HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2015

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV101/2010CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. CHAN CHUN CHUEN AND ANOTHER
  • CACV106/2022CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE AND OTHERS
  • CACV124/2023LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD
  • CACV268/2021CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. CHAN WAI TONG CHRISTOPHER AND OTHERS
  • CACV62/2010CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. CHAN CHUN CHUEN AND ANOTHER
  • FACV9/2014CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE AND OTHERS
  • HCAP8/2007CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. CHAN CHUN CHUEN AND ANOTHER
  • HCCL6/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. CHAN WAI TONG CHRISTOPHER AND OTHERS
  • HCMP877/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP878/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP879/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP880/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP881/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP882/2020CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. WILKINSON & GRIST (a firm)
  • HCMP93/2023CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD v. THE SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE AND ANOTHER

Files (6)

[2023] HKCFI 2047-EN-2023-08-23

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

HCA 764/2015

[2023] HKCFI 2047

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 764 OF 2015

________________________

BETWEEN

 LAM YEE HUNG (林義雄)Plaintiff

and

 CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LIMITED
(華懋慈善基金有限公司)
Defendant

________________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers
Date of Hearing:23 May 2023
Date of Decision on Costs:23 August 2023

________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

________________________


1.  After trial, this court handed down judgment on 31 March 2023 (“the Judgment”) whereby I found for the plaintiff (“Lam”) and entered judgment on his claim against the defendant (“the Foundation”) with a nisi order that the Foundation shall pay Lam’s costs, including any costs reserved, in the action. Lam now applies to vary the costs order.

2.  The background and discussion of the case were set out in the Judgment, which will not be repeated here. The same definitions and abbreviations are adopted.

3.  By his summons filed on 14 April 2023, Lam seeks the following costs order:

(1) The Foundation do pay Lam’s costs in this action including all costs reserved:

(a) on an indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed (Option A);

(b) alternatively, on a party and party basis up to 2 December 2021 and on an indemnity basis from 3 December 2021, to be taxed if not agreed (Option B);

(2) The Foundation do pay interest on the above indemnity costs at the enhanced rate of judgment rate plus 10% or a rate as the court deems fit from 3 December 2021 until full payment.

4.  By the affirmation filed in support of the application, those acting for Lam set out the following grounds:

(1) Lam has made a sanctioned offer on 4 November 2021 which the Foundation ignored. The Foundation lost, which is way worse than the terms of the offer.

(2) The Foundation engaged in unreasonable and abusive litigation conduct which wasted time, escalated costs and judicial resources, and contravened the underlying objectives of civil litigation.

5.  The Foundation resists.

Discussion

6.  Lam first argues his Option B on the basis of the sanctioned offer.

7.  There is no dispute that by letter dated 4 November 2021, Lam’s solicitors made a written offer to accept from the Foundation HK$75,000,000 inclusive of interest in full and final settlement of his entire claim. It was served on the Foundation’s solicitors on the same day. It qualified as an offer under O22, rr2-5 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A (“RHC”). The offer was open for acceptance without leave in 28 days, ie until 2 December 2021.

8.  Lam obtained the Judgment against the Foundation in the sum of HK$42,850,000 with interest at the rate of 48% p.a. accruing from the drawdown dates. With accrued interests, the amount which Lam is entitled to recover as of 4 November 2021, ie the date of the sanctioned offer, would have materially exceeded the amount offered for the settlement.

9.  O22, r24 of the RHC provides, amongst others, that:

“(3) The Court may also order that the plaintiff is entitled to—

(a) his costs on the indemnity basis after the latest date on which the defendant could have accepted the offer without requiring the leave of the Court; and

(b) interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate.

(4) Where this rule applies, the Court shall make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) unless it considers it unjust to do so.

(5) In considering whether it would be unjust to make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3), the Court shall take into account all the circumstances of the case including—

(a) the terms of any sanctioned offer;

(b) the stage in the proceedings at which any sanctioned offer was made;

(c) the information available to the parties at the time when the sanctioned offer was made; and

(d) the conduct of the parties with regard to the giving or refusing to give information for the purposes of enabling the offer to be made or evaluated.

(6) The power of the Court under this rule is in addition to any other power it may have to award interest.”

10.  The issue is whether it is unjust to make an order pursuant to r24(3) upon considering the circumstances of the case including those set out under r24(5).

11.  I do not think it is unjust to do so.

12.  First, nothing about the terms of the offer may be questioned. Second, the offer was made at a time close to the commencement of trial (18 January 2022). However, if one considers that in the scale of the time already taken since the commencement of this action, it was not unreasonably, if at all, late. Much costs and time could still have been saved, had a full blown trial been avoided. Third, the Foundation should have been in a fully informed position to assess its position and the offer when it was made. Last, by ignoring the offer, the Foundation made its conscious decision to accept the consequence of failure to beat the offer eventually.

13.  That the Foundation has lodged an appeal against the Judgment is irrelevant. The present application must proceed on the basis of the Judgment as it is, and hence the consequential costs order. That the Foundation projects the prospect of its appeal in respect of the adjudged interest rate on the principal of the loan recoverable by Lam is also irrelevant. As far as the Foundation was concerned, it was rejection of the offer in its entirety.

14.  As for Option A that Lam is seeking, he pleads for the exercise of this court’s general discretion as to costs pursuant to O62, r28. O62, r5 sets out the following special matters to be taken into account in exercising the discretion:

(1) The underlying objectives set out in O1A, r1;

(2) Settlement offers (including whether the party could have protected his position as to costs by means of sanctioned offer);

(3) Conduct of all the parties, including:

(a) Whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;

(b) The manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue;

(c) Whether a claimant has exaggerated his claim;

(d) Conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.

(4) Whether a party has succeeded on part of his case even if he has not been wholly successful.

15.  For his purpose, Lam quoted the instance where there is presence of ulterior motive or underhand conduct on the part of the paying party and where the proceedings were conducted in an oppressive manner or such that it constituted an affront to the court: see Overseas Trust Bank Ltd v Coopers & Lybrand (a firm) & Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co (a firm) & Anor (third parties) [1991] 1 HKLR 177 at 183B-C. He also quoted the instance where the proceedings should never have been defended or unreasonably and unjustifiably persisted by the defendant: see Huge Dragon Corporation Ltd v The Incorporated Owners of Lung Man Oasis (IO) [2014] 3 HKLRD 286 at §13. These circumstances would warrant the exercise of the discretion by the court to award costs on a higher scale.

16.  It appears from the argument advanced by Lam that he acknowledged the need to draw a line between where the court preferred the case of one side to that of the other and where the case of the side rejected ought not to have been put forward at all. Lam argues that the Foundation had crossed the line of legitimate defence and fallen into the latter of the two situations.

17.  In my judgment, it requires much before one would categorise a case as the latter of the two situations mentioned above. The running of a case per se must either be an affront, and I stress, to the court or obviously oppressive or unreasonable from the outset. In other words, the running of the defence or its contentions per se is tantamount to an abuse of legal process. Such a conclusion should not be too readily drawn from the fact that the court prefers one side’s version and finds the losing side’s version to be incredible as a matter of assessment of the evidence in respect of the disputed existence of an oral agreement. While Lam may be aggrieved by the delay in obtaining judgment, the same was compensated by the award of interest, which in the present case was at a substantial contractual rate as found.

18.  Lam also refers to what is described as unfair and oppressive litigation tactics in disregard of the court’s orders. What he refers to was the late application of the Foundation which formed the subject of the order of this court dated 6 January 2022. For such specific litigation conduct in the proceedings, the Foundation was already ordered to face the adverse costs consequence: see reasons for decision and decision on costs in that matter dated 27 January 2022.

19.  As to the failure to mediate, there was attempt by the previous solicitors of both parties to arrange mediation back in 2018. That came to a halt partly because of the Coronavirus pandemic for nearly 2 years. When it was resumed by the succeeding solicitors of Lam, positive response from the Foundation was no longer forthcoming. The sanctioned offer was made at about similar time. As to the relevance of the sanctioned offer, the above discussion refers.

20.  Lam also criticises the attempt of the Foundation to run un-pleaded contention raised only during the trial. That was however disposed of swiftly, as explained in the Judgment. As to the apparent attempt of the Foundation to repeat the same contention in the appeal, that would be a matter for the appellate court to view.

21.  All the circumstances considered, I am not inclined to categorise the present case as one warranting an order that goes beyond the operation of O22, r24 of the RHC (ie Option B) so that the Foundation shall pay all the costs of Lam in the action on an indemnity basis (Option A).

Conclusion and order

22.  All matters considered, I grant an order in terms of §§1(1)(B) and 1(2) of Lam’s summons. Following such event, the Foundation should pay Lam his costs of the application on a party and party basis. Hence an order in terms of §2 of his summons.

 (Simon Leung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Haldanes, for the plaintiff

Mr Tony Ko, instructed by Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, for the defendant

[2023] HKCFI 908-EN-2023-03-31

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

[2022] HKCFI 329-EN-2022-01-27

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

HCA 764/2015

[2022] HKCFI 329

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 764 OF 2015

________________________

BETWEEN

 LAM YEE HUNG (林義雄)Plaintiff
 and 
 CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LIMITED
(華懋慈善基金有限公司)
Defendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 6 January 2022
Date of Decision: 6 January 2022
Date of Reasons for Decision and Decision on Costs: 27 January 2022

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION
AND
DECISION ON COSTS

________________________

1.  There were two summonses before this court. One was taken out by the defendant for extension of time for filing various witness statements purportedly pursuant to the order of this court made on 9 November 2021. The defendant went ahead to have those statements filed before the present hearing, and therefore the application became effectively one for retrospective extension of time. This met with the plaintiff’s summons for those statements of the defendant and documents disclosed by its two further lists of documents to be expunged. At the end of the hearing, this court granted the order sought by the plaintiff. These are my reasons.

Background

2.  The backdrop of the present case was the litigation between Chan Chun Chuen and the defendant in respect of the validity of the will of the late Nina Wang commenced back in 2007.  In the present case, the plaintiff claims to have provided money to the defendant in funding the latter’s conduct of that litigation.  The major dispute is whether such funds said to have been caused by the plaintiff to be deposited in the names of different parties with the defendant on divers dates in 2009 were loans to the defendant, as the plaintiff contends, or unconditional donations to the defendant, as the defendant contends.

3.  The plaintiff’s case is premised on an oral agreement between the plaintiff and Dr Kung Yan Sum (“Dr Kung”), chairman of the board of the defendant, during certain meetings in 2009.  The defendant denies the existence of the meetings, and hence any agreement, at all, and avers that the deposits in question were all recorded as unconditional donations in its financial records.

4.  The trial of this case was then due to commence in less than two weeks, that was 18 January.

5.  By the time of the pre-trial review, the parties have filed statements of their witnesses in the following chronological order:

(1)  the statement of the plaintiff (“P-1st”);

(2)  the statement of Chan Kam Por (“Chan”)  for the defendant;

(3)  the statement of Dr Kung Yan Sum (“Dr Kung”)  (“Dr Kung-1st”)  for the defendant;

(4)  the supplemental statement of the plaintiff (“P-2nd”);

(5)  the supplemental statement of Dr Kung (“Dr Kung-2nd”)  for the defendant;

(6)  the second supplemental statement of the plaintiff (“P-3rd”); and

(7)  the second supplemental statement of Dr Kung (“Dr Kung-3rd”)  for the defendant.

6.  The pre-trial review was heard before this court on 29 September 2021.  The legal representatives then newly coming on record to act for the plaintiff indicated that he would apply for leave to call a new witness.  The application for leave to adduce the witness statement of this new witness was subsequently taken out on 12 October 2021.  Further incidental discovery was also made.

7.  The plaintiff’s application was eventually resolved by consent of the parties.  On 9 November 2021, this court gave leave to the plaintiff to adduce the witness statement of Pang Chun Sing (“Pang”)  with consequential leave to the defendant to file and serve on or before 26 November 2021 its further supplemental witness statements in reply to the matters raised by the Pang’s statement and the documents in the plaintiff’s further discovery (“the 9/11/2021 Order”).

8.  On 26 November 2021, the defendant filed a summons for extension of time for filing and serving its further supplemental witness statements pursuant to the 9/11/2021 Order.  That was the defendant’s time summons before this court. The correspondence between the parties’ solicitors recorded that these further witness statements were supplied by the defendant’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors in the evening of 3 December 2021.  They consisted of:

(1)  the third supplemental statement of Dr Kung (“Dr Kung-4th”);

(2)  the statement of Woo Kwok Hang (“Woo”); and

(3)  the statement of Madam Kung Yan Sum (“Madam Kung”).

9.  As mentioned, the defendant’s solicitors went ahead to file the above witness statements on 6 December 2021 before its time summons was heard.  They did so after much heated argument with the plaintiff’s solicitors by way of correspondence.  The parties also saw fit to engage this court in such argument by way of correspondence.

10.  This manner of engaging the court in the parties’ argument by correspondence has repeatedly been criticized by the court of the first instance and the appellate level from time to time. This caused this court to have to point that out in writing to the parties in December 2021, and to point that it would be for the parties, being legally advised, to consider if any application should be taken out.

11.  Hence the plaintiff’s summons taken out on 3 January 2022 now before this court.

12.  Everything stemmed from the 9/11/2019 Order. Whether or not the further witness statements filed by the defendant were legitimate depends on whether they served no more than replying to the matters raised by Pang’s statement and the plaintiff’s further list of documents filed pursuant to that order.  The stance of the defendant was that all its further witness statements and further discovery fell within the ambit of that order. All it needed was (retrospective)  time extension for their filing.

13.  The plaintiff disagreed.  By his summons, the plaintiff applied for the expunging of:

(1)  Woo’s statement;

(2)  Madam Kung’s statement; and

(3)  parts of Dr Kung-4th that refer to (1)  and (2)  above.

14.  The plaintiff also sought to expunge the documents disclosed by way of the two further lists of documents filed by the defendant.

15.  Alternatively, in the event that leave was given to retain Woo’s witness statement for reliance by the defendant at the trial, the plaintiff would seek leave to file and serve a further statement of Pang and a statement of a new witness Mao Lai Wai on the basis that they would be necessary to specifically address the new matters raised by Woo’s statement.

The principles

16.  It is the case management discretion of the court.  Counsel referred to various authorities in their submissions.  All the circumstances of the present case have to be taken into account.  Amongst others, the state of the evidence by the time of the 9/11/2021 Order, the matters covered by Pang’s statement, the ambit of the 9/11/2021 Order, the evidence intended to be adduced by the further witness statements and discovery by the defendant as well as the limited time prior to the forthcoming trial were the particularly relevant to this court’s exercise of discretion.

The witness statement of Pang

17.  Pang and his involvement in the present case were actually set out in the existing witness statements of the plaintiff, which the defendant, if so advised, has had the opportunity of addressing even before the plaintiff sought leave to also call Pang as a witness.  By his witness statement, which is 4-page long consisting of 14 paragraphs, Pang intends to give first-hand evidence of his involvement at the trial.  As counsel for the defendant described it during his submission, this would mainly serve to corroborate the evidence of the plaintiff in those respects of his case.

18.  In summary, Pang gives an account of the following matters:

(1)  his mutual friendship with the plaintiff and the late Tsui Tsin Tong (“Tsui”)  and how he came to know Dr Kung of the defendant through Hui Yip Wing (“Hui”);

(2)  the discussion initiated by Tsui during their meal gathering at China Club, Central, attended by him and the plaintiff in 2008 about the defendant’s urgent need for funds for the litigation with Chan Chun Chuen;

(3)  how the three of them, including the plaintiff, went about the assembly of funds from various sources within and outside Hong Kong;

(4)  his presence in a meeting in early 2009 at China Club, which was attended by Tsui, the plaintiff, Dr Kung and Hui when a loan of about HK$40-50 million and its terms, including interest, to the defendant was discussed;

(5)  his subsequent discussion with the plaintiff regarding interest of the loan;

(6)  after the oral agreement between the parties for the loan has been reached, his assisting the plaintiff, who was not in Hong Kong, to arrange the funds secured by the plaintiff from his various sources as well as to deposit the same in various sums and in the names of various third parties, including the Kan couple and their company Ray IH Limited, into the bank account of the defendant on divers dates in 2009; and

(7)  subsequent to the deposit of a total sum of HK$42,850,000 to the defendant, his conversation with Hui as well as knowledge from the plaintiff and the Kan couple about the absence of any written acknowledgement of the loan by the defendant to anyone of them.

19.  The matters mentioned under §18(1)  and (2)  above did not involve anyone from the defendant, and were already mentioned in P-1st. Dr Kung and the plaintiff came to know each other through Hui (who was then a member of the board of the defendant).  There is dispute as to the occasion and venue when that happened, but such dispute was already addressed by Dr Kung-1st and P-2nd.

20.  Part of the matters mentioned under §18(3)  above may be said to be newly raised, but their alleged happening involved no one from the defendant.

21.  The matters mentioned under §18(4)  above constitute the major dispute between the parties.  However, the meetings in 2009, including the one which was attended by Pang, and what happened during those meetings were already mentioned and addressed by P-1st, Dr Kung-1st, P-2nd, P-3rd and Dr Kung-3rd.  Importantly, Dr Kung in his statements consistently denies the existence of any of the meetings in 2009 at all.

22.  The matters mentioned in §18(5)  above may be said to be newly raised, but again they involved no one from the defendant.

23.  The matters mentioned in §18(6)  above were already mentioned in P-1st, P-2nd and P-3rd. As far as the deposits of the funds into the bank account of the defendant are concerned, the defendant also addressed how they were booked and reflected in its financial records in Chan’s statement, Dr Kung-1st and Dr Kung-2nd.

24.  The non-existence of any bilateral written record of the parties and unilateral acknowledgement of the alleged loan by the defendant is undisputed fact.  The matters mentioned in §18(7)  above in this respect were already mentioned in P-1st.  The matters so mentioned also did not involve anyone from the defendant.

25.  Also mentioned in the statements of the plaintiff and addressed by the statements of Dr Kung and Chan was the executive committee meeting of the board of governors of the defendant on 25 August 2009 which the plaintiff and Pang also attended.  However, Pang made no mention of that in his statement, and therefore no reply in respect of that matter would be called for.

26.  In view of the state of evidence by way of witness statements prior to Pang’s witness statement, what the latter raised in terms of really new issues to which the defendant may need and would be in a position to reply are actually very limited.  However, purportedly for such purpose, the defendant has filed their various witness statements, including those of the following two new witnesses.

Witness statement of Woo

27.  Woo did not propose to give evidence in respect of the any of the matters happened between the parties by the end of 2009 already covered by the existing witnesses.  His statement began by referring to mid-2010 when Pang allegedly approached him for assistance in the development of the defendant in charity with the assistance of the central government in the Mainland.  He went on to describe his effort in rendering such assistance. These matters were irrelevant to the present action and hardly matters in response to the statement of Pang.

28.  Of the entire statement, the only part that might be said to be relevant was Woo’s mention of a meeting on 8 July 2010 at China Club which he attended with the plaintiff, Pang and Dr Kung.  The possible relevance lied in his statement that Pang represented during the meeting that he and the plaintiff has donated tens of millions of Hong Kong dollars to the defendant to fund its litigation and other respects.  However, such part of the statement of Woo was still problematic.

29.  First, the dispute as to the nature of the deposits of funds to the defendant said to be caused by the plaintiff and arranged through Pang was hardly newly raised by Pang.  Second, and importantly, the alleged meeting on 8 July 2010 was nowhere mentioned and did not arise out of the evidence of Pang as per his statement.  If considered relevant, there is no reason why this would not and could not have been raised by Dr Kung in any of his previous witness statements.  As Woo stated, Dr Kung was present at that alleged meeting.

30.  The circumstances were such that it was really the defendant which was seeking to call a new witness to raise a new factual issue.  If allowed, it would have entailed the plaintiff at the receiving end of that to have to respond to that for the first time.  This also explains why the plaintiff’s legal representatives complained about the need to rush up with additional evidence in order to address such new allegation.

31.  Woo’s statement exceeded the ambit of the 9/11/2021 Order.

32.  Further, given the then limited time before the commencement of the trial, it would not be fair and appropriate exercise of discretion to allow the witness statement of Woo even confined to this limited scope of his evidence.  It was somehow argued on behalf of the defendant that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiff, as he has managed to come up with the necessary further witness statements (as mentioned, including one new witness)  for the purpose of addressing such evidence of Woo.  This was not fair. It was inappropriate for the defendant to effectively take advantage of the prejudice that it has caused to the plaintiff, in terms of forcing the latter to have to rush up with such new evidence within much less than ordinary time and merely out of prudence, to justify its move.

Witness statement of Madam Kung

33.  Madam Kung is the younger sister of the late Nina Wang and Dr Kung.  According to her, she has been the head of administration of the Chinachem Group since the death of her elder sister until 2019.

34.  In summary, Madam Kung’s statement covered the following matters purportedly in reply to Pang’s statement:

(1)  A governor of the defendant has no power under its memorandum and articles of association to commit it to any loan without authorization.  There was no such authorization by the board of governors.  The plaintiff and Pang should have had knowledge about that in view of the accessible information by the general public.

(2)  Referring to the matter mentioned in §18(7)  above, namely the conversation between Pang and Hui after the deposits in question have been made to the defendant, Madam Kung states that she has not learned from Hui about any loan by the plaintiff.

35.  §34(1)  above could not be said to be called for by Pang’s statement.  What it said would have been a matter of the defendant’s internal management.  The defendant has pleaded generally (at §3 of the re-amended defence and counterclaim)  that it is a charitable corporation limited by guarantee permitted to accept charitable donations unless otherwise agreed to by the defendant.  Even if it was argued that the widest possible construction of such pleading might amount to the specific reference to the constitution of the defendant regarding its capacity to borrow, the contention in respect of constructive knowledge on the part of the plaintiff (and Pang)  about all those still lacked the necessary pleading foundation.  The alleged constitutional restriction of the authority of the defendant to borrow was not properly put in issue.  To the extent that the defendant went further to contend constructive knowledge on the part of the plaintiff and Pang, the same was also not properly in issue.

36.  According to Pang’s witness statement, the alleged conversation between him and Hui was personal to them, and the evidence in this respect serves to (partly)  accounted for the undisputed lack of documentary record of the alleged loan agreement between the parties. It was difficult to see how this was a matter calling upon Madam Kung to reply to.  What she stated in this respect also had nothing to do with such alleged conversation.

37.  Admittedly, Madam Kung’s witness statement serves an additional, and probably more important, purpose, namely to replace Chan as a witness for the defendant.  In this respect, Madam Kung stated as follows:

(1)  In her recent contact with Chan on 24 November 2021, Chan refused to testify on the ground that he has left the defendant.

(2)  She would replace Chan as witness for the defendant, and for that purpose adopt and verify the content of Chan’s statement in entirety.

(3)  As an update, she gave the names of the persons newly appointed to the board of the defendant.

38.  It should be noted that Chan made his statement in September 2017 while his last term of alternate governorship at the defendant had already come to an end in March 2017.  Departure from the defendant was hardly convincing as a new development explaining his backing out at this stage.  That aside, the defendant also did not approach the attempt to replace a witness properly.

39.  A proper application supported by explanation by affidavit of the need for the replacement should have been made.  It was to begin with wrong for the defendant to effectively hitch-hike on the 9/11/2021 Order to introduce a witness to replace a witness.  The ambit of the order never contemplated or permitted that.  Despite similar complaint by the plaintiff, the defendant somehow persisted in its stance.  Hence the plaintiff’s present application.

40.  The new witness tendered must still be one who would be in a position to testify from his or her own knowledge and belief, with grounds, as to the matters covered by Chan’s statement.  To prevent prejudice in view of the tight timeframe prior to the trial, what the new witness would testify about must not be permitted to exceed those covered by Chan’s statement.  In other words, it must be true replacement of witness and nothing more.

41.  Apart from being the head of administration of the Chinachem Group, Madam Kung was also a member of the board of the defendant.  However, in the statements of Dr Kung and Chan, the latter was described as the member of the board of governors responsible for the account and finance matters of the defendant.  He was also said to be the one responsible for preparing the relevant records of the defendant for the year 2009.  In such circumstances, it would be for Madam Kung, who was never suggested to be responsible for or involved in such account and finance matters of the defendant, to set out in her own words to what extent and on what basis she herself was in a position to testify as to the matters scheduled to be covered by Chan as the defendant’s witness.

42.  However, all that Madam Kung proposed to do was to adopt the content of Chan’s statement in entirety.  This might sound convenient but gave rise to awkwardness.  Various parts of Chan’s statement referred to his own consideration of documents, report by staff to him personally and his own enquiry made with the other governors that accounted for his observation and views as stated.  These could not be matters that Madam Kung might simply adopt in entirety as her own evidence.

43.  Last, her evidence to update on the appointment to the board of governors of the defendant, albeit apparently harmless, exceeded the evidence that Chan was expected to give.  That also did not arise out of the evidence of Pang.

44.  The defendant might not expect to put its opponent and the court on the spot to differentiate the objectionable parts from the possibly legitimate parts of the witness statement of Madam Kung sought to be introduced the way that it was.  Even assuming that this court were prepared to entertain an oral application for leave to do so, which the defendant did not actually make, it would have been inappropriate for the court to entertain, let alone to allow.  There was only a time summons from the defendant, as the defendant took the stance that the statement of Madam Kung could either be allowed pursuant to the 9/11/2021 Order or alternatively in the absence of a proper application.  Both in my decision were wrong.

The 3rd supplemental witness statement of Dr Kung (“Dr Kung-4th”)

45.  Following the non-admission of the witness statements of Woo and Madam Kung, the references to them in Dr Kung-4th must be expunged.

46.  As mentioned, the alleged meetings in 2009 where the alleged oral loan agreement was reached in the presence of Pang was not a new issue raised by Pang’s statement.  As Dr Kung acknowledged in this new statement of his, all he intended to say regarding that would be to repeat his denial of the existence of any of those meetings already covered by his previous statements.

47.  The emphasis in Dr Kung-4th that all the donations and the deposits in question said to be from the plaintiff have been utilized in funding the litigation with Chan Chun Chuen did not arise out of any matters newly raised by Pang’s statement.  Nor was the contention that any loan would have been extended to the estate of late Nina Wang instead of the defendant.

48.  That said, the plaintiff did not seek to expunge the parts of Dr Kung-4th mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs, and therefore they were saved simply on that basis.

The defendant’s 3rd list of documents

49.  The documents disclosed by way of the defendant’s 3rd list of documents consisted of three categories: (i) notice of change of secretary and director of the defendant dated 4 October 2021; (ii) excerpts and extracts of articles in media.

50.  Change of secretary and director of the defendant as of 4 October 2021 was irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute in the present case.  The excerpts and extracts were not self-explanatory in terms of relevance.  They were not allowed.

The 4th supplemental list of documents

51.  Disclosed by the 4th supplemental list of documents are copies of the originating proceedings in HCMP 2299/2013 and HCA 410/2013.  The actions were referred to in the witness statements of the defendant’s witnesses.  As court documents, which are self-explanatory, they were allowed.  Counsel for the plaintiff did not insist otherwise.

Conclusion and order

52.  The witness statements of Woo and Madam Kung were expunged.  Dr Kung-4th, subject to proper redaction, was allowed to be filed and served within 2 days.

53.  Following the above, the alternative application by the plaintiff for leave to adduce further witness statements and further documentary evidence became unnecessary.

54.  The documents disclosed by the 3rd supplemental list of documents were expunged.

55.  Trial Bundle D, consisting of the new witness statements and documents from the defendant, was removed.  Instead, Dr Kung-4th with the necessary redaction and the documents disclosed by the 4th list of documents would have to be inserted by the plaintiff into the trial bundles within 7 days.

56.  In view of the above, no order was made in respect of the defendant’s time summons.

Costs

57.  The plaintiff sought costs against the defendant on an indemnity basis. The defendant did not resist costs but only the taxation scale.

58.  The stance and approach of the defendant, while legally advised, was incorrect and unexpected.  It made the conscious decision, notwithstanding pre-application written complaint by the plaintiff, to proceed the way it did.  The plaintiff had to respond both urgently and as a matter of prudence, but such work and costs were wasted.  For the record, I do not find such work of the plaintiff in response to be unreasonable in the circumstances.  The argument on behalf of the defendant (in its subsequent submission on costs)  that the plaintiff should have waited for the outcome of the applications before responding reflects a persistent failure to acknowledge the impact and prejudice of the then tight timeframe before the commencement of the trial.

59.  There was therefore justification for this court to share the adverse view of the conduct of the litigation on the part of the defendant in this episode, and thus adverse costs on a higher basis.  Common fund basis at the least, this court said.  This court therefore directed that costs shall be summarily assessed by the court on such basis, and gave the incidental directions for the lodging and service of statement of costs and comment.

Summary assessment

60.  The plaintiff’s costs as aforesaid are summarily assessed at the sum of HK$150,000, payable by the defendant in 14 days.

( Simon Leung )
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Haldanes, for the plaintiff

Mr Alan Kwong and Ms Natalie So, instructed by Jones Day, for the  defendant

[2018] HKCFI 2404-EN-2018-11-06

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

HCA 764/2015

[2018] HKCFI 2404

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 764 OF 2015

____________

BETWEEN  
 LAM YEE HUNG (林義雄)Plaintiff
 and 
 CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LIMITED
(華懋慈善基金有限公司)
Defendant

____________

Before: Mr Recorder Houghton SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 12 July 2018
Date of Judgment:6 November 2018

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

1.  The plaintiff’s claim as originally set out in the Statement of Claim was based upon a loan. By the proposed amendments in paragraphs 12 to 14 of the Amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff seeks to introduce a new cause of action based upon restitution for mistake. Other non-controversial amendments are also made elsewhere.

2.  Leave to the plaintiff to make such amendments was given bythe Master on 30 April 2018.  The defendant now appeals against the part of that decision identified above.  As is well understood, the application before me is a hearing de novo, but with due regard paid to the decision of the Master.

3.  The relevant facts need only briefly be stated. It is the plaintiff’s case that it loaned money to the defendant at a time in which the defendant was, and was known to be, in financial difficulties.  Perhaps unusually in view of the sums involved, the loan arrangements were said to have been agreed orally in meetings between individuals representing the parties.  For its part, the defendant contends that there was no discussion of loans to the defendant, but rather the discussion concerned donations to be made to the defendant as a charitable foundation.  There is no dispute between the parties as to the fact of payments, which were made over a period of time to the defendant.  The defendant says that it “pooled” that money, and applied those payments to its charitable activities.

4.  The recent amendment proposed on behalf of the plaintiff seeks to bring an alternative basis of claim, namely that, if there was no loan agreement reached, then the monies paid by the plaintiff to the defendant were paid under a mistake of fact and, as such, are recoverable by way of a restitutionary claim.

5.  With or without the amendments there is, therefore, an issue between the parties as to what if, anything was agreed in the meetings in February and March 2009 referred to in the Statement of Claim.

Amendment principles

6.  The ‘usual’ principles on the grant of leave to amend are well understood and, in the ordinary run of cases, the court will be inclined towards permitting an amendment to be made, providing that the timing of any application, and the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate that there will be little or no procedural prejudice to the other party once costs considerations have been addressed.

7.  The factual circumstances relevant to the present application introduce potential limitation considerations however.  The discussions and payments which lie at the heart of the plaintiff’s claim took place over a period leading up to June 2009.  The plaintiff’s writ was issued on 13 April 2015.  The defendant submits therefore that the provisions of the Limitation Ordinance and Order 20, rule 5(5) are of relevance since prima facie, transactions before April 2009 would be susceptible to a limitation defence.  However, the Rules of the High Court permit amendments to be made notwithstanding the fact that the relevant limitation period has expired in certain circumstances, including where a claim which is ostensibly ‘out of time’ for limitation purposes is permitted by virtue of section 35 of the Limitation Ordinance.

8.  In particular, section 35(6)(a) of that Ordinance permits a claim which involves a new cause of action to be brought and maintained if it arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action advanced in an existing action by the party seeking to bring the new claim.

The relevant approach

9.  There have been decisions which have adopted different approaches to the grant of leave to amend where limitation considerations are relevant, and these differences in approach were described in Akai Holdings Ltd (in comp liq) v Everwin Dynasty Ltd [2012] 4 HKLRD 248:

“ The difference between the approaches is this—the English approach is to refuse an amendment where there is an arguable limitation defence, unless the new cause(s) of action arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as those on which existing causes of action are based, whereas the approach apparently taken in Extramoney Ltd v Chan, Lai, Pang & Co isto allow the amendment where the limitation defence is arguable.”

10.  The “English approach” to which the judge made reference was that in Welsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd [1994]1 WLR 1409.  In the Court of Appeal, in Global Bridge Assets v Sun HungKai Financial[2012] 4 HKLRD 474 (at paragraph 20) Kwan JA referred to that judgment and stated:

“ … Barma J did say in para.32 he was of the provisional view that the approach in Welsh Development Agency v Redpath Dorman Long Ltd is preferable and observed that the Court in Extramoney does not appear to have considered the effect of the relation-back rule in s.35(1)(b) and its impact on the question of prejudice being caused to a defendant by allowing an amendment to plead an arguably time-barred claim.

I respectfully agree with his observations. The approach in Welsh Development Agency and Sun Focus Investment[1] gives effect to and accords with s.35(1)(b) and 35(3). Leave to amend should not be given if the effect of this would be to deprive the defendant of an accrued limitation defence, which would be lost as a result of the operation of the relation-back rule in s.35(1)(b). In that situation, the correct approach is to refuse leave to amend, unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant does not have a reasonably arguable case on limitation or that the new claim arises out of the same or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed in the existing action. ‘By this means the injustice to the defendant of depriving him of an arguable limitation defence is avoided without denying the plaintiff the right to bring a fresh action to which, if he is correct, there is no limitation defence.’

…

For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the approach in Extramoney Ltd v Chan, Lai, Pang & Co (a firm), which is to give leave to amend where there is a triable issue on limitation and leaving this issue to be resolved at trial, is incorrect.”

11.  The Court of Appeal went on to hold that there was a burden on a plaintiff seeking leave to amend in circumstances in which limitation was an issue to “show that the defendant has no reasonably arguable defence of limitation to the new claim and so would not be prejudiced by the relation-back rule, irrespective of whether the limitation period is to run from the time provided under s.4(1) or s.26(1).”  See paragraph 24 of the judgment.

12.  The rationale underpinning this approach is that, where there is a dispute as to the applicability of the “relation-back rule in s.35(1)(b)”, the better course of action is to refuse to allow the amendment so as to allow the question of the applicability of that section to be determined in a separate action, which the plaintiff would be entitled to bring (subject to the limitation point) were leave to amend to be refused.

13.  The decision of the Court of Appeal in Global Bridge was applied by Ng J in Shenzhen Futaihong Precision Industry Co Ltd v BYD Co Ltd [2016] HKEC 1969 (HCA 2114/2007, 18 July 2016), in which the judge adopted the ‘three-stage test’ described in Ballinger v Mercer [2014] 1 WLR 3597 and Michael Agapios Diamandis v Sir David Seton Wills [2015] EWHC 312 (Ch).  In summary (see paragraph 16) this involves consideringwhether it is reasonably arguable that the proposed amendments fall outside the limitation period.  If not the ‘usual’ principles on amendment apply, but if limitation appears to be in issue, then it is necessary to consider whether a new cause of action is added by the amendments (stage 2).  If a new cause of action is added or substituted, then (stage 3) does it arise out of the same or substantially the same facts?  If it does not, then the amendment cannot be allowed, but if it does, then it is an exercise of discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed.

Submissions

14.  The defendant/appellant submits that the appropriate starting point is that any transactions (payments to the defendant) made prior to 14 April 2009 are, prima facie, time-barred as having taken place more thansix years prior to the issue of the writ.  The plaintiff accepts for the purposeof the appeal that there is an arguable limitation defence shown prima facie, and that the relevant amendments constitute a new cause of action.

15.  [The plaintiff does not contend that “concealment” / section 26 applies, but if it does, there are no particulars and its applicability is disputed, so that the better course is to require the plaintiff to start a fresh action.]

16.  The focus therefore is on the “stage 3” question above, namely whether the proposed amendment arises out of the same or substantially the same facts as the existing claim.

17.  The defendant refers the court to the decision of the Court of Appeal (citing Bharwaney J) in WDA Architects v MHS Planners CACV 116/2014, 21 July 2015 (at 20C, para 68):

“ The reason why an amendment is only permitted if it is based onthe same facts, or substantially the same facts, pleaded to supportthe original cause of action, is to avoid putting a defendant in theposition where, if the amendment is allowed, he will be obliged, after the expiry of the time period, to investigate facts, and other evidence, relating to matters which are completely outside the ambit of, and unrelated to, those facts which he could reasonably be assumed to have investigated for the purpose of defending the claim as originally pleaded without the amendment. The exception in sub-paragraph (5) is based on the assumption that the party, against whom the proposed amendment is directed, would not be prejudiced because that party, for the purposes of the pre-existing matters in issue, will already have had to investigate the same or substantially the same facts.”

18.  The better course of action, it is submitted, is that the plaintiff be required to commence a fresh action setting out through the process of pleadings its case as to why any limitation defence to be pleaded by the defendant is incorrect.  The defendant submits that allowing the fresh cause of action to proceed within the present action would prejudice the defendant, because it would then be required to investigate facts and mattersrelevant to the alleged mistake which would not have required investigation in respect of the existing contractual claim.

19.  On behalf of the plaintiff, counsel submits that the focus should be placed on whether or not the new claims are properly to be described as arising out of substantially the same facts as the existing claims.  This is to be considered, it is submitted, by taking a broad approach, with an emphasis on the substantiality of the similarity of facts.

20.  The existing claim is summarised by the plaintiff as involving a concluded oral loan agreement made in meetings between certain representatives of the parties.  To that assertion the plaintiff seeks to add, as a fallback, the contention that the conclusion drawn by the plaintiff fromthe meetings (that he would be making a loan to the defendant) was mistaken, and that it was pursuant to that mistaken understanding that he made the payments to the defendant.

21.  The plaintiff accepts that there is no complete overlap in the essential facts, but submits that there is more than enough to meet the requirement of substantial identify.  The plaintiff accepts also that an amendment which would require the defendant to investigate facts which are completely outside the ambit of the existing factual investigation would likely not be sufficiently congruous to the existing claim as to be said to arise out of substantially the same facts.

Inconsistent pleading

22.  The defendant further submits that the case which the plaintiff now seeks to advance, that of a mistaken payment, is inconsistent with the existing contractual loan claim.  The defendant accepts, naturally, that alternative pleas may be made, but contends that it is necessary for the plaintiff to set out the “reasonable grounds” upon which it advances alternative claims which are inconsistent as to their underlying facts.  The existence, or otherwise, of a contract is said to be a matter which is, firstly, factual, and secondly, within the knowledge of the plaintiff, such that there could be no justification here for pleading inconsistent alternative cases.

Discussion

23.  The central issue between the parties is as to what was said by the parties in the various meetings on which the plaintiff relies.  The pleadings (with or without the proposed amendment) do not set out any detail of this, but this will be the ‘core’ of the evidence at the trial.  As analleged oral agreement, the factual background will no doubt also be relevant, including perhaps the circumstances in which the plaintiff obtained and provided the funds.

24.  The proposed restitutionary claim will require the investigation of the “mistake” made, including, perhaps, when this was discovered by the plaintiff, and whether it could, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered earlier.  Moreover, investigation will be required as to what the defendant has done with the monies received and whether (assuming this to be pleaded in due course), the defendant is able to rely on a ‘change of position’ defence in consequence.  This, it is submitted, will be a complex exercise requiring consideration of the various separate payments made to the defendant, and the consequential transactions by the defendant. This is an exercise which would be wholly unnecessary in regard to the contractual claim.

25.  There are three elements to this: (1) whether it can be shown that the proposed limitation defence is bound to fail; (2) if not, whether thisfactual investigation is of such nature as to render the claim other than one based on substantially the same facts; and (3) if the facts are substantially the same, does this investigation militate against the amendment being allowed simply as a matter of discretion?

26.  The plaintiff is not able to show, at this stage, that the limitation defence is ‘bound to fail’.  The circumstances of the payments to the defendant and the plaintiff’s own understanding of what had been discussed and agreed is still to be investigated.

27.  The restitutionary claim does, however, in my judgment arise out of substantially the same facts as the ‘loan’ claim, notwithstanding the more complex defence issues that may be engendered.  This may also giverise to limitation issues which cannot be decided as the materials before me.  The commonality of issues, in my judgment, far outweighs the implicationsof the potential need for additional evidence regarding the use of the (pooled) funds received, and the broadening of issues in dispute.

28.  Nor do I accept that there is any impermissible pleading of factually inconsistent alternatives.  Inconsistent factual assertions are, ordinarily, not permissible, whereas inconsistent legal conclusions drawn from consistent factual assertions ordinarily will be permissible.  See YiuKa Fung v Info-Vantage CACV 96/2014, 3 July 2015, at para 63.  The existence, or otherwise, of a concluded contractual agreement, while based upon facts, is fundamentally a question of law.  It appears to me entirely reasonable as a matter of principle for the plaintiff to contend that certain oral discussions resulted in a contractual agreement, but that, if not, then a mistake existed pursuant to which the relevant payments were made.

29.  For these reasons I do not accept that the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s proposed amendment are valid.  The appeal against the decision of the Master is accordingly dismissed.  I order the costs of the appeal to be to the plaintiff, on a nisi basis.

The amendments to the reply

30.  The plaintiff seeks leave to amend the reply as per a draft supplied to the court.  These amendments were not opposed by the defendant.  The parties, pragmatically, agreed that, since some amendments are to be made to the statement of claim irrespective of the outcome of the appeal, that there should be just one round of amendments.  Thus the defendant is to respond to the amended statement of claim with consequential amendments within 21 days of the date of this decision, and the plaintiff is to be at liberty to make necessary consequential amendments to the reply within a further 21 days.

31.  There is, accordingly, no other order to be made on the plaintiff’s ‘reply’ summons.


 
 
 (Anthony Houghton SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Mr Wilson Leung and Mr Jason Lee, instructed by Lam & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Jeremy Chan, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant



[1] Sun Focus Investment Ltd v Tang Shing Bor [2012] 1 HKLRD 738

104273-EN-2016-05-16

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

102048-EN-2015-12-31

LAM YEE HUNG v. CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LTD

HTML content

HCA 764/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 764 OF 2015

_________________________

BETWEEN 
 LAM YEE HUNG (林義雄)Plaintiff
 and
 CHINACHEM CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONLIMITED
(華懋慈善基金有限公司)
Defendant

_________________________

Before : Master J Wong in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing : 30 November 2015
Date of Handing Down Decision : 31 December 2015

_______________

DECISION

_______________

Application

1.  This is an application by the defendant for further and better particulars of the statement of claim herein.

Statement of claim

2.  On 13 April 2015, the plaintiff commenced the present proceedings.  The plaintiff said that, in 2007 to 2009, the defendant had a bitter litigation on the estate of the late Madam Nina Wang. It needed funds to continue the litigation. In or about January or February 2009, through the introduction of the late Mr. Tsui Chin Tong, the plaintiff meet several times Dr. Kung of the defendant to discuss about the possibility of arranging a loan to the defendant to enable it to fund the litigation.

3.  Later, the plaintiff agreed to lend and the defendant agreed to borrow a sum in the region of 40 million with maximum interest permissible by the laws of Hong Kong. It was to be repaid after the conclusion of the litigation or upon written demand thereafter, whichever was the later.

4.  From March to June 2009, the plaintiff advanced or caused to have advanced a total sum of $42,350,000 to the defendant.  Out of them, $20,000,000 was from the plaintiff’s own resource and the remaining, loans he borrowed from his business associates in Hong Kong and China.

5.  Despite demand letter and statutory demand, the defendant failed and refused to repay the plaintiff the said loan together with interest at the rate of 48% per annum.  The plaintiff therefore sued the defendant for the same with costs.

Defence

6.  The defendant contested the proceedings.

7.  The defendant said that it was a charitable corporation.  Sums transferred to or received by the defendant were and should be treated as charitable donations unless there was contrary express agreement.

8.  It was admitted that the defendant was involved in the said probate litigation and required money to fund legal costs.  However, the defendant did manage to fund them through a combination of inter alia donations and loans (all of which were properly documented and recorded and none of which involved the plaintiff).

9.  Dr. Kung of the defendant did know the plaintiff but it was through the introduction of the then chief executive officer of Chinachem Group in or about 2008 during a causal meeting in Shenzhen.  Further, neither Dr. Kung nor any of the other governors of the defendant had ever discussed with the plaintiff nor contacted with him for any alleged loan financial assistance or donation.  There was no loan agreement, verbal or written, between the parties.

10.  The plaintiff further averred that:

(a) On 10 March 2009, it did receive an unconditional donation of $20,000,000 from a donor bearing the same name of the plaintiff, which was duly recorded as such.

(b) As to the rest of the alleged sums of $22,350,000, they represented unconditional donations from companies and individuals other than the plaintiff.  The defendant also duly recorded them as such.

(c) Further or alternatively, the defendant relied on limitation to bar the plaintiff to claim some of the “loans” (which were denied).

11.  Although the defendant did receive the demand letter and statutory demand, the alleged loans were denied.  Further, the statutory demand did not mention “loan” and/or “interest” and the same was only a subsequent fabrication. The defendant also relied upon evidence in HCMP 2056/2014, including that the plaintiff only claimed the sum of $42,850,000 in the statutory demand without mentioning the interest of $122,068,734.25 or $164,418,734.25 in the statement of claim herein.

12.  Regarding the claim of interest of 48% per annum, the defendant said that, as a charitable institution, it would not and could not accept and agree to such a high interest rate.  The defendant also said that it had obtained an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from presenting a winding petition against it in HCMP 2056/2014.

13.  The defendant averred that it had always been its standing practice to treat every single borrowing of loan with utmost seriousness.  All loans and donations would be clearly and properly recorded in its audited governors’ reports and financial statements (which were publicly available documents) and the alleged loan transactions by the plaintiff had never appeared in these records.

Request for further and better particulars

14.  On 22 May 2015, the defendant filed its request for further and better particulars of the statement of claim.  It targeted at 3 paragraphs, namely 5, 6 and 8.

“Under Paragraph 5

1. Of “In or about January, or February, 2009, through the introduction of the late Mr. Tsui Chin Tong (徐展堂), the Plaintiff met Dr. Kung Yan Sum (龔仁心) (“Dr. Kung”) who was and still is the chairman and one of the governors of the Defendant. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss about the possibility of arranging a loan to the Defendant to enable it to fund the Litigation.”

Request

Please state with full particulars:-

(1) the date or approximate date in January or February 2009 on which the meeting is alleged to have taken place (the “Alleged Meeting”);

(2) who was / were allegedly present in the Alleged Meeting;

(3) the venue where the Alleged Meeting took place;

(4) the circumstances leading to the Alleged Meeting and the alleged ‘purpose’;

(5) how and when Mr. Tsui had allegedly ‘introduced’ the Plaintiff and Dr. Kung;

(6) the details of what was said at the Alleged Meeting and by whom.

Under paragraph 6

2. Of “After several meetings with Dr. Kung, the Plaintiff agreed to lend and the Defendant agreed to borrow a sum in the region of HK$40 million with maximum interest permissible by the laws of Hong Kong (meaning not to violate the provision under the Money Lenders Ordinance) and to be repaid after the conclusion of the Litigation or upon written demand thereafter, which ever was the later.”

Request

(1) Please state with particularity:-

(i) the number and date(s) or approximate date(s) of each of the alleged ‘several meetings’ (the “Alleged Meetings”);

(ii) who was / were allegedly present in each of the Alleged Meetings;

(iii) the venue(s) where each of the Alleged Meetings took place;

(iv) the circumstances leading to each of the Alleged Meetings;

(v) the details of what was said at each of the Alleged Meetings and by whom.

(2) Please state whether the alleged ‘agreement’ referred to in paragraph 6 is made in writing or contained in any document, and if so please identify the document(s); or if it was allegedly made orally, please state when, where, between whom, and the circumstances under which the alleged agreement was made.

Under paragraph 8

3.  Of “The Defendant avers that of the said sum of HK$42,350,000, HK$20,000,000 was from his own resource and the remaining amounts were loan he borrowed from his business associates in Hong Kong and China.”

Request

(1) Please state all the facts and matters relied upon in support of the allegation that “the remaining amounts were loan he borrowed from his business associates in Hong Kong and China.”

(2) Please identify each of the “business associates in Hong Kong and China”

(3) Give full particulars of the alleged relationship or connection of the Plaintiff with each such alleged ‘business associates’.

(4) When and how was each alleged ‘loan’ agreed upon and borrowed, and between whom and whom.

(5) When and how did the Plaintiff receive each alleged ‘loan’ advancement.

(6) What were the terms of each alleged ‘loan’, including as to repayment time, terms and conditions, and interest rate if any.”

15.  On 5 June 2015, the plaintiff filed his answers.

“Under paragraph 5

…..

Answer

…...

1.(1) to (6) The requests are evidence which will be canvassed in witness statements.

……

Under paragraph 6

……

2.(1)(i) to (v) The requests are evidence which will be canvassed in witness statements.

2.(2)             The agreement was made orally. As for the remaining of the request, they are evidence which will be canvassed in witness statements.

Under paragraph 8

……

3.(1) to (6) The requests are evidence which will be canvassed in witness statements.

……”

16.  On 29 June 2015, the defendant took out the present summons.

Reply

17.  In the meantime, the plaintiff filed his Reply on 18 June 2015. Briefly, he set out the objects of the defendant as per its memorandum and articles of association. He reiterated that the sum of $42,350,000 was loans, and not donations, otherwise, they could only be used towards the promotion of the objects of the defendant.  

18.  Parties appeared before me on 30 November 2015 for the substantive arguments. They were both represented by counsel.  Mr Jeremy Chan for the defendant and Mr Minju Kim, for the plaintiff. Upon hearing from them, I adjourned the matter for a written decision to be handed down.  I now do so.

Rulings and reasons

19.  Both counsel referred me to a number of basic principles relating to whether further or better particulars of pleadings were to be ordered or not.  As a starting point, I remind myself of the following extracts from paragraph 18/12/1 of the HKCP 2016 at page 421.

“Effect of rule – The requirement to give particulars reflects the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly, without suprises and, as far as possible, so as to minimize costs. In Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Wheelock Marden & Co. Ltd [1994] 2 H.K.C. 264 Bokhary J.A. said at 269E-270E that the functions of properly particularized pleadings are as follows:

(1) to inform the other side of the nature of the case that they have to meet as distinguished from the mode in which that case is to be proved;

(2) to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at the trial ;

(3) to enable the other side to know with what evidence they ought to be prepared and to prepare for trial;

(4) to limit the generality of the pleadings, the claim and the evidence;

(5) to limit and define the issues to be tried, and as to which discovery is required;

(6) to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot without leave go into any matters not included (although if the opponent omits to ask for particulars, evidence may be given which supports any material allegation in the pleadings).

     It is not the function of particulars to take the place of necessary averments in the pleading, nor “to state the material facts omitted … in order by filling the gaps, to make good an inherently bad pleading” (per Scot L.J. in Pinson v Lloyds, etc., Bank [1941] 2 K.B. 72 at 75).

     The purpose of pleadings is not to play a game at the expense of the litigants but to enable the opposing party to know the case against him. There is a tendency to forget this basic purpose and to seek particulars which are not necessary when in truth each party knows the others’ case (Trust Securities Holdings v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd, The Times, December 21, 1994, CA).

     …..”

20.  With the above in mind, one immediately notices that some of the arguments of Mr. Kim might not be as persuasive as they should have been. He said that the case of the plaintiff had been made known to the defendant. It could plead the defence. There was no surprise and so forth. Mr. Kim might be correct, but further and better particulars of pleadings serve a number of different functions. As long as the defendant could persuade this court to accept at least one, it might justify an order for the same.

21.  Upon considering the arguments from both counsel, I have come to the view that the plaintiff should provide the particulars sought.

22.  As pointed out by Mr. Chan, the plaintiff is not saying that he could not remember and/or did not know the particulars sought. He only argues that it is evidence to be disclosed in his witness statement (to be exchanged at a later stage of the proceedings).

23.  Should the plaintiff be allowed to do it later then?

24.  I take the view that those further and better particulars of the alleged loans should forthwith be given to the defendant.

(a) It is the case of the plaintiff that parties came to an “agreement” of loans. It is trite law that particulars of the agreement should be provided within the pleadings.  Paragraph 18/12/3 of the HKCP at P.421 states that:

“(2) Agreement – The pleading should state the date of the alleged agreement, the names of all parties to it, and whether it was made orally or in writing, in the former case stating by whom it was made and in the latter case identifying the document, and in all cases setting out the relevant terms relied on (Turquand v Fearon (1879) 48 L.J.Q.B. 703. If the agreement is not under seal, the consideration also must be stated. ….”

(b) It is also the case of the plaintiff parties came to such agreement after several meetings.  By the same or similar rationale as particulars of agreement, details as to “when”, “who”, “where” and “how” regarding the meetings should be given.

(c) One of course does not forget (the plaintiff’s case) that it is Mr. Tsui who introduced him to Dr. Kung of the defendant to discuss about the loans.  When a key witness has passed away, details of the meeting will become particularly important so that parties could prepare their cases.

(d) Given that the usual practice of this court is to order discovery and exchange of witness statements after close of pleadings, I also agree with the submission by Mr. Chan that the provision of such particulars at the present stage is necessary because it would help the defendant to seek discovery (from the plaintiff or other third parties), prepare witness statement(s) and get ready its case for trial. The delaying of the provision of those particulars to the stage of exchange of witness statements is likely to lead to late application(s) for discovery and supplemental witness statements. 

(e) Discovery against third parties is also particularly true in the present case because the plaintiff said that he had to borrow from others in order to make loans to the defendant.  Details of these loans, including repayment term(s) and interests (if any) payable, borrowed by the plaintiff are relevant to the issues in dispute between the parties and should be disclosed so that the matter could be followed up, if necessary.

(f)  All in all, the provision of the further and particulars sought by the defendant is necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter and for saving costs.

Conclusion

25.  To conclude, I will make the following orders.

(a) The plaintiff do within 14 days serve upon the defendant further answers to the Request for Further and Better Particulars of the Statement of Claim filed and served by the defendant on 22 May 2015 herein.

(b) There be an order nisi (which is to be made absolute after 14 days) that the plaintiff do pay the defendant costs of the application, including costs reserved and certificate for counsel for hearing on 30 November 2015, to be summarily assessed by the court.

(c) Subject to (b) above, for the purpose of the summary assessment, the defendant do lodge and serve its costs statement within 3 days after the order nisi having been made absolute.  The plaintiff also lodges and serves his reply within 3 days thereafter.

(J Wong)
Master of the High Court

Mr Minju Kim, instructed by Lam & Co., for the plaintiff.

Mr Jeremy Chan, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the defendant.