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Matrimonial Causes2015

N v. W

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Files (5)

[2019] HKFC 205-EN-2019-08-09

N v. W

HTML content

FCMC 5026 / 2015

[2019] HKFC 205

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 5026 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 NPetitioner
(Judgment Creditor)
 and 
 WRespondent
(Judgment Debtor)

----------------------------

Coram:  Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)

Date of hearing:  25 June 2019

Date of Ruling:  9 August 2019

---------------------------------------

RULING

 (Costs)

---------------------------------------

Introduction

Costs order dated the 20 August 2018

1.  On the 20 August 2018 I handed down a Ruling on the issue of costs arising out of the wife’s original application for a judgment summons and the ensuing litigation in relation to that issue. In conclusion I ordered as follows:

 Conclusion

 17. Generally speaking the Family Court encourages parties to settle and when they do so they are not normally penalised in costs. In this instance settlement only came very late in the day, making further legal expenditure for the wife inevitable. Other costs ensued because the husband did not proceed as directed by the court. Although I accept that some leeway should be given to him because he is acting in person, there is no doubt that costs have increased for the wife because of this. Given all of the prevailing circumstances I will therefore make an order

 that the husband do contribute towards 50% of the wife’s costs of and arising out of the judgment summons dated the 8 February 2018 such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.  

2.  It is of note that both parties had argued that they had been the successful party and that costs should be paid to them on a party and party basis and that in the absence of any other agreement such costs should be taxed forthwith. (See the wife’s written submission for the hearing on the 25 June 2018 and her subsequent written submissions on costs, dated the 16 July 2018, together with the husband’s submission in reply dated the 27 July 2018). The court did not make either of these orders. The order is as set out above. This was a final order as opposed to an order nisi, given that there had been full argument in relation to it. No other applications have been made in relation to that order. It is of note that the judgment was handed down nearly a year ago. In my view it is not now open to the wife to seek to re-open any aspect of that order. If she had wished to challenge it then, with respect I agree, with Ms Chin, who appeared for the husband, the only available option for her was to have filed an application for leave to appeal. For the avoidance of doubt it was not the court’s intention at the time to order that the costs be taxed forthwith. That remains the court’s position now.

Costs order dated the 17 January 2017

3.  On the 17 January 2017 the husband was also ordered to pay the costs of and occasioned by an application for litigation funding on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for counsel.

4.  On the 1 February 2017 the court received a letter from the wife, who was then acting in person, in the following terms:

I am the Petitioner in the above proceedings.

I refer to Her Honour Judge Melloy’s Ruling dated 17th January 2017 on the Respondent’s MPS application for litigation funding by which the Judge has made a costs order in my favour.

In order to save time and costs, in the event the costs order is made absolute, I would be grateful if the Court would make an order for a gross sum assessment and for this to be payable forthwith by the Respondent so that the more time consuming and costly taxation proceedings can be dispensed with and in that event, I would be obliged if the Court would grant me a 14-day period to submit a statement of costs for the gross sum assessment.

I would be grateful if the Court would kindly consider the above and make the appropriate directions at the earliest opportunity. I look forward to hearing favourably from the Court soon.

5.  On the 10 February 2017 the court responded as follows:

Order/Comments:

 1. Please seek the consent of the other side to your proposal.

6.  The court heard nothing further from the wife, or indeed the husband on this point until it received a letter from her re instructed solicitors on the 6 October 2017, when they wrote to the court in the following terms:

We refer to the Ruling of Her Honour Judge S. Melloy dated 17 January 2017, dismissing the Respondent’s application for litigation funding.

Her Honour ordered that the “husband do pay the costs of and occasioned by his application for litigation funding to be taxed if not agreed on a party and party basis.” We understand that no formal Order has been drawn up for this application to-date.

The Order is silent as to whether the parties may proceed to taxation forthwith.

Given the Petitioner’s financial situation, it would be of great assistance to the Petitioner if she is able to recover her legal costs now without having to wait until the conclusion of these proceedings. Therefore, we are writing to seek the Court’s clarification on whether Her Honour had intended for the taxation to proceed forthwith and if so, we should be grateful if Her Honour could make such direction. 

Upon the Court’s kind direction, we will proceed to prepare the draft Order in respect of the Respondent’s application accordingly.

We should be grateful if you could place this letter, before Her Honour for her consideration.

7.  The court responded unequivocally on the 10 October 2017 as follows:

Order/Comments:

1.   No, it was not H.H. Judge Melloy’s intention that the costs arising out of the Ruling dated the 17/1/2017 be taxed forthwith.

8.  This then is the end of the matter. Again the wife did not issue any further applications in relation to this order.

Conclusion

9.  In both instances the court has made an order on costs. It had not ordered that the costs should be taxable forthwith. This was not an oversight. The issue had been considered and those orders were not made.

10.  It is not now open for the wife to seek to reargue these matters now – especially given that she has not even issued a summons in relation to the same, so her position remained somewhat opaque right up to the hearing on the 25 June.

11.  The fact that the court had adjourned the issue of costs to this date is simply reflective of the fact that HH Judge Melloy had been asked to do so. She was not taken to any of the arguments and had not realized that she had effectively already made a decision on both of the points now raised.

12.  With respect these were not matters that were capable of being reargued. HH Judge Melloy stands by what she said during the hearing. Parties cannot keep returning to court on matters of this nature until they get the decision that they want. That is not how the system works. For the avoidance of doubt I accept the Respondent’s primary point that the two costs orders are not taxable until the conclusion of the action. The wife’s application, such as it is, shall be dismissed. The husband asks for his costs of the matter to be taxed forthwith and to be summarily assessed. I shall not make this order either. The costs arising out of the hearing on costs on the 25 June 2019 shall be paid by the Petitioner, on a party and party basis. The costs shall NOT be taxed forthwith neither shall they be summarily assessed. The costs for this hearing shall also be dealt with at the end of the action.

13.  The parties are caught up in aggressive and time consuming litigation. I appreciate that the issue of costs is very much a live issue. However, it is suggested that the parties should concentrate on the task in hand as opposed to peripheral issues of this type. For the avoidance of doubt leave of the court shall be sought with respect to any further interlocutory applications that the parties seek to issue, prior to the matter returning to this court following determination of the s 17 application in the High Court next year.    

( Sharon D. MELLOY )
District Judge

Mr Robin Egerton instructed by Robertsons for the Petitioner/Judgment Creditor

Ms Janice Chin of Stevenson Wong & Co for the Respondent/Judgment Debtor

[2018] HKFC 137-EN-2018-08-20

N v. W

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FCMC 5026 / 2015

[2018] HKFC 137

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 5026 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 NPetitioner
  (Judgment Creditor)
 and 
 WRespondent
   (Judgment Debtor)

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of written submissions: 16 July 2018
Date of written replies: 27 and 30 July 2018
Date of Ruling: 20 August 2018

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RULING
(Costs)

---------------------------------------

Introduction

1.  This is an application by a Petitioner/Judgment Creditor wife for her costs. At the callover hearing on the 25 June 2018 I directed that this matter be dealt with by means of a paper disposal and I gave further directions that both parties do file and exchange short written submissions and for each to file and exchange replies – if so required. Infact the husband’s original submission ran to some 18 pages and both parties chose to file replies, so in total there are about 38 pages of submission plus other attachments.  

2.  The application for costs arose out of the wife’s judgment summons dated the 8 February 2018 in which she sought payment of the children’s expenses as follows:

1. The Petitioner and the Respondent be jointly and severally responsible for any fees associated with the psycho-educational assessment of Cs with Dr. O;

2. The costs of the Children’s medical/dental expenses with Dr T and Dr S shall be divided equally between Petitioner and the Respondent;

3. S shall continue to receive ongoing therapeutic support, the costs of which shall be divided equally between Petitioner and the Respondent;

4. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent shall be equally responsible for the Children’s other major expenses, which shall include the cost of school trips, school camps and any major items such as a computer for school purposes; and

5. The Petitioner and the Respondent shall each be responsible for respective costs of transporting the Children to and from school when the Children are in their respective care.

She claimed that the sum of HK$66,992.50 remained outstanding in this respect and she asked that the husband pay HK$67,622.50 in order to discharge the debt.

3.  It is not disputed that the husband did infact pay the debt, but given that payment was not made until Wednesday the 18 and Thursday the 19 April 2018, the wife argues that this payment came too late in the day and that legal costs were expended by her as a result. The next callover hearing was on Monday the 23 April 2018, which came less than two working days after all of the payments had been received. Thus the wife seeks her costs of and occasioned by the judgment summons on a party and party basis. The husband for his part maintains inter alia that he paid in good time, and that he did so in part so that legal fees would not be spent unnecessarily.

Background

4.  At the first callover hearing before me on the 23 April 2018, Mr Egerton of counsel appeared on behalf of the wife and the husband appeared in person. By that stage, as set out above, the husband had already paid the outstanding amount in full. Mr Egerton explained that the main issue before the court therefore was in relation to costs. The husband however used this opportunity to argue that he had infact overpaid and that this was a matter than needed to be taken into account. Consequently, the court asked the husband if he would be prepared to file a summons dealing with this issue, so that it could be dealt with properly. The husband agreed and this is recorded in the preamble of the order dated the 23 April 2018 as follows:

And Upon the Respondent agreeing to file a summons in support of the proposed application inter alia that he has overpaid the petitioner within 10 days from the date hereof (“Proposed Summons”).

5.  I then adjourned both the proposed summons and the issue of costs to the 25 June 2018. I also gave directions that both parties do file and serve affidavits and to file a short submission prior to the return hearing date. Unfortunately, despite being in court and notwithstanding the fact that I had asked the husband if he agreed to this course of action, he did not file the summons as agreed.

6.  Notwithstanding the lack of summons, the wife did file an affidavit in reply. The order stated that she should file and serve a reply to the Respondent’s affidavit dated the 23 April within 21 days of receipt of the proposed summons. Thus she was perfectly within her rights not to file, but she chose to do so nevertheless. In her affidavit she sets out her position with respect to the arrears and she also highlights the difficulties that she has encountered inter alia with respect to the husband paying for his half share of the school fees and other items.

7.  In her Conclusion she states as follows:

Conclusion

25. Her Honour Judge Melloy in her Ruling dated 8 September 2017 has accepted that I have been “wholly responsible” for all the major expenses for the children since 2011, as supported by documentary evidence which Her Honour accepted.  In the same decision, the Judge has also accepted that both parents should be equally responsible for the children’s expenses and that on the face of it, the Respondent’s earning capacity is greater than that of mine.  Having adjudicated on the matter and obtaining an Order from the Court that the Respondent should be equally responsible for the children’s expenses, I was forced to issue the Judgment Summons to enforce the Order against the Respondent due to his reprehensible conduct and blatant disregard for orders of the Court.  It would be wholly unfair and unconscionable if I were to bear the legal costs resulting directly from the Respondent’s defiance of the Order.  Even in his solicitors’ letter (sent a few weeks before the hearing), they indicated the Respondent will try to borrow funds to pay for the expenses but it was not until the 11th hour that the Respondent settled the Judgment Summons.  The Respondent had ample opportunities to settle earlier but ignored my repeated demands and in turn, made my life difficult by forcing me to resort to Court and unnecessarily driving up my legal costs.  I pray that the Court will see through the Respondent’s unreasonable tactics and award costs of my application against him.

26. I affirm that as of the date of the swearing of this Affirmation, save for my legal costs, all the children’s expenses under the Judgment Summons are settled.  Since the issuance of the Judgment Summons, I have incurred more expenses for the children and the receipts of all these been provided to the Respondent but he continues to be difficult about these expenses. I pray that this Honourable Court will direct the Respondent to pay for my legal costs forthwith, which I hope will deter him from breaching the Order again.

8.  The husband then filed a fairly indignant affidavit in reply dated the 22 June 2018, which seems to be mainly about the children’s expenses and other matters pertaining to the children. In conclusion he states as follows:

24. I therefore respectfully ask Her Honour Judge Melloy to:

a.   Order the Judgement Summons against me invalid, to order the Petitioner to pay me HK$6,254 that should not have been forcibly claimed from me in the first place, to cancel the Petitioner's claims against me, and award me the costs of HK$HK$28,057.50 I have unnecessarily incurred refuting the Petitioner’s unjust claims against me.

b.   Make an order requiring the parents to obtain written approval from the non-purchasing parent for any items intended to be purchased or booked on behalf of the children and jointly claimed, prior to the purchasing or booking of the item.

c.   Make an order that the Parents inform each other of their intention to book either child in for medical procedures or consultation and provide each other with booking details of said appointments at the time of booking or within 1 day.

9.  For the avoidance of doubt if either party wishes to vary the court order dated the 8 September 2017 then they MUST file the appropriate summons. The court will not deal with the matter otherwise. It is not possible for the court to make the order that the husband seeks given the current circumstances.

10.  At the return hearing on the 25 June 2018 Mr Egerton reiterated that it was the wife’s case that everything had been paid that was due and owing under the original judgment summons and that there were other items that were now due and owing, but that she accepted that this would need to be subject to a second judgment summons. He stated that the husband had not filed the summons and thus that the only outstanding issue related to costs. With respect  I agree. The only matter currently before the court and therefore the only issue that I am now asked to determine relates to the costs of and arising out of the judgment summons.

The law 

11.  The law in relation to costs is well settled. It has been said that

the issue of costs lies in the discretion of the court and that costs are normally expected to follow the event. It is also accepted that this presumption is more easily displaced in family proceedings than in others – especially where there are matters to be resolved concerning children. I have noted that in this instance that the outstanding issues although child related, were financial in nature.

Discussion  

12.  I accept that the wife had tried to resolve matters with the husband and that she was initially within her rights to issue the judgment summons. I also accept that service was somewhat difficult, which only served to increase costs unnecessarily. However, some credit must be given to the husband for eventually paying the outstanding amount in full – although I accept that he did so rather late in the day. Further credit should also be given to him for doing this notwithstanding his concerns re overpayment.

13.  The husband argues that the payment did not come too late and that there was no need for further legal costs to have been expended. With respect I do not agree. The wife was within her rights to instruct counsel – especially one who has been very involved with the intricacies of her case. Most counsel would expect a brief to be delivered at least one week before a proposed hearing. In this instance the brief was delivered on the 16 April 2018 for the hearing on the 23 April 2018. This is not unreasonable.

14.  The matter may have ended there and directions could have been given on the 23 April for a paper disposal of the costs issue only. However, the husband took this opportunity to raise the issue of the over payment, but did not then issue the appropriate summons, despite confirming his agreement to this course of action during the hearing. It was for this reason that the court gave the parties a further callover date on the 25 June 2018. Had the husband issued a summons seeking to vary the original court order further directions could then have been given for this matter to be dealt with in a short hearing.

15.  The husband makes further allegations against the wife. He says that she has deliberately instructed expensive lawyers and that there was no need for her to instruct counsel, especially as he was acting in person. He said inter alia

c.   The Petitioner hired Robertson’s who are experienced family solicitors who were perfectly capable of appearing in court on the Petitioner’s behalf for such a small judgement Summons claim of HK$66,992.5 (actual amount due was only HK$41,927, which has resulted in the difference causing this dispute).  In fact, Robertson’s representatives (3 of them) were in court on each occasion. Why the Petitioner then chose to unnecessarily engage Senior Junior Counsel on multiple occasions to represent her is beyond me, especially knowing that I was representing myself and have no legal training of any sort. The only conclusion I can draw is that it was the intention of the Petitioner to drive up legal costs as high as possible to beggar me financially to make it difficult for me to proceed with my Section 17 case in the High Court.

Although this may be the husband’s belief there is nothing currently before the court to substantiate this.

Conclusion

16.  Generally speaking the Family Court encourages parties to settle and when they do so they are not normally penalised in costs. In this instance settlement only came very late in the day, making further legal expenditure for the wife inevitable. Other costs ensued because the husband did not proceed as directed by the court. Although I accept that some leeway should be given to him because he is acting in person, there is no doubt that costs have increased for the wife because of this. Given all

of the prevailing circumstances I will therefore make an order that the husband do contribute towards 50% of the wife’s costs of and arising out of the judgment summons dated the 8 February 2018 such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.  

( Sharon D. MELLOY )
District Judge

Mr Robin Egerton instructed by Robertsons for the Petitioner/Judgment Creditor

The Respondent/Judgment Debtor acted in person

111635-EN-2017-09-08

N v. W

HTML content

FCMC 5026/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 5026 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 NPetitioner
and
 WRespondent
and
 O1st Intervener

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)

Date of Hearing: 3 August 2017

Date of Ruling: 8 September 2017

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RULING
(Transfer up to the High Court)

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Introduction

1.  This is an application by the 1st Intervener to transfer up to the High Court, the Respondent husband’s section 17 application dated the 7 April 2016 to set aside the transfer of 490 shares from the Petitioner wife to the 1st Intervener. The 1st Intervener is the brother of the wife and the transfer summons is dated the 12 October 2016. It is supported by an affidavit from the 1st Intervener’s solicitor, Mr Colin Cohen.   

Background

2.  I have set out the background to this case in my previous judgments and in particular to the judgment on litigation funding dated the 29 August 2016. Reference can and should be made to that judgment as necessary. Much has been made in the affidavits and witness statements filed within the s 17 application and the application to transfer up, to comments made by myself within that judgment. For the avoidance of doubt I was critical of all three parties; I did not on the face of it find any one party particularly credible. In particular reference should be made to paragraphs 25 - 27 of that judgment where I said as follows:  

25. Here it is almost impossible for me to form a definitive preliminary view. The credibility of each of the three parties is very much in issue. It will therefore be necessary to hear from each of them in the witness box in order to make the appropriate findings.

26. Having said that it is of note that on the one hand, even on the case of the brother and the wife, they admit to creating a paper trail which at best was economical with the truth in order to hood wink both the Inland Revenue Department in the United States and possibly the brother’s then wife. The documents and their explanation do not paint either of them in a particularly good light. I am asked to now disbelieve part of the documentary evidence produced and to believe their present story, when they already have a history of lying to others because that is what suited them at the time. On the other hand, should I now give them the benefit of the doubt for “coming clean” notwithstanding the obvious difficulties with their evidence?

27. In so far as the husband is concerned did he know the reality of the situation and is this why he signed the letter on the 20 September 2011? Is this his attempt to now gain a strategic litigation advantage when in truth there is very little money available to either side otherwise? 

The law   

3.  The application to transfer up is made pursuant to Rule 32 and Rule 80 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap 179A, together with Practice Direction 15.14. I have also been referred to a number of cases as set out in the Practice Direction including the judgment of His Honour Judge Saunders in H v H, FCMC 7173/2000 dated the 1 February 2002 (unreported).

4.  It is accepted that in accordance with those authorities that the Family Court has an unfettered discretion to order a transfer up of any application to the High Court and that such an unfettered discretion also extends to deciding when such an order should be made.

“The fundamental principle is whether in light of the overall circumstances including the nature of the issues of fact or law involved, the proceedings or part of them are more desirable to be dealt with in the Court of First Instance” (§2)

It is also accepted that:

… an application for transfer should be made as soon as practicable after it becomes apparent that a transfer is required.

5.  In H v H His Honour Judge Saunders also stated as follows:

… there must be cogent reasons why a case should be removed from the ambit of a group of specialist judges.  It is right that R 80 requires the court to take into account the financial limits for the time being relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court in other matters, but that is only one consideration.  Very large sums of money alone will rarely be sufficient to justify transfer.  There must be some special complexity in the case which will demand that it be given the attention of a Judge of the Court of First instance.

With respect I agree.

Decision  

6.  I should say at the outset that in this instance I have decided to transfer the section 17 application up to the High Court as requested by the 1st Intervener. I do so because I am largely persuaded by the arguments advanced by Mr Todd as follows, namely that the application

(a) … raises very substantial points of law.

(b) Included within the substantial points of law is that it is a case which involves allegations of fraud.

(c) The margin of error on the dispute runs to many tens of millions of Dollars.

(d) This separate matter involving the intervention of a third party will probably resolve all matters.

7.  I agree in particular that it would be more appropriate for the Court of First Instance to consider the law on ex turpi causa, as pleaded by the husband, especially given the recent Supreme Court decision in England on this point, namely the judgment in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. I accept that in an ideal world the High Court should be in a much better position to “consider the discursive and intellectually invigorating debate surrounding such changes in the law”. Although from a personal perspective I would perhaps like to accept that challenge, I also agree that this is beside the point and that given the circumstances it is more appropriate for such matters to be dealt with by a higher level of court than the Family Court.  

8.  It is also clear to me that this case has criminal overtones and perhaps other civil law ramifications. The 1st Intervener has already indicated, for example, that he is considering issuing proceedings for defamation. There are also issues of fraud to consider and I accept that it is likely that expert evidence may be necessary. Again I accept that these issues can more properly be canvassed in the High Court as opposed to the Family Court.

9.  Ms Rattigan for the husband also expressed some concern about delay, accusing the 1st Intervener of already causing some delay given that his application was not made until the 12 October 2016. It seems to me that there is little in this point. The 1st Intervener made the application to transfer up after the husband had filed his Reply to both the Petitioner and 1st Intervener’s Points of Defence. This is dated the 12 August 2016. It seems to me that it would have been completely inappropriate for the 1st Intervener to have made the application to transfer up before the close of pleadings. It was only at this point that the fully pleaded case would have been known. The 1st Intervener then wrote to both the Petitioner and the Respondent seeking their consent to transfer the matter up. On the 30 September 2016 the husband’s solicitors wrote refusing to give such consent. The application to court was made some 16 days later. In such circumstances I accept that the 1st Intervener issued his application as soon as it was practicable to do so.

10.  Finally it is of note that although quantum of itself is rarely a reason on its own to transfer a matter up to the High Court, it may nevertheless form part of the issues to be considered. In this instance there is at least US$18 million at stake – not an insubstantial amount. Again this points to the application being dealt with in the High Court as opposed to the Family Court.

11.  Consequently I will make an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the 1st Intervener’s summons dated the 12 October 2016. The 1st Intervener has asked for costs on an indemnity basis. I do not accept that this application falls into the category of cases where costs may be ordered on an indemnity basis. Costs should though follow the event in the normal way. Consequently, the Respondent husband shall pay the costs of and occasioned by this application on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.

12.  It is further directed that the solicitors prepare a paginated bundle as set out in paragraph B2 of the Practice Direction and then proceed as set out in paragraph C. It is of note that given that this is a discreet application that it may not be necessary to include all of the documents in the First Directions Hearing Bundle as set out in paragraph B.2. I should add that it is also accepted that this case will in all probability be re transferred back to the Family Court once the section 17 trial has been concluded. In addition, the Family Court will continue to have jurisdiction over the children related matters. In that regard it is noted that there will a call over in 2018 with respect to the children’s arrangement.

 (Sharon D. MELLOY)
 District Judge

Mr Richard Todd instructed by Boase Cohen & Collins for the 1st Intervener

Ms Mairead Rattigan instructed by Withers for the Respondent

The Petitioner appeared in person

111634-EN-2017-09-08

N v. W

HTML content

FCMC 5026/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 5026 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 NPetitioner
and
 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)

Date of Hearing: 7 August 2017

Dates of letters received from the parties’ solicitors as requested by the court: 14, 21, 29 and 30 August and 4 September 2017

Date of Judgment: 8 September 2017

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JUDGMENT
(Maintenance pending suit/Interim maintenance)

-----------------------


Introduction

1.  This is an application by the Petitioner wife dated the 13 September 2016 as follows:

1. The Respondent do pay to the Petitioner a monthly sum in maintenance pending suit to be determined by the Court, which will cover the reasonable living costs of the Petitioner and the children, including school fees and the costs of the children’s play therapy with Dr. P.

2. The Respondent do pay the costs of this application.

2.  This application was eventually heard just four days after the 1st Intervener’s application to transfer up to the High Court, the Respondent husband’s section 17 application dated the 7 April 2016 to set aside the transfer of 490 shares from the Petitioner wife to the 1st Intervener. Although the subject matter is different I have therefore decided to hand down both the ruling on the transfer up and this judgment on maintenance pending suit, together.

3.  As indicated in the Ruling I have set out the background to this case in my judgment on litigation funding dated the 29 August 2016. In addition, reference can and should also be made to the judgment on the arrangements for the children dated the 28 April 2017. In that judgment I made an order inter alia as follows:

i) There shall be an interim order for joint custody of the two children of the family namely S, a girl born on the XX August 2005 and C a boy born on the XX November 2007 such order to be reviewed in 18 months’ time once the preliminary issues matter has been concluded.

ii) There shall be an order for shared care with the children splitting their time between the two households on a 2/2/5/5 basis during term time.

iii) The school holidays shall be divided between the parties on a 50:50 basis as set out in paragraphs 40 - 44 above.

iv) An updated Social Investigation Report shall be called for in 18 months time.

v) A report from Ms G (or a replacement parental co coordinator) shall also be called for in 18 months time.

vi) There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time that there be no order as to costs. There shall be certificate for counsel.  

IT IS FURTHER DIRECTED that the parties adopt and follow the recommendations made by Dr B as set out in Annex A attached hereto. In particular, it is directed that C have a full psychoeducational assessment and that a copy of that be filed at court within the next 6 months.

4.  In addition, it was recommended that elder child S have ongoing weekly therapy to help her deal with “moderate to severe levels of emotional distress”. I also further commented as follows:

38. I am though particularly concerned about the father’s lack of involvement with choosing a school for S and how he seemed happy for the mother to do all the leg work and to take all of the financial responsibility – when in truth this was an active decision to be taken by both parents. The father does not simply have a right of veto, as with the offer of a place at Island School – if he wants joint custody he has to actively be part of the decision making process. He also has to be financially responsible for any of the decisions made – regardless of the outcome of the preliminary issue hearing. …

5.  It is the wife’s case that she has been responsible for all of the major expenses for the children since 2011. She has produced documentary evidence in support of what she says in exhibit LCN3-2 attached to her 3rd affidavit dated the 23 January 2017. Although the schedules produced also include other general expenses, such as rent and utilities etc, it is of note that they fully itemize the wife’s payment of school fees and for the cost of the children’s Nanny during the period that she was employed and latterly for payment of play therapy for the children with Dr P. I accept that she was wholly responsible for these costs as indicated.

6.  It is the wife’s case that she has liquidated all of her available assets and that she is currently unemployed, although she has also said that she has recently set up a new business – C Ltd, with funds allegedly borrowed from an independent source in Pasadena USA. She intends to operate her business from home – which is similar to the business model that her brother describes in his affidavits. In any event she anticipates that it will take at least two years to get this new business up and running. Consequently, she has written to the husband’s solicitors in an e-mail dated the 1 August 2017 as follows:

I refer to the hearing of my MPS application on 7 August 2017.

I am writing to see if your client will consider my proposal below so as to avoid further litigation costs relating to the hearing on the 7 August 2017.

As your client is well aware, I have been paying for the family’s, including the children’s, expenses since 2011 and this continued after our separation in January 2015.  Until the hearing in March this year, your client never offered to contribute anything towards the children’s expenses.  To date, he has only contributed 50% towards S’s school fees for the autumn term to commence in August 2017.  He has not paid for any of the major expenses for the children since 2011 and indeed since our separation.

Over the last 2.5 years I have depleted my savings in funding the children’s living and education expenses as well as the legal costs in these proceedings.  Therefore, I am struggling financially and find it very difficult to make ends meet, especially in the long term till I hopefully can get my business established.

I have tried to get back on my feet but due to my very specialized work experience, my age and lack of local language skills, my efforts have been unsuccessful so far.  I have therefore in April 2017 started a new business.  My company is called C Limited.  I am currently operating the business from home.

Like any new trading business, C will take time to grow.  I believe it will take at least 2 years for my company to established and be profitable.  As mentioned in my Form E, I have bought 200x20’ standard containers for an investors money.  I am currently in the process of getting the containers moved to saleable locations in USA and Russia.

Therefore, I am writing to see whether your client will be agreeable to pay 100% of the below children’s expenses for the next 2 years.  This will enable me to focus on establishing my company and getting back on my feet financially.  It is also a steep learning curve for me, building a business and this will also take time and focus.

The main children’s expenses for the next two years include the following, not accounting for price increase in schools etc.

1.   Yearly school fees, C HKD155,500.00 S HKD164,000.00 + school trips, camps, school computers etc.

2.   School bus fees for 2 semesters per child, C HKD21,000.00 and S 26,500.00

3.   Medical / dental expenses with Pediatric Dr. T and dentist, S.  The children know both doctors well.

4.   Health insurance, USD24,078.00 was due on March 2017.  Future insurance policies may increase.

5.   Costs of Therapy, Counselling, Assessments etc.; Dr. O, M and any other therapy/therapist require as per our ruling.

Clothes, uniforms, shoes, food, holidays, ECA etc. in our own households we pay ourselves respectively.

After the 2 years, we can revisit sharing the children’s above cost 50/50.

I do hope that W will genuinely consider the above as it will benefit the children in the long run.

7.  The wife remains convinced that the husband has significant undisclosed assets at his disposal and refers to his disclosure to date as being “opaque”. She also refers to the husband’s significant earning capacity. However, on the evidence currently before the court there is no evidence that the husband has any undisclosed assets. On the face of it I would though accept that he has a potentially higher earning capacity than the one that he currently appears to enjoy.   

8.  The husband for his part also repeats his case on the shares and the section 17 application. He also remains convinced that the wife has access to very significant funds and that she has likewise failed to make full and frank disclosure of her means. Again, there is no concrete evidence to support the husband’s contention in this respect. Simply repeating his case on the section 17 application is not sufficient. Needless to say this is vigorously opposed by the wife in any event. In the husband’s updated Form E dated the 13 July 2017 he says this of the allegation that he has not contributed properly to the children’s expenses:

There is no arrangement or order currently in place but I have paid for the children’s expenses when they have been in my care since separation.  I have also paid for the following:

Furnishing the children’s bedrooms with soft furnishings, bedding, carpets, art, toys, games, musical instruments, books, puzzles, drawing materials, learning materials, etc.

Extra curricular activities such as surf camp and adventure camp for both children each year for the past 3 years, 3D printing workshop, mindfulness training, cooking class, trips to Kadouri Farm, Farm Milk, Tai O, Dolphin Watching, Strawberry Picking, etc.

A complete new set of clothes and school uniforms for each child to keep at my house, regularly updated as they grow

Craft materials such as for S, a sewing machine with accompanying tools and materials, also S now has a wide array of her own cooking and baking materials which she loves to use in the kitchen, and for C, woodworking and metalworking tools, wood, and instruction materials to assist with him creating interesting items.

Toys for both children such as nerf guns (firing foam pellets), a Wii home game console, Scalextric car racing set, Lego, Bead making loom, art and craft sets, and games sets such as Chess, Backgammon, Scrabble, Rummikub, Twister, Ludo, etc.

Gardening materials for both children including their own 6’ long planting troughs (which they made) on the roof of our house.

Both children are avid readers and I regularly purchase books and reading materials for them.  Each child has approximately 200 books on their bookshelves.

Each year, both children have birthday parties with many friends attending, all paid for by myself.

Each child attends many birthday parties each year.  I take them to these events, plus buy presents for them.

I paid for S’s C school entrance admission fee, plus multiple other school application fees.

Whenever each child attends an event, I pay their entrance fees.  Examples include Bounce, Ryze, Central Carnival, Art Basel, Ocean Park, etc.

I have also paid for holidays for the children (including flights, accommodation, travel, food, and activity costs) including a cultural trip to Thailand, and two trips to the UK to visit family.

9.  In other words, it is accepted by the husband that he has provided for the children when they are in his care, but implicit in that acknowledgment is the fact that historically he has not paid for the children’s school fees or for their other major expenses.

10.  He also maintains his view that the wife is still working for her brother. He further says that he has no money and that he is significantly in debt. He adds that he had been wholly responsible for all of the household expenses, including the expenses for the children, in the earlier part of the marriage. Whilst that may be true, the court is now concerned with how the children are going to be provided for going forward.   

11.  As before, and as I pointed out in the judgment on litigation funding dated the 29 August 2016, I am in no position to form a definitive view with respect to the many allegations and counter allegations that exist in this case. I am though able to form a view with respect to how the children’s expenses should be funded going forward, and this is regardless of what has happened historically. In a nut shell I am of the view that the parties shall be jointly and severally liable for those expenses.  

The law   

12.  I set out the law on Maintenance pending suit and litigation funding in my previous judgment, but for the avoidance of doubt I repeat that the law is well known and not in dispute. Section 3 MPPO Cap 192 states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case. Consequently, applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis. A detailed examination of the parties’ means may be examined at a later date at a full ancillary relief hearing if there is no agreement in the meantime, when there is then every opportunity to achieve fairness by means of set off. In other words, if there is any overpayment or underpayment that can normally be rectified at a final ancillary relief hearing. This is particularly pertinent given the circumstances of this particular case.

13.  Reference has been made inter alia to the Court of Appeal decision in HJFG v KCY (CACV 127/2011, 28 October 2011, where the following principles were reiterated with respect to maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance applications:

a. The sole criteria to be applied in determining the application is “reasonable” which is synonymous with “fairness”.

b. A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living.

c. In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing.

d. Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the Court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The Court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such situation, the Court should err in favour of the payee.

Discussion   

14.  At the hearing the husband offered to pay for half of C’s school fees. He also confirmed that he had paid for half of S’s school fees up to the 1 January 2018. Ms Rattigan confirmed that her client would continue to pay for half of the children’s school fees going forward and that he was prepared to give an undertaking to this effect. Consequently this shall be included as an undertaking in the preamble of the order. The husband did not agree to pay for half of the school bus fees, or for medical and dental expenses, save that he agreed that he would pay for the children’s expenses when they are in his care. He did not agree to pay for half of the medical insurance policy or for the cost of therapy/counselling save for half of the cost of the therapy with M. I subsequently queried the situation further and the matter was further clarified in the letter from Withers dated the 4 September 2017, when they stated on behalf of the husband as follows:

1. M, MA, Specialising in Children & Adolescents, MA in Counselling Post Grad Cert in Education, BA Hons

M is a counsellor who works at the Southside Family Health Centre of the Central Health Medical Practice Group.  C attended the Superflex program with Ms M. The fee for the Superflex Course was HK$7,000.  The Respondent has paid HK$3,500 (and not HK$3,000 as stated in Robertsons’ letter), representing 50% of the fees.  Contrary to what was stated in Robertsons’ letter, this was not the only sum that “the Respondent has paid towards the children’s therapy costs to-date”.  So far in these proceedings, the Respondent has also contributed towards the following children’s therapy costs:

•   HK$44,250 for Dr B’s fees (which included therapy sessions) and HK$9,750 for her court appearance;

•   The intake session fee of HK$2,000 for C’s assessment with Dr O.

The Respondent will also pay half of the fees for C’s second Superflex program (i.e. $3,500) due to start on 6 September 2017.  The Respondent sent an e-mail to the Petitioner at 7:10 am on 30 August 2017 (before Robertsons’ letter was sent) and agreed to enrol C in the second Superflex program (relevant correspondence at Attachment A). It is therefore wrong and clearly intentionally misleading of the Petitioner to say in Robertsons’ letter that the Respondent ‘has not responded nor agreed to pay for this course’.  He had responded and he had agreed to pay his 50% share of this course.

2. Psycho-educational assessment with Dr O

C attended his first psycho-educational assessment sessions with Dr O on 17 and 23 August 2017.  The Respondent took C to his first session on 17 August 2017 and the Petitioner took him to the second session on 23 August (and not on 24 August as stated in Robertsons’ letter).

The Respondent was notified by C on 23 August that Dr O wanted to see C again.  However, to date, Dr O has not contacted the Respondent and to his knowledge, no appointment is currently being scheduled.  The Petitioner has said in Robertsons’ letter that a final session is currently being scheduled.  If this is correct then the Petitioner must be discussing the scheduling of this appointment with Dr O without involving the Respondent.  Further, Dr O has also not confirmed to the Respondent (either verbally or in writing) when her report could be made ready.  If she has confirmed to the Petitioner that it will be ready in October 2017 as stated in Robertsons letter, the Petitioner has not informed the Respondent of this, leaving him very much in the dark.

The Respondent has not delayed in providing his agreement to the Petitioner to engage Dr O.  In fact, the Respondent has contacted and made enquiries with other psychologists (such as Dr V) for C’s assessment for comparison purposes, particularly given Dr O’s high fees which are unaffordable to the Respondent.  The Respondent understood that Dr O’s fees were more costly than other similar experts.  Unfortunately, the Petitioner was opposed to the idea of finding other psychologists for comparison purposes and proceeded to appoint Dr O without the Respondent’s agreement and input. Going forward, the Respondent agrees to the appointment of Dr O for the best interests of C, as the appointment had already been made by the Petitioner, but the Respondent objects to the Petitioner making unilateral decisions in relation to the children without his input (relevant correspondence at Attachment B).

As the Court will aware, the Respondent is in a very dire financial position at present and is not financially able to pay for Dr O’s assessment fees.  However he has paid the fees for his own intake parent session (HK$2,000) with Dr O.

3. Dr H and Dr S

To the Respondent’s understanding, the children have not seen Dr H for play therapy for at least 3 months because the children found the sessions ineffective and refused to see Dr H anymore. Although the Respondent has no objections for C to see Dr S in place of Dr H, he wishes to point out that Dr S is a child psychologist and does not conduct play therapy sessions.

The Petitioner has again reached out to Dr S without first discussing with the Respondent.  Having been made aware that Dr S had been contacted by the Petitioner, the Respondent has now contacted Dr S directly to discuss his engagement.

Consequently, and for the avoidance of doubt there shall also be an acknowledgment in the preamble to the order to the effect that both parties have paid for half of the costs associated with C’s second Superflex program.

15.  It is further directed that the parties shall be jointly and severally responsible for any fees associated with the psycho assessment of C with Dr O. I also accept that the cost of medical/dental expenses with Dr T and S shall be divided equally. Given the alleged financial position of each party I accept that it may not be feasible for the parties to have health insurance for the children. This is a matter of significant regret and some concern. However, given the fact that both children have been struggling significantly, as set out in the children’s judgment, it seems to me that it is imperative that S in particular receives ongoing therapeutic support regardless and that the cost for this shall also be split equally between the parties.  

16.  Going forward it seems to me that both parties shall be equally responsible for the children’s other major expenses which shall include the cost of school trips, school camps and any major items such as a computer for school purposes. In so far as the school bus is concerned, as I understand it when the children are with the husband he arranges for their transport to and from school and he is responsible for the cost associated with that. Likewise, the wife shall also be responsible for the cost of transporting the children to and from school when they are in her care.

17.  Given that both parties are caring for the children more or less on a 50:50 basis it follows that they should be more or less equally responsible for the children’s expenses. The wife’s arguments with respect to her historical contribution will need to be dealt with at trial, in the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement in the meantime. Both parties have an earning capacity of sorts. I accept that on the face of it the husband’s earning capacity is greater than that of the wife’s.  Notwithstanding that it is incumbent upon both parties to maximize their earning capacity so that they are each able to properly provide for their children from a financial perspective pending the final outcome of this litigation.

Order

18.  Other than as set out above I will therefore dismiss the mother’s summons dated the 13 September 2016. There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that there be no order as to costs. 

 (Sharon D. MELLOY)
 District Judge

Mr Robin Egerton instructed by Robertsons for the Petitioner  

Ms Mairead Rattigan instructed by Withers for the Respondent

109858-EN-2017-04-28

N v. W

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