he has incurred a higher rent because he now has L living with him for 2 weeks every 4 weeks.

36. L is only 3 years old, and it is unlikely that F’s other expenses under “General” are going to increase substantially because of L’s 2 week stay.  I note however that he has not included any food for L.  M’s estimated expenses for food and milk for L are about $1,561.  These items should be more or less the same when L stays with F.

37. Taking a broad brush approach, I am of the view that L’s expenses when she is staying with F are about HK$5,500, plus any medical expenses which will be reimbursable under his medical insurance policy, and any nursery school fees, if applicable.

During the 2 weeks L is with M

38. In her 6th affidavit, M estimated the accommodation for her and L if L remains in Hong Kong to be about HK$14,000 per month from August 2016 onwards.

39. Unlike F, M does not now live in Hong Kong, and when she and L first returned in March 2016, they had stayed with friends.  M and L should not be expected to depend on the generosity of M’s friends to provide accommodation for them on an ongoing basis.  L is too young to live in Hong Kong on her own during the two weeks when she is not with F.  I therefore accept that, pending the determination of M’s relocation application, M will need accommodation for the benefit of L and her estimated amount for accommodation expenses in Hong Kong of about HK$14,000 per month is reasonable. 

40. M has been flying back to Singapore when L is with F, and her future flight tickets from August 2016 onwards will be about SG 375.50 per month, or @ 5.5, about HK$2,065 per month.  Again, in my view, this is a reasonable amount, as M needs to fly back to Singapore when L is with F, to work.

41. F has said that L’s medical costs are covered under his medical insurance scheme, and upon his undertaking to reimburse M for L’s medical costs, the estimated amount of HK$2,727.50 can be deducted from L’s estimated expenses.

42. M has recently submitted a Schedule (D) in relation to L’s updated estimated expenses from August 2016 onwards.  This has continued to include a monthly amount of SG 834.50, or about HK$4,590 for L’s school fees in Singapore.  M’s relocation application will only be heard around middle of December 2016, and it is unlikely that the court will hand down its judgment immediately, and there may be an appeal.  Thus, realistically, even if M is successful with her relocation application, L is unlikely to return to live in Singapore until sometime in early to mid 2017. There is no sufficient evidence that L will not be re-admitted into the same school if M is successful with her relocation application, or that L’s place will no longer be available by early 2017.  Unless M is able to provide further evidence as to why she needs to continue to pay the monthly school fees in Singapore, I will deduct this item from Schedule (D). 

43. On a broad brush basis, I am of the view that L’s expenses as from August 2016 onwards, when she stays with M will be about HK$22,224.50 a month, plus L’s medical expenses being reimbursed by F.  

M’s financial position

44. M is a psychologist.  According to M, prior to leaving Hong Kong for Singapore in June 2014, she and L were financially dependent on F.  This was however disputed by F.

45. Anyway, after M took L to Singapore, in August 2014, M started her own practice in Singapore as a clinical psychologist, and as mentioned earlier, she has flown to and from Singapore so that she can continue her work in her clinic during the two weeks when L is with F.

46. In M’s Form E sworn on 6 April 2016, she gave her average income to be about HK$21,730 per month.  This was challenged by F, who said her income was in the region of HK$38,000 per month.

47. In her 6th affidavit, M gave further details about her income and her practice.  M’s net income was said to be about average of HK$28,622 over the past 12 months (July 2015 to June 2016), although, if one were to take an average over past 6 months (January to June 2016), it would be about HK$38,126 per month.  She had however explained that her income varied from month to month, in that for April to June 2016, she had had a much larger than usual amount of money coming into her accounts due to clients purchasing “packages”, and she had also said this would likely be a significant drop in her income for July and August 2016.

48. For the present interim purposes, I am prepared to accept that M’s net income to be an average of about HK$28,633 only.  Her updated general and personal expenses in Schedule (C) are about $22,907 a month.

49. In M’s Form E filed on 6 April 2016, she disclosed negative assets of about HK$597,000, which was updated to about negative HK$475, 740 at the hearing.  

F’s financial position 

50. F has changed his job earlier this year and as from 1 February 2016, he has been working as the Country Manager for an Swiss insurance group.  He stated in his 2nd Form E filed in early April 2016 that his income was HK$150,000 per month.

51. So far as F’s salaries tax is concerned, he had mentioned tax rate at 17%, but this is only the maximum on a progressive scale if he had elected personal assessment.  According to F, his wife works as a personal trainer and her monthly income is about HK$10,000 per month, and she has assets of about HK$232,000.  If F is single, then his present income will fall into the level for standard flat rate of 15%, but if he and his wife are entitled to elect personal assessment, there will be deductible allowances and he may also be able to claim child allowance for L.  F has not provided copies of his latest tax returns.

52. In any event, the average amount of HK$25,500 per month for tax, as stated by F in his Form E, is on the high side, and as seen from his bank statement, his payment of tax on 20 January 2016 was HK$179,496 which presumably was for 2014/2015 tax year.

53. His current income is about HK$10,000 per month higher than his previous income.  On a rough calculation, his tax liabilities should not be more than about HK$200,000 a year, or roughly HK$17,000 per month.  Although the tax is not payable every month, I accept that monthly savings/allowances should be made for tax liabilities.  In fact, M has herself done the same.

54. At the hearing, F informed this court that for the first 6 months, he is on probation, and although for the first 3 months, there was no MPF deduction, the MFP deduction of HK$1,500 per month started as from May 2016, and further there has been a monthly deduction of HK$4,600 for medical insurance, making his present take home pay to be HK$143,900 per month, before tax.  F had not produced a copy of his latest salary statement or employment contract.  It is not clear whether he receives any other benefits from his employment.  His general and personal expenses were about $143,232 in his 2nd Form E, at the old rent.

55. In his 2nd Form E, his assets were stated to be in the region of HK$2.4m.  F said the majority of his assets were illiquid, and he owed legal costs to his Singapore solicitors and his former solicitors in Hong Kong.  The amount which he said he still owed his former solicitors Hong Kong at the time of the hearing was HK$116,872[10].

56. F had taken out a personal loan for HK$1.6m which was drawn down on 25 January 2016, and which appeared to be still in F’s HSBC Savings Account.  Mr Egerton submitted that this amount, which was taken out shortly after the hearing on 14 January 2016, was taken out by F to increase his expenses.

57. Although F said he still owed legal costs to his lawyers, it did not seem that it was necessary for him to take out a personal loan of an amount as high as HK$1.6m.  In any event, I am satisfied that he is able to make financial contribution towards L’s interim expenses as ordered below.

Parents’ respective contributions

58. Leaving aside her school expenses and medical expenses, L’s  interim financial needs while staying in Hong Kong, combining both her expenses when she is with M and when she is with F are a total of about HK$27,724.50 per month, or about HK$28,000.

59. I am of the view that the parties’ respective income, after tax, should be taken as a rough basis for calculating their respective contributions for L’s interim financial needs of HK$28,000 per month.

60. M has said her monthly tax liabilities to be about HK$720 per month, and thus, I would make her average income after tax to be about HK$28,000 per month.  F’s tax liabilities are estimated to be about HK$17,000 per month, and his after tax income is thus about HK$133,000 per month.

61. Comparing F’s after tax income of about HK$133,000 to M’s after tax income of HK$28,000, on a broad brush approach, I am of the view that F and M should contribute and share L’s total interim needs of HK$28,000 in the respective proportion of about 83% (being F’s) and 17% (being M’s).

62. Thus, F should pay M HK$17,740 per month (being 83% x HK$28,000 less HK$5,500 paid by F for L during L’s 2 week stay with him ) from 1 August 2016 onwards until further order, in addition to his undertaking to arrange for L’s medical expenses since her arrival in Hong Kong to be paid/reimbursed as soon as practicable upon presentation of such invoices and also on his undertaking to pay L’s nursery school expenses in Hong Kong, if and when applicable.

63. This means M will herself have to contribute about $4,500 per month for L’s expenses (22,224.50 less $17,740).  I am of the view that M should be able to do so.

L’s expenses from 8 March to 13 July 2016

64. M has set out L’s expenses from 8 March to 13 July 2016 in Schedule (B) attached to her 6th affidavit in the sum of HK$85,137.

65. To this, L’s medical expenses should be paid/reimbursed by F as mentioned earlier. 

66. As for L’s school fees in Singapore, this court gave directions for the fixing of 5 days for trial for M’s relocation application on May 2015, and dates were fixed on that day.  It should be clear to M on that day that the trial dates are fixed in December 2016, and that even if her relocation application is successful, L is unlikely to return to Singapore until early next year.  In my view, unless there is further evidence provided by M as mentioned earlier, it appears to be rather unnecessary for M to continue to pay for L’s school fees after May 2016.  Anyway, I am of the view that it is reasonable for F to contribute to such school fees only until May 2016. 

67. Save for the above deductions, F should reimburse M for 83% of her other expenses.  For whatever reason, M seemed to choose to calculate all L’s expenses in Hong Kong based on Singapore Dollars in Schedule (B).  On my calculations, after deducting L’s medical expenses, the total amount came to SGD 12,834.50 being:

M’s Flights
SGD 2,428.50
 
Rental Accommodation + utilities
SGD 2,858
 
Other expenses ( items 3-11 less L’s school fees for June and July 2016)
SGD 7,548
 

Total
_____________
SGD 12,834.50
 
@ 5.5
HK $ 70,589.75
 

68. The amount to be paid by F should be about HK$58,589.49 (83% of HK$70,589.75), which I will round up to HK$58,590.  I am of the view that F should be able to pay this amount within 14 days.  As M is under legal aid, the amount should be paid to M’s solicitors so that they can clarify with the Director of Legal Aid as to whether any first charge is applicable.

Order

69. The effect of my order is therefore as follows:

(i) The Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant HK$17,740 per month  as interim maintenance for the benefit of L, from 1 August 2016 onwards on the 1st day of each calendar month until further order, upon the Plaintiff’s undertaking to arrange for L’s medical expenses since her arrival in Hong Kong to be paid/reimbursed as soon as practicable upon presentation of such invoices and also upon the Plaintiff’s undertaking to be responsible for payment of L’s nursery school expenses in Hong Kong, if and when applicable.

(ii) The Plaintiff shall pay the Defendant through her solicitors a sum of HK$58,590 within 14 days hereof, being expenses incurred by the Defendant for the benefit of L from 8 March 2016 until 13 July 2016.

70. I will reserve the question of costs.  M’s own costs be taxed under Legal Aid Regulations, with certificate for Counsel.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

The plaintiff appeared in person

Mr Robin Egerton, instructed by Tanner De Witt, for the defendant



[1] CB151-156

[2] CB:6, 29

[3] CB:11-14

[4] Paras 17 and 18, CB (1): 475-93, 475-94

[5] Para 16, CB (1) :475-93

[6] See s 3, Cap 13

[7] See s 10(4), Cap 13

[8] Paras 2 and 3 of the Consultation Paper

[9] Main Bundle D1:336 to 338-26

[10] CB:191

95347-EN-2014-10-17

DCB v. AB

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