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Personal Injuries Action2015

WONG HIN CHUEN v. WANG ON MAJORLUCK LTD AND OTHERS

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  • CAMP25/2017WONG HIN CHUEN v. WANG ON MAJORLUCK LTD AND OTHERS

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111068-EN-2017-08-29

WONG HIN CHUEN v. WANG ON MAJORLUCK LTD AND OTHERS

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DCPI58/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 58 OF 2015

-------------------------------------

BETWEEN
 WONG HIN CHUENPlaintiff
and
 WANG ON MAJORLUCK LIMITED1st defendant
 CHOI WU TONG trading as CHUEN YUEN CLEANING & PEST CONTROL SERVICE COMPANY2nd defendant
 GREATEST WEALTH LIMITED trading as 萬有放心肉3rd defendant

-------------------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Eric Tam in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 9 May 2017

Date of Supplemental Submissions on Costs for the 3rd defendant: 26 June 2017

Date of Supplemental Submissions on Costs for the plaintiff: 1 August 2017

Date of Decision: 29 August 2017

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DECISION

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Introduction

1.  By the Judgment (“the Judgment”) dated 5 December 2016, it is adjudged, inter alia, that:-

(a) The plaintiff’s claim against the 1st and the 2nd defendants be dismissed.

(b) the 3rd defendant was solely liable for the Accident.

(c) the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to the extent of 15%.

(d) There be costs order nisi that the 3rd defendant do pay costs, including reserved costs, to the plaintiff (including the plaintiff’s costs in pursuing against the 1st and the 2nd defendants), the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed (the nisi costs orders were made absolute on 29 May 2017).

2.  By a summons dated 30 December 2016, the 3rd defendant sought leave to appeal against the findings on liability, contributory negligence and the costs order.  For convenience purpose, I will adopt the abbreviations in the Judgment.

3.  The grounds of appeal are:-

(a) It is manifestly wrong to find that pork residues were disposed on the passageway in the manner described at paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement, namely “我看到該員工在切除那些豬皮、碎骨、碎肉等時會把這些東西散佈在該豬肉檔肉枱附近的地上”;

(b) It is an error in law to find that the plaintiff slipped and fell because the 3rd defendant’s staff washed the floor of the stall in the morning, because this case is not pleaded by any party;

(c) The learned Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent to the extent of 15% only; and

(d) The learned Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in finding at paragraph 58 of the Judgment that the 3rd defendant is liable for costs to the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

Ground 1: Wrong finding of fact

4.  Paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement stated as follows:

“……. 我看到該員工在切除那些豬皮、碎骨、碎肉等時會把這些東西散佈在該豬肉檔肉枱附近的地上。”

5.  Mr Ho, counsel for the 3rd defendant for the leave to appeal, submitted that “the Judgment did not explain why paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement was accepted when the plaintiff repeatedly confirmed that he did not actually see that the pork substances were discarded by Cheung, the employee of the 3rd defendant.  Further, the Judgment did not explain why paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement is sufficient to find liability against the 3rd defendant when the plaintiff also said at paragraph 6 of the witness statement that “我不知道我實在是踩到那些碎豬皮、豬骨和豬肉而跌下,又或是地下濕滑而失平衡的。”

6.  The full version of paragraph 6 of the plaintiff’s witness statement is “我不知道我實在是踩到那些碎豬皮、豬骨和豬肉而跌下,又或是地下濕滑而失平衡的。我相信兩者都是直接令我失平衡而跣倒的。”

7.  The plaintiff, in his examination in chief, clarified that he saw Cheung chopping the pork, and only after the Accident, he saw pork residues on the floor (page 38 of the transcript).

8.  The plaintiff stated in cross examination that it was his conjecture that when Cheung cut the pork, there would be pork residues bounced off on the floor.

9.  According to the oral evidence of the plaintiff at the trial, it is true that paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement was modified.  It is a pity that such change or modification was not clearly brought to the court’s attention.  Instead, when dealing with the issue of contributory negligence in the closing submissions, Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd defendant at the trial, said that the plaintiff saw Cheung discarded the pork residues in the manner as described in paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement.

10.  The record on page 283 of the transcript is appended as follows:-

“Court: Sorry. I beg your pardon?

Mr Chan: That is his evidence in testimony.

Court: You mean the plaintiff saw the 3rd defendant’s witness…

Mr Chan: Yes.

Court: discarding the …

Mr Chan: Yes.

Court: …residue…

Mr Chan: Yes.

Court: on the ground?

Mr Chan: Yes, because … allow me to spend some time to review the evidence.  And it’s in Bundle 1, it’s in the witness statement of the plaintiff starting at page 88.  And please look at page 91, and let us focus on paragraph 8.”

11.  Mr Chan then read out paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement and said that the it was the plaintiff’s evidence “in witness statement as well as in testimony” (pages 283-284 of the transcript).

12.  It is admitted that in paragraph 18 of the Judgment, when paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement was recited, the court failed to mention the modification aforesaid.  But I am not convinced that the 3rd defendant was prejudiced by this.

13.  The Judgment only recited paragraph 8 of plaintiff’s witness statement.  The findings, as stated in paragraph 19 of the Judgment, that the plaintiff fell because he stepped on pork residues, such residues were left there by the 3rd defendant’s staff, would not be affected.  It was never mentioned in the Judgment, nor was it the reasoning of the court, as submitted by Mr Ho that “paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement is sufficient to find liability against the 3rd defendant”.  Mr Ho’s submission is far-fetching.

14.  The honesty of the plaintiff was not substantially challenged at the trial.  The credibility of the plaintiff would not have been affected even if the court’s understanding of the meaning of paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement had been incorrect.

15.  The findings had been based upon the conversation between the plaintiff and Cheung after the fall, and the fact that Cheung hurriedly cleaned up the floor after the Accident.

16.  I do not accept Mr Ho’s submission that the conversation was entirely consistent with Cheung not having discarded pork substances onto the passageway.  Right after the Accident, the plaintiff blamed Cheung for the fall.  Instead of denying the responsibility, Cheung said that he did not intend to cause the Accident and started to clean the floor despite the plaintiff’s objection.

17.  Paragraph 20 of the Judgment is relevant as it discredited Cheung’s evidence that he properly handled the pork residues.  The picture clearly showed that some pork residues were sticking to the bottom of the table, instead of being properly put inside the basket.  Paragraph 27 of Mr Ho’s submissions is not accepted.

Ground 2: Unpleaded case of washing the floor

18.  The issue needed not be dealt with for the reasons stated in paragraph 23 of the Judgement.

19.  Virtually, it is not accepted that the case was not pleaded.  The pleaded case of the plaintiff was that he stepped on pork residue which was discarded by the worker of the 3rd defendant.  The particulars of negligence included discarding, disposing of or dropping the pork residues onto the floor; causing or allowing the pork residues to remain on the floor; failing to clean up, clear or remove the pork residues.

20.  The evidence was derived from Cheung, the witness of the 3rd defendant.  Cheung was the second witness at the trial.  The 3rd defendant had ample opportunities to take instructions, apply for adjournment or call another witness if Cheung’s evidence was to be disputed.  No such application was made.  No question was asked by counsel in the re-examination.

Ground 3: Contributory negligence

21.  It is not in dispute that only after the Accident, the plaintiff noticed the pork residues on the floor.  Ground 3 of the leave to appeal has no basis.

22.  Mr Ho did not identify any error in principle.  The percentage of contributory negligence is a matter primarily at the discretion of the trial judge.

Ground 4: Issue of costs

23.  Mr Ho submitted that the allegation of wet floor was only made when the plaintiff amended his statement of claim on 29 July 2016, therefore the plaintiff did not join the 1st and the 2nd defendants because of the wet floor.

24.  In paragraph 12 of the Decision on Costs dated 29 May 2017 (“the Costs Decision”), it was reiterated that the wet floor also contributed to the slippery floor and the fall of the plaintiff.  The fact that the plaintiff amended the statement of claim, although at a later stage, should be understood as the plaintiff wished to rely on such allegation at the trial.  The delay is not relevant to the question of whether it was reasonable to join the defendants.  Furthermore, the wet floor was only one of the reasons to join the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

25.  In paragraph 10 of Mr Ho’s Supplemental Submissions on Costs dated 26 June 2017 (“the Supplemental Submissions”), Mr Ho tried to use the findings of the court to justify that joining the 1st and the 2nd defendants was not reasonable.  This is a wrong approach.  The finding of the court after trial that “there is no duty to keep the floor of the market dry at all time” does not contradict the view that it is reasonable to join the 1st and the 2nd defendants.  It is only one of the reasons why they are found not liable.

26.  Mr Ho submitted in paragraph 11 of the Supplemental Submissions that “it is not said at paragraph 12 of the Costs Decision or at all why in considering whether it is reasonable to sue the 1st and the 2nd defendants, all that the court needed to consider is whether the floor of the market was wet.”

27.  Such submission is incorrect.  The court did mention in paragraph 12 of the Costs Decision that “in the present case, it was alleged that the floor of the market was wet and not clean.”  Mr Ho should have no reason to forget the plaintiff’s allegation that he slipped because he did step on pork residues.

28.  Mr Ho relied on Leung Cheuk Hin v The Hong Kong Polytechnic University DCPI 682/2010.  Each case turns on its own facts. In Leung Cheuk Hin case, the venue was a changing room, the dispute of fact in the case, as described in paragraph 57 of the judgment, is “whether the towelling area at the time of the accident was only covered with one anti-slip mat as opposed to most area being covered with anti-slip mats the usual condition as admitted by the plaintiff”.  The Judge found that most of the towelling area was covered with anti-slip mats.  The case is distinguished on facts.

29.  Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd defendant at the trial, in his closing submission, did comment on the design of the Stall (pages 336-337 of the transcript).  Mr Ho submitted in paragraph 16 of the Supplemental Submissions that the 3rd defendant’s suggestion that the pork residues might have been left there by other stalls were not directed at the 1st and the 2nd defendants.  I do not agree.  If there were pork residues discarded by other parties, given the obligation to clean was on the 2nd defendant, and the 1st defendant was the occupier, some responsibilities would unavoidably be imposed on the 1st and the 2nd defendants.  It is wrong for Mr Ho to submit that they were not directed at the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

30.  As to paragraphs 21-25 of Mr Ho’s Supplemental Submissions, I agree with Mr Lim’s submission that the Faclon’s letter to the plaintiff’s solicitors dated 17 January 2013 was a denial of liability.  It impliedly shifted the blame onto other parties.

31.  As to paragraph 32 of Mr Ho’s Supplemental Submissions, paragraph 20 of the Costs Decision stated that “the indemnity and contribution notices served amongst the defendants in this case are evidence that they blamed each other”.  That would include the 3rd defendant blaming the other defendants.  As stated in paragraph 11 of the Costs Decision, the court should consider whether the unsuccessful defendant blames the successful defendants.  The Costs Decision did not say that the court should consider whether the successful defendants blame the unsuccessful defendant.

32.  As to Mr Ho’s submission that the 3rd defendant only issued the Notice of Contribution as a prudent step, I do not agree.  A lot of claims are issued as a prudent step, such step does not mean that it should not have any costs consequence.

33.  As to paragraphs 35-39 of Mr Ho’s Supplemental Submissions, the Calderbank Offer was mentioned on the issue of costs of the contribution proceedings among the defendants.  The 3rd defendant, in his application for variation of costs order nisi, submitted that the plaintiff should be liable for the contribution proceedings.  The submissions raised by Mr Ho in paragraphs 35-39 are ill-conceived.

Conclusion

34.  Having considered the grounds of appeal raised by the 3rd defendant, I find the 3rd defendant fails to establish that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

35.  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.  There be costs order nisi that the 3rd defendant do pay the costs of this application to the plaintiff, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.  The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.  Such order shall be made absolute after 14 days unless application for variation is taken out within 14 days.

 (Eric Tam)
Deputy District Judge

Mr Patrick D Lim, instructed by Szwina Pang, Edward Li & Co, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff

Cheng, Yeung & Co, for the 1st defendant, whose attendance was excused

Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin, for the 2nd defendant, whose attendance was excused

Mr Leon Ho, instructed by Au & Associates, for the 3rd defendant

109719-EN-2017-05-29

WONG HIN CHUEN v. WANG ON MAJORLUCK LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

DCPI 58/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 58 OF 2015

-------------------------

BETWEEN
 WONG HIN CHUENPlaintiff
and
 WANG ON MAJORLUCK LIMITED1st defendant
 CHOI WU TONG trading as CHUEN YUEN CLEANING & PEST CONTROL SERVICE COMPANY 2nd defendant
 GREATEST WEALTH LIMITED trading as 萬有放心肉3rd defendant

-------------------------

Before: Deputy District Judge Eric Tam

Date of Hearing: 16 February and 9 May 2017

Date of Decision: 29 May 2017

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DECISION

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Background

1.  The plaintiff claimed for damages he sustained in a slip and fall accident (“the Accident”) on 16 May 2012 at Po Lam Market, Tseung Kwan O (“the Market”).  The Market was a wet market.  The Accident happened outside shop 54B (“the Stall”) at the Market.  The plaintiff was shopping at the Market.  When he passed the Stall, he stepped on some slippery substance which caused him to lose his footing and balance.  He fell and suffered a fracture of the left femoral neck commonly known as hip fracture.  It is the plaintiff’s case that after the fall he found out that he had stepped on some pork residues that were discarded by the staff of the Stall.  The floor of the passageway was wet at that time.

2.  At the time of the Accident, Wang On Majorluck Limited (“the 1st defendant”) was the property manager of the Market.  Choi Wu Tong trading as Chuen Yuen Cleaning & Pest Control Service Company (“the 2nd defendant”) was the cleaning contractor engaged by the 1st defendant to provide cleaning service for the Market.  Greatest Wealth Limited trading as 萬有放心肉 (“the 3rd defendant”) was a tenant of the 1st defendant at the Market and operated the Stall selling pork.

3.  Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff and the claims against the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant were dismissed.

4.  There was order nisi that the 3rd defendant do pay costs to the plaintiff, the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

5.  The was also order nisi that the costs of the contribution and indemnity proceedings be paid by the 3rd defendant to the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

6.  The 3rd defendant applied to vary the order nisi.

7.  The 3rd defendant contended that the plaintiff should pay costs to the 1st and the 2nd defendants (including contribution proceedings among the defendants) for the reason that:-

(a) the plaintiff’s claims against the 1st and the 2nd defendants had been dismissed;

(b) based on the finding of facts of the court, there was no good reason to commence proceedings against the 1st and the 2nd defendants; and

(c) the 3rd defendant did nothing to lead or induce the plaintiff to claim against the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

8.  Mr Ho, counsel for the 3rd defendant, submitted in paragraphs 8 to 16 of his written submissions as follows:-

“8. The Court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence at §8 of his witness that the plaintiff saw the 3rd defendant’s worker drop the pork substances onto the floor of the Market (我看到該員工在切除那些豬皮、碎骨、碎肉等時會把這些東西散佈在該豬肉枱附近的地上。). This finding of fact must be the basis of the court’s exercise of discretion: see §7 of Lui Yin.

9. As the plaintiff was a shopper at the Market (§1 of the judgment), based on the finding of the court, the pork substances must be discarded seconds before the plaintiff stepped on them - otherwise the plaintiff would not be able to say that he saw that pork substances were discarded by the 3rd defendant’s worker.

10. Further, as the plaintiff is the only eye-witness of the Accident, whether it is reasonable to claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants depend solely on his version of the Accident as accepted by the court.

11. However, if the plaintiff’s case is that pork substances were dropped seconds before he slipped over them, it will be ludicrous to suggest that the 1st and 2nd defendants would have a duty to remove pork substances immediately, because the duty on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants is only up to a reasonable standard. The plaintiff’s claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants was rightly dismissed by the court.

12. Therefore, if the plaintiff has been properly advised based on his version of the Accident, there is no reason why he should claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants.

13. The plaintiff’s case against the 3rd defendant is that the 3rd defendant’s littered pork substances on the ground of the Market. The plaintiff’s case against the 3rd defendant is completely different from that against the 1st and 2nd defendants, which is failure to keep the floor to be free from slippery substances. Further:

(a) If the plaintiff succeeded in his claim, he would be able to claim damages from the 3rd defendant fully.

(b) The plaintiff’s claim against the 3rd defendant depends solely on the court’s acceptance of his evidence. It does not depend on evidence from the 1st and 2nd defendants.

(c) The 1st and 2nd defendants were not joined because they were vicariously liable or otherwise connected to the 3rd defendant. They were joined in because the plaintiff had separate and distinct causes of action against them, which were dismissed by the court.

14. As held in Irvine, the absence of connection of claims between successful and unsuccessful defendants is a material factor against the making of a Sanderson Order.

15. The plaintiff sent a pre-action letter to the 3rd defendant on 17 December 2012, where the plaintiff invited the 3rd defendant to suggest whether other parties were at fault. The 3rd defendant did not write back to blame any other party. Notwithstanding that, the plaintiff commenced proceedings against all 3 defendants.

16. In the 3rd defendant’s Amended Defence, the 3rd defendant did not seek to blame the 1st and 2nd defendants. Although the 3rd defendant filed a Notice of Contribution, the 3rd defendant cannot possibly lead or induce the plaintiff to commence proceedings against the 1st and 2nd defendants, because:

(a) The 3rd defendant’s Notice of Contribution was issued 6 days before the trial, some 18 months after the plaintiff decided to claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants.

(b) The 3rd defendant simply relied on the plaintiff’s claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants as the basis of the Notice of Contribution.  No additional cause of action or evidence was adduced on the part of the 3rd defendant against the 1st and 2nd defendants.”

Legal principles on Sanderson or Bullock order

9.  In Chong Ngan Seng v China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd and 3 ors CACV no 54 of 2012 (judgment on costs handed down on 25 September 2013) Fok JA, as he then was, stated at paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment as follows,

“6. In deciding whether to make a Sanderson or Bullock order and, if so, which of the two orders to make, the court is exercising its discretion.

7. It was common ground that, in deciding whether to exercise that discretion, the court looks to see whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the plaintiff to join the successful defendant in the action.”

10.  InFung Chun Man v Hospital Authority [2012] 1 HKC 531 Bharwaney J stated at paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment as follows,

“6. The classic case where a Sanderson or Bullock order is made is where the unsuccessful defendant blames the successful defendant and causes the plaintiff either to join the successful defendant or to continue the proceedings against the successful defendant. However, even absent such circumstances, it may be reasonable for the plaintiff to join the successful defendant, in cases where the plaintiff is faced with a denial of liability by the unsuccessful defendant and the real risk that the unsuccessful defendant may either be absolved from liability or unable to satisfy any judgment that may be obtained against him. In such circumstances, if the plaintiff is in possession of evidence that can implicate the successful defendant, evidence that is neither tenuous nor speculative nor far-fetched, it would be reasonable for the plaintiff to join or to proceed against the successful defendant and the court, at the conclusion of such a case, may, in the exercise of its discretion over costs, make a Sanderson or Bullock order.

7. In the context of actions in tort, it does not matter that the claim against the successful defendant was not made in the alternative but was a separate and independent cause of action. Although a Sanderson or Bullock order is unlikely to be made in a case of successive and unrelated torts by different tortfeasors causing different damage, whether tortfeasors jointly caused the same damage or whether they separately caused different damage or only one of them caused the damage may only be known after a final determination by court. In exercising its discretion whether or not to make a Sanderson or Bullock order, the court would have regard to all the circumstances of the case and the state of the evidence to determine whether or not it was reasonable for the plaintiff to pursue the successful defendant. In making its decision, the court must be careful not to lose sight of the uncertainties surrounding the case before its conclusion (per Bokhary J., as he then was, in Lee Lai Ha & Anor. v. Hong Sau Ling & Anor. [1993] 1 HKLR 86)”.

11.  In a nutshell, the court should consider whether it is reasonable to join the successful defendants, and whether the unsuccessful defendant blames the successful defendant.

Discussion and analysis

12.  I agree with Mr Lim’s submission that it is reasonable to join the 1st and the 2nd defendants.  It is my finding that the plaintiff fell because he stepped on pork residues.  The pork residues were left on the passageway by the staff of the 3rd defendant.  The wet floor also contributed to the slippery floor and the fall of the plaintiff.  For the purpose of this application, we shall proceed on the basis that it is the finding of the court that the plaintiff saw the pork residues bounced off from the pork and scattered on the floor of the Market while the worker of the 3rd defendant was chopping the pork.  In the present case, it was alleged that the floor of the Market was wet and not clean.  The negligence of the 3rd defendant does not mean that the 1st and the 2nd defendants will not be liable.  The finding that the plaintiff saw the disposal of the pork residues is only one of the factors to be considered.  The wet floor was also one of the factors that contributed to the Accident of the plaintiff.  It is reasonable in the circumstances to join the 1st and the 2nd defendants.

13.  The 3rd defendant did try to shift the blame to the 1st and the 2nd defendants in the trial.  Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd defendant at the trial, suggested that the design of the Stall was at fault and the pork residues might have been left there by other stalls.  In paragraph 27(4) of the closing submissions, Mr Chan submitted that “the pork substances could have been discarded by other parties:-

“(i) The plaintiff admitted that the neighbouring stall 54A was a cooked food stall selling, inter alia, chicken feet and spare ribs rice (鳳爪排骨飯) and beef rice.  Mr Cheung added that minced lean meat would be sold to stall 54A, but the 3rd defendant was not responsible for transferring the minced lean meat.

(ii) Mr Cheung gave evidence the lard company would pick up pork waste from the Stall with a trolley from time to time.”

14.  The 3rd defendant tried to shift the blame to the 2nd defendant, the cleaning contractor.

15.  It is also noted that in the letter from Falcon Insurance Company (Hong Kong) Limited (“Falcon”), the insurer of the 3rd defendant, to the plaintiff’s solicitors dated 17 January 2013, Falcon asked the plaintiff’s solicitors to provide documentary proof that the alleged place of accident was under the control and management of the 3rd defendant.  It implied that the person in control and management of the place, that is, the 1st defendant, should be liable.

16.  I agree with Mr Lim that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants was for the same damages arising out of the same incident.  The argument of different causes of action is not accepted.

17.  In addition, the 3rd defendant served the Notice of Contribution against the 1st and the 2nd defendants on 2 February 2016.  It strongly indicated that the other defendants should be a party to these proceedings.  The fact that it was served 6 days before the trial does not matter much.  Mr Ho sought to rely on Tam Kam Fai v Michael J Design Limited and others, HCPI 347/2005.  I do not agree.  The facts of the case are completely different.  The indemnity and contribution notices served amongst the defendants in this case are evidence that they blamed each other.  To say the least, I agree with the submission of Mr Chung, counsel for the 1st defendant, that the 1st and the 2nd defendants are the successful parties in defending the contribution proceedings, the 3rd defendant should bear the costs of the 1st and the 2nd defendants in defending the Notice of Contribution.

18.  The 3rd defendant was held liable and is the only person at fault.  It was reasonable for the plaintiff to join other defendants.  The 3rd defendant failed to claim contribution from other defendants.

19.  Besides, on 20 January 2016 (which at that time, the 3rd defendant is yet to issue any Notice of Contribution), the 1st and the 2nd defendant jointly issued a Calderbank Offer in relation to the Contribution and Indemnity proceedings to the 3rd defendant, consisting, inter alia, the following terms:-

“(1) Subject to the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, the 1st defendant do bear 25%, the 2nd defendant to bear 25%, and the 3rd defendant do bear 50% of liability; and

(2) There be no order as to costs amongst the defendants in the main proceedings and the contribution proceedings.

(3) The 3rd defendant may accept the offer in 14 days.”

20.  The 3rd defendant never reverted to the joint offer.  It is appropriate that the 3rd defendant should be liable for the costs of the contribution and indemnity proceedings.

21.  In the circumstances, the application for variation be dismissed.  I order that all the nisi costs orders be made absolute.

22.  There be costs order nisi that costs of this application be paid by the 3rd defendant to the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.  The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.  Unless application for variation is made within 14 days from the date hereof, such order shall become absolute 14 days thereafter.



 (Eric Tam)
Deputy District Judge

Mr Patrick D Lim, instructed by Szwina Pang, Edward Li & Co., for the plaintiff

Mr Gary K H Chung, instructed by Cheng, Yeung & Co., for the 1st defendant

Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin for the 2nd defendant, who attendance was excused

Mr Leon Ho, instructed by Au & Associates, for the 3rd defendant

107119-EN-2016-12-05

WONG HIN CHUEN v. WANG ON MAJORLUCK LTD AND OTHERS

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DCPI58/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 58 OF 2015

--------------------

BETWEEN

 WONG HIN CHUENPlaintiff

and

 WANG ON MAJORLUCK LIMITED1st defendant
 CHOI WU TONG trading as CHUEN YUEN CLEANING & PEST CONTROL SERVICE COMPANY2nd defendant
 GREATEST WEALTH LIMITED trading as 萬有放心肉3rd defendant
--------------------
Before:  Deputy District Judge Eric Tam in Court
Dates of Hearing:  28 and 29 July 2016, 1 and 17 August 2016, and 31 October 2016
Date of Judgment:  5 December 2016

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JUDGMENT

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Background

1. The plaintiff claims for damages he sustained in a slip and fall accident (“the accident”) on 16 May 2012 at Po Lam Market, Tseung Kwan O (“the market”).  The market was a wet market.  The accident happened outside shop 54B (“the stall”) at the market.  The plaintiff was shopping at the market.  When he passed the stall, he stepped on some slippery substance which caused him to lose his footing and balance.  He fell and suffered a fracture of the left femoral neck commonly known as hip fracture.  It is the plaintiff’s case that after the fall he found out that he had stepped on some pork residues that were discarded by the staff of the stall. The floor of the passageway was wet at that time.  At the time of the accident, Wang On Majorluck Limited (“the 1st defendant”) was the property manager of the market.  Choi Wu Tong trading as Chuen Yuen Cleaning & Pest Control Service Company (“the 2nd defendant”) was the cleaning contractor engaged by the 1st defendant to provide cleaning service for the market. Greatest Wealth Limited trading as 萬有放心肉 (“the 3rd defendant”) was a tenant of the 1st defendant at the market and operated the stall selling pork.

2. The plaintiff claims against the 1st and the 2nd defendants for failing to keep the floor of the market clean/dry, free from slippery substance, failing to take steps to prevent shopkeepers at the market from discarding or depositing slippery substance onto the passageway of the market, failing to clean up slippery substance onto the passageway of the market, failing to inspect the market and clean up slippery substance.

3. The plaintiff’s case against the 3rd defendant is that the 3rd defendant’s worker was the primary wrongdoer and the 3rd defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of its staff.  The plaintiff’s case is that the 3rd defendant’s worker, in the course of chopping pork, allowed the slippery substance to be deposited onto the passageway outside the stall, allowed the slippery substance to remain on the passageway and failed to clean it up.  The slippery substance was pork residues which composed of pig skin, broken bones and minced meat.

4. It is the plaintiff’s case that both the wet floor and the pork residues contributed to his slip and fall. 

Assessment of Credibility of the Witnesses

Evidence of the Plaintiff Wong Hin Chuen

5. The plaintiff adopted his witness statement as evidence.  I find that the plaintiff is a credible witness.  He had some confusion as to the location of the shops at the market, but such confusion is not relevant to the dispute.  Furthermore, there was a discrepancy as to the position of Cheung Chi Choi (“Cheung”), the 3rd defendant’s witness, at the time of the accident.  At first, the plaintiff said Cheung was standing at an angle of around 45 degrees, diagonally to the table; but afterwards, he demonstrated that the position was about 85 degrees.  The plaintiff was not a person of much education.  The difference between 45 degrees and 85 degrees has little bearing in the present case.  Henceforth, I would not find that he is a dishonest witness for this discrepancy. 

Evidence of Cheung Chi Choi

6. I do not accept the evidence of Cheung, the 3rd defendant’s witness.  His evidence is not consistent with his previous statements.  For example, he said the shop opposite to the stall was open at the time of the accident.  But in his statement dated 4 January 2013 (“the first statement”), he said it was vacant.

7. He said he heard nothing at the time of the accident, but in his oral evidence, he said he heard a woman shout someone had fallen.  He said in the first statement that when he first saw the plaintiff, he was sitting on the floor.  But in his oral evidence, he said that somebody was helping the plaintiff to get up.

8. In the first statement, he said the floor the plaintiff was sitting on was wet.  In his statement dated 7 June 2013 (“the second statement”), he said that the floor of the passageway was dry.

9. In his statement dated 3 November 2015 (“the third statement”), he clarified that as the passageway was wide, there was some distance between the two locations.  The place he was standing near the stall was dry but the position the plaintiff was sitting was wet.

10. In his oral evidence, he said that the whole floor was wet, the relevant parts of the third statement were wrong, and he had not read the third statement before he signed it.  But during examination-in-chief, he confirmed the veracity of the third statement.

11. In the third statement, he said he was the only one working at the stall at the time of the accident.  But in his oral evidence, he said there was another worker.

12. In his first statement, he said there was the sign of “Beware of slippery floor” on the floor.  In his oral evidence, he said there was none.  He said that the policeman only noted down his identity card number at that time.  But during cross-examination, he admitted that the policeman also asked for his telephone number and he had given it to them, as stated in the second statement.

Evidence of Choi Wu Tong

13. Choi Wu Tong (“Choi”) was the 2nd defendant’s witness.  There were some exaggerations in her oral evidence, but on the whole I find her an honest witness.  She said that there was always water flowing from the stall onto the passageway. Such evidence is consistent with the evidence of Cheung. Cheung said sometimes he even put some sand bags to prevent water from flowing out of the stall.  When there was water flowing out onto the passageway, he would sweep it back to the direction of the stall.

14. Choi’s evidence supported the fact that there was water flowing from the stall onto the passageway.  Although there was drainage at the side of the stall, I do not think Cheung had successfully prevented water from flowing onto the passageway.  I accept Choi’s evidence that the passageway was made wet by the 3rd defendant’s staff after they washed the floor of the stall.

15. As to whether the court should draw adverse inference against the 2nd defendant for failing to call the cleaners to give evidence.  I find that Choi could tell the court the material facts of the present case.  I do not find that she is trying to hide anything.  The sanitary state of the market was illustrated by Cheung’s evidence. He said that the market was dry in the morning; the cleaning workers cleaned the area several times a day, which is consistent with Choi’s evidence.

The evidence of Wong Wai Chi Nicole

16. Wong Wai Chi Nicole (“Wong”) gave evidence for the 1st defendant.  She adopted her witness statement as her evidence.  She was employed by the 1st defendant in December 2013.  The accident happened on 16 May 2012.  She had no personal knowledge of the accident.  What she could provide was mainly evidence glanced from the contemporary documents.  Her evidence was not challenged by any parties and I accept her evidence.

Issues in dispute relating to the 3rd defendant

What caused the plaintiff to fall

17. The plaintiff’s evidence was that as he was walking past the stall, he stepped on something slippery.  He was unable to maintain his balance and fell as a result.  Immediately after the fall he saw pig skin and other pork residues on the floor near his feet.  The floor was wet and his trousers got wet.  He then said to the Cheung, “師傳你今次累死我啦, 我起唔到身”.  Cheung’s response was “我都唔想架!”  Cheung then got hold of a folding chair from a nearby stall and helped the plaintiff to get up and sit on the chair.  Cheung then went and got a broom to sweep away the pig skin and other debris.  The plaintiff tried to stop him but Cheung went ahead and said, “你咁自私! 滑倒第二個就慘啦!” 

18. In paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement, he said that before the accident, he noticed that Cheung would tidy up the pork by cutting off some skins, small bones and meat from the pork and dispose those parts around the floor of the stall.

19. As I accept the evidence of the plaintiff and reject those of Cheung, I find that the plaintiff fell because he stepped on pork residues.  Such residues were left there by the 3rd defendant’s staff.  Such finding is also supported by the conversations between the plaintiff and Cheung after the fall, and the fact that Cheung hurriedly cleaned up the floor after the accident.

20. As pointed out by Mr Lim, counsel for the plaintiff, Cheung would not be said to have carefully disposed of the pork residues.  In one of the photographs produced by the 3rd defendant showing the basket for the collection of the pork residues, the scene that some pork residues sticking to the bottom of the table, instead of being put inside the basket, was captured.

21. It is not in dispute that the floor of the passageway was wet.  I find that the wet floor also contributed to the slippery floor and the fall of the plaintiff.  But the main reason for the accident was the presence of pork residues on the floor.

22. When Cheung gave evidence, he said that the 3rd defendant dismembered pig carcasses twice a day.  After that, the 3rd defendant’s staff would use a hose to wash away the debris and residues.  From the photographs taken by the 3rd defendant, it can be seen that the floor was wet.  It was the evidence of Cheung that the floor was dry at 8:00 a.m.  The worker of the stall would wash the floor at around 10:00 a.m.  The accident happened at around 11:00 a.m. As mentioned above, I find that the floor of the passageway was wet because the 3rd defendant’s staff washed the floor of the stall in the morning.  The water flew outside the stall and it is also likely that debris and residues were flushed onto the passageway and were deposited there.

23. Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd defendant, submitted that the plaintiff never pleaded such case.  Given my findings above, there is no need to deal with the issue.  I accept the plaintiff’s evidence and find that Cheung improperly handled the pork residues and caused the pork residues being left on the passageway.  If the issue has to be dealt with, I find that the washing of the floor by the 3rd defendant’s staff may also be the cause of the residues being left on the passageway.  Such information was only disclosed by Cheung at the trial and could not be found out by the plaintiff before the trial.

24. The plaintiff had already pleaded that the residues of the pork were discarded by the 3rd defendant’s worker and in the Particulars of Negligence of the 3rd defendant, the plaintiff had pleaded in sub paragraph (a) discarding, disposing of or dropping the pork residues; sub paragraph (c) causing or allowing the pork residue to remain on the floor; and sub paragraph (d) failing to clean up, clear or remove the pork residues.  I find that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded his case to allow the 3rd defendant to defend his case, and the 3rd defendant would not be said to be taken by surprise.  There is also no prejudice to the 3rd defendant as the evidence came from his own witness. As to the reason for the wet floor, again it was the evidence of the 3rd defendant’s witness. I do not see any reason why the court should not make such a finding.

Liability of the 2nd defendant

25. The plaintiff claims against the 2nd defendant for failing, inter alia, to keep the floor of the market clean, dry and free from debris, oily and slippery substance.  On Choi’s own evidence, she was fully aware that the 3rd defendant’s workers cut up pig carcasses at the back of the stall and then hosed down the floor resulting in water and pork residues flowing onto the corridor. 

26. Mr Cheng, counsel for the 2nd defendant, submitted that there was no evidence to show for how long the pork residues had been discarded by the 3rd defendant onto the passageway, before the plaintiff slipped and fell at the time of the accident.  There is no basis to fault the 2nd defendant for failing to clean up the pork residues just because the accident happened.  It was equally possible that the pork residues were discarded by the 3rd defendant just moments before the accident, leaving the 2nd defendant with no time to detect and clean up properly.

27. Further, Mr Cheng submitted that the 2nd defendant had put in place a reasonable system to minimise the risk of slip and fall accidents inside the market.

(a) It was not challenged that two workers would be on duty during the day inside the market.  These two workers would each patrol half of the market to clean up the passageway.  There was no complaint that such system of patrol was insufficient for the market’s purpose.

(b) The 2nd defendant was aware that the stall was the only stall that would allow greasy water to overflow to the passageway, and thus she paid special attention to clean the passageway outside the stall.  She arranged the cleaning workers to use cleaning powder (黃粉) and bleach (漂水) to remove dirt and oil when the market was less busy.  Any water would be mopped off afterwards.  This would be repeated at irregular junctures throughout the day, depending on the condition of the passageway outside the stall.

(c) During the evenings when the market closed, the cleaning workers would again use cleaning powder to wash the passageway to remove dirt and oil.  After washing with water, the passageway would be left to dry over the night.

(d) The 2nd defendant also stated that she put a yellow warning sign to warn the visitors of the wet floor.  (I find that there was a warning sign on the floor at the time of the accident. Cheung, in his witness statement, also confirmed that there was a warning sign.)

(e) The 2nd defendant would inspect the conditions of the market daily, by staying at the market for 1.5 to 2 hours each time.  She would ensure that the cleaning workers carried out their work in a proper manner.

28. Mr Cheng submitted that there was no evidence suggesting that slip and fall accidents were prevalent in the market, both before and after the accident.  As such, the cleaning system she implemented was more than reasonable.  There was no breach of duty by the 2nd defendant.

29. I find that there is no duty to keep the floor of the market dry all the time.  The market is a wet market.  Given the practice that the 3rd defendant used the hose to clean the stall twice a day, it is impossible to keep the floor of the passageway dry all the time.  Such demand is more than reasonable.  I agree with Mr Cheng‘s submission that the 2nd defendant’s duty was to keep the market in a reasonable clean state.

30. The main reason for the fall of the plaintiff was the pork residues.  There is no evidence that pork residues were there every day, or that slip and fall accidents were prevalent in the market. I accept that the 2nd defendant had established and implemented a cleaning system, employed sufficient staff for the cleaning, and put up warning sign to warn against the risk of wet floor.  She was not in breach of her duty.

Liability of the 1st defendant

31. Mr Lim submitted that the 1st defendant, as the property manager and occupier of the market, owed a duty to visitors to the market to keep it in a reasonably safe condition.  The accident happened in the passageway which was a common area under the control of the 1st defendant.

32. The evidence of Choi was that the floor of the market was washed overnight and it was the 3rd defendant who made the floor of the passageway wet at least twice a day.  This scenario was set up by three factors:-

(a) The use of the stall to cut up pig carcasses;

(b) The inclining floor of the stall which resulted in water used to clean the floor flowing out towards the passageway;

(c) The lack of drainage right outside the stall which resulted in water from washing of the floor flowing out onto the passageway.

33. Mr Lim submitted that water and pork residues flowing onto the passageway was a daily occurrence which was a long standing problem before the accident.  As an occupier, the 1st defendant was under a duty to keep the passageway safe.  On the facts of this case, the 1st defendant’s duty went beyond employing a competent independent contractor to clean the market.  Choi’s evidence was that she had made numerous complaints to the 1st defendant but nothing was done about it. The problem was created by its tenant and the 1st defendant had not done anything to stop the problem of the water flowing from the stall onto the passageway.  Apart from complaints from the 2nd defendant, the 1st defendant, as the manager of the market ought to know that for pork stall, it was necessary to wash the floor after pig carcasses had been cut up.  The 1st defendant could have located the 3rd defendant to a stall that had drainage opening next to the shop front, or if no such stall was available at the time then drainage should be constructed by the front of stall so that dirty water would go into the drain hole and not onto the passageway. 

34. Mr Lim submitted that the evidence about the complaints by Choi to the 1st defendant that water flushed from the stall emerged during cross-examination of Choi.  After 1 August 2016 (day 3 of the trial) the case was adjourned until 17 August 2016 when Wong gave evidence.  It was clear that Wong only joined the 1st defendant after the 3rd defendant had moved away from the stall, and she would have no knowledge of the complaints made by Choi.  Having a two week adjournment, the 1st defendant made no effort to call the manager of the market to give evidence on the aspect of whether any complaints had been made by Choi.  Mr Lim submitted that this was an appropriate case for the court to draw an adverse inference against the 1st defendant that Choi had made complaints to the 1st defendant against the 3rd defendant on the ground that the 1st defendant failed to call a material witness and no explanation was offered for not calling this witness.

35. Mr Chung, counsel for the 1st defendant, submitted that 1st defendant’s case was that a reasonable system to guard against the risk of slippery floor within the market was implemented with the exercise of reasonable care and diligence:-

a) An independent cleaning contractor, namely the 2nd defendant was engaged;

b) An adequate system of inspection and patrol of the market was implemented;

c) An efficient system of report and remedy coupled with the cooperation/assistance of the 2nd defendant was implemented.

36. Mr Chung submitted that Wong’s evidence was as follows:-

(a) The 1st defendant took various measures in selecting the 2nd defendant as the cleaning contractor for the market;

(b) The cleaning contract sets out the conditions and standard which the 2nd defendant was required to meet, including:-

(i) Number of cleaners to be engaged;

(ii) Regular cleaning during daytime;

(iii) Ad hoc cleaning;

(iv) Regular cleaning during nighttime;

(v) Regular monthly cleaning in massive scale including removal of stains;

(vi) Regular monthly removal of grease;

(vii)  Massive cleaning of the entire market at least half-yearly.

(c) A schedule of daily/weekly/monthly cleaning were also set out in a table.  In the said table, the 2nd defendant was required to clean the floor three times per day and once per week.

(d) Pursuant to clause 7 of the cleaning contract, the 2nd defendant’s staff was required to record their work and attendance.  The 1st defendant would check cleaning records submitted by the 2nd defendant.

(e) The 1st defendant would also arrange staff on duty to supervise and monitor the 2nd defendant’s cleaning work.  Warnings/notices and penalty would be given if the 2nd defendant’s work was found to be unsatisfactory or below the standard.

(f) Patrols and inspections were conducted by the 1st defendant’s staff every two hours to ensure the cleaning state of the market.

(g) The 1st defendant also held regular reporting meetings with the 2nd defendant to review and monitor the standard of the 2nd defendant’s cleaning service.

37. Wong’s evidence was supported by documents and I accept her evidence.  I find that the 1st defendant had established a reasonable system to guard against the risk of slippery floor, and such system was implemented with reasonable care and diligence.  There is no evidence that the system was not implemented.  The hourly cleaning records filled in by the 2nd defendant’s staff and countersigned by the 1st defendant’s staff were not challenged.  The plaintiff’s evidence that he had never seen any cleaning staff or patrol staff could not challenge the existence of such staff in the market.  The plaintiff only stayed in the market for a short period of time.  Cheung agreed that cleaning and patrol by the 2nd and the 1st defendants’ staff were undertaken.

38. I do not agree with Mr Lim’s submission that the flow of water from the stall onto the passageway after cutting up the pig carcasses imposed an extra duty on the 1st defendant.  Although the washing of floor was a daily event, there is no evidence that the presence of pork residues on the passageway was a daily occurrence.  The 3rd defendant did wet the floor of the passageway, and the market was a wet market.  It should not pose a serious problem.  Extra measures had been taken by the 2nd defendant to deal with the wet floor of the passageway outside the stall.

39. Both Cheung and Choi said that there was drainage near the stall, I find there was such drainage.  I do not accept that the wetness of the passageway was caused by the lack of drainage or the inclining floor.  It was due to the manner of how the floor of the stall was washed.

40. I do not think it is an appropriate case to draw adverse inference against 1st defendant for failing to call new witness.  The 2nd defendant had already dealt with the problem.

41. I find the 1st defendant not liable.

Plaintiff’s contributory negligence

42. Mr Lim submitted that in this case, the plaintiff was familiar with the market.  He knew it was wet, he wore non-slip shoes and he walked slowly.  But he did not notice the pork residues as these were of similar colour to the wet shiny floor.  As such the pork residues were not readily noticeable and he was entitled to expect the passageway to be free from slippery substance like pork residues. I do not agree.

43. I agree with Mr Chan’s submission that if the plaintiff’s evidence was accepted, as stated in paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s witness statement, the plaintiff noticed that Cheung would tidy up the pork by cutting off some skins, small bones and meat from the pork and dispose those parts around the floor of the stall.  The plaintiff should pay more attention while walking near the stall.

44. Furthermore, after the fall, he noticed that there were residues of the pork in the area, and Cheung used a broom to clean that up.  I find that the amount of pork residues should not be too small, as according to his own statement, there were a pile of pig skins, broken bones and minced meat, and Cheung needed to clean them up with a broom.  They were not so invisible.  I find that the plaintiff should have noticed the pork residues on the floor if he had paid more attention.  His extent of liability should be 15 %.

Quantum

The Injury

45. The plaintiff sustained a fracture of the left neck of femur which necessitated an Austin Moore hemiarthroplasty of the hip.  Mr Lim submitted that the plaintiff was left with residual left hip pain.  There was muscle wasting of left thigh 3 cm smaller than right side.  In his oral evidence the plaintiff said that he started to experience pain in his right hip early this year and he had seven sessions of physiotherapy.  As advised by the physiotherapist, the reason he was experiencing pain on the right side was because he was not putting weight on the injured side so the right side was bearing more weight.  This was a problem created by the original injury.

Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities (“PSLA”)

46. Mr Lim submitted that the plaintiff suffered from residual pain and weakness of the left hip.  In addition, the plaintiff could not do physical exercise which he used to do prior to the accident.  In Dr Tio’s report, it was stated that the plaintiff’s mobility such as walking, standing and squatting could be slightly adversely affected.  Dr Tio opined that these implant could last up to 10 years, i.e. 2022 and the plaintiff would need another operation by then, when he would be aged 80.  The life expectancy of males in Hong Kong is around 88.42, so in the normal course of events the plaintiff would live beyond the time when a conversion operation is needed.  Mr Lim submitted that the pain of this future operation should also be taken into account for the award for PSLA.

47. The plaintiff claims $450,000 for PSLA.  Mr Lim submitted that an award of $450,000 for hip fracture would be at the upper end of the range of PSLA award for this kind of injury.  Mr Lim submitted that the plaintiff’s claim at this amount was reasonable given the circumstances of his injury and residual symptoms.

48. The defendants submitted that PSLA should be in the range of $200,000 to $250,000.

49. The parties submitted some relevant authorities for the court’s consideration.  After considering the authorities, and taking into account that the plaintiff may have to undergo another surgery after 10 years, I find that the amount for PSLA be at $300,000.

Cost of future operation

50. Mr Lim submitted that Dr Tio opined that the replacement hip would normally last up to 10 years and after that a replacement would be required. The hemiarthroplasty was done in 2012 and a replacement would be required in 2022. By that time, the plaintiff would be aged 80.  Given the life expectancy of male aged 77 in Hong Kong was 11.42, the plaintiff had a life expectancy of 88.42.  Given that he would have 8.42 years’ life expectancy at the age of 80, it would be reasonable to allow the cost of a hip replacement surgery, the average cost for the surgery at a private hospital would be around $252,000.

51. Mr Lim submitted that according to the information from the Hospital Authority, the notional waiting time for total hip replacement surgery in the New Territories East Cluster was 57 months.  The plaintiff should be entitled to conduct the surgery in a private hospital.

52. Mr Chung submitted that Dr Tio only stated in the expert report that most of these implants could last up to 10 years after which a conversion hip replacement should be considered.  Whether the plaintiff would undergo the operation was not certain.

53. Mr Chung further submitted that, as revealed in medical records, the plaintiff was suffering from long term illness, including hypertension and diabetes.  It was doubtful whether the surgery would be recommended by then.  The plaintiff’s claim for future medical expenses was based on the waiting time for surgery in the public sector.  But there was no urgency in this kind of surgery.

54. I agree with Mr Chung’s submission that the medical opinion only stated that most implants could last up to 10 years and another operation had to be considered.  Whether the plaintiff will have another operation depends on a lot of variable factors.  Life expectancy is only one of them. Furthermore, such operation is not urgent and I cannot see the reason why the public hospital could not provide the service.  There is no history that the plaintiff usually engaged private medical services.  However, it is anticipated that some follow up medical consultations are needed.  I assess the cost at $2,000.

Loss of housekeeping ability

55. The plaintiff withdrew this item.

Special Damages

56. The revised claim is $10,852 and agreed by all the defendants.

          Summary on quantum:-

(a)PSLA$300,000 
(b)Special Damages$10,852 
(c)Future medical expense$2,000 
  ___________ 
 Total:$312,852 

The liability of the 3rd defendant is $265,924.20 ($312,852 x 85%).

Conclusion

57. The 3rd defendant do pay the sum of $265,924.20 to the plaintiff, together with interest at 4% p.a. on the sum of $9,224.20 ($10,852 x 85%) from 16 May 2012 to judgment date, and interest on the sum of $255,000.00 ($300,000 x 85%) at 2% p.a. from 12 January 2015 to judgment date, thereafter interest on the sum of $265,924.2 from judgment date at judgment rate until payment.

58. I also grant order nisi on costs, including reserved costs, that the 3rd defendant do pay costs to the plaintiff, the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.  The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.  Unless application for variation of the order nisi is taken out within 14 days from the date hereof, the order shall become absolute 14 days thereafter.

59. I thank counsel for their assistance.

( Eric Tam )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Patrick D Lim, instructed by Szwina Pang, Edward Li & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Gary K H Chung, instructed by Cheng, Yeung & Co, for the 1st defendant

Mr Alfred C P Cheng, instructed by Au Yeung, Cheng, Ho & Tin, for the 2nd defendant

Mr Maurice Chan & Leon Ho, instructed by Au & Associates, for the 3rd defendant