CHOI TAK MAN v. CHAN YUK LAN, DIDI AND ANOTHER

HCA 600/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 600 OF 2015

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DECISION ON COSTS

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A. Introduction

1.  In this case, the Plaintiff sues the Defendants, who are legal owners of the land known as Lot 343 of Demarcation District 110 (the “Land”), for inter alia a declaration that he has acquired possessory title of the Land by adverse possession.  The Defendants dispute the Plaintiff’s claim and counterclaim against him for trespass.

2.  On 20 February 2017, I handed down my judgment (in Chinese) in which I made an order granting the Plaintiff the relief sought in this action, and dismissing the Defendants’ counterclaim.  On the question of costs, I made a costs order nisi that the Defendants do pay to the Plaintiff the costs of this action (the “Order Nisi”).

3.  By a Summons dated 21 February 2017, the Plaintiff applies to vary the Order Nisi to the extent that costs incurred after 26 December 2015 be paid by the Defendants on indemnity basis.

4.  In support of his application, the Plaintiff relies on a “Notice of Sanctioned Offer” dated 27 November 2015 filed by the Plaintiff (the “Offer”), in which the Plaintiff offers “to accept entering judgment in [his] favour for the declaratory reliefs set out in the Statement of Claim herein and dismissal of the whole of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ counterclaim in full and final settlement of the captioned action with no order as to costs”.

5.  The Plaintiff’s application was heard before me on 2 March 2017.

6.  At the hearing, the Plaintiff contended that the Offer is a sanctioned offer under Order 22 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”).  Since the judgment against the Defendant is more advantageous to the Plaintiff than the proposal contained in the Offer, this Court should order indemnity costs against the Defendant from the latest date on which the Defendant could have accepted the offer (ie 26 December 2015) pursuant to Order 22, rule 24 of the RHC.

7.  After the hearing, I became aware of the decision of Wong Yim Man Anthea v Wong Ho Ming Felix [2016] 3 HKLRD 249, in which Deputy Judge Kent Yee held that an offer containing a terms as to costs was not a valid sanctioned offer under Order 22 of the RHC.

8.  Accordingly, on 3 March 2017, I directed the parties to file further written submissions to address me on the point.

9.  Both parties filed further written submissions pursuant to my direction.

10.  The Plaintiff in his further written submissions maintains the position that the Offer is a valid sanctioned offer.  However, he goes on to argue that even if it is not a sanctioned offer, the Court is still entitled to treat the Offer as a Calderbank offer and take that into account in the exercise of its discretion on costs.

11.  As far as the Defendants are concerned, although they are not legally represented, they also filed further written submissions (in English) in which they contend that the Plaintiff’s Offer cannot be regarded as a sanctioned offer under Order 22 of the RHC and, therefore, he is not entitled to indemnity costs thereunder.

12.  In view of the parties’ respective submissions, the issues which I would need to decide for the purpose of disposing of the Summons are:

(1) Issue 1:  Whether the Offer should be regarded as a valid sanctioned offer?  If “yes”, whether indemnity costs should be ordered in the circumstances?

(2) Issue 2:  If the Offer is not a sanctioned offer, whether the Offer can be taken into account as a Calderbank offer?  If “yes”, whether indemnity costs should be ordered in the circumstances?

B.   Issue 1: Sanctioned offer

13.  The question whether an offer providing terms as to costs can be regarded as a sanctioned offer under Order 22 of the RHC has been discussed in a number of cases.  Those cases have been extensively reviewed by DHCJ Kent Yee in Wong Yim Man Anthea.

14.  DHCJ Kent Yee held in that case that an offer including terms as to costs could not be treated as a sanctioned offer under Order 22 of the RHC.  His reasoning (as set out in paras 8 – 19 of his decision) can be briefly summarised as follows:

(1) Order 22, rule 1 defines a “sanctioned offer” to mean “an offer made (otherwise than by way of a payment into court) in accordance with this Order”. 

(2) In the case of a defendant’s sanctioned offer, it is provided in Order 22, rule 15(1) that any such offer made not less than 28 days before the commencement of the trial can be accepted by the plaintiff “without requiring the leave of the Court”.

(3) It is then further provided in Order 22, rule 20(1) that where a defendant’s sanctioned offer to settle the whole claim is accepted “without requiring the leave of the Court”, the plaintiff is entitled to his costs of the proceedings up to the date of serving notice of acceptance, unless the court otherwise orders.

(4) Put it simply, if a sanctioned offer is made in good time by a defendant (ie more than 28 days before trial), the plaintiff can accept it without leave of the court and the costs consequences provided for in Order 22, rule 20(1) will automatically follow.

(5) Hence, an offer including a term as to costs is incompatible with the Order 22 mechanism in that it will prevent the specified costs consequences upon acceptance from arising.

15.  I entirely agree with the learned Deputy Judge’s scholarly analysis.  As I will explain in para 21 below, the same analysis is in my view equally applicable to a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer.

16.  In terms of authorities, DHCJ Kent Yee reviewed many English and Hong Kong authorities, including MitchellvJames (Costs)[2004] 1 WLR 158 (CA), Central Management LtdvLight Field Investment Ltd [2011] 2 HKLRD 34 (CA), Chan Kwing ChiuvChan Chi Kau (unreported, CACV 209/2012, 3 October 2013), Lin YanjinvSmart Billion Engineering Ltd(unreported, HCPI 739/2009, 10 August 2011) per Master Marlene Ng, Sunbeam Investments LtdvIncorporated Owners of Villa Veneto[2011] 1 HKC 86 per HH Judge K W Wong, Chen Tek YeevChan Moon Shing [2015] 3 HKC 622 per DHCJ Marlene Ng, The Procter & Gamble CovSvenska Cellulosa AB SCA [2013] 1 WLR 1464 per Hildyard J, Leung Lai KwanvLo Kai Wing (unreported, HCMP 1554/2015, 20 August 2015) per Lam VP and Barma JA.

17.  I do not think it is helpful for me to revisit all the above authorities, which have been carefully considered in Wong Yim Man Anthea.  Suffice it to say, I agree with what he said about these cases. 

18.  In particular, I agree with DHCJ Kent Yee’s view that the issue regarding whether an offer containing terms as to costs is a valid sanctioned offer was in fact not argued and, hence, not determined in the Court of Appeal decisions of Central Management Ltd and Chan Kwing Chiu.  On the contrary, the Court of Appeal in Leung Lai Kwan specifically ruled that “offers [which] were made on the basis of no order as to costs … cannot be accommodated in the sanctioned payment or sanctioned offer regime in view of O 20 r 20(1)” (at para 7, per Lam VP).

19.  Hence, I am satisfied that both as a matter of principle and authority, an offer containing terms as to costs cannot be treated as a sanctioned offer since it is incompatible with our Order 22 regime.

20.  In his further written submissions, the Plaintiff seeks to distinguish this case from Wong Yim Man Anthea.  The Plaintiff points out that Wong Yim Man Anthea is a case involving defendant’s sanctioned offer; whereas the present case concerns plaintiff’s sanctioned offer.  He then argues that in case of defendant’s sanctioned offer, a defendant cannot by such offer deprive the plaintiff of his right to the automatic costs consequence in his favour; whereas, in case of a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer, the plaintiff by such order should be allowed to voluntarily gives up or waives his right to his entitlement to costs.

21.  Despite its apparent attractiveness, I cannot accept the Plaintiff’s argument for the following reasons:

(1) The conclusion that a defendant’s offer with terms as to costs cannot be treated as a sanctioned offer within the meaning of Order 22 is drawn on the basis of the wording and effect of Order 22, rule 15(1) and Order 22, rule 20(1) (see para 14 above).

(2) Similar to Order 22, rule 15(1) (which deals with acceptance of defendant’s sanctioned offer), Order 22, rule 16(1) provides that a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer made not less than 28 days before trial may be accepted by the defendant without requiring the leave of the court.

(3) Also, similar to Order 22, rule 20(1) (which deals with costs consequence of defendant’s sanctioned offer), Order 22, rule 21(1) provides that where a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer is accepted by the defendant without requiring the leave of the court, the plaintiff is entitled to his costs up to the date upon which the defendant serves notice of acceptance, unless the Court otherwise orders.

(4) Thus, there is on this issue a perfect symmetry between a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer and a defendant’s sanctioned offer.  If, as held by Lam VP in Leung Lai Kwan and DHCJ Kent Yee in Wong Yim Man Anthea, a defendant’s settlement offer with terms as to costs is incompatible with the regime of sanctioned offer, it follows that a plaintiff’s settlement offer containing terms as to costs also does not fit into such regime.

(5) The Plaintiff’s argument, in my view, misses the point.  The point is not so much about whether the Plaintiff is deprived of his right to costs, or whether he can waive his entitlement to costs.  The point is whether the offer (whether made by a plaintiff or a defendant) is a sanctioned offer within the meaning of Order 22.  As explained by Lam VP and DHCJ Kent Yee, an offer with terms as to costs is simply not the kind of sanctioned offer envisaged under Order 22.

(6) On proper analysis, the point that a plaintiff can waive or give up his entitlement to costs is incapable of distinguishing a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer from a defendant’s sanctioned offer.  The same point can equally be made in connection with a defendant’s offer, in that one can also say the plaintiff should be entitled to waive his entitlement to costs in accepting a defendant’s offer with costs proposal different from that provided for in Order 22, rule 20(1).  That, however, does not change the fact that such offer is not a sanctioned offer contemplated under Order 22 regime.

(7) This point was in fact considered by DHCJ Kent Yee in Wong Yim Man Anthea, and the learned Deputy Judge observed (at para 19) that:

“ Of course, Madam Wong [ie the plaintiff] could have waived her right thereunder and proceeded to accept the Offer including the costs proposal of Mr Wong [ie the defendant]. However, such an acceptance could not ex post facto turn the Offer into a sanctioned offer.”

Again, I entirely agree with this astute observation of DHCJ Kent Yee that a waiver by the plaintiff would not turn what is not a sanctioned offer into a valid sanctioned offer.

22.  For the above reasons, I find that the Offer in this case is not a sanctioned offer under Order 22. It therefore follows that the non‑acceptance of the Offer by the defendant does not attract the same consequences flowing from the non‑acceptance of a sanctioned offer provided for in Order 22.  However, even assuming that the Offer is a valid sanctioned offer, this Court still needs to decide whether it is unjust to order indemnity costs under Order 22, rule 24(4).  For the reasons explained in paras 31 – 33 below, I consider that it is unjust to order indemnity costs in the circumstances of this case.

C.   Issue 2: Calderbank offer

23.  Although the Offer is not a sanctioned offer, it can still be taken into account as a Calderbank offer in considering the issue of costs pursuant to Order 62, rule 5(1)(d) of the RHC: Wong Yim Man Anthea (at paras 47 – 50, per DHCJ Kent Yee), Leung Lai Kwan (at para 7, per Lam VP).

24.  The Plaintiff in his further written submissions argues that even treating this offer as a Calderbank offer, this Court should still order indemnity costs.  In this regard, the Plaintiff places reliance on the following observations made by DHCJ Saunders in Leung Lai KwanvLo Kai Wing [2015] 3 HKLRD 152:

“ 24. It is well established that an offer may be taken into account even if it does not constitute a sanctioned offer although so entitled …

…

27. A party who is in receipt of an offer which is reasonable and who goes to trial having rejected that offer is always liable to a higher level of costs if they do not do better than the offer that has been rejected. …”

25.  Whilst I agree that a party who fails to do better than an offer which he has rejected may justify the court awarding costs against him on a higher scale, I am unable to accept that the court must always do so.  At the end of the day, the existence of a settlement offer is just one of the many factors that the court can take into account in the exercise of its discretion on costs under Order 62, rule 5.

26.  In fact, the plaintiff in Leung Lai Kwan (who was ordered to bear costs on indemnity basis) later applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the costs order made by DHCJ Saunders.  In addition to those observations set out above, Lam VP in dealing with the leave application further observed (at para 9) that:

“… The Judge [ie DHCJ Saunders] did not equate the offers with sanctioned offers. He did not award indemnity costs based on the offers of 12 September 2013 and 19 June 2014. Though he awarded costs on indemnity basis for the trial, the Judge did so primarily due to the Plaintiff propounding false evidence given at the trial than the offer of 7 July 2014.”

(emphasis added)

27.  Clearly, the Court of Appeal in Leung Lai Kwan did not consider DHCJ Saunders to be making any general statement of law that a party who fails to do better than an offer previously rejected by him would invariably be liable for costs on a higher scale.  Instead, the Court of Appeal considered that the primary reason for DHCJ Saunders to award indemnity costs was the proffering of false evidence by the plaintiff.

28.  For this reason, I do not think there is any principle laid down by DHCJ Saunders in Leung Lai Kwan that the court must award costs on a higher scale in favour of a party who has offered something more advantageous to his opponent than what is provided for in the judgment.

29.  At the end of the day, any award of costs requires the court to exercise its discretion in light of the surrounding circumstances.

30.  Whilst I accept that costs could have been avoided had the Defendants accepted the Offer, this is just one of the factors that this Court needs to take into account.

31.  In the present case, the Plaintiff claims for adverse possession against the Defendants who only purchased the Land in December 2014.  There is in my view nothing wrong for the Defendants to take the position that the Plaintiff should be put to strict proof of his case at trial.

32.  In this regard, it is also pertinent to note that the Defendants had also engaged their own expert to give an opinion on the historical occupation of the Land based on the aerial photos.  However, due to financial reasons, the Defendants did not call their expert to testify at trial, and it was for this reason that I refused to accept the evidence of the Defendants’ expert (insofar as it was not agreed by the Plaintiff’s expert).

33.  Accordingly, although I did not accept the Defendants’ evidence and ruled in favour of the Plaintiff after trial, I can well understand why the Defendants did not accept the Offer and insisted on going to trial. 

34.  With the benefit of hindsight, it seems to be an unwise decision for the Defendants not to accept the Offer.  However, having taken into account all the circumstances (including the Offer), I do not consider it is just and appropriate to exercise my discretion to order costs on indemnity basis or common fund basis against the Defendants.

D.   Disposal

35.  For the reasons given, I find that the Offer is not a sanctioned offer.  Even treating it as a Calderbank offer, I am not satisfied that I should order costs on indemnity basis or common fund basis against the Defendants in the circumstances of this case.  I, therefore, dismiss the Plaintiff’s Summons and order that the Order Nisi be made absolute.

36.  Since the Defendants are the successful parties in this application, I order that the costs of the Summons be to the Defendants, to be taxed if not agreed.

37.  Lastly, I wish to mention that although the hearing was conducted in Cantonese, I consider it more appropriate to write this judgment in English since it involves some technical issues of law.  I think the Defendants in person would also agree since their further submissions are also written in English.  That said, I hereby direct that, if so requested by the Defendants, the Court will arrange an interpreter to orally interpret the contents of this judgment to the Defendants.

HCA 600/2015

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事訴訟2015年第600號

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判案書

A.  引言

1.  本案原告人蔡德文先生2015 年3 月23 日入稟要求法庭頒令宣布，基於逆權管有的原則，原告人擁有新界元朗丈量約份第110 約第343 號地段（“涉案地段”）的管有業權，而被告人陳玉蘭和龔慧珊女士不得提出收回涉案地段的訴訟，她們對涉案地段的所有權亦繼之而終絕。

2.  被告人陳玉蘭和龔慧珊女士是涉案地段現有的登記業主。在本案中，她們否認原告人的說法，並向原告人作出反申索，要求法庭裁定原告人非法佔有涉案地段，容許她們取回涉案地段，並向原告人申索租值補償金。

3.  涉案地段的地界圖（“地界圖”）可見於本案判案書附件一。

B.  原告人案情

4.  根據原告人的案情，涉案地段位於新界元朗，在1957 年12 月9 日由駱官友先生購入。

5.  1970至1971 年間，原告人家族以原告人母親的名義，租用涉案地段鄰近的官地，建造祖屋，隨後遷入。

6.  1971 年1 月14 日，駱官友先生以年租方式，將涉案地段租予原告人父親作耕種之用。

7.  約於1971 年1 月，原告人父母及包括原告人在內的六名兄弟姐妹，根據租約佔用了涉案地段，按季節種植蔬果、馬鈴薯、粟米和南瓜等農作物。此時，涉案地段的西南邊界(即地界圖A至B點)已築有圍欄，隔開鄰接地段。

8.  約於1973 年，原告人父親在涉案地段東南邊界（即地界圖C至D點），築起矮磚牆及鐵絲網，並於涉案地段上搭建一木屋廚房。

9.  1992 年9 月18 日以後，原告人父親最後一次向駱官友繳付涉案地段租金。此後，原告人父親及其家族再無就涉案土地繳付租金因此與駱官友先生的租約於1994 年1 月亦告終結。

10.  自1992 年以來，原告人家族成員依舊一直於涉案地段務農，並先後在涉案地段西北（即地界圖B至C點）、東（即地界圖D至E點）及東南邊界（即地界圖E至A點）圍封涉案地段。至2002 年末，涉案地段被完全圍封。

11.  原告人的案情指，自1994 年原告人父親與駱官友先生的租約終結以來，原告人及其家族成員一直管有涉案地段務農，其時超過12年，並具備持續性，且獨立於被告人及其前業主。故此，根據香港法例第347 章《時效條例》第7 條和第17 條，被告人喪失收回土地的權利，對涉案地段的所有權，於本案開展前已告終絕。

C.  被告人案情

12.  第一和第二被告人為涉案地段的登記業主。根據日期為2014 年12 月18 日的轉讓契，第一和第二被告人從駱官友之子駱仲明先生手上，以同等分權共有的形式購入涉案地段，成為涉案地段的業主。

13.  被告人指，涉案地段長有大量野生植物，不可能在相關時間被用作農地。被告人亦指，涉案地段面積約700 餘平方米，原告人僅自2004 年6 月12 日起，非法佔有涉案地段約100 平方米的部分，直至2014 年末，原告人才非法地佔有該土地的其餘部份。故此，原告人在相關時間並未實質管有涉案地段。

14.  被告人同時指出，原告人缺乏逆權管有涉案地段的意圖。按照她們的案情，在2014 年之前，除了涉案地段的西南邊之外（即地界圖A至B點），原告人案情所指的其他圍欄或鐵絲網根本不存在。

15.  被告人特別提到，第二被告人與鄧鳳嬌女士（亦即駱仲明先生的妻子），於2012 年至2014 年間曾經三度視察涉案地段。據被告人的陳述，鄧鳳嬌在2012 年首次到達涉案地段之時，沒有受驅趕，涉案地段不但沒有可上鎖的出入口，亦無針對入侵者的警告標示，任何人都可自由進出涉案地段。

16.  至2014 年8 月，鄧鳳嬌女士再度視察涉案地段，並遇到一名蔡姓男子，期間鄧鳳嬌女士向蔡姓男子表露自己業主的身分，並交代日內將安排測量師到涉案地段進行測量工作，蔡姓男子聽後對此並無任何表示。

17.  數日後，鄧鳳嬌女士偕同陳達榮土地測量師行的職員前往涉案地段，期間，他們遇到兩位女子，一位自稱是蔡姓男子的姊姊，另一位則自稱為蔡姓男子的妻子，蔡姓男子的姊姊表示，願意歸還涉案地段，但要求鄧鳳嬌女士考慮容許他們經由涉案地段往返祖屋。

18.  基於上述理由，原告人並未對涉案地段完成逆權管有，被告人至今依然擁有涉案地段的所有權。

19.  就被告人提及的有關陳述，原告人予以否認，並指出從法律的角度出發，被告人的說法並不影響原告人的申索。

D.  原告人證供之分析

20.  原告人共傳召兩名證人，一位是原告人，另一位是專家證人鄧仕堅先生。

21.  原告人於其證人陳述書中交代了涉案地段多年來使用的具體情況。受被告人一方盤問期間，原告人亦能清晰回答被告人提出的問題。被告人在結案陳詞中要求法庭拒絕接納原告人的證據。被告人認為原告人是在2014 年首次從鄧鳳嬌女士得知當時的業主有意出售涉案地段後，才作出一系列措施，以求符合逆權侵佔的法律要求。

22.  本席認為被告人的說法毫無根據，亦與一些不能爭議的證供有所衝突。

23.  例如，原告人在其證人陳述書中清楚指出，在2006 年和2011 年原告人曾兩度對涉案地段進行多項翻新工程，例如改以鐵絲網圍封涉案地段，重新鋪設涉案地段來往祖屋的水泥路，為涉案地段安裝獨立水錶等。此等證供跟聯合專家報告的內容吻合。此外，原告人及其家族在案件相關時間一直在涉案地段活動、並未放棄管有涉案地段的事實，也能從原告人母親多年來為涉案地段鄰近的祖屋所繳交的水費單和電費單得到佐證。

24.  被告人亦向本席指出，原告人於庭上提及其父親逝世的日期，與原告人姊姊於2014 月8 月左右在涉案地段告知鄧鳳嬌女士的日期有出入。被告人因而指出原告人並不可信，認為本席不應接納他的證供。

25.  本席不能接受被告人的說法。首先，本席看不到原告人有任何動機就其父親逝世的日期說謊。其次，本席拒絕接納鄧鳳嬌女士與原告人姊姊會面的證據，原因留待本判決書E部分解釋。

26.  基於上述原因，以及本席對原告人作供時的觀察，本席認為原告人是誠實可信的證人，本席採納他在本案中所提出的證據。

27.  按照法庭的指示，雙方聘用的專家證人曾就涉案地段歷來的使用情況撰寫一份聯合專家報告（“聯合報告”）。就聯合報告中雙方專家所同意的觀察，本席予以採納。在聯合報告中雙方的專家證人均同意，從鳥瞰圖可見：

(一) 1991 年至1999 年間，耕作活動覆蓋涉案地段靠南部分，面積約占涉案地段的三分之二，而涉案地段北部，亦可見不明顯的耕作痕跡；

(二) 2000 年至2009 年間，依然可觀察到不明顯的耕作痕跡，特別是在2005 年，可見用作灌溉用的田畿，田畿隨後被植被覆蓋，

(三) 2011 年，涉案地段四分之三的植被被清除，其後，涉案地段又出現田畿。

28.  就聯合報告中的內容，原告人傳召其專家證人鄧仕文先生作供，作進一步解釋。本席認為，鄧仕文先生的證供有力可信，公平客觀。

29.  鄧仕文先生根據涉案地段的鳥瞰圖向本席指出，自1970 年起，涉案地段均有耕作活動進行。鄧仕文先生很公平地指出，與此前的鳥瞰圖比較，可見在90 年代涉案地段有部分田畿開始消失。被告人因此而向鄧仕文先生指出，涉案地段於90 年代開始再無耕作活動。

30.  鄧仕文先生不接受被告人的指稱，他向法庭解釋涉案地段能否見到田畿，與涉案地段當時栽種的農作物有關。假如涉案地段當時栽種的植物需要不時灌溉，涉案地段就會出現田畿。相反，假如涉案地段當時栽種的植物是不需要經常灌溉的根部植物（如番薯），涉案地段則不會看到田畿。鄧先生進一步向法庭指出，從鳥瞰圖可見在某些年分涉案地段上出現收割的情況。因此，他認為涉案地段一直有耕作活動進行。

31.  被告一方於盤問中質疑鄧仕文先生的意見，但由於被告人沒有傳召其專家證人作供，本席看不到有任何理由拒絕接納鄧仕文先生的專家意見。

32.  再者，就涉案地段的使用情況而言，鄧仕文先生的專家意見與原告人在庭上的證供是吻合的。審訊期間，原告人曾解釋為何從鳥瞰圖中能看到涉案地段的部分植被似乎被移除，原告人清楚解釋，該處正為栽種根部植物的地方，因此在收割之後該處就會出現沒有植被的情況。

33.  基於上述原因，本席接納鄧仕文先生的證供。

34.  因此，本席裁定在1971 年至2014 年間，原告人及其家族在涉案地段務農，搭建廚房，又分別在1973、1993、1996、2002 年以各種形式圍封涉案地段，並在隨後十年間對涉案地段進行多項修繕工作。

E.  被告人證供之分析

35.  被告人共傳召兩名證人，一位是第一被告人，另一位是鄧鳳嬌女士。雖然本席在審訊中曾提醒被告人，如果被告人的專家證人沒有出庭作證，本席不能接受他在聯合報告中不被原告人專家證人接納的有關證供，但被告人選擇不傳召其專家證人作供。

36.  本席首先要指出被告一方的兩位證人對涉案地段2012 年之前的使用情況並無個人認知。她們對涉案地段的認知也僅限於2012 年和2014 年間對涉案地段的數次考察。故此，她們所提出的證據，對於本席上述D部分原告人有關2012 年之前涉案地段使用情況的證供之裁定，沒有影響。

37.  其次，本席要指出，在經修改的抗辯書和反申索書，被告人只有提及三次於涉案地段的實地考察，當中只有其中一次涉及第二被告，第一被告從未涉及其中。值得留意的是，第二被告沒有呈交任何證人陳述書，相反，第一被告在其證人陳述書卻提及在2014 年下旬多次到訪涉案地段。因此，本席在處理被告人的證供時，需考慮其抗辯書和反申索書不一致的地方。

38.  第一被告人在其證人陳述書中，交代了她2014 年8 月首次到訪涉案地段時的觀察。本席認為，第一被告人的證供，並不可信。根據她的說法，涉案地段當時築有鐵絲網，出入口有一道閘門，閘門雖然以鐵絲網建成，並以竹竿加固，但閘門沒有上鎖，任何人均可自由出入。第一被告人同時呈上三張她聲稱是2014 年8 月在涉案地段拍攝的照片以證明她的觀察。

39.  問題是，在那三張照片中，涉案地段的鐵閘不但已經關上，而且清楚以鐵鍊和掛鎖鎖好，這都直接否定了第一被告人的說法。當原告人大律師向第一被告人指出，其供詞與照片並不吻合之際，第一被告人卻馬上改稱，這三張呈堂的照片，不是2014 年8 月拍攝的，而是2014 年9 月至10 月間她再次到訪涉案地段時拍攝的，言下之意，是照片裡的見到鐵鍊和掛鎖，都是原告人於8 月以後裝上的。

40.  第一被告又堅稱，2014 年8 月的時候，任何人都可以自由出入涉案地段，而且她亦有進入涉案地段，拍攝涉案地段內外、包括閘門未有上鎖的情況。她指出，這批照片確實可以證明她本人的案情，她已經將該批照片全數轉交她起初聘用的律師，對於該批照片為何未有呈堂，她自己也感到奇怪。本席認為，第一被告人的說法前後矛盾，難以置信。

41.  至於鄧鳳嬌女士，她分別就2012 年涉案地段的情況和2014 年涉案地段所發生的對話作供。

42.  本席認為，就2012 年涉案地段的情況而言，鄧鳳嬌女士的證供是不可信的。按照她的主問證供，她於2012 首次到訪涉案地段，拍照作紀錄，從照片可見，涉案地段雖然築有鐵絲網，但出入口並未上鎖。可是，接受盤問之時，鄧鳳嬌女士卻提出此前從未說過的版本，她宣稱，她2012 年之前首次到訪涉案地段，當時，涉案地段僅為平地一片，沒有樹立任何鐵絲網，但同時，她又自相矛盾地表示已呈堂並顯示涉案地段築有鐵絲網的照片，正是首次到訪涉案地段所拍攝的。在意識到她的說法跟照片有出入的時候，她又解釋呈堂的照片，並非首次到達涉案地段之時拍攝的，雖然多年前初訪涉案地段，她也有拍攝照片，但該批照片未有呈堂。

43.  鑑於鄧鳳嬌女士有關呈堂照片拍攝日期的證供大有矛盾之處，鄧鳳嬌女士涉案地段情形的回憶是不可靠的。況且，假如呈堂的照片是2012 年拍攝的，則已證明涉案地段早於2012 年已經有鐵絲網圍封，在該批照片當中，可以清楚看見，出入口處其實裝有可以隨時樹起的鐵絲網。

44.  盤問的過程中，原告人大律師要求鄧鳳嬌女士細看涉案地段呈堂的照片，然後要她基於對照片的觀察判斷涉案地段是否被人佔用。對此她堅決認為涉案土地當時並無被人佔用。可是，呈堂的照片顯示涉案土地被鐵絲網圍封，本席認為任何客觀的觀察者都會同意涉案土地當時被人佔用，鄧鳳嬌女士的供詞顯然受其主觀意願影響，甚為偏頗，並不可信。

45.  除了2012 年外，鄧鳳嬌女士亦有就2014 年8 月時她兩度到訪涉案地段的情形作供。據鄧鳳嬌女士所說，在第一次，原告人曾聽到有人表示是業主，要對涉案土地進行測量工作，原告人卻不發一言，而在第二次，原告人姊姊則向鄧鳳嬌女士表示，父親逝世多年，母親現時在老人院居住，因此她願意歸還涉案地段。

46.  本席認為，鄧鳳嬌女士的證供不可信。首先，正如原告人作供時澄清，原告人父親於2014 年6 月6 日逝世，本席適才亦已接納原告人此一說法。原告人姊姊沒有理由不清楚其父親逝世的日期，她也沒有動機向一位到訪涉案土地的陌生人謊稱父親已於數年前逝世。因此，本席有理由相信鄧鳳嬌女士供稱與原告人姊姊的對話有可能從未發生。況且，原告人及其家族在涉案地段務農超過40 年，他們願意將涉案地段隨便交還的說法，實在不合常理，難以置信。

47.  本席留意到原告人的姊姊沒有出庭作證，但是基於上述原因，以及本席對第一被告和鄧鳳嬌女士作供時表現的觀察，本席不接納二人與原告人案情有衝突的證供。

F.  法律原則

48.  根據香港法例第347 章《時效條例》第7 條第2 款：‑

「自有關訴訟權在任何其他人方面產生的日期起計滿十二年後他不得提出回收土地的訴訟……」

49.  根據《時效條例》第13 條，收回土地的訴訟權在土地開始處於逆權管有的當天產生。

50.  要證明逆權管有，管有人（即本案中的原告人）必須證明他實質管有一地，並意圖管有該地。實質管有的意思是，管有人須按照實際情況，對一地行使一定程度的、實質的、具獨有性的控制，正如Slade J 在Powell v McFarlane and Another (1979) 38 P & CR 452中第470‑471頁所言：‑

“Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and conclusive possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree ofexclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed.”

51.  至於管有意圖，指的是管有者必須有意圖，以自己的名義，在合理切實可行以及法律容許的範圍內，將原業主在內的其他人排除於該地之外，正如Slade J 在Powell v McFarlane and Another (1979) 38 P & CR 452中第471 頁所言：

“the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.”

52.  將一地圍封，是意圖管有該地的最有力證據，但圍封並非意圖管有該地的唯一證明，在一地務農，翻土播種，澆水栽種，在適當的情況下，同樣可以證明務農者有意圖管有該地：Seddon v Smith (1877) 36 LT 168。

53.  關於實質管有與管有意圖的關係，J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v Graham and Another [2003] 1 AC 419曾有所裁決。Lord Hutton在該案判辭第76 段裁定，假如有人視一地為自己的物業，以符合業主身分之方式使用該地，那人則會被視為意圖管有該地，而當法庭有足夠證據裁定那人意圖管有該地，實質管有通常都能一併被證明：

“I consider that such use of land by a person who is occupying it will normally make it clear that he has the requisite intention to possess and that such conduct should be viewed by a court as establishing that intention, unless the claimant with the paper title can adduce other evidence which points to a contrary conclusion. Where the evidence establishes that the person claiming title…has occupied the land and made full use of it in the way an owner would, I consider that in the normal case he will not have to adduce additional evidence to establish that he had the intention to possess.”

54.  在租賃終結後，原租客通常即對原先承租的地段展開逆權管有，因為在大部分的情況下，原租客獨有管有該地段的事實並不會隨租賃終結而改變。這種對原承租地段的實然獨有管有，並非業主所允許的，因此必然具備逆權性質，正如Buxton LJ在Williams v Jones [2002] 3 EGLR 69第19 段和21 段所說：

“…on the determination, at least for Limitation Act purposes, of the tenancy, the possession held by the tenant moves from being a possession with the landlord’s consent to being possession held without his consent, and thus for limitation purposes adverse…”

“The true distinction between a ‘trespasser case’ and a “former tenant case” is that in the former, animus possidendi is required in order to establish that the paper owner has been dispossessed.  That is not necessary in a ‘former tenant’ case, because as the freeholder has permitted the tenant into possession, he will normally continue in possession, just as he did before the payment of rent stopped.”

55.  當然，假如租賃終結後，原租客以任何形式中止對原承租地段的實然管有（例如從承租地段遷出），上述的原則不會適用：Buxton LJ在Williams v Jones [2002] 3 EGLR 69第20 段。

56.  租賃何時終結，視乎租賃的性質而定。香港法例第347 章《時效條例》第12(2) 條規定：

「按年或按其他期限計算的無書面租約的租賃，就本條例而言，須當作於第一年或第一個其他期限屆滿時終結，而據此，有權享有受該項租賃所規限的土地的人，其訴訟權須當作在上述租賃終結的日期產生：但如其後曾就該項租賃而有任何租金被收取，則訴訟權須當作在最後一次收取租金的日期產生。」

57.  亦即是說，按年計算的租賃，在沒有書面租約的情況下，首年屆滿之後，即告終結。原租客可在此時開始對該地進行逆權管有，而根據《時效條例》第7 條和第17 條的規定，假如管有的時間滿12 年，原業主即喪失收回土地的權利，對土地的所有權，亦告終絕。

58.  值得留意的是，並非所有載有租賃條款的書面文件都屬於書面租約，因為「有書面租約的租賃」與「有書面證明的租賃」，是兩個不同的概念。假如載有租賃條款的書面文件，足以在法律上訂立該租賃，則該租賃可被視為有書面租約的租賃。可是，假如載有租賃條款的書面文件，不足以在法律上訂立該租賃件，則該租賃只會被視為有書面證明，而非書面租約。正如Long v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1998] Ch 197,第208‑209 頁所言：‑

“As I have said, Mr. Walter's argument is that a document is not a ‘lease in writing’ unless it is dispositive, that is, a document which at law creates, of and by itself, a leasehold estate in land. A document which is merely an agreement for a lease, or merely evidential of the terms of a lease, is not, he submits, a ‘lease in writing’. Miss Hargreaves’s submissionis that this is much too subtle and technical an approach … An equitable lease is not, he says, a lease and does not of itself create an estate in land. In my judgment, Mr. Walter's submission on this point is correct.”

59.  在Moses v Lovegrove [1952] 2 QB 533一案中，英國高等法院上訴法庭亦曾裁定，載有收租紀錄的 “rent book”，並非雙方藉以訂立租賃的書面文件，因此不構成書面租約。Evershed MR在該案判辭第536 頁裁定：‑

“The rent book is, I think, what it purports to be, and what it is called, a rent book, that is, a book containing acknowledgments for payment of weekly sums of rent, and containing also, in pursuance of the terms of the legislation, a reference to the conditions on which the tenant was holding his tenancy. I think that on the face of it, it was not intended to be, and is not a contract for granting a tenancy, still less a lease creating an estate. It is, I think, at most what it was intended to be, and what it is on the face of it called, a book evidencing the terms on which the tenant held.”

G.  討論

60.  基於上述的原則，原告人能否以逆權管有為基礎取得涉案地段的管有業權，取決於下列的考慮：‑

(一) 租賃涉案地段的部分條款，記錄在一份手寫租賃協議上（“手寫協議”），協議有雙方的簽名。原告人父親和駱官友先生對涉案地段的手寫協議，是否屬於《時效條例》第12(2) 條所指的書面租約？

(二) 原告人父親對涉案地段租賃於何時終結？

(三) 在租約終結之後，原告人是否實質管有涉案地段，並具備管有意圖，足以構成逆權管有？

(四) 第一被告人與鄧鳳嬌女士的證供會否影響本席的結論？

G1.  書面租約

61.  本席認為，原告人父親和駱官友先生對涉案地段的手寫協議，並非《時效條例》第12(2) 條所指的書面租約。手寫協議內容可見於本案判案書附錄二。

62.  原告人父親以年租方式向駱官友先生租用涉案地段，按年繳付一定租金，故此，租金必為租賃一部份。然而，在手寫協議內，對租金的具體數目，卻隻字未提。按照Long v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1998] Ch 197, 第208‑209頁的原則，手寫協議只能視為部分租賃條款的書面證明，而不可能是訂立租賃的書面租約。

63.  對此裁決，本席有兩項補充。首先，本席不認為，租約的效力，取決於租客是否需要繳付租金。可是，假如租約確實規定租客須繳付相當租金，則租金必然是租約的一部份，紀錄該租約的文件亦必須列明租金，才可能構成書面租約。

64.  其次，本席留意到，手寫協議的隨後幾頁，以「…年…月…日…收…元」的格式，紀錄了原告人父親自1971 年至1992 年間按年繳付的租金。假如手寫協議與隨後的租金紀錄一併詮釋，是否足以構成書面租約呢?

65.  本席不認同這樣的說法。原告人一家於1971 年1 月開始租用涉案地段務農，此時，雙方應已就租金達成協議，而根據租薄的紀錄，原告人卻在1971 年8 月22 日才首次交租。

66.  換言之，租薄上對於租金的紀錄遠在訂立租賃的日期之後。這種紀錄的作用，僅為確認駱官友先生已收妥某年的租金，其性質正與Moses v Lovegrove一案中提到的租薄rent book無異，因此，本席認為，即使將租薄隨後頁數與手寫協議一併詮釋，亦不足以將手寫協議變成《時效條例》第12(2) 條所指的書面租約。

G2.  涉案地段的租賃何時終結

67.  基於上述原因，本席裁定原告人父親與駱官友先生之間並無《時效條例》第12(2) 條所指書面租約。本席接納原告人的證供和租簿中的紀錄，裁定原告人父親於1992 年後未再繳付租金。因此，根據《時效條例》第12(2) 條規定，原告人父親與駱官友先生的租賃，最遲於1994 年1 月終結。

68.  原告人大律師在其書面陳詞中，向本席指出根據Halsbury’s Law of England（5^th ed）第68卷第1062 段，即使手寫協議構成按年計算的書面租約，但假如租客多年未有繳付租金，而又沒有證據顯示業主要求繳付租金，則法庭可以推斷該租賃已經終結。

69.  本席接受原告人大律師上述的陳詞。假如本席誤將手寫協議裁定為不屬於《時效條例》第12(2) 條所指的書面租約，本席亦會認為考慮到本案所有證據後，本席也可推論手寫協議的租賃已於1994 年終結。

70.  在此方面，本席認為上述推論跟被告的案情也吻合，畢竟被告一方也認為原告人非法侵佔涉案地段。雖然被告人案情指原告人於2004 年6 月12 日才開始非法侵佔，但在本席審訊中向被告人詢問時，被告人卻無法解釋為何在其抗辯書和反申索書中會提到這個確切的日子。顯然易見，被告人認為原告人一直非法侵佔涉案地段。因此，根據被告人的案情，原告人1994 年之後依然根據手寫協議所構成的租賃使用涉案地段的可能性並不存在。

G3.  原告人對涉案地段的實質管有和管有意圖

71.  基於D部分的分析，本席採納原告人所提出的證供，並同意原告人的案情，亦即自1971 年至2014 年間，原告人的家族一直佔有及使用涉案地段，原告人對涉案地段的獨有管有，並未有因原告人父親與駱官友先生的租賃終結而中止，根據Buxton LJ 在Williams v Jones [2002] 3 EGLR 69第19 段和21 段所提出的原則，原告人對涉案地段的獨有管有，自租賃結束之日，開始具備逆權性質，換言之，原告人於1994 年初對涉案地段展開逆權管有。

72.  另外，本席同時裁定，在1994 年以後，原告人及其家族一直在涉案地段務農、圍封和修繕，單以務農一項而言，已對涉案地段構成實質的、具獨有性的控制，這種行為猶如以業主的身分作出，反映出他們將他人排除於涉案地段之外的意圖。假如將圍封和修繕的行為一併考慮，則原告人對涉案地段的實質管有和管有意圖就更加明顯。因此，即使不依賴Williams v Jones [2002] 3 EGLR 69一案的原則，原告人及其家族同樣最遲於1994 年初開始實質管有和意圖管有涉案地段，換言之，逆權管有在1994 年初正式開始。

73.  儘管本席裁定原告人及其家族自1994 年起一直在涉案地段務農，但嚴格而言，這並非證明逆權管有所必須的，因為「管有」和「連續使用」是兩個不同的概念。在本案中，耕作活動證明了原告人及其家族對涉案地段獲得管有，但原告人一旦證明他對涉案地段的管有，他即使不再繼續使用涉案地段，其行為一樣可以構成逆權管有，正如高等法院原訟法庭特委法官何沛謙資深大律師在Law Bing Kee v Person(s) in Occupation of RP, HCMP 2270/2009一案第42段中裁定：

“…what is required to establish adverse possession is the taking of possession, and not continuous use. I would adopt the following observations of Lewison LJ in Chambers v London Borough of Havering (supra):

‘57.  …In addition at this point in his judgment he seems to have beenlooking for 'continuous use'.  But in my judgment continuous use is not the test.  It is the taking of possession that is critical.  If possession passed to Mr. Chambers at any point then he would not have needed continuous use to have maintained possession: Bligh v Martin [1968] 1 WLR 804, 811; Generay Ltd v The Containerised Storage Company Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 478 §49.’”

74.  特委法官何沛謙資深大律師此項裁定，在Chow Tin Sang v Citihero International Limited, CACV 121/2012一案第27 段中被高等法院上訴庭採納。

75.  至於原告人及其家族未必在案件的所有相關時間用盡涉案地段的每一寸土地務農，這並不代表原告人及其家族無法對涉案土地進行逆權管有，因為某一行為是否構成逆權侵佔，視乎實際情況而定，對一地段的一部份進行逆權侵占，在適當的情況下，同樣可以構成對整個地段的逆權侵占：Higgs v Nassauvian Ltd [1975] AC 464, 第474 頁。考慮到案件的所有證供後，本席認為，原告人已經足以滿足逆權管有的法律要求。

76.  本席既已裁定，1994 年至目前為止，一直實質管有涉案地段，並具有管有意圖，有鑑於此，原告人對涉案地段逆權管有已於1994 年的12 年後，亦即2006 年完成，原告人在該年獲得涉案地段的管有業權，涉案地段原業主駱官友先生和其所有權繼承人（包括本案被告人）於2006 年後不得提出收回涉案地段的訴訟，對涉案地段的所有權繼之而終絕。

G4.   第一被告人與鄧鳳嬌女士的證供會否影響本席的結論？

77.  本席於判案書早前的段落拒絕接納第一被告人與鄧鳳嬌女士的證供，並詳細解釋拒絕的原因。可是，鑑於本席裁定原告人已於2006 年對涉案地段完成逆權管有，根據《時效條例》第17 條，涉案地段註冊業主對該地的所有權隨之而終絕。因此，即使本席假設被告人所提出的相關證供屬實，這些證供都無法改變逆權管有已經完成的事實。從法律的角度而言，第一被告人與鄧鳳嬌女士的證供不會影響本席的結論。

H.  結論

78.  故此，本席裁定原告人勝訴，並根據其申索陳述書所要求的濟助（1）、（2）、（3）及（4）作出頒令。本席亦撤銷被告人的反申索。

79.  訟費方面，由於原告人勝訴，本席根據慣例命令被告人支付本案（包括反申索）的訴訟費用。此為暫准命令，除非有人提出申請更改此命令，否則14 日後此命令即為最終命令。

原告人： 馮黃伍林有限法律責任合夥律師行 轉聘葉劍明大律師代表

第一及第二被告人： 無律師代表，親自應訊

附件一

附件二

收租人：潘瑞祥立租約人。台山村駱觀有。本人名下。有田地在110約。第343號地段。

甲方同意。將該地出租。予蔡幹君承受。以作耕種之用。不能蓋搭屋宇之用途。業主聲明。每年租金。十足收成。先交上期。不得拖欠。該地乙方。無論何時。無權轉讓他人之用。圖利。係乙方。所耕作之用。他日甲方。擬收回此地。並無任何條件。補回損失乙方。權利。

以上租約。雙方願意。並無迫勒等情。恐口無憑。特立合約各執壹份為據。

甲方業主：駱官友

乙方業主：蔡幹

見證人：駱益來

一九柒一年壹月十四日

收租人：潘瑞祥

HCA 600/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 600 OF 2015

________________________

________________________

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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A. Introduction

1.  In this action, the plaintiff asks for a declaration that the defendants’ title to the piece of land known as Lot 343 in Demarcation District 110 (“the Land”) has been extinguished by reason of adverse possession.  The defendants are the present joint owners of the Land, which they purchased from their predecessor‑in‑title on 18 December 2014 at $900,000 for leisure farming. 

2.  This action was set down for trial on 23 May 2016.  The trial is scheduled to commence on 18 January 2017, with seven days reserved.

3.  Until recently, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had been represented in this action by counsel and solicitors.  However, just about a week before the trial, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants filed their respective Notices to Act in Person dated 11 January 2017.

4.  On 13 January 2017, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants respectively applied for legal aid.  Memorandum of Notification of an Application for Legal Aid was issued by the Director of Legal Aid on 17 January 2017 notifying the plaintiff and this Court of the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ application.

5.  On the first day of the trial, Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Francis Yip, asked this court to exercise its power under section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91) to uplift the stay arising from the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ belated legal aid applications.

6.  Having heard the submissions of Mr Yip and the 1^st and 2^nd defendants on the matter, I ordered that the stay be uplifted and the trial be adjourned to the coming Friday (i.e. 20 January 2017) so as to give the defendants a bit more time to prepare for the trial (including, to consider engaging their own private lawyers to represent them).

7.  I now give the reasons for my said decision.

B.  History of proceedings

8.  This action was commenced by a Writ of Summons issued on 23 March 2015.

9.  The 1^st and 2^nd defendants filed their Acknowledgement of Service on 2 April 2015 through their then solicitors, Francis Kong & Co (“FKC”).

10.  On 10 June 2015, both the 1^st and 2^nd defendants respectively filed their Notices to Act in Person.

11.  Two days later, on 12 June 2015, both the 1^st and 2^nd defendants applied for legal aid.  Both of their applications were refused by the Legal Aid on 27 July 2015.

12.  On 1 August 2015, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants engaged FKC as their solicitors to represent them in this action.  Since then, and until about a week before the trial of this action, FKC had been the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ solicitors in this action.

13.  In addition, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had also engaged Mr Simon SM Yip, an experienced counsel of over 20 years of standing, to advise and represent them in this action.  Mr Simon SM Yip settled both the original and the amended Defence and Counterclaim filed in this action.  He was also briefed to attend the pre‑trial review held on 19 October 2016.

14.  This action was set down for trial on 23 May 2016.  

15.  On 16 June 2016, the parties were notified by the court of the trial dates starting from 18 January 2017.

16.  As mentioned above, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants instructed Mr. Simon SM Yip as their counsel at the pre‑trial review on 19 October 2016.  Having heard counsel for the parties, Deputy High Court Judge Wilson Chan (as he then was) gave directions for the conduct of the trial at the pre‑trial review.

17.  Pursuant to such directions, the parties were required to agree on the index of the trial bundles on or before 2 January 2017, the plaintiff was required to file and serve the trial bundles and opening submissions no later than 9 January 2017, and the 1^st and 2^nd defendants were required to file and serve their opening submissions no later than 13 January 2017.

18.  Within a week before the commencement of the trial on 18 January 2017, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants respectively filed their Notices to Act in Person and made their (second) applications for legal aid.

C.  The plaintiff’s submissions

19.  There is no dispute that under section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91) and Regulation 7A of the Legal Aid Regulations (Cap 91A), unless otherwise ordered by the court, the proceedings in this action should be stayed for 42 days.  Consequently, unless this court uplifts the stay, the trial has to be adjourned and re‑fixed to some later dates.

20.  Mr Francis Yip submitted that this court should uplift the stay.

21.  Mr Yip drew to the attention of this Court that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had previously made applications for legal aid on 12 June 2015 and such applications had been refused on 27 July 2015.

22.  On that basis, Mr Yip submitted that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants knew of the procedures for applying for legal aid and also of the fact that it would take time for the Department of Legal Aid to process their applications.  Since the 1^st and 2^nd defendants undoubtedly knew of the trial dates, Mr Yip further submitted that what the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had done amounted to an attempt to abort the trial and that they had no right to do so.  According to Mr Yip, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants should have made their legal aid applications before or shortly after the pre‑trial review.

23.  Mr Yip also made the point that since the 1^st and 2^nd defendants did not appeal against the refusal of the Department of Legal Aid in July 2015 and there is no suggestion of any change of circumstances, it is unlikely that the recent applications for legal aid would yield a different result.

24.  I also asked Mr Yip to inform the court whether the plaintiff would suffer any prejudice arising from an adjournment of the trial.  Mr Yip could not point to any specific prejudice, but submitted that any adjournment would unavoidably lead to wastage of costs and time.  He also submitted that such adjournment would be unfair to the plaintiff because justice delayed is justice denied, and it would also be unfair to other court users.

D.  The defendants’ explanation and submissions

25.  There is no material before me that sheds light on the issue as to why the 1^st and 2^nd defendants made their legal aid applications so shortly before the trial.  Given that this matter is a matter of some significance to the exercise of the court’s discretion, I made some enquiries with both the 1^st and 2^nd defendants at the hearing in order to understand their version of the events leading to their recent applications for legal aid.

26.  Both the 1^st and 2^nd defendants accepted that they knew that they needed to put their solicitors in funds for the purpose of conducting this action.  They also accepted that they knew from their lawyers that the trial had been fixed to be heard in January 2017.  

27.  They, however, told this court that their solicitors only informed them of the exact amount of the funds for the conduct of the trial in November 2016.  According to the 1^st and 2^nd defendants, their solicitors on that occasion asked them to come up with the funds for the legal costs of the trial by 28 December 2016. They, however, were unable to raise sufficient money for that purpose.

28.  When I asked the 1^st defendant why she did not apply for legal aid immediately on 28 December 2016, the 1^st defendant said that because she had no money to fund the litigation, she did not intend to hold on to the Land anymore.  When I asked the 2^nd defendant the same question, the 2^nd defendant said that she asked the solicitors to give them more time to raise funds but they were unable to raise any money.

29.  In short, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants claimed that they applied for legal aid at such a late stage because they were only informed by their solicitors of the exact amount of the funds that they needed to put up for the trial in November 2016, and they are unable to raise sufficient funds for such purpose.

E.  The legal principles

30.  In considering whether a stay of proceedings imposed by section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap 91) should be lifted, the primary junction of the court is to do justice between the parties.  The court should be slow to do so, particularly if a point of law had to be dealt with by a layman: see Lee Shiu Ming v Yeo Hiap Seng (Hong Kong) Ltd [1994] 1 HKC 18 (CA) at 23E‑H.

31.  However, if the court is satisfied that the application was an abuse of process, then the court should exercise its discretion to lift the stay: see Re Ip Lai Fan HCSD 10/2000 (3 November 2000) per Yuen J (as she then was) at para 8.

32.  In Bank of China Ltd v Fu Ming Kong Michael HCA 7769/2000 & HCMP 3909/2000 (24 June 2005), Recorder Kenneth Kwok SC emphasized (at para 27) that “the statutory stay is an aid in, not an obstacle to, the administration of justice.  It does not mean that a defendant has the right to abort the trial of an action by making a fresh application for legal aid on the eve of every set of dates fixed for the trial of the action”.

33.  Hence, the court in previous cases has exercised its discretion to lift the statutory stay where a litigant only applied for legal aid shortly before the trial: e.g. Bank of China Ltd v Fu Ming Kong Michael HCA 7769/2000 & HCMP 3909/2000 (24 June 2005); 陳韻怡訴陳道奮, HCAP 2/2012 (3 May 2013); 黃吉雲 訴 孫磊, HCA 752/2014 (9 November 2016).

34.  In this regard, I agree with what was said by Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Kwok SC in The Personal Representative of The Estate of Chan Chuen v Forestside Ltd, HCA 2055/2011 (29 December 2015) about a litigant’s duty to get ready for trial (at para 19):‑

“It is in the interests of litigants to get ready for legal proceedings. If a litigant wishes to be legal represented, it is incumbent on the litigant to (1) instruct privately funded lawyers; or (2) apply for legal aid, and if necessary and appropriate, to appeal against any refusal to grant legal aid, in good time and with due diligence so that the lawyers can properly equip themselves for trial. Litigants have no right to expect the court to grant them indulgence if they do not act”.

35.  The above observation was also endorsed by Chow J in Elijah Saatori v Raffles Medical Group (HK) Ltd HCPI 1114/2006 (2 September 2016) at para 29.

36.  Further, in Elijah Saatori, Chow J (at para 33) added the observation that under Order 25, rule 1B(3) of the Rules of the High Court, a date which the court has fixed for the trial is a “milestone date” and cannot be varied unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation.  As mentioned in para 42 of Practice Directions 5.2, late instructions from a client, a change in the team of lawyers, and the absence of prejudice to the other party which cannot be compensated for by costs, will not be treated as exceptional circumstances. Also, as stated in para 25/1B/1 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2017, neither will a last‑minute application by the plaintiff for legal aid, which is not reasonably explained, be considered an exceptional reason.

37.  In my view, when parties engage in litigation, they have every reason to expect that the legal proceedings would be conducted in accordance with the rules, including the rule that a date which the court has fixed for the trial would not be varied unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation.  As Ma CJ said in Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd v Yip Kwong Robert (2011) 14 HKCFAR 935 (at para 34), litigation is not to be treated as a game, but as a serious legal contest. Parties to a litigation and their legal representatives are required to comply with the rules and court orders.  Thus, the legitimate expectation that trial dates would not be varied save for exceptional circumstances is a relevant factor that the court needs to take into account in deciding whether it is just and fair to the parties in all the circumstances to lift the stay.

F.  Discussions

38.  Having regard to all the circumstances, I am of the view that it is just and fair to the parties that the statutory stay should be lifted.

39.  Clearly, as evidenced by their first applications for legal aid in mid‑June 2015 (which were refused in late July 2015), it is beyond argument that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had concerns that they might need legal aid to fund their litigation, and also that they were at all material times fully aware of their right to apply for legal aid and the application procedures.

40.  During my enquiries with the 1^st and 2^nd defendants, both of them accepted that they knew from the very beginning of this action that they needed to pay for their lawyers for the conduct of this action.  The 1^st defendant further said that as this action progressed, she began to realize that she needed more money than she expected to fight this piece of litigation. 

41.  In these circumstances, it would only be natural for the 1^st and 2^nd defendants (who had previously applied for legal aid) to ascertain the amount of legal costs that they would be required to incur for the trial as soon as this action was set down for trial.  Certainly, they would be interested to know the costs estimate when they were asked to incur costs to brief Mr Simon Yip to appear for them at the pre‑trial review.

42.  I made enquiries with both the 1^st and 2^nd defendants as to why they did not ask their solicitors to give them the fee estimates of the trial before the pre-trial review in October 2016.  The 1^st defendant answered by saying that it was her oversight, whereas the 2^nd defendant claimed that she was not familiar with the procedures.  For the reasons explained above, I find such explanation unsatisfactory and hard to believe. 

43.  Even if I am to accept what the 1^st and 2^nd defendants told this court (as set out in Section D above), I am of the view that as soon as they were informed by their solicitors of the amount of legal costs that they needed to put up for the trial in November 2016, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants should have made their fresh applications for legal aid there and then, or at least shortly thereafter. 

44.  By reason of their previous experience, the 1^st and 2^nd defendants clearly knew that it would take some time for the Department of Legal Aid to consider their fresh applications.  Any reasonable litigant with such knowledge would surely appreciate the risk that if he made his legal aid application too close to trial, he would run the risk of having no legal representation advancing or defending his case at trial.  There is plainly no good reason why the 1^st and 2^nd defendants did not make their legal aid application in November 2016, or at least in early December 2016.

45.  In my judgment, I do not think the alleged deadline of 28 December 2016 for the 1^st and 2^nd defendants to put their former solicitors in funds provides any justification for their failure to make their legal aid applications in good time.  If the 1^st and 2^nd defendants had any concern as to whether they would be able to raise sufficient money to pay their lawyers, the most reasonable thing for them to do would be to apply for legal aid first.  In the event that they were able to raise sufficient funds to engage their lawyers, they could always withdraw their applications for legal aid and retain their lawyers on a private basis.

46.  Further, and without prejudice to my foregoing observations, I also find it difficult to understand why the 1^st and 2^nd defendants did not apply for legal aid immediately after the alleged deadline of 28 December 2016. If they could not raise sufficient money in November and December 2016, on what basis could they believe that they could achieve that target within the time between 28 December 2016 and the commencement of the trial on 18 January 2017?  The 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ conduct, in my view, is simply inexplicable.

47.  In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is no satisfactory explanation for the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ last‑minute applications for legal aid, and that such applications amount to an attempt to sabotage the trial of this action and is an abuse of process.

48.  Even if (contrary to my above ruling) the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ last‑minute legal aid applications fall short of an abuse of process, I still take the view that justice and fairness between the parties requires this court to lift the statutory stay in the circumstances of the present case.

49.  I, of course, appreciate that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants will suffer some prejudice if they are not legally represented in the trial of this action.  Such prejudice, however, can to a certain extent be compensated by some assistance from the plaintiff’s counsel and this court.

50.  In this regard, in view of the latest time estimate given by Mr Yip at the hearing, I ordered that the trial be adjourned to Friday (20 January 2017) such that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants would have a bit more time to prepare for their case.  I also directed Mr Yip to provide the 1^st and 2^nd defendants (and also this court) with the Chinese version of his written opening submissions by Thursday (19 January 2017), 4pm.  I also indicated at the hearing that the trial (or at least the taking of evidence at the trial) would be conducted in Punti.

51.  Further, at the hearing, I also suggested to the 1^st and 2^nd defendants that they might use the time to consider whether to engage private lawyers to represent them at the trial.  While the 1^st and 2^nd defendants may not be able to afford the costs of retaining a counsel of over 20 years standing to appear for them at the trial, they may have just enough resources to engage competent counsel of suitable seniority to represent them. At the end of the day, according to the 1^st and 2^nd defendants, they purchased the Land at $900,000 for “leisure farming” purpose.  One would naturally expect the 1^st and 2^nd defendants must be persons of some financial means in order to engage in such investment.

52.  Further, while this court has to take into account the prejudice that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants may suffer as a result of having no legal representation at trial, this court also has to bear in mind that such prejudice is the result of their own making. As pointed out above, it is the duty of the 1^st and 2^nd defendants as litigants to get themselves ready for the trial.  The said prejudice suffered by the 1^st and 2^nd defendants is on any view caused by their failure to comply with such duty, without any fault on the part of the plaintiff.

53.  Furthermore, this court has to balance the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ prejudice against such prejudice that the plaintiff will suffer as a result of the adjournment of the trial.

54.  I accept Mr Yip’s submission that justice delayed is justice denied, though I would qualify this by saying that the weight to be attached to such factor would depend on circumstances.  No doubt, I need to give weight to the plaintiff’s legitimate expectation that according to the rules, the trial dates are such “milestone dates” which would not be varied unless in exceptional circumstances.  That said, in deciding how much weight I should attach to this factor, I have not lost sight of the fact that it does not appear to me that there is pressing urgency for the plaintiff to obtain the relief sought in this action.

55.  However, given the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ indication at the hearing that they need legal aid to fund their litigation, I have concern that as they are currently not covered by legal aid, if the stay is not uplifted and the trial is adjourned, the plaintiff may not be adequately compensated by any costs order that this court may make in relation to such costs thrown away by the adjournment of the trial.

56.  Applying the relevant legal principles and balancing all the factors, I am persuaded that justice and fairness require this court to lift the statutory stay.

G.  Disposition

57.  Accordingly, I at the hearing ordered that:‑

(a)  there be no stay of proceedings arising the 1^st and 2^nd defendants’ legal aid applications;

(b)  the trial of this action be adjourned and resumed on Friday (20 January 2017), 10pm; and

(c)  costs of today be in the cause of the trial.