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Matrimonial Causes2015

LEYY v. UKWK

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[2023] HKFC 37-EN-2023-02-15

LEYY v. UKWK

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FCMC 1393/2015

[2023] HKFC 37

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1393 OF 2015

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BETWEEN

 LEYYPetitioner

and

 UKWKRespondent

------------------------

Coram:Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing:22 November 2022
Opening Submissions from Petitioner:17 November 2022
Opening Submissions from Respondent:15 November 2022
Closing Submissions:13 December 2022
Date of Judgment:15 February 2023

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J U D G M E N T

( Variation of Maintenance )

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This Application

1.  On 3 November 2021, Respondent Husband (“H”) applied to vary a Consent Order made on 20 November 2020 (“2020 Consent Order”) for maintenance payment for his only daughter A (“VOM Application”).

2.  A was born on XX March 2012 and will be 11 coming March.

3.  The 2020 Consent Order provides for:

“H. AND UPON the Respondent agreeing and undertaking to the Court and to the Petitioner that in addition to the lump sum payment in Paragraph 3 below, the Respondent shall continue to pay promptly A’s school fees and school bus fees directly to the school and school bus provider until A reaches the age of 18 or completes her tertiary full- time education, whichever is the later.”

…

“3. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner a lump sum of HK$3,000,000 for the maintenance of the child of the family, A, by way of 106 monthly instalments of HK$28,302 each, commencing from 1 June 2021, and thereafter on or before the 1st day of each subsequent calendar month until full payment.”

4.  The number of instalments was designed to be paid up on A reaching age 18.

5.  H’s VOM Application asks for the lump sum of $3,000,000 to be reduced to $1,100,000 to be paid over 100 months with instalments reduced to $11,000 per month. He also seeks to be released from his undertaking to pay for school fees and asks that these be shared with W.

Parties background

6.  Petitioner Wife (“W”) is 43 and H is 45, they were both born and grew up in the UK. They met there and moved to HK in 2007 when H’s then employer posted him here.

7.  W now works for an insurance company and earns $83,000 a month. She is in a relationship with a long-term partner T (“T”).

8.  H claimed to be self-employed on a consultancy business under his own company SIC in his Form E dated 19 January 2022, but declared he has only limited income from this business; he also declared $20,000 rental income from his investment property in the UK. He is in a relationship and has moved from Saikung to live with his girlfriend in a Jardines’ Lookout apartment in October 2021 with rental of $59,000 which he claimed he shares with her. He says this is to economize and his girlfriend is helping him out with sharing the costs of living.

9.  Some more background to this case has been laid down in a judgment by HHJ Melloy on 19 March 2020 regarding A’s care and control when the Judge changed A’s residence from H to the W, and gave her sole custody care and control (“March 2020 CC Judgment”).

Proceeding History

10.  W petitioned for divorce on 23 January 2015, Decree Absolute was pronounced on 15 June 2015.

11.  By an Order made on 20 April 2015, the parties have joint custody of A, care and control to H and W has reasonable access.

12.  In Feb 2018, W applied for sole custody care and control of A, with defined access to H. A 7-day trial (“Care and Control hearing”) resulted in the abovementioned March 2020 CC Judgment. H’s access to A is now under professional supervision and limited to remote access only.

13.  On 28 May 2020, a costs order was made against H on the Care and Control hearing.

14.  A Consent Summons was filed on 18 November 2020 leading to the 2020 Consent Order which was made on 20 November 2020.

15.  W applied for relocation to the UK in her Summons dated 25 April 2022. H originally opposed but finally conceded at the PTR on 18 October 2022 after having read the Official Solicitor’s report which reveals that A wishes to go to the UK with W and her partner T.

16.  The VOM Application was heard for one day on 22 November 2022 with H giving oral evidence.

H’s case

17.  H claims to be in “substantial distress and emotionally lost” after losing A’s custody care and control to W, and that the court case has destroyed the family’s wealth.

18.  In his opening submission, he states the following as reasons for the VOM Application:

a. lack of income due to unemployment from November 2019 up until 17 March 2022;

b. material inability to close a more material proportion of the expected business during 2021 resulting in a slump in anticipated income;

c. additional debts incurred from further borrowing from friends and family to sustain expense payments.

19.  H further says the November 2020 Consent Summons was drafted by W’s solicitors who added in his obligation to pay for A’s school fees and school bus fees without his agreement or notice as he was self-represented. He then contends that payment of school fees of $16,475 on top of the $28,302 was excessive.

20.  His previous employment was with an international financial institution earning $2.4M annually, he was made redundant and has been unemployed since November 2019.

21.  In support of this VOM Application, H says he could not find work.

22.  He said SIC, his consultancy company has made considerably less income than expected and declared in his Form E that the gross revenue therefrom was $158,180 for 2021. This translates to $13,181.66 per month.

23.  As H has not been paying regularly for the school tuition, he came to an agreement with A’s school in late 2021 for the school debenture to be sold and the proceeds used to pay school fees.

24.  H resumes employment on 17 March 2022 with a company called F Limited (“F HK Ltd”) where he is currently making $140,000 per month; but did not reveal this new employment to the W until November 2022.

25.  He complains that the expense for A is excessive but proffers no counter numbers. H says as A will be enjoying free education in the UK, her expenses can be adjusted down further.

26.  His opening submission focuses on comments / criticisms on W; H also claims that she has been benefitting from the maintenance he pays for A.

27.  On the morning of the hearing, I seek to confirm what H wants to do having considered the W’s submission, and my indication that he has very high hurdles if he is seeking to vary the $3,000,000 lump sum. He eventually conceded that he will not be seeking a variation of the lump sum, but asks to pay an instalment payment that he can afford. Parties were directed to see if they could attempt to mediate the amount but failed.

W’s Case

28.  W objects to H’s application.

29.  W says that following the Care and Control hearing, there were difficulties with H’s payment of school fees for A, and W has hoped to resolve matters with H with the Consent Order. W says that when she accepted a lump sum payment for A, it was because a lot of time and money has been spent on the Care and Control hearing, and she felt that there was a need to have some finality and certainty. She also says that in agreeing to the lump sum for A, she has foregone any chance of maintenance adjustments for A resulting from costs of living increase, accepting that she will bear the brunt of inflation, and acknowledging that she will not be able to change this lump sum payment for A.

30.  W says that at the time of the Consent Order, she acceded to H’s ask for 6 months stay before starting payment; which is why the Consent Order made in November 2020 ordered payment to commence in June 2021.

31.  But H only paid for three months from June to August 2021, stopped payment, and took out this VOM Application. At the time of this hearing, the outstanding payments come up to $452,832 over 16 months.

32.  W also says that H cannot rely on his unemployment status to support his application as he entered into the Consent Summons in November 2020 at a time when he was not in employment.

33.  W says H at least has income from his current employment of $140,000 and rental income of $20,000 of his investment property.

34.  She also says H has failed in his duty to give full and frank disclosure of his finances, and that H has continued with his high living expenses while breaching his Order to pay for his daughter.

Legal Principles

35.  The empowering legislation for variation of maintenance is in Section 11(1) and (7) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap 192):

(1) Where the court has made an order to which this section applies, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the court shall have power to vary or discharge the order or to suspend any provision thereof temporarily and to revive the operation of any provision so suspended.

….

(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates and, where the party against whom that order was made has died, the changed circumstances resulting from his or her death.” (emphasis added)

36.  The modern approach in dealing with an application for variation of maintenance is summarised by Cheung JA in AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36 at §14, in particular the following sub-paragraphs:

“4. The modern approach, as required by section 11(7), is for the Court to consider all the circumstances of the cases. The Court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh: Flavell v. Flavell [1997] 1 FLR 353 at 357B following Lewis v. Lewis [1977] 1 WLR 409 and Garner v. Garner [1992] 1 FLR 573.

5. Any change in any of the matters to which the Court was required to consider when making the original order was one of the circumstances to be considered.

6. Almost invariably, an application to vary an earlier periodical payment order will be brought on the basis that there has been some changes in the circumstances since the original order was made, for example, continuing inflation; the increased costs in supporting a growing child and that one party may be more adversely affected than another by the increase in the costs of living: Garner v. Garner.

7. …

8. At the same time the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors to which the Court on variation should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order: Boylan v. Boylan [1988] FLR 282.”

37.  The principles are trite in that there should be some change of circumstances since the previous order was made and I am entitled to look at the case de novo.

38.  Counsel for W also quoted two more relevant cases which I will refer to below.

39.  The Court of Appeal case in G v G [2001] 1 HKLRD 580, where Rogers, V-P confirmed the jurisdiction to vary a consent order for payment of lump sum by instalments; but however in confirming the decision, stated that:

“But in the absence of circumstances which makes the agreement voidable due to duress, a mistake, fraud or the like, it seems to me that this should only be done where there has been a material change of circumstances so drastic and unforeseen as to make it only fair to vary.” (at p584 F-H) (emphasis added)

40.  And in the Court of Appeal decision of CH v MEH [2012] 1 HKLRD 751, Cheung JA (as he then was) stated that the jurisdiction to vary under these circumstances must be exercised with caution. Further, quoting from paragraph 24:

“This strict approach was affirmed 32 years later in Westbury v. Sampson [2002] 1 FLR 166 which was a negligence claim against a solicitor who had not advised the husband that a consent order for lump sum payable by instalments was liable to be varied. The wife had successfully varied the consent order. The judgment of Bodey J in the Court of Appeal is instructive:

[56] So far as counsel have been able to find, there are no decided cases stating any principles on which the court should act when applying s 31(1) and (7) to orders for a lump sum payable by instalments.

[57] Nevertheless, given the constant emphasis in the authorities generally on the need to uphold the finality of orders intended to be final, including orders as to capital, it seems to me that very similar considerations ought in practice to be applied under s 31 as those laid down in Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20, sub nom Barder v Barder (Caluori Intervening) [1987] 2 FLR 480, at any rate as regards varying the overall quantum of a lump sum order by instalments (as distinct from re-timing or ‘re-calibrating’ the instalments).

[58] The re-opening under s 31 of the overall quantum of lump sum orders by instalments, especially when made as part of a package intended to be final (and all the more so when ordered by consent following an agreement) should only be countenanced when the anticipated circumstances have changed very significantly, and/or for cogent reasons rendering it quite unjust or impracticable to hold the payer to the overall quantum of the order originally made.” (emphasis added)

41.  The legal principles, therefore, dictate that I need to find not just a change of circumstance, but one which has changed significantly.

Discussion

H non-disclosure of his job status

42.  After H’s cessation of employment with his former employer in November 2019, H has worked on his own consultant business, but claims to be not making money. He resumed employment status as Chief Business Officer with his current employer F HK Ltd from 17 March 2022; but failed to inform this court and W; it was not until 3 November 2022 when he provides information via his solicitors and only after repeated enquiries from W’s solicitors. He makes a monthly income of $140,000 with F HK Ltd.

43.  W maintains that H had many opportunities to inform the Court since March 2022 but has failed to do so. These include:

(1) his 10th Affirmation filed on 21 March 2022;

(2) his Answer to Questionnaire dated 14 April 2022;

(3) the letter dated 31 May 2022 from the H’s solicitors;

(4) his second answer to Questionnaire dated 1 November 2022;

(5) at the PTR on 18 October 2022 when he was represented by counsel

44.  W goes further to say that H has been deliberately dishonest when he says he ceased to receive regular income since losing his job in November 2019, and that he tried to look for a job in 2019, 2020 and 2021 but to no avail.

45.  H says that before disclosing his employment via his lawyers on 3 November 2022, he has also informed the SWO on 4 October 2022; this was before he informed the W.

46.  H generally blames the fact that he has no legal representation and therefore did not know to disclose this.

47.  H says he filed his 10th Affirmation on 15 March 2022 and therefore he was “not wrong in stating that as of the date of the affirmation [he] did not have a regular income since November 2019”, and further support this statement by saying that at that time he has not started his employment nor received any salary from the new job.

48.  He maintains that there were no questions about his employment in the questionnaire. Under cross examination, he says, “you did not ask the question, my responsibility is to answer your question.”

49.  When asked why he did not withdraw his application on finding employment, he said “I was already in this financial variation, I didn’t know what to do”.

50.  H says in court that he began negotiation with F HK Ltd for his employment in February 2022, his employment agreement was dated 10 March 2022. Clearly, leaving this important development in his financial position out of his 10th Affirmation is disingenuous to say the least. Even if he can get away with his explanation for omission in his 10th Affirmation, he has clearly failed to come clean in all the subsequent times mentioned in §43 above.

51.  I find that H has deliberately withheld the fact that he has found employment. From the way he responded his cross examination, I am also convinced that he knew it is something he should disclose but chose not to do so. This has clearly shed a very poor light on his overall credibility.

Issues to consider

i. Has there been a material change of circumstances so drastic and unforeseen which warrants H changing his maintenance payment for A?

ii. Does H have the ability to pay?

iii. Is the level of maintenance reasonable?

Has there been a change of circumstances?

52.  I am looing for material change of circumstances from November 2020 to November 2021.

53.  W argues that H was already unemployed when he signed the Consent Summons, so he should not be able rely on his lack of employment as a change of circumstances. I agree.

54.  With regard to his consulting business, he said there were shortfalls from estimated revenue in 2021, relying on a table in his Reply Affirmation, which shows his expected income from some deals and the eventual revenue which came in. His supporting documents far from support this position. Not only has he failed to identify the relevant income receipts with regard to the alleged deals, there is hardly any supporting documents for his so called “expected” income. I therefore find this argument far from convincing.

55.  H argues that he has increased debts which his income is not sufficient to cover. While he has declared he has liabilities from his credit card with high interest rate financing, and personal instalment loans, he did not mention that he is servicing these loans in Part 4 of his Form E.

56.  With regard to two personal instalments loans, in his second Answer dated 1 November 2022, H stated that they were respectively drawn down in March 2018 and June 2020, therefore both loans predate his VOM Application, and even the Consent Summons.

57.  Furthermore, while the borrowings are the bases of his application, I do not have any evidence of his previous liability positions, his January 2022 Form E being the only one there is on file. I am therefore unable to accept that this is a “change of circumstances so drastic and unforeseen” to justify a variation of maintenance.

58.  The same rationale goes for his credit card liabilities and loans from friends, I do not have evidence if these are pre-existing to his VOM Application. Neither does it appear that he is paying off his credit card liabilities on a regular basis. As for the loans from his friends, they are a relatively minor portion of his alleged liabilities.

59.  Nor do I accept the outstanding loans from his mother as change of circumstances leading to the need for variation. I am also of the view that these are but soft loans, and should not be taken into account in looking at H’s overall financial position at this point of time.

60.  However, the additional change of circumstance which must be taken into account since the VOM Application is clearly his new employment. This is evidently contrary to the position he takes in his application in that he now has a regular income.

61.  Therefore, looking at the bases of his application, I am of the view that there is no material change of circumstances that warrants a revisit of his maintenance for A. H’s VOM application will therefore, not succeed.

62.  I can stop here, but for completeness’ sake, I will proceed to look at H’s finances.

H’s Ability to Pay

63.  Although he claims to have no income when he took out the VOM Application, H’s income by the time of this hearing is $160,000 ($140,000 from F HK Ltd and $20,000 from his investment property in UK). H now argues that despite his new job, he is still unable to pay per the 2020 Consent Order.

64.  There is a need to review his expenses, and I am mindful to draw a distinction between expenses versus liabilities when I consider his ability to pay.

65.  In his 6th Affirmation dated 3 November 2021 in support of this application, he declared his monthly “liabilities” as follows:

a.Rent
(1/2 share of his current Jardines’ Lookout residence)
$30,000
b.Food, transport, general monthly expenses$15,000
c.Loans $17022.16 + $24,020.83$41,042.99
d.Insurance $945.95 + $470.47$1,416.42
e.UK Mortgage £1,329.67 (@10.6)$14,105.30

On his own case, his total “liabilities” are therefore $100,148.29.

66.  Turning to look at his Form E dated 19 January 2022, his declared expenses under Part 4 then increased to $129,131.17 although covering different items. From this total amount, I shall remove the interim maintenance of $28,302 and school fees of $18,891.67 (which is now covered under the school debenture and will come to an end when A relocates to UK), to calculate his net expenses: $129,131.17 – $28,302 – $18,891.67 = $81,937.5.

67.  While there is an overdraft facility in his bank account declared as a liability, this is not a loan which requires servicing on a monthly basis. Nor does he appear to be making regular monthly repayment of his other loans from his mother and friends.

68.  H argues in his closing submission that payment for his credit cards should be deducted as expenses, but a quick review of his credit card statements attached to his Form E shows that these are for internet purchases, utilities, restaurant spending, groceries and gas, items which should have been included in his general and personal expenses. Double counting is not acceptable. Even if there are historical outstanding balances, he is not repaying these on a monthly basis so should not be factored into his monthly expenses.

69.  What I will therefore factor, are only the two loan repayments amounting to a total of $41,042.99, which are the monthly instalment repayment for his two personal instalment loans, based on the loan statements he produced to his Affirmation and Form E. Making his total expenses $81,937.5 + $41,042.99 = $122,980.49.

70.  On the basis of his income of $160,000, he still has a net balance of $37,019.51, which is sufficient to pay for the monthly payment of $28,302 under the Consent Order.

71.  In addition, there should be room to economize for items such as $13,500 for food and meals out of home declared in his Form E.

H’s further resources

His Mother

72.  H has produced a note signed by his Mother in March 2022 stating that she loans to him £2,000 per month to support him in his expenses.

73.  W’s case also collated various amounts coming into H’s bank accounts from his Mother. This amounts to £63,464 into his Barclays bank account from December 2020 to November 2021; and a further $230,000 into his Standard Chartered bank account in September 2021, which were called “loans” by H in his second Answer. These were not disputed in his reply and I accept these figures. Apparently, H’s Mother is clearly his financial resource, she has the funds, and will continue to support H on both a monthly and ad hoc basis.

2SP

74.  H has a property in the UK. This is solely owned by him, there is a mortgage for which he is paying per month, and he receives monthly rental income therefrom at $20,000. In his Form E, he declares the market value of $5,824,344.90 with a mortgage of $3,999162.36, net value by his declaration is $1,825,182.54.

75.  W says his estimation is understated, and the closing balance of the outstanding mortgage he produced is from December 2020. All said, there should be a higher amount of equity on this property than he claims.

76.  H argues that he does not wish to sell this property as it is preserved for A’s future use.

77.  I do not agree with this argument at all. Needless to say, this is his financial resource from which liabilities can be covered and payment be made, he cannot be holding onto a property of this value and then says he has no funds to pay for A. There is an immediate on-going need to look after A’s need today for which he is responsible. At A’s current age of 10, H’s intention to save 2SP for her use should not even be a consideration for at least another 8 or more years.

SIC

78.  H has declared a gross revenue of $158,180 annually in his Form E. This is not accepted by W and I agree. No financial statements have been provided despite requests were made. And more importantly if this is what he was making prior to his current employment, which is $13,181.66 per month, it is inconceivable how he could be paying for the expenses he claims he has. He can say this is why he has accrued so much liabilities, but it makes no sense for someone to be spending the way he did when he did not have the resources to pay.

79.  It is not clear whether H can still operate his consultancy business with his new employment; if he can, he will also have an extra source of income.

A’s expenses

80.  W argues that if A’s expenses were to be looked at afresh, it still far exceeds the sum that H should be paying for A.

81.  H says in his opening submission that as he does not have regular updates from W on A’s activities and expenses, and that it was near impossible to have a fair estimate or understanding of A’s expenses. Yet he argues that A’s expenses are excessive.

82.  H says W has been pocketing the maintenance he pays for A, yet he produces no evidence in this regard, and I do not accept his allegations.

83.  In his supporting Affirmation, H uses a simplistic approach to make his claim. He calculates A’s expenses as follows:

- 1/3 share of rent in HV = $14,333

- Food allowance = $5,400

- Part time auntie 1/3 share = $1,800

This adds up to $21,533, and H therefore claims that his $28,302 is 131% of A’s expenses.  He then claims that based on this calculation, he should be paying half share of A’s expense which comes to $10,766.50.

84.  W says the H’s calculation is misconceived and I have to agree.

85.  H has clearly omitted to consider a substantial number of items of expenses, including share of W’s general expenses such as utilities and household expenses; and miscellaneous expenses for A including clothes and shoes, uniforms, school lunches, snacks, external ECAs, medical and dental expense, school trips, holidays, other transport, and A’s therapy treatments.

86.  W’s Form E dated 18 January 2022 declared the following expenses:

General = $38,066

A’s expenses (net of School fees) = $21,201.50

W has in fact explained that the general expenses is her half share (with her partner T), and therefore E’s share of general expenses should be $38,066 × 2 /3 = $25,377.33. This when added to A’s expenses of $21,201.50, will takes her monthly expenses to $46,578.83.

87.  I note that the expenses in W’s Form E look reasonable. H is therefore just paying 60.7% of A’s expenses. And I am mindful that he has not even been paying at all since October 2021, which means W has been bearing the full amount for A since November 2020 except for three months in 2021.

88.  Assuming W’s representation is correct, in that there will not be need for school fees for A on her relocation to the UK, H’s payment for A’s maintenance is a more than fair amount.

89.  I will also add that I do not accept H’s version of W’s solicitors adding his undertaking to pay school fees into the Consent Summons “without his agreement or notice”. The Consent Summons was made in clear and simple English, and cannot possibly be misunderstood by H.

Conclusion

90.  I accept the W’s version of event which led to her accepting a lump sum payment for A. She said by the time the Consent Summons was under negotiation, she felt that after the strenuous process and legal costs of the Care and Control proceedings, both she and A needed the finality to the litigation, and she was willing to forego any opportunity to vary A’s maintenance to bring matters to a close. This must have been a well-considered step. The payment was spread out only to the month A reaches age 18, while H’s obligation to pay for A’s school fees is to last until A completes tertiary full-time education. This is the finality she has opted for, and in all fairness, should not be changed lightly or unless there is very good reason to do so.

91.  I find that in considering the bases of the H’s application, I do not accept that there has been a material change of circumstances so drastic and unforeseen that warrant a reduction of his maintenance payment for A.

92.  Furthermore, looking at H’s income and expenses on a monthly basis, and the financial resources available to him, I find that he has the means to pay.

93.  I therefore dismiss the H’s VOM Application, and hold him to his undertakings and to pay for the maintenance for A as set out under the 2020 Consent Order.

Costs

94.  W has asked for Costs on an indemnity basis. While I have found H to have deliberately failed to disclose his new employment, and still proceeded with his application despite receipt of employment income, he has done so in the absence of legal advice at the relevant time. Giving him the benefit of doubt, I shall refrain from ordering indemnity costs on this occasion.


95.  In the circumstances, I make an Order for Costs of these proceedings, including all costs reserved, to be paid by H to W, to be taxed if not agreed, including certificate for counsel. This to be a Cost Order nisi to be made absolute from 14 days hereof.

 (Thelma Kwan)
 District Judge

For Petitioner: Ms. Frances Irving instructed by Messrs Haldanes

Respondent: Acting in person

[2020] HKFC 118-EN-2020-05-28

LEYY v. UKWK

HTML content

FCMC 1393 / 2015

[2020] HKFC 118

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1393 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 LEYYPetitioner

and

 UKWKRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public). To be determined by way of a paper disposal
Date of both sides mutual exchange of written submission on costs: 14 and 23 April 2020
Date of Petitioner’s written reply: 5 May 2020
Date of Respondent’s written Reply: 14 May 2020
Date of Ruling: 28 May 2020

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RULING
(Costs in children’s cases)

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Introduction

1.  On the 19 March 2020 I handed down my judgment in relation to the arrangements for the child of the family, A. The judgment was in two parts, the first part being a Fact Finding determination and the second part being a judgment inter alia on the practical arrangements for A, a little girl who is now 8 years of age, going forward. In that judgment I initially summarized my orders and directions as follows:

Summary of the judgment

2.  In summary the judgment states as follows:

i) On the balance of probabilities, the allegations made by the father against the mother, T and M are without any proper foundation and I accept that the abuse did not take place;

ii) Paragraph 1 of the court order dated the 20 April 2020 shall be varied and sole custody and care and control of A shall be granted to the Petitioner mother with immediate effect;

iii) There shall also be an immediate change of residence, or as immediate as is possible given the challenging circumstances brought about by COVID-19;

iv) The father, his family and nanny P shall have no contact with A in the short term. Longer term I accept that the father shall, all things being equal, have regular contact with A. Consequently, access shall be suspended temporarily and this issue shall be reviewed at a hearing scheduled for September 2020;

v) For the avoidance of doubt it is further directed that A shall have therapy, preferably with the Family Separation Clinic in the UK, together with a therapist in Hong Kong. A copy of this judgment shall be made available to them. It is anticipated that A will need to have therapy once a week for about 6 months – 25 sessions in total.

vi) A penal notice shall be endorsed on this order;

vii) The issue of costs shall be reserved for argument and shall be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

viii) I shall stand down inter alia so that the mother can formally provide the undertakings that she had promised to give during the course of the trial and as set out in paragraph 50 of this judgment.        

2.  This summary gives a flavour of the trial and the litigation itself. However, this Ruling on costs should be read in conjunction with the full judgment dated the 19 March 2020 and to the findings made within that judgment.

The issues

3.  In summary and notwithstanding the fact that this is primarily a children’s case, the mother asks for her costs on an indemnity basis. The father for his part argues that there should be no order as to costs or in the alternative that costs should be awarded on a party and party basis.

Legal principles

4.  Although costs are always in the discretion of the court, it is accepted that a costs order made against one parent in a child related matter is generally considered unusual unless that parent has, for example, been unreasonable in the conduct of the litigation or has behaved in a way that is somehow reprehensible, or beyond the limit of what might be regarded as reasonable. See Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR 569, Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1992] 1 AER 271, S v S HCMP 5547/1999 and Lv C CACV 169 of 2006). 

5.  Thus, in the normal course of events, regardless of the outcome, the court would normally make no order as to costs following a trial on a children’s matter. To that end, Ms Irving for the mother has also referenced the following English cases in her written submission:

5. The principle that reprehensible behaviour, or behaviour beyond the band of what is reasonable, may result in an order for costs against that party was set out in Keller v Keller and Legal Aid Board [1995] 1 FLR 259 at 265 per Wilson J.;

“No one suggests that the court’s discretion in respect of costs under s 51 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 has become emasculated in children cases. The position is only that in most such cases, indeed in ordinary cases, the proper weighing of the factors in the exercise of the discretion is likely to lead to the choice of no order …. Where, for example, the conduct of a party has been reprehensible or his stance in the litigation has been beyond the band of what is reasonable, an order for costs might well be made against him.” [emphasis added]

6. When assessing whether a party’s conduct has been unreasonable, what should be considered is unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation. In R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95 at 98B, per Hale J.

7. In Re G (Costs: Child Case) [1999] 2 FLR 250, per Butler-Sloss LJ at 252G:

“If this judge in this case had found that this Father had behaved unreasonably in the litigation and had gone beyond what many Fathers do, seeking orders which are hopeless, the point will come at which pursuing a hopeless application becomes unreasonable. But hopelessness and unreasonableness are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, particularlywhere there is a litigant in person, a degree of generosity towards a litigant may be more appropriate than to a litigant which is on legal aid generally advised by counsel and solicitors as to the extent to which they should continue to litigate.” [emphasis added]

Her Ladyship then added at 253D:

“It seems to me that the case of R v R does not change the normal situation that it is unusual to order costs, although it will be appropriate to order costs when a parent, even a litigant in person, goes beyond the limit of what is reasonable to pursue the application before the court.” [emphasis added]

6.   This general approach was also reiterated in the later case of Re T (A Child) [2005] EWCA Civ 311, where the Court of Appeal in England and Wales repeated the general principles on costs in child related matters as follows:

36. The principles, which fall to be applied, are not, we think, in dispute.  The judge summarised them succinctly in the following way:-

“2.1 The CPR apply. Under normal circumstances, according to rule 44.3(2)(a), the general rule is that costs should follow the event, although the court can make a different order. ( Rule 44.3(2) (b) )

2.2 However, this general rule does not apply to family proceedings. (Family Proceedings (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules1999)

2.3 It is suggested that even in family proceedings, the general rule is probably the starting point but can more easily be displaced. (Gojkovic v Gojkovic(No 2) [1992] Fam 40)

2.4 In cases involving children in particular, costs awarded against one parent or another are exceptional since the court is anxious to avoid the situation where a parent may feel “punished” by the other parent which will reduce co-operation between them. This will only impinge ultimately on the welfare of the child or the children concerned. (London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR569; Re: M (Local Authority’s Costs)[1995] 1 FLR 533)

2.5The conduct of the parties is in reality the major consideration when deciding whether or not an exceptional order for costs should be made. It should only be made if the penalised party has been unreasonable in his or her conduct. Moreover the “unreasonableness” must relate to the conduct of the litigation rather than the welfare of the child. ( R v R (Costs: child case) [1997] 2 FLR 95)

2.6 One has to be very careful in this distinction when, as in the case of (the mother), the apparent unreasonableness is as a result of the personality of the relevant party. In such circumstances, there is often an overlap of that party’s conduct of the litigation and the conduct relating to the welfare of the child.

7.  Reference may also be made to our own Court of Appeal decision in TPL v WYY, CACV 47 & 61 of 2014, which also reiterates these general principles.

8.  However, notwithstanding this, it is very unusual indeed, for a court to take this further and to make a costs order against a parent in a private child related case on an indemnity basis. I know of no such case and it is of note that Ms Irving has not been able to produce one in support of her submissions.

9.  However, she did refer to my sister judge’s analysis of the correct approach to indemnity costs generally in an unreported family case (although not a child related case) namely LYE and CWW and HWL, FCMC 14787 of 2002, 6 May 2005. In that case HH Judge Bebe Chu (as she then was) sets out the Legal Principles relating to indemnity costs as follows:

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

3.  According to Rule 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, the Rules of the High Court (RHC) shall apply with the necessary modifications to the commencement of matrimonial proceedings in, and to the practice and procedure in matrimonial proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance or in the District Court.

4.  Rule 91A of the Matrimonial Causes Rules provides that where the costs of an incidental to any matrimonial proceedings are directed to be taxed, R.H.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the Court of First Instance, and R.D.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the District Court.

5.  Order 62 Rule 28(3) in both R.D.C. and in R.H.C. provides that the Court in awarding costs payable to one party by another may in any case in which it thinks fit to do so order or direct that the costs shall be taxed on the common fund basis or on the indemnity basis.

6.  Any order for costs is in the discretion of the Court.  (see Headnote of Re Engindata Ltd (No. 2) 1993 1 All ER 232).

7.  Section 53 of District Court Ordinance Cap. 336 (equivalent to Section 52A of High Court Ordinance Cap. 4) provides that the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.  See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 62/2/5:-

“The Court of Appeal in Choy Yee Chun (The Representative of the state of Chan Pui Yiu) v. Bond Star Development Ltd [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 1327, CA reviewed the cases and summarised the law as follows. A taxation of the successful party’s costs on an indemnity basis could properly be ordered where the proceedings were scandalous or vexatious, or had been initiated or prosecuted maliciously, or for an ulterior motive, or in an oppressive manner. Any proceedings instituted or prosecuted in such circumstances as to constitute an affront to the court could properly be the subject of a direction for the taxation of the successful party’s cost on the indemnity basis. However, the circumstances in which an indemnity award might properly be made were not restricted to circumstances beyond the requirement that taxation on an indemnity basis must be “appropriate”. The principle for the award of an order of costs on an indemnity basis applied equally to those who not only instituted proceedings but who defended them. If a plaintiff had been forced to institute proceedings by the defendant whose conduct had been not only hostile in the normal litigious sense, but oppressive and with base ulterior motive, and if the pursuit of a defence constituted conduct which was part of an oppressive game plan, then invocation of the power to award costs on an indemnity basis might well be justified”.

10.  Ms Irving, also refers to Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd No 2 (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114, which supports the general proposition that indemnity costs orders are based “on a wide range of factors and circumstances” and that an order must be “appropriate”.

Discussion 

11.  Thus the issue to be determined here is essentially a question of degree. Given the circumstances in this case, should the father be penalised when it comes to the issue of costs? Generally, as I have said, it is accepted that there should be no order as to costs in a standard dispute over a child, where for example the argument is about the level of access for a non-care taking parent or whether there should be an order for sole or joint custody? These sorts of disputes form the bedrock of the Family Court and are in no way unusual. Thus parents should not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns about their children, which need to be properly ventilated and determined by the courts when considering what is in their best interests, by the concern caused by a possible adverse costs order being made against them. It is however a fine line. When then can it be said that a parent has crossed that line to the extent that a costs order against him (or her) is deemed permissible? And did the father cross that line in this case? Further, even if that is the case, when does the situation additionally warrant an order for indemnity costs?

12.  In this instance I made a number of findings, which go to the father’s behaviours. For example, in paragraph 26 of the judgment I said as follows:

… the father believed then and continues to believe now, that what A had told him and allegedly the Police also, was 100% true. He did so notwithstanding the fact that there was little, if any, corroborating evidence in support of what A says.

I added at paragraph 33 – 35 that:    

Discussion

33.The difficulty is that whereas the father has made these complaints there is very little to support them – there is no evidence of any injury; for example, there are no medical reports or photographs to support the allegation that T “punched” A’s chest repeatedly and on various occasions. There is also no subsidiary evidence to support his case. For example, there was nothing to suggest by A’s behavior at school during the initial period of time i.e. from the 29 April 2017 – 16 December 2017, (or indeed during the later period) that she was being abused or ill treated in any way. Further A did not generally resist contact with her mother during this time. There was one conversation with A’s teacher which led to second allegation about M, but that happened after the first allegation had been made. Infact, it seems that if A had not said anything then there would have been very little at all to suggest that anything was wrong. The father did claim that A had said various things to both him, KA and Grandma C and that she had also painted some dark or “black pictures” – but again there is nothing to verify this. It is also of note that none of the said paintings were produced. I can also place no weight on anything allegedly said by KA in this respect. [This is because although KA was asked to file an affidavit and to attend court, she chose not to do so]. When asked about the pictures in the witness box the father said that he had destroyed them because they were just “weird”.       

34.It is also of some concern that the father simply seems to have believed everything that A allegedly said to him verbatim, stating continually that his daughter does not/did not lie. With respect it seems to me that this shows a remarkable lack of insight. In my experience, children, like adults lie all of the time and for various reasons, both good and bad. 

35.My other concern relates to the fact that it subsequently transpired that the father had bought boxing gloves for A because she was taking Kung Fu lessons, so presumably she was aware of the concept of boxing or fighting. I also had an opportunity to view exhibit LEYY 3-3 produced by the mother which shows A “play fighting” with a mutual friend of both parties. The father can be heard commenting in the background. A also got into trouble immediately before the alleged incidents in December 2017 for hitting another child at school. In such circumstances it seems very likely indeed that A was very alive to the concept of both punching and/or fighting. It is also of note that the father did not tell the police about the Kung Fu lessons or the purchase of the boxing gloves.        

13.  Ms Irving for the mother says, and I accept this to be the case, that the father had an obligation not to simply accept what A told him verbatim, but to make a proper assessment of what she had said. In her reply submission dated the 5 May 2020 she adds that:

7.   Para 9(a) and (b); an argument that has been rejected is an unreasonable one when there is not one shred of evidence to support it and a great deal of evidence against it, yet there is no attempt made to evaluate that evidence. F’s determination to insist on his version of events was so far removed from reality that it moved beyond the realms of hopeless, and became unreasonable.  Before acting as he did, F had a responsibility to properly assess the evidence and his own conduct e.g. the boxing gloves, which he did not inform police about, while then relying on A making boxing moves.  This case was not merely a “normal” Family Court issue about how much time either parent might spend with a child; it was an attempt to exclude M from her child’s life and send her innocent boyfriend to prison.

8.   Para 9(d); the conduct of the litigation was appalling; this was not just a matter of running a case that was unreasonable; inter alia, orders were obstructed and breached, an SJE was given instructions contrary to the Judge’s directions, relevant factors were not disclosed, (e.g. boxing gloves) and an Order to produce correspondence was “reinterpreted” by F, saying;

“There are many irrelevant emails from the school with respect to this case. Given the mother has access beginning. What are the purpose and need to read every mail?”[B6/1327]

14.  The difficulty however, is that whilst that is the case, it is also true that husband does appear to have genuinely believed what A had said to him. He then acted on that, without making a proper investigation it is true, but with A’s best interests at heart. I do not accept, for example, that he deliberately set out to destroy the child’s relationship with her mother, although this will certainly have been the outcome if his behaviours had been allowed to go unchecked. I also accept that it is inevitably the case that a Police investigation often takes a long time to complete and that the father cannot be blamed for the flaws in the system.

15.  The other difficulty is that some of the problems seem to have come about because of the father’s personality. Reference to this is made in Ms L’s report as set out in paragraph 40 of the judgment. Dr JB also added in his psychological report on the father, at paragraph 41 of the judgment as follows:

41. …

Mental Status:

K [the father] was oriented to person, place, and time.  His memory and concentration were within normal limits. His speech and thought were impaired, as evidenced by tangential, disorganized and magical thinking, and marked difficultly and resistance to taking the perspective of others.  His event memory appeared appropriate. His fund of knowledge seemed limited, especially in his understanding of child development. K’s intellect appeared average.  His insight and judgment appeared impaired, as evidenced by his difficulty in considering alternative interpretations / hypotheticals to his present situation insistence that his perspective was the only one that could possibly be accurate, and belief that only he could heal the wounds resultant from the current litigation. His mood was anxious during this evaluation and he displayed a restricted range of spontaneous affect.

42. In his Discussion and Recommendations, he added that:

K found itdifficultto consider a situation in which the child’s visitation with her mother was unsupervised. He ultimately acknowledged that such an order is within the realm of possibilities.  Althoughit appeared that he would be compliant with such a court order, it did not appear that he could be openly cooperative.  Rather, he would tend to interpret an order that is not in complete alignment with his beliefs in his own terms, and actaccordingly. Therefore, it seems necessary that any order for cooperative parenting needs to state explicitly the terms for communication, visitation, and exchange of residence between the parents.

K’s psychological condition is stable and resistant to therapeutic intervention. Indeed, K saw no need for personal psychotherapy and is not amenable for such treatment.  He did state that he is willing to attend co-parenting courses.  He stated that he has not attended any such course in the past.  He also stated that he is willing to attend courses in child development.

16.  Thus it seems to me that this case is one in which the apparent unreasonableness of the father was due in part to his personality (see paragraph 6, subsection 2.6 above).

17.  This goes in some way to explain, but not to excuse, the litigation conduct of the father as set out in paragraph 49 of the judgment. Although this is a very long paragraph, I have nevertheless decided to reproduce it in full, as it goes to the heart of the cost issue currently before me. It is also of note that some of the truly terrible incidences that are set out in this paragraph, and which took place during the course of the litigation, were also perpetuated not by the father, but by his mother and sister, KA. 

The litigation and other incidences that occurred during the litigation process

49.    In addition to the allegations of abuse the following is also of note:

a)  On the 8 January 2018 the father sent A’s school photographs of the mother, T and someone who they thought might be M and made various allegations against them.

b)  A wrote a number of letters to the school in which she discussed with them inter alia how to block the mother from the school communications tools, SS and V. It is of note that the mother was unilaterally removed from these and KA and the father’s girlfriend V were added. 

c)  The father moved to live in Sai Kung with A and his other family members following the alleged incidents, in February 2018.  He did not inform the mother of this or provide her with the address or other contact information.

d)  Notwithstanding the court’s order on the 21 March 2018 for interim access namely that the mother should have unsupervised access on Wednesday afternoons in Sai Kung for 4 ½ hours and supervised access for the whole day on Saturday’s, A only saw her mother on three occasions namely on the 24 March, 28 March and 14 April 2018. It is of note that she had not seen her mother for nearly 4 months at that point. There were difficulties on each occasion emanating from the fact that the father did not agree that any access should be unsupervised and as a result he orchestrated his own attendance at those sessions. In addition, on the 24 March 2019 A attended access and was found to be wearing a yellow paper triangle on a black cord around her neck. She told her mother that it was to “keep away the bad stuff” presumably whilst she was at the mother’s house. In the witness box the father said that this was a “lucky charm”. On the 14 April 2018, during the Saturday access, immediately after the Easter school holiday, when no access had been allowed given that the court order referred to access during term time, an incident ensued between the mother, the father and KA. The mother produced a video clip taken shortly before this unfortunate event, from her phone, which shows a very unhappy A refusing to go to her mother’s apartment. Both mother and father were charged with fighting in a public place and on the 5 June 2018 they were both bound over for 12 months.  It seems that during this fracas, which was witnessed by A, the father and KA both accused the mother and T of being pedophiles and child abusers. Notwithstanding this the father wrote to the school and told them that the mother had been arrested on that day for child abuse and was on bail. This was a deliberate lie on his part. A was also taken to hospital following this incident and she remained there for 9 days.      

e)  The mother did not have access to A from the 14 April 2018 until the court order in March 2019. 

f)  The father unilaterally appointed a play therapist for A, Ms SM. This was not done with the mother’s permission. Difficulties then ensued. It seems that Ms SM was appointed on the premise that the alleged abuse had taken place. It is also of note that Ms SM’s did not liaise with the mother. On the 19 June 2018 I ordered that this therapy cease forthwith. In doing so I accepted Ms L’s assessment that this could be very damaging for the child, if the abuse had not taken place as claimed. There was some confusion during the trial about the number of therapy sessions attended by A, with it initially being suggested that she had had 17 play therapy sessions. Although this was not proven it was clear that she had attended a significant number of sessions with Ms. SM prior to the order of the 19 June.

g)  Further problems then ensued with respect to the appointment of a therapist, to provide A with intensive (and independent) therapy for herself. Eventually this led to the hearing of the 19 October 2018 and the subsequent Ruling dated the 2 November 2018. Reference may be made to that Ruling as appropriate. In conclusion I said as follows:

Decision

12. Consequently and for the avoidance of doubt, order 4 contained in the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged. It is further directed that A shall commence therapy with Dr A immediately and for 120 minutes per week. This is not currently in anticipation of intensive family therapy or indeed reunification therapy. A copy of this Ruling is to be provided to Dr A and as indicated during the hearing a penal notice shall be endorsed. Thus an order shall be made as follows:

1. The Respondent [father] shall take or arrange his agent to take the child of the family, namely U, AV, a girl born on XX March 2012 (“A”), to attend the intensive therapy sessions, for 120 minutes per week with the jointly appointed child psychologist, Dr. A OV pursuant to paragraphs 3 of the Order dated 19th June 2018. For the avoidance of doubt the cost of those sessions shall be split between the parties equally.

2. Order 4 of the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged.

3. A penal notice be endorsed on this order and personal service of the Order be dispensed with.

h)  In a nut shell although the court had ordered that A should receive intensive therapy and eventually also ordered, in the absence of agreement between the parties, that Dr OV be appointed for that purpose, the father did not co operate with that appointment. He was clearly very unhappy indeed at the approach taken by Dr OV, which he said was more in the nature of an investigation. He also rejected any notion that the underlying reason for the therapy was to mend the relationship between mother and child; he was certainly opposed to the concept of “reunification” therapy. Although he agreed to give permission for Dr OV to communicate with the school counselor, he did not follow through with this. He objected to Dr OV reading into the case, even though I had directed that she be provided with all of the pleadings and reports to date. He also insisted that a third party sit in on the sessions, namely Grandma C, even though Dr OV made it clear that she could not work properly in that environment as she was unable to form an appropriate therapeutic relationship with A. There were also other difficulties, including the father cancelling appointments at short notice and ultimately stopping all sessions at all prior to the hearing in October 2018. He then informed Dr OV of the outcome of that hearing BEFORE I had handed down my Ruling. Ultimately Dr OV resigned not once but twice, stating finally on the 5 February 2019 as follows:

To Whom It May Concern,

It has come to my attention that the following incidences have taken place:

·  A parental party is not in agreement with interventions being conducted by myself (Dr. A OV). This includes any interaction and the forms of therapeutic approaches considered necessary and relevant.

·  A parental party is breaching confidentiality and has requested confidential notes and records (between therapist and other parties).  This is despite both parents’ written consent for liaising with relevant parties (such as school or other parent) when clinically necessary.

·  This also includes the request of information about other (non-relevant) parties attending school and SPOT.

·  Intentional obstruction of information important to support child clinically.

·  Improper boundaries and coaching to child in order to keep child from divulging information and develop therapeutic rapport.

·  Threatened or insinuated litigious actions against therapists.

·  Repeated bounced checks, missed payments and missed sessions - causing a substantial bourdon on our administrative staff.

Considering the above, it is concluded that therapy may be counter productive given that said actions can:

·  potentially create a rift between the child, parents and therapists

·  perpetuate unhelpful polarisation of caregiver roles

·  place child in unstable position to have to choose parties to trust

·  cause pervasive and long term negative consequences with respect to the healthy development of child’s sense of self, and relationships and undermine their need for stability.

While it is still strongly advised that the child and caregivers seek therapeutic support, current circumstances impede therapeutic success and are believed to be further damaging at this time.

…

i)  Dr. OV later confirmed, on the 5 March 2019, that the parental party in question was the father. She said that she could not resume therapy because this placed A in a detrimental position and that:

My hope is that this termination of services will somehow aid in the court’s understanding of the family dynamics, necessity in future treatment, and aid in the decision regarding parental access/custody.

j)  As indicated above, there were also other concerns including the fact that the school removed the mother from two web sites, one called SS, where a parent is able leave messages for their child and to comment on their child’s work etc and the other called V. This was done at the request of the father and KA. It is of note that KA was then nominated to be the contact person in lieu of the mother. It seems that the school concurred because the father was the parent with care and control.

k)  There have also been other issues concerning both KA and Grandma C and their inappropriate involvement in this litigation and the care of A. This includes KA’s correspondence with the school and communications sent to other family friends and acquaintances in which all manner of accusations are made against the mother, T and M, without any proper foundation.    

18.  The father asks for some degree of generosity arguing that an adverse costs order would only make things worse and suggesting that it would further undermine the possibility of the parties co-operating in the future (although I tend to agree with Ms Irving that given the very extreme nature of this litigation it seems very unlikely indeed that the parties will be likely to successfully cooperatively co parent going forward). He also confirmed, once again, that he is being penalized for believing his daughter and acting in what he thought was her best interest. Even now he seems to have little insight into the damaging effects of his behaviours. However, I do accept up to a point, as stated in paragraph 14 of his submission that:

14. …  It is not that case that I had acted dishonestly by fabricating the allegations against the Petitioner or that I had acted maliciously for an ulterior motive or in an oppressive manner.

In other words, I accept that the father did not simply make the whole thing up in order to destroy the mother’s relationship with A. As ever the situation is more complicated than that. However, I do not accept that he was merely defending himself. This litigation arose because of his actions and at his instigation.    

19.  In such circumstances it seems to me that it would be appropriate for the father to contribute towards the mother’s costs, although not on an indemnity basis. Although he behaved very badly on occasions, I am not convinced that this case falls into that very rare band of cases where an indemnity costs order would be appropriate.      

20.  Instead I shall order that the father contribute towards 50% of the mother’s costs of and arising out of her amended summons dated the 10 September 2018. This order shall also include all other related applications within the litigation and all costs reserved. There shall be certificate for counsel. The costs shall be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.                  

( Sharon D. MELLOY )
District Judge

Ms. Frances Irving instructed by Haldanes for the Petitioner

The Respondent acted in person

   

[2020] HKFC 68-EN-2020-03-19

LEYY v. UKWK

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FCMC 1393 / 2015

[2020] HKFC 68

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1393 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 LEYYPetitioner

and

 UKWKRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Dates of Trial: 16 – 18, 23 – 25 July 2019 and 16 October 2019
Date of closing submissions:28 October, 1 November, 11 November and 18 November 2019
Date of Judgement:19 March 2020

__________________________

JUDGMENT
(Fact finding, custody, care and control, access and change of residence)

__________________________

Preliminary Note

1.  It is unusual for the Family Court to deliver long substantive judgments orally. In part this is because of ongoing pressures on the courts diary, particularly at this time following the closure of the courts because of the Coronavirus. In this instance however I have decided that a short oral hearing is necessary. Consequently, I intend to summarize the judgment and then give both sides time to read it in full before I ask that a number of housekeeping issues be dealt with.   

Summary of the judgment

2.  In summary the judgment states as follows:

i)    On the balance of probabilities, the allegations made by the father against the mother, T and M are without any proper foundation and I accept that the abuse did not take place;

ii)   Paragraph 1 of the court order dated the 20 April 2020 shall be varied and sole custody and care and control of A shall be granted to the Petitioner mother with immediate effect;

iii)  There shall also be an immediate change of residence, or as immediate as is possible given the challenging circumstances brought about by COVID-19;

iv)   The father, his family and nanny P shall have no contact with A in the short term. Longer term I accept that the father shall, all things being equal, have regular contact with A. Consequently, access shall be suspended temporarily and this issue shall be reviewed at a hearing scheduled for August 2020;

v)    For the avoidance of doubt it is further directed that A shall have therapy, preferably with the Family Separation Clinic in the UK, supported by a therapist in Hong Kong. A copy of this judgment shall be made available to all the therapists and/or organisations involved in this process. It is anticipated that A will need to have therapy once a week for about 6 months – 25 sessions in total.

vi)   A penal notice shall be endorsed on this order;

vii)  The issue of costs shall be reserved for argument and shall be dealt with by way of paper disposal.

viii)  Lastly I shall ask that the mother do formally provide the undertakings that she had promised to give during the course of the trial and as set out in paragraph 50 of this judgment.         

Introduction

3.  This is the Petitioner mother’s summons dated the 9 February 2018, subsequently amended on the 10 September 2018 as follows:

1. The care arrangement for the child of the family,  namely U, AV,  a girl born on XX March 2012 (“A”,  under paragraph Paragraph 1 of the Order dated 20th April 2015 be varied to the effect that the sole custody and care and control of the child of the family,  namely,  U,  AV,  a girl born on XX march 2012(“A”),  be granted to the Petitioner with defined access to the Respondent;in the manner as this Honourable Court sees fit with interim defined access pending the outcome of the police investigation into the abuse on A as alleged by the Respondent.

2. The Respondent’s access to A be supervised until such time as the Respondent has received appropriate therapy/treatment pursuant to the report by Dr JB and until it is assessed by Dr JB that unsupervised access might be appropriate.

4.  This is a very difficult case that has played out against the father’s allegations that the mother, her partner T and T’s brother M have physically and mentally abused the child of the family A, a little girl who is now 7 years old, having been born on the XX March 2012.

5.  Given the nature of the allegations there has been a Police investigation and T was initially arrested and placed on bail. That is no longer the case and the Official Solicitor has confirmed that the case is now closed. It has also been confirmed by the Police, in their letter dated the 13 August 2019 that the mother has never been arrested for child abuse. 

6.  In addition to the Police investigation there has also been a Multi Disciplinary Case Conference which was held on the 11 May 2018. This concluded inter alia, that the occurrence of child abuse could not be verified or established.

7.  Notwithstanding these conclusions the father remains convinced that the assaults did take place and he has approached the litigation on that premise, initially refusing to allow any access at all. Attempts by the court to get access up and running proved to be very problematic and other issues also ensued, particularly with respect to arranging independent therapy for A. The net result is that A did not receive the therapeutic support that had been originally intended by the court, only attending eight sessions over a 10-month period, three of which were in the presence of Grandma C, the paternal Grandmother. Further she did not have any contact with her mother for almost a year. On the 25 March 2019 the court ordered that the mother have supervised access at the Parent and Child Contact Centre (PCCC) once a week. As far as the court is aware that access is now taking place and it has been going well. At the end of the hearing on the 25 July 2019 I also confirmed that the access could be increased at the discretion of the PCCC, both in terms of length and scope.            

The court’s approach

8.  There had been discussions from early on in these proceedings about the best way to approach this litigation and whether or not a Fact Finding hearing should be held first. Indeed, reference is made to this in my Ruling of the 2 November 2018 when I gave further directions in relation to therapy. On that occasion I also said inter alia as follows:

9.    Although this is a short Ruling, it seems to the court that at this juncture it is necessary to point out that this is all being played out against a very difficult factual situation. The father accuses the mother’s partner (and indeed other people) of serious physical and mental abuse of A. A report has been made to the Police and A has recently been re interviewed by them. It is not clear for what purpose. There is currently an ongoing investigation into those allegations. The court was initially minded to hold a Fact Finding hearing given this scenario, but it is concerned, amongst other things, about potential delay. It seems that no one has yet been charged. The mother for her part denies all of the allegation in so far as they relate to her, and her partner also denies all of the allegations in so far as they relate to him. Attempts to get some form of access up and running have not been fruitful and there have been incidences between the adults when such an attempt was made, which necessitated further police involvement. This was all witnessed by A. The mother says that she is being alienated – successfully at this stage - by the father from A. She has not seen the child for a considerable period of time. The father’s position, rightly or wrongly, seems to be that he is protecting A.

9.  Both parties were then represented by specialist Family law firms and barristers. That is still the case for the mother, whereas the father represented himself at the trial.  At the end of the first tranche of the trial on the 25 July 2019, after the father’s re-examination had been concluded I stated as follows:

COURT: …  Now, I flagged up earlier some of my concerns with respect to how this trial has developed. Certainly insofar as the judgment itself is concerned, I will be dealing with that in two halves in that I will be dealing with the allegations of abuse first and then I will be dealing with the mother’s application for a variation of custody, care and control and access.  Now, it seems to me that given that, it is imperative that I see T [the mother’s boyfriend], KA [the paternal Aunt] and C [Grandma C – the paternal grandmother] in the witness box.  The question then becomes whether or not we invite them…

10.  The exchange continued, but in any event it can be seen that I made it clear that I would need to see T and both KA and Grandma C in the witness box, pointing out that this would be the case, even without the allegations of abuse, as on the father’s case Grandma C will be involved in A’s care and upbringing going forward. It is also clear that historically KA was also very involved with parenting A and that both she and Grandma C have been active participants in the abuse allegations. The possibility of hearing from KA by video link was also discussed.  I then ordered as follows:

COURT: ... So it’s further ordered that affidavits or affirmations are to be filed and served by T, KA and Grandma C within the next 14 days.  For the avoidance of doubt, other than that, no further affidavit or affirmations to be filed without leave of the court.  Costs be reserved. …

11.  It is of note that T filed an affirmation and attended the adjourned trial. However, neither KA nor Grandma C filed affidavits/affirmations as ordered and they also chose not to attend the trial in order to be cross examined. Given that I then determined that it would be very hard indeed for the court to place any weight on the affidavit previously filed by KA, and her affidavit was subsequently removed from the pleading bundle.     

12.  In so far as the approach to the trial is concerned however, and as indicated, I intend to deal with this judgment in two halves, dealing first with the allegations of abuse and secondly with the issue of custody care and control and access and the proposed change of residence.    

The issues

13.  For the avoidance of doubt therefore, the first issue is whether or not the mother, her boyfriend T and T’s brother M, physically and mentally abused A. Once that has been determined the court is then asked to consider what orders should be made for custody, care and control and access and whether or not there should be an immediate change of residence?

The law on Fact Finding

14.  In my judgment FCMC 12118 of 2010, Specific Issues, dated the 7 March 2014, I set out the law relating to the standard of proof and the appropriate approach to be taken by a court in a Fact Finding trial. I have therefore taken the liberty of repeating the relevant sections as set out below:

13.  The Family Court does of course follow the civil standard of proof when determining issues of this nature. Thus the court has to decide on the balance of probabilities whether it is more likely than not that these incidences took place.

14.  Counsel for the wife has very helpfully set out the up to date position on the law in his closing submission as follows:

The Burden and Standard of Proof of the Allegation

3     It is trite in our legal system that he who alleges bears the burden of proving his allegation.  There is no exception in the present proceedings although family proceedings are regarded as quasi-inquisitorial.

4     The majority in the United Kingdom House of Lords in Re H & Other (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 held that the civil standard requiring proof on a balance of probabilities continues to apply where, in civil proceedings, an allegation is made of criminal (or similarly serious) misconduct, but explained that such standard is to be applied flexibly, factoring in the inherently greater improbability of serious misconduct as compared with lesser forms of misconduct, therefore requiring the person bearing the burden of proving the allegation to prove it with evidence of a commensurate cogency.

5     This approach was adopted by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Nina Kung v Wong Din Shin (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387 (see para. 181 of the judgment).  Nevertheless, afterall, the civil standard shall still apply while this Court has to bear in mind the seriousness of the misconduct alleged, recognizing that it carries an inherent degree of improbability.

15.  With respect I agree. It is then accepted that the burden of proof lies with the father as he has made the allegations and that given the seriousness of those allegations, he has to prove to a very high standard indeed that what he alleges is infact correct. It follows that he should also provide compelling evidence to support his case that A was abused as claimed.

The law on children’s matters

16.  In so far as the second tranche of the judgment is concerned, the main provisions regarding the law on children’s matters can be found in the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 and the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13. Section 19 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 states that:

(1)   The court may make such order as it thinks fit for the custody and education of any child of the family who is under the age of 18-

(a)   in any proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, before, by or after the final decree;

17.  The general principles governing such applications are set out in section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13, which states that:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

(1)   In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property-

(a)   in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court -

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to -

(A)    the wishes of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B)    any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing;

List of factors

18.  In addition, reference can also be made to the list of factors found in the Children’s Proceedings (Parental Responsibility) Bill. Although this list of factors has yet to find its way into our statute books, I agree as suggested by Ms Irving, that reference may be made to this list and that it may provide helpful guidance in the context of this case. I have reproduced the list below. I should say at the outset that this is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but that it is considered to be a useful guide when considering issues relating to custody, care and control and access and the best interests of children generally.  The checklist states that the following matters should be taken into account by the court when determining matters relating to children:

(a)   the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b)   the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c)   the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

(d)   The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

(e)   The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

(f)    The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

(g)   Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(h)   Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

(i)     How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(j)     (a broader formulation along the lines of) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

(k)   The range of powers available to the court under this Ordinance in the proceedings in question.

(l)     Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.”

Background to the marriage

19.  The mother sets out the background to the party’s relationship and eventual divorce from her perspective in her first affirmation dated the 10 April 2018, when she said inter alia as follows:

Background

3.   Both the Respondent, YKWK (“K”) [the father] and I were born and grew up in the UK.  K is now 40 years old and I am now 38 years old.  We met each other and started our courtship in our 20s.  At that time, both of us were residing in the UK.  In around 2007, K’s employer, L offered him a role in Hong Kong.  I therefore gave up my job in the UK and relocate to Hong Kong with him.  This was also because we had decided on a fresh start after he had been unfaithful to me prior to the relocation decision.  After our relocation, we were lawfully married in Hong Kong on XX October 2008. A was born during our marriage on XX March 2012 and is now almost 6 years old.  After A was born, I took care of her on full-time basis until A was 5 months old.  I then resumed working full-time.  Since that time, K and I have employed a nanny, namely Ms. GL (“L”), [Nanny P] who was initially my confinement nanny, to assist us in taking care of A.  At the beginning, L only assisted K and me in taking care of A during the day time and she would leave after we got home from work.  I would then look after A through the night.  In around mid 2014, L became a live-in nanny and started to work for about 6 days and nights a week at the former matrimonial home, remaining flexible when we needed her.  Despite the subsequent divorce of K and me, L has continued to be A’s nanny under K’s employment and takes a major role in taking care of A when K is at work.

…

5.   In November 2013, K was made redundant in his employment with L.  At the beginning of K’s redundancy, K and I planned to relocate back to the UK with A as our families are there.  I also resigned from my job soon after for the purpose of relocation. However, by that time, we were barely speaking to each other (only basic communications and mostly regarding A) and I felt that our relationship really had come to an end. Therefore, I started to discuss with K about having a divorce around the end of 2013.  K agreed to have a divorce and we also decided to continue to stay in Hong Kong for job opportunities.

6.   Since K intended to rely on his redundancy payoff and the sale proceeds of his property in the UK to start his own business, I believed that K would have more flexible working hours with most of his time spent at home with A, whereas I would have to work normal business hours, and therefore accepted his request that the care and control of A be granted to him with reasonable access to me.

20.  In so far as A’s care is concerned it is clear that following the divorce there were some issues with respect, inter alia, to the choice of primary school, the MMR inoculation booster, Extra Curricular Activities (ECA’s) and the access arrangements, but despite these problems the mother was still able to see A on a reasonably regular basis. Originally she would visit the former matrimonial home on Hong Kong island in the evenings 3 or 4 times per week and she was also involved with A’s evening routine. This changed at the beginning of 2015 and from that time onwards she would have access on some evenings per week when she took A out for dinner. She also saw her for part of the weekends.  In May 2017 the mother moved into a larger apartment and from then on she would generally have staying access with A, each weekend from 11 am on Saturday to around 12 noon on Sunday, in addition to access after school on Wednesday afternoons, when A had a short day. The mother says that this arrangement was not always smooth and that there was some tension with the father and his family. This included her concern that they would accept invitations to birthday parties for A over the weekends and organize other events during her time, cutting short the access period. But notwithstanding this she did continue to see A regularly.

21.  From the father’s perspective he maintains that he was the caretaking parent and that the mother was often absent and disinterested, something that in turn the mother denies. He also maintains that A often did not want to see or to spend time with the mother. Again this is denied by the mother. She says that she has always had a close and involved relationship with her daughter.  

The Fact Finding component

Has the mother, her boyfriend T and T’s brother M abused A?

Background

22.  Following a disagreement concerning the access arrangements over the school Christmas holidays in 2017 the mother received the following letter from the husband’s then solicitors dated the 23 December 2017:

1.   We act for K [the father], the Respondent and given to understand you acted for Madam L, [the mother] the Petitioner.

2.   It is to our client’s total shock that he was recently given to know that A has been repeatedly physically assaulted and mentally abused over a substantial period of time during your client’s access.  In particular:

(a)  A was punched in the chest by your client’s boyfriend in the presence of your client, who failed to take any steps to stop the same, and even approved of such violent act;

(b)  There, vas a humiliating “farting” game whereby your client and her boyfriend would deliberately fart at A’s face;

(c)  Your client’s boyfriend frequently plays violent and disturbing video games that involves shooting of people and animals in A’s presence.  He would then act like he would shoot A, which is extremely distressful to her;

(d) A has been taken to stay overnight at your client’s boyfriend’s residence without our client’s consent, at an address of which our client is not aware of; and

(e)  During your client’s weekly overnight access, A has been left alone repeatedly in the care of helpers without the consent of our client.

(f)  Your client has threatened A that she must keep secret the violent assault mentioned above, namely, the repeated punching, the farting on her face and threatening imitation of shooting at her all of which she has finds immensely distressful, intimidating and disturbing.

3.   The above acts of your client clearly amount to serious physical and psychological abuse, which is absolutely intolerable and unacceptable.  In order to protect A from further abuse and to ensure her safety and well-being, our client hereby suspend all your client’s access to A immediately.

4.   We are instructed that a report of domestic violence has been made to the police and the case is now under investigation.

5.   In the meantime, we are taking instructions to make all necessary applications to the Court for a temporary suspension of all access by your client to A.

23.  The mother did not have access to A over the holiday period as planned. On the 4 January 2018 T was arrested on suspicion that he had assaulted A with “his hands” on “Saturday’s between the 29 April 2017 and the 16 December 2017”. He gave a cautioned statement, as did the mother who did so voluntarily. He was placed on bail for about a year and then released unconditionally. As indicated above this case has now been dropped and there is currently no ongoing investigation. It is of note that A, who was very young at the time, was also interviewed by the Police, seemingly on more than one occasion. 

The father’s case

24.  It is the father’s case, as set out in his 1st affirmation dated the 10 April 2018 that A initially told him, KA and Grandma C about the abuse in the following context:

28. On 13 December 2017, I came home from work and overheard A talking to KA about a secret that she had been asked to keep by E [the mother] and T.  I found it somewhat disconcerting that A has been asked by E to keep a secret and I was concerned as to what the secret was, and what else A had been asked to keep secret.

29. On 13 December 2017, A told KA and me before bed time, that E and T would fart intentionally on her face and that it would smell of rotten eggs.  She told us that the farting would make her sad and angry.  In the same conversation, A told us that T would pretend to shoot her with a remote control and that “it made her feel frustrated angry and sad”.  She said that T would play scary video games in front of her which involved shooting people, animals and walking dolls, and that the games seemed very realistic.  She expressed to us that she felt the game made her feel that the world would end and that “everybody dies”.

30. On16 December 2017, KA, my girlfriend V, my mother, [Grandma C] and I went on holiday to Taiwan. During the trip A told KA and me that she had been called into the principal’s office at school for punching another child.  We explained to A that if you grow up to punch people and as an adult it was a very serious matter, and the police would want to come and speak to you about it.

31. On 19 December 2017, whilst at the airport and travelling back to Hong Kong, A informed KA that on a Saturday, E would take her to stay at T’s house, and that whilst there, T would punch her in the chest with two fists which E would encourage by saying to T, “keep on going” and that she liked it. KA promptly told me what A had said and I immediately went over to console her.  A also informed KA that E told her that the punching game was a secret between mummy, T and A and that “no one could know about it”.

25.  The father repeated these allegations later and added that A also mentioned the following in her Police interview

33. When A was interviewed by the police I was not present in the room, but I was able to observe the interview through a monitor.  It was a very difficult interview to sit through and watch A relate such awful events.  A informed the police that she had been repeatedly punched by T in the chest with two fists and she demonstrated the action to the police.  A said her chest would become sore and red and that E told T to punch her.  A also described to the police how E would take her in a taxi to T’s place and that upon arriving at T’s house, when taking off her shoes, T would start to punch her.  A would then cry and go to the sofa.  T would then come over and start punching her again. During the interview, A informed the police that T has a son called R, who would also be repeatedly punched by T.  A said that both she and R would cry as a result of being punched.  A said that E would also encourage T to punch R and that E enjoyed it.  A and R would then cry together.  The police asked A during the interview what her relationship with E was like and she told them “not good”. The police also asked what her relationship was like with me to which he responded “good”.

26.  It seems that the father believed then and continues to believe now, that what A had told him and allegedly the Police also, was 100% true. He did so notwithstanding the fact that there is little, if any, corroborating evidence to support what A says.

27.  The father added that

45. In and around 16 to 19 March 2018, following the police interview, A told me that on a Wednesday afternoon, E [the mother] would ask P, her nanny, [Nanny P] to go for a walk, leaving her in E’s sole care.  Whilst P was on her walk, E would intentionally fart on her face and that it smelt of rotten eggs and that this made her feel angry.  After farting on her face, E would shout at A and say “I hate you A and tell your dad I hate him too”.  A told me that she was too scared to tell P what had happened in her absence, out of fear that this might get P in trouble with E.  She also told me that she did not want to tell me what had happened, or what E had said, because she did not want to upset me.

46. During A’s bedtime story routine on 20 March 2018, A told KA and me that E would tell A to say goodbye to T and E would shout at her “I hate you A” and then T would order A to “stand up to get ready to be punched”.  T would then hold her tightly to stop her moving and punch her on the chest in front of E.

28.  He then made further allegations against T’s brother M as follows:

54. I also spoke to A about what Ms G [A’s teacher] had told me that morning and A went on to tell me that on Saturdays, whilst at T’s house, M [T’s brother] would take A to the bedroom alone and squeeze A hard around her chest so tight that she would find it hard to breath and shout at her, “I hate you A" and that she felt scared and in danger.  On several other occasions, A said M would take her to T’s room and T would lock her in.  M would physically restrain her with force and T would punch her.  After telling me about these incidents, I broke down in tears and tried to console A as she continued to cry also, while describing these events.  A said E simply stayed outside the bedroom playing on her mobile phone whilst these men attacked her.  After telling me about these incidents, A told me she is very scared of mummy and what she would do to her if she were to see her again.  A told me that it makes her stomach feel sick thinking about it.

…

58. On 7 April 2018, A told me that mummy and T are married, and that A had seen their wedding photo at T’s place and asked her mummy if that was a real wedding dress and her mother had said “Yes”.

29.  The father made a subsequent report to the police about M on the 30 March 2018. He also sent pictures of someone he believed to be M to A’s school with instructions that this person was not to be given access to the school premises. It later transpired that the person in the pictures was not M but a friend of both the mother’s and T, who has been visiting the couple. It was later shown that M was not in Hong Kong at the time of the alleged abuse in any event and that he had not visited Hong Kong since 2016.

30.  Later other allegations were made including further allegations of child abuse. This followed an incident on the 14 April 2018, which ended up with both parties being bound over for 12 months for fighting in a public place.     

The mother’s case

31.  Put simply it is the mother’s case that none of these things ever happened and that they were all made up. Initially she believed that as they arose out of the dispute over Christmas access in 2017, that the father had manufactured the accusations to retaliate and to prevent her from seeing A at that time. However, as this case has developed, she has become more and more convinced that the father has taken these steps to deliberately alienate A from her and to remove her from A’s life completely.   She says that the father is mentally unstable and that he has “lost the plot”. In so far as the first allegations are concerned she pointed out as follows:

22. K [the father] has made various allegations on how he “discovered” the first suspected child abuse on A and made the First Complaint to the Police on 20th December 2017 in paragraphs 31 to 38 of his 1st Affirmation.  Since the First Complaint is currently under police investigation, I have been advised by my criminal litigation lawyer that I should remain silent in respect of K’s allegations.  However, I would like to draw to the Honourable Court’s attention the following issues:-

(i)     I had always been present with A the entire time when T was also present during my access to A.  No criminal activity, ever took place.

(ii)    I believe that K went to Canada for a skiing holiday on his own leaving A behind in Hong Kong in January 2018. If K was so concerned about his discovery of the alleged abuse of A at the end of December 2017, and believed this to be true, he would not have gone on a ski trip leaving A behind in Hong Kong at that critical point in time.

(iii)    T has never been married.  He does not know anyone called “R”.

(iv)   I have never left A to stay overnight at T’s apartment.  Moreover, neither T nor I has/have a domestic helper at home.

(v)   Since the making of the First Complaint by K until now, the date of this affirmation, no charge has been brought against either T or me in respect of the First Complaint.  I have never been arrested by the Police as a result of the First Complaint.

32.  She further denied the allegations concerning M and other spurious allegations made by Grandma C, to her other family members:

49. Since the resumption of the present proceedings, particularly shortly after both K and I were arrested by the Police, C [Grandma C] kept on sending various text and audio messages harassing my mother.  The content of those text and audio messages being that I had gone crazy and I needed to be taken back to the UK, that I am living with two pedophiles, and that T has a 6-year-old son R, and an ex-partner who had committed suicide, and I had allowed my daughter to be raped and beaten.  All these allegations are again untrue and had caused unnecessary distress to my family members. Apart from sending my mother messages, C [Grandma C] sent a text message to me on 7th April 2018 asking me to “leave A alone to a normal child-wood for daughter thankrp l”.  KA even sent text messages and emails to some of my friends claiming that T, M and I were child abusers.  After seeing these messages, I am deeply concerned that what K [the father], C [Grandma C] and KA are doing now is to entirely remove me from A’s life. …

Discussion

33.  The difficulty is that whereas the father has made these complaints there is very little to support them – there is no evidence of any injury; for example, there are no medical reports or photographs to support the allegation that T “punched” A’s chest repeatedly and on various occasions. There is also no subsidiary evidence to support his case. For example, there was nothing to suggest by A’s behavior at school during the initial period of time i.e. from the 29 April 2017 – 16 December 2017, (or indeed during the later period) that she was being abused or ill treated in any way. Further A did not generally resist contact with her mother during this time. There was one conversation with A’s teacher which led to second allegation about M, but that happened after the first allegation had been made. Infact, it seems that if A had not said anything then there would have been very little at all to suggest that anything was wrong. The father did claim that A had said various things to both him, KA and Grandma C and that she had also painted some dark or “black pictures” – but again there is nothing to verify this. It is also of note that none of the said paintings were produced. I can also place no weight on anything allegedly said by KA in this respect. When asked about the pictures in the witness box the father said that he had destroyed them because they were just “weird”.   

34.  It is also of some concern that the father simply seems to have believed everything that A allegedly said to him verbatim, stating continually that his daughter does not/did not lie. With respect it seems to me that this shows a remarkable lack of insight. In my experience, children, like adults lie all of the time and for various reasons, both good and bad. 

35.  My other concern relates to the fact that it subsequently transpired that the father had bought boxing gloves for A because she was taking Kung Fu lessons, so presumably she was aware of the concept of boxing or fighting. I also had an opportunity to view exhibit LEYY 3-3 produced by the mother which shows A “play fighting” with a mutual friend of both parties. The father can be heard commenting in the background. A also got into trouble immediately before the alleged incidents in December 2017 for hitting another child at school. In such circumstances it seems very likely indeed that A was very alive to the concept of both punching and/or fighting. It is also of note that the father did not tell the police about the Kung Fu lessons or the purchase of the boxing gloves.

 The Multi Disciplinary Case Conference

36.  The Multi-Disciplinary Case Conference was held on the 11 May 2018. In the letter from the Social Welfare Department dated the 30 May 2018 the following was reported:

            During the case conference; the multi-disciplinary professionals were concerned about the child’s condition.  After thorough discussion and upon considering all the inter-playing factors, members understood that the child had revealed something that made her distressed / scared, but the occurrence of child abuse could NOT be verified and established.

Considering the highly conflicting family condition, members of the case conference have formulated the following welfare plan:

a.  The parents should receive counselling and supportive services on co-parenting;

b. The school will work closely with parents continuously to ensure A’s study and proper development; and

c.  A should continue to attend play therapy and may need to receive psychological services concerning the parental conflict at a later stage.

The Psychologist Report on the child by Ms L dated 13 June 2018

37.  Ms. L produced a very comprehensive report. She was also a very impressive witness. She visited the homes of the mother, the father and T. Consequently, she was quickly able to establish that what A had said about T’s house did not appear, on the face of it, to be correct. I do not wish to repeat the whole of her interview/s with A, but it seems to me that the following paragraph, in particular, was very insightful:

93. I told her I went to Mr. A’s[T’s] house because I had to see it. She was a bit surprised.  She asked if I went in and I said yes. She asked how? I said I told him I had to see it. I asked her to guess what I saw and she said boxing gloves.  I said no, I saw a lot of games. Mr. A said she used to love playing Twister and that she was very good at it because she is very flexible.  She nodded her head.  I told her I saw that there was only 1 room and no bunkbed to which she replied ‘oopsy’ and avoid eye contact by looking down at the puzzle.

94. I explained that my job was not to get her into trouble. She may get confused if people ask her too many questions.  It was obvious that she didn’t want to talk about it and changed the subject.

38.  Although the father tried to undermine Ms L’s assessment of the situation by suggesting that T had had time to change the furniture and the layout of his flat, it seems to me that it is much more likely that A initially told an untruth and then elaborated on that untruth and has subsequently been found out. There may have been many and various reasons for this.

39.  In conclusion Ms. L said as follows:

Conclusion

189.  In order to assess a child’s psychological state, one needs to consider the developmental factor and temperament of the child.  From my interviews with A, I did not see signs of reactive attachment disorder (markedly disturbed and developmentally inappropriate social relatedness in most context) or separation anxiety disorder (excessive anxiety concerning separation from whom the child is attached) or oppositional defiant disorder.

190.  From the timeline, it seems that something must have happened in early December and during their Taiwan trip-that seemed to be the turning point.  It was also clear that KA had been portrayed as the surrogate mother and the conflict between KA and Madam L [the mother] intensified as KA increasingly became involved in the decision making of A’s daily life, health care decisions and holiday arrangements.

191.  Parental indoctrination can be subtle and effective, especially on young children or done repeatedly.  According to Dr. W, children can be programmed against a targeted parent by a parent, by using subliminal suggestions, such as “Your mum not much fun, is she?”, “Your mum didn’t’ call you, did she?” “We had a great time in Spain, didn’t we?”

192.  The indoctrination process can be both a conscious effort or an unconscious occurrence.  A parent or carer could alienate a child by portraying the targeted parent as a diabolical creature or an abuser. An angry or anxious parent or carer could also project his or her anxiety or anger toward the targeted parent, so the child would want to avoid the targeted parent and feel the need of protection of the favourable parent.

193.  Because of an unfounded and bizarre allegation, Madam L [the mother] is now being portrayed as a dangerous and unworthy mother, as a result, A loses one of the most important relationships in her life.  A is also at risk of experiencing anxiety and depression later on in life, as she would develop this belief that she had been abused by her own mother.

She further stated in answer to a question from the father that she didn’t believe that the abuse was true.

40.  Ms. L also recommended that there be a psychological assessment of the father. She further reiterated her concerns about some of the father’s behaviours and those of his family:

177.  Mr. U [the father] seemed to be on a journey to prove that all professionals are wrong, unless they agreed with him about the child abuse and that he and his sister are the only two that know the truth, and they must defend A from harm.  He demonstrates Crusade-like Behaviours and suggest that no one cares for A to the extends that his sister and himself do. He could not entertain the possibility that he could be wrong, despite the fact that there has been significant inconsistencies in the allegation.  He seems to have lost the ability to be rational, which is the biggest red flag, not only for A to have any relationship with her mother or her mother’s family, but also, A would start to believe in all those allegations that seemed impossible to prove.

178.  During the course of the interview, it is evidenced that Madam L [the mother] and A used to have a close relationship. It is also evidenced that the parenting styles and values of the two parents are extremely different. As A is getting older, the conflict between the parents intensified over schooling, diet, activities, holidays, and how they should spend time with A.

179.  As Madam L, was becoming financially stable and able to afford a home for A and herself, she is now able to work flexible hours (verified by the HR department).  She is obviously trying to exercise her parental rights more than before, and that seemed to create a lot of conflict between the parents since the beginning of the school year, especially prior to Christmas.

180.  As a child therapist; I will always listen to both sides of the·story, even when I work with children that have been abused.  I also work in a number of schools, so I deal with allegations from bullying to physical abuse on a daily basis, and when a child tells me their side of the “facts”.  By the time I interview the different parties involved, I usually get a very different story.  The child is not necessarily intentionally lying, but the child only focuses on his or her limited perspective and or not wanting to get in trouble.

181. During the last interview, it was clear that A was trying to suppress any positive feelings toward her maternal grandmother.  She remembered the fun they used to have but reminded herself that she only wanted to stay with her daddy and not her mummy.

182.  I am deeply concerned that Mr. U [the father] and KA are so certain about the child abuse and sexual abuse that there won’t be any chance of A to have any relationship with her mother and that A would start to believe that she had been abused physically, emotionally, verbally and maybe sexual, given she is so vulnerable to suggestions.

183.  Mr. U was cost conscious, hence he had not made any further interview appointments, apart from the first one.  I knew that he was not happy with the police investigation; however, he seemed to escalate the allegations of sexual abuse and, on a couple of occasions last week, he asked if I felt comfortable to send a raped victim to the rapist.

184.  This is deeply concerning, as it is clear to me that Madam L and Mr. A had already been demonized to the point that it was hard for A, to accept the good relationship that she had once had with her own mother and maternal grandparents.

185.  It seemed to me that, no matter what police investigation results were, Mr. U had already made up his mind to stop A from having any future relationship with her mother; he wanted her to be deemed as an unfit mother and for Mr. A to be deemed as an abuser.

186.  I am concern of Mr. U’s sharp vicissitude of accusation and thoughts about the potential sexual abuse, where these would lead and how A would be affected by these unjustified fears.

I accept what Ms. L has said in her report as confirmed by her in the witness box and in particular her assessment of the situation as set out above.   

The Psychologists reports on the parents

41.  JB PhD produced a psychological report on both of the parents. In his report on the father dated the 18 August 2018 he described the father’s mental status as follows:

Mental Status:

K [the father] was oriented to person, place, and time.  His memory and concentration were within normal limits. His speech and thought were impaired, as evidenced by tangential, disorganized and magical thinking, and marked difficultly and resistance to taking the perspective of others.  His event memory appeared appropriate. His fund of knowledge seemed limited, especially in his understanding of child development. K’s intellect appeared average.  His insight and judgment appeared impaired, as evidenced by his difficulty in considering alternative interpretations/hypotheticals to his present situation insistence that his perspective was the only one that could possibly be accurate, and belief that only he could heal the wounds resultant from the current litigation.  His mood was anxious during this evaluation and he displayed a restricted range of spontaneous affect.

42.  In his Discussion and Recommendations, he added that:

K found itdifficultto consider a situation in which the child’s visitation with her mother was unsupervised. He ultimately acknowledged that such an order is within the realm of possibilities.  Althoughit appeared that he would be compliant with such a court order, it did not appear that he could be openly cooperative.  Rather, he would tend to interpret an order that is not in complete alignment with his beliefs in his own terms, and actaccordingly. Therefore, it seems necessary that any order for cooperative parenting needs to state explicitly the terms for communication, visitation, and exchange of residence between the parents.

K’s psychological condition is stable and resistant to therapeutic intervention.  Indeed, K saw no need for personal psychotherapy and is not amenable for such treatment.  He did state that he is willing to attend co-parenting courses.  He stated that he has not attended any such course in the past.  He also stated that he is willing to attend courses in child development.

This will be discussed in more detail below. However, from the point of view of the Fact Finding aspect of this case, it is of note that Dr B’s findings were congruent with those of Ms L. 

T’s evidence

43.  As the criminal case was no longer pending, it seemed to me that it was important that T, who was at the centre of the allegations of abuse, should have an opportunity to give evidence. Consequently, he filed an affirmation on the 14 August 2019 and came to court to give evidence on the 16 October 2019. I found him to be a wholly credible witness. I have no doubt at all that this has been a terrible ordeal for him, but notwithstanding that he was both measured and calm in the witness box and able to deal with the allegations in a rational manner. In his affirmation he stated as follows:

7.   All K’s [the father’s] abuse allegations in his 1st and 3rd Affirmations against E [the mother], ‘M” [T’s brother] and/or me are entirely untrue and unfounded. I wish to take this opportunityֹto confirm the following facts with this Honourable Court by way of an Affirmation, if this would help this Honourable Court to make a determination on the fact-finding in respect of K’s false abuse allegations:-

(i) I strongly deny that E, ‘M” and/or I have ever abused A, including punching A, or by way of all the other abuse allegations put forward by K [the father], his sister, Ms. U, KLK (“K”) [KA] and his mother, Ms. SHCU (“C”) [Grandma C].

(ii) I do not have a son, and do not know anyone called ‘R’.

(iii) I have no helper, and do not know anyone named ‘RO’.

(iv) It is untrue that E and I had an affair in 2012 as reported by K in L’s (Ms. L’s) report. I live in a one-bedroom flat.  I have never lived in a two-bedroom flat with a bunk bed in Hong Kong, as alleged by K.

(v) A has always been accompanied by E (the mother) in my presence, and A has never cried in my presence.

(vi) I have never played any violent video or any shooting games with or in front of A, particularly I have never pretended to shoot A with a remote control as alleged by K and KA. I have also never farted in A’s face.

(vii) My brother, MGA (“M”), was not in Hong Kong at any time in 2017.  In other words, he was absent from Hong Kong during the period of the alleged abuse.  His travel itinerary for his last visit to Hong Kong was produced to Ms. L (“L”) when she visited my flat at ABC and has now been produced to Her Honour Judge Melloy as an exhibit fromַ E.

(viii) I have never accompanied A during her yearly trips with E to visit their family members in London, nor travelled with A and E on a flight from London to Hong Kong.

(ix) I have always had a good relationship with A, witnessed by many friends.  The last time I saw A in December 2017 when we took her along to a pre-Christmas dinner at a friend’s apartment, as the couple have a dog and A is very fond of animals.  They, as well as other friends are witnesses to the good relationship we had.

(x) The picture of ‘M’ produced by K is not of my brother.  He is a friend of mine who was at my apartment for dinner, along with his girlfriend, who are both witnesses to the good relationship A had with me.  I cannot disclose anything further in detail in relation to my said friend and his girlfriend, as I·ֹverily believe that K and/or KA will very likely take any new information to the Police and make further complaints and accusations, and embellish the abuse claims against me and/or my friend.  I have to prevent K from causing any nuisance to my friend and his girlfriend, which he has already done to my brother by making false accusations against him.

(xi) I have never been present during E’s interim access on 24th March 2018, 28th March 2018 and 14th April 2018, and I have never intended to be present during such access, at such a sensitive time in A’s life.

8.  I found K’s and KA’s allegations are beyond absurd, but terrifying nonetheless.  I am 6 feet 2 inches, and fit.  If I had repeatedly punched A in the chest once a week over 9 months as alleged by K, she would have been dead.  If I had punched her even once, she would have had broken bones, let alone ‘soreness and redness’ as alleged by K in paragraph 33 of his 1st Affirmation.

44.  T also confirmed that he was willing and prepared to let A’s therapist take the lead, in so far as reintroducing him into her life was concerned and rebuilding their relationship. He said that they had had a good relationship previously. 

I accept what he says in this respect.

M

45.  As set out above, other terrible allegations were made against T’s brother, M. I accept that M was not even in Hong Kong at the time of the alleged incidents given that the mother was able to show that he had not been in Hong Kong since 2016 and that the photographs, allegedly of M, which were also given to the school, L and others, were of someone else entirely. The father’s behavior in this regard and that of KA and Grandma C was with respect quite extraordinary.      

Conclusion

46.  In conclusion then, and on the balance of probabilities, I find that the allegations made by the father against both the mother, T and M to be without any proper foundation. In laymen’s terms I accept that the alleged abuse did not take place and I will consider the other outstanding issues on that premise.

What orders should the court now make for custody, care and control and access? In particular, should there be an immediate change of residence?

 Introduction

47.  The parties currently have joint custody, with care and control to the father and reasonable access to the mother, by virtue of the court order dated the 20 April 2015. This order also contained the father’s undertaking to maintain and support A until she reaches the age of 18 years or ceases full time education. Originally the mother issued a summons on the 9 February 2018 seeking, inter alia, interim defined access pending the outcome of the police investigation into the alleged abuse of A. As indicated above, on the 10 September 2018 the mother subsequently amended her summons. She currently seeks sole custody and care and control of A with defined access to the father, such access to be supervised until the father has received appropriate therapy/treatment and Dr. B has assessed that unsupervised access might be appropriate.

48.  It is of note that the mother believes that A is now at risk of continued emotional and psychological harm and she further believes that this is likely to continue for as long as A continues to live with the father and his family. She is proposing a change of residence, so that A can have appropriate therapy. She is not proposing that A be removed from the father’s life completely but she does suggest that there be a period of time when A does not see the father or his family, in order that the therapy has a chance of commencing and hopefully succeeding. She says that she is the parent who is best able to support A having a relationship with both of her parents. The father for his part wishes the status quo to be maintained and for A to continue to live with him, Grandma C and Nanny P and for A to have access to her mother in a “safe environment”. When asked in the witness box he made no suggestions on how A’s relationship with her mother might be developed in the longer term, although he did say that he would support A eventually having a relationship with her mother. He also said that he was willing to accept continued supervised access at the PCCC.  

The litigation and other incidences that occurred during the litigation process

49.  In addition to the allegations of abuse the following is also of note:

a)  On the 8 January 2018 the father sent A’s school photographs of the mother, T and someone who they thought might be M and made various allegations against them.

b)  KA wrote a number of letters to the school in which she discussed with them inter alia how to block the mother from the school communications tools, SS and V. It is of note that the mother was unilaterally removed from these and KA and the father’s girlfriend V were added. 

c)  The father moved to live in Sai Kung with A and his other family members following the alleged incidents, in February 2018.  He did not inform the mother of this or provide her with the address or other contact information.

d)  Notwithstanding the court’s order on the 21 March 2018 for interim access namely that the mother should have unsupervised access on Wednesday afternoons in Sai Kung for 4 ½ hours and supervised access for the whole day on Saturday’s, A only saw her mother on three occasions namely on the 24 March, 28 March and 14 April 2018. It is of note that she had not seen her mother for nearly 4 months at that point. There were difficulties on each occasion emanating from the fact that the father did not agree that any access should be unsupervised and as a result he orchestrated his own attendance at those sessions. In addition, on the 24 March 2019 A attended access and was found to be wearing a yellow paper triangle on a black cord around her neck. She told her mother that it was to “keep away the bad stuff” presumably whilst she was at the mother’s house. In the witness box the father said that this was a “lucky charm”. On the 14 April 2018, during the Saturday access, immediately after the Easter school holiday, when no access had been allowed given that the court order referred to access during term time, an incident ensued between the mother, the father and KA. The mother produced a video clip taken shortly before this unfortunate event, from her phone, which shows a very unhappy A refusing to go to her mother’s apartment. Both mother and father were charged with fighting in a public place and on the 5 June 2018 they were both bound over for 12 months.  It seems that during this fracas, which was witnessed by A, the father and KA both accused the mother and T of being pedophiles and child abusers. Notwithstanding this the father wrote to the school and told them that the mother had been arrested on that day for child abuse and was on bail. This was a deliberate lie on his part. A was also taken to hospital following this incident and she remained there for 9 days.       

e)  The mother did not have access to A from the 14 April 2018 until the court order in March 2019. 

f)  The father unilaterally appointed a play therapist for A, Ms SM. This was not done with the mother’s permission. Difficulties then ensued. It seems that Ms SM was appointed on the premise that the alleged abuse had taken place. It is also of note that Ms SM’s did not liaise with the mother. On the 19 June 2018 I ordered that this therapy cease forthwith. In doing so I accepted Ms L’s assessment that this could be very damaging for the child, if the abuse had not taken place as claimed. There was some confusion during the trial about the number of therapy sessions attended by A, with it initially being suggested that she had had 17 play therapy sessions. Although this was not proven it was clear that she had attended a significant number of sessions with Ms. SM prior to the order of the 19 June.

g)  Further problems then ensued with respect to the appointment of a therapist, to provide A with intensive (and independent) therapy for herself. Eventually this led to the hearing of the 19 October 2018 and the subsequent Ruling dated the 2 November 2018. Reference may be made to that Ruling as appropriate. In conclusion I said as follows:

Decision

12.  Consequently and for the avoidance of doubt, order 4 contained in the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged. It is further directed that A shall commence therapy with Dr A immediately and for 120 minutes per week. This is not currently in anticipation of intensive family therapy or indeed reunification therapy. A copy of this Ruling is to be provided to Dr A and as indicated during the hearing a penal notice shall be endorsed. Thus an order shall be made as follows:

1.     The Respondent [father] shall take or arrange his agent to take the child of the family, namely U, AV, a girl born on 3rd March 2012 (“A”), to attend the intensive therapy sessions, for 120 minutes per week with the jointly appointed child psychologist, Dr. A O-V pursuant to paragraphs 3 of the Order dated 19th June 2018. For the avoidance of doubt the cost of those sessions shall be split between the parties equally.

2.     Order 4 of the court order dated the 19 June 2018 shall be discharged.

3.     A penal notice be endorsed on this order and personal service of the Order be dispensed with.

h)  In a nut shell although the court had ordered that A should receive intensive therapy and eventually also ordered, in the absence of agreement between the parties, that Dr O-V be appointed for that purpose, the father did not co operate with that appointment. He was clearly very unhappy indeed at the approach taken by Dr OV, which he said was more in the nature of an investigation. He also rejected any notion that the underlying reason for the therapy was to mend the relationship between mother and child; he was certainly opposed to the concept of “reunification” therapy. Although he agreed to give permission for Dr OV to communicate with the school counselor, he did not follow through with this. He objected to Dr OV reading into the case, even though I had directed that she be provided with all of the pleadings and reports to date. He also insisted that a third party sit in on the sessions, namely Grandma C, even though Dr OV made it clear that she could not work properly in that environment as she was unable to form an appropriate therapeutic relationship with A. There were also other difficulties, including the father cancelling appointments at short notice and ultimately stopping all sessions at all prior to the hearing in October 2018. He then informed Dr OV of the outcome of that hearing BEFORE I had handed down my Ruling. Ultimately Dr OV resigned not once but twice, stating finally on the 5 February 2019 as follows:

To Whom It May Concern,

It has come to my attention that the following incidences have taken place:

·    A parental party is not in agreement with interventions being conducted by myself (Dr. A OV). This includes any interaction and the forms of therapeutic approaches considered necessary and relevant.

·    A parental party is breaching confidentiality and has requested confidential notes and records (between therapist and other parties).  This is despite both parents’ written consent for liaising with relevant parties (such as school or other parent) when clinically necessary.

·    This also includes the request of information about other (non-relevant) parties attending school and SPOT.

·    Intentional obstruction of information important to support child clinically.

·    Improper boundaries and coaching to child in order to keep child from divulging information and develop therapeutic rapport.

·    Threatened or insinuated litigious actions against therapists.

·    Repeated bounced checks, missed payments and missed sessions - causing a substantial bourdon on our administrative staff.

Considering the above, it is concluded that therapy may be counter productive given that said actions can:

·    potentially create a rift between the child, parents and therapists

·    perpetuate unhelpful polarisation of caregiver roles

·    place child in unstable position to have to choose parties to trust

·    cause pervasive and long term negative consequences with respect to the healthy development of child’s sense of self, and relationships and undermine their need for stability.

While it is still strongly advised that the child and caregivers seek therapeutic support, current circumstances impede therapeutic success and are believed to be further damaging at this time.

…

i)    Dr. OV later confirmed, on the 5 March 2019, that the parental party in question was the father. She said that she could not resume therapy because this placed A in a detrimental position and that:

My hope is that this termination of services will somehow aid in the court’s understanding of the family dynamics, necessity in future treatment, and aid in the decision regarding parental access/custody.

j)    As indicated above, there were also other concerns including the fact that the school removed the mother from two web sites, one called SS, where a parent is able leave messages for their child and to comment on their child’s work etc and the other called V. This was done at the request of the father and KA. It is of note that KA was then nominated to be the contact person in lieu of the mother. It seems that the school concurred because the father was the parent with care and control.

k)    There have also been other issues concerning both KA and Grandma C and their inappropriate involvement in this litigation and the care of A. This includes KA’s correspondence with the school and communications sent to other family friends and acquaintances in which all manner of accusations are made against the mother, T and M, without any proper foundation.     

Each party’s’ proposals

The mother’s proposals

50.  It is now the mother’s case that the father has deliberately sought to remove her from A’s life and that he has also tried to alienate A from her. She asks that A be immediately returned to her full time care. She says that although she is currently living with T, that the intention is that she will return to live in her own flat on Hong Kong Island and that A will live with her and continue to attend the Hong Kong Academy in Sai Kung. She will not cohabit with T in the short term. This will however, mean that A will need to take a long commute to school. The mother has checked this and has confirmed that school buses are available. A will be dropped back at Happy Valley at about 4:30 pm each day. The mother will continue to work in the Hopewell Centre on Hong Kong Island and she intends to live in Happy Valley. Her company is aware of her situation they have indicated that she will also be able to work from home on occasions. The mother works in internal communications. She also acknowledges that she will need to employ at least a part time helper to help take care of A in the period between A returning from school and the end of the mother’s normal working day at about 5:15 pm. In her affidavit she also said that her father and possibly her mother would also be able to come to Hong Kong in order to assist with the care of A in the short term. She also wishes A to have therapy and that this be supported by a specialized therapist in alienation cases. She proposes that A work with a therapist from the Family Separation Clinic in the UK, together with a therapist in Hong Kong. She says that she will need some financial assistance from the father and that if necessary she will make a further application for that support.      

The father’s proposals

51.  The father for his part proposes a continuation of the status quo. He says that A should continue to live with him in Sai Kung, which is very close to the school. He is now working full time, but he will continue to be assisted by both Grandma C and Nanny P, who has helped to take care of A since she was born. He says that he does not oppose A seeing her mother in a safe environment namely the PCCC. He does not appear to be able to contemplate the possibility of any other outcome.

52.  As indicated above I heard from both of the parties in the witness box, together with Ms L, Dr JB, the Social Welfare Officer Ms. YHM, the mother’s sister, Ms MYLL and T. Although the court directed that both Grandma C and KA attend the trial in order to be cross examined, as I have already explained they did not do so. In addition, I have been greatly assisted by a report filed by the Official Solicitor, who also represented A at the trial.   

The reports

The Social Welfare Report

53.  It is trite but worth repeating that recommendations made to the court in social welfare reports although not binding are generally considered to be persuasive. The reports are said to be the “eyes” and “ears” of the court. In this instance the Social Welfare Report was filed on the 5 June 2018 before the Mother filed her amended summons. At that stage the focus was on the resumption of access only and to that end the Social Welfare Officer recommended as follows:

Remarks and Recommendation

29.  The information gathered revealed that the mother used to have regular access to the girl after divorce but the access was suspended since December 2017 owing to the alleged abusive incidents.  The patents’ distrustful relationship and ineffective communication further complicated the situation.  Nevertheless, it should not be arguable that the child, for her best interest, has to maintain stable and positive contacts with both parents, and hence the access with the mother is suggested to be resumed judging from previous smooth interaction with the mother and without the presence of her boyfriend or other related persons who were viewed as a threat towards the girl.  Since the girl appeared to be trapped by the alleged abusive incidents, though could not be verified of the actual happening according to the conclusion from the member of MDCC, special attentions have to be paid onto the girl’s emotional condition and her readiness to have access resumption. The assessment and advice from the private clinical psychologist on the child become crucial in the access planning.  Although the report is not yet available upon the submission·of this report, it is good that the mother was willing and ready to follow the girl’s pace and the advice from the clinical psychologist in the future access arrangement.  Co-parenting counseling may also be beneficial for both parents to help them work together constructively and communicate effectively with the ultimate goal to protect and improve their child’s well-being.

It is of note that the father did not allow A to be interviewed with her mother for that report.

54.  Although the Ms. Y confirmed in the witness box that she had seen the MDCC report and on that basis she was inclined to believe that the alleged abuse had not taken place she was not really in a position to take the matter very much further forward.  However, she did confirm that A had given her some photographs and that at the time she had been concerned that the child had been told what to say to her about those photographs – in other words that A had been coached. She reiterated that at that early stage the father remained opposed to access. She had also spoken to the school counselor who had reported to her as follows:

15.  At present, A was studying K3 in Hong Kong Academy.  She had whole day school, except Wednesday with morning session only.  She also had a private Ballet Class at 9:00 a.m. for 45 minutes in every Saturday in Happy Valley.  Ms. C N, [C] counsellor of the girl’s school commented the good performance of the girl at school in all aspects.  The girl was articulated and could well express herself.  Her school attendance was stable in the past but had certain days of absence in recent two months saying for her hospitalization to investigate the alleged suspected abuse incident happened in April and meeting with the private clinical psychologist etc..  Learning that the girl was facing a difficult moment of the family change, C said the school has offered the girl support and counseling.  Both parents were also invited to involve in the counselling process and they gave active response on it.  To show support to the girl, C also met A before and after the access on 28.3.2018, the first access after school after three months. When she met the girl on 29.3.2018, the girl expressed her happiness to meet the mother again and exhibited no emotional distress for the access arrangement. Besides, owing to the alleged suspected child abuse, incidents reported by the father, the school also arranged play therapy for the girl.  No abnormality or emotional distress of the girl was detected so far.

55.  I agreed that a further updated Social Welfare Report would not be necessary given the fact that the court had also been assisted by the filing of Ms L’s report, Dr B’s reports and the Official Solicitor’s report. There was also a concern that A was being over interviewed and that this was likely to do more harm than good at this stage.

Ms L’s report

56.  As I have said previously Ms L filed a very comprehensive and useful report. I largely accepted the recommendations that were made and I attempted to put some of these into effect prior to the trial. Ms L also explained in the witness box why she had approached A as if the allegations of abuse were true. This is also set out in Ms Irving’s closing submission as follows:

81. Ms. L explained in her evidence why she would ask the Mother to say to A that T would never punch her again (with reference to paras 100 and 170 of her report) and said;

“It is easier for children of A’s age - once they are caught lying, they would defend themselves) so if you go along with their story.”

82. She was asked about the damage that can be cause to children from the situation that A is in;

Q   Can you explain when you talk about damage can be caused to children if they are allowed to believe in these things, what are the long-term ramifications for a child in A’s position with these influences?

A    A lot of conflicting information in her head, what is happening, Children need to be able to trust their parents, very hard for her to trust either of them.

Father is obviously telling her she cannot trust Mother; there’s a conflict for her

Q   Any in1pact on her psychological well-being?

A    She won’t be able to trust her own judgment, very hard for her.

83. Ms. L was asked by the Official Solicitor about therapy; the length and frequency of sessions.  She said:

“I still believe she needs intensive therapy (just for herself, with no obstruction) – from my experiences, needs 4-5 sessions to build up, a total at least 20 sessions.”

84. Asked by the Judge if that would be “weekly/ bi-weekly/ monthly” she answered “Weekly is ideal.  Monthly would be too long a gap”.

85. Ms. L also confirmed, to the Official Solicitor’s question, that A should re-establish her relationship with T.

57.  Ms. L was also concerned about Ms SM and the fact that she had seen A without any input from the mother. She was of the view that this was very bad practice and that A may have been receiving therapy that was not appropriate for her. For the avoidance of doubt I accept what she says in this respect. It was for this reason that she decided not to interview Ms SM. Again I accept her reasoning on this point.

58.  In addition, Ms. L was very concerned about the psychological effect on A going forward in the event that the allegations were found to be false. Dr B agreed with her on this point in the witness box.

59.  When asked by the Official Solicitor Ms L said that she thought A would probably need one therapy session a week for the next 6 months or so – i.e. about 25 sessions in total. She did not think it was a good idea for the mother to employ Nanny P, even if that was an option.        

Dr B’s reports

60.  Again, as indicated above Dr B filed a psychological evaluation on both parents dated the 8 July 2018 (for the mother) and the 16 August 2018 (for the father). He found the mother to have an adjustment disorder with disturbed emotions that had arisen as a direct result of these proceedings. He also said that her prognosis was good.

61.  However, Dr B was concerned about the father’s emotional and psychological state, and as set out in paragraphs 41 and 42 above and noted in particular his inability to view a situation from any other perspective other than his own and to interpret any court order from that perspective. Ms Irving says that this is exactly what has happened during this litigation:

96. While this was said by Dr. B more than a year ago, this has been exactly what has been seen in the Father’s conduct during the entirety of this litigation.  It was clear beyond peradventure that the Father has acted exactly as he chose to and to ignore the Orders made in this Court.  That can be seen in his approach to therapy with Dr. O-V, starting with refusing to cooperate with her appointment, including telling her not to read documents the Court ordered she be provided with, insisting grandma be present, and in his repeated cancellation of sessions followed by telling the therapist she was not doing her job right. It can also be seen in him deciding to impose supervision on access, in his refusal to consent to the school speaking to the therapist in spite of having told the Court he would agree; and thereafter it could be seen in his continued refusal to produce all the correspondence between him and A’s school that he was ordered to produce. The list of examples is long.

With respect I agree with this assessment of the situation. Dr B confirmed that in his view it would be very difficult indeed for the mother to co parent with the father, mainly because the father would always believe that he was 100% correct in everything that he thought and did with respect to A.  

62.  During his cross examination Dr B also confirmed that “personality” or “character” is generally considered to be hard if not impossible to change, whereas emotions or mood are more susceptible to therapeutic intervention. He confirmed that placing A in her mother’s care would not pose any risks to A.   

The Official Solicitor’s report

63.  The Official Solicitor filed a very detailed and helpful report dated the 19 March 2019. In preparing this report Ms Ip also had sight of the other reports referred to above and she interviewed A.

64.  Ms. Ip was very concerned that A should have intensive therapy as recommended by Ms L and in that context she recommended as follows:

Intensive Therapy

87. It is of great concern that A is in urgent need of Intensive Therapy as recommended by L in her Psychological Report on A.

88. However, disregarding professional advices and Orders of the Court, the Father failed to recognize the importance of having A to receive prompt and continuous psychiatric therapy and also fails to exercise sensible decision to facilitate the Intensive Therapy, which is detrimental to the interest of A.

89. Dr. B is of the view that the Father's level of reflection on himself, the current situation and evaluations is limited.  In parenting, his perspective is enabled by a very-limited understanding of child development.  The Father would tend to interpret an order that is not in complete alignment with his beliefs in his own terms, and act accordingly.

90, It appears that the ability of the Father to reach any rational accord in respect of the Intensive Therapy is so deeply undermined that to compel attempts at cooperation will not protect the interests of the A but only leave her more vulnerable. The Father was also preoccupied with feeling of hatred and antagonism against the Mother that he has overlooked the welfare of A.

91. As Dr. A has terminated the services to A, the Mother has proposed an alternative therapist, Ms. KR from Jadis Blurton Family Development Center for A, pending the Father’s reply.

92. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration, it is necessary to monitor the progress of the Intensive Therapy to be resumed, the Father’s demeanors in this respect and its possible impact on A.  We also suggested inviting Dr. A to provide a synopsis on the therapy she has given to A.

93. We make the observation that unless there is substantial progress in the Intensive Therapy, with positive support and facilitation on the part of the Father; consideration should be given to assess whether the Father is indeed a suitable caretaker of A.

94. A transfer of residence is a serious matter and will undoubtedly upset A.  However, if such need is apparent in this case, it appears that it is in the interest of A for her to be removed from the Father’s influence and control.  Subject to the assessment and recommendation by the child psychologist, it may be appropriate for the interim care and control of A be granted to the Mother in order to enable A to receive prompt and continuous Intensive Therapy.

95. In the event that interim care and control of A is granted to the Mother, it is further suggested that the access by the Father should be supervised by a Social Welfare to safeguard against the Father’s incongruous influence on A, and to avoid A being caught again in between the disputes of the parties.

As will be seen I largely agree with these observations.

Discussion

65.  I accept that in the context of this case that it would be helpful to go through the list of factors as set out in paragraph 15 above, when considering what would be in the best interests of A going forward. This was helpfully also considered by both Ms Ip, in the Official Solicitor’s report and Ms Irving in the closing submission for the mother.

a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

66.  A has stated to everyone who has asked i.e. the Social Welfare Officer, Ms L and Ms Ip that she wishes to live with her father. I tend to accept however that little weight can be placed on those views given her tender age and the fact that I accept that her relationship with the mother has been seriously undermined by the father and his family. Ms Ip puts it thus

67. Although the views of the child will be taken into account, the weight to be placed on the child’s expressed wishes will depend very much on the age of the child and her level of maturity.  In light of the age of A, she is still far from the level of understanding and deciding what is in her best interest, in particular in the present case, in maintaining a personal relationship with both of her parents.

With respect I agree.

b) the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

67.  At present it seems that Nanny P is largely responsible for A’s physical needs, with the assistance of Grandma C, when she is in Hong Kong, and the father. The father has also taken over almost sole responsibility for A’ educational needs, although this was arguably done without the mother’s consent. From an emotional perspective however I accept that it cannot be in A’s best interest for her not to have a proper relationship with her mother. I also accept that the father’s own behaviour is a matter of some concern in this respect and that he is currently unable to meet all of A’s emotional needs including her need to have a relationship with her mother.   

68.  Ms. Irving summarizes the situation as follows in her closing submission:

147.  A needs stability with a rational parent.  She needs not to be manipulated into believing that she has been abused. She needs therapy.  She needs a proper relationship with her mother and her maternal family.  None of these things are available should she remain living with her father.

I agree. 

c) the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

69.  A’s relationship with her mother and her maternal family was interrupted. It is now important that it be fully restored. I also accept that A’s relationship with her father and KA and Grandma C is unlikely to be a healthy one and that in all probability it has had a damaging effect on her. It is also though acknowledged that notwithstanding this A has a seemingly close emotional bond with her father, KA, Grandma C and Nanny P, who has cared for her since she was a baby.   

d) The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

70.  Although ultimately it is accepted that a change of circumstance will be good for both A and the mother and T, in the short term it is accepted that changing the status quo and moving A to live with her mother is likely to be very challenging and difficult for her.

e) The child’s age, maturity, sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

71.  A has just turned 8 years of age. She is an Asian child, born of Asian parents who were brought up in the United Kingdom. Ms Ip, the Official Solicitor said the following of her:

66. A is now 7 years old.  She is observed to be polite, happy and responsive.  She is forthcoming and spontaneous when expressing her views, but somehow her recollection of some past events/incidents was fragmentary and uncertain.  She appears to be in good mood and relaxed during the whole interview; and has not exhibited any fear or anxiety even when she mentions what the Mother and/or T had done to her in the past.

…

68. A is now primarily in the care of the Father with the assistance of Nanny P.  As the Father is in full-time employment, A is mainly looked after by Nanny P.  While the Grandma is more or less a companion rather than an independent hands-on carer. It is observed that A has a good relationship with the Father, Grandma and Aunt.

69. On the other hand, A has shown aloofness and rejection towards the Mother.  Apparently, her negative feelings on the Mother is largely due to the Allegations.

I accept this to be the case.

f)  The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

72.  As indicated above, this is probably the central difficulty in this case. Although I have no doubt that the father, and his other family members, love A very much, the fact that he has believed everything that A has said about the allegations, has ultimately proved to be extremely damaging for her, as it has deprived her of her relationship with her mother and other maternal relatives for approximately two years. This is a very long time for such a young child. Putting it as neutrally as possible, Dr B said that the father had a “very limited understanding of child development”. I accept that to be the case. I also accept that given the father’s character it is very unlikely indeed that he will accept this analysis, or the damaging effect that it has had on A.

73.  The other difficulty is that the father has shown that he is not willing to support a therapeutic intervention for A, unless it is done on his terms. It is also unlikely that he will support any therapy that will be focused on reunification with the mother and her family and ultimately with T. It is of note that this was the case historically and that even a penal notice (endorsed on the court order dated 2 November 2018) did little to assist attempts to ensure that A had proper therapeutic support from Dr. OV. The concern is that these behaviours may continue unless A is removed from the father’s care. 

74.  Ultimately I also accept that A is likely to have been influenced by the father and his family’s views and that in turn this is likely to have undermined the mother-child relationship.

75.  The mother for her part has shown that she is determined to ensure that A is removed from an unhealthy environment and that every attempt is made to ensure that her relationship with her daughter is restored. She has proposed specialized therapeutic intervention with support from a therapist in Hong Kong.

 g) Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

76.  As indicated above A may be at risk of continued psychological harm if there is no intervention.

h) Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

77.  This has been dealt with in the Fact Finding component of the judgment and will not be repeated here.

i)  How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

78.  I accept that the mother is better placed at present to meet A’s needs, notwithstanding the fact that the father has proved able to meet her physical needs to date in terms of providing a comfortable home for her, ensuring that she has a good education and that she has good care when he is unable to look after A himself. I accept too that the mother will be able to do these things, although she may also need some financial support from the father in order to achieve this for A. Dr. B explained it well when he said in the witness box that the father may be able to give A what she wants and what makes her happy, but he may not be able to provide her with what she needs from a developmental perspective. He also reiterated his concern that the father was not very “child centered”.

79.  From a slightly different perspective it is of note that both parents are working full time and both will need to rely on other people to assist them in caring for A. To that end the father said initially that Grandma C was intending to spend more time in the UK and then on the other hand that she would be coming to Hong Kong in order to help him and Nanny P in caring for A. Likewise the mother has said that she will also rely on her parents help, at least in the short term. There was some confusion during the trial concerning the time that the father is able to get home. He confirmed that his working hours were generally from 9:00 am to 5:30 pm, but that he often did not get home until about dinner time at c 7:30/8:00 pm when A had her second supper and ate her vegetables. The mother says that she should be able to get back home by about 6:00 pm.      

j)  (a broader formulation along the lines of) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

80.  This is largely moot and I will not comment on this section further.

The parties

81.  Generally speaking it is incumbent upon judges in Children’s trials to see the parties in the witness box. This case was no exception. In this instance I was also greatly assisted by the reports prepared by Dr. B. From my own observations everything that Dr. B had flagged up about the father was borne out by his behaviours and his approach to the litigation generally. In particular, it was clear that he still believes that what A said was true and that he is protecting her by proceeding with this litigation. Given that I think it extremely unlikely that he will accept the contents of this judgment or indeed the related order, which is why in part I have decided to deliver this judgment in court. I shall also endorse a penal notice on the order.

82.  The mother was also accurately portrayed by Dr. B. I have no doubt that this whole situation has been enormously difficult for her. Generally, I found her to be a straightforward, honest and ultimately credible witness.

Other witnesses

83.  I also heard from the mother’s sister who was able to talk about her observations of the mother’s relationship with A historically and the difficulties that she had observed since December 2017. I also found her to be wholly straightforward in her approach and entirely credible.              

Decision

Should there be an immediate change of residence?

84.  It is a very difficult matter indeed to change the residence of a child, when their relationship with the current non caretaking parent has been damaged, but in this instance it seems to me that there is no alternative. It is now imperative that A have intensive and appropriate therapy which is designed to ensure that her relationship with her mother and her maternal family, and ultimately with T, be restored. I do not believe that that will be possible whilst she continues to reside with the father. I am also comforted in that she has been seeing her mother at the PCCC, and by all accounts that access has gone well.

85.  This order shall also be made on the premise that the mother undertakes to do the things that she has offered to do in paragraph 50 above and I will stand down in a minute so that those undertakings may be drafted and signed.

What order should be made for custody, care and control and access?  

86.  It follows that sole custody and care and control of A shall vest in the petitioner mother and paragraph 1 of the court order dated the 20 April 2015 shall be varied accordingly. Ms. Ip has suggested that this should be an interim order. However, it seems to me that there must now be some finality with respect to these proceedings, which have been dragging on now for over 2 years. It is not in anyone’s interest for this to carry on for any longer than necessary. Consequently, I shall NOT make an interim order, save in so far as the access arrangements are concerned. I am concerned about the father’s possible reactions to this judgment and that of his other family members given the extreme nature of his stance so far. Consequently, I intend to suspend all access between the father and A initially. It almost goes without saying, but for the avoidance of doubt it follows that A shall also have no contact with Grandma C, KA or Nanny P either in the short term. I would suggest that this be reviewed after there has been an initial assessment undertaken by A’s new therapist and I will ask the Official Solicitor to file a short updated report in this respect within the next 6 months. Longer term I accept entirely that the father should have an opportunity to have a proper relationship with A and to see her on a regular basis.

Costs

87.  The issue of costs shall be reserved for argument and shall be dealt with by way of a paper disposal. The Petitioner mother has indicated that she wishes to seek her costs, possibly on an indemnity basis notwithstanding the fact that this is a children’s matter. I shall therefore order that the parties do file and mutually exchange written submissions on the issue of costs only, such submissions to be limited to no more than 10 A4 pages, 14 font and double spaced and to be filed within the next 28 days. Leave be given for each side to file and serve a short submission in reply, if so required within 14 days thereafter. The reply submissions to be no longer than 5 A4 pages, 14 font and double spaced.      

The Order 

88.  UPON HEARING counsel for the Petitioner, the Respondent in person and the Official Solicitor for the child of the family, A.

AND UPON the Petitioner filing an undertaking today as set out in paragraphs 50 and 85 above.

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1)    Order 1 contained in the court order dated the 20 April 2015 shall be varied to the effect that the sole custody and care and control of A, a girl born on the XX March 2012 shall be granted to the Petitioner mother with immediate effect.

2)    There shall be an immediate change of residence and A shall be handed over to the Petitioner mother with the assistance of the Social Welfare Department on a date to be determined today.

3)    For the avoidance of doubt access to the Respondent father shall be temporarily suspended pending receipt of an updated report from the Official Solicitor.

4)    The issue of access shall be adjourned to the 31 August 2020   at 2:30 pm.

5)    Both parties do personally attend that hearing.

6)    Both parties shall file a Statement of Proposals in relation to access only 3 days prior to the hearing.

7)    The Official Solicitor do file and serve a short updated report on the issue of access only, to be filed 14 days prior to the hearing.

8)    Costs shall be reserved and shall be dealt with by way of a paper disposal as set out above.

9)    A penal notice be endorsed on this order.

10)    There be liberty to apply on an urgent basis.

11)    For the avoidance of doubt it is further directed that A shall have therapy with a specialized therapist from the Family Separation Clinic in the UK, or a similar organization, such therapy to be supported by a therapist in Hong Kong. Leave is given for a copy of this judgment to be provided to any organization or individual therapist involved in A’s therapy going forward.

( Sharon D. MELLOY )
District Judge

Ms. Frances Irving instructed by Haldanes for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person