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Personal Injuries Action2015

CHAN WAI HING, the administratrix of the estate of LEE GUN, deceased v. MTR CORPORATION LTD

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[2018] HKDC 586-EN-2018-05-29

CHAN WAI HING, the administratrix of the Estate of LEE GUN, deceased v. MTR CORPORATION LTD

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DCPI 1649/2015

[2018] HKDC 586

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 1649 OF 2015

-------------------------------------

BETWEEN  
 CHAN WAI HING, the administratrix of the Estate of LEE GUN, deceased Plaintiff
 and 
 MTR CORPORATION LIMITEDDefendant

-------------------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Johnny Ma in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 3 May 2018
Date of Decision: 29 May 2018

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DECISION

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1.  This is the plaintiff’s application by Summons dated 9 March 2018 for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from my Judgment dated 9 February 2018. Unless otherwise stated, for the purpose of this Decision, I will adopt the abbreviations as defined in the Judgment.

2.  Leave to appeal shall not be granted under section 63A of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336, unless this Court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard.  The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying this court that her appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, which means an appeal with prospects that are more than fanciful but which do not need to be shown to be probable.  The Court of Appeal will not interfere with findings of facts unless the appellant can show that this court has misunderstood the evidence, or failed to appreciate its effects, or overlooked some other documentary evidence, or other indisputable evidence which should have compelled this court to a different conclusion.

3.  In the draft notice of appeal, the plaintiff sought to raise four grounds of appeal.

Ground 1

4.  In paragraphs 44 to 45 of the Judgment, I held or noted, inter alia, that (i) the plaintiff bore the legal and evidential burden in establishing her contention that the defendant has failed to place anti-slip carpet on the floor in the vicinity of the Entrance; (ii) other than Lee’s assertion in Lee’s Statement that the carpet as shown in the photograph taken in about June 2013 was not there at the time of the Accident, the plaintiff has adduced no other evidence in this regard; and (iii) I did not accept Lee’s aforesaid piece of evidence as being reliable or sufficient in proving that there was no anti-slip carpet placed at the Area at the time of the Accident.

5.  Mr Pun, counsel for the plaintiff, contended that I ought to have found, as a matter of inference, that there was no anti-slip carpet placed at the Area at the time of the Accident. 

6.  The location of the Accident was covered by CCTV.  In the letter dated 21 January 2015 from the loss adjuster appointed by the defendant’s insurer to the Legal Aid Department, it was stated, inter alia, that the defendant was “prepared to release a copy of the CCTV surveillance footage of the incident” subject to payment of charges.  However, no such CCTV footage has in fact been produced.  By letter dated 9 May 2016, the plaintiff’s solicitors requested for specific discovery of a copy of the relevant CCTV footage.  By letters dated 11 May and 19 July 2016, the defendant’s solicitors replied, inter alia, that the relevant CCTV footage was “not kept as Lee Gun told the security staff that he fell because his legs felt weak and no water / slippery substance was found on the floor upon inspection by the staff”.  By letter dated 20 December 2016, in reply to the plaintiff’s draft interrogatories,[1] the defendant’s solicitors stated that “the CCTV recording was automatically recycled 7 days after the date of the accident”.  Mr Pun contended that in the circumstances, I ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the defendant due to its failure to preserve and disclose the relevant CCTV footage without good reason, the inference being that it was probably recorded in the CCTV footage that there was no anti-slip carpet placed at the Area at the time of the Accident. 

7.  With respect, I do not agree. 

8.  In Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] P.I.Q.R. P324, Brooke LJ set out, inter alia, the following principles which in my view are similarly applicable to the present context:-

“(1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.

…

(4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn.  If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.”

9.  In Earles v Barclays BankPlc [2010] Bus L R 566, it was held that where the destruction of documents has occurred prior to the commencement of the litigation, there would have to be some “clear evidence of deliberate spoliation in anticipation of litigation” before one could legitimately draw evidential adverse inference in those circumstances.

10.  In the present case, as noted above, the defendant’s solicitors have given explanations as to why the CCTV footage had not been kept by the defendant but was automatically recycled 7 days after the date of the Accident.  Mr Pun submitted that such explanations were not satisfactory and could not stand given that I have rejected the defendant’s evidence to the effect that there was no water mark or stain on the floor and have instead found that there was rainwater on the floor surface of the Area (see paragraph 19 of the Judgment).  However, in my view, the explanations should be considered in light of the information made available to the defendant at the relevant time (bearing in mind that the CCTV recordings were automatically recycled in 7 days).  While I have found that Lee has not said that he fell down because of dizziness or weakness in his legs and insofar as Lau believed that this was the case (and hence reported to the others as such) he was mistaken (see paragraph 28 of the Judgment), the fact is that the information that was made available to the defendant at the relevant time was that contained in Lam’s 1st Report (made on the date of the Accident) in which Lam reported that Lee told him that he felt dizzy and unwell and fell down, and in the Occurrence Book in which the relevant entry recorded that Lee indicated that he felt dizzy and unwell which caused him falling down.  Besides, while it was a rainy day, the fact is that on 26 March 2013, other than the Accident, no other accident of a similar nature had happened. In light of such information, one can readily understand why no steps had been taken to prevent the relevant CCTV footage from being automatically recycled within 7 days of the date of the Accident.

11.  Mr Pun referred to the correspondence from a District Councillor and the Legal Aid Department and submitted that the defendant must have known that there was a serious dispute as to the cause of Lee’s fall where for the defendant would be expected to have preserved the CCTV footage.  This argument presupposes that the relevant CCTV footage was still in existence when those correspondence were written. However, the first such correspondence came from the District Councillor which was dated 22 May 2013, ie after the aforesaid 7-day period.  In other words, the relevant CCTV footage would have already been automatically recycled by the time of receipt of the said letter.

12.  Mr Pun relied on the loss adjuster’s letter of 21 January 2015 and contended that the CCTV footage of the Accident was said to be available at that time, and that no explanation was given by the defendant for such a statement if in fact the CCTV footage has already been recycled within 7 days of the Accident as the defendant’s solicitors subsequently alleged.  He further contended that the defendant has failed to comply with Order 24 rule 5 as the said CCTV footage was not listed in the defendant’s list of documents.  However, the subsequent letters were written by the defendant’s solicitors having the conduct of these proceedings in response to the plaintiff’s request by letters for specific discovery and interrogatories, and the plaintiff has not pursued such requests further with any application thereafter.  Instead, after receiving the defendant’s solicitors’ letter of 20 December 2016 which stated, in answer to the plaintiff’s draft interrogatories, that “the CCTV recording was automatically recycled 7 days after the date of the accident”, the plaintiff’s solicitors proceeded to file the application to set the case down for trial on 29 December 2016. 

13.  In these circumstances, I do not see any good reason to reject the defendant’s solicitors’ answers and explanations, which for reasons set out above I accept to be credible and satisfactory.  The relevant CCTV footage ceased to exist long before the commencement of this action and there is no evidence, let alone clear evidence, of any deliberate spoliation in anticipation of litigation.

14.  In the premises, I do not consider that any adverse inference can or should be drawn against the defendant as Mr Pun contended. 

15.  Mr Pun also contended that based on my finding in paragraph 29 of the Judgment, I ought to have found as a matter of inference that there was no anti-slip carpet placed at the Area at the time of the Accident.

16.  In paragraph 29 of my Judgment, I found that there was rainwater on the floor surface at the Area, and Lee fell backward and down to the ground at the Area because he slipped when he was trying to pull open the glass door at the Entrance.  Mr Pun submitted that, in light of such findings, it would be “very surprising” if an anti-slip carpet has been placed at the Area at the time of the Accident, and that the possibility of there being such a carpet was “extremely low”. 

17.  Mr Pun’s contention is, in my view, tantamount to saying that no one could probably slip on an anti-slip carpet, such that if a person slipped on a surface with rainwater on it, it must follow that no anti-slip carpet has been placed at the area.  With respect, I do not agree.  In my view, this is the kind of assumption with conjecture which should be guarded against as I said in paragraph 45 of the Judgment.  Besides, as Mr Sakhrani submitted, there were gaps in the plaintiff’s evidence (see paragraph 49 of the Judgment).  Furthermore, people can slip for various reasons.  There is no evidential basis to suggest that no one could probably slip on an anti-slip carpet.  I do not consider that there is any valid basis to draw the inference as Mr Pun contended. 

18.  In paragraphs 44 to 45 of the Judgment, I have explained why I did not accept that Lee’s evidence regarding the carpet was reliable or sufficient in proving that there was no anti-slip carpet at the Area at the time of the Accident.  For reasons set out above, I do not consider that Ground 1 has any reasonable prospect of success.

Ground 2

19.  Mr Pun submitted that as it was not the defendant’s pleaded case that at the time of the Accident a carpet was placed at the Entrance as one of the precautionary measures, the defendant was not entitled to adduce evidence in this regard.  He submitted that the evidence given by Wong (DW3) under cross-examination (that there was water-absorbing carpet placed outside the Entrance on a long-term basis) should have been ruled inadmissible or alternatively attached no weight or otherwise the defendant would have been allowed to adduce the evidence through the back door, and that the question of admissibility of such piece of evidence should at least be left to the Court of Appeal to consider to set out clearer principles in this regard.

20.  I have dealt with this contention in paragraphs 42 to 43 of the Judgment.  I agree that the defendant should not be entitled to adduce evidence to prove affirmatively that a carpet (water-absorbing or otherwise) was placed at the Entrance at the time of the Accident.  However, Wong’s said evidence was not adduced by the defendant in examination in chief, but rather came out in the course of cross-examination. The said evidence was relevant to the issue whether any carpet was placed at the Entrance at the time of the Accident, and Mr Pun did not suggest otherwise.  Whether the defendant was entitled to rely on such piece of evidence in running a positive defence that a water-absorbing carpet was there is another matter, and I have held that it was not so entitled (see paragraph 43 of the Judgment).  As such, I do not see any legal basis to rule such evidence which came out in the course of cross-examination to be inadmissible.

21.  In the Judgment, I said that I attached little weight to Wong’s said evidence.  Mr Pun now contended that I ought to have attached no weight to it.  The weight to be attached to any piece of evidence is a matter for the trial judge, and Mr Pun has not demonstrated why I have erred in law in attaching little as opposed to no weight to Wong’s said evidence.  In any event, as Mr Sakhrani pointed out, I have made clear in paragraph 45 of the Judgment that I did not accept Lee’s evidence regarding the carpet as reliable or sufficient in proving that there was no anti-slip carpet placed at the Area at the time of the Accident and I came to that view without taking into account Wong’s said evidence at all, and I have not made any finding of fact that there was in fact a carpet there.  As such, whether I should have attached little or no weight to Wong’s said evidence is in any event immaterial to the determination of the case.

22.  In the premises, I do not consider that Ground 2 has any reasonable prospect of success. 

Ground 3

23.  Under this ground, it was said that I erred in law and in fact by holding that it would be imposing too high a standard of care in the circumstances of this case to expect the defendant to ensure that a cleaner would be stationed near the Entrance to mop dry the Area or to close off or place barrier around the Area for a period of time.

24.  Mr Pun submitted that, given that the defendant is a large business in Hong Kong, it should be expected to do something more, and stringent precautions at the Entrance, including to place mats or carpets large enough to absorb the moisture, to station a member of staff near the Entrance to mop up the Area, to keep the glass door open so that the customers needed not pull open it in order to enter the shopping centre, to close off or place barrier around the Area for a period of time, and/or to put electric fans near the Area to blow dry the floor, were not unreasonable. 

25.  The contentions about keeping the glass door open and putting electric fans near the Area to blow dry the floor were not raised at the trial and were raised for the first time in this application.  Besides, Mr Sakhrani submitted that neither of these contentions was pleaded as particulars of negligence in the plaintiff’s case and these contentions, if properly pleaded, would have an impact upon the evidence to be adduced.  Mr Pun submitted that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to plead every particular and it was for the defendant to plead what precautionary measures it has taken.  With respect, I disagree.  Particulars must always be given showing in what respects the defendant was negligent: Hong Kong Civil Procedures 2018, vol 1, 18/12/27.  The burden lies upon the plaintiff to plead the case with proper and adequate particulars.  Mr Pun sought to rely on paragraph 4(a) of the Statement of Claim (“failing to take any or any reasonable care to see that the plaintiff would be reasonably safe in using the Area as a lawful visitor”) and paragraph 4(i) of the Statement of Claim (“failing to provide a safe means of access from Telford Plaza”) in this regard, but I agree with Mr Sakhrani that neither of these two particulars was adequate to allow the plaintiff to run the two said contentions.  In light of the existing state of pleadings and the fact that neither of these two contentions has been raised at the trial, it is in my view not open to the plaintiff to run these two contentions at this stage.

26.  As to the remaining contentions, I refer to paragraphs 30 to 52 of the Judgment, and more particularly paragraphs 46 to 50 thereof.  As I said in paragraphs 32 and 48 of the Judgment, the question for the present case is what was reasonable to expect of the defendant in the particular circumstances of this case and whether anything else would have made a difference, and each case has to turn on its own facts, depending on all the circumstances of the case.  Mr Pun did not suggest that I have applied the wrong test or approach.  The plaintiff’s challenge is thus against the application of the test or approach to the facts of this case.  For reasons set out in the Judgment, having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I found that the defendant has not breached its duty of care to Lee whether as the plaintiff alleged or at all, and I do not consider that Ground 3 has any reasonable prospect of success.

Ground 4

27.  Under this last ground, it was said that I erred in holding that the defendant has not breached its duty of care to Lee and in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.  This appears to be just a concluding remark from the previous three grounds of appeal, and Mr Pun confirmed that no additional point was relied upon in support of Ground 4. 

28.  In light of the aforesaid, I do not consider that Ground 4 has any reasonable prospect of success.

Conclusion

29.  In the premises, I do not consider that the plaintiff’s appeal has any reasonable prospect of success.  Nor do I consider that there is any reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard.  The application is dismissed.

30.  I make an order nisi that the plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel, while the plaintiff’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

  

  

 ( Johnny Ma )
 Deputy District Judge

  

Mr Chase Pun, instructed by Cheng & Wong, for the plaintiff

Mr Ashok K Sakhrani, instructed by Deacons, for the defendant



[1]  No copy of such draft interrogatories has been provided to the court.

[2018] HKDC 139-EN-2018-02-09

CHAN WAI HING, the administratrix of the estate of LEE GUN, deceased v. MTR CORPORATION LTD

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108138-EN-2017-02-16

CHAN WAI HING, the administratrix of the estate of LEE GUN, deceased v. MTR CORPORATION LTD

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DCPI 1649/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 1649 OF 2015

-------------------------

BETWEEN

 CHAN WAI HING,
the administratrix of the estate of LEE GUN, deceased
Plaintiff
 

and

 
 MTR CORPORATION LIMITEDDefendant

-------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Johnny Ma in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 3 February 2017
Date of Decision: 3 February 2017
Date of Reasons for Decision: 16 February 2017

------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR DECISION

------------------------------------------

1.  This is a personal injury action commenced on 27 July 2015. On 15 November 2016, upon the joint application of the parties’ respective solicitors, this action was set down for trial commencing on 7 February 2017 with an estimated length of 4 days.

2.  By Summons dated 10 January 2017 (“the Summons”), the defendant sought leave to serve 3 Supplemental Witness Statements of Wong Shu Hong (transliterated) (“Wong”), Lau Wing Nam (transliterated) (“Lau”) and Yim Po Ki (transliterated) (“Yim”) respectively as per the drafts attached thereto.  On 16 January 2017, the defendant sent 3 signed supplemental witness statements of the abovementioned 3 persons (“the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements”) to the plaintiff which (as I was told at the hearing) contained some “cosmetic changes” to the said drafts.  The application came before this court on 3 February 2017, just 4 days before the trial was due to commence.

3.  As Ms Wai of the Solicitors acting for the defendant rightly acknowledged, this application was late.  The plaintiff objected to certain parts of the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements being admitted.  Having heard submissions from both parties, I granted leave to the defendant to serve the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements except that certain parts thereof and certain annexure thereto be expunged and removed.  These are the reasons for my decision.

Background

4.  The defendant was the owner and manager of Telford Plaza.  On 26 March 2013, Thunderstorm Warning was issued at 1530 hours and lowered by 2220 hours, and Amber Rainstorm Warning was issued at 1650 hours and lowered by 1935 hours. 

5.  The plaintiff’s case is that in the evening of 26 March 2013, Lee Gun (who was the plaintiff at the commencement of this action but passed away on 23 October 2015) (“Lee”) slipped and fell down as he intended to pull open a glass door at the entrance CA1 (“the Entrance”) of Telford Plaza to get into it, and suffered personal injuries as a result (“the Accident”).  The particulars of negligence as pleaded in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim (filed on 27 July 2015) included, inter alia, an allegation that the defendant has failed to place anti-slip carpet on the floor in the vicinity of the Entrance.

6.  On 18 September 2015, the defendant filed its Defence.  Among other matters, the defendant denied that the Accident was caused by the negligence on its part whether as alleged in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim or at all, and put the plaintiff to strict proof of each and every allegation contained therein.  The defendant further pleaded, in paragraph 8 of the Defence, precautionary measures that were said to have been put in place at the material time due to the rainy weather / Amber Rainstorm Warning.  In paragraph 9 of the Defence, the defendant further pleaded, inter alia, that at all material times it entrusted the cleaning work of Telford Plaza to Tsang Lik Services Limited (“Tsang Lik”), and engaged Dragon Guard Security Limited (“Dragon Guard”) to perform security services within Telford Plaza.  For present purposes, it is noted that in its Defence the defendant has not specifically traversed to the plaintiff’s allegation that it has failed to place anti-slip carpet on the floor in the vicinity of the Entrance. 

7.  On 13 July 2016, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors asking, inter alia, for a confirmation whether there was any carpet and/or anti-slip mat placed at the Entrance outside Telford Plaza at the material time, and supporting documents such as any photographs showing its existence before or at the time of the Accident.  On 19 July 2016, the defendant’s solicitors replied that there was no supporting document to show that carpet / floor mat was placed at the Entrance at the time of the Accident.

8.  In the Witness Statements of Wong, Lau and Yim all dated 25 August 2016 and served for the defendant, there was no mention of there being any carpet or mat having been placed at the Entrance at all, whether before or at the time of the Accident.

9.  On 28 September 2016, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors asking again for a confirmation whether at the time of the Accident there was any anti-slip carpet or mat placed at the area marked on the photograph enclosed therewith, ie at the Entrance outside Telford Plaza.  On 3 October 2016, the defendant’s solicitors replied that since there was no record of whether a carpet / floor mat was placed at the Entrance at the time of the Accident, the defendant was not in a position to make the confirmation as requested.

10.  On 15 November 2016, upon the joint application of the parties’ solicitors by way of Consent Summons filed on 3 November 2016, Master Rita So ordered by consent, inter alia, that this action be set down for trial commencing on 7 February 2017 with an estimated length of 4 days. 

11.  On 29 December 2016, the plaintiff’s solicitors filed an Application to Set a Case Down for Trial.

12.  It was against the above background that the defendant issued the Summons.

The plaintiff’s objections

13.  The plaintiff’s objections to parts of the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements can be sub-divided into 2 broad categories.

14.  First, the plaintiff submitted that the defendant was seeking to introduce evidence, including 2 photographs bearing the date 20 March 2013 (“the Photographs”), that there had been a carpet at the Entrance outside Telford Plaza prior to and at the time of the Accident.  The plaintiff objected to it on the grounds that (a) it formed no part of the defendant’s pleaded case; and (b) the application was late without satisfactory explanation for the lateness, and the plaintiff would suffer severe prejudice if the application was allowed.  I shall refer to this as “the Carpet Objection”.

15.  Second, the plaintiff submitted that parts of the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements contained merely guesswork or speculation, and hence should not be admissible.  I shall refer to this as “the Guesswork Objection”.

The carpet objection

16.  If a party fails to plead his own version, he will be taken not to have put forward any positive case, and accordingly he will not be entitled to call any evidence of fact contrary to or inconsistent with the other party’s pleaded contentions: Wu Ching Sau v New World First Bus Services Ltd, HCPI 767/2009, 9 September 2010, Master Marlene Ng (as she then was), at paras. 54-55; Samlane Development Ltd v Fung Chi Fai, HCA 318/2006, 22 April 2013, Registrar K.W. Lung, at paras.13-14.

17.  As noted above, in its Defence, the defendant has not specifically traversed to the plaintiff’s allegation that it has failed to place anti-slip carpet on the floor in the vicinity of the Entrance.  On the existing state of the pleadings, Mr Wong of the Solicitors acting for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant was not entitled to adduce evidence (including the Photographs) to prove that there was a carpet at the Entrance outside Telford Plaza prior to and at the time of the Accident. 

18.  Ms Wai indicated at the hearing of this application that if this court were minded to grant leave to the defendant to serve the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements including the evidence relating to the existence of a carpet at the Entrance, the defendant could amend the Defence accordingly and no delay would be caused to the trial.  For present purposes, I was prepared to proceed to consider the merits of the defendant’s present application notwithstanding that there was in fact no application for amending the Defence placed before this court.

19.  Whether the court should allow a late application (be it amendment of pleadings, discovery of new documents, or service of additional witness statements) is a matter of case management and balancing exercise having regard to all relevant circumstances in light of the underlying objectives.  See: Guangzhou Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co Ltd & anr v Green Power Health Products International Co Ltd & ors, HCA 4651/2002, HCA 2802/2003, HCMP 74/2004, 22 July 2004, Lam J (as he then was), at para.14; Chan Wing Cheung Allan v Ho Shu Yee Susana, CACV 393/2004, 10 January 2005, Ma CJHC (as he then was), at para. 9; Liu Chen v Chan Poon Wing & anor, HCPI 779/2006, 7 October 2009, Master Marlene Ng (as she then was), at paras. 32-37 & 55; Kinetics Medical Health Group Company Limited & ors v Dr Tse Ivan Cheong Yau, HCA 1115/2010, 8 May 2013, Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng, at paras. 36 & 49.

20.  Regarding late discovery of documents, among other matters, the Court expects the applicant to provide full and accurate information or justification at least as to (a) the reasons why the subject documents were not disclosed earlier; (b) the provenance and the makers of such documents; (c) the relevance of such documents to the issues before the court; (d) the availability or non-availability of the makers to attend trial for cross-examination in case the opponent objected to the hearsay evidence; and (e) why the application should be entertained at all at such late stage notwithstanding the underlying objectives.  See: Hong Lok School Ltd & anor v Chow Sai Yiu & anor [2003] 2 HKLRD 782 at para. 6; Liu Chen(supra) at paras.32-37; Kinetics Medical Health Group Company Limited (supra) at para. 36.

21.  In support of this application, the defendant has filed an affidavit made by Ms Wai.  According to Ms Wai, since the commencement of proceedings, “the defendant has conducted a diligent search to trace any record to show that an anti-slip carpet was placed at the subject entrance at the material time but in vain”.  A pre-trial conference with the defendant’s trial Counsel was held on 6 January 2017.  As Counsel has “requested the defendant to conduct a further search to ascertain if a carpet was indeed placed at the subject location”, Wong “therefore searched again and was finally able to find” the Photographs taken by the defendant’s promotion team.  Ms Wai then said that “Wong has explained in his supplemental witness statement how he finally came to locate the said photographs recently”.  Apart from the aforesaid, I have also taken into account what Wong has said in his Signed Supplemental Witness Statement in this regard. 

22.  Regarding the “diligent search” said to have been conducted, there is no information as to how many times the defendant’s staff had attempted to search for such documents, and how the search had been conducted.  The Counsel’s request was nothing other than a mere request to conduct a further search without any specificity.  In any event, there is no good reason why such a further search (prompted by Counsel or otherwise) ought not to have been conducted earlier, at least prior to the parties’ solicitors making their joint application in early November 2016 to set this case down for trial.

23.  There is also little information regarding the provenance and the maker of the Photographs.  It was said that they were taken by the defendant’s “promotion team”, but there is no information as to who took them, by what device they were taken, and how they had been kept since then.  Mr Wong indicated that the plaintiff did not accept the authenticity of the Photographs, and the plaintiff might wish to serve interrogatories against and/or cross-examine their maker.  Besides, he also made an observation that the carpet as shown in the Photographs appeared to be red in color, and I note that in the photographs annexed to Lee’s witness statement (which was said to be taken in June 2013) (“Lee’s Photographs”), the carpet as shown therein appeared to be grey in color.  In my view, the aforesaid makes it even more important that full and accurate information should have been given by the defendant as to the provenance and the maker of the Photographs, which is lacking.

24.  In the premises, I consider that the explanation and information given by the defendant was not a satisfactory one.  This is one relevant factor which I should, and did, take into account in considering the defendant’s present application. 

25.  Regarding prejudice, the court has to balance the prejudice suffered by the defendant by not having the evidence relating to the carpet (including the Photographs) admitted against the prejudice caused to the plaintiff in allowing such evidence in at this late stage, having regard to the underlying objectives including, inter alia, the securing of the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties: Chan Wing Cheung Allan (supra) at para. 9; Kinetics Medical Health Group Company Limited (supra) at para. 49.

26.  Besides, post-CJR case management recognizes that the closer to trial an applicant makes an application to adduce late discovery the more likely it is to cause real prejudice to the other party, especially when a milestone date is likely to be compromised by there being insufficient remaining time until the commencement of trial to accommodate the other party’s response to the application if granted: Kinetics Medical Health Group Company Limited (supra), para.52.

27.  Mr Wong referred to the pre-action protocol under Practice Direction 18.1 for mutual discovery with respect to issues of liability, and submitted that had the Photographs been disclosed in accordance with such protocol, Lee would at least get a chance to give further instructions before he passed away, and the plaintiff thus suffered prejudice as the opportunity to take such instructions from Lee has gone.  He also submitted that should the Photographs and the evidence relating to the carpet be admitted, the plaintiff would very likely have to take out interlocutory applications such as serving interrogatories to deal with it, particularly in view of the lack of information regarding the provenance and the maker of the Photographs and the circumstances under which the Photographs were said to have been found only recently, and the plaintiff would not have sufficient time to deal with it. By contrast, the defendant has run its case on several fronts, and non-admission of the aforesaid evidence would result in only limited prejudice to the defendant.

28.  Ms Wai, on the other hand, submitted that the aforesaid evidence was directly relevant to the issue in this case, and justice required it to be admitted with weight to be decided at trial.  She queried what instructions could possibly have been given by Lee other than merely maintaining that no carpet was there at the time of the Accident, even if such evidence had been disclosed prior to Lee’s death.  She further submitted that the plaintiff’s indication of taking out interlocutory applications was speculative, and that no new dimension would be introduced to the case if the evidence was admitted.

29.  While I acknowledge the prejudice suffered by the defendant by not having the Photographs and the evidence relating to the carpet admitted into evidence, in my view, this prejudice is entirely of the defendant’s own making.  The issue as to whether a carpet (or, more specifically, an anti-slip carpet) was in place at the time of the Accident must have been obvious to the defendant since at least the pleadings stage if not earlier.  While it was said that the defendant had not been able to find any documentary record in relation to the carpet until very recently, as I said above I am not satisfied with the explanation and the information given on behalf of the defendant in this regard. 

30.  Besides, as I noted above, there is apparently a difference in color between the carpet as shown in the Photographs (which appeared to be red) and that as shown in Lee’s Photographs (which appeared to be grey).  The plaintiff did not admit the authenticity of the Photographs, and in light of the aforesaid, the plaintiff is entitled, if so advised, to pursue against the defendant for further information and/or documents, for instance, as to whether the carpet as shown in the respective photographs was one and the same, and if not, why was there a change and when such change took place.  Moreover, if the defendant’s case is that there was a carpet at the Entrance at the time of the Accident, new issues may arise as to whether, and if so why, the surface where Lee stepped onto was slippery despite the existence of such a carpet.  In my view, the admission of the evidence (and, if admitted, the corresponding amendment to be made to the Defence) could at least potentially give rise to a new dimension to the case, and the trial may have to be adjourned if the plaintiff seeks to be allowed a fair opportunity to deal with it in such manner as she may be advised.  The plaintiff would be prejudiced by the admission of the evidence at this late stage.

31.  In all the circumstances, taking into account, inter alia, the lack of a satisfactory explanation of the lateness, and having balanced the prejudice suffered by the defendant against the prejudice caused to the plaintiff, and also bearing in mind the underlying objectives, I have declined to allow the defendant to adduce and rely on the Photographs and the evidence relating to the carpet. 

The guesswork objection

32.  As noted above, the plaintiff also objected to parts of the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements to be admitted on the ground that such parts contained merely guesswork or speculation, and hence should not be admissible.

33.  Ms Wai submitted that those parts were factual and related to the procedures or practice to be adopted by the cleaners of Tsang Lik and/or the security guards of Dragon Guard when certain problems arose.

34.  I have considered the contents of the objected parts, and the parties’ submissions as to their admissibility.  In my view, this aspect is better left to the trial so that those objected parts would be seen in light of all the evidence and the parties can make submissions as to how such parts of the evidence should be understood, whether and if so how the defendant can rely upon the same, and how much weight if any should be attached thereto. 

35.  In the premises, I rejected the Guesswork Objection.

Conclusion

36.  I have thus granted leave to the defendant to serve the Signed Supplemental Witness Statements of Wong, Lau and Yim with signed Statement of Truth as per the signed version sent to the plaintiff’s solicitors on 16 January 2017, subject to and except that (a) paragraph 4 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Wong together with Anenxure 6 thereto shall be expunged and removed; and (b) paragraph 7 of the Supplemental Witness Statement of Yim shall be expunged and removed.  I directed that such statements shall stand as evidence in chief unless the trial judge otherwise directed.

37.  I ordered costs of the application be to the plaintiff, to be taxed if not agreed, and that the plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

( Johnny Ma )
Deputy District Judge

     

Mr W Wong, of Cheng & Wong, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff

Miss Karen Wai of Deacons, for the defendant