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GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LTD v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

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[2023] HKCFI 3110-EN-2023-12-01

GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LTD v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

HTML content

HCA 1677/2015

[2023] HKCFI 3110

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1677 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN

 GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LIMITED
(廣東盈⾼航運有限公司)
(SUBSTITUTED BY ORDER OF MASTER HUI DATED 20 JANUARY 2021)
Plaintiff

and

 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEDefendant

_____________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing:24 November 2023
Date of Decision:24 November 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision:1 December 2023

_______________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_______________________

1.  This was the Plaintiff’s application for (a) leave to appeal from this Court’s dismissal of its appeal from the decision of Mr Registrar Simon Kwang on 26 October 2023; and (b) an extension of time of one day to make the application for leave to appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, leave was refused with costs to the Defendant to be summarily assessed and payable forthwith.

2.  On 7 July 2023, the Registrar dismissed the Plaintiff’s application to expunge the witness statement of Lui Siu Fai (“LSF”) and to strike out the Amended Defence

3.  This Court’s reasons for dismissing the appeal from the Registrar are set out in Reasons for Decision dated 6 November 2023 (“Reasons”) to which reference should be made for the relevant background facts (including its lengthy procedural history) as well as the reasons for dismissing the Plaintiff’s appeal.

The draft notice of appeal (“NOA”)

Ground 1: whether it was plain and obvious that the Defendant never exchanged its witness statements

4.  Mr Raymond Young, counsel for the Plaintiff, submitted that the Court erred in not striking out the Amended Defence in rejecting that it was plain and obvious that the Defendant never exchanged its witness statements. 3 reasons were given:

(1) the Court failed to take into account the absence of direct evidence that such witness statements had been exchanged;

(2) the Court attached no weight to the fact that the witness statements had not been filed with the Court when such act was highly prohibitive of the Plaintiff’s position that the witness statements had not been exchanged; and

(3) the Plaintiff sought to challenge the Court’s rejection of the veracity of the matters stated in Chin 4th, largely focusing on §22 (iv) of the Reasons.

5.  As regards (1), to succeed on a striking out application, the onus is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that it is plain and obvious that the Defendant never exchanged its witness statements. In reaching its conclusion, the Court has to consider all relevant factors of which the absence of direct evidence from the Defendant was but one.

6.  Its absence was clearly not dispositive when the Defendant was under no obligation to adduce direct evidence to prove that such service took place. The Plaintiff’s contention would reverse the burden of proof.

7.  As regards (2), the Plaintiff took issue with the statement in the Reasons (at §10) that the filing of witness statements is not required absent an order to that effect. In its written submissions, the Plaintiff raised a new point based on its interpretation of Order 38, rule 2A (2) and rule 2A (7) (a).

8.  On 19 September 2016, Registrar Lung ordered the parties to “exchange all statements of factual witnesses, which will stand as evidence in chief unless otherwise directed by the trial judge”. In so doing, the Registrar was acting pursuant to Order 38, rule 2A (2) and rule 2A (7) (a).

9.  In pertinent part, paragraph 3 (b) (iv) of the Plaintiff’s written submissions read as follows:

“where a witness statement is directed to stand as evidence in chief of the witness pursuant to rule 2A (7) (a), the necessary implication of this rule is that the witness statement be filed with the court. Only by having a filed copy of the witness statement can the court exercise its functions of granting leave to the witness to amplify the witness statement or give evidence in relation to new matters (see rule 2A (7) (b)) and allow any person to inspect a witness statement (see rule 2A (12)).” (Emphasis added)

10.  This appears to be little short of an invitation to amend/recast Order 38 by inserting (presumably into rule 2A (7) (a)) a requirement that the witness statement be filed. It is not the role of the Court to rewrite the rules.

11.  In any event, had the Registrar considered it necessary for the witness statements not only to be exchanged but also filed, he would have so ordered. There is no justification to second-guess the Registrar’s true intention.

12.  As regards (3), in §22 (iv) of the Reasons, the Court considered it inexplicable that 2 years after ceasing to be the Plaintiff’s solicitors in HCA 1677, HTW still had files for Mr Fred Ho to review. The Plaintiff submitted that the assumption that the old solicitors’ entire client file gets transferred to the new solicitors is incorrect, citing the Law Society Guidance Note on Storage and Destruction of Old Files (Revised June 2012).

13.  There was no evidence whatsoever of HTW’s practice or policy (if any) adopted to implement the Guidance Note. In the absence of that evidence, it is unclear how and where witness statements if exchanged would have been recorded. There was also no affirmation from Mr Ho as to what files/records he was able to consult in reaching his conclusion.

14.  It is also to be noted that the Plaintiff did not challenge subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of §22. Presumably, it was unable to disagree with those reasons for doubting the veracity of Chin 4th.

15.  The Plaintiff also raised a new matter that it did not raise at the October hearing. The document in question was the Plaintiff’s Timetabling Questionnaire (“TQ”) dated 24 May 2023 that was in the October hearing bundles[1] but in respect of which no submissions were made at the October hearing. Had the point been material, it was unlikely to have been overlooked.

16.  Be that as it may, the Plaintiff highlighted the fact that the Defendant never replied to any of the Plaintiff’s accusations of non-service of witness statements. It singled out the Defendant’s failure to reply to the Plaintiff’s accusation made in Part M1 of the Plaintiff’s TQ objecting to the Defendant’s request to file and serve a supplemental witness statement. This was despite the Defendant writing to the Master’s clerk on 25 May 2023 in relation to the parties’ respective TQs.

17.  The Plaintiff’s criticism is misplaced since the Defendant had already filed its TQ that prompted the Plaintiffs objection in Part M1. The Defendant was under no obligation to reply to the accusation since the onus of proof was on the Plaintiff.

18.  In any event, when the Court enquired as to the Court’s disposition of the Plaintiff’s objection, the Plaintiff replied that the relevant document was not in the hearing bundles. In those circumstances, the new matter cannot assist the Plaintiff.

Conclusion

19.  For those reasons, I see no merit in Ground 1 of the NOA. In my view, the prospects of the Plaintiff overturning the dismissal of its application to strike out the Amended Defence are virtually nil.

Ground 2: the competence point

20.  The Plaintiff did no more than repeat the submissions it made at the October hearing.

21.  It cited the CFA’s judgment in Yeung May Wan & Others v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 137 at §§71, 73-76 that concerned the power of the arrest, holding that it is the state of mind of the arresting officers, and not that of the commanding officer, that matters.

22.  That case has no application unless, contrary to my view, the issues relating to the lawfulness and bona fides of actions taken by the CED officers are found to have been pleaded in the ASOC.

23.  Even if it were applicable, there are significant differences in the factual backdrop to the 2 cases. Yeung May Wan’s case concerned arrests made during a demonstration when the demonstrators ignored a series of police warnings. The present case concerned an operation plan and enforcement action devised by LSF, the Unit Commander and officer in charge of CED’s investigation on a syndicate suspected to be involved in the offence of smuggling. LSF himself manned the Command Centre and kept the entire operation in view, including the boarding of the vessels and the inspection of cargo manifests by CED officers[2].

24.  I stand by my view expressed in the Reasons that LSF is a competent witness.

Conclusion

25.  Accordingly, Ground 2 is equally meritless.

 (Doreen Le Pichon)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Simon N M Young, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Ms Esther Chan, senior government counsel of Department of Justice, for the Defendant



[1] See Bundle A, tab 22. The Bundle A index wrongly described this document as the Defendant’s TQ instead of the Plaintiff’s TQ filed after receipt of the Defendant’s TQ dated 22 May 2023.

[2] See DOJ's letter dated 13 June 2023 to TNTL at C/58/387 (g).

[2023] HKCFI 2851-EN-2023-11-06

GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LTD v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

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HCA 1677/2015

[2023] HKCFI 2851

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1677 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN

 GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LIMITEDPlaintiff
 (廣東盈⾼航運有限公司) 
 (SUBSTITUED BY ORDER OF MASTER HUI DATED 20 JANUARY 2021) 
 and 
 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEDefendant

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 26 October 2023
Date of Decision: 26 October 2023
Date of Reasons for Decision: 6 November 2023

_________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________

1.  This is the Plaintiff’s appeal from the Decision of the Registrar Simon Kwang dated 7 July 2023 (“the Summons”) dismissing the Plaintiff’s application for an order that the witness statement of Lui Siu Fai (“LSF”) filed on 9 May 2023 be expunged and that the whole of the amended defence filed on 20 October 2021 (“Amended Defence”) be struck out. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed with costs to be summarily assessed. My reasons appear below.

Background facts

2.  The Plaintiff (who was substituted on 20 January 2021) is a related company of the original plaintiff which was wound up in December 2016. This action, commenced on 24 July 2015, is a claim against the Department of Justice (“the Defendant”) for damages for trespass to property and chattels and violations of constitutional rights arising out of conduct by officers of the Customs and Excise Department (“CED”) who, on 11 and 12 January 2012, boarded 2 vessels owned by the Plaintiff at the River Trade Terminal.

3.  The procedural history is as follows:

(i)  on 29 February 2016, Master M Wong directed, inter alia, that the parties exchange all statements of factual witnesses on or before 6 June 2016, such statements to stand as evidence in chief unless otherwise directed by the trial judge;

(ii)  the Defendant’s list of documents filed on 29 March 2016 listed 4 original statements of 3 CED officers who had carried out the operation on 11 and 12 of January 2012;

(iii)  on 15 April 2016, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff’s solicitors (“HTW”) requesting written confirmation of the date and venue for exchange of witness statements but never received a reply even after the deadline of 6 June 2016;

(iv)  on 15 August 2016, the Defendant’s 4 factual witnesses signed their witness statements;

(v)  on 7 September 2016, with a CMC scheduled for 21 September 2016, the Defendant wrote to HTW again in connection with its earlier letter of 15 April 2016 which remained unanswered;

(vi)  the Defendant’s listing questionnaire filed on 15 September 2016 listed the names of 4 witnesses, stating that the parties would exchange their respective witness statements as to the facts within 35 days:

(vii)  by consent, on 19 September 2016, Registrar KW Lung ordered the exchange of witness statements within 35 days of the order, namely, by 24 October 2016;

(viii)  HTW never responded to the Defendant’s letters sent in April and September 2016 for the exchange of witness statements and no exchange took place on 24 October 2016;

(ix)  on 2 November 2016, the Defendant proposed to HTW to have the exchange take place on 5 November 2016 at 3 pm at the High Court;

(x)  HTW replied on 4 November 2016, counter proposing that the exchange take place on 9 November 2016 at 3 pm at the High Court;

(xi)  the Defendant’s copy of HTW’s letter of 4 November 2016 shows a handwritten revision of the time of exchange from 3 pm to 3:30 pm;

(xii)  thereafter, there was no correspondence from either the Plaintiff or HTW complaining or putting on record that the Defendant had failed to exchange witness statements pursuant to the agreement for exchange to take place on 9 November 2016;

(xiii)  on 12 July 2021, some 4 years and 8 months later, the Plaintiff amended its statement of claim resulting in the Amended Defence of 20 October 2021;

(xiv)  meanwhile, on 6 October 2021, another firm (“KHM”) replaced HTW as the Plaintiff’s solicitors;

(xv)  while the Plaintiff’s timetabling questionnaire (“TQ”) of 22 September 2022 proposed a direction for exchange of witness statements after discovery, the Defendant’s TQ at F3 referred to Chow Wai Tong as a factual witness but the “template” wording of F3[1] was revised to “supplemental[2] statements”, proposing that “supplemental witness statements” be filed and exchanged by both parties;

(xvi)  on 15 November 2022, Master Ho ordered the exchange of “witness statements and/or supplemental witness statements” by 27 January 2023;

(xvii)  on 15 March 2023, the Plaintiff’s current solicitors (“TNTL”) took over from KHM;

(xviii)  on 31 March 2023, the Plaintiff sought an unless order for the Defendant to file and serve its “witness statements and/or supplemental witness statements[3]” within 7 days;

(xix)  on 11 April 2023, after hearing argument, Master Kot ordered the Defendant to file and serve its “supplemental witness statement[4]”, if any, within 21 days;

(xx)  by consent, on 4 May 2023, Master Ho granted the Defendant a further extension of time to “exchange its witness statement(s) and/or supplemental witness statement(s)” with the Plaintiff by 9 May 2023 at 5 pm on an unless basis (“the May 2023 unless order”).

4.  The Summons seeks (a) to expunge LSF’s witness statement filed on 9 May 2023; and (b) that the whole of the Amended Defence filed on 20 October 2021 be struck out.

5.  Registrar Kwang dismissed the Summons, culminating in the present appeal.

This appeal

6.  The Plaintiff’s ground(s) for striking out the Amended Defence is/are that the Defendant failed to comply with the unless order dated 4 May 2023 and/or Order 25, rule 6 (1); and further and/or in the alternative there is no evidence to support the Defendant’s case in the Amended Defence.

7.  For the Plaintiff to succeed in striking out the Amended Defence, it must satisfy the court that it is plain and obvious that (i) the Defendant never exchanged its witness statements; and (ii) LSF is not a competent witness.

Exchange of the Defendant’s witness statements

8.  In support of its Summons, the Plaintiff filed the 2nd affirmation of Chin Kam Chiu dated 23 June 2023 (“Chin 2nd”), currently the chairman of the Keen Lloyd Group and the person in charge of the Plaintiff. Assertions were made in §§4, 9, 11 and 15 of Chin 2nd to the effect that no statements were given or produced by the Defendant before the expiration of the May 2023 unless order.

9.  Those assertions were based on (a) the fact that the document index of the court search does not show the filing of the Defendant’s witness statements; and (b) the Plaintiff’s ‘speculation’ that the Defendant’s factual witnesses “were called off to give or produce any statements of factual witness in order to avoid criminal liability” as a result of Reasons of Verdict in criminal proceedings before District Court Judge Tam Sze Lok on 26 June 2019 who disbelieved their evidence relating to the export cargo manifests.

10.  As regards (a), the May 2023 unless order did not require the filing of witness statements which were only ordered to be exchanged. The fact that the filing of such statements is not recorded in the court index does not mean that they have not been exchanged. Filing is not required absent an order to that effect.

11.  In its skeleton dated 19 October 2023, the Defendant took issue, inter alia, with the repeated submissions made in the Plaintiff’s skeleton that the Defendant had failed to produce any witness statements of its witnesses.

12.  The Plaintiff (who was allegedly taken by surprise) caused urgent enquiries to be made. As a result, it sought leave to file Mr Chin’s 4th affirmation dated 25 October 2023 (“Chin 4th”).

13.  At the hearing, Chin 4th was read de bene esse.

14.  In pertinent part:

(a)  §4 of Chin 4th referred to the fixing of time for exchange witness statements at 3 pm on 9 November 2016;

(b)  §5 stated that at 2.45 pm HTW’s representative provided the Defendant with the witness statement of the Plaintiff’s witness;

(c)  §6 is a hearsay account of what the Defendant’s representative stated to HTW’s representative[5], namely that “he was only being told to collect the Plaintiff’s witness statement and was not instructed to provide the Plaintiff with the Defendant’s witness statements”;

(d)  in §7, Mr Chin gave an account of a visit made to him (when he was in custody) on 15 November 2016 by Mr Ho Chun Ki Fred (“Mr Fred Ho”), the then handling solicitor at HTW who recounted to Mr Chin the events described in (a) to (c) above whereupon Mr Chin immediately instructed him to make an application to court for an adjournment of these proceedings until the criminal proceedings have concluded;

(e)  §§10-11 referred to Mr Chin being advised on 19 October 2023 of the Defendant’s submissions regarding the 9 November 2016 exchange of witness statements, causing Mr Chin to call Mr Fred Ho the following morning (20 October 2023) at 9 am requesting him “to search for the witness statements” of the 4 officers;

(f)  §12 exhibited HTW’s reply dated 20 October 2023. The English translation read:

“RE: High Court Case No. HCA 1677/2015.

You have called us to enquire whether we have received any witness statement of the Defendant from the Department of Justice during the period when we were handling the action on behalf of the Plaintiff. After checking our files, we do not have any witness statement of the Defendant, nor can we find any record for the receipt of witness statement of the Defendant.”

Striking out the Amended Defence

15.  Mr Simon Young, counsel for the Plaintiff, maintained that based on this evidence, and the absence of evidence from the Defendant, the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendant did not exchange its witness statements on 9 November 2016. It is now too late for the Defendant to do so and the May 2023 unless order should be given effect.

16.  Mr Young submitted that Chin 2nd was before the Master and there are passages in that affirmation that state that the Plaintiff never received the 4 witness statements. In reaching his decision, the Master must accept that those are the facts.

17.  That submission has to be viewed against the backdrop of how the Plaintiff’s representative presented the Plaintiff’s case to Master. The transcript shows that when the Master asked the Plaintiff’s representative the grounds upon which the relief was sought, as for paragraph 1 of the Summons (about LSF’s competence), all that was said was that LSF was not physically present on the vessel. As for paragraph 2 (to strike out the Amended Defence) the Plaintiff’s representative never made the point that the Plaintiff never received the 4 witness statements and never referred the Master to the various passages in Chin 2nd to that effect.

18.  Mr Young accepted that based on the transcript, the issue of non-service of witness statements was not expressly raised but he highlighted the fact that when the Master asked the Defendant’s representative how many witness statements had been exchanged, the reply was there was just one and no mention was made of the other 4 witness statements. Further, the Defendant did not seek to put in evidence to refute the Plaintiff’s evidence in Chin 2nd.

19.  When it is said that there is no evidence to refute what is asserted in Chin 2nd, the context is important. Had the point been raised before the Master, the matter would have been addressed. The fact is that the point was never raised by the Plaintiff at the hearing.

20.  Leaving aside Chin 4th for the moment, what the procedural history shows is that from the time of Master M Wong’s order[6] made in February 2016 for the exchange witness statements until 9 November 2016, the Plaintiff not only failed to respond to the Defendant’s 2 letters regarding such exchange prior to the 2 court deadlines (6 June and 24 October 2016)[7], but also ignored them. The Defendant, on the other hand, was anxious to comply with the court orders.

21.  Given that background, Mr Mike Lui SC, leading counsel for the Defendant submitted that it is inherently implausible that the Defendant would agree to an appointed time and place for the exchange of witness statements but, according to the hearsay account in Chin 4th, its representative was there simply to collect the Plaintiff’s witness statement.

22.  Turning to Chin 4th, it is riddled with difficulties:

(i)  although HTW was not replaced as the Plaintiff’s solicitors in HCA 1677 until 6 October 2021, based on the papers for this hearing, its last involvement in HCA 1677 appears to be Mr Fred Ho’s oral hearsay account[8] of the 9 November 2016 exchange when he visited Mr Chin who was in custody on 15 November 2016;

(ii)  notwithstanding Mr Chin’s instructions given to Mr Fred Ho upon hearing the latter’s account of the events of 9 November 2016, there is no evidence that any action was taken by HTW to carry out those instructions, for example, by writing to the Defendant referring to Plaintiff’s instructions or making an application for a stay;

(iii)  if what was recounted by Mr Fred Ho is true, the DOJ (representing the Government) would have been engaging in unprofessional and entirely unacceptable conduct, intentionally misled HTW into attending the High Court for an exchange witness statements when it had no intention of doing so. In those circumstances, it is inexplicable and unbelievable that HTW would not have made a complaint or put on record what the DOJ had done;

(iv)  it is also inexplicable that having ceased to act as the Plaintiff’s solicitors in HCA 1677 in October 2021, upon receiving Mr Chin’s telephone call[9] 2 years later, HTW still had files that it could review;

(v)  if Mr Chin’s account of what he had been told by Mr Fred Ho on 15 November 2016 is true, knowing (as he must) that HTW ceased to act in HCA 1677 at least 2 years earlier, Mr Fred Ho could simply have been asked to confirm what he had told Mr Chin 7 years earlier.

23.  For those reasons, I have serious misgivings as to the veracity of the matters stated in Chin 4th and reject that evidence.

24.  Plainly, the court is not in a position to resolve the conflict of evidence as to what really transpired on 9 November 2016. Nor would further evidence on that issue assist.

25.  The Plaintiff (who is the applicant for striking out the Amended Defence) bears the burden of demonstrating that it is plain and obvious that the Defendant never exchanged its witness statements on 9 November 2016. On the evidence before the court, the Plaintiff is unable to do so. For that reason alone, the Plaintiff cannot succeed in striking out the Amended Defence.

The competence point

26.  This is premised on the action involving the trial of issues as to (a) whether the operation carried out by the CED on 11-12 January 2012 was “lawful and bona fide”, (b) whether the masters of the relevant vessels provided “genuine Hong Kong export manifests” to the 3 CED officers who had given witness statements, and (c) how the “alleged manifests” were obtained by those officers[10]. Those issues are said to be the central or material issues.

27.  But the complaint in the amended statement of claim (“ASOC”) is about the CED officers boarding the vessels that the Plaintiff had leased from the River Trade Terminal as “private premises” without valid search warrants and unlawfully seized the containers that were on board. In other words, the causes of action pleaded are confined to trespass to premises and/or goods. The issues referred to in §26 above are not pleaded.

28.  The particulars given in §19 of the ASOC are confined to CED’s conduct of trespassory entry into the berths (i.e. private premises) without search warrants and boarding the vessels as trespassers purportedly in accordance with section 21 (1) (a) of the Import and Export Ordinance, Cap 60, and of wrongfully and/or unlawfully seizing (and thereafter refusing to return to the Plaintiff) the unlawfully seized articles.

29.  Nothing is pleaded in the ASOC about fraudulent conduct, fabrication of the manifests, malicious prosecution.

30.  It is relevant to mention that in relation to the witness statements of the Plaintiff’s 2 witnesses (Leung Ka Yip and Mr Chin) in these proceedings, after a contested hearing on 16 August 2023, substantial passages in those witness statements concerning the issues referred to in §26 above (with serious allegations of fraud, malicious prosecution and fabrication of documents made against the CED officers) were struck out by Master Kwong[11].

31.  The objection to LSF’s competence rests solely on the fact that he was not physically present on the vessel at the time of the operation and so does not have personal knowledge of the ‘misconduct’ (fraud, malicious prosecution and fabrication of documents) that occurred.

32.  It is accepted[12] that LSF was the person in charge of the entire operation. In that capacity he would have received reports from his subordinates throughout the operation. In my view, LSF is competent to testify as to how the entire operation was carried out.

33.  For those reasons, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s submissions on the competence point.

34.  Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

  (Doreen Le Pichon)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Simon N M Young, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Mike Lui SC, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Defendant



[1]  See Appendix A to PD 5.2.

[2]  This summons was and could be only consistent with the fact that the Defendant had produced witness statements earlier.

[3]  The Plaintiff's summons specifically referred to "supplemental witness statements". If the Defendant had never exchanged factual witness statements previously, there would be absolutely no reason for the Plaintiff to refer to the filing and service of "supplemental" witness statement(s).

[4]  This order was and could only be consistent with the fact that the Defendant’s witness statements had been produced earlier.

[5]  Neither representative was identified by name. Nor was the maker of this hearsay account identified by name.

[6]  See §3 (i) above.

[7]  See §3 (i) and (vii) above.

[8]  Mr Fred Ho’s account was what he was told by HTW’s unidentified representative present at the exchange.

[9]  See §11 (e) and (f) above.

[10]  The Plaintiff's skeleton at §§31, 32

[11]  At the hearing, the court was informed that the Plaintiff has filed an appeal against Master Kwong’s decision.

[12]  In HCA 1804/2021, both LSF and Mr Chin filed affirmations. In Mr Chin's affirmation, he acknowledged LSF’s  involvement in CED's investigation and operation regarding suspected cross-border smuggling activities. LSF (a Senior Inspector and Unit Commander) was responsible for planning and overseeing the daily operation and investigation of the Unit (C/379-383).

[2022] HKCFI 554-EN-2022-02-22

GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LTD v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

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HCA 1677/2015

[2022] HKCFI 554

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1677 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN  
 GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LIMITEDPlaintiff
 (广东盈⾼航运有限公司) 
 (SUBSTITUTED BY ORDER OF MASTER HUI 
 DATED 20 JANUARY 2021) 

and

 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEDefendant

_____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon in Chambers (by paper disposal)

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions: 7 February 2022

Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 14 February 2022

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Reply: 16 February 2022

Date of Decision: 22 February 2022

_______________

DECISION

_______________

1.  This is the plaintiff’s application by summons for leave to appeal from the order made on 20 January 2022 dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal from Master Hui’s order extending time for the defendant to file her amended defence.

2.  The procedural history and the reasons for dismissing the appeal are set out in the Reasons for Decision dated 24 January 2022 (“the Decision”) to which reference should be made. For convenience, the nomenclature and abbreviations used in the Decision will be adopted.

3.  It is common ground that the applicable principles for granting leave to appeal are those set out in SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125. Leave under Order 59, rule 2B will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that (a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or (b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

4.  The plaintiff’s draft Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) sets out the 4 grounds set out and considered below.

Ground 1 (“NOA §1”)

5.  There are 3 limbs to NOA §1;

(a)  The Decision is plainly wrong in that the court failed to take into consideration that allowing the extension for the filing of the amended defence has the effect of barring the plaintiff from making an application for default judgment (“the default judgment bar point”).

(b)  Further or alternatively, the court erred in having taken irrelevant matters (namely, the July order) into account when what should have been taken into account is the amended writ enclosed with Form No 14 served on 12 July 2021 on the defendant (“the Form 14 point”).

(c)  Further or alternatively, the court failed to take into account that the acknowledgement of service of the defendant was to be treated as an entry of appearance (O. 12, r. 10), for the purpose of any enactment referring expressly or impliedly to the entry of appearance as a procedure provided by rules of court for responding to the amended writ, whereas such peremptory order has imposed the additional requirement of sanction, or other process issuing out of the CFI and the defendant stated her intention to contest acknowledgement of service filed (“the entry of appearance point”).

6.  As to the default judgment bar and the Form 14 points, it is stated in HKCP 2022 at §19/2/3 that:

“if an amended statement of claim is served after the defence and the defendant does not serve an amended defence, he does not thereby place himself in default, for he is presumed to rely on his original pleading”.

In the present case, as the defence was filed on 2 November 2015, any application by the plaintiff for default judgment must fail.

7.  Mr Brian Lo, counsel for the plaintiff, considers that the ‘peremptory’ order in Form 14 imposes the additional requirement of ‘sanction’. If that were correct, it would be at odds with what is clearly stated in HKCP 2022 §19/2/3 set out above.

8.  Further, the July order dispensed with service of the amended writ of summons endorsed with the amended statement of claim on the defendant and granted leave to the defendant to file an amended defence “if so advised”. By serving the amended writ on the defendant, the plaintiff did not comply with the July order. Even if there was anything in the Form 14 point, the plaintiff cannot unilaterally and without the court’s approval impose any ‘sanction’ on the defendant. It is also a fact that the defendant was not obliged to file an amended defence.  

9.  Form 14 is but part of the process stemming from and governed by the July order. It cannot override the effect of the July order. As explained in the Decision (at §15) there are 2 forms of peremptory orders and the July order does not carry any self-executing sanction for its non-compliance.

10.  As regards the entry of appearance point, in substance, it appears to be no different from the Form 14 point.

Grounds 2 and 3 (“NOA §§2 and 3”)

11.  The court erred in failing to take into account that the defendant failed to serve and file her amended defence within 28 days after the service and filing of the acknowledgement of service. After the 28 days, in the absence of an amended defence, the sanction would be in effect and the proceedings would come to an end unless the defendant had within 14 days after the 28 days’ limit applied for and obtained relief from sanction under O. 2, r. 4, and that such application must be supported by evidence under O.2, rr. 5 (1) and 5 (2) (“the relief from sanction point”).

12.  However, the relief from sanction point does not arise in the absence of an “unless order”. It adds nothing to the points taken under NOA §1.

Ground 4 (“NOA 4[1]”)

13.  The court erred in failing to take into account [the fact] that the defendant failed to comply with the peremptory order that an act be done within the [specified] time and that the defendant failed to apply for relief from sanction of the peremptory order. The sanction [took] effect [upon the] expiration of the [period for] the act to be done [and] the proceedings of the plaintiff [came] to an end. The defendant had erred in relying on O.3, r. 5 for an application for the extension of time [to comply with the] amended writ of summons after 13 days (23 September 2021) of the expiration. Master Hui had no jurisdiction to deal with the defendant’s application for an extension to comply with the amended writ of summons.

14.  The nub of NOA §4 appears to be that on the facts of the present case, the court had no jurisdiction to grant a time extension under O.3, r. 5.

15.  It is to be noted that at the appeal hearing, the plaintiff’s submission was that the master should not have exercised his discretion under O.3, r.5 to grant a time extension and not that the Master had no jurisdiction to so. That the discretion ought not be exercised is not to be conflated with the notion that the court has no jurisdiction it could exercise.

16.  In its reply submissions, the plaintiff resiled from the proposition that the court had no jurisdiction to grant a retrospective time extension absent an explanation from the defendant. While accepting that this court does have jurisdiction to do so, the defendant maintains that the factors identified in O.2, r.5 ought to be taken into account.

17.  But the factors identified O.2, r.5 are only relevant in an application for relief from sanction which (as earlier explained) does not arise in the present case.

18.  In dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal from the Master’s decision, this court exercised its discretion afresh having in mind[2] the statement in HKCP 2022 at §3/5/2 that all matters (including the adequacy of any reason for delay) must be considered. Reasons were given as to why the court considered it appropriate to grant a time extension see §§21-24 of the Decision.

Conclusion on the NOA §§ 1-4

19.  For the reasons stated above, NOA §§1-4 are misconceived and, in my view, have no prospect of success on appeal.

The plaintiff’s written submissions

20.  Unconventionally, the plaintiff’s written submissions do not directly address NOA §§1-4. Rather, they raise the following 3 contentions, namely, that the court erred in

(a)  disregarding the retrospective nature of the defendant’s time summons; in failing to consider the factors for granting relief from sanctions in O.2, r. 5 and the objectives of RHC O.1A (“the 1st contention”);

(b)  incorrectly applying the principles in Wing Fai Construction Co Limited v Cheng Kit YinKelly, CACV 249/2010, unrep., 8 April 2011 and The Decurion [2012] 1 HKLRD 1063 at §11 (1) (“the 2nd contention”); and

(c)  failing to take into consideration the defendant’s failure to apply for relief from sanction (“the 3rd contention”).

21.  While the 3rd contention resembles NOA §3 and so requires no further comment, the 1st and 2nd contentions appear to be a mishmash of miscellaneous points some of which had been advanced in the NOA. Those can be dealt with briefly.

(a) the 1st contention

22.  That this court was well aware of the defendant’s application for a retrospective time extension and without a supporting affidavit is apparent [3]. Equally clear is the firm view taken that the July order, whilst a peremptory order, was not an “unless” order[4]. Accordingly, O.2, r.4 was inapplicable[5].

23.  The reasons for exercising the court’s discretion afresh are set out in the Decision. The criteria for an appellate court to interfere with the exercise of a discretion conferred on the judge in the court below are well established and require no elaboration: see HKCP 2022 at §59/0/54. In my view, in the present case, the plaintiff has no prospects of overturning the exercise of that discretion.

(b) the 2nd contention

24.  The premise underlying the 2nd contention is that an explanation by the defendant (as to why the original deadline could not have been adhered to) is a pre-requisite or condition for the exercise of the court’s discretion. As noted earlier, that is no longer the plaintiff’s position. 

Conclusion

25.  Accordingly, the leave summons is dismissed with costs nisi to the defendant with certificate for counsel, such costs to be summarily assessed and payable forthwith.

26.  As the defendant has already lodged her statement of costs, the plaintiff is directed to lodge its objections within 14 days of this Decision and the defendant is directed to lodge her reply (if any) within 7 days thereafter.

 

 (Doreen Le Pichon)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Brian Lo, instructed by K. H. Mak & Co., for the Plaintiff

Ms Esther Chan, Senior Government Counsel of the Department of Justice, for the Defendant

[1]  To make better sense of NOA §4, minor changes to the wording of the original version have been made as indicated.

[2]  See §20 of the Decision.

[3]  See the Decision at §8.

[4]  See the Decision at §§15-17.

[5]  See the Decision at §18.

[2022] HKCFI 305-EN-2022-01-24

GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LTD v. SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE

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HCA 1677/2015

[2022] HKCFI 305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1677 OF 2015

________________________

BETWEEN

 GUANGDONG YINGGAO SHIPPING LIMITED
(广东盈高航运有限公司)
Plaintiff
 and 
 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEDefendant

________________________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Le Pichon in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  20 January 2022

Date of Decision:  20 January 2022

Date of Reasons for Decision:  24 January 2022

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________


1.  This is the appeal of Guangdong Yinggao Shipping Limited (“the plaintiff”)  from the order dated 29 September 2021 made by Master Hui extending time to 20 October 2021 for the Secretary for Justice (“the defendant”)  to file its amended defence.

Procedural history

2.  On 24 July 2015, Yinggao Shipping (HK)  Limited (“the original plaintiff”)  commenced this action against the defendant by issuing a writ endorsed with a statement of claim.

3.  The court was informed by Mr Ng Man Sang Alan counsel for the plaintiff that the original plaintiff went into compulsory liquidation at some point.

4.  On 20 January 2021, the plaintiff was substituted as plaintiff in place of the original plaintiff by an order made by Master Hui and, some 5 months later, on 24 June 2021, the plaintiff applied by summons to amend its statement of claim.

5.  This resulted in a consent order made by Master Rita So on 7 July 2021 (“the July order”)  which, inter alia, provided that:

“§3. [T]he Defendant do have leave to make consequential amendment(s), if so advised, and to file and serve the amended Defence within 28 days from the date of service of the Amended Writ of Summons endorsed with the Amended Statement of Claim;”

6.  The plaintiff served its amended statement of claim on the defendant on 12 July 2021.

7.  The defendant failed to file its amended defence by 10 September 2021 which was the deadline for so doing under the July order. 

8.  By summons dated 23 September 2021, then being 13 days out of time, the defendant applied for an extension of time for the filing of the amended defence. There was no supporting affidavit to the summons.

9.  The application was heard by Master Hui on 29 September 2021 (“the September hearing”). Neither the plaintiff’s counsel at this hearing nor its present solicitors were at the September hearing. The plaintiff was represented by its former solicitors who opposed the application. There is in the court file the written submission dated 29 September 2021 from the plaintiff’s then solicitors to the court opposing the defendant’s application.

10.  Ms Esther Chan, Senior Government Counsel for the defendant, who was present at the September hearing informed the court that the only question posed by the Master at the September hearing was whether it was the defendant’s first application for time. That question was answered in the affirmative.

11.  The Master extended time for the defendant to make consequential amendments to its defence by 3 weeks, to 20 October 2020.

This appeal

12.  The plaintiff’s case is premised on the proposition that non-compliance with a court order automatically gives rise to a ‘sanction’. Mr Ng submitted that the fact that a defendant is debarred from filing an amended defence without the leave of the court is implicitly a ‘sanction’ imposed on that defendant.

13.  It was further submitted that the general extension application taken out by the defendant has no effect on the ‘sanction’ so imposed and the only recourse open to the defendant is to seek relief under O. 2, r. 4 which it failed to do. On that basis, it was said that no time extension under O. 3, r. 5 should have been granted.

14.  The plaintiff relied on Top One International (China)  Property Group Co Limited v Top One Property Group Limited [2011] 1 HKLRD 606. However, that case concerned an “unless order” and so does not address a situation such as the present.

15.  In my view, the present application is wholly misconceived.  As is clear from Practice Direction 16.5, that there are 2 forms of peremptory orders.  One is an “unless order” with the ordered consequences should there be non-compliance. The other does not carry within its wording the sanction for disobedience. The latter form is only preliminary to an “unless” order and, on disobedience, a supplementary order in “unless” form setting out the sanction should be obtained.

16.  The July order does not contain a self-executing sanction. It is therefore not, and cannot be, an “unless order”.

17.  It is clear from the following passage in Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, 2nd Ed. 2021, Vol 8 at §90.0070 that O.2, r.4 is not applicable in the circumstances of the present case:

“Where the court makes a peremptory order but without accompanying it with an ‘unless’ order, the court has jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for complying with the peremptory order.

Where, however, the court makes an ‘unless order’ and a party fails to comply with it, any sanction imposed by the ‘unless’ order will take effect unless the party in default applies to the court and obtains relief from the sanction within 14 days of such failure to comply.”

18.  O.2, r.4 is particularly relevant when the extension of time sought is with respect to compliance with an “unless order” the time for which has expired: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure (“HKCP”)  2022 at §3/5/5.

19.  The plaintiff’s alternative submission is that the Master should not have exercised his discretion under O.3, r. 5 in the absence of any explanation by the defendant as to why she could not have adhered to the original deadline.

20.  Given that the grant of an extension of time involves the exercise of a judicial discretion, there is no absolute requirement that an adequate explanation for delay be given before the discretion can be exercised; rather all matters (including the adequacy of any reason for delay)  must be considered: HKCP 2022 at §3/5/2.

21.  While “an adequate reason for delay is the norm”, it is equally clear that “the exercise of the judge’s discretion to enlarge time is highly fact-sensitive”: see Wing Fai Construction Co Limited v Cheng Kit Yin Kelly, CACV 249/2010, unrep., at §28 Thus, the court eschews rigidity and considers all relevant matters and the overall justice of the application: see The Decurion [2012] 1 HKLRD 1063 at §11 (1).

22.  The plaintiff sought to rely only on part of the observations made by the court in the Wing Fai case, without taking into consideration the fact that the court’s remarks were made in the context of the particular facts of that case.

23.  The plaintiff alluded to the fact that the present action was commenced in 2015. That fact has little relevance when the plaintiff only took over as plaintiff in January 2021. It is apparent from the amended statement of claim filed in June 2021 that the amendments made to the statement of claim were substantive.  

24.  The July order (whilst a peremptory order)  was not an “unless order”. The defendant’s time extension application was the very first application made for an extension.  In those circumstances, in exercising the court’s discretion afresh (this hearing being a rehearing of the summons), it is obvious that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the defendant.

25.  There is nothing to the point that the application was only made after the time for compliance had expired. O.3, r. 5 (2)  empowers the court to grant such an extension although it is not made until after the expiration of the period for filing the defendant’s amended defence.

26.  It was plainly within the Master’s power to grant a retrospective time extension and there is no valid basis for challenging the exercise of his discretion.

27.  Accordingly, the plaintiff’s summons was dismissed with costs.

 (Doreen Le Pichon)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Ng Man Sang Alan and Mr. Ivan Lee, instructed by K. H. Mak & Co., for the Plaintiff

Ms Esther Chan, Senior Government Counsel of the Department of Justice, for the Defendant