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Miscellaneous Proceedings2015

SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. AU YUK KWAN

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SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. AU YUK KWAN

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HCMP 2916 & 2923/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2916 OF 2015

_____________________

 IN THE MATTER of an application by the Secretary for Justice for leave to apply for an Order of Committal
 

and

 N THE MATTER of civil proceedings in HCA 2086/2014

_____________________

BETWEEN

 Secretary for JusticeApplicant

and

 Cheng Kam Mun (鄭錦滿)Respondent
_____________________

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2923 OF 2015

_____________________

 IN THE MATTER of an application by the Secretary for Justice for leave to apply for an Order of Committal
 and
 IN THE MATTER of civil proceedings in HCA 2086/2014

_____________________

BETWEEN

 Secretary for JusticeApplicant

and

 Au Yuk Kwan (歐煜鈞)Respondent
_____________________
 (Heard Together) 

Before:  Hon Andrew Chan J in Court

Date of Hearing:  17 February 2017

Date of Sentence:  30 March 2017

_______________________________

R E A S O N S   F O R   S E N T E N C E

_______________________________

1.  The respondents appear before this court for determination of their sentence. They both admitted their liability for criminal contempt on the basis of the following facts.

The Admitted Facts

2.  As a result of what was generally known as the “Occupy Movement”, a significant part of the public highway in Mongkok, namely, the westbound carriageway of Argyle Street between the junction of Tung Choi Street and Portland Street and the streets nearby had been occupied by different individuals since late September 2014.  The general public was prevented to a varying extent from using the relevant roads/streets.  

3.  On 20 October 2014, Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Company Limited (“the Plaintiff”) in HCA 2086 of 2014 (“the underlying civil action”) made an ex parte application on notice for an injunction against persons unlawfully occupying or remaining on the public highway, namely, the westbound carriageway of Argyle Street between the junction of Tung Choi Street and Portland Street (“the Way” / “the Area”), and/or other persons hindering or preventing the passing or repassing of Argyle Street.  

4.  On the same day, an injunction order was granted until the return date on 24 October 2014.  

5.  The granting of the ex parte injunction order was widely reported in the mass media including, inter alia, English and Chinese newspapers with wide circulation in Hong Kong, major radio and television service providers such as Radio Television Hong Kong, Commercial Radio Hong Kong, and Television Broadcasts Limited, etc, and various sources on the internet.

6.  By a judgment dated 10 November 2014, the ex parte injunction was ordered to be continued (“the Injunction Order”).  The terms of the order made essentially were as follows: 

(1) the Defendant(s), and each of them, whether by themselves / himself, their / his servant(s) or agent(s) or any of them or otherwise howsoever be restrained from:

(i) preventing the demolition or removal by the Plaintiff of the temporary structures along the Way;

(ii) blocking up, or obstructing or permitting the blocking up or obstructing of the gateway, entrance or yard providing access from the Way; and

(iii) placing or allowing to be placed on the Way anything substantially restricting, preventing or otherwise interfering with the reasonable use of the Way;

(2) the bailiff be authorized to take all reasonable and necessary steps to assist the Plaintiff to effect the clearance and removal of the obstructions as provided in the Injunction Order;

(3) the bailiff be authorized and directed to request the assistance of the police where necessary;

(4) any police officer be authorized to arrest and remove any person who the police officer reasonably believes or suspects to be obstructing or interfering any bailiff in carrying out his or her duties; and

(5) any person so arrested by the police be brought before the Court, under lawful or legal processes, as soon as practicable for further directions.

7.  Applications for leave to appeal were dismissed by the Court of Appeal.  The dismissal of the applications was likewise widely reported by the local media.  

8.  The Injunction Order was served on the 1st Defendant [1], by placing an advertisement in one Chinese and one English newspaper; and placing the Injunction Order in a clear plastic envelope and attached to a board or post, or other prominent location in the Way, together with a notice (in Chinese and English) notifying the Defendants:  

(1) of the obligations and rights of the 1st Defendant; and

(2) that the 1st Defendant could obtain copies of the Injunction Order and other relevant court documents by applying to the Plaintiff’s solicitors at an identified address during normal office hours upon payment of the usual photocopying charges.

9.  The service of the Injunction Order was widely reported by the local media.

10.  Prior to 25 November 2014, it was already widely reported in the local media that the Plaintiff and the bailiff were going to take action on 25 November 2014 to execute/carry out the Injunction Order. 

11.  On 25 November 2014, the bailiff executed the Injunction Order in Mongkok at the Plaintiff’s request. 

12.  At about 8:00 am, Sergeant Li Kwong (PW1) set up three loudspeakers and two metal stages at Argyle Street junction Nathan Road, and two loudspeakers and one metal stage at Argyle Street junction Portland Street. 

13.  Between 9:20 am and 9:26 am, in front of the barricades at Nathan Road near the junction of Argyle Street, Assistant Chief Bailiff Ms Chim Fung-ling, (PW2) accompanied the Plaintiff’s legal representative to make the following announcement through the loudhailer in the following terms:

“各位在場人士注意,我哋係司法機構執達事務組嘅執達主任。

根據高等法院案件編號2014 年第2086 號於2014 年11 月10 日所發出嘅命令,執達主任會協助原告人嘅合法代理人清除及移走阻塞介乎亞皆老街西行由通菜街至砵蘭街交界的公共道路上嘅障礙物,以防干擾原告人合理使用該道路。請上述範圍內嘅人士,立即收拾你哋嘅物品離開。

任何人士,如果作出任何阻礙執達主任執行職務嘅行為,將有機會觸犯藐視法庭罪,執達主任會要求警方協助作出拘捕行動。

以下時間會由原告人代表律師,宣讀臨時禁制令嘅內容。”

14.  From about 9:25 am to 9:30 am, Senior Inspector of Police Cheung Kin-pan (PW3) stood on a metal stage at Argyle Street junction Nathan Road and repeatedly made public announcements to the obstructing crowd at Argyle Street through the PA System.  He said that the police was carrying out an operation to assist the bailiff to clear away the obstacles at Argyle Street in accordance with the Court order but not including those solely on Nathan Road.  PW3 also repeatedly advised the obstructing crowd to take away their personal belongings and leave the scene in an orderly manner following the instructions of the bailiff, and not to obstruct the bailiff from performing their duty in accordance with the Court order. 

15.  Between 10:15 am and 10:16 am, bailiffs and the Plaintiff’s legal representative and agents returned to the barricades at Argyle Street.  Acting Assistant Chief Bailiff Mr Yu Tak-shun (PW4) announced through the loudhailer that the Injunction Order would be executed immediately and clearance action would be taken accordingly. 

16.  At about 10:16 am, 11:48 am and from 12:13 pm to 12:22 pm, the agents of the Plaintiff made several attempts to clear the barricades and the tents located within the Area.  Verbal warnings were given by PW2 on a number of occasions when protestors interfered with or impeded the operation during the attempts. Clarification was made by the Plaintiff’s solicitors at the scene through the loudhailer that human beings refusing to leave the Area would also constitute obstruction under the Court order.

17.  In the meantime, PW3 repeated the public announcements at the metal stage at Argyle Street junction Nathan Road from 11:55 am to 12:00 pm.

18.  At about 12:25 pm, the situation became too chaotic and the bailiffs were prevented from executing the Injunction Order.  In this light, Chief Bailiff, Mr Kwan Sek-nam Sunny (PW5) made a formal request to the police for assistance.  Almost at the same time, PW2 gave yet another verbal warning to the crowd.

19.  At about 12:26 pm, PW2 warned the obstructing crowd in the Area again that they should not obstruct the bailiff to carry out its duties in execution of the Court order.

20.  At about 12:46 pm, PW2 together with other bailiffs and the agents of the Plaintiff reached the section of Argyle Street outside the Mongkok HSBC Centre.  Further clarification of the Court order was made by the Plaintiff’s solicitors in response to purported queries by the crowd. 

21.  At about 1:09 pm, PW5 (who was at the section of Argyle Street outside the Mongkok HSBC Centre and about to reach the section outside “Little Sheep”) indicated to the obstructing crowd that they could have 30 minutes to take away the materials.  At the same time, PW2 gave another warning to the obstructing crowd in the Area requesting them to leave with their belongings packed.

22.  At about 1:50 pm, the Plaintiff’s agents and bailiffs formed a check line with police officers following them from behind.  Afterwards, the check line moved gradually towards Portland Street along Argyle Street with the view to clearing the Area in execution of the Injunction Order.  However, the way was blocked by reporters and masked crowd who were facing the check line.  PW2 requested the reporters and the crowd to disperse through Portland Street.  However, instead of dispersing, some members of the crowd moved towards the check line thereby deliberately obstructing the bailiff in its attempt to clear up the Area.

23.  At about 2:25 pm, whilst being stalled by the obstructing crowd at the check line, PW2 announced the gist of the Injunction Order and requested the obstructing crowd to leave through Portland Street. Immediately afterwards, PW2 made a further warning to the obstructing crowd that their conduct had obstructed bailiffs in the execution of their duties and in doing so they might commit the offence of contempt of court.  The police would be requested to take arrest actions.

24.  At about 2:35 pm, PW2 requested the police to take immediate action.  Therefore, the police started to take part in controlling the crowd at the scene whereas all bailiffs retreated behind the check line. At the same time, the agents of the Plaintiff continued removing the barricades where permissible.  The crowd however continued their obstruction by deliberately remaining in the Area confronting the check line and refusing to leave.

25.  Immediately afterwards, Chief Inspector of Police Lam Chi-yuen (PW6), who was in the check line, issued a verbal warning to the obstructing crowd in Chinese and English in the following terms:

“前面人群注意。這是警方發出的警告。高等法院的執達主任,正在此根據高等法院的命令,清除及移走路上的障礙物。高等法院命令的副本,已在附近張貼,並已在報章刊登。執達主任/代表原告人的律師亦已在這裡現場解釋法院命令的要點。任何人阻礙或干擾執達主任及協助執達主任的人員執行高等法院的命令,可能違反法院命令和阻礙司法工作。這些行為可能構成刑事藐視法庭和干犯香港法例第228 章《簡易程序治罪條例》第23 條的抗拒或阻礙公職人員罪,干犯此兩項的任何一項,都可被判監禁及罰款,此外,這些行為亦可能構成其他的刑事罪行。你們必須立即停止阻礙或干擾執達主任及協助執達主任的人員,否則你們可能會被拘捕及檢控。

This is a Police warning to the crowd in front of me. The bailiffs of the High Court are now clearing and removing the obstructions here in accordance with an order / orders of the High Court.  Copies of the order(s) is / are displayed nearby and has/have been published in the newspapers.  Bailiffs / solicitors acting for the plaintiff(s) have explained the gist of the court order(s) here.  Any person who obstructs or interferes with any bailiff or person assisting him in enforcing the High Court order(s) may be in breach of court order(s) and obstructing administration of justice. Such conduct may constitute criminal contempt of court and an offence of Resisting or Obstructing a public officer under section 23 of the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228)[2]. Either of these may result in imprisonment and a fine.  Furthermore, such conduct may also constitute other criminal offences.  You must immediately stop your obstruction and interference with the bailiffs and those assisting them, otherwise you may be arrested and prosecuted.”

26.  At about 2:44 pm, PW6 gave a final verbal warning to the obstructing crowd in Chinese and English in the following terms:

“前面人群注意。這是警方發出的最後警告。你們必須立即停止阻礙或干擾高等法院執達主任及協助他們的人員清除及移走路上的障礙物。如你們不立即停止,警方會按涉嫌刑事藐視法庭,抗拒或阻礙公職人員罪,和你們已涉嫌干犯的其他罪行拒捕你們,如有必要會使用最低的武力執行拘捕,而不會再作任何警告。

This is the final warning made by the Police to the crowd in front of me.  You must immediately stop obstructing or interfering with bailiffs of the High Court or those assisting them in clearing and removing the obstructions on the road.  If you do not stop immediately, police officers will arrest you for suspected criminal contempt of court, resisting or obstructing a public officer, and other offences which you are suspected to have committed, and police officers will use minimum force for making arrests if necessary.  No further warning of arrest will be issued before arrest action.”

27.  At about 3:02 pm, PW6 told the police officers at the scene to first ask the obstructing crowd to leave voluntarily and then arrest those refusing to comply.

28.  As a consequence of hearing the warnings, some members of the crowd left upon being urged or warned by police officers at various times. 

The Arrest of Mr Cheng Kam Mun

29.  Mr Cheng was subdued and arrested by Detective Senior Police Constable 23222 for the two offences at around 3:08 pm.  After arrest, Mr Cheng was brought back to Cheung Sha Wan Police Station for further enquiry. 

30.  During the operation, several police video teams were deployed to capture the incident.  As revealed from available evidence, it is clear that Mr Cheng was found present in the Area for an extended period of time prior to and during the execution of the Injunction Order:

Approximate TimeParticulars of the Acts of the respondent
9:48 amHe stood on a stage placed in Argyle Street near the junction of Nathan Road with his face masked and with a hood put on.
11:36 amHe stood next to the stage.
1:00 pmHe stood next to the stage holding a yellow banner.
1:20 pmHe walked into Argyle Street from a pavement near Portland Street holding a yellow banner.  After around 2 minutes, he left Argyle Street.
1:43 pmHe was found standing among the crowd in Argyle Street near the junction of Nathan Road with his face masked and the hood taken off.
1:44 pmHe was found standing among the crowd in Argyle Street near the junction of Nathan Road with his face masked and the hood put on.
2:48 pmHe stood in front of the Police check line at Argyle Street near the junction of Nathan Road holding an amplifier.
3:03 pmHe was still found in the crowd holding an amplifier when the Police check line was moving forward in Argyle Street outside HSBC.
3:08 pmHe was arrested by the Police.

The Arrest of Mr Au Yuk Kwan

31.  On the other hand, Mr Au was found to be present in the Area at 3:04 pm and he stayed in the crowd and obstructed the crowd to move backward.  He was arrested by Detective Police Constable 58295.

32.  In the premises, the two respondents:

(1) were in the Area, and in the case of Mr Cheng, for an extended period of time and ought to have heard the repeated requests and warnings made by the bailiff / police officers prior to the arrest;

(2) had ample opportunities to leave the Area prior to the arrest but decided against doing so; and

(3) the actions taken by them constituted a breach of the Injunction Order.  By reason of the aforesaid, both of the respondents ought to have been aware of their breach and the breach was intentional.

33.  The deliberate acts of the respondents identified above, together with their determination to continue flouting the Injunction Order, constituted interference and/or impediment to the due administration of justice by obstructing or resisting the police and/or bailiff in executing the Injunction Order, and therefore amounted to criminal contempt of court.

The Principle in Dealing Contempt

34.  The Court of First Instance of the High Court is a superior court of record.  It has been invested with power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused.

35.  A criminal contempt is engaged where there is a serious interference with the due administration of justice.  Criminal contempt proceedings become the means for the court to ensure that conducts or activities calculated to undermine the administration of justice are properly addressed.  The object of the sentence is both to punish conduct in defiance of the court’s order and to serve a coercive function by holding the threat of future punishment as means of securing the protection which the order was primarily there to do. 

36.  In relation to sentencing, the common law power to punish for criminal contempt was described by Lord Denning MR in Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114 in the following manner:

“The powers at common law remain intact. It is a power to fine or imprison, to give an immediate sentence or to postpone it, to commit to prison pending his consideration of the sentence, to bind over to be of good behavior and keep the peace, and to bind over to come up for judgment if called upon. These powers enable the judge to give what is, in effect, a suspended sentence.”

37.  In addition to common law powers, there are specific provisions under Order 52 of the Rules of High Court which deal with penalties in contempt cases.  The power to punish for contempt of court may be exercised by an order of committal.  Moreover, the court may by order direct that the execution of the order of committal shall be suspended for such period or on such terms or conditions as it may specify.  The power to require a person guilty of contempt of court to pay a fine or to give security for good behavior has been expressly preserved. 

38.  In Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa [2011] 1 HKC 349, Chu J (as she then was) after reviewing a number of authorities, identified the relevant principles:

“Relevant principles

9. The court has a wide discretion as to the sanction to be imposed for contempt of court.  Sanction for contempt ranges from a fine to a term of imprisonment. 

10. In civil contempt, which covers breach of court order and undertaking to court, the primary concern in sentencing is to demonstrate to litigants that orders of the court are to be obeyed: Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v Lam Ming Chi [1998] 4 HKC 320 at 336E. In modern times, imprisonment is regarded as a sanction of last resort.  However, where there has been deliberate and repeated breach of court orders and undertaking, a term of imprisonment is appropriate: Excel Noble Development Ltd v Wah Nam Group Ltd [2001] 4 HKC 148, at 162; Oriental Daily publisher Ltd v Ma Chiu Sing [2009] 2 HKLRD 558; and Citybase Property Management Ltd v Kam Kyun Tak (No 2) [2003] 2 HKC 108.  Further in cases of deliberate breaches of orders, the court has to take into account public interest in the administration of justice: Citybase Property Management Ltd v Kam Kyun Tak (No 2) at para 9.

11. In criminal contempt, which involves interference with the administration of justice, a term of imprisonment is generally called for: see R v Montgomery [1995] 2 All ER 28, at 32j.  This is particularly the case where the interferences are grave and contumelious and contumacious: see for example Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press group [1998] 2 HKLRD 293, at 172-176 and Secretary for Justice v Choy Bing Wing [2005] 4 HKC 416 at 445-450.

12. In considering the penalty to be imposed, the court will have regard to the facts of the case.  The acts of contempt, its nature and volume, the circumstances in which the contempt is committed as well as the gravity of the interference with the due administration of justice are the relevant considerations.”

39.  In ACCC v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (No 6)(2013) 223 FCR 426, the Australian court points out a number of relevant factors which may be taken into account in determining the penalty for a proved contempt, which include: (i) the contemnor’s personal circumstances; (ii) the nature and circumstances of the contempt; (iii) the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; (iv) the contemnor’s culpability; (v) the need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt; (vi) the absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt; (vii) the contemnor’s financial means; (viii) whether the contemnor has exhibited genuine contrition and made a full and ample apology; (ix) whether the conduct falls within the most serious category of criminal contempt cases, such as to warrant the imposition of a term of imprisonment; (x) whether or not imprisonment is a “last resort” penalty in the circumstances of the case.

40.  Further, the High Court of Australia has emphasised the need for an effective remedy for contempt of court in Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 115 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ):

“Contempt of court is a distinctive offence attracting remedies which are sui generis: Morris v Crown Office (90). It is required of the chosen remedy that it be effective, no more but no less. For, if it is not effective, serious and lasting damage to the fabric of the law may result.”

41.  As far as large-scale protest in defiance of a court order is concerned, a helpful analysis of the considerations to be taken into account can be found in the Canadian decision of R v Bridges (No 2) (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 545.  That case involved an organized, large-scale and deliberate defiance of an injunction restraining the protesters from interfering with the operation of a pregnancy counselling and abortion services clinic. 

42.  The Canadian court placed emphasis on the “primary consideration to the principle of deterrence” where the rule of law was challenged in such a manner.  Its reasoning is summarized in the headnote:

“The contempt of court in this case was serious, representing as it did a challenge to the rule of law. There can be no more sinister or more threatening contemptuous conduct than that of organized, large scale, deliberate defiance of an order of the court. This requires that the court in sentencing the accused give primary consideration to the principle of deterrence. The sentence to be imposed must be such as to deter the accused and others like them from committing such an offence. The court must also take into account the fact that none of the accused acknowledged that they had erred and none of them offered any assurance that they would not commit further offences. On the other hand there were mitigating factors. There was a very real possibility that the strength and sincerity of the accused’s belief led them to an error in judgment. As well, they may have acted upon an erroneous understanding of the serious nature of the conduct and the court’s responsibility when faced with this kind of conduct. Finally, it may be that the accused were led astray by the leaders who were responsible for devising the strategy by which over 100 law-abiding citizens were encouraged, if not induced, to commit a criminal act.”

43.  In passing sentence, Wood J in R v Bridges (No 2) made cogent observations as to the threat to the rule of law which was posed by the defiance of the injunction at pages 547-549:

“What is very much at issue and before this court is the future survival of the rule of law. It is the rule of law which distinguishes civilized society from anarchy. Everything which we have today, and which we cherish in this free and democratic state, we have because of the rule of law. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression exist today because of the rule of law. Your right to hold the beliefs you do, to espouse those beliefs with the fervour which you do, and to attempt to persuade others to your point of view, exists only because of the rule of law. Without the rule of law there is only the rule of might. Without the rule of law the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which some of you sought to invoke, would be nothing but another piece of parchment adrift in the timeless evolution of man's history.

…

Your conduct does not embarrass this court, it challenges its very existence.  The breach of an order of this court is not a crime against the judge who issued it, it is an attack upon the institution itself – that institution which alone stand between the rule of law and anarchy.  The inherent jurisdiction of this court to punish for contempt does not exist for the purpose of preserving judicial vanity.  It is the sole device by which the court can ensure its own continued effectiveness in the struggle to preserve the rule of law.  Thus it is that the more serious the contempt the more serious the threat to the rule of law.  In the whole spectrum of conduct classified as contemptuous, there can be none more sinister or more threatening than that of organized, large scale, deliberate defiance of an order of the court.”

I entirely endorse Wood J’s view.  With the sentiment as expressed, I come to deal with the two respondents. 

HCMP 2916/2015

44.  The respondent in this matter Mr Cheng was at the material time 26.  He was employed as an assistant to one Legislative Councillor and making $15,000 a month.

45.  It can be seen from the police video that Mr Cheng had been found in the Area for a prolonged period of time.  He was seen to be carrying a yellow banner and also an amplifier at different stages.  He was seen wearing a mask and a hood but his face and profile could clearly be seen. 

46.  Judging from the period of time that he stayed at the Area and the paraphernalia that he carried, it can hardly be disputed that his involvement in the occupation, thus his conducts in contempt, was extensive and deep.  There is little doubt that he was involved in the organization of the occupation of the Area.  His conducts constituted a flagrant defiance of the Injunction Order on the day in question.

47.  Not only did Mr Cheng pay little respect to the Injunction Order, he was also late to the court on the day of his hearing.  In the course of the proceedings, he was found to be toying with his mobile phone till he was ordered to stop.  Little remorse has been shown by Mr Cheng.  I do not accept that he has purged the contempt.  It therefore comes with no surprise that following the present incident, he was involved in another case which resulting in him being convicted of obstructing public officers in the execution of their duty and sentenced to 21 days’ imprisonment.  Since that event took place afterwards, it will not affect any penalty imposed.

48.  Bearing in mind the extensiveness of his contempt and the matters to which I have referred, it appears clear that the appropriate option opened to the court is one of immediate imprisonment.  Having considered past precedents both in Hong Kong as well as other common law jurisdictions, it is ordered that Mr Cheng to serve an imprisonment term of 3 months.

HCMP 2923/2015

49.  The respondent in this matter Mr Au Yuk Kwan was at the material time 21.  He was a casual waiter earning $10,000 per month.  In mitigation, it was submitted by Mr McCoy that Mr Au had no political affiliation to any party or organization.  He was present at the barricades simply to show his support for the “Occupy Movement”.  It was further submitted that Mr Au did not have any specific intention in challenging the court. Because of his limited education level, Mr Au was not fully aware of the role played by the police, though he did have the necessary knowledge regarding the existence of the court order.  Further, Mr Au had also unreservedly apologized to the court and pleaded for leniency.  It was hence submitted that the contempt committed by Mr Au was towards to lower end of the spectrum and warranted a non-immediate custodial sentence.

50.  I agree.

51.  I have the opportunity in watching the police’s video, thus Mr Au’s activities during the final stage when the police was clearing up the barricades.  Essentially what Mr Au did was no more than refusing to leave the scene when repeated announcements had been made by the bailiffs and police officers.  When being arrested by police officers, he also put up struggle, causing minor scratches on the forearm of one police officer.  I however accept that the injuries caused to the police officer might have been accidental rather than intentional given the chaotic circumstances at the time. 

52.  Bearing in mind the limited role played by Mr Au and his personal circumstances, his age, educational level, clear record and the extent of his involvement, a suspended sentence combined with a fine in my view will exert sufficient deterrent effect. 

53.  With the above in mind, Mr Au will be fined a sum of $10,000 and given an imprisonment term of 1 month but suspended for 12 months. Mr Au will have 3 months to pay the sum.  In default, he will go to prison for one month. 

Costs

54.  The respondents do pay to the applicant the costs of and occasioned by these proceedings including all costs reserved on an indemnity basis. The respondents’ own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

 (Andrew Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Victor Dawes SC and Mr Derek Chan, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Applicant

Mr Gerard McCoy SC and Mr Albert NB Wong, instructed by Kenneth Lam, for the Respondents


[1] ie the original Defendant being “Persons unlawfully occupying or remaining on the public highway namely, the westbound carriageway of Argyle Street between the junction of Tung Choi Street and Portland Street and/or other persons hindering or preventing the passing or repassing of Argyle Street.”

[2] Hereinafter referred to as “the two offences”

107328-EN-2016-12-16

SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. AU YUK KWAN

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HCMP 2916-2932/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NOS 2916-2932 OF 2015

_______________

  IN THE MATTER of applications by the Secretary for Justice for leave to apply for Order of Committal
  and
  IN THE MATTER of civil proceedings in HCA 2086/2014

_______________

BETWEEN  
 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEApplicant
 and  
 CHENG KAM MUN (鄭錦滿)Respondent in HCMP 2916/2015
 SIEW YUN LONG (蕭雲龍)Respondent in HCMP 2917/2015
 MAN FOR ON (文伙安)Respondent in HCMP 2918/2015
 LAI YU SING (黎宇聲)Respondent in HCMP 2919/2015
 LAW WAI YAN (羅慧茵)Respondent in HCMP 2920/2015
 CHAN JEFFREY (陳子勳)Respondent in HCMP 2921/2015
 CHAN WAI FUNG (陳瑋鋒)Respondent in HCMP 2922/2015
 AU YUK KWAN (歐煜鈞)Respondent in HCMP 2923/2015
 CHU SUI YING (朱瑞英)Respondent in HCMP 2924/2015
 YUNG YIU SING (翁耀聲)Respondent in HCMP 2925/2015
 WONG KA YEE (黃嘉義)Respondent in HCMP 2926/2015
 KONG KAM TO (江金桃)Respondent in HCMP 2927/2015
 CHAN AO TIEN (陳遨天)Respondent in HCMP 2928/2015
 CHAN PAK TAO (陳柏陶)Respondent in HCMP 2929/2015
 CHAN WING WAH (陳榮華)Respondent in HCMP 2930/2015
 LOU TIT MAN (劉鐵民)Respondent in HCMP 2931/2015
 LEUNG HON LAM (梁翰林)Respondent in HCMP 2932/2015

_______________

(Heard together)

Before: Hon Chow J in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing: 14 December 2016
Date of Decision: 16 December 2016

___________________

D E C I S I O N

___________________


INTRODUCTION

1.  The issue that I have to decide is whether to give a direction that all affidavits or affirmations filed on behalf of the Secretary for Justice shall stand as the evidence in chief of the deponents at the trial of these committal proceedings provided that the deponents do attend the trial to be cross-examined on their affidavits or affirmations by the respondents.

2.  The above direction is sought by Mr Victor Dawes SC on behalf of the Secretary for Justice as the applicant in these proceedings and supported by Mr Gerard McCoy, SC on behalf of his clients in HCMP 2916, 2922, 2923 and 2926 of 2015, but objected to by (i) Mr Earl Deng on behalf of his clients in HCMP 2917, 2920 and 2921 of 2015, (ii) Mr Man Ho Ching (adopting the written submissions prepared by counsel, Ms Christine Yu) on behalf of his clients in HCMP 2928, 2929, 2931 and 2932 of 2015, and (iii) the respondents in HCMP 2918 and 2925 of 2015.  The remaining respondents adopt, I understand, a neutral position on this matter.

DISCUSSION

3.  The background facts to these proceedings are well known to the parties and I do not propose to set them out again in this decision.

4.  On behalf of the Secretary for Justice, Mr Dawes submits that the direction sought should be given for the following reasons:-

(1)   The court has clear power to give such direction in view of the confirmation by the Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Cheung Kai Yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 367, at paragraph  35, that the Rules of the High Court are generally applicable to proceedings for criminal contempt.

(2)   A similar direction was given in what are referred to as the “Taxi Cases” by consent, and there is no rational basis for not giving the same direction in the present group of cases.

(3)   The current estimated length of trial of 40 days is put forward on the basis that the affidavits or affirmations of the deponents will stand as their evidence in chief.  If the deponents are required to give oral evidence in the traditional manner, it is estimated that an additional 15 to 20 days will be required for the trial.

(4)   There is no clear or intelligible reason why the deponents should be required to give evidence in chief in the traditional manner.  None of the respondents has indicated which paragraphs of their affidavits or affirmations, or which areas of their evidence, are likely to be disputed.  Neither has any of them been able to explain what tactical or other advantage he or she may obtain by requiring the deponents to give evidence in chief in the traditional manner.

(5)   Lastly, the mere fact that the credibility of a witness may be in issue does not necessarily mean that his or her witness statement should not be allowed to stand as his or her evidence in chief (see Bam Ganesh v Hussain Maroof, CACV 47/2007, 16 July 2008, at paragraph 18 per Le Pichon JA).

5.  In my view, of the 5 reasons advanced by Mr Dawes, the important ones are the third and fourth reasons mentioned above.  The fact that the court has power to give the direction sought is not a reason for the exercise of such power. Also, the fact that a similar direction was given in the Taxi Cases by consent cannot of itself be a good or sufficient reason for giving the same direction in the present set of cases.  I accept, however, that the efficient administration of justice and the promotion of the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform are good reasons for giving the direction sought by the Secretary for Justice.  These considerations are, in my view, as relevant to proceedings for criminal contempt as they are to ordinary civil litigations.

6.  I shall deal with a number of objections to the direction sought by the Secretary for Justice which have been raised by Mr Deng, Mr Man and some of the respondents acting in person.

7.  First, it is said that the Secretary for Justice should, instead of seeking the direction, put forward agreed facts to the respondents for their consideration and use his prosecutorial discretion to identify witnesses who are necessary to prove his case so as to limit the number of witnesses required to give evidence at the trial.  While I agree that it would be helpful for the Secretary for Justice to propose agreed facts with a view to them being agreed by the respondents and to limit the number of witnesses as much as possible so that the trial may be shortened, I do not consider these matters to be valid grounds to object to the direction now being sought by the Secretary for Justice.  Irrespective of whether the affidavits or affirmations shall stand as the evidence in chief of the deponents, there is no obstacle to the agreement of undisputed facts or the limitation of witnesses.

8.  Second, it is said that the respondents are not required to disclose or give any indication of their defence, because these are proceedings for criminal contempt with penal consequences.  Hence, the Secretary of Justice’s fourth reason mentioned above has no force or validity.  Granted that the respondents are entitled, as a matter of right, not to disclose their defence, it is a matter entirely for them to decide whether to exercise such right.  If they choose to exercise the right of silence, the court can only make a decision on the basis of the materials and arguments now before the court, and determine whether, in the interest of justice, the affidavits or affirmations of the deponents filed on behalf of the Secretary for Justice should be allowed to stand as their evidence in chief.

9.  Third, it is argued that the present cases and the facts in issue are identical to summary offences of a criminal nature, and safeguards in the criminal trial process to ensure the integrity and fairness of the system should be followed. I have been referred to a number of Australian authorities which explain the rationale behind the usual rule or practice of requiring witnesses to give their evidence orally in criminal trials.  It is a fact, however, that the respondents are not currently being charged with any summary offences. It is also now clear that the present contempt proceedings are civil causes or matters (see Secretary for Justice v Cheung Kai Yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 367, at paragraph 35).  As I see it, in considering whether to allow the affidavits or affirmations of the deponents to stand as evidence in chief, what is critical is not whether the present committal proceedings should be treated as being civil or criminal in nature, but whether the respondents will suffer any real prejudice as a result of the direction and whether the fairness of the trial will be compromised.  It is, in my view, important that the direction will have no effect on the right of the respondents to fully cross-examine the deponents on their affidavits or affirmations.  It has not been suggested or shown that any particular prejudice will be suffered by the respondents as a result of the direction, or that the trial process will be rendered unfair by permitting the deponents to adopt their affidavits or affirmations as their evidence in chief.

10.  Lastly, it is argued that requiring the witnesses to give evidence in chief orally will promote the public interest of transparency of the proceedings.  I am given to understand by Mr Dawes (which I consider to be a fair observation) that a large part of the case for the Secretary for Justice will be presented by video evidence and not the oral evidence of witnesses.  It is clear to me that the trial of these applications will be fully reported in the media.  I do not believe that the transparency of the proceedings will be compromised by giving the direction sought by the Secretary for Justice.

11.  In my view, whether the direction sought by the Secretary for Justice should be given is ultimately a matter of case management.  I consider that I ought to arrive at a result which would promote the efficient administration of justice while seeing that the respondents will not suffer any real prejudice in the conduct of their defence.  I believe that a proper balance can be achieved by giving the direction sought by the Secretary for Justice but subject to an express proviso that the trial judge may direct the evidence in chief of any particular witness (in whole or in part) to be given orally.

Disposition

12.  I give the following directions:-

(1)   all 17 applications now before me shall be heard together;

(2)   the Secretary for Justice shall have leave to fix dates for the trial of the 17 applications in consultation with counsel’s diary, with 40 days reserved;

(3)   there shall be a pre-trial review to be held on a date not earlier than 10 weeks and not later than 6 weeks prior to the commencement of the trial, with 1 hour reserved; and

(4)   subject to such direction as may be given by the trial judge that the evidence in chief of any particular witness (in whole or in part) shall be given orally, the affidavits or affirmations filed by the Secretary for Justice in these 17 applications shall stand as the evidence in chief of the deponents provided that they attend the trial to be cross-examined by or on behalf of the respondents.

13.  I also make an order nisi that the costs of the application be in the cause, with certificate for 2 counsel where applicable.

14.  The respondents’ own costs, in so far as they are legally aided, are to be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.

 (Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Victor Dawes, SC and Mr Jin Pao, instructed by Department of Justice, for the applicant in HCMP 2916-2932 of 2015

HCMP 2916, 2922-2923, 2926 of 2015
Mr Gerard McCoy, SC and Mr Albert N B Wong, instructed by Kenneth Lam, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents

HCMP 2917, 2920-2921 of 2015
Mr Earl Deng, instructed by JCC Cheung & Co, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents

HCMP 2928-2929 and 2931-2932 of 2015
Mr Man Ho Ching, of Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents

HCMP 2924 of 2015
Mr Kenneth Lam, of Kenneth Lam, for the respondent

HCMP 2927, 2930 of 2015
Kong Kam To and Chan Wing Wah, the respondents, in person, absent

HCMP 2918 of 2015
Man For On, the respondent, in person, present

HCMP 2919 of 2015
Lai Yu Sing, the respondent, in person, present

HCMP 2925 of 2015
Yung Yiu Sing, the respondent, in person, present

103888-EN-2016-05-06

SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. AU YUK KWAN

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HCMP 2917, 2920-2923, 2926, 2928-2929, 2931-2932/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS

NOS 2917, 2920-2923, 2926, 2928-2929, 2931-2932 OF 2015

_______________

 

IN THE MATTER of applications by the Secretary for Justice for leave to apply for Order of Committal

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of civil proceedings in HCA 2086/2014

_______________

BETWEEN

 SECRETARY FOR JUSTICEApplicant

and

 SIEW YUN LONG (蕭雲龍)Respondent in HCMP 2917/2015
 LAW WAI YAN (羅慧茵)Respondent in HCMP 2920/2015
 CHAN JEFFREY (陳子勳)Respondent in HCMP 2921/2015
 CHAN WAI FUNG (陳瑋鋒)Respondent in HCMP 2922/2015
 AU YUK KWAN (歐煜鈞)Respondent in HCMP 2923/2015
 WONG KA YEE (黃嘉義)Respondent in HCMP 2926/2015
 CHAN AO TIEN (陳遨天)Respondent in HCMP 2928/2015
 CHAN PAK TAO (陳柏陶)Respondent in HCMP 2929/2015
 LOU TIT MAN (劉鐵民)Respondent in HCMP 2931/2015
 LEUNG HON LAM (梁翰林)Respondent in HCMP 2932/2015
_______________
 (Heard together) 
Before:  Hon Chow J in Chambers (open to public)
Date of Hearing:  29 April 2016
Date of Decision:  6 May 2016

___________________

D E C I S I O N
___________________

 

INTRODUCTION

1.  I have before me a total of 5 summonses taken out by the respondents seeking, in each instance, an order that the leave (“the Second Leave”) granted by this court on 11 November 2015 to the Secretary for Justice (“the Secretary”) to apply for an order of committal against the respondents be set aside.

2.  In what follows, references to “Order” and “rule” shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, be references to the Rules of the High Court.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3.  The present contempt proceedings arose out of events occurring at the westbound carriageway of Argyle Street between the junction of Tung Choi Street and Portland Street on 25 November 2014 in connection with the execution of an injunction order granted by Au J on 10 November 2014 and sealed on 14 November 2014 in HCA 2086/2014 (“the Injunction Order”).

4.  The background facts leading to the lapse of the earlier leave (“the First Leave”) granted by this court on 20 March 2015 to the Secretary to apply for an order of committal against the respondents have been set out in my earlier decision in Secretary for Justice v Cheng Kam Mun [2015] 1 HKLRD 41 given on 1 September 2015.  I do not propose to repeat them in this decision.

5.  Following the court’s decision in Cheng Kam Mun, on 6 November 2015, the Secretary applied, ex parte, for fresh leave to apply for an order of committal against the respondents pursuant to Order 52, rule 2(2).

6.  On 11 November 2015, this court granted fresh leave (ie the Second Leave) to the Secretary to apply for an order of committal against the respondents.

7.  On 25 November 2015, the Secretary, pursuant to the Second Leave, issued an originating summons under Order 52, rule 3(1) against each of the respondents.

8.  Also on 25 November 2015, the Secretary for Justice issued, in respect of each of the respondents, a notice of appointment to hear the originating summons pursuant to Order 52, rule 3(2).

9.  The respondents now seek to challenge the Second Leave granted by this court.  In summary, the following grounds have been raised by some or all of the respondents in support of their applications:-

(1) The Secretary is time-barred from initiating committal applications on conduct which could have been prosecuted by way of a statuary offence under section 23 of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap 228 (“Section 23”).

(2) Alternatively, the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside the Second Leave on the ground of frustration of legitimate expectation.

(3) The time limit imposed by Order 52, rule 3(2) for entering the originating summons for hearing is mandatory.  Once the court has granted leave to an applicant to apply for an order of committal against a respondent and such leave has lapsed, the court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the same matter anymore.

(4) The lapse of the First Leave means that it is an abuse of process for the Secretary to re-commence committal proceedings against the same respondents.

10.  In what follows, I shall deal with each of these grounds separately.

1ST GROUND: IMPLIED TIME BAR

11.  According to Mr Gerard McCoy SC, there is an implied time bar, namely, 6 months from the date when the matter of complaint of criminal contempt arose, for the Secretary to apply for leave to apply for an order of committal against the respondents.  This time bar, it is said, arises from the “principle of legality” and/or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights having regard to the following circumstances:-

(1) The conduct of the respondents complained of by the Secretary could equally be prosecuted as an offence under Section 23.

(2) As a matter of fact, the Secretary did originally charge the respondents for an offence under Section 23 in the magistrates’ court.

(3) The Secretary subsequently decided not to pursue the Section 23 charge and elected to proceed with committal proceedings, recognising that the respondents could not be punished “twice on the same acts”.

(4) A person who is charged with a Section 23 offence is entitled to certain statutory protections, including (i) a time limit of 6 months for commencement of prosecution under Section 26 of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227), and (ii) a penalty limit of a fine of HK$1,000 and imprisonment for 6 months under Section 23.

(5) Accordingly, the same protections should be available to the respondents who could have been, and were originally, charged with an offence under Section 23, even though the Secretary has later elected to pursue committal proceedings against them.

12.  On this argument, the lapse of the First Leave is irrelevant.  The time bar of 6 months would apply even if the leave application made on 6 November 2015 was the first time that the Secretary sought leave to apply for an order of committal against the respondents.

13.  I do not accept that the Secretary is subject to the suggested time bar of 6 months for seeking leave to apply for an order of committal under Order 52, rule 2(2), whether generally or in the particular circumstances of these cases.  In my view, Mr McCoy’s argument overlooks two fundamental points.  First, the offence created by Section 23 and the offence of criminal contempt are completely different in so far as their purposes, essential ingredients and sanctions are concerned.  In particular:-

(1) The purpose of Section 23 is to proscribe conduct amounting to “resisting or obstructing a public officer or other person lawfully engaged in a public duty”, whereas the purpose of the offence of criminal contempt is for “the protection of the administration of justice and the maintenance of the court’s authority”: see Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt (4th Ed, 2011), paragraph 3-6.

(2) In relation to their essential ingredients, Section 23 catches conduct amounting to resisting or obstructing a public officer or other person lawfully engaged, authorized or employed in the performance of any public duty or any person lawfully assisting such public officer or person therein (which may have nothing whatsoever to do with the execution of any court order or the administrative of justice), whereas conduct constituting a criminal contempt can take a variety of forms occurring in a variety of circumstances which can be far removed from what is mentioned in Section 23.  Since the parties have not made submissions on the precise essential ingredients of the offence of criminal contempt, I shall leave that matter for future consideration as and when it becomes necessary to do so.

(3) Lastly, the sanction following a conviction of an offence under Section 23 is limited to a fine of HK$1,000 and imprisonment for 6 months, whereas the sanction for criminal contempt is not so limited.

14.  The second fundamental point is that under Article 63 of the Basic Law, prosecutorial decisions are vested in the Department of Justice free from any interference.  Generally speaking, it is entirely a matter for the Secretary to decide what criminal charge to pursue against a person whose conduct could be prosecuted for a number of different offences carrying difference consequences.  The court has power to restrain an abuse of process, but it would only be in the most exceptional circumstances that the court would consider a prosecutorial decision made by the Department of Justice as amounting to an abuse.

15.  In the present cases, the Secretary’s reasons for deciding to pursue the criminal contempt route were set out in the skeleton submissions of the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions (“DDPP”) dated 7 January 2015 in HCA 2086/2014 and more fully in paragraph 5 of the DDPP’s skeleton submissions dated 7 January 2015 in HCA 2104/2014 (relating to another set of contempt proceedings), as follows:-

“(1)The main gravamen of the conduct leading to the arrests was open disobedience of the Court Injunction Order, thereby undermining (a) the due administration of justice, (b) the respect for the authority of the court, and (c) therefore the Rule of Law …

(2) The Rule of Law ought to be upheld.

(3) In the interest of justice, it is more appropriate to bring the APs back before the court whose order s/he openly disobeyed to be dealt with by the Court as the court may deem appropriate.

(4) The Rule of Law, and the authority of the Court, are best safeguarded and seen to be safeguarded this way.”

16.  Whether the respondents’ conduct amounted to an open disobedience of the Injunction Order or constituted a criminal contempt are matters to be tried in due course (in respect of which I express no view at present), but I am unable to see how the Secretary’s decision to proceed with contempt proceedings for the aforesaid reasons, which appear to be based on public interest considerations, can be said to amount to an abuse of the court’s process or, as put by Mr McCoy, a “colourable device to circumvent time limits to arrive at the possible outcome of a deprivation of liberty” (see paragraph 9 of Mr McCoy’s written submissions).

17.  Neither can I see any valid basis to import the time bar prescribed by Section 26 of the Magistrates Ordinance into the criminal contempt regime.  In Gascoyne v Custom and Excise Commissioners [2003] Ch 292, Neuberger J (as he then was) had to consider whether it would be an abuse of process for the Commissioners of Custom and Excise to commence condemnation proceedings in the High Court (which was not subject to any time limit) when he could have instituted condemnation proceedings in the magistrates court, which would have been subject to a time limit of 6 months which had expired.  Rejecting the defendant’s complaint of abuse of process, Neuberger J stated as follows:-

“70. … The legislature, for reasons best known to itself, has given the commissioners the option of bringing condemnation proceedings either in the magistrates' court or the High Court, and I cannot see any reason, in principle or logic, for applying to High Court proceedings a time bar which plainly only applies to magistrates' court proceedings. Where legislation gives a person, whether a public body or a private individual, the option of taking one of two courses, each of which is subject to its own statutory and procedural rules, it seems to me that it would require the most exceptional circumstances before a statutory procedural rule, which was plainly promulgated in relation to only one of the courses, could be applied to the other course as well.

71. On the other hand, the notion that the commissioners have, almost literally, an infinite period within which to issue condemnation proceedings in the High Court cannot, to my mind, be right. It appears to me that, in any particular case, a time will come when it would be an abuse of their powers, and indeed an abuse of process, for the commissioners to issue condemnation proceedings, that is to say that such proceedings would, if issued, be struck out. It would be inappropriate to try to set out the sort of circumstances which might give rise to such a situation; whether such proceedings are or would be an abuse would have to be decided on the particular facts of the particular case. Plainly, in the great majority of cases, an abuse argument would be based on an unjustifiable or oppressive period of delay, or on some sort of assurance or indication that condemnation proceedings would not be issued in the High Court.”

18.  I pause to observe that there is no suggestion, nor is there any ground to contend, in the present cases that the Secretary was guilty of unjustifiable or oppressive delay in making the application for fresh leave on 6 November 2015, or that some sort of assurance or indication had been given by the Secretary that committal proceedings would not be issued in the High Court against the respondents.

19.  A similar argument, in the context of the same offence in civilian and military jurisdictions, was raised and rejected by the English Court of Appeal in R v Buchan [2007] EWCA Crim 716 and R v S [2013] EWCA Crim 2519.

20.  Although the above cases arose in somewhat different contexts, they illustrate the difficulty of trying to import rules made specifically for one regime for application in another regime.

21.  In support of his argument, Mr McCoy places heavy reliance on two cases, one a judgment of the House of Lord in R v Rimmington [2006] 1 AC 459, and the other a judgment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Siemer v Solicitor-General [2010] 3 NZLR 767.

22.  In Rimmington, the defendants were charged with and convicted of the common law offence of causing a public nuisance, in one case by sending to several different people a total of 538 separate letters and packages containing racially offensive materials, and in the other by sending through the post to an old friend an envelope containing a cheque in repayment of a debt together with a small quantity of salt, which was intended as a humorous gesture or joke but which a postal worker, upon seeing some of the leaked salt, feared might be anthrax and raised an alarm leading to the evacuation of the building and cancellation of the second delivery of the post for that day.  In the UK, conduct that was formerly chargeable as the crime of public nuisance at common law had largely become the subject of express statutory provision.  Apparently, the prosecutor chose to proceed with the common law offence because (i) by the time that the first defendant was unmasked as the writer of the letters, many of the incidents were so old that there was a bar on any prosecution under statute, and (ii) the sentence available on conviction under statute was regarded as insufficient to mark the seriousness of that’s defendant’s conduct.   It was in that context that consideration was given to the question of whether, where conduct was the subject of express statutory provision, it should be charged under the statutory provision and not as public nuisance at common law.

23.  On that question, Lord Bingham of Cornhill said the following at paragraphs 30 and 31 of his speech in the House of Lords:-

“30. Where Parliament has defined the ingredients of an offence, perhaps stipulating what shall and shall not be a defence, and has prescribed a mode of trial and a maximum penalty, it must ordinarily be proper that conduct falling within that definition should be prosecuted for the statutory offence and not for a common law offence which may or may not provide the same defences and for which the potential penalty is unlimited… It cannot in the ordinary way be a reason for resorting to the common law offence that the prosecutor is freed from mandatory time limits or restrictions on penalty. It must rather be assumed that Parliament imposed the restrictions which it did having considered and weighed up what the protection of the public reasonably demanded. I would not go to the length of holding that conduct may never be lawfully prosecuted as a generally-expressed common law crime where it falls within the terms of a specific statutory provision, but good practice and respect for the primacy of statute do in my judgment require that conduct falling within the terms of a specific statutory provision should be prosecuted under that provision unless there is good reason for doing otherwise.

31. It follows from the conclusions already expressed in paras 29 to 30 above that the circumstances in which, in future, there can properly be resort to the common law crime of public nuisance will be relatively rare. It may very well be, as suggested by J R Spencer in his article cited in para 6 above, at p 83, that ‘There is surely a strong case for abolishing the crime of public nuisance’. But as the courts have no power to create new offences (see para 33 below), so they have no power to abolish existing offences. That is a task for Parliament, following careful consideration (perhaps undertaken, in the first instance, by the Law Commission) whether there are aspects of the public interest which the crime of public nuisance has a continuing role to protect. It is not in my view open to the House in resolving these appeals to conclude that the common law crime of causing a public nuisance no longer exists.”

24.  In the same case, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated the following at paragraphs 52 to 54 of his speech:-

“52. When Parliament enacted the statutory offences, it did not expressly abolish the corresponding aspect of the common law offence of public nuisance. Therefore, if - contrary to my view - Mr Rimmington's conduct in writing the letters had amounted to a public nuisance, it would presumably have continued to do so even after the statutory offences were introduced. So a charge could not have been regarded as bad simply because it was framed in terms of the common law rather than in terms of the statute. To put the matter more generally, where Parliament has not abolished the relevant area of the common law when it enacts a statutory offence, it cannot be said that the Crown can never properly frame a common law charge to cover conduct which is covered by the statutory offence. Where nothing would have prevented the Crown from charging the defendant under the statute and where the sentence imposed would also have been competent in proceedings under the statute, the defendant is not prejudiced by being prosecuted at common law and can have no legitimate complaint.

53. Here, however, according to what Mr Perry told the House, the Crown had deliberately chosen the common law offence in order to avoid the time-bar which Parliament had enacted and to allow the judge, if he thought fit, to impose a heavier sentence than the one permitted under statute. The issue bears some resemblance to the issue in R v J [2005] 1 AC 562 . There is no suggestion, of course, that the Crown acted in bad faith. On the contrary, it is easy to understand why they did what they did. In a particular case, such as this, a time-limit which prevents prosecution once a certain time has passed since the act was committed can appear to be arbitrary and to reward an offender for concealing his offences. The sentence available under the statute may also seem inadequate to reflect the gravity of the defendant's conduct. But Parliament has deliberately chosen to intervene and to prescribe a period within which conduct of this kind can be prosecuted summarily under statute. This must be taken to reflect Parliament's judgment that, if the conduct has not been prosecuted within that time, the public interest is now against proceeding. That judgment may be based on various factors. Parliament may, for example, consider that after a certain period everyone should move on and prosecutors should turn their attention to other matters. Police and prosecution resources, it may be thought, are better spent on detecting and prosecuting recent, rather than stale, offences of this kind or recent, rather than old, incidents in a course of conduct. More serious matters should be given priority. Similarly, in the matter of sentence, Parliament has reached a view that certain conduct is appropriately covered by an offence which can be tried only summarily and which should attract no more than a particular level of sentence. Parliament has also fixed the maximum sentence to be imposed in summary proceedings, even where the defendant is convicted of more than one charge. Again, in any particular case, the sentence available under statute may appear to the prosecutor to be inadequate. But Parliament is entitled to place an offence in what it regards as the appropriate level in the hierarchy of offences and to limit the sentencing power of a court where the accused is not tried by jury.

54. It is not for the Crown to second-guess Parliament's judgment as to any of these matters by deliberately setting out to reject the applicable statutory offences and to charge the conduct in question under common law in order to avoid the time-limits or limits on sentence which Parliament has thought appropriate. It may be that, in the light of experience, Parliament's judgment can be seen to have been flawed or to have been superseded by events. Doubtless, the prosecuting authorities have channels through which they can-and perhaps should-draw any such perceived deficiencies to the attention of the Home Secretary. It is then up to ministers and, ultimately, Parliament to decide whether the law should be changed. But, unless and until it is changed, its provisions should be respected and the Crown should not devise a strategy to avoid them.”

25.  In my view, the true principle to be derived from the above speeches of Lord Bingham and Lord Rodger is that it is a matter of statutory construction whether the legislature intends, by enacting the relevant statutory offence, that the prosecution should no longer be permitted to prosecute an accused person for a corresponding common law offence where his conduct can also be prosecuted as an offence under statute.  It may be that the existence of the statutory offence can be taken as a pointer that the legislature intends that henceforth the prosecution should only proceed under statute.  The question is, ultimately, one of statutory construction, and the proper question to ask is whether the legislature intends that the prosecution can only prosecute the accused person for an offence under the statute in the circumstances which have occurred.

26.  Three further points are of note arising out of the judgment of the House of Lords in Rimmington.  First, the situation in which Lord Bingham said it would ordinarily be proper that conduct falling within the ingredients of a statutory offence should be prosecuted for the statutory offence and not for a common law offence is where the legislature has enacted a specific statutory offence and the conduct complained of can be prosecuted both as the statutory offence and a generally-expressed common law crime.  It does not seem to me that Section 23 can be regarded as the specific statutory offence designed or intended to cover the field of criminal contempt involving resisting or obstructing of a public officer or other person engaged in the execution of a court order.

27.  Second, the corresponding common law offence still exists notwithstanding the creation of the relevant statutory offence by the legislature.  For this reason, it must be the case that there could be occasions where it would be permissible, and indeed proper, for the prosecution to proceed with a charge under common law. As observed by Lord Bingham in the aforesaid quote from his speech, “good practice and respect for the primacy of statute do in my judgment require that conduct falling within the terms of a specific statutory provision should be prosecuted under that provision unless there is good reason for doing otherwise” [emphasis added].

28.  Third, where the prosecution has proceeded under common law but the circumstances are such that it ought to have proceeded under statute, it is not the case that statutory protections such as those relating to time bar for prosecution or maximum sentence upon conviction should be imported into the common law offence.  If, upon the true construction of the relevant statute, it is held that the prosecution can only prosecute the accused person for the statutory offence, the proper course to take, it seems to me, would be to dismiss the common law charge.

29.  It may also be observed that in Rimmington, notwithstanding what was said about the interaction between the statutory offence and the common offence of public nuisance, as a matter of fact, the House of Lords allowed the defendants’ appeals because in one case the conduct of the sender of the racially offensive materials did not amount to the offence of causing a public nuisance, and in the other case the sender of the letter containing the salt lacked the necessary mens rea for the common law offence.

30.  Rimmington was considered by the Hong Kong courts in two public nuisance cases concerning the same defendant, (i) HKSAR v Pearce [2006] 3 HKC 105, and (ii) HKSAR v Pearce [2009] 5 HKLRD 1.

31.  In the first case, the defendant dressed himself in a “Spiderman” costume and mounted to the podium in a building in Central and hung a banner in front of a large TV screen.  His actions drew crowds of onlookers and caused traffic congestion which lasted for about 2 hours.  Fire Services set up rescue cushion and part of the road beneath was cordoned off.  Vehicular traffic was diverted, and traffic lights were suspended.  Police were called in for crowd and traffic control.  Access to and from the shops in the building was impeded.  Some shops closed and staff of the management company had to shepherd pedestrians along the detour.  One of the defendant’s grounds of appeal against his conviction for public nuisance was that he should not have been charged with the common law offence of public nuisance when a statutory offence under section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, which prohibited “any act whereby injury or obstruction, whether directly or consequentially, may accrue to a public place …” without lawful authority or excuse and prescribed a more limited penalty upon conviction, was available.  Rejecting the defendant’s argument, Beeson J said the following at paragraphs 54 to 58 of her judgment:-

“54. Counsel for the Appellant argued, on the basis of Rimmington, that if a statutory offence existed it should be used, rather than the common law equivalent, unless there was good reason not to do so. However as counsel for the Respondent pointed out the offence had not been abolished and could be charged in appropriate circumstances.

55. Article 63 of the Basic law provides:

‘The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.’

56. The choice of charge and venue for trial is the responsibility of the Secretary for Justice and his designated officers. The prosecution has a wide discretion as to the charge or charges it may lay and in the absence of bad faith, abuse of process, or perverse decision a court is unable to question the decision. Charges are laid and venues chosen according to prosecution policy and guidelines taking into account the gravity of the offence, the elements that can be proved and other factors such as prevalence, deterrence, community mores etc. The prosecutorial burden is a heavy one and it is for the Secretary for Justice to decide in what manner it is borne. Although the Appellant argued that the charge was inappropriate, it was not suggested that the common law offence was chosen, in the manner deprecated in Rimmington, to circumvent mandatory time limits, or limits on penalties.

57. The Respondent submitted that it was open to the Secretary for Justice to choose the charge, which, in the proper exercise of his discretion, he considered, properly reflected the gravity of the situation it was intended to deal with. Section 4(28) of the Summary Offences Ordinance, Cap. 228 was more commonly used to combat the mischief of hawkers or shop owners encroaching on and obstructing public space in some way, although it could be used, as it was in Yeung May-wan and HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 137, to deal with obstruction caused by demonstrators.

58. Nothing in the arguments put forward by counsel for the Appellant convinces me that the common law offence should not have been preferred. This ground of appeal fails.”

32.  In the second case, the defendant unlawfully climbed onto Tsing Ma Bridge and, during a two-hour demonstration, roamed the six-lane upper deck and between two gantries using a makeshift crossing; hung three banners; spent significant periods without safety harness attached to any anchor; and placed one leg over the safety fencing twice threatening to jump off.  Out of concern for the safety of the defendant and others, the authorities closed the entire upper deck, creating traffic jam which stretched 4 km in one direction and 12 km in another. The defendant again raised the objection that he ought to have been charged with the offence of obstruction under the Summary Offences Ordinance instead of the common law offence of public nuisance.  Wright J dismissed the defendant’s objection, and said the following at paragraphs 25 to 27 of his judgment:-

“25. The appellant further raised a query why, in the light of the comments of Beeson J in HKSAR v Pearce, he had been charged with the common law offence of public nuisance rather than obstruction contrary to the Summary Offences Ordinance. The creation of a statutory offence does not abolish, of necessity, an existing common law offence, absent express indication: the restriction, if it maybe regarded as such, is against the prosecution charging a common-law offence with the express purpose of circumventing the statutory offence, especially, perhaps, as to either time limits or penalty.

26. Lord Bingham of Cornhill expressed it in this way in R v Rimmington, R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63:

‘30 … I would not go to the length of holding that conduct may never be lawfully prosecuted as a generally-expressed common law crime where it falls within the terms of a specific statutory provision, but good practice and respect for the primacy of statute do in my judgment require that conduct falling within the terms of a specific statutory provision should be prosecuted under that provision unless there is good reason for doing otherwise.’

27.   It seems to me that good reason for prosecuting the appellant under the common law offence clearly existed in the instant matter…”

33.  Returning to the cases at hand, I am unable to discern, from Section 23 or any other provision in the Summary Offences Ordinance, any legislative intention that, in the circumstances obtained here, the Secretary can only proceed against the respondents for an offence under Section 23 instead for criminal contempt in respect of their conduct complained of by the Secretary. I do not believe that the legislature intends, by enacting the offence of resisting or obstructing a public officer or other person lawfully engaged in a public duty under Section 23, that cases involving an open disobedience of an injunction order granted by the High Court (as alleged by the Secretary here) should or could only be prosecuted for the offence under Section 23 instead of the common law offence of criminal contempt.  In any event, I consider that the Secretary’s reasons for deciding to pursue the criminal contempt route given by the DDPP (referred to in paragraph 15 above) amount to “good reasons” for prosecuting the respondents for the common law offence of criminal contempt instead of the offence under Section 23.

34.  I next turn to consider the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Siemer, which Mr McCoy says is “particularly apposite to the facts at hand” (see paragraph 9 of Mr McCoy’s written submissions).  The issue in that case was whether a person founded to be in contempt of court and sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment should have been allowed to elect for a jury trial in his contempt proceedings by virtue of the section 24(e) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which provided as follows:-

“Everyone who is charged with an offence –

(e) Shall have the right, except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of a trial by jury when the penalty for the offence is or includes imprisonment for more than 3 months …”

35.  By a majority, the Supreme Court of New Zealand held that the protection under section 24(e) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was applicable to a person who was the subject of an application for committal for contempt, and substituted an order committing the appellant to prison for a maximum term of three months.

36.  The decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in Siemer may support the proposition that the rights which a person charged with a criminal offence enjoys under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights are also available to a person who is the subject of an application for committal for criminal contempt.  No relevant right under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights is, however, engaged in the present cases.  Although Mr McCoy has referred the court to Articles 10 and 11 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, I do not see what right(s) which the respondents may be entitled to under those articles has or have been infringed.

37.  On any reading, Siemer cannot support the proposition that a specific time limit of 6 months for commencement of contempt proceedings can be implied, whether generally or in the circumstances obtained in the present cases.

38.  In all, I reject the argument that the Secretary was time barred from applying for fresh leave to apply for an order of committal against the respondents on 6 November 2015.

2ND GROUND: FRUSTRATION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTION

39.  Mr McCoy next argues that the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside the Second Leave on the ground of frustration of legitimate expectation, the relevant expectation being, it is said, the substantive protections of (i) a time bar for prosecution similar to that provided by Section 26 of the Magistrates Ordinance and (ii) a maximum sentence as prescribed by Section 23.

40.  Mr McCoy submits that the Secretary’s circumvention of the aforesaid statutory protections, by electing to proceed with contempt proceedings instead of pursuing a Section 23 charge, comes under the third category of frustration of legitimate expectation as articulated by Lord Woolf MR in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213, at paragraph 57:-

“There are at least three possible outcomes. (a) The court may decide that the public authority is only required to bear in mind its previous policy or other representation, giving it the weight it thinks right, but no more, before deciding whether to change course. Here the court is confined to reviewing the decision on Wednesbury grounds (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223). This has been held to be the effect of changes of policy in cases involving the early release of prisoners: see In re Findlay [1985] AC 318 ; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906. (b) On the other hand the court may decide that the promise or practice induces a legitimate expectation of, for example, being consulted before a particular decision is taken. Here it is uncontentious that the court itself will require the opportunity for consultation to be given unless there is an overriding reason to resile from it (see Attorney General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629) in which case the court will itself judge the adequacy of the reason advanced for the change of policy, taking into account what fairness requires. (c) Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantive, not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy.”

41.  It is clear from the above judgment of Lord Woolf MR that before any legitimate expectation under the third category can arise, there must first be a lawful promise or practice by the decision maker inducing the expectation.  In the present cases, the respondents have not been able to identify any relevant lawful promise or practice by the Secretary either that he would only charge the respondents for an offence under Section 23 and would not apply for an order of committal against them, or that any application for leave to apply for an order of committal would be made within 6 months of the conduct giving rise to the alleged contempt.  There is, in my view, no proper basis for the alleged legitimate expectation which could have been frustrated by the Secretary’s decision to seek fresh leave to apply for an order of committal against the respondents on 6 November 2015.

42.  Mr Benjamin Yu SC (for the Secretary) has also drawn my attention to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The Queen v Soo Fat-ho, HCMA 982/1991 (26 June 1992), in which it was held that the concept of “legitimate expectation” has no place in the criminal law, although the court has power to stay proceedings on the ground of abuse of process.  In R v Maxwell [2011] 1 WLR 1837, at paragraph 13, Dyson JSC said that the court has the power to stay proceedings in two categories of cases, namely, (i) where it will be impossible to give the accused a fair trial, and (ii) where it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the particular circumstances of the case.  The same principles were stated by Sir Anthony Mason NPJ (with whom the other members of the Court of Final Appeal agreed) in HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336, at paragraph 182.  In the present cases, I do not consider that it will be impossible to give the respondents a fair trial, or it will offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to determine the Secretary’s complaint of criminal contempt against them in a public trial.

43.  In all, I do not accept Mr McCoy’s argument that the court should, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside the Second Leave on the ground of frustration of legitimate expectation.

3RD GROUND: COURT’S JURISDICTION AFTER LAPSE OF ORIGINAL LEAVE

44.  This ground is raised by Mr Lawrence Lok SC and Mr Hectar Pun SC on behalf of their respective clients.  In particular, Mr Pun argues that Order 52, rules 2(2) and 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court do not envisage any procedure for making a “second application” for leave after the original leave granted has lapsed due to a failure to comply with the time requirement under rule 3(2).

45.  I have dealt with substantially the same argument in my earlier decision in Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan Ying and Others, HCMP 774, 776-781, 783, 784, 787-789, 791-798 of 2015 (8 March 2016), in which I came to the conclusion that the court has jurisdiction to entertain an application by the Secretary for fresh leave in the same proceedings in which the original leave, which had lapsed under Order 52, rule 3(2), was granted.  If the court has jurisdiction to grant fresh leave in the existing proceedings in such circumstances, it seems to me obvious that the court must likewise have jurisdiction to grant fresh leave in new proceedings commenced by the Secretary.

46.  Despite the submissions of Mr Lok and Mr Pun, I am not persuaded that the aforesaid conclusion reached in Chau Wan Ying is wrong.  I am given to understand that my decision in Chau Wan Ying is currently under appeal to the Court of Appeal.  Since the issue of jurisdiction will in due course be fully ventilated in the Court of Appeal, I do not propose to deal with this matter any further in this decision.

4TH GROUND: ABUSE OF PROCESS

47.  Mr Lok argues that it is was an abuse of process for the Secretary to apply for fresh leave for committal in new proceedings, in circumstances where (i) the originating summonses in the first set of proceedings have not yet been struck out, dismissed or withdrawn, and (ii) the costs of the first set of proceedings have not yet been paid.

48.  In relation to the argument that it is an abuse of process for the Secretary to bring a second action while the first action is still extant and for duplicitous proceedings to be maintained over the same subject matter, Mr Lok relies on the judgment of Recorder Fok SC (as he then was) in Lam Pak Cheung v Lin Zhen Lue [2009] 1 HKLRD 35.  In that case, the plaintiff commenced two separate actions against several parties, one by way of an originating summons in July 2006 and the other by writ of summons in November 2007, in relation to the same subject matter.  The learned Recorder considered that the two sets of proceedings were materially duplicitous and that the plaintiff or his legal advisers should have realised, having regard to the complexity and nature of the disputes, that the originating summons procedure was inappropriate and the proper course was to issue proceedings by a writ of summons.  He further came to the view that the only rational reason for the plaintiff wishing to keep the original action alive was in order to avoid the incidence of an adverse costs order being made in that action (paragraph 57).  As such, the plaintiff’s stance in having commenced two overlapping sets of proceedings against substantially the same parties and for substantially the same relief but in seeking to keep the original action alive while prosecuting the second, more appropriate, action was an abuse of the court’s process (paragraph 58).  The learned Recorder therefore struck out the first action.

49.  Lam Pak Cheung is plainly distinguishable from the present cases.  There is no question here of the Secretary seeking to avoid the incidence of any adverse costs orders being made in the earlier contempt proceedings.  The court has already made costs orders in those proceedings which, I understand, are currently under assessment.  The Secretary sought fresh leave for committal only because the original leave granted had lapsed. The original set of contempt proceedings can no longer be proceeded with in the absence of some further order of the court.   I am unable to see how the seeking of fresh leave by the Secretary in such circumstances can be regarded as an abuse of the process of the court.

50.  Reliance is placed by Mr Lok on what was said in paragraph 38 of the judgment in Lam Pak Cheung, as follows:-

“It has been held that, where proceedings are in existence based on a particular cause of action, it is prima facie an abuse of process to bring a second action based on the same cause of action and the latter action is liable to be struck out: see Buckland v. Palmer [1984] 1 WLR 1109, applied in Hong Kong in The Pertamina [1986] HKC 78.”

51.  It is important to note the words “prima facie” in the above passage in the judgment of the learned Recorder.  Whether a plaintiff has abused the court’s process by bringing a second action when there is in existence an earlier action based on the same cause of action must be determined by the court on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. As mentioned above, I do not consider the seeking of fresh leave by the Secretary on 6 November 2015 can be regarded as an abuse of the process of the court.

52.  It should also be noted that in Lam Pak Cheung, there was no suggestion that the second, more appropriate, action should be struck out or stayed.  What was under consideration was whether the first, inappropriate, action ought to be struck out or stayed (see paragraph 48 of the learned Recorder’s decision). There is no application before me to strike out or stay the first set of proceedings which, as earlier mentioned, can no longer be proceeded with in the absence of some further order of the court.  It is thus not necessary for me to decide whether those proceedings ought to be struck out or stayed.

53.  In relation to the argument that it is was an abuse of process for the Secretary to apply for fresh leave for committal where the costs of the first set of proceedings have not been paid, I am given to understand that the costs which the Secretary has been ordered to pay have not yet been assessed or agreed. The previous and present proceedings are publicly funded on both sides.  There is no question of the Secretary not paying the costs incurred by the Director of Legal Aid on behalf of the respondents in the first set of proceedings once they have been assessed or agreed.  I am simply unable to see how it would be right to set aside the present proceedings merely because the unascertained costs of the first set of proceedings have not yet been paid by the Secretary. It cannot possibly be in the interests of any parties, or in the public interests, for the Secretary to delay the fresh proceedings until after the costs of the first set of proceedings have been ascertained and discharged. Neither of the authorities cited by Mr Lok, namely, Investment Invoice Financing Ltd v Limehouse Board Mills Ltd [2006] WLR 985; and Global Bridge Assets Ltd v Sun Hung Kai Financial Ltd [2015] 5 HKLRD 553, can lead to the result contended for by Mr Lok.

DISPOSITION

54.  For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the respondents’ summonses with costs to the Secretary, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for 2 counsel.

55.  The respondents’ own costs are to be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.

56.  I shall leave it to the parties to agree on the further directions to be given for the future conduct of these proceedings, including the fixing of trial dates pending any appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal, with liberty to the parties to apply where necessary.


57.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for the assistance that they have rendered to the court.

 (Anderson Chow)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Benjamin Yu, SC, Mr Victor Dawes, SC and Mr Martin Ho instructed by Department of Justice, for the applicant in (HCMP 2917, 2920-2923, 2926, 2928-2929, 2931-2932 of 2015)

HCMP 2917, 2920-2921 of 2015

Mr Hectar Pun, SC and Mr Earl Deng, instructed by JCC Cheung & Co, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents

HCMP 2922-2923, 2926 of 2015

Mr Gerard McCoy, SC and Mr Albert N B Wong, instructed by Kenneth Lam, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents

HCMP 2928-2929 and 2931-2932 of 2015

Mr Lawrence Lok, SC and Ms Christine Yu, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the respondents