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LACHY v. YC

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[2022] HKFC 94-EN-2022-04-27

L, ACHY v. Y, C

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FCJA 2057/2016

[2022] HKFC 94

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

JOINT APPLICATION NO. 2057 OF 2016

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BETWEEN  
 L, ACHY 1st Applicant
 and 
 Y, C2nd Applicant

------------------------

Coram:  H.H. Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (not open to public)

Mode of Hearing:  By way of Written Submissions

Date of 1st Applicant’s Written Submissions:  6 April 2022

Date of Decision:  27 April 2022

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D E C I S I O N

(VARIATION OF SHARED CARE)

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1.  On 22 February 2022, the 2nd Applicant (“the mother”) issued a summons asking for the following orders:

(1)  The shared care of the daughter (“O”) to be varied so that the hand-over of O to be changed from once every 3.5 days to once every 7 days or 14 days;

(2)  The receiving parent must produce a negative Covid test result before receiving O.

(3)  Both parents must observe all Covid prevention regulations pronounced by the government when caring for O; and

(4)  The 1st Applicant (“the father”), his girlfriend and his mother be stopped from brain washing O.

2.  The father opposes the application.

3.  The first return date of the mother’s summons was on 10 March 2022, falling within GAP. As a result, I directed both parties to file their written submissions for the summons to be dealt with on paper. The father lodged his written submissions on 6 April 2022, but none was received from the mother. Be that as it may, I now proceed to consider the mother’s application despite her failure to comply with the court’s directions.

4.  I note that the mother was acting in person and her summons was issued in the Chinese language. However, I also note from the case files that the proceedings were previously heard by Judge Melloy in English and most of the documents were also prepared in that language. Therefore, I have decided to give my decision in English as well. If the mother requires interpretation of this decision, she should contact my clerk for the necessary arrangement to be made.

5.  After considering the mother’s application and all the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that her application has to be dismissed. These are my reasons:

(1)  This case has a very long history. After an 8-day trial, Judge Melloy granted a very detailed order on custody and shared care on 14 June 2019 which included, inter alia, the following arrangements:

(i)  Both parties shall have joint custody of O; and

(ii)  They shall also have shared care of O during term time in that O will be in the care of the father from Sunday 9:30am until Thursday morning when he takes O to school, and the mother shall have O after school on Thursday until Sunday 9:30am.

(2)  The mother now asks for the hand-over to be changed from a 3.5-day interval to a 7-day or 14-day interval because of the public health situation. I accept that the public health situation in late February 2022 was serious, but I do not think that was a good enough reason to justify a change to the hand-over interval. Furthermore, by the date of this decision, the public health situation has obviously stablished and there is even less reason to change the hand-over arrangement.

(3)  I also agree with the father’s submission that the requirement for the production of a negative test result before hand-over is too draconian. As both parents will have the best interest of O in mind, I am quite sure that they will adopt the most appropriate measures to protect O. A mandatory requirement for either parent to produce a negative test result before exercising his or her care of O is unnecessary.

(4)  The mother’s third application is that both parties must comply with all Covid prevention regulations when exercising care of O. From the mother’s supporting affirmation, there was allegation that the father had breached the government restriction by having gathering involving more than 2 households. The father denies this, saying that the 3-household gathering took place before the imposition of such restriction. I see no point in making any adjudication on this factual dispute. Such restriction on household gathering is no longer in place and I will say no more on this.

(5)  The last application of the mother is that the father, his girlfriend and his mother should be stopped from brain washing O. What she meant was that the father and his girlfriend had passed very inappropriate and negative comments on her in front of O. Again, the father denies this. I do not see any concrete evidence on parental alienation, or “brain washing” in the words of the mother. Moreover, the relief requested by the mother is akin to a prohibitory injunction not only against the father, but also against a non-party, namely the father’s girlfriend.  I do not think this court has jurisdiction in granting such a relief.

6.  For the reasons above, the mother’s summons is dismissed.

7.  The father asks for costs against the mother.

8.  Despite the fact that the mother failed in her application and some of her supporting evidence was rather weak, I do accept that when the application was made at the end of February this year, the public health situation was indeed quite alarming. The mother might simply have over reacted and therefore, I am not minded to make any adverse costs order against her on this occasion. However, I must warn the mother that she has to give serious thoughts before making any future application, and to seek proper legal advice before so doing. The fact that she is acting in person is not a license for her to make any unmeritorious application. Any such application is likely to be met with an adverse costs order in the future.

9.  I now make the following orders:

(1)  The mother’s summons dated 22 February 2022 is dismissed.

(2)  There shall be no order as to costs, including all costs reserved.

  C. K. Chan
District Judge

Representation:

Messrs. John M. Pickavant & Co., solicitors for the 1st Applicant

2nd Applicant acting in person

[2019] HKFC 152-EN-2019-06-14

LACHY v. YC

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FCJA 2057 / 2016

[2019] HKFC 152

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

JOINT APPLICATION

NUMBER 2057 OF 2016

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BETWEEN
 LACHY1st Applicant
and
 YC2nd Applicant

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Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)

Dates of Hearing: 5 – 8 March, 12, 13 and 20 March 2019

Date of closing submissions: 12 April 2019

Date of closing replies: 26 April 2019

Date of Judgment: 14 June 2019

__________________________

JUDGMENT
(Sole custody/joint custody, care and control, access or joint care and control/shared care)

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Introduction

1.  There are cross applications before the court that now require adjudication. They concern the practical arrangements to be put in place for the only child of the family, a little girl, O, who was born on the XX January 2014 and who is now nearly 5 ½ years of age. The 1st Applicant father wishes to have sole custody and care and control of O, with reasonable access to the 2nd Applicant mother. As will be seen below, under his proposal, O would have two overnights per week during term time with the mother. The mother for her part seeks an order for joint custody, but with care and control to herself and reasonable access to the father. Under her proposal O would have five overnights every two weeks with the father – namely every Wednesday night and either Friday and Saturday night or Sunday night, on a two week rolling basis.

2.  At present the care of the child is split between the parties during term time on a more or less equal basis as set out in the court order dated the 10 February 2017 where it is stated as follows:

7.  The care of the child of the family namely, OPSL(“O”), a girl born on XX January 2014 shall be shared between the parties on an interim basis as follows:-

-   O shall be in the care of the 1st Applicant [father] from Sunday, 12th February 2017 at 9:30 a.m. until Wednesday 15th February 2017 when the child is taken to school at 1:55 p.m.

-   O shall be in the care of the 2nd Applicant [mother] from Wednesday, 15th February 2017 after school at 4:55 p.m. until Sunday, 19th February 2017 at 9:30 a.m.

-   O shall be picked up by the 1st Applicant at the 2nd Applicant’s home and the 2nd Applicant shall pick up O on Wednesday after school.

-   These arrangements shall continue until further order.

-   O shall have contact with the parent with whom she is not staying each day at 7:30p.m. by Skype, Video WhatsApp or telephone

Consequently, O currently spends three nights per week with the father and four nights per week with the mother and approximately 3 ½ days with each of her parents during term time.

3.  O is currently in K2. Her parents have been litigating over her care for most of her young life, but not withstanding that she appears to be thriving and doing well at Kindergarten. The intent is that she shall go into K3 next year and that she shall proceed to primary school with effect from September 2020, when she will be 6 ½ years old.    

4.  The court is therefore concerned with the medium to longer term arrangements for O, in a situation where both parents are working and each requires some support in caring for O. The father is now 41 years of age and the mother is 35. They have no other children. As will be seen the father has re partnered, but the mother is currently single.

The Fact Finding hearing

5.  Unfortunately, much of the difficulty in this case has arisen because of the mother’s allegations primarily against the father’s girlfriend, Ms N, which necessitated a Fact Finding hearing. On the 21 November 2017 a judgment was handed down in that respect and reference should be made to that judgment as necessary.

6.  In summary though, the mother had accused Ms N of sexually abusing O, or in the alternative of behaving in a way that was “sexually inappropriate”. It became clear, as the case progressed, that the mother had no evidence to support her claim and she was warned several times of the possible cost consequences if she chose to proceed. Notwithstanding that she did not withdraw her allegations and a trial ensued.

7.  The mother also behaved in other ways that were inappropriate and the following is also recorded at paragraph 14 of the judgment:

   14.  Following the hearing in court on the 10 February 2017 the mother then posted a copy of the undertaking given by the father on Facebook, contrary to the implied undertaking on confidentiality. She did this for the first time on the 11 February 2017. Facebook took the post down on the 18 February and the mother reposted it on the 20 February. It was finally removed sometime after the 23 February after the father sent the mother a pre action letter for contempt. Ms. N also wrote to the mother directly expressing her concern about this. I am told that the mother did not respond.

8.  At the end of the day I completely exonerated Ms. N. I accepted that she had not touched O in a sexual way or behaved infront of her in a way that might be considered inappropriate. At paragraph 29 I said that I thought that the mother probably stuck with her story because she thought it would help her win sole custody and care and control of O (although as can be seen, infact the mother is now seeking joint custody of O). Consequently, I ordered that the mother pay the costs of the Fact Finding hearing on a party and party basis, notwithstanding the fact that this was essentially a child related matter. Reference can also be made to my Ruling dated the 29 November 2018 in that respect. The mother sought leave to appeal that Ruling. Leave to appeal was not granted either by myself or by the Court of Appeal.   

9.  Prior to this, and immediately following the separation, it seems that the parties were able to conduct themselves in a more civilized manner and consequently they were probably more able to effectively co parent O. It is though against this background that I am now asked to determine the arrangements for O in the medium to longer term. Consequently, one of the issues that the court now needs to consider is whether or not the relationship between the parties is so severely damaged that an order for joint custody is no longer feasible? In either event, i.e. whether there is an order for sole or joint custody, it is clear that the parties will need to consciously “parallel parent” as opposed to “cooperatively co parent” going forward.  

Background to the marriage

10.  In the Fact Finding judgment dated the 21 November 2017 I set out the background to the case as follows:

Background

3.   … The parties are both ethnically Chinese – but the father was born and grew up in the United Kingdom, whereas the mother was originally from the Mainland. They married on the XX March 2009 in Hong Kong and, as I have said, O was born on the XX January 2014. It seems that they have spent most of their married life based in Hong Kong, although the mother in particular has travelled frequently for business. The father is a barrister and the mother has her own precious gem stone and jewellery companies.

4.   It seems that unhappy differences arose between the couple and they separated, although the date of that separation does not appear to be agreed. In any event a joint application for divorce was filed on the 14 June 2016. In that application it is stated that the father shall have the custody and care and control of the child with reasonable access to the mother. Minutes of Agreement dated the 19 May 2016 were also filed and again this document stated that it was agreed that the father would have custody and care and control of the child.  This document is signed by both parties.

5.   It is the father’s case that he was the primary carer of the child at that time and that O was living with him and that he cared for her with the assistance of his mother and a domestic helper. This is denied by the mother who maintains that she has been the primary care taking parent of the child since birth. She also refers to the parties sharing O’s care.

6.   In any event, on the 12 January 2017 the decree nisi was pronounced. On the same day the court received a joint affirmation from the parties in which it was stated that it was agreed that the mother would now have custody of O with reasonable access to the father. A further document stated that it was agreed that the father would pay child maintenance of HK$10,000 per month. Given the differing agreements the court adjourned the question of both custody and ancillary relief. Eight days later the father filed a summons seeking interim custody of O and claimed in his supporting affirmation that the mother had misrepresented the situation to him, particularly with respect to the employment of a domestic helper and the mother’s business commitments. This summons was returnable before the court on the 6 March 2017. On the 7 February 2017 the father issued an ex parte summons on notice seeking inter alia interim custody and care and control of O. This application was returnable before the court on the 10 February 2017. It was at this hearing that the mother’s allegations first came to light. An interim order was made on that occasion splitting O’s time between the father’s household and the mother’s household. Further the father undertook to ensure that Ms N had no form of contact and did not see O, whilst O was in his care and the mother undertook to ensure that her new dog was kept secure whilst O was in her care. As indicated above the Fact Finding hearing was set down for trial on the 13 April 2017 after the mother was given an opportunity to withdraw her allegations. On that occasion she was also warned that she might face an indemnity costs order in the event that it was found that she had “made up” these allegations. On that occasion the father also sought to vary his undertaking with respect to Ms N. This was opposed by the mother and the court did not intervene further pending the hearing preferring to err on the side of caution. Undertakings were also given by both parties not to discuss the proceedings with the child.  

11.  During the trial there was much discussion about each sides understanding of the divorce process and the arrangements that they had originally agreed to, and entered into, for O. I do not intend to go into that here, or to make any findings of fact in that respect, especially as the court is now primarily concerned with the future arrangements for O, as opposed to any original agreement for her care – or what was said or not said by each of her parents at the time of the separation and subsequent divorce. Suffice it to say that there was clearly some confusion over the terminology used, which was seemingly exacerbated by the fact that Cantonese is neither parties mother tongue.  

The issues

12.  The issuesto now be determined then are these:

1)   What practical arrangements should be put in place for O’s care during term time? In particular, should the current arrangement be maintained or should an alternative arrangement be put into place?

2)   For the avoidance of doubt what arrangement should be put in place for the school holidays?

3)   What formal orders should then be put in place for custody/joint custody, care and control/joint care and control/shared care and/or access?

4)   Are there any other orders/directions that the court should make at this juncture?  

The law

The law in Hong Kong

13.  The main provisions regarding children can be found in the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 and the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13. Section 19 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 states that:

(1)   The court may make such order as it thinks fit for the custody and education of any child of the family who is under the age of 18-

(Amended 69 of 1997 s. 28)

(a)  in any proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, before, by or after the final decree;

14.  The general principles governing such applications are set out in section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13, which states that:

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

(1)  In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property-

(a)  in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court -

(i)  shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to -

(A)  the wishes of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B)  any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing;

List of factors

15.  In addition, reference can also be made to the list of factors found in the Children’s Proceedings (Parental Responsibility) Bill. Although this list of factors has yet to find its way into our statute books, I have nevertheless reproduced the same below. I should say at the outset that it is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but is simply a useful guide when considering issues relating to custody, care and control, access, joint care and control/shared care and access and the best interests of children generally. The checklist states that the following matters should be taken into account by the court when determining matters of this nature:

(a)   the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of his age and understanding);

(b)   the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

(c)   the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

(d)   The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

(e)   The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

(f)   The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

(g)   Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(h)   Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

(i)   How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(j)   (a broader formulation along the lines of) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

(k)   The range of powers available to the court under this Ordinance in the proceedings in question.

(l)   Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.”

16.  It is acknowledged that it is not generally necessary to go through this list mechanically, but that it can be a useful aid memoire for the court and that it can assist in the decision making process.   

Case law    

17.  It was noted during the trial that despite being legally trained that the father did not appear to fully understand the concepts under discussion. It was of particular concern that he seemed to equate the notion of “custody” with “control”. Indeed, in his affidavit evidence and also in the Form J, the father referred a number of times, to “allowing” the mother to have access. For the avoidance of doubt therefore both parties should familiarize themselves with the leading Court of Appeal decision on the subject of terminology, namely PD v KWW, Civil Appeal No 188 of 2008, 9 June 2010. I do not intend to repeat all of what is said in that judgment, but given the way in which this litigation has developed, it seems to me that the parties should particularly take on board the comments made by the Hon Mr Justice Hartmann, JA, when he said as follows:

The concepts of ‘custody’ and ‘care and control’

28.   As our law has developed and now presently stands, when a marriage breaks down and the court must ensure the best interests of any child of the union, it will invariably do so by bringing into play the dual concepts of ‘custody’ – whether it be sole or joint custody – and ‘care and control’.  Neither concept, however, is defined in our statute books.

29.   Regrettably, empirical evidence suggests that there is a large measure of misunderstanding as to the nature and extent of the two concepts, certainly among lay persons.

30.   At a practical level, a convenient way of understanding the two concepts is to compare the nature of the decision-making that is required to put them into practice.

31.   The decisions to be made by a custodial parent are those of real consequence in safeguarding and promoting the child’s health, development and general welfare.  They include decisions as to whether or not the child should undergo a medical operation, what religion the child should adhere to, what school the child should attend, what extracurricular activities the child should pursue, be it learning a musical instrument or being coached in a sport.  A parent vested with custody has the responsibility of acting as the child’s legal representative.

32.   By contrast, the decisions to be made by a parent who (at any time) has care and control of the child are of a more mundane, day-to-day nature, decisions of only passing consequence in themselves but cumulatively of importance in molding the character of the child.  They include a host of decisions that arise out of the fact that the parent has physical control of the child and the responsibility of attending to the child’s immediate care. They include decisions as to what the child will wear that day, what the child may watch on television, when the child will settle down to homework and when the child will go to bed.  They also include the authority to impose appropriate discipline.

33.   We have spoken of the misunderstanding that exists as to the nature and extent of the two concepts.  This is most often manifested in the misperception that, if sole custody is given to one parent, that parent thereby ‘wins’ the right to determine all matters big and small in the upbringing of that child while the parent who is not given custody ‘loses’ the right to have any say in the child’s upbringing.  The present case is a prime example.

18.  This case could also be said, to be another prime example of the misunderstanding that can sometimes ensue when discussing the issue of sole versus joint custody. It is of note that the father acknowledges that he wishes to have “sole custody” because he is concerned that without this the parties might simply continue to be involved in endless arguments about the appropriate arrangements for the child going forward. He said that if the parties could avoid at least one argument as a result of an order for sole custody, then in his view that would be worth it.

19.  The Hon Mr Justice Hartmann, JA also added as follows when discussing the notion of joint custody:

47.  It is widely recognised today that the long-term best interests of a child are invariably best protected if, despite the breakdown of the marital union, both parents are able to continue to play an equal role in making the important decisions that will determine the child’s upbringing.

…

Joint Custody: the proper approach

52.  Today, although there has been no change in our law similar to many other common law jurisdictions, orders of joint custody are in no way exceptional.  This is because it is accepted that, in principle, such orders are in the interests of children.

53.  In all but the most exceptional circumstances, the effect of divorce on the children of the marriage, especially children of tender years, is deeply felt.  In all but the most exceptional circumstances, such children desire that they should continue to be protected and guided by both parents.  The case before us is an example.

54.  In the result, in the best interests of the child, the fact that, as a result of the breakdown of the marriage, relations between the parents are strained is not of itself a reason to refuse to make a joint order of custody.  Nor is the fact that the parent to be given care and control does not agree.  Such orders look to the future.  They will govern a limited area of exchange between the parents, albeit one of the greatest importance.

55.  Accordingly, the issue for the judge is whether, with the court proceedings concluded, it is reasonably anticipated that the parents will be able to agree on the questions of importance that will determine the upbringing of their child, both recognising that, as difficult as it may be for them, this process of co-operation is in the best interests of the child.

56.  In determining this issue, the judge is entitled to proceed on the presumption that competent, loving parents possessed of sufficient objectivity to be able to make rational decisions in the interests of the child will be able to co-operate with each concerning matters of importance in the upbringing of the child.

57.  At all times, of course, the welfare of the child remains the first and paramount consideration.  As this Court has recognised (see, for example, Y v P [2009] HKFLR 308), there may be occasions when the ability of the parents to reach any rational accord in respect of important matters concerning the upbringing of their child is so deeply undermined that to compel attempts at co-operation will not protect the interests of the child but only leave the child more vulnerable.

That then is one of the primary issues for the court when considering the issue of custody. Would an order for joint custody, which seeks in part to compel a certain level of co operation between the parties, only leave O more vulnerable?

20.  Both sides have also referred me to other case law which goes to support either the concept of sole or joint custody. These cases are all very fact specific. I accept that there are occasions when an order for sole custody becomes necessary given inter alia the very difficult relationship that exists either between the parents themselves, or between a parent and a child or perhaps because one or other of the parties has a mental health issue or their behaviours are nevertheless so extreme that normal interaction between them becomes impossible. The issue is whether or not this case falls into that particular category of case, especially given the unfortunate nature of the litigation to date.

21.  There are also other issues to consider, including the mother’s ability to care for O given her work commitments, which include frequent travel to Mainland China. This is an issue which the father refers to constantly and on which the Social Welfare Officer also relies.   

Each party’s proposals

22.  I asked the parties to consider their proposal in the alternative – i.e. their proposal for O’s care a) if the child was based with them and b) their proposal for her care, if the child was based with the other parent. It is of note that neither party proposed that the status quo should continue. 

The mother’s proposals

a)  If O is living primarily with the mother

1.   Joint custody of the child of the family, namely LOPS (“O”) with care and control to the Mother and defined access to the Father as set out below.

2.   Access during School term:

a.   Overnight Access from 6:30p.m. every Wednesday to every Thursday morning so that the Father takes O to school;

b.   Weekend Staying Access:

(1) for the first weekend, after school on Friday until Sunday at 11:00 a.m., with the Father’s undertaking to take O to extra-curricular activities on Saturdays; and

(2) for the second and weekend, from 11:00 a.m. every Sunday to Monday when O goes to school.

On a non-school day, the staying access will continue until 11:00 am.  The Father shall pick up O at the Mother’s residence and return O to the same on a non-school day.

School Holiday Access

3.   The Father do have 50% of the long school holidays (that is, Summer Vacation, Chinese New Year, Christmas and Easter) which will include the in-between weekday and weekend access as follows:

(1) Chinese New Year and Easter will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who is to take the first half of each holiday.

(2) Summer holidays will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(3) When O has an October break, the holiday will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(4) Christmas holidays will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(5) Subject to agreement between the parties, either party may take O out of Hong Kong during long school holiday;

(6) In the event that O has longer school holidays, alternate two weeks on - two weeks off.

4.   O to be with her Father on Father’s Days and the Father’s birthdays (16 December) and to be with her Mother on Mother’s Days and the Mother’s birthdays (12 November).

5.   Public holidays during School term to be alternated.

6.   Both parties do attend co-parenting counselling services.

7.   Each parent does have reasonable telephone, Skype or Facetime contact with O when O not in the care of such parent.

N.B. The Mother understands the following is not for this application; she would like to agree with the Father as to school一 (1) O continues with her current school (Kowloon Tong) and will attend full-day (O is able to continue with her current school until July 2020, but applications for her next school will have to be made by September 2019)

b)  If O is primarily living with the father

1.   During school term:

a. Overnight Access every Wednesday after school to Thursday morning, with the Mother to take O to school; and

b. Weekend Staying Access: after school on Friday until Sunday at 11 :00 a.m.

2.   School holidays:

The Mother do have 50% of the long school holidays (that is, Summer Vacation, Chinese New Year, Christmas and Easter) as follows:

(1) Chinese New Year and Easter will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(2) Summer holidays will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(3) When O has an October break, the holiday will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(4) Christmas holidays will be split 50-50 between the Father and Mother alternate as to who to take the 1st half of each holiday.

(5) Subject to agreement between the parties, either party may take O out of Hong Kong during long school holidays.

(6) In the event that O has longer school holidays, alternate two weeks on - two weeks on.

3.   Day Access on Mother’s Days, the Mother’s birthdays and O’s birthdays.

4.   Both parties do attend co-parenting counselling services.

5.   Each parent does have reasonable telephone, Skype or Facetime contact with O when O is not in the care of such parent.

The father’s proposals

c)  If O is living primarily with the father

The 1st Applicant be granted sole custody of the child of the family, namely LOPHS [“O”] (the “Child”) with care and control to the 1st Applicant and defined access to the 2nd Applicant as follows: -

a. The 2nd Applicant has staying access to the Child from after school Fridays until 9:30 a.m. Sundays; if any Friday is a public holiday or inset day, the 2nd Applicant shall pick up the Child from the 1st Applicant’s residence at 9:30 a.m.;

b. Dinner access from 5:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every Wednesday;

c. The 2nd Applicant be entitled to staying access on half of long school holidays (that is, Summer holidays, Chinese New Year, Christmas and Easter) with alternative halves;

d. The Child shall have contact with the parent with whom she is not staying at 7:30 p.m. by Skype, video, whatsapp or telephone;

e. The 2nd Applicant shall have day access to the Child on her birthday and Mother’s Day;

f. The 2nd Applicant shall have staying access on alternative public holidays on Mondays to Thursdays which do not fall in long school holidays.

d)  If O is living primarily with the mother

The Applicants be granted joint custody of the child of the family, namely LOPS [“O”] (the “Child”) with care and control to the 2nd Applicant and defined access to the 1st Applicant as follows: -

a. The 1st Applicant has staying access to the Child from after school Fridays until 9:30 a.m. Sundays; if any Friday is a public holiday or inset day, the 1st Applicant shall pick up the Child from the 2nd Applicant’s residence at 9:30 a.m.;

b. Dinner access from 5:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. every Wednesday;

c. The 1st Applicant be entitled to staying access on half of long school holidays (that is, Summer holidays, Chinese New Year, Christmas and Easter) with alternative halves;

d. The Child shall have contact with the parent with whom she is not staying at 7:30 p.m. by Skype, video, whatsapp or telephone;

e. The 1st Applicant shall have day access to the Child on his birthday and Father) s Day;

f. The 1st Applicant shall have staying access on alternative public holidays on Mondays to Thursdays which do not fall in long school holidays.

23.  It was of some concern that the father wished to have sole custody if the child was primarily based with him but joint custody if the child was primarily based with the mother. It was not clear how it was more likely that he was going to be able to co operate with the mother if the child was based with her. The unfortunate sense was that he wished to have sole custody of O in order to ensure that he retained the upper hand when making all decisions about her care going forward and that he wished to retain some sort of legal foot hold in the unfortunate event that I allowed O to be primarily based with her mother.

The Social Welfare reports

24.  It is trite but worth repeating that recommendations made to the court in social welfare reports although not binding are generally considered to be persuasive. The reports are said to be the “eyes” and “ears” of the court.

25.  In this case the Social Welfare officer filed three reports dated the 28 March 2017, 22 June 2018 and the 4 February 2019 and she maintained her position throughout that the father should be granted sole custody and care and control of O, with defined access to the mother once per week for two nights, from after school on Friday until 9:30 am on Sunday morning. She added that if the Friday was a school holiday that the mother could pick O up from the father’s residence at 4:55 pm. She added that the school holidays should be divided equally between the parties. It seems that one of her main concerns in making these recommendations is the mother’s travel schedule.

26.  The father originally appears to have simply adopted the recommendations made by the Social Welfare Officer without question. He also accepted the suggestion that O would be best served by having one settled home base. Similarly, this proposition was put to the mother in the witness box and she also accepted it. As will be seen I do not necessarily accept that suggestion, especially given the fact that by all accounts it seems that O has adapted to living in two homes on a half weekly basis, seemingly without any significant difficulty.

27.  The Social Welfare Officer also produced a schedule setting out the frequency of the mother’s trips to China as follows:

Complied information on the frequencies of Madam Y’s Leaving HK

  Duration Total number of days Total number of days that Madam Y left HK Total number of days that Madam Y left HK with O Number of days that Madam Y left HK when O was under her care
1.     14/1/2014-13/1/2015 365 242 (66%) 93 (38%) N.A.
2.     14/1/2015-13/2/2016 365 264 (72%) 56 (21%) N.A.
3.     3/2016 (Parents separated) -7/2016 (Before O started schooling) 153 129(84%) 40 (31%) N.A.
4.     8/2016(O started schooling – 9/2/2017 (Before Order granted) 194 108 (55.6%) 21 (19%) N.A.
5.     10/2/2017 (Order granted) – 31/12/2017 344 168 (48.8%) 15 (8.9%) 52
6.     1/1/2018-31/12/2018 365 146 (40%) 20 (13%) 25

Total number of days per month that Madam Y left HK in 2018

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
14 15 9 18 20 7 7 14 3 8 6 25

28.  This will be discussed in more detail below. As will be seen I do not intend to fully adopt the Social Welfare Officer’s recommendations for reasons that will become clear in the body of the judgment. It is also of note that the father has moved away from seeking just a straightforward endorsement of the Social Worker’s recommendations, in that he also proposes that O should be able to see her mother mid week in addition to the overnight staying access at the weekends. It seems to me that in part that is a recognition that it might be quite difficult for O to move from seeing her mother for part of five days each week, (from Wednesday after school, Thursday, Friday, Saturday to Sunday morning) to only seeing her from after school on Friday to Sunday morning.     

Discussion

What practical arrangements should be put in place for O during term time? In particular, should the current arrangement be maintained or should an alternative arrangement be put into place?

The mother’s travel schedule

29.  Putting to one side for a moment the ramifications that arise out of the Fact Finding hearing and the highly conflicted nature of these proceedings (including each party’s allegations against the other, i.e. the fact that the mother accuses the father of drinking to excess and being quick tempered and the fact that the father accuses the mother of being malicious and untrustworthy), the other main point of contention relates to the mother’s travel schedule. It is clear that this is one of the main reasons why the Social Welfare Officer made the recommendations that she did. Consequently, I asked to see the Immigration records of both the parties and O. During the trial I repeatedly said that reference should be made to this as a primary source of evidence. Attached to this judgment is a schedule marked “A”, which is based on those immigration records and shows when the mother was away from Hong Kong for the period from March 2018 to the end of the year. It identifies which days she travelled and the approximate time that she was away from the territory. During this period O was with the mother from Wednesday after school until Sunday morning. O also attended all day school on Thursday and Fridays. It can therefore be seen from this schedule that the mother mainly travelled when O was not in her care. I have marked with an * those occasions when that does not appear to be the case. On some of those days the mother is seen returning to Hong Kong either in the late afternoon or early evening and she is likely to have been with O either later that day or the following morning before she went to school. On some occasion the mother is likely to have returned home before O as she seen returning to Hong Kong earlier in the day. On others it seems likely that the date fell over a school holiday in which case O may have been with the father in any event. But in total there are only 22 occasions which fall into this category out of a total of approximately 72 occasions when the mother left and then returned to Hong Kong. I accept therefore that the mother has been able to largely organize her work around her child care responsibilities.

30.  Mr. Egerton for the mother put it to the father that whereas the Immigration records are able to show conclusively when the mother left and returned to the territory, it is not similarly possible to assess when the father was truly available to care for O. I accept that to be the case. The father is a barrister and although he is also a door tenant there will of necessity be occasions when he is in court or having a conference with a client outside of court hours. Thus there must also be times during the week when the father is not able to take care of O himself and when she is scheduled to be in his care.

31.  It seems to me that a number of things follow from this analysis. Firstly, I accept that it is optimal for parents, as opposed to third party care givers, to take care of their own children. I also accept that where you have two full time working parents that the reality is that both parents will of necessity need to rely on others to help take care of their offspring.

32.  Consequently, it seems to me that a line can be drawn between their care of the child during the day and their care of the child overnight. Therefore, if either parent is away from Hong Kong overnight, it follows that the other parent should be given the opportunity to take care of O during that period of time. The mother has occasionally been away overnight as set out in the schedule. It is also acknowledged that on occasions she needs to travel to trade fairs and she also goes to Australia on a reasonably frequent basis as she sources many of her gems there, particularly opals. The father also says that although he is based in Hong Kong, very rarely he may also be required to go away for a short period of time e.g. to take part in a polo playing competition. In such circumstances, whenever such an occasion arises, the other parent should be given first right of refusal to take care of O. If the other parent, who is in Hong Kong, is unable to oblige, then the original caretaking parent, shall make whatever alternative arrangements for her care that she or he deems appropriate in the circumstances. This arrangement shall only apply if a parent is away overnight. Otherwise each parent shall make appropriate arrangements for O’s care when she is scheduled to be with them during the day time. I accept that both parents have made suitable arrangements to care for O when they are not available. 

The check list of factors   

33.  Reference can also be made to the checklist of factors as set out in paragraph 15 above.

The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of her age and understanding;

The nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons

34.  O is still very young and it is difficult to attach very much weight to the views expressed by such a young child. It has been suggested by the Social Welfare officer that O does not like being left with the mother’s domestic helper and that she is closer to the father’s domestic helper and also to her paternal Grandmother. This is not accepted by the mother. I accept however that it is likely that O is close to both of her parents and to the father’s domestic helper who has helped take care for her since she was born and to the paternal Grandmother who has also been very involved in her upbringing, as she lives next door to the father. In such circumstances it is only natural that the child should be emotionally close to those adults. In contrast the mother was only able to employ a new domestic helper in 2017 and the maternal grandmother does not reside in Hong Kong, although she is a reasonably frequent visitor. I should add that it seems to me that the criticisms of the maternal Grandmother, by the father particularly in his written evidence, were wholly unnecessary and did nothing to assist an already fraught situation.   

The child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

35.  The parties have different views with respect to O’s present and future education. As pointed out by the Social Welfare Officer, neither can be said to be entirely right or entirely wrong in that respect. O attends kindergarten at present. This is a half day program. The mother explains in her most recent Form J that O was offered an opportunity to attend a Multiple Intelligence Course run by the kindergarten, which includes a Cambridge English Course. This was for a further half a day, which would mean in effect that O would be attending full day school. The mother wished O to attend this course. The father did not. The net result was rather unsatisfactory in that O attended this course when she was in her mother’s care on Thursday and Fridays, but not when she was in her father’s care. An unfortunate situation also arose during the trial in that the child had been asked to take part in a test which was part of the Cambridge English course. The test was to take place during the father’s part of the week. The mother kept the father fully informed of the same, but it soon became clear that the father simply refused to interact or to respond to her. In the end I directed that the child be permitted to take the test. The teachable point to be taken from this however, is that regardless of how the week is to be divided up or what orders are ultimately put in place, there are inevitably going to be occasions when the parties will need to interact with each other and make decisions about something which affects O. The father’s behavior in this respect was somewhat concerning. He simply took the view that O should not be obliged to take the test because it was in his half of the week. 

36.  Longer term it is clear that the father wishes O to attend some form of international primary school where the medium of teaching is English. He is particularly concerned that O should not be exposed to the pressures of the local education system. It is not entirely clear what the mother’s preference might be, although she does seem to acknowledge that the parties may not be able to reach consensus in this respect (see paragraph 22 a) above – last paragraph).

37.  As a general observation I should like to reiterate that the issue of schooling did not form part of the present application before me. Judicial notice has though been taken of the fact that many international schools would expect their pupils to commence primary 1 when a child is 5 years of age. However, the local system would expect a child to join P1 after three years of kindergarten when the child is 6 years of age. I am not sure if this is likely to become an issue going forward.    

38.  As a general point, I accept that both parties are able to cater for O’s physical, emotional and educational needs.

The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

39.  As indicated above, O’s care is currently shared between the parties on a more or less equal basis. The concern, notwithstanding the mother’s sometimes hectic travel schedule, is that reducing the amount of time that O ostensibly spends with her mother might be detrimental to her. The father queries this and maintains that infact the mother is often not actually looking after O when she is in supposedly in her mother’s care. The mother for her part says that she always makes appropriate arrangements for O, that she now travels less than before and that often she is away from Hong Kong for only a relatively short period of time.  Reference should also be made to the discussion in paragraphs 29 - 32 above in that respect.   

The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

40.  As I have said O is a little girl and her parents have been engaged in ongoing and aggressive litigation for most of her young life. Although both of her parents are of Chinese descent they are culturally very different. Both of these aspects of her upbringing will need to be acknowledged and nurtured including exposure to both English and Chinese (Putonghua and Cantonese) Further, it seems to me that O has the right to form a relationship with both sides of her family. 

The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs

41.  Although both of the parents clearly regard themselves as the “better” parent and although I have accepted that the mother showed a distinct lack of judgment in the way in which she approached the Fact Finding hearing, nevertheless I also accept that she is generally a concerned and a responsible parent. She takes O’s education very seriously and she has tried to involve the father in ongoing aspects of that education. She has also ensured that appropriate care is put in place for O, when she is working. Similarly, I accept that the father is also a responsible and caring parent. It is also of note that the father has a good relationship with other family members who live close by, including his cousin and family and that O has an opportunity to spend time with them when she is in her father’s care. 

42.  The mother was asked in the witness box about other times when she has behaved inappropriately and she accepted that on occasions she has got angry and has seemingly lashed out. She acknowledged this.     

The character of the parents

The mother

43.  It would be fair to say that the mother had not come across well during the Fact Finding hearing. In contrast, on this occasion, she seemed much more measured in her responses and to have more insight into the effect of some of her behaviours on the litigation. Generally, she seemed calmer than before. I have no doubt that she is a good and caring mother to O. It is of note that she said that she was willing to attend a parenting course of some type.

The father

44.  In contrast the father seemed very angry and somewhat agitated for much of the trial. As I have said, it quickly became clear that he did not fully understand the issues in dispute or what was actually meant by sole and joint custody, nor had he read the relevant case law, although he is a lawyer by profession. He placed a lot of emphasize on how he “felt”. He clearly still felt very bitter about the Fact Finding hearing and had not taken any steps to deal with his own emotional responses to the current situation. Further it was clear that he had initially simply accepted the recommendations made by the Social Welfare Officer without question. He said in his closing submission that he would not be willing to attend a co parenting course, seemingly being under the misapprehension that this was something that he would be required to do together with the mother. He cited other ongoing litigation between the paternal grandmother and the mother for not agreeing to this.

Decision

45.  I have given a lot of thought to whether or not there should be any change at all to the current shared care arrangement. Notwithstanding the high level of conflict between the parents and the recent issue with respect to the Cambridge English exam, generally speaking the arrangement seems to have been working as well as any other might in the circumstances. Both parties seem, in truth, to prefer splitting the weekends as they do at present, with the mother having Saturday’s and the father having Sundays. Both parties have arranged activities for O on their days and neither seemed to relish the prospect of joining in with the other’s activities, although the mother did ultimately propose something along those lines.

46.  Similarly, the parties have generally been able to reach consensus with respect to holidays, although the father says that this has also not been without incident.

47.  I have some difficulty with the mother’s proposal as set out in paragraph 22(a)(2) as that would mean a lot of to ing and fro ing for O. If she spent every Wednesday overnight with the father and either Friday and Saturday or Sunday’s night with him, it would mean in truth that she would be shuttling between the two households much more frequently than she does at present. Given that both parties acknowledge that she should have a settled home base, and whilst I may not fully agree with that, this proposal nevertheless does not seem like a sensible alternative given the circumstances.

48.  I also have some difficulty with the father’s proposal at 22(c) a) – b) above, as this would mean that O would have a lot less contact with the mother than she does at present.

49.  I accept that the mother does travel up to China on a frequent basis and that she is also required to travel elsewhere for business and that it would not generally be appropriate for her to take O with her. Although I acknowledge that she has made suitable arrangements for O’s care, I have nevertheless decided to make a slight change to the current arrangements during term time whereby O shall be in the care of the father from Sunday at 9:30 am until Thursday when O is taken to school. O shall be in the care of the mother otherwise. In making this slight change the expectation is that the mother will try to ensure that most of her travel takes place whilst O is not in her care. This will mean that O shall spend 4 nights per week with the father and 3 nights per week with the mother.

50.  This is also subject to the caveat in paragraph 32 above, which shall also be included in the court order. There shall be no makeup access in the event that one or other of the parents is required to be away from Hong Kong overnight.

51.  Each parent shall be responsible for arranging ECA’s/extra tuition when the child is in their care. On the rare occasion, such as in the case of the English exam, where there is an event that encroaches on the other sides time, then the requesting parent will need to inform the other side and seek their agreement. If agreement cannot be achieved then the issue will need to be referred to a Parental Co coordinator, ultimately for adjudication.

52.  As before O shall continue to have contact with the parent with whom she is not staying each day at 7:30 pm by Skype, Video, WhatsApp or telephone. This is not an evidence gathering exercise and contact at other times is not encouraged at this stage.

53.  Single public holidays during term time shall be taken as they fall. The mother shall also have day access to O on her birthday and on Mother’s Day and the father shall have day access to O on his birthday and on Father’s day.

For the avoidance of doubt what arrangement should be put in place for the school holidays?

54.  Thankfully there has been some consensus with respect to the school holidays and the parties are agreed that these should generally be split equally between them, although the manner in which that is to be done has not been fully articulated.

School summer holiday   

55.  This year the school summer holiday is relatively short because O is still in kindergarten. This holiday shall be split equally between the parties with the mother taking the first half this year and in all odd years going forward and the father taking the second half. In even years the father shall take the first half of the school summer holiday and the mother shall take the second half. For the avoidance of doubt the first day of the holiday shall be the day following the last day of the school term and the last day of the school holiday shall be the day before the commencement of the school term.

Christmas school holiday, Chinese New Year School holiday and the Easter school holiday

56.    It is also agreed that these school holidays shall be split equally between the parents. For the avoidance of doubt whoever had the first half of the Christmas school holiday last year shall have the second half this year and the other parent shall have the first half this year and for all odd years going forward and so on and so forth.

57.  I am not sure if the parties split the Chinese New Year and Easter school holidays last year. If so, the same principle shall apply as set out in paragraph 56 above. If not the mother shall have the first half of Chinese New Year holiday in 2020 and in all even years going forward and the father shall have the first half in 2021 and in all odd years going forward. The father shall have the first half of the Easter school holiday in 2020 and in all even years going forward and the mother shall have the first half in 2021 and in all odd years going forward.   

58.  There have been occasional difficulties with respect to taking O outside of Hong Kong for holidays. The parties may wish to consider filing a consent summons in this respect giving each party general leave to take O out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong from time to time for holidays and other trips, subject to the normal undertakings etc. I don’t intend to take this matter any further in this judgment. As a general observation the parties should ensure that they take O away in their share of the school holidays.  

Bearing in mind the above what formal orders should be put in place for custody/joint custody, care and control/joint care and control/shared care and/or access?

59.  At the beginning of this judgment I asked myself a rhetorical question, namely whether or not the relationship between the parties was now so severely damaged that an order for joint custody was no longer feasible? Having considered all of the relevant factors it seems to me that although this case comes very close to that, it doesn’t actually cross the line. It seems to me that the situation between the parties is difficult but not impossible. Further it is within the power of both of them to work on their relationship and on their parenting and communication skills. They are both intelligent people and their daughter is only 5 years old. They will need to actively parent her for a considerable period of time. Certainly I am not of the view that an order for joint custody would leave O vulnerable in any way.

60.  Consequently, I shall make an order for joint custody with shared care of O as set out in paragraph 49 and 50 above. In doing so, although I recognize that the Fact Finding hearing caused tremendous strain on the parties, it seems to me that this is not one of those cases which falls into the category referred to in paragraph 19 and 20 above, where the court has no other option but to make an order for sole custody. I am also concerned that the mother’s parental rights should be fully recognised and given the same weight as the father’s and that she should not be marginalised in any way. 

Are there any other orders/directions that the court should make at this juncture?

61.  It is further directed that the parties each attend a parenting course for high conflict cases. They should consider in particular enrolling on Dr Deena Stacer’s online parenting course, but at the end of the day the choice is there’s. For the avoidance of doubt it should be noted that they are not required to attend the course together. They should also consider getting their own therapeutic support, but that is not something that I intend to direct at this stage. However, I shall direct that they shall appoint a Parental Co ordinator to assist them in decision making in relation to the enforcement of this judgment and other related matters arising out of the judgment. The cost for that shall be split equally between the parties.

62.  As referred to above, it is of note that there may be some dispute over the future arrangements for O’s schooling. O is currently in K2. It is moot, but perhaps worth repeating at this juncture, that regardless of the current arrangements she will need to attend full day school once she enters primary school. It is anticipated that she will go into K3 at the same school in September 2019, but thereafter she will need to change schools for her primary school education. In such circumstances it is further directed that both parties shall apply for whichever schools they deem appropriate for O, with a view to her commencing her new school in August/September 2020.  Both parties may apply for whichever schools they deem appropriate in the first instance and each side shall cooperate with the other with respect to those applications including any interviews or assessments.   

63.  In so far as the current schooling arrangement is concerned and for the avoidance of doubt and notwithstanding the slight change in the care arrangement, it is further ordered that in the absence of any further agreement between the parties, O shall continue to attend all day school on Thursday and Fridays.   

Costs

64.  Given that this is truly a child related matter there shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that there be no order as to costs such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.

Orders 

65.  Consequently, the court shall make an order as follows:

i)    There shall be an order for joint custody of the child of the family namely O, a girl born on the XX January 2014 with shared care as follows:

Term time

-   During term time O shall be in the care of the 1st Applicant [father] for four nights per week from Sunday at 9:30 a.m. until Thursday morning, when the child is taken to school. This arrangement shall commence on Sunday 23 June 2019.

-   O shall be in the care of the 2nd Applicant [mother] from Thursday after school until Sunday morning at 9:30 a.m.

-   O shall be picked up by the 1st Applicant at the 2nd Applicant’s home and the 2nd Applicant shall make arrangements to pick up O from school on Thursday.

School holidays      

ii)    The parties shall split the school holidays on a 50:50 basis as set out in paragraphs 55 – 57 above.

Additional orders

iii)    O shall spend mother’s day and the mother’s birthday with the 2nd Applicant mother and father’s day and the father’s birthday with the 1st Applicant father as set out in paragraph 53 above.

iv)   O shall have remote access daily with the parent with whom she is not staying at 7:30 pm by Skype, Video WhatsApp or telephone.

v)    It is further directed that a) a parental co coordinator be appointed by the parties and that the cost for such shall be split equally between the parties and b) the parties shall each attend a parenting course for high conflict families.

vi)    Other orders and directions as set out in paragraphs 32, 50, 51, 53, 62 and 63 above shall also be adhered to and included in the order.

vii)   The First Appointment hearing and the callover in relation to the arrangement’s for O’s primary schooling shall be adjourned to the 16 October 2019 at 9:30 am. Both parties do personally attend that hearing. 

viii)  An updated Social Investigation Report shall be called for in 6 months’ time to include recommendations for schooling.

ix)    There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 day’s time that there be no order as to costs. There shall be certificate for counsel.

 (Sharon D. MELLOY )
 District Judge

Mr. Robert Connelly instructed by John M. Pickavant & Co appeared for the 1st Applicant

Mr. Robin Egerton and Mr. Chase Pun instructed by Fongs appeared for the 2nd Applicant



[2018] HKFC 215-EN-2018-11-29

LACHY v. YC

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FCJA 2057/2016

[2018] HKFC 215

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

JOINT APPLICATION NO. 2057 OF 2016

________________________

BETWEEN
 LACHY1st Applicant
and
 YC2nd Applicant

________________________

Coram:Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to the public)
Date of submissions:3 October and 7 November 2018
Date of Ruling:29 November 2018 (paper disposal)

________________________

R U L I N G
(Leave to appeal and leave to appeal out of time)

________________________

Introduction

1.  The 2nd Applicant mother now seeks leave to appeal and leave to appeal out of time. I should say at the outset that I accept her explanation with respect to her leave to appeal out of time namely that it was caused in part by the new process. I intend therefore to proceed directly to her application for leave to appeal.

2.  In this instance the mother seeks leave to appeal against the Ruling on Costs dated the 17 August 2018, which followed a Fact Finding judgment dated the 21 November 2017. In that Ruling I said as follows:  

4.    Given the fact that there was no evidence to support the mother’s allegations I said as follows when it came to the issue of costs:

Costs

 32.   The father seeks his costs on an indemnity basis. The mother for her part asks that the normal order be made i.e. that there be no order as to costs.

 33.   I accept that O probably did display some of the acts that so concerned the mother and therefore that the mother did not simply make the whole thing up. But by the same token the mother’s actions did have a malicious undercurrent. I have been particularly concerned by the posting of the father’s undertaking by the mother on Facebook and the fact that she did this not once but twice!! It also seems to me that the mother over reacted and jumped to conclusions. She is an intelligent woman and she was legally represented throughout. Nevertheless, she insisted on her position even though there was no tangible evidence to support it.  It is a matter of great concern to me that litigants should not be able to hide behind the fact that a matter is child related to mask litigation behavior which would not be countenanced in any other situation. Consequently, although an order for indemnity costs seems excessive in the circumstances, I have nonetheless decided that the mother should pay the costs of this hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. This is notwithstanding the fact that this is a child related matter and that this hearing came about at the bequest of the court, as opposed to an application made by either of the parties. Consequently, I shall make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the mother do pay the costs of and occasioned by the Fact Finding hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.   

The law

3.  Section 63A of the District Court Ordinance allows for an appeal to be made to the Court of Appeal with the leave of the presiding District Court judge.  Section 63A of the District Court Ordinance provides as follows:

“Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the judge hearing the application for leave is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.”

4.  It is generally accepted that there needs to be an arguable case in respect of an intended appeal, and, as I have said, that it has a reasonable chance of succeeding. The Court of Appeal is unlikely to interfere with the exercise of the Court’s discretion unless it can be shown that it has clearly exercised that discretion incorrectly.  Alternatively, it will be necessary to show that the Judge was wrong on the law or in relation to a certain legal principle.

Discussion

5.  In this instance I set out the law on costs and pointed out that although the general rule was that there should be no order as to costs in children’s matters, that this general principle could be departed from if the circumstances demanded it. I was of the view that this was one such case. In my Ruling I said as follows:

 9. Thus the issue to be determined is essentially a question of degree. In what circumstances should a parent be penalised in costs when the dispute is about a child and more specifically about the possible abuse of a child? Generally, it is accepted that there should be no order as to costs in a general dispute over a child. This is so that parents will not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns which need to be properly ventilated and determined by the courts when considering the best interests of a child. It is however a fine line. When then can it be said that a parent has crossed that line to the extent that a costs order against her (or him) is permissible? And did the mother cross that line in this case?

 10. Given my findings, as set out above, I was initially of the view that the mother had crossed that line for all of the reasons that have been set out in the judgement. Nothing that has been said or written since that has caused me to change my mind in that respect. I stand by my reasoning as set out in paragraph 4 above.

6.  The proposed grounds of appeal are that it was wrong for the court to err from the general principle given that the Fact Finding hearing came about at the bequest of the court and that I did not think that the mother had made the whole thing up. Although that is true, it is also true that the mother was given several opportunities to retract her allegations and she chose not to do so. She was also warned that there may be cost consequences if she chose to proceed as she did. The allegations that she made against the father’s girlfriend were extremely serious and there was absolutely no reason at all for her to link the child’s behaviours to the girlfriend. As I said there was a malicious undercurrent to her actions, which went far beyond acceptable litigation behaviour in children’s matters. The fact that the mother was said to be genuinely concerned about the child was neither here nor there. I remain of the view that her litigation behaviour was such that it is appropriate for her to be sanctioned by a cost order being made against her. I also consider that it is appropriate for her to pay the father as the father’s girlfriend was not joined in the proceedings.

7.  In such circumstances I shall not accede to the mother’s request. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the mother’s summons dated the 3 October 2018 shall be dismissed. Costs of the summons be to the 1st Applicant on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.       

 
 

 (S.D. Melloy)
 District Judge

  

Messrs John M Pickavant & Co, solicitors for the 1st Applicant

Messrs Fongs, solicitors for the 2nd Applicant

[2018] HKFC 136-EN-2018-08-17

LACHY v. YC

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FCJA 2057 / 2016

[2018] HKFC 136

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

JOINT APPLICATION

NUMBER 2057 OF 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 LACHY1st Applicant
and
 YC2nd Applicant

----------------------------

Coram:Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of hearing:16 July 2018
Date of Ruling:17 August 2018

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RULING
(Costs)

------------------------------------------------

Introduction

1.  On the 21 November 2017 I handed down my judgment in relation to a Fact Finding hearing. In the Introduction of that judgment I summarized the matter before the court as follows:

  Introduction

1.   This is a hearing to determine whether or not the father’s girlfriend (Ms. N) has sexually abused the only child of the family, a little girl called O, or in the alternative whether Ms. N has behaved in a way that could be deemed to be “inappropriate”. O was born on the XX January 2014 and is now 3 ¾ years of age. At the time that the allegations were made she was not yet three years of age. At a hearing on the 13 April 2017 the mother was given an opportunity to withdraw these allegations. She chose not to and as a result the court ordered that there should be a Fact Finding hearing. This came before the court on the 26 and 27 September 2017.

2.   The father was originally under the impression that the mother was also accusing him of sexual abuse. However, the mother has made it clear since she filed her 2nd affirmation dated the 9 May 2017 that this was not the case. Her concern is solely with respect to Ms. N.       

2.  At paragraph 16 and 17 of the judgment I found as follows:

16. It is of note that the mother was unable to provide any actual evidence in support of this very serious allegation of sexual abuse and/or “inappropriate” behavior. It seems that her position was merely based on conjecture.     

17. In the mother’s closing submission, she said as follows:

5.   Upon reading Ms. P’s psychologist report [the report was filed on the 11 July 2017] and hearing the evidence at the Hearing, Ms. Y agrees that there might not be any actual sexual abuse against the Child per se.  However, from the evidence, it is reasonable to suspect there might be some kind of harassments / inappropriate behaviour which had been shown / seen by the Child, which led to the well-being of the Child being affected.

The mother submitted in her opening submission that she would able to discharge the high burden of proof required of her and that at the end of the hearing she would invite the court to conclude that “inappropriate” behavior did occur infront of O. It seems that by that stage she was not insisting that O had infact been sexually abused by Ms. N. However, it is of note that she was again unable to provide any actual evidence in support of what she said in this respect.

3.   I also found at paragraph 21 that the mother’s motive in making these allegations was probably in order to “… bolster any claim that she might have for sole custody and care and control of O”. I added at paragraph 29 that

… It seems to me that there is no evidence to support the allegations made and that she [the mother] simply jumped to conclusions and then refused to climb down completely – despite being given the opportunity to do so on at least one occasion.  

4.    Given the fact that there was no evidence to support the mother’s allegations I said as follows when it came to the issue of costs:

  Costs

   32. The father seeks his costs on an indemnity basis. The mother for her part asks that the normal order be made i.e. that there be no order as to costs.

   33. I accept that O probably did display some of the acts that so concerned the mother and therefore that the mother did not simply make the whole thing up. But by the same token the mother’s actions did have a malicious undercurrent. I have been particularly concerned by the posting of the father’s undertaking by the mother on Facebook and the fact that she did this not once but twice!! It also seems to me that the mother over reacted and jumped to conclusions. She is an intelligent woman and she was legally represented throughout. Nevertheless, she insisted on her position even though there was no tangible evidence to support it.  It is a matter of great concern to me that litigants should not be able to hide behind the fact that a matter is child related to mask litigation behavior which would not be countenanced in any other situation. Consequently, although an order for indemnity costs seems excessive in the circumstances, I have nonetheless decided that the mother should pay the costs of this hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. This is notwithstanding the fact that this is a child related matter and that this hearing came about at the bequest of the court, as opposed to an application made by either of the parties. Consequently, I shall make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the mother do pay the costs of and occasioned by the Fact Finding hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.   

5.   The mother subsequently issued a summons on the 5 December 2017 seeking to challenge this costs order. The father for his part is content for the order to stand, notwithstanding the fact that he originally sought his costs on an indemnity basis.  

The law

6.   I accept that a costs order made against one parent in a child related matter is generally considered unusual unless that parent has inter alia been unreasonable in the conduct of the litigation. See Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR 569, Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1992] 1 AER 271, S v S HCMP 5547/1999 and Lv C CACV 169 of 2006).

7.   Reference can also be made to inter alia to the English case Re T (A Child) [2005] EWCA Civ 311, where the Court of Appeal set out the general principles on costs in child related matters as follows:

36.    The principles, which fall to be applied, are not, we think, in dispute.  The judge summarised them succinctly in the following way:-

“2.1 The CPR apply. Under normal circumstances, according to rule 44.3(2)(a), the general rule is that costs should follow the event, although the court can make a different order. ( Rule 44.3(2) (b) )

2.2 However, this general rule does not apply to family proceedings. (Family Proceedings (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules 1999 )

2.3 It is suggested that even in family proceedings, the general rule is probably the starting point but can more easily be displaced. ( Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No 2) [1992] Fam 40 )

2.4 In cases involving children in particular, costs awarded against one parent or another are exceptional since the court is anxious to avoid the situation where a parent may feel “punished” by the other parent which will reduce co-operation between them. This will only impinge ultimately on the welfare of the child or the children concerned. (London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) (No 2) [1994] 2 FLR569; Re: M (Local Authority’s Costs) [1995] 1 FLR 533)

2.5The conduct of the parties is in reality the major consideration when deciding whether or not an exceptional order for costs should be made. It should only be made if the penalised party has been unreasonable in his or her conduct. Moreover the “unreasonableness” must relate to the conduct of the litigation rather than the welfare of the child. ( R v R (Costs: child case) [1997] 2 FLR 95)

2.6 One has to be very careful in this distinction when, as in the case of (the mother), the apparent unreasonableness is as a result of the personality of the relevant party. In such circumstances, there is often an overlap of that party’s conduct of the litigation and the conduct relating to the welfare of the child.

8.   Counsel for the mother has also referred me inter alia to our own Court of Appeal decision in TPL v WYY, CACV 47 & 61 of 2014, which also reiterates these general principles. I should add that I did not find Counsel’s other authority namely Re T (Children) [2012] UKSC 36 particularly helpful given that it was a judgment concerning costs following public law proceedings in the United Kingdom. The factual matrix is entirely different and I am not persuaded that this judgment provides the court with the necessary authority to move outside what would be considered a more normal approach to costs applications in family cases in Hong Kong.    

9.   Thus the issue to be determined is essentially a question of degree. In what circumstances should a parent be penalised in costs when the dispute is about a child and more specifically about the possible abuse of a child? Generally, it is accepted that there should be no order as to costs in a general dispute over a child. This is so that parents will not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns which need to be properly ventilated and determined by the courts when considering the best interests of a child. It is however a fine line. When then can it be said that a parent has crossed that line to the extent that a costs order against her (or him) is permissible? And did the mother cross that line in this case?

10.   Given my findings, as set out above, I was initially of the view that the mother had crossed that line for all of the reasons that have been set out in the judgement. Nothing that has been said or written since that has caused me to change my mind in that respect. I stand by my reasoning as set out in paragraph 4 above.

11.   Ms Tan for the father in her oral submission reiterated that a) there was no cogent evidence to show that the child’s behaviours related in any way to the girlfriend and that the mother had wilfully refused to consider any other explanation, which was of itself unreasonable; b) the court had warned her that she risked an indemnity costs order if she failed to be reasonable in the conduct of the litigation; c) the mother posted the father’s undertaking on Facebook not once, but twice and d) although the behaviours complained of may have taken place there was no evidence to show that this related to the girlfriend in any way. I accept these submissions. It seems to me that the mother’s litigation conduct was unreasonable in that she doggedly continued to trial notwithstanding the reports that had been filed and the fact that it was clear that she could not substantiate the allegations made. I repeat, when litigation is about a child, parents cannot hide behind that fact and behave in a way which would be totally unacceptable in any other form of litigation. Infact, arguably there should be an even greater duty on parents to act reasonably within the course of the litigation because it is about a child.

12.   In such circumstances paragraph 1 of the 2nd Applicant’s summons dated the 5 December 2017 shall be dismissed with costs of that application to the 1st Applicant to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.   




 (Sharon D. MELLOY)
 District Judge

  

Ms Elaine Tan of John Pickavant & Co for the 1st Applicant

Mr Chase Pun instructed by Fongs for the 2nd Applicant

117676-EN-2017-11-21

LACHY v. YC

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FCJA 2057 / 2016

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

JOINT APPLICATION

NUMBER 2057 OF 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN
 LACHY1st Applicant
and
 YC2nd Applicant

----------------------------

Coram:Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Dates of Hearing:26 and 27 September 2017
Date of closing submissions:23 October 2017
Date of Judgment:21 November 2017

__________________________

JUDGMENT
(Fact Finding hearing)

__________________________

Introduction

1.  This is a hearing to determine whether or not the father’s girlfriend (Ms. N) has sexually abused the only child of the family, a little girl called O, or in the alternative whether Ms. N has behaved in a way that could be deemed to be “inappropriate”. O was born on the XX January 2014 and is now 3 ¾ years of age. At the time that the allegations were made she was not yet three years of age. At a hearing on the 13 April 2017 the mother was given an opportunity to withdraw these allegations. She chose not to and as a result the court ordered that there should be a Fact Finding hearing. This came before the court on the 26 and 27 September 2017.

2.  The father was originally under the impression that the mother was also accusing him of sexual abuse. However, the mother has made it clear since she filed her 2nd affirmation dated the 9 May 2017 that this was not the case. Her concern is solely with respect to Ms. N.     

Background

3.  The allegations made by the mother came in the context of a potential dispute over custody and care and control of the child. The parties are both ethnically Chinese – but the father was born and grew up in the United Kingdom, whereas the mother was originally from the Mainland. They married on the XX March 2009 in Hong Kong and, as I have said, O was born on the XX January 2014. It seems that they have spent most of their married life based in Hong Kong, although the mother in particular has travelled frequently for business. The father is a barrister and the mother has her own precious gem stone and jewellery companies.

4.  It seems that unhappy differences arose between the couple and they separated, although the date of that separation does not appear to be agreed. In any event a joint application for divorce was filed on the 14 June 2016. In that application it is stated that the father shall have the custody and care and control of the child with reasonable access to the mother. Minutes of Agreement dated the 19 May 2016 were also filed and again this document stated that it was agreed that the father would have custody and care and control of the child.  This document is signed by both parties.

5.  It is the father’s case that he was the primary carer of the child at that time and that O was living with him and that he cared for her with the assistance of his mother and a domestic helper. This is denied by the mother who maintains that she has been the primary care taking parent of the child since birth. She also refers to the parties sharing O’s care.

6.  In any event, on the 12 January 2017 the decree nisi was pronounced. On the same day the court received a joint affirmation from the parties in which it was stated that it was agreed that the mother would now have custody of O with reasonable access to the father. A further document stated that it was agreed that the father would pay child maintenance of HK$10,000 per month. Given the differing agreements the court adjourned the question of both custody and ancillary relief. Eight days later the father filed a summons seeking interim custody of O and claimed in his supporting affirmation that the mother had misrepresented the situation to him, particularly with respect to the employment of a domestic helper and the mother’s business commitments. This summons was returnable before the court on the 6 March 2017. On the 7 February 2017 the father issued an ex parte summons on notice seeking inter alia interim custody and care and control of O. This application was returnable before the court on the 10 February 2017. It was at this hearing that the mother’s allegations first came to light. An interim order was made on that occasion splitting O’s time between the father’s household and the mother’s household. Further the father undertook to ensure that Ms N had no form of contact and did not see O, whilst O was in his care and the mother undertook to ensure that her new dog was kept secure whilst O was in her care. As indicated above the Fact Finding hearing was set down for trial on the 13 April 2017 after the mother was given an opportunity to withdraw her allegations. On that occasion she was also warned that she might face an indemnity costs order in the event that it was found that she had “made up” these allegations. On that occasion the father also sought to vary his undertaking with respect to Ms N. This was opposed by the mother and the court did not intervene further pending the hearing preferring to err on the side of caution. Undertakings were also given by both parties not to discuss the proceedings with the child.    

The issue

7.  The issue then is whether or not Ms N has sexually abused O or in the alternative whether she has behaved in a way towards O that could be deemed to be “inappropriate”.

The law

8.  In the judgment of FCMC 12118 of 2010, Specific Issues, dated the 7 March 2014 I set out the law relating to matters such as this in some detail. I have therefore taken the liberty of repeating the relevant sections as set out below:

13.   The Family Court does of course follow the civil standard of proof when determining issues of this nature. Thus the court has to decide on the balance of probabilities whether it is more likely than not that these incidences took place.

14.   Counsel for the wife has very helpfully set out the up to date position on the law in his closing submission as follows:

The Burden and Standard of Proof of the Allegation

3   It is trite in our legal system that he who alleges bears the burden of proving his allegation.  There is no exception in the present proceedings although family proceedings are regarded as quasi-inquisitorial.  Therefore, it is accepted that W [the wife] bears the burden of proving the Allegation. [The same applies in this case].

4   The majority in the United Kingdom House of Lords in Re H & Other (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 held that the civil standard requiring proof on a balance of probabilities continues to apply where, in civil proceedings, an allegation is made of criminal (or similarly serious) misconduct, but explained that such standard is to be applied flexibly, factoring in the inherently greater improbability of serious misconduct as compared with lesser forms of misconduct, therefore requiring the person bearing the burden of proving the allegation to prove it with evidence of a commensurate cogency.

5   This approach was adopted by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Nina Kung v Wong Din Shin (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387 (see para. 181 of the judgment).  Nevertheless, afterall, the civil standard shall still apply while this Court has to bear in mind the seriousness of the misconduct alleged, recognizing that it carries an inherent degree of improbability.

9.  In addition, the solicitors for the father provided further case law and analysis in their opening submission, which went to the general point concerning the standard of proof required in a case where serious allegations of misconduct are made in the context of civil proceedings as here. They said inter alia as follows:

4.   The law regarding the requisite standard of proof for serious criminal allegation alleged in civil cases was set out in the following cases.  In HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, FACC 1 of 2003, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ cited at paragraph 71: In re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 where Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead (with whom Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Mustill concurred) said (at 586E)

“When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability.”

5.   In Ming Shiu Chung v Ming Shiu Sum, FACV 25 of 2005, Ribeiro PJ which was by cited Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, FACC 1 of 2003, that inferences of fraud or serious misconduct are “……not to be reached by conjecture nor …... on a mere balance of probabilities.”  They are “to be plainly established as a matter of inference from proved facts”

6.   In Nina Kung v Wang Din Shin, FACV 12 of 2004, Mr. Justice Chan stated that paragraph 185 that:

“……the court is invited to reach a conclusion of forgery as an inference to be drawn on the basis of circumstantial evidence, any such inference must be properly grounded in the primary facts found. The court guards against indulging in conjecture under the guise of drawing an inference where the primary evidence does not logically and reasonably justify the particular inference in question.”

10.  With respect I agree. It is then accepted that the burden of proof lies with the mother and that given the seriousness of the allegations made, she has to prove to a very high standard indeed that what she alleges is infact correct. In other words, she has to provide compelling evidence to support her case.

The mother’s case

11.  The mother sets out her allegations in her 2nd affirmation of the 9 May 2017 as follows:

The behaviour of O

9.   Since around late October 2016, every time when O stayed overnight at my place, I noticed that she would display unwillingness and express fear to taking a bath.  She would cry whenever I asked her to take a bath.  On two to three occasions, while taking a bath, I saw O pulling her nipples hard and putting one of her fingers inside her private parts.  I was deeply shocked to observe such a behaviour from O, but initially I wondered if that might be attributable to her curiosity on her body and might be part of a child development.  Accordingly, I only told O not to conduct such acts and did not ask further.

10.   Although O was not yet three years old at that time and could not articulate her feelings in detail, I could easily feel her mood and physical conditions since I had been the primary carer for her since child birth.  Between November 2016 and early January 2017, I noticed that O was often not in mood.  She appeared to be preoccupied and in a trance from time to time.  At that time, I was worried that O might not be getting sufficient nutrition or that her general health conditions were not good.  Accordingly, I consulted a Chinese physician to give her some Chinese herbs to increase her appetite.

11.   During December 2016 to January 2017, again, whenever O stayed overnight at my place, she would display unwillingness and fear to taking a bath.  She would cry and refuse to take a bath.  In order to ease her anxiety, I suggested that I took a bath with her so we could play water together.  On two to three occasions, while taking a bath together, O pulled her nipples hard again and tried to touch my private parts. I told her that would hurt and told her to stop.  I explained to O the difference between a child female and an adult female, that she should not pull her nipples so hard or let anyone touch them.

12.   On one occasion in December 2016, after finished taking a bath and while I was helping O dry her body, O put her finger inside her vagina again.  I saw her putting her whole finger in and out of her private part.  I was so shocked at that time I did not know how to react other than telling her to stop.

13.   I do not consider that was an act that a normal 2-year-old would do and do not think that was a normal conduct. Accordingly, I searched on the internet and consulted my close friends who also have daughters about the situation.  I was in great anxiety that my daughter’s conduct was affected some other persons.

12.  As indicated above, although concerned, the mother did not attach very much weight to these co called “acts” at first and simply put it down to a young child’s natural curiosity about her own body. This changed however following O’s 3rd birthday party at her mother’s house on the XX January 2017. Notwithstanding the toing and froing over the arrangements for O as set out above, the parties were still on relatively good terms at that time and although there is some dispute about what actually happened on that day it does not appear to be disputed that the father came to the birthday party and dropped off a birthday cake for O. There were various people at the birthday party including a friend of both the father and the mother called M. According to the mother:

21.   In the afternoon when we were about to cut the birthday cake, M suddenly said in front of me, L, my sister and another friend, AC, that the 1st Applicant [the father] told him that Ms. N was very upset that the 1st Applicant had consented to grant the custody, care and control of O to me.  The 1st Applicant told M that Ms. N had requested that the 1st Applicant take immediate steps to get back the custody, care and control of O, and that the 1st Applicant would not be a man if he failed.  The 1st Applicant indicated his concerns that Ms. N might leave him if he lost custody, care and control of O.  I was surprised to hear of M’s conversation with the 1st Applicant. However, there were other guests present at that time and I did not discuss further with M on this point there and then.

22.   Later that evening, after most of the guests had left, I told L, AC and my sister that I was concerned about the 1st Applicant’s earlier conversation with M.  I described my observations as stated in paragraphs 9 – 12 above to L and my sister, and they were both shocked to learn of O’s conduct.  L, being a mother of a boy and a girl, immediately suggested me to consult a professional doctor and report the incident to the police if necessary.

13.  The mother then phoned the Hong Kong Society for the Protection of Children to seek advice. She did not report the matter to the Police at that time. She did though inform both the father and the paternal grandmother of her concerns namely that she somehow thought, as a result of the conversation referred to above, that Ms. N was responsible for O’s explicit sexualized behaviour. Consequently, she insisted that Ms. N not be allowed to bathe O or take her swimming or touch her naked body or indeed be alone with her. She says that after the father gave his undertaking in court that Ms. N not have any contact with O, that the so called “acts” ceased. The mother eventually reported the matter to the Police on the 25 April 2017.

14.  Following the hearing in court on the 10 February 2017 the mother then posted a copy of the undertaking given by the father on Facebook, contrary to the implied undertaking on confidentiality. She did this for the first time on the 11 February 2017. Facebook took the post down on the 18 February and the mother reposted it on the 20 February. It was finally removed sometime after the 23 February after the father sent the mother a pre action letter for contempt. Ms. N also wrote to the mother directly expressing her concern about this. I am told that the mother did not respond.

15.  The Social Welfare Report was filed on the 28 March 2017. On the 22 June 2017 the mother filed her 4th affirmation in reply. In that affirmation she maintained her basic stance as follows:

Suspected Sexual Harassment by Ms. N

41.   I have already stated clearly why I have concerns over potential sexual harassments suffered by O in my 2nd Affirmation and I do not intend to repeat my grounds here.  The logic is, given the 1st Applicant, his mother and the domestic helper have had the chance to bathe O since she was a baby, the only new element which preceded O’s inappropriate touching was the appearance of Ms. N.  In fact, after the 1st Applicant’s undertaking preventing Ms. N’s contact with O, O’s inappropriate touching has stopped.

42.   I would very much hope that O had never been assaulted.  Maybe she just imitated the touching from Ms. N or maybe she witnessed some initiate interactions between the 1st Applicant and Ms. N when O stayed at the 1st Applicant’s place (given that the 1st applicant often got drunk and would not care who was around).  However, the reactions of the 1st Applicant, his mother and Ms. N have deepened my worries.

43.   They have been saying different things at different times.  Ms. N denied that she had ever bathed O, but the 1st Applicant had affirmed that Ms. N had helped bathed O in paragraph 11 of L’s 5th Affirmation.  They have never mentioned that Ms. N had touched the private parts of O, and now they admit and are trying to explain away why Ms. N would have done so on occasions.  If really no harassment had taken place, how would O be going through a “traumatic experience” (paragraph 51 of L’s 5th Affirmation)?  Why would Ms. N be anxious about the court “finding any truth” in my observations (paragraph 4 of L’s 5th Affirmation).

44.   I deny that I had alleged the 1st Applicant having sexually harassed O.  Even the various messages and audio scripts shown in L’s 5th Affirmation had confirmed my approval that both of O’s parents could have physical contact with and bathe O.

45.   An account of events above shows that my concerns in relation to sexual harassment allegation against Ms. N is not unfounded and Ms. N’s credibility is questionable.

45.   Regarding my late reporting of my observation of O, I had already stated in the paragraph 9 of my 2nd affirmation that I suspected O’s inappropriate conduct was due to her curiosity on her body and child development so I did not notify the 1st Applicant and report to the police for the sexual assault in as early as late October 2016. I only harboured my suspicion of sexual assault towards Ms. N after consultation with my friends, professionals and asking O on whom had touched her private part on 15th January 2017.  Once I have held the suspicion towards Ms. N, I immediately notified the 1st Applicant and demanded that Ms. N could not touch O.

Conclusion

46.   In view of the responses above to the wrongful allegations and fabricated facts by the 1st Applicant and Ms. N, I re-affirm my reasonable causes that O might have been subject to sexual assaults, and questioned the 1st Applicant’s suitability as a custodian due to his past records of mistreating O, inability to control emotions with frequent drinking and relation with other women.

16.  It is of note that the mother was unable to provide any actual evidence in support of this very serious allegation of sexual abuse and/or “inappropriate” behavior. It seems that her position was merely based on conjecture.    

17.  In the mother’s closing submission, she said as follows:

5.   Upon reading Ms. P’s psychologist report [the report was filed on the 11 July 2017] and hearing the evidence at the Hearing, Ms. Y agrees that there might not be any actual sexual abuse against the Child per se.  However, from the evidence, it is reasonable to suspect there might be some kind of harassments / inappropriate behaviour which had been shown / seen by the Child, which led to the well-being of the Child being affected.

The mother submitted in her opening submission that she would able to discharge the high burden of proof required of her and that at the end of the hearing she would invite the court to conclude that “inappropriate” behavior did occur infront of O. It seems that by that stage she was not insisting that O had infact been sexually abused by Ms. N. However, it is of note that she was again unable to provide any actual evidence in support of what she said in this respect.

The father’s case

18.  The father for his part alleges that the mother has deliberately and maliciously “made up” these allegations in order to malign both him and his girlfriend. He points out that there is not a shred of evidence to support either the mother’s primary or secondary position and that her whole case is built on “suspicion and surmise” and her own “subjective inferences and speculation”. This is especially damaging given that Ms. N is a school teacher of young children and that as indicated above the mother posted his undertaking on Facebook. The father says that he has never seen O behave in the way described by the mother. In summary he said in his closing submission that:

20.   It is the 1st Applicant’s case that he himself, the domestic helper and his mother have never seen O touch herself inappropriately in the manner described by the 2nd Applicant, and has always been happy and healthy under his watch (see paras. 12 and 13 of the 1st Applicant’s 5th Affirmation).

21.   It is Ms. N’s case that she has never and would never touch O inappropriately and that she never and would never teach O to touch herself in appropriately, and that the allegations against her sicken her (seen para. 23 of her affirmation”).

19.  In so far as the events surrounding O’s 3rd birthday party are concerned the father said as follows in his 5th affirmation of the 7 June 2017:

24.   I strongly deny all of the allegations made against me at paras. 20 to 23 of the 2nd Affirmation.  I did not tell M [the friend] that Ms. N had put pressure on me to fight for the return of O.  I did not tell M that I was afraid that Ms. N would leave me unless I fought for the custody of O.  All I told M was that I was upset about signing custody of O over to the 2nd Application and Ms. N was also upset about my situation.  I do not know how M could have said what is alleged, if he in fact did.  On 12th May 2017 at around 21.17, after I had read the 2nd Affirmation of the 2nd Application I called up M and I asked him whether he told his wife and the 2nd Applicant what they had alleged against him.  He said that he had no recollection.  I asked him whether he had any recollection of me telling him what they had alleged and he replied that he had no recollection.  He also said that he had a lot to drink that day and couldn’t remember much.  I told him that I had never said what the 2nd Applicant and his wife alleged against me and said that he only remembered that I said Ms. N and I were sad because I had signed custody of O over to the 2nd Applicant.  I suspect that the 2nd Applicant’s sister and friends at the party could have gossiped, made subjective inferences, put words in my mouth, and caused the 2nd Applicant to believe that Ms. N was threat to the 2nd Applicant’s status as a mother.

Illogical inference of sexual assault against Ms. N

25.   In any event I do not see how M’s alleged words against me, which falsely paints the picture that I am some sort of puppet of Ms. N, advance or support the 2nd Applicant’s allegations of sexual abuse against Ms. N.  They are irrelevant.  Furthermore, I do not see how M’s alleged allegations that I had told him that Ms. N had put pressure on me to fight for the custody of O could trigger the 2nd Applicant to link what was said by M to the alleged fact that O had touched herself inappropriately (see para. 22 of the 2nd Applicant’s 2nd Affirmation).  The 2 matters are wholly distinct, unless the 2nd Applicant has preconceptions and prejudices against Ms. N.  I strongly suspect that the 2nd Applicant is on some sort of witch-hunt, against Ms. N as she is fueled by jealousy of O and Ms. N’s relationship.

20.  In conclusion he states:

CONCLUSION

53.   The 2nd Applicant’s allegations as to O’s alleged inappropriate behavior are materially inconsistent and unreliable. My domestic helper, my mother and myself have never witnessed O touch herself inappropriately.  Even if O had touched her private parts, it can be attributed to one of many reasons including that O is possibly being curious about her own body.  This is simply no reasonable basis for the 2nd applicant to accuse Ms. N and/or me of sexually abusing O.  There is no reasonable nexus between O inappropriately touching herself and Ms. N sexually abusing O.

With respect I entirely agree with this analysis of the situation. He adds that:

54.   The 2nd Applicant’s allegations against Ms. N and me occurred 3 days after she had obtained custody of O on 12th January 2017.  The WhatsApp messages support that the 2nd Applicant has ulterior motives against Ms. N and that the 2nd Applicant is: ageist; racist; jealous of Ms. N; perceives Ms. N as a threat to her status as O’s mother; and does not approve of my relationship with Ms. N.  These appear to be the real reasons why the 2nd Applicant has made these malicious and false allegations against Ms. N.

21.  Although this may have been the mother’s motive, it seems to me that there might be a simpler explanation, namely that the mother thought that her allegations may ultimately bolster any claim that she might have for sole custody and care and control of O. It is of note that M was not called as a witness. Neither has the mother been able to explain the causal link between O’s behavior and Ms. N.

The Clinical Psychologists Report

22.  Ms. P, the clinical psychologist provided a very helpful report and was similarly helpful in the witness box. She said that she tended to believe the mother’s account of what happened but interpreted these “acts” differently. Ms. P described her interaction with the mother as follows:

The mother’s allegation against the father’s girlfriend

13.   The mother informed that since October to November of 2016, the child refused to take bath during the stay at her house (e.g. screaming and refusing to take off her clothes when the mother told her to take bath).  The mother told by that time, she employed some ways to handle (e.g. offering more toys for bathing to make it more appealing to the child; disguising some dust as worms and putting on the child so that the latter was more willing to clean up herself).  The mother told these ways worked out well.  When taking bath for the child, the mother saw a few things that bothered her: (i) the child pulled her own nipples; (ii) the child lowered her head to peep her lower private part; (iii) after bathing, the mother cleaned up the child with towel and then put her in bed while she was getting clothing for the child.  The child reportedly put her finger into her lower private part and then pulled her finger out.  For the acts (i) to (iii) (referred to as “the acts” hereafter), the mother told she once considered as the child’s curiosity about sex and which was normal to her.  As for her handling, the mother said she once had told the child to stop putting her finger into her lower private part.  The child reportedly looked up to her with a smile while she accordingly stopped so.  The mother was asked of the frequency and time frame of witnessing “the acts”.  The mother sounded unsure.  She then told “the acts” took place every time she took bath for the child.  The time frame was from October to November in 2016 and until the Court ordered stopping contact between the girlfriend and the child in February 2017.

14.   The mother confirmed that she had never informed or alerted the father of “the acts” of the child despite having observed so for several months.  She explained that she considered as the child’s curiosity about sex and was normal.  The turning point was at the birthday party of the child in January 2017.  The mother informed a common friend attending the party quoted the father saying that the girlfriend would be separated from him if he could not get the custody of the child.  This quote had triggered off the mother’s worries.  The mother interpreted the quote as: the girlfriend was not loving of the father but using the father to approach the child and the only explanation for her approaching the child was pertaining to the purpose of sexually abusing the child.  The suspicions of sexual abuse had triggered off the mother’s recollections about some pieces (e.g. the father’s taking the child for swimming in around October to November 2016 despite the weather was cool) which had coincided with timing she noticed “the acts”.

15.   If the mother’s line of thinking was followed (i.e. the girlfriend would be separated from the father if he could not get the custody of the child), there could be alternatively explanation for this.  I had hypothetically put up an explanation for this to the mother that the girlfriend might want the father to have the child’s custody because financial arrangement of the child in the future could be more predictable and under control.  Then, the girlfriend’s agenda of wishing the father to have the custody, as the mother so believed, was not exclusively limited to approaching the child for sexually abusing her. Despite what I had raised, the mother insisted that based on her gut sense as a mother, sexual abuse must have taken place for the child and the abuser must be the girlfriend.

16.   The mother contacted a social worker over telephone enquiring ways to handle.  She said with advice from that social worker, she had asked the child apart from the mother, who else had touched her lower private part.  The child reportedly replied the father, the (father’s) domestic helper, the paternal grandmother and the father’s girlfriend.  The mother told the girl was hesitant on naming the father’s girlfriend.  Apart from this specific enquiry, the mother told she had no other information gathered from the child direct regarding “the acts” (i) to (iii).

17.   The mother repeatedly told she would rather be she herself having made false accusation against the girlfriend.  Nonetheless, by “the acts” of the child, the mother told firmly that according to her gut sense as a mother, child sexual abuse must have taken place.  By the sequence of events (the child displayed “the acts” (i) to (iii) from October 2016 and until the Court stopped contact between the girlfriend and the child in February 2017) and her own elimination of other parties involved in the child’s routine (e.g. the mother observed the child to be at ease in relating with school personnel and her classmates), the mother deduced that it was extremely probable that the abuser was the father’s girlfriend.  The mother concluded that the child’s display of “the acts” was sexual by nature.  She strongly believed “the acts” had resulted from the girlfriend’s performing the same acts on the child and/or the child’s having witnessed similar sexual acts between the father and the girlfriend.  The mother said in order to protect the child, she had called up the father and also his own mother alerting them of the sexual abuse and told them not to allow the girlfriend taking bath for the child, but was accused by the father as being jealousy of the good relationship between the child and the girlfriend.  She then asked the father to stop the girlfriend from being alone with the child.  When asked if she had trust in the father that he would protect the child from harm or hurt, the mother told she trusted the father would protect the child if he knew there was harm.  The mother informed she had already reported the case to the police in April 2017 and yet, she was unsure of the follow-up action by the police.  She said she had overheard the police saying that she reported the case for getting the custody of the child in the upcoming hearing.  The mother then swore in front of me that she did not do this for the custody but just for protection of the child.

23.  Ms. P concluded that:

Conclusion and recommendation

37.   The parents, Mr. ACHYL and Madam YC, were getting divorced and the questions of custody and access arrangement of their only child, O, were put up to the Family Court.  Upon the mother’s insistence on her allegation that the father’s girlfriend had improper behavior against the child (sexual abuse), the Court had scheduled a Fact Finding Hearing and a Pre-trial Review with respect to the mother’s allegation.  Meanwhile, the Court requested for a clinical psychologist report with submission date on or before 14th July 2017.  Under this context, the parents and the child were seen.  Also collateral information about the child were gathered from her school.  The parents are impressed to be genuinely concerned about the child.  The mother’s self-reports about having witnessed the child’s acts when taking bath for the child (the child’s pulling her own nipples; peeping at her lower private part; and putting her finger in and out of her lower private part) are consistent in terms of content this time and also as compared with her previous reports made during social investigation by caseworker.  While I incline believing that the mother has reported what she has witnessed, her links drawn to sexual abuse and specifically by the father’s girlfriend cannot be substantiated if based on information gathered for this report.  Having said this, it should not be definitely concluded that no sexual abuse has ever happened to the child. It remains obscure if the findings in this report could ease the mind of the mother and if the parents could come up with way-out(s) as they continue to go back and forth over this issue, in the midst of custody disputes and disputes over other issues (e.g. finance).  Still, both parents’ views about possible way-out are deliberated in the report as a reference.

Ms. N

24.  Ms. N’s affirmation dated the 7 June 2017 makes for quite difficult reading. However, she was clear both in her affirmation and in the witness box that:

17.   I have read paragraph 21 of the 2nd Applicant’s 2nd Affirmation where it states that I had told or put pressure on the 1st Applicant to fight for the custody of O, by intimating to the 1st Applicant that I would leave him if he did not.  I specifically deny these allegations against me.  In fact it makes no sense for me to have said this, considering that the 1st Applicant had just signed over custody only one day before.

21.   At para. 31 of the 2nd Applicant’s 2nd Affirmation she accuses me of bathing O.  I deny that I have ever bathed O.  I have only played with O in the bath whilst the domestic helper was bathing O, as described hereinbefore at para. 13.

22.   At para. 30 of the 2nd Applicant’s 2nd Affirmation she states that O had mentioned, along with the 2nd Applicant, the 1st Applicant and I, that I had touched her private parts.  If this is true, I can only say that I had touched O’s private parts with a tissue when I wiped them after she had gone to the toilet, as already referred to in para. 11 hereinabove.

23.   I have and would never do anything to harm O.  I deny all accusations of sexual abuse that the 2nd Applicant has maliciously alleged against me.  I am extremely offended by her malicious and unfounded accusations.  For the avoidance of doubt, I have and would never touch O inappropriately, and I have and would never teach O to touch herself inappropriately.  All of these allegations of sexual abuse against me make me feel sick.

25.  Ms. N further describes the stress that she has been under as a result of these allegations and in particular the posting of the father’s undertaking twice on Facebook. She concludes:

29.   I sincerely hope that one can appreciate the level of stress and anxiety that this whole ordeal has caused me.  The 2nd Applicant’s act of publishing the Post on Facebook was clearly intended to damage the 1st Applicant’s and my reputation, and to cause us much stress and hardship.

I accept that to be the case.  

Discussion

26.  I have heard from all of the parties in the witness box. Generally speaking, I found Ms. N to be a credible and a wholly believable witness. I have no doubt that this has been a terrible ordeal for her. It was unfortunate that Ms. N appeared to have discussed the hearing with the father prior to her giving evidence (and the father as a practicing barrister should have known better) but nevertheless I found her to be credible. I accept that she has not touched O in a sexual way or behaved infront of her in a way that might be considered “inappropriate”. (At one point it was suggested to both Ms. N and the father that they may have had sexual relations or behaved in an overtly sexual manner infront of O). Ms. N was understandably very upset by this suggestion and generally and categorically denied any impropriety. Indeed, it seems to me that she conducted herself with admirable restraint given the circumstances, especially with respect to the Facebook postings. She was both reasonably calm and measured in her responses in the witness box.

27.  In contrast the mother did not come across well. She made very long speeches and often did not answer the questions put to her directly. She remained convinced that Ms. N had behaved inappropriately towards O despite the lack of any cogent evidence to support what she said and seemed unable or unwilling to consider other alternatives. I accept the father’s analysis of this in paragraph 20 (53) above.

28.  I was particularly concerned that the mother posted the father’s undertaking on Facebook. This was inexcusable behavior on her part and I accept that this was both vindictive and nasty. It was also wholly unnecessary.

29.  The father maintains that the mother was motivated by jealousy and that she is both racist and ageist. (Ms. N is Caucasian and a little older with grown up children). Although that is possible, as indicated above, I think it is more likely that the mother thought that these allegations might assist her in her application for sole custody and care and control of O. It seems to me that there is no evidence to support the allegations made and that she simply jumped to conclusions and then refused to climb down completely – despite being given the opportunity to do so on at least one occasion.  

30.  I also accept, as suggested by Ms. P in the witness box that these so called “acts” of O, if they happened (and I am also more inclined to accept that they did happen, although perhaps not quite as described by the mother) perhaps shocking to an adult were simply the explorations of a young child who was naturally curious about her own body. It is of note that Ms. P did not think that this behavior was particularly unusual. This was also the mother’s original thinking. It is very unfortunate indeed that she did not stick with this. 

31.  In such circumstances I completely exonerate Ms. N. There is no evidence at all to support the terrible allegations made by the mother against her.  In such circumstances the father’s undertaking dated the 10 February 2017 shall be discharged with immediate effect. The mother was obliged to produce compelling evidence to support her allegations and she has been unable to do so.

Costs

32.  The father seeks his costs on an indemnity basis. The mother for her part asks that the normal order be made i.e. that there be no order as to costs.

33.  I accept that O probably did display some of the acts that so concerned the mother and therefore that the mother did not simply make the whole thing up. But by the same token the mother’s actions did have a malicious undercurrent. I have been particularly concerned by the posting of the father’s undertaking by the mother on Facebook and the fact that she did this not once but twice!! It also seems to me that the mother over reacted and jumped to conclusions. She is an intelligent woman and she was legally represented throughout. Nevertheless, she insisted on her position even though there was no tangible evidence to support it.  It is a matter of great concern to me that litigants should not be able to hide behind the fact that a matter is child related to mask litigation behavior which would not be countenanced in any other situation. Consequently, although an order for indemnity costs seems excessive in the circumstances, I have nonetheless decided that the mother should pay the costs of this hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. This is notwithstanding the fact that this is a child related matter and that this hearing came about at the bequest of the court, as opposed to an application made by either of the parties. Consequently, I shall make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the mother do pay the costs of and occasioned by the Fact Finding hearing on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.    




 (Sharon D. MELLOY)
 District Judge

Mr. Pickavant of John Pickavant & Co appeared for the 1st Applicant

Mr. Alex Ng instructed by Fongs appeared for the 2nd Applicant