HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Matrimonial Causes2015

YCKS v. MPKC

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV113/2021YCKS v. MPKC
  • CAMP97/2021YCKS v. MPKC
  • FCMC5771/2018YCKS v. MPKC

Files (3)

[2018] HKFC 76-EN-2018-05-17

YCKS v. MPKC

HTML content

FCMC 8480 / 2015

[2018] HKFC 76

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8480 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 YCKSPetitioner
 and 
 MPKCRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge J. Chow in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing : 9 May 2018
Date of Judgment : 17 May 2018

-----------------------

Leave to Appeal

-----------------------

Introduction

1.  The respondent (“the father”) filed a summons on 9 March 2018 for leave to appeal against my judgment handed down on 28 February 2018 on custody, care and control, and access arrangement of the four children of the family.

2.  I do not intend to repeat the facts and evidence of this case. I shall adopt the abbreviations contained in my judgment.

3.  In my judgment, I ordered the custody, care and control and access arrangement as follows:

(i)  The mother (the petitioner) do have sole custody, care and control of the 4 children of the family, namely, child C, child R, child L and child T.

(ii)  The father (the respondent) do have reasonable access to child C and child R.

(iii)  The father (the respondent) do have defined access with child L and child T in pairs, twice a month for a duration no more than 5 hours with the presence of a domestic helper.

(iv)  The father (the respondent) do have day access with child L and child T in pairs, with a duration of no more than 5 hours, with the presence of a domestic helper, (i) on one day of Christmas public holidays and (ii) on one day of Chinese New Year public holidays.

(v)  The father (the respondent) do have phone access with child L and child T on the birthday of both children respectively.

Applicable legal principles

4.  Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard. (See section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336.

5.  Reasonable prospect of success connotes the prospect of succeeding must be reasonable and more than fanciful, without having to be probable.  An applicant is required to show more than just an arguable case, but he does not have to demonstrate the appeal will probably succeed. Even if the court takes the view that there is a reasonable prospect of success, it still remains adiscretion as to whether to grant leave, though the fact that there is, ex hypothesi, a reasonable prospect of success would heavily influence the court in exercising its discretion. (See commentary of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2018, §59/2A/4)

The father’s application for leave to appeal

6.  Primarily, the father submitted I have erred by not granting an order of joint custody. He complained he has been disconnected with his four children as a result of parental alienation by the mother. He has essentially no relationship with his four children and he was of the view that he had no prospect at all. He is now being removed from the school system, he has no updates, he was not invited to the graduation ceremony.

7.  I should have given weight to his good relationship with his four children prior to the petition and not to believe the mother’s evidence. He intends to adduce further evidence by calling additional witnesses including his mother in law, the mother’s current domestic maid, the first social investigation officer who has handled the case to testify how the relationship was like prior to the petition.

8.  The father submitted I have erred by not protecting the two younger children, the access arrangement was wrongly granted in terms of a defined schedule.

9.  The father promulgated further detailed investigation of his relationship with his four children by social investigation officer.

Analysis

10.  I do not see there are real prospect of success in the father’s application for leave to appeal. It is understandable that the father was aggrieved by the order that I have given, his grounds of appeal were mainly complaints of not making an order as he has wished.

11.  The sole custody of the four children be granting to the mother was premised on the unsatisfactory relationship of the father with the four children; high conflicting situation and mistrust of the father and the mother, as well as their communication breakdown. The father blatantly admitted it is his wishful thinking of seeking joint custody, as a means to be involved again in the life of the four children. His understanding of joint custody was misconceived.

12.  Secondly, his urge on adducing new evidence (even leave be granted) would be unlikely to assist. His witness, the ex-domestic helper testified the father and children relationship was satisfactory prior to the petition. Regrettably, the relationship deteriorated because of the father’s continuing exercise of domestic violence to the mother and verbal threats of withholding interim maintenance to both the mother and the children. The verbal threats were realized and at time of trial, one child of the family was suspended from school because of outstanding school fees.

13.  Thirdly, the defined access granted to the father with the two younger children of the family was meant to give both children an appropriate means to nourish parental relationship. Defined access would be of best interest of the two children when both the father and mother have serious communication problem.

14.  Lastly, the existing social investigation reports are well written, the social investigation officer has testified at trial. I do not see the necessity of conducting further investigation by social investigation officer in light of custody, care and control and access.

15.  With the reasons foregoing, I do not see the father has a real prospect of success in the appeal. I also failed to see there are some other reasons in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard. I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant leave of appeal to the father.

Conclusion

16.  I make the following orders:

(i) The father’s (the respondent’s) summons filed on 9 March 2018 for leave to appeal against the judgment handed down on 28 February 2018 be dismissed.

(ii) The father’s (the respondent’s) do pay the mother (the petitioner) the costs of the summons filed on 9 March 2018 forthwith, to be taxed if not agreed.

(iii) The mother’s (the petitioner’s) own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

  

  

 ( J. Chow)
 Deputy District Judge

Mr John Pickavant of Messrs J M. Pickavant & Co, appeared for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person

[2018] HKFC 57-EN-2018-04-27

YCKS v. MPKC

HTML content

FCMC 8480 / 2015

[2018] HKFC 57

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8480 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 YCKSPetitioner
 and 
 MPKCRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge J. Chow in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing : 20 April 2018
Date of Judgment : 27 April 2018

-----------------------

Judgment
(Variation of Maintenance Pending Suit)

-----------------------

Introduction

1.  The issue in this judgment is variation of maintenance pending suit.

Background

2.  The Petitioner (“the mother”) took out a summons on 20 October 2016 to vary the maintenance pending suit granted in the Order of H.H. Judge Bruno Chan (as he then was) dated 20May 2016 (the “MPS Order”).  

3.  In the MPS Order, the father was ordered to pay maintenance pending suit at HK$4,800 for the mother and HKHK$35,200 for four children of the family. It was further ordered in paragraph 2 thereof, such order was made on an ex-parte basis without prejudice to the father’s right to oppose or to apply to set aside the MPS Order at a later date.

4.  The father took out a summons for variation on 28 June 2016, in that he sought an order to vary the MPS Order to a reasonable sum. In the hearing on 30 June 2016, both the mother and the father’s summonses be adjourned sine die, with liberty to restore. On 28 November 2017, the mother took out another summons to restore the summons filed on 20 October 2016. On 13 December 2017, I so directed the mother to proceed with the said summons. The father made no application to restore his summons.

5.  The mother is now seeking an upwards variation of maintenance pending suit to an aggregate sum of HK$92,000 in either (i) the father to pay the mother HK$92,000 or (ii) the father do pay the mother a further sum of HK$52,000 (being rental payment of HK$12,000 and HK$40,000 school fees of the four children of the family).

6.  The father opposed. He submitted he has been unemployed for 5 years. He has no means to pay.

The legal principles

7.  The applicable legal provisions for maintenance pending suit can be found in section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Properties Ordinance, Cap 192 (“Cap 192”), the governing principle is that the Court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all circumstances by adopting a “broad-brush” approach. In HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95, Hartmann JA (as he then was) at paragraphs 37-38 of the judgment, gave a succinct summary of the law in this area:

“37. The principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness. This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn QC, sitting then as a deputy High Court judge, in TL v ML and Others (Ancillary Relief: Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263, at 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it. For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the judge’s reference to the source of those principles:

i. The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, whichis synonymous with ‘fairness’.

ii. A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

iii. In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

iv. Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources. In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38. Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties.  While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a ‘broad brush’ basis.”

39.  In C v L (unrep, FCMC 13605/2013, 10 December 2014), HHJ Melloy summarized the law on interim maintenance in paragraph 5 of her decision:

“The law is well known and not in dispute. Section 3 MPPO Cap192 states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case. Consequently applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis. A detailed examination of the parties’ means may be examined at a later date at a full ancillary relief hearing if there is no agreement in the meantime, when there is then every opportunity to achieve fairness by means of set off. In other words, if there is any overpayment or underpayment that can normally be rectified at a final ancillary relief hearing. Applications for interim maintenance for a child under section 5 of the same ordinance are approached in exactly the same way as a maintenance pending suit application under section 3. It is interim maintenance that we are concerned with here.”

40.  For variation of interim maintenance, section 11(7) of Cap 192 states,

“In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates…”

41.  The principles in AEM v. VMF (CACV 261/2011), the Court shall also consider the current financial means and circumstance of the parties. The modern approach as required by section 11(7) is for the Court to consider all circumstances of the cases. The Court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh.

New documentary evidence

42.  Mr. Pickavant, solicitor for the mother submitted, he would rely on new documents, mostly letters sent to the father from banks. For reason she has only discovered them at the matrimonial home recently, she applied to confirm those by oral evidence. The father raised no objection. I aware in usual maintenance pending suit (or variation) hearings, the Court is not required to take evidence as such, nevertheless, I see the evidence would assist in this application, I allowed both the mother and father to testify.

The current needs of the mother and the children of the family

43.  The mother updated the monthly expenses of herself and the 4 children in paragraph 18 of her 8th Affirmation filed on 14 July 2018.  The mother has set out the current monthly expenses of herself and the children in Form E. The general expenses in sum of HK$32,500; personal expenses in sum of HK$7,000; and children expenses in sum of HK$93,510. The aggregate monthly expenses are therefore HK$133,010. The mother produced her bank statements from January 2016 until March 2018. The latest current balance of the mother’s personal account was HK$15,544.66.

44.  The mother deposed in her affirmation that she is running out of means to meet daily expenses. She complained the father did not pay promptly as ordered by the MPS Order. She was unable to pay the school fees of all four children. At time of this hearing, the one child of the family was out of school because she could not settle the school fees on time.

45.  The mother has set out a current record of payments under the MPS Order by the father to-date. The father had fully paid the said maintenance in the sum of HK$40,000 in addition to the rent and school fees until June 2017. Since around August 2017, the father has continuously and unilaterally reduced the maintenance provided for the benefit of the mother and the children. That is, that all four children have been suspended from school and three of them were expelled as a direct result of the father’s non-payment of maintenance under the MPS Order. Until today, the youngest child does not attend school whereas the other three were only able to return to school upon the father taking out loans.

46.  The mother mostly adopted her affirmation and to tender new documentary evidence.

The father’s opposition

47.  The father testified his inability to pay the maintenance pending suit as ordered and had objected to an upwards variation. The father stated that he is willing to pay the mother and his four children maintenance pending suit in sum of HK$32,000, which is the exact amount of the rental income of his property in Lamma Island.

48.  The father explained, he was unemployed for 5 years. He was living on savings and loans. He complained the mother was not aware of the financial crisis and had continued to demand for maintenance of herself and four children of the family. He criticized the mother has earning capacity but refused to work. The father claimed he has proposed to the mother to relocate 4 children of the family to England where expenses on education could be reduced substantively. The mother refused to discuss the matter and he was unable to plan ahead.

The Court’s view

49.  Applying the legal principles stated above, both the application and variation of maintenance pending suit shall be assessed on a broad brush manner without detail investigation of parties financial means as in an ancillary relief trial.

50.  I accept the mother and the children’s needs. The mother has minimal amount of saving left in her bank account, she could not meet the daily needs of herself and the 4 children of the family. The MPS order plus rent and school fees are necessary and appropriate. As at the hearing, without the means to pay school fees, one of the children cannot attend school. The mother was being asked why she did not return to the workforce when she had a domestic maid at home. I agree with the mother that it would be difficult for one adult to look after 4 children without assistance, especially when she need to take one of the children to see the doctor and someone has to take care of the other 3 children at home. Without going into details, I share the same view of the mother.

51.  Mr. Pickavant submitted, in comparison, the father has  sufficient means, assets and income streams.  The father is engaged in business ventures in vegetation where inklings existed he is more a businessman.

52.  The father updated the information in his Form E whilst giving evidence. He said, his current expenses had largely reduced to HK$25,000 per month when he was currently living in his brother’s home. He has to live on personal loans. His savings in banks plunged; stocks and securities sold. Only HK$70,000 was left with the “Interactive Brokers Group”. He has no other income apart from HK$32,000 rental income from the Lamma property.

53.  Nevertheless, the documentary evidence revealed the father is the principal or sole beneficiary of premium insurance plans and mandatory provident fund with Fidelity and AIA. He has been paying premiums and was able to maintain them. The father explained the redemption value of the policy or fund would be minimal and disproportionate to benefits. He preferred to maintain them.

54.  I am in line with the mother. Letting alone the insurance plans or mandatory provident fund (I agree with the father it might not be wise to redeem them at this stage), the father is capable to pay maintenance pending suit to both the mother and the 4 children. The timeline of premium payments is telling in that they overlap with the father’s default to repeatedly reduce the maintenance of the mother and the children.  I see there is also a statement of the father’s pension scheme with Legal & General, the father agreed there is still some £6,000 in there. Without regard whether those schemes are capable or worth to be realised at this moment, the father has assets.

55.  The mother further argued, father failed to disclose his financial means. The father’s financial disclosure in his Form E filed on 12 January 2016 was materially deficient. The father had failed to disclose bank statements in relation to numerous financial holdings or interests.  The father, in his most recent financial disclosure, appears to have received HK$260,280 in both HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank between 27July 2017 and 21 January 2018 from an undisclosed source. The father explained the HK$32,000 were rental payment from his property, he could not explain the other income source.

56.  In the father’s Form E, he stated he would apply for bank statements from Citibank (United Kingdom), NatWest Bank (United Kingdom) and Lloyds Bank (United Kingdom), nevertheless, the father has never disclosed any of such after the filing of Form E. I take into account the father was being ousted from the matrimonial home and might be unable to have access to those statements. Yet, I see no reason he did not attempt to retrieve at least some of those directly from the banks by himself. In fact, the father admitted, his priority in this matrimonial proceedings is to reconnect with his four children, not to fulfil his duty to disclose documents for ancillary relief applications. Ancillary relief is also a vital part in matrimonial proceedings. The conduct of the father, as at this stage, has blatantly failed to disclose relevant materials as required in Form E.

57.  The father is also being criticized of dissipating family assets.  In the father’s bank statement of China Construction Bank (Asia) dated 31 March 2014, the father has HK$4 million in there. The deposit was withdrawn and was left with some $2.8 million in 30 April 2014. The father said he has been transferring monies between banks, so as to accrue higher interest rate for fixed deposit. The father further claimed there were double accounting of sums. I was not required to embark on detailed financial investigation of the financial position of the father, but at least, there is no evidence to verify the flow of monies.

58.  The father even admitted, he had failed to settle the maintenance pending suit (or any outstanding amount due) when he has given two cheques of tax refund around HK$90,000 by the mother by the end 2017. The father deposited the cheques into his Standard Chartered Bank account and such sums have been reflected in both the statements in October and November 2017. At that time, he has stopped paying 4 children’s school fees for some 3 months. The father preferred to settle his bills to paying school fess for his children.

59.  It was decided in HJFG v KCY, “where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee”. I am of the view that this is exactly on point, bearing all these in mind, I am not satisfied the father could explain satisfactorily of how he could sustain his monthly expenses if he was unemployed for the past 5 years. Allegedly he said he has been looking for jobs but all attempts were unsuccessful. He claimed he has reduced his expectation of seeking an employment in the range of HK$30,000 per month. The father was also unable to explain the whereabouts of funds transferred between banks. He has assets with financial institutions in both Hong Kong and England. He has means to pay.

60.  At this stage, in light of the father’s deficient Form E and non-disclosure of financial assets. Adopting a broad-brush approach in applications for maintenance pending suit, I should err in favour of the mother. I aware the father has at times failed to pay rent and school fees of the 4 children of the family even he has means to do so.  In light of reasonableness and fairness, I find it is appropriate to vary the MPS Order to the extent that the father should pay HK$12,000 rent to the mother and HK$40,000 school fees in additional to the MPS Order.

61.  I aware the father was in default of the satisfaction of the MPS Order intermittently and had ceased to pay school fees since July 2017.  For maintenance pending suit, any underpayment or overpayment can normally be rectified at a final ancillary relief hearing, I have no reason not to backdate the variation of maintenance pending suit on school fees to July 2017.

Conclusion

62.  I make the following orders:

(i) The order dated 20 May 2016 be varied to the extent that the Respondent (the father) do pay to the Petitioner (the mother) a further sum of HK$52,000 in additional to HK$40,000 as ordered in such order, representing monthly rental payment of the matrimonial home (HK$12,000) and monthly school fees of the 4 children of the family (HK$40,000) as maintenance pending suit. 

(ii) The payment of HK$40,000 being school fees of the 4 children of the family be backdated to 1July 2017. The Respondent (the father) do pay the Petitioner (the mother) the sum of HK$400,000 (HK$40,000 x 10 months, from July 2017 to April 2017) being the backdated sum after variation within 28 days hereof.

(iii) The total payment of HK$92,000, being (a) HK$40,000 as ordered in the Order dated 20 May 2016, (b) first payment of further sum of HK$52,000 shall be paid on the 1st day of May 2018 and subsequent payments on the 1st day of each succeeding month, until further order of the court.

(iv) Both the backdated sum of HK$400,000; the first and subsequent payments shall be credited directly into the Petitioner’s (the mother’s) designated bank account.

(v) Penal notice be endorsed. Personal service on the Respondent (father) is required.

(vi) The costs of both the mother’s summonses filed on 20 October 2016 and 28 November 2017 be reserved.

(vii) The Petitioner’s (the mother’s) own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

  

  

 ( J. Chow)
 Deputy District Judge

  

Mr John Pickavant of Messrs J M. Pickavant & Co, appeared for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person

[2018] HKFC 25-EN-2018-02-28

YCKS v. MPKC

HTML content

FCMC 8480/2015

[2018] HKFC 25

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8480 OF 2015

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 YCKSPetitioner

and

 MPKCRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge J. Chow in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing : 9, 11 & 12 January 2018

Date of Judgment :  28 February 2018

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T

(Custody and Access Arrangement)

-----------------------

Introduction

1.  The issues in this judgment are custody and access arrangement of the children of the family.

Background

2.  The petitioner (“the mother”) and the respondent (“the father”) were married in London in 2001. They have four children, namely, the eldest brother (“child C”); younger brother (“child R”), younger sister (“child L”) and the youngest brother (“child T”).  At time of trial, the four children are respectively 15, 14, 11 and 9 years old.  All of them are studying in various international schools in Hong Kong. The family had lived in their matrimonial home, a village house in Lamma Island. The father moved out from the matrimonial house sometime around February – March 2015. All four children have been staying with the mother in the matrimonial home since then.

3.  The mother claimed she has suffered from violent dispositions by the father. On 6 July 2015, she obtained a non – molestation order to refrain the father from doing so.

4.  The mother commenced this petition for divorce on 6 July 2015. No decree nisi has been granted yet.

5.  On 25 November 2016, an interim access was ordered, the father shall have interim access: (i) one Saturday each month for a duration of 8 hours for child C and child R; and (ii) two alternate Saturdays each for a duration of 8 hours for child L and child T. On 25 January 2017, the father obtained defined access to the four children on specific dates during the period from 30 January 2017 to 4 April 2017. Save and except the above orders on interim access, no order on custody, care and control has been granted.

The open proposals

6.  The mother complained of high level of conflict with the father resulting from the past domestic violence suffered by her in the hands of the father. She found fruitful communication and cooperation between herself and the father impossible. She seeks sole custody, care and control of the four children with defined access to the father. She agreed to the recommendations on custody and access by the clinical psychologist.

7.  The father disagreed. He agreed care and control of 4 children be granted to the mother, but insisted for an order of joint custody. At time of giving evidence at trial, the father revised his proposals on access to one of reasonable access for child C and child R; and defined access to child L and child T, more particularly,

(i) day access on each Saturday and Sunday; the father’s birthday;

(ii) staying access for two weekend per month;

(iii) day access on the child L and child T on their birthdays on alternate years;

(iv) half-share of long school holidays and share of access on Christmas and Chinese New Year on alternate years.

The social welfare reports and clinical psychological reports

8.  A number of reports have been obtained, namely,

(i) Ms Cheng’s social investigation report prepared dated 28 April 2016 (“the 1st SIR report”);

(ii) Ms Cheng’s progress report dated 12 September 2016 (“the 1st progress report”);

(iii) Ms Lo’s progress report dated 30 March 2017 (“the 2nd progress report”);

(iv) Ms Lo’s updated social investigation report dated 17 October 2017 (“the updated SIR report”);

(v) Dr Poon’s clinical psychological report dated 27 April 2016 (“the 1st clinical psychological report”); and

(vi) Dr Yau’s clinical psychological report dated 17 November 2017 (“the 2nd clinical psychological report”).

9.  I shall summarize them in turn:

(i) In the 1st SIR report, Ms Cheng (who was not called as a witness) confirmed the children wanted to stay with the mother, they did not want to live with or have regular access with the father. Ms Cheng also noted the children’s hatred and dislike for the father as a result of his angry and violent disposition and treatment to the mother. The father asked for increased access. The children asked for reduced access. Ms Cheng hoped for both the mother and father to put aside their difference and to share parental responsibility and to make decisions for the children. She recommended joint custody, care and control to the mother and defined access at least 2 hours each week with a view to increase frequency of access when the children show willingness and readiness to do so in the future.

(ii) In the 1st progress report, Ms Cheng noted continuing disagreement on access. The father insisted to increase access; the mother concerned the resistance of the children to see their father. All parties were stressful. Ms Cheng was of the view that the father’s request to increase access might not be viable in light of the children’s resistance. An increased access at this stage would result of more stress on the children. Ms Cheng suggested access be carried out in pairs, at least once a month, with the presence of the domestic helper, to maintain father – child relationship.

(iii) The 2nd progress report was prepared by Ms Lo. This report was called for on access with the father. Ms Lo noted both the mother, father and the children had been attending counselling services. The mother reinstated her concern of the children’s reluctance to attend access, she said the father shall be blamed. The father said the mother was uncooperative in making access a smooth one. The children maintained their resistance to see their father. Ms Lo held the same view with Ms Cheng, that an increased level of access was untenable, she suggested the same access arrangement as Ms Cheng did in the 1st progress report.

(iv) The updated social investigation report, called for on issues of custody and access, was prepared by Ms Lo as well. Ms Lo was aware of the mother and father had been undergoing counselling services from therapist and clinical psychologist, she took the view, with a hope, that communication between the mother and father could show improvement gradually. She suggested joint custody. Child C and child R indicated they were engaged in extra-curricular activities and were unwilling to pay visit to the father’s home in Yuen Long. Ms Lo then made a recommendation to reduce access duration for both of them to a period of 4 hours, once a month. For child L and child T, Ms Lo suggested access 3 times a week, not more than 5 hours each time. A domestic helper can attend access to make the children comfortable. Ms Lo added access can be increased whilst the children show willingness and readiness in the future. Joint custody of the children, care and control to the mother and defined access is recommended.

(v) The 1st clinical psychological report was prepared by Dr Poon (she was called as a witness). She wrote, “the father having low frustration tolerance. He tends to get angry and loses his temper easily. Although he does not directly abuse the children, he does not understand them. It is possible that he often says and does things that hurts them and damages their relationship inadvertently”. Dr Poon further said the father should make positive changes to regain the children’s trust. The father should acknowledge violence done to the mother, learn to ventilate his frustration without using violence, and learn to cope and face the children’s rejection. Dr Poon opined present weekly defined access for the children can be continued with a view that each father could have access with each child each week as relationship improved.

(vi) The 2nd clinical psychological report was prepared by Dr Yau. Dr Yau analysed the children took side with the mother because of domestic violence. They see the father a “bad, mean and dangerous” person. High level of conflict persisted after separation of the mother and the father. She said “in other words, the estrangement becomes consolidated into alienation of the children from the father in the context of a bitter divorce as well as the continual use of violence by the father. However, it is not just brought by a single casual factor, that is, the mother as the single etiological factor”. Dr Yau opined joint custody would not work. Joint custody would bring about more disputes, arguments and conflicts. She inclined to suggest sole custody to the mother. Dr Yau recommended the father to have some genuine reflection on issue of domestic violence. The father can only improve the relationship with the children when all forms of domestic violence ceased and then the children can “feel safe” again. Dr Yau do not agree to staying access, she said 4 – 5 hours of day access would be appropriate. She agreed to maintain the current access arrangement, i.e. to attend in pairs.

Evidence

10.  Both the mother and the father testified at trial. The father called the ex-domestic helper, (“D”) as his witness. Only Ms Lo, the social investigation officer and Dr Yau, the clinical psychologist were called as witnesses. 

The legal principles

11.  The applicable principles are those contained in section 3(1)(a) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13.

3. General principles

(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property—

(a) in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court—

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to—  

(A) the views of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father.”

12.  I also take into account the “welfare checklist” referred to in  section 9.29 of the Report on Child Custody and Access published by the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong in March 2005:

(a) the ascertainable views of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b) the child’s physical, emotional and education needs;

(c) the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

(d) the likely effect on the child of any changes in the child’s circumstances;

(e) the child’s age, maturity, sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics of the child which the court considers relevant;

(f) the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;

(g) any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(h) any family violence involving the child or a member of the family;

(i) how capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(j) [a broader formulation along the lines of] the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

(k) The range of powers available to the court under this Ordinance in the proceedings in question;

(l) Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

The father’s evidence

13.  The father insisted joint custody be granted because he was frustrated with the adverse reaction of the children. He protested his access with the children were curtailed, the quality of access was shallow. He found the children have disappeared in his life. He complained “now nothing shared, no photos, no advice of what the kids do”. The father was eager and had great concern to keep the bondage with his children. He wished to rebuild father – child relationship though participating in the children’s life with the aid of increased level of access. He was bewildered of the drastic change of attitude of the children and then start to believe the mother was the person to be responsible for this.

14.  The father thought there would only be a short separation with the mother from February 2015. He expected the mother and himself will resume dialogue to solve the disputes but things did not go smoothly. The father was unsettled particularly when he had mentioned he was being ousted from the lives of his family by the mother. He was asked to leave the matrimonial home in February 2015 permanently. The father said, the relationship with the children was harmonious prior to the separation. He took care the children, prepared meals for them, brought them to do cycling and so on. He adduced photographs and videos depicting the good moments with the children. The father recalled happy moments when child L, child T and himself staying in United Kingdom few years ago.

15.  The father complained the mother debarred him from information of the children. He has no idea of the happenings of the children. In one access session, he learnt child L had injured her arm recently, neither did the mother inform him of child L’s injury and the medical treatments. When being asked of the achievements of child C and child R at school, the father frankly said he had no idea of those deeds. The father further alleged the children were not telling the truth to both the social welfare officers and clinical psychologist. He said the mother has imposed her view on the children of whom were in loyalty conflicts between himself and the mother.

16.  The father responded to the mother’s allegation of domestic violence. He said he had done nothing to the children. He had only recalled a fight in 2010, when both the mother and himself discussed whether the children were going to have bracelets with an orthodontist, he said there were “push, push, slap, slap, you kick me, I kick you”. In another incident in 2011, when the mother had asked him to move out, out of reflex reaction, he touched the mother with part of his leg. The father apologised to the mother and no other incidents of the like had occurred. The father further said body movements and physical contacts during discussions were not unusual in their marriage.

The mother’s evidence

17.  The mother said the children were not happy with the father’s access. The mother named a few important incidents on domestic violence:

(i) On 16 June 2015, the father followed the mother with child L and child T home, he forced entry to the matrimonial home by using a ladder to climb onto the balcony and opened the door. He sat on the sofa and refused to leave. At a time, child L was standing in front of the father, he shoved her out of his way and had caused her head to hit on a basket. The father insisted to stay after the mother reported the incident to the police. He then stayed with child R in his bedroom.

(ii) On 19 June 2015, at the ferry pier in Central, the father snatched the keys from the mother, both of them struggled. The father pushed and pinned the mother to a low wall, he bent her finger hardly and had caused immense pain to the mother. The medical report showed the mother had swollen finger and abrasions on her arms. The incident was reported to the police again.

(iii) On 6 July 2015, the father forced entry to the matrimonial home by climbing to the balcony by way of a ladder. He agreed to leave after the police had explained to him of the mother’s application for non – molestation order. On 6 December 2015, the father came back to the matrimonial house without notice and had banged on the door for several times. The mother, the children and the domestic helper were scared. The matters were reported to the police again. The mother has successfully applied for non-molestation order against the father.

(iv) On 21 December 2015, the mother brought the children to IFC, Central. Child C refused to see the father, child R met the father and said he does not to see him again. Child C later saw his father and had resulted some degree of physical contact with him. The father was angry about this, he used foul languages, verbally threatened the children that he will not by paying their school fees. The father later texted the mother and had complained she had “poisoned” the children not to see him.

(v) On 28 December 2015, D brought the children to IFC. The father did not let child L to leave, he cursed her with foul language, and hit child T’s leg.

(vi) On 20 December 2015, D took the children to the father, she returned home afterwards. The mother was told the access was not a smooth one because the children kept telling the father that they did not want to see him. The father shouted at the children and had slapped on child T’s leg.

(vii) On 6 January 2016, D brought child L and child T to meet the father. Child C and child R went joined afterwards. The father complained. Similar incidents occurred as the children keep telling the father that they do not wish to see him. The father shouted at them and child T started to cry.

(viii) On 10 January 2016, the mother brought the children to see the father. Notwithstanding argument on the time of access, the mother witnessed the father squeezing child T, refusing to release him. Child T screamed and cried.

(ix) On 25 January 2016, access of child C and child R with the father. Neither was a smooth one as both of them told their father of their reluctance on access. By the end, the father pulled child C’s hood of his jacket and that this close to ripping child C’s head off. The father further screamed and shouted at them.

(x) On 15 February 2016, D brought child C and child R to meet the father. Both children showed their reluctance. Child R played with his i-touch and child C refused to follow the father’s instructions to say Kung Hee Fat Choi on phone to somebody. It resulted in the father’s yelling and threatening to hurt them if they do not listen.

(xi) On 17 February 2016, the father used foul language (to the mother) in front of the children.

(xii) On 24 February 2017, access with child L and child T. Child L complained the father sat on her and her stomach was hurt.

(xiii) On 22 June 2016, the father appeared in a scout activity that child C and child R had participated with the mother. The father shouted to the mother with abusive language. The matter was reported to the police.

18.  The mother testified and said the father controlled her and the children by means of financial threats since November 2014. The father verbally threatened her to reduce or cease to pay maintenance, including but not limiting to rent and school fees. As at the date of trial, child C and child R were being suspended from school because the father did not pay the maintenance. The mother reiterated, the father’s behaviour hindered effective communication, joint custody could not be an appropriate option. She will be under stress if such an order be granted. 

19.  Having said that, the mother encouraged the children to participate in father’s access, she brought the children, or sometimes by D (or the current domestic helper) to the father on the day of access. She understood the children were anxious to meet with the father, she witnessed child L had nightmare often after access, child T complained the father was rude to him. The mother denied she had brainwashed the children so as to obstruct access. Notwithstanding the unhappy incidents, the mother still continued to persuade the children to see their father. At times, during access, when she has been told of the children’s intention to leave earlier, she would talk to the children on phone and comfort them to stay a little longer. The mother agreed to the recommendations made by both the social investigation officer and the clinical psychologist.

20.  The mother responded to the father’s complaint of not keeping him informed of the children’s school results and information. She said the father’s phone number and email address are on the schools’ intranet list. The respective teachers will send update emails to both the mother and the father directly.

The domestic helper’s evidence

21.  D testified for the father. D worked for this family for 4 years and 3 months, she left in July 2016. She said the relationship between the father and the children was harmonious before February 2015. The father took care of the children, sometimes prepared meals for them. He brought the children for outdoor activities on weekends. The children were comfortable with the father and showed no sign of anxiety. D witnessed no incident of violence done to the mother by the father at any time.

22.  After their separation, D saw the father – child relationship deteriorated. When the father called home, child T refused to talk to him. D once reminded child T that the father is “your daddy”.

The social investigation officer’s and the clinical psychologist’s evidence

23.  Both Ms Lo and Dr Yau interviewed the mother, the father and the children. She maintained her recommendation in both her reports mentioned in paragraphs 9(iii), 9(iv) and 9(vi) hereinabove of which I do not intend to reproduce them here.

The Court’s view

Generally

24.  There are overwhelming evidence, including recommendations by experts that care and control shall be granted to the mother. The father has no dispute. I agree it would be the best arrangement for the children.

25.  The father acknowledged the negative attitude both child C and child R, both of them did not respect him as a father, each of their access only lasted for a short period of time, uneventful. The father has reasonably revised his stance, during trial, he agreed reasonable access for both child C and child R would be viable. Child C and child R now 15 and 14 of age respectively. Premised on the comments of both Ms Lo and Dr Yau, and also viewed from the children’s perspective, I accept, in their best interest, this is an appropriate arrangement to both child C and child R.

26.  The outstanding matters to be determined are (i) custody of 4 children and (ii) access arrangement of child L and child T. To determine the issue on custody and arrangement of access for the children, best interest of the child must be the first paramount requirement.

27.  In this case, domestic violence ranks high amongst other factors. The children were not infants, their view should be taken into account. Such determination should be done with the assistance of both the information contained in the social investigation reports and clinical psychologist reports. I attuned to the fact that I am not bound to adopt the recommendations given in any of the reports.

28.  The children’s positions were well written in all the reports. As Ms Cheng and Dr Poon were not called as witness at trial, I shall attach less weight in their reports. In turn I shall focus and consider the reports written by Ms Lo, the social investigation officer and Dr Yau, the clinical psychologist and of course, their evidence.

Joint custody appropriate?

29.  Having considered all evidence, information and the recommendation of all the reports. The answer is no. The reasons are as follows.

30.  The classic principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in PD v KWW (Joint Custody, Care and Control) [2010] HKFLR 184, it stated the proper approach of granting joint custody from paragraphs 52 onwards:

“Joint Custody: the proper approach

52. Today, although there has been no change in our law similar to many other common law jurisdictions, orders for joint custody are in no way exceptional. This is because it is accepted that in principle, such orders are in the interest of children.

53. In all but the most exceptional circumstances, the effect of divorce on the children of the marriage, especially children of tender years, is deeply felt. In all but the most exceptional circumstances, such children desire that they should continue to be protected and guided by both parents. The case before us is an example.

54. In the result, in the best interests of the child, the fact that, as a result of the breakdown of the marriage, relations between the parents are strained is not of itself a reason to refuse to make a joint order of custody. Nor is the fact that the parent to be given care and control does not agree. Such orders look to the future. They will govern a limited area of exchange between the parents, albeit one of the greatest importance.

55. Accordingly, the issue for the judge is whether, with the court proceedings concluded, it is reasonably anticipated that the parents will be able to agree on the questions of importance that will determine the upbringing of their child, both recognizing that, as difficult as it maybe for them, this process of co-operation is in the best interests of the child.

56. In determining this issue, the judge is entitled to proceed on the presumption that competent, loving parents possessed of sufficient objectivity to be able to make rational decisions in the interests of the child will be able to co-operate with each other concerning matters of importance in the upbringing of the child.

57. At all times, the welfare of the child remains the first and paramount consideration. As this Court has recognized (see, for example, Y v P [2009] HKFLR 308), there may be occasions when the ability of the parents to reach any rational accord in respect of important matters concerning the upbringing of their child is so deeply undermined that to compel attempts at co-operation will not protect the interests of the child but only leave the child more vulnerable.”

31.  In Y v P [2009] HKFLR 308, Rogers VP also gave an account on whether joint custody and sole custody shall be opted for.

“On this appeal, the first matter which must be considered is the question of custody. In this respect, attention has been drawn to the decision in ML v YJ HCMC 13 of 2006, a decision of Rimsky Yuen SC, sitting as a Recorder, given on 23 May 2007. The Recorder/s judgment usefully sets out the law relating to custody. As the Recorder pointed out in paragraph 24, the first consideration as to whether to grant joint custody to both parents or sole custody must be the welfare of the child. The Recorder went on to state that whether or not a joint custody order is workable depends very much on whether the parents can co-operate. The Recorder continued:

“A joint custody order may in appropriate cases be made for the purpose of encouraging parents to overcome their differences and co-operate for the benefit of their children. Joint custody in such circumstances can serve the purpose of recognizing the role of both parents in the child’s upbringing. However, if it is clear that a joint custody is not workable, it seems unlikely that the Court will nevertheless make such a joint custody order solely for the purpose of encouraging the parties to overcome their differences or to recognize the continuing role of the parties. As stated above, a joint custody order which is unlikely to be workable cannot be in the best interests of the children as the adverse consequences will far outweigh the benefits that it may bring”.

32.  The evidence from all respects points to the fact that both the father and the mother are unable to cooperate, without inkling of effective communication. The situation stemmed from the couples’ resentment. The mother suffered from physical abuse by the father during their marriage. In some incidents, the degree of violence was serious that the mother had called the police for assistance. The tension between the parties elevated since the separation in February 2015.  

33.  Taking the incidents prior to formal separation, the couple had had numerous disputes on daily matters. The father testified he always wanted to talk to the mother on issues. Unfortunately, it might be his wishful thinking when disputes had turned into violence. The father has referred to two occasions that he exercised “physical contact” with the mother. In one incident the father admitted he has touched the mother’s leg, he apologised profusely. I fail to see this is whole truth. From the evidence of the mother, she was able to list out quite a number of incidents. She said the father was a bad tempered person, always in rage when things are not with him. After separation, the pattern of using violence persisted. In an incident on 19 June 2015, the mother’s injury as a result of the father’s violence was recorded in a medical report. In another incident, the father was bound over for assaulting the mother.

34.  The communication problem was also noted by both Ms Lo and Ms Cheng. Ms Lo stated in her reports that she had hoped the parties could learn to cooperate by attending counselling or co-parenting workshops. Ms Lo was over cautions in giving evidence. She insisted on the hope of cooperation between the parties. Joint custody of children shall not premise on the “hope” that the parties could cooperate in the future for the benefit of the children. For the simple fact that the mother is unwilling to participate in counselling sessions and further mediation (the mother explained the father did not keep his promise) was a strong pointer, not merely they were unable to communicate, but the mother was unwilling to communicate with the father at all.

35.  It is self-evident that the mother and the father were in a state of total communication breakdown. Attempts to overcome their difference to discuss, to cooperate and to make decisions for the benefit of their children are almost impossible. The mother refused to communicate with the father. The mother and the father could not discuss matter rationally and make decisions for the children in their best interest. Despite zero reply from the mother, the father sent whatsapp messages to the mother continuously. The mother had replied once “I did not want to talk to you”. The mother’s reluctance to communicate with the father is very clear.

36.  The father admitted, during cross examination, that he and the mother are not able to communicate. The father further admitted he has tried his best endeavour to seek joint custody because he wished to participate in the lives of the children. I regret to say the father has misinterpreted the concept of joint custody. It should only be ordered for parents who can still cooperate in making decision for the children after divorce. This is obviously not the case here.  

37.  With due respect, Ms Lo has underestimated the consistent tension between the father and mother during marriage and after separation. This is a clear case that joint custody is not workable, such order shall not be granted solely for the purpose of encouraging the parents to overcome their difference and to cooperate. The recommendations of Ms Lo should not be opted for.

38.  Dr Yau’s opinion, on the other hand, was more practical and sensible. She opined joint custody is not viable at this stage. Dr Yau tested the consistency and accuracy of previous claims on domestic violence. She was aware of verbal threats by the father not to pay maintenance to the mother. The conflict between the mother and the father are insurmountable on all topics, and of course, on children issues. Sole custody of the children to the mother was left as the only viable option. I agree.

Access arrangement

39.  My determination of access would focus on child L and child T. What is practicing now is that the father will have access of both child L and child T in pairs, twice a month. It took place on alternate Saturdays for 5 – 6 hours from 11:00 am with the presence of a domestic helper. The father is now seeking day access more frequently and then to staying access progressively. The mother believes, access for child L and child T, once a month, 4 – 5 hours is appropriate at this stage. The mother also suggests a 4 – 5 hour access on Christmas holidays Chinese New Year holidays and contact with the father on the child’s birthday would be reasonable.

40.  The father pressed for an increased level of access to fix father – child relationship. He believed the more the time with the children, the more their relationship will improve. The father relied on D’s evidence to support increased access is feasible. The father submitted video clips  depicted harmonious moments with child L and child T.

41.  D testified for the father. She witnessed the father – children were in good relationship prior to separation. There were good days, children had enjoyed spending time with him. He was hands on with the children’s daily matter, he took care of the children. It is not surprising that the father and the children had good relationship prior to the divorce, yet,  what I have to focus on is the existing relationship.

42.  I have doubt in accepting D’s evidence. It must be the case that a domestic helper, though working at home may not have witnessed all happenings, including quarrels or actions of the mother and father. D testified in her evidence, after she has ceased working with the mother, she was then employed by the father’s cousin. She admitted the father has occasionally advance loans to her and has kept close contact with her since he had moved out from the matrimonial home. She further admitted her witness statement was drafted by the father, she confirmed the contents and had duly signed on it. For her frank admission, I have difficulty to accept she is an impartial witness. I cannot be sure, what she has depicted are all truth.

43.  The father then submitted the children have lied to both social investigation officers and clinical psychologists. He criticized the mother must have brainwashed the children. Dr Yau, in her evidence, firmly rejected this possibility. She frankly said, the children were tired of interviews with experts. The children told her clearly that they do not want any more interviews. Dr Yau explained, in occasions where a child attempted to evade from telling the truth, the exchanges during interview would be mechanic because the children will only repeat sentences. In her interviews with the children, they could recall incidents spontaneously, with no signs of reciting any scripts. I accept the observations of Dr Yau, the children have expressed their true feelings and were so recorded in the reports.

44.  From the information provided in both the social welfare reports and clinical psychologist reports, the children were being verbally threatened that the father would cease paying them maintenance if the children continued refusing access. Not only child L and child T had witnessed the conduct of the father, they are often subject to the same financial threats. Unfortunately, the financial threat was realised, in default of paying interim maintenance, child C and child R were being suspended from schools. Both child L and child T are mature enough to appreciate what had happened. It would not be surprising if both child L and child T be affected in near future when the mother are unable to pay their school fees. At this stage, potential harm could have disturbed child L and child T’s feelings towards their father.

45.  The father complained the emptiness of access. Child L and child T were silent, refused to stay, running away and then the father became agitated. Dr Yau was quite right in concluding the father lacks insight on the impact of his conduct on the children. Although he has no intention to hurt the children’s feelings, he had done so inadvertently.

46.  With the assistance of the “welfare checklist”, the children’s view is of importance. Child L and child T were unhappy during access with the father. It could be well explained that both of them has witnessed violence at home; accidently suffered from physical contacts by the father when he was in rage; verbal threats to stop paying interim maintenance; and/or having heard unwelcome exchanges between the mother and the father with foul languages. With these factors, with both child L and child T became reluctant to see their father.

47.  The next step, the needs of both child L and child T. The father has put it correctly that the father – child relationship has to be fixed. I entirely agree with Dr Yau’s observation the imminent thing is to let child L and child T to be comfortable, or to feel safe during access. It takes time. Both of them needed comfort and reassurance by the father, that they will not be subjected to violence, verbal threats during access. Dr Yau as pointed it out correctly, the father has to take responsibility of his past dealings with the mother, to change his attitude during access, to control his temper, to comfort the children and to listen to them. Afterall, access is in practice the right and privilege of the children rather than that of the father. It may not be fruitful by increasing frequency and duration of access as proposed by the father at this stage.

Conclusion

48.  I therefore make the following order:

(i) The mother (the petitioner) do have sole custody, care and control of the 4 children of the family, namely, child C, child R, child L and child T.

(ii) The father (the respondent) do have reasonable access to child C and child R.

(iii) The father (the respondent) do have defined access with child L and child T in pairs, twice a month for a duration no more than 5 hours with the presence of a domestic helper.

(iv) The father (the respondent) do have day access with child L and child T in pairs, with a duration of no more than 5 hours, with the presence of a domestic helper, (i) on one day of Christmas public holidays and (ii) on one day of Chinese New Year public holidays.

(v) The father (the respondent) do have phone access with child L and child T on the birthday of both children respectively.

(vi) There be no order as to costs of this hearing.

(vii) The mother’s (the petitioner’s) own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

(viii) The parties do jointly apply to court for restoring the 1st appointment hearing of this petition within 14 days hereof.

 ( J. Chow)
 Deputy District Judge

Mr John Pickavant of Messrs J M. Pickavant & Co, appeared for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person